These are excepts from documents available from the British National Archives at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ brought to my attention by frequent KSMessage 1 of 240 , Nov 18, 2011View SourceThese are excepts from documents available from the British National Archives at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ brought to my attention by frequent KS Forum contributor Helen Bitner (thanks again, Helen).See what was being done behind closed doors while Polish combatants were giving their lives for the freedom of Italy, Western Europe and Britain itself.John HaluchaSault Ste Marie, CanadaPoland - Młodów/Lubaczów, Januszewice/OpocznoUSSR - Brygidki/Starobielsk/Pechorlag (Pieczorłag)/Abez’ (Abiez)Army - 1 Dywizja Pancerna 10.Komp.Zaop. 10.Bryg.Kaw (1st Pol Armd Div, 10th Supply Co, 10th Armd Cav Brig) / 2 Korpus 10 Baon Saperów (2nd Corps 10 Pol.Corps Tps Engs)
Memorandum of British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presented to the War Cabinet on Nov. 22, 1943
We consider that the only possible solution, which, would in fact be in Poland'sown interest, is for the future frontier to be based on the Curzon Line. This ismore favourable to the Poles than the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line, for which the SovietGovernment will no doubt press, in that it includes in Poland the Bialystokarea in the north, whose inhabitants are mainly racial Poles. We should tryas part of a comprehensive settlement to persuade the Russians to be generousand allow the Poles to keep Lwow. It would, I think, be out of the questionto press for Vilna for the Poles, except possibly as an opening bargaininggambit. We should, I think, suggest that such a settlement should be accompaniedby transfers of populations, more particularly in Eastern Galicia, to remove, so faras possible, racial minorities from each side of the frontier.In return, the Poles should receive a definite assurance from the SovietGovernment and His Majesty's Government, and, if possible, the United StatesGovernment, that they will receive in compensation East Prussia, Danzig, andthe Oppeln district of Upper Silesia. This arrangement would also beaccompanied by transfers of population if this were considered desirable....Since the Polish forces under our own command consistof over 100,000 men who are shortly going into the front line for the first time,of sixteen air squadrons, a cruiser, several destroyers, submarines and other smallcraft, we clearly cannot in the interests of the Allied war effort lightly contemplateprovoking serious troubles among the Polish troops....The Polish Government on their side wish to be assured that we shallnot simply throw them into the arms of the Russians and then abandon them.They have the Munich precedent very much in mind. It is, I submit, essentialfor our.own good name, as well as to satisfy the Poles, that we should make itcrystal clear that this settlement differs from Munich in that (i) the Poles receiveadequate compensation in the west for their losses in the east; and (ii) that theyreceive an effective instead of an ineffective guarantee of their future securityfrom the Western Powers as well as from Russia.
Nov. 28, 1943Personally, he [Churchill] thought Poland might move westwards like soldiers taking two steps left close....MARSHAL STALIN said the Polish people had their culture and theirlanguage, which must exist. They could not be extirpated.THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and asked if we were to draw frontier lines.MARSHAL STALIN said Yes.THE PRIME MINISTER said he had no power from Parliament, nor hebelieved had the President, to define any frontier lines. He suggested that theymight now, in Tehran, see if the three Heads of Government, working inagreement, could form some sort of policy which might be pressed upon the Polesand which we could recommend to the Poles, and advise them to accept.MARSHAL STALIN said we could have a look.THE PRIME MINISTER said we should be lucky if we could.MARSHAL STALIN asked whether it would be without Polish participation.THE PRIME MINISTER replied in the affirmative and said that this wasall informally between themselves, and they could go to the Poles later....MR. EDEN said what Poland lost in the east she might gain in the west.MARSHAL STALIN said possibly they might, but he did not know.THE PRIME MINISTER demonstrated with the help of three matcheshis idea of Poland moving westwards, which pleased Marshal Stalin.
