Linder, The name of the book is Allied Wartime Diplomacy A pattern in Poland. Written by Edward J Rozek. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc offices in NewMessage 1 of 4 , Apr 2, 2007View Source
The name of the book is Allied Wartime Diplomacy A pattern in Poland . Written by Edward J Rozek . Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc offices in New York .
It has no other numbers other then the Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 57-13449. Published date is 1958.
Edward J Rozek was at that time in the Department of Political Science University of Colorado Boulder.
Here is some background information about this author.
Edward J. Rozek escaped from Poland when the Russians and Nazis took over the country in 1939. Jailed in Hungary , he again escaped to join the Polish Armies. As an officer in the Polish Armored Division under field General Marshall Montgomery and General Eisenhower he fought from Normandy to Germany . Wounded four times he holds high decorations for bravery. He is an American citizen. He earned a BA (magna cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa) in international relationships, and a MA and Ph.D degrees in Political science at Harvard University after the war. He assisted in teaching at Harvard for three years before joining the University at Colorado .
As I read the book I will post small sections that I find of interest to me or the group. But I think this book should be available to be purchased on the used book market. That is where I purchased it.
PO BOX 3099
San Bernardino, CA 92413
From: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com [mailto: Kresy-Siberia@yahoogroups.com ] On Behalf Of Linder Ladbrooke
Sent: Monday, April 02, 2007 1:50 PM
Subject: RE: [Kresy-Siberia] Polish Areas of Deportation into Russia/Soviet Union /Gulags
This information is very valuable to us. Please post more or let me know the details of the book, which I will try to buy. Some of the place names are on my dad's Polish Army Records [Guzar], but, I'm still trying to figure out his movements from being 'conscripted' in Lvow, sent to Krasnoyarsk, joining Anders Army. I think an 'overview' of the whole situation may be a help.
Dear Julek, Thank you for the tip regarding this fascinating book. I just purchased a copy on amazon.com for $12.42 ($8.93 plus postage). Amazon has severalMessage 1 of 4 , Apr 2, 2007View Source
Thank you for the tip regarding this fascinating book. I just purchased a copy on amazon.com for $12.42 ($8.93 plus postage). Amazon has several copies left for those from the KS group that may be interested.
Sent: Apr 2, 2007 10:29 AM
Subject: [Kresy-Siberia] Polish Areas of Deportation into Russia/Soviet Union/Gulags
The following is taken from the Allied Wartime Diplomacy book which I
hope will help some of us find where our families were deported. This
book contains a great deal of information and I recommend it to
everyone. I have taken the liberty to post the few lines before and
after the listing to allow fuller flow of information regarding the
subject and its background. It might be a good idea to have this
posted as part of our referance for future readers if those in charge
find it usefull.
In addition there might be records in the Embassy records are located
during that time (where Embassy representative were located) see that
information listed near the end of this page.
In the meantime, the Polish Embassy was informed by its delegates
that Polish citizens of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Jewish origin
who were released from Soviet prisons were being drafted into the Red
Army. Upon instructions from London, Ambassador Kot protested to
Vyshin-sky against this arbitrary and illegal act.
According to information received, the War Commissar for Kazakhstan
at Alma-Ata, General Schcherbakov, issued orders that all Polish
citizens deported by the Soviet authorities from occupied Polish
territory and possessing documents issued to them by these
authorities, endorsed to the 16effect that they are of Ukrainian,
Byelorussian, or Jewish origin are to be enrolled in the Red Army if
they meet the age and fitness requirements.
After an intervention by the interested parties and by
representatives of this Embassy, General Schcherbakov declared that
he was acting on in¬structions from the Central authorities, who are
alleged to have directed him to treat as citizens of the U.S.S.R. all
citizens of the Republic of Poland of other than Polish origin
possessing Soviet passports. Among others the following Polish
citizens, despite protests on their part, were among those
conscripted and sent, it would seem, to the Far East: Alexan¬der
Rothstein, Silberspits, and Kotok.
This same discrimination between Polish citizens according to origin
or race, devoid of any impartial basis and contrary to the provisions
of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, is being practiced
by the military authorities in Alma-Ata, who also explain to the
Polish citizens reporting to them to settle various formalities
connected with their enlistment in the Polish Army in the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, that they are acting on instructions from
the Central authorities. Only Polish citizens of Polish origin are
given permits to travel to centers where the Polish Army is being
organized, while Polish citizens of Ukrainian and Jewish origin are,
it seems, categorically refused permits by the aforementioned
The Polish Embassy has the honor to request the People's Commissariat
for Foreign Affairs to cause instructions to be given to the War
Commissar in Kazakhstan to apply impartially to all Polish citizens
residing in the area under his authority, the principles deriving
from the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, and the Polish-
Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941, which guarantee the
right to serve in the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. to every Polish
citizen who is capable of bearing arms.8
On December 1, Molotov sent the following reply:
Referring to the fact of the conscription by the Red Army in the
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, as Soviet citizens, of citizens of
Ukrain¬ian, Byelorussian, and Jewish origin who left the territories
of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, the Embassy of the Polish
Republic calls in question the existence of a legal basis for this
order, considering that it is contrary to the principles of the
Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941 and the Soviet-Polish
Military Agreement of August 14, 1941.