Dec. 1, 1943
MARSHAL STALIN asked with what Government he would have tonegotiate. The Polish Government and their friends in Poland were in contactwith the Germans. They killed the partisans. Neither the President nor thePrime Minister could have any idea of what was now going on in Poland.PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT remarked that he had. recognised that therewere difficulties....THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would be a great help if round thatvery table we could learn what were the Russian ideas about the frontiers. Hewould then be glad to put the matter before the Poles and to say frankly if hethought the conditions fair. His Majesty's Government (he was only speakingfor His Majesty's Government) would like to be able to tell the Poles that the planwas a good one and, the best that they were likely to get, and that His Majesty'sGovernment would not argue against the Soviet Government at the peace table.Then we could get on with the Presidents idea of resuming relations. What wewanted was a strong and independent Poland, friendly to Russia....MR. EDEN asked if this meant the Ribbentrop-Molotov line.MARSHAL STALIN said : " Call it whatever you like.".M. MOLOTOV remarked that it was generally called the Curzon Line.MR. EDEN said no, there were differences which were important.M. MOLOTOV said there were no essential differences....MR. EDEN suggested that the Curzon Line was intended to pass to the east of Lvov.MARSHAL STALIN replied that the line on the Prime Minister's map hadnot been drawn right. Lvov should be left on the Russian side and the lineshould go westwards towards Przemysl, adding that M. Molotov would get a mapof the Curzon Line and a description of it.THE PRIME MINISTER said he would be grateful....PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT asked if he might put a question. Did the.frontier of East Prussia and the territory east of the Oder approximate to the sizeof the eastern provinces of Poland itself?MARSHAL STALIN said that he did not know and that it had not beenmeasured....THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the value of this land was muchgreater than the Pripet Marshes. It was industrial and it would make a muchbetter Poland. We should like to be able to say to the Poles that the Russianswere right, and to tell the Poles that they must agree that they had had a fairdeal. If the Poles did not accept, we could not help it. And here he made itclear that he was speaking for the British alone, adding that the President hadmany Poles in the United States who were his fellow-citizens....THE PRIME MINISTER said that he liked the picture, and that he wouldsay to the Poles that if they did not accept it they would be fools, and he wouldremind them that but for the Red Army they would have been utterly destroyed.He would point out to them that they had been given a fine place to live in, morethan 300 miles each way....THE PRIME MINISTER said to Mr. Eden, with some emphasis, that hewas not going to break his heart about this cession of parts of Germany to Polandor about Lvov....THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Poles would be wise to take ouradvice. They were getting a country 300 miles square, and that he was notprepared to make a great squawk about Lvov,......THE PRIME MINISTER protested that the Polish problem was much moreurgent. The Poles would make a clatter. Why not a formula on which hecould say something like this to them : " I do not know if the Russians wouldapprove, but I think that I might get it for you. You see you are being welllooked after." He added that we would never get the Poles to say that they weresatisfied. Nothing would satisfy the Poles.
August 28, 1944, secret British War Cabinet minutes"THE FOREIGN SECRETARY then referred to thepolitical aspects of the situation. ...Further messages had also been received by the Poles andcommunicated to him, to the effect that the leaders ofthe Underground Army, as the Russians advanced, werebeing seized and deported-. "..."THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION said he thoughtwe could not reckon for long on the Press maintainingsilence about the present difficulties between Polandand Russia and, in particular, about the Russian refusal- to allow- the United States air forces the use ofairfields In Russia for the purpose of dropping suppliesto the Polish Underground Army in Warsaw."...THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said he thought that whennews of these difficulties was published it would be bestthat it should first be published in the American ratherthan the British Press, since if the news first brokein the British Press we should be accused of making badblood between the Russians and the Americans."
Jan. 26, 1945 minutes of British War Cabinet regarding western borders of Poland
The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the Western Frontier of Poland. The Memorandum reviewed the undertakings given to the Polish Government in the past in regard to their Western Frontiers, and recorded that they had been given as part of our endeavours to induce the PolishGovernment to accept the Curzon Line as the basis ofa settlement with Soviet Russia in the East.If, as now seemed more probable, we had to dealwith the claims of the Lublin Poles who were readyto accept the Curzon Line anyhow, there was no longerany need for H.M. Government to support any moreextensive transfers of territory than we thoughtconvenient and proper on other grounds....The present indications were that the LublinPoles were anxious that the frontier should followthe line of the River Oder up to the Gttrlitzer Neisse(the more westerly of two tributaries of this name).While we should not commit ourselves in sucha way as to prejudge the future settlement, theMemorandum suggested that the time had come to makeclear to our principal Allies that we had doubts onthe subject and must not be regarded as committed tethe support of any annexation by Poland beyond thoseof East Prussia, Danzig and the Oppeln District....Our line might be that H.M. Government must notbe considered as having accepted any definite lineas a Western Frontier of Poland...
I was mostly with you until you made the rather ludicrous assertion that Obama might not have declared war on Japan after Pearl Harbor amid other negativeMessage 240 of 240 , Jan 30, 2012View SourceI was mostly with you until you made the rather ludicrous assertion that Obama might not have declared war on Japan after Pearl Harbor amid other negative comments about FDR.