The People's Commissariat cannot agree with this point of view of the
Embassy of the Republic of Poland. No foundation to support the point
of view expressed in the Note of the Embassy of the Republic of
Poland, referred to above, can be found in the Agreement of July 30,
or in the Military Agreement of August 14, 1941. In accordance with
the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of
November 29, 1939, all citizens of Western districts of the Ukrainian
and Byelorussian S.S.R.'s who found themselves on the territory of
the said districts on November 1 and 2, 1939, respectively, acquired
the citizenship of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Citizenship of
the Union of Soviet So¬cialist Republics Act of August 19, 1938. The
Soviet Government's readi¬ness to recognize as Polish citizens
persons of Polish origin, who resided (until November 1 and 2, 1939)
on the aforementioned territory, gives
evidence of good will and compliance on the part of the Soviet
Govern¬ment, but can in no case serve as a basis for an analogous
recognition of the Polish citizenship of persons of other origin, in
particular those of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, or Jewish origin, since
the question of the fron¬tiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland has
not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future.9
When the difficulties grew beyond manageable proportions, Am¬bassador
Kot asked for an audience with Stalin. This was granted, and on
November 14 he was received by Stalin and presented the issues which
were causing friction between the two Governments. Stalin promised to
remove all the causes of complaint and took that occasion to declare
that "I am particularly interested in restoring a free and
independent Polish State with an internal political and social system
of its own choice." 10
It took considerable time before the Poles realized that there was a
vast difference between Stalin's polite promises and the performance
of his subordinates. These latter were often blamed for completely
contrary interpretations of his decisions, although actually, as it
was found later, they were executing the real intentions of the
This hopeless situation was by-passed by the decision of the Poles to
proceed on their own and to salvage what they could of the
situa¬tion. First of all, they decided to register all Polish
citizens. This had to be based,on reports from various individuals
and from various places where Poles were discovered and which the
Embassy managed to reach. It obviously did not embrace every center.
Up to December 15, 1941 it was established that the number of Poles
located in various oblasts was as listed on page 78.
On the basis of various reports received by the Embassy, it was
estimated that between 15% and 20% of this number had died between
the time they were taken from Poland and December 1941. These were
mainly children, old people, women, and the sick. This indicated and
confirmed that over one million Poles had been deported to the
U.S.S.R. It was also estimated that as a result of the twenty months
of starvation, hard labor, and disease, about 60% of the above number
were disabled or unfit for work. This included women and children.
The most difficult problem for the Embassy was to arrive at any
reliable estimate of the Poles drafted into the Red Army or into sir
oy battalions (labor battalions) which were under military control.
They were not included in the "amnesty" and their fate was most
tragic. They were treated worse than Soviet citizens.
The majority of Poles were forced to work in mines and forests
Arkhangelsk Oblast 40,000
Chelyabinsk Oblast 5,000
Gorky Oblast 5,000
Kirov Oblast 5,000
Komi ASSR Oblast 35,000
Molotov Oblast 7,000
Mari ASSR Oblast 4,000
Vologda Oblast 5,000
Irkutsk Oblast 12,000
Sverdlovsk Oblast 8,000
Krasnoyarsk Krai 10,000
Novosibirsk Oblast 12,000
Omsk Oblast 3,000
Altai Oblast 12,000
Yakut ASSR Oblast 5,000
Alma-Ata Oblast 10,000
Akmolinsk Oblast 12,000
Aktyubinsk Oblast 12,000
Dzhambul Oblast 30,000
Kustanai Oblast 10,000
Pavlodar Oblast 10,000
South Kazakh Oblast 40,000
Semipalatinsk Oblast 15,000
Kirghiz Republic 5,000
Tadzhik Republic 5,000
Turkmen Republic 20,000
Uzbek Republic 80,000
Total Military Centers
Those deported to Franz Josef Land, the Kolyma area or drafted into
the Red Army were estimated to be approxi-300, 000
mately Approximate grand total accounted for 807,000 (leso-povals) .
They were not allowed to work in factories. A con¬siderable portion
of them worked on the building of three railroad lines, Arkhangelsk-
Byelomorsk, Kotlas-Vorkuta, and Akmolinsk-Kartaly.