Your own statement show that the allies were in now shape to take on a powerful Soviet force. The operation tag of "unthinkable" pretty much sums it up. Your reference to Japan supports it. The estimated losses if the anticipated invasion of the home island was in excess of a half million.
Poland, Latvia and Estonia along with East Germany may well have been betrayed in the short term but it may well have prevented the extermination of the Polish people. It certainly would have involved nuclear weapons. Poland lives today in a better world by letting things cool. We did after all, win the cold war.
Poland was betrayed in a more fundamental way for worse consequences in the 1700's by its own magnate class who allowed foreign troops to walk thru its borders.
I think I detect some rather partisan tainting of history here.
Valders Wi. USA
--- In Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com, Dan Ford <cub06h@...> wrote:
> I think you give Roosevelt too much credit for cunning. Churchill,
> perhaps, but not Roosevelt! He genuinely believed that he could parley
> with Stalin, just as Obama believed (and may still believe) that he can
> parley with Ayatollah Kamani over Iran's nuclear program. Roosevelt
> thought the Russians were just another political pressure group--like
> the Polish-Americans in Chicago, for example, whose votes he needed in
> 1944, hence the need to keep the Tehran agreements secret at least until
> the election was over.
> Churchill by contrast had a very clear idea of what Stalin intended, and
> as I have previously shown, he seriously considered what it would take
> in the way of British, American, Polish, and German (yes! German!)
> troops to roll back the Red Army to the 1939 borders of the Soviet
> Union. Truman vetoed that notion, and Churchill's own military chiefs
> were likewise opposed. (The plan was called Operation Unthinkable.)
> The choice was between throwing Poland under the bus and going to war
> against the Red Army, which was just as powerful in June 1945 as it had
> been in April, whereas the US Army was already deploying to the Pacific,
> and the British Army was pretty much spent. Poland got thrown under the
> bus. Would Cameron and Obama do any differently today?
> (I'm not entirely convinced that Obama, were he president during the
> Second World War, would have gone to war against Japan or Germany in
> 1941, let alone against the USSR in 1945.)
> Blue skies! -- Dan Ford
> On 1/30/2012 1:22 PM, John Halucha wrote:
> > Thanks for your work to bring this crime to the attention of more
> > people, Dan.
> > KS members who want to look at the US Congress report itself can find
> > it in our files at
> > http://www.kresy-siberia.com/1952_Katyn_report_to_Congress.pdf
> > The most interesting aspect, to me, is the West's collusion to cover
> > up Stalin's crime - something that the report to Congress steers clear
> > of. In other words, besides being interested in the coverup of the
> > crime, I'm interested in the coverup of the coverup. As you point out,
> > "the State Department refused to follow Congress's recommendation that
> > the Katyn massacres be brought up at the United Nations."
> > You say in your author's note: "It's long been an article of faith
> > among Poles in the West that the United States and Britain hushed up
> > the atrocity in the Katyn Forest and related massacre sites. This made
> > sense during the Second World War, when Churchill and Roosevelt were
> > desperate to keep the Soviet Union in the war again Germany. But why
> > would the coverup have continued after 1948, when the Cold War was in
> > full swing? It didn't, as these previously unpublished documents reveal."
> > First, it is not obvious that the coverup "made sense" during the
> > Second World War. I often wonder if apologists for Roosevelt and
> > Churchill on this count would just as comfortably countenance them
> > covering up Hitler's crimes if the allegiances been different at the
> > time, and the destruction of Stalin had been to their geopolitical
> > advantage instead. The way Roosevelt and Churchill compromised their
> > core principles on this count laid the groundwork for ongoing
> > corruption in their dealings with Stalin later.
> > While the US did an investigation and publicly released its finding of
> > Soviet guilt in 1952, it pointedly skirted the issue of when
> > Roosevelt's administration knew the truth and how hard it worked to
> > keep it hidden. The British continued a slightly different tack into
> > at least the 1970s ( see
> > http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/our-history/historical-publications/research-projects/katyn/
> > and the pages that link from it), essentially that the British
> > government "has no definite view as regards the attribution of guilt
> > for the Katyn massacre". So, it laid the groundwork to argue in the
> > future, should the crime's perpetrator ever been definitively proven
> > (as it subsequently was) that it did not know at the time.
> > Of course, we know now that both Churchill and Roosevelt were totally
> > aware of Soviet responsibility early on. They knew it when they
> > partied with Stalin at Teheran and Yalta. They knew of Stalin's
> > criminality when they countenanced him keeping the half of Poland he
> > had stolen as Hitler's partner, and they knew it when they pretended
> > to believe his promises of an independent government and free
> > elections in Poland after the war.
> > That may help answer the question, "But why would the coverup have
> > continued after 1948, when the Cold War was in full swing?" The
> > coverup of the US and British early knowledge of the crime's
> > perpetrator was not to keep polishing the image of "Uncle Joe" even
> > after he was their acknowledged enemy, but to protect the image of
> > their own heroes Roosevelt and Churchill. There was great reluctance
> > to publicize their collusion in hiding the truth while they
> > "negotiated" with Stalin. It remains easier for some people to
> > maintain Churchill's later claim amounting to that they were naively
> > bamboozled by Stalin whom they had no reason to distrust, than that
> > they knew full well that they were dealing with a mass-murderer and
> > liar but chose to go along with him for their own motives.
> > At every level of every society there have always been criminals and
> > there probably always will be. An important question is how the "good
> > guys" deal with those criminals and protect us from them and budding
> > criminals who are inevitably going to crop up. Because the Katyn
> > coverup example is an indicator of how corrupted Roosevelt and
> > Churchill were, its importance is broader than "merely" determining
> > responsibility for the cold-blooded officially sanctioned murders of
> > more than 22,000 Polish prisoners.
> > Why worry about the crime and coverup more than a half-century later?
> > Perhaps we should reflect on Santayana: "Those who do not remember the
> > past are condemned to relive it." In this instance, Stalin OK'd the
> > murders confident no one would ever know what he did, or he didn't
> > care. Roosevelt and Churchill OK'd the coverup because they hoped no
> > one would ever know what they did, or at least that by the time it was
> > known no one would care.
> > There may be others in our current governments who are tempted to
> > cover up crimes from the same perspective, much as Hitler was
> > comfortable about perpetrating the Jewish Holocaust after witnessing
> > the world's indifferent stance on the Armenian genocide by the Turks.
> > We can't let that happen: the world needs to reflect not only on
> > Stalin did, but on what Roosevelt and Churchill did to help cover it
> > up. We need to condemn being an accessory after the fact, not excuse it.
> > More evil Stalins have come up, and more will. While we may feel
> > powerless to prevent emergence of psychopaths, we should feel hope
> > that we can influence people of good will to do the right thing when
> > the criminals emerge. That's why we need to study the despicable
> > behaviour of Roosevelt and Churchill, and educate more people about
> > it. Potential imitators need to fear that eventually the truth will
> > out and their complicity will be exposed.
> > John Halucha
> > Sault Ste Marie Canada
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *From:* Dan Ford <cub06h@...>
> > *To:* Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com
> > *Sent:* Monday, January 30, 2012 8:25:54 AM
> > *Subject:* Re: [Kresy-Siberia] Re: Death Rates/Survival Rates [From
> > the Archives]
> > Well, the full report--Findings of the Select Committee--is certainly
> > available. I have published it as an ebook:
> > http://www.amazon.com/Katyn-Findings-1952-intellectuals-ebook/dp/B005BZKWPW/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_2
> > Of course there was testimony that didn't make it into the final report,
> > and no doubt that's what Mr Paul is referring to. He seems anxious to
> > prove a cover-up, but his thesis is disproved by the fact that the
> > report was indeed published.
> > It is true that the Eisenhower administration was in 1953 trying to calm
> > the waters with Soviet Russia, those being somewhat roiled by the Berlin
> > Blockade and especially the Korean War, which he had pledged to bring to
> > an end. Accordingly, the State Department refused to follow Congress's
> > recommendation that the Katyn massacres be brought up at the United
> > Nations. That was the whole of the "cover-up."
> > Beware of writers! They feel a need to come up with the larger number or
> > the unknown conspiracy, both of which help to get books published and,
> > once published, bought.
> > There was no cover-up. People just weren't all that interested, with the
> > big War behind them and the Korean War dragging on and on. They were
> > much more interested in hunting out Communists in the US government than
> > in raking up a massacre thirteen years old.
> > (I hasten to add that Mr Paul's book is excellent, apart from that bit
> > of silliness, which I think appears only in the third edition. Perhaps
> > he needed something new to persuade the publisher to bring it out again.)
> > Blue skies! -- Dan Ford USA