Even the "amnesty," when strictly applied to certain numbers of , the
deported, proved to be a great burden. The NKVD stopped issuing food
rations. This forced the freed Poles to look for work, which was not
easy to come by; for in the documents issued to them by the NKVD, it
was stated that they could not settle in cities of the first or
second categorieswhich meant the large industrial cities. Outside
cities in these categories, it was extremely difficult to secure
employment or to purchase food. The situation became further
complicated when whole masses of people began migrating south to
Uzbekistan, Kirghizistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan
(especially to Alma-Ata) in order to escape the approaching winter
and to find food. This chaos lasted several weeks, only to be stopped
when they were rounded up by the Soviet authorities and transported
back to the northern regions. In order to obtain food, the deportees
had to sell the last pieces of clothing which they could spare.
These hungry and cold masses of people became an extraordinary
problem to the Embassy. For a long time it was not in a position to
extend any of the help needed, because the NKVD would not permit it.
Only after the exchange of numerous sharply worded notes with the
Narkomindel did the Soviets give tacit permission to direct the freed
deportees to the former German republic along the Volga. It was
subsequently found that this was not feasible, and so the regions of
Buzuluk and Totsk were chosen instead. The choice was dictated by the
presence of the Polish military camp, which could employ a certain
number of the civilians in various services. From that time on, the
Soviets provided transportation which consisted of unheated cattle
trains not equipped with any food. The journey often lasted over a
week, and only the ingenuity of the most energetic passengers and the
ordinary human sympathy of natives en route enabled most of them to
reach their destination. The weaker ones did not survive.
The tragedy is illustrated by the following reports submitted to the
Embassy by reliable individuals:
COL. DR. TORWINSKI, October 10, 1941. Huge waves of Poles are
con¬tinuously arriving at Novosibirsk from Krasnoyarsk Krai, Irkutsk
Oblast, Yakut Republic, etc. They are coming individually, in small
or large groups, and then move on further south. Most of them are in
a lamentable condition, exhausted, in shabby rags, hungry and without
money. They have sold everything that they had to buy railroad
tickets for themselves and their families. All of them are under a
powerful psychosis to get out
as soon as possible and at any price to the south. We have no means
to help them. Children are dying in great numbers. Please send
DR. STANISLAW KODZ, November 18, 1941, reported from Tashkent: We are
swamped with great numbers of sick and dyingparticularly children.
Every day new transports are arriving. Work on the fields (i.e., in
Kagan) is over. We located 7,000 people in the Kolkhozys but more
than 6,000 of them are without work. In Farab 4,000 of our people are
camping out in the open air without any shelter whatsoever. They are
gradually moving south on open barges along the Amu-Darya River. Many
of them get wet and the temperature is low. The mortality rate is
growing rapidly. Many transports which arrive here from Omsk consist
up to 10% of dead bodies. Others faint from hunger.12
Similar conditions were reported from numerous other regions.
The vast distances and the imperfect Soviet system of communica¬tion
were not helpful to the Embassy in extending its aid. Railroads were
overworked by military transports. Food was located in govern¬mental
stores and could not be given away or sold without a special order.
The Embassy attempted to send money by telegraph, but in most cases
it took over two weeks before it reached its destination.
Consequently, the Ambassador sent his representatives to all the
major railroad stations through which Poles were traveling in order
to distribute money and bread. In some cases and in certain places
the Soviet authorities were helpful, but this was the exception and
not the rule.
On November 21, the Soviet authorities decided to evacuate 45,000
Poles back north to Uzbekistan. Jan Kwapinski (a socialist leader and
later a member of the Polish Government in London) reported to Kot:
On the night of November 21, in all the kolkhozes and sovhozes where
Poles were located, the Soviet authorities issued an order to get
ready for departure in fifteen minutes to one hour. No one received
any supply of food. Then all were moved to railroad stations:
Kiseldipi, Bukhara, Karshi, Guzar, Kiplap, and Kagan. People were
exhausted and depressed by the previous weeks and months of the
journey south. They were afraid of the northern climate and
conditions. But an "ukaz" cannot be changed. They were packed into
trains and disappeared without trace.13
Then an order was issued by the Soviet authorities to stop all other
transports of Poles south. It took several months and considerable
pressure before they were resumed and the people shifted to places
chosen by Stalin.
The Embassy realized that even with the best organized help it could
not save all those who benefited from the amnesty. The
under¬nourished, the sick, and particularly the women and children
could not withstand the hardship of the winter.
But at least for those who managed to reach the region of Buzuluk,
where the Polish Army was formed, or Kuybyshev, where the Em¬bassy
was located after its evacuation from Moscow, their welfare was
An urgent appeal was issued by the Polish Embassy and Government to
Britain and to the United States for help, but it was understood that
considerable time would elapse before any relief would be available.
With the verbal consent of Vyshinsky, Ambassador Kot developed an
extensive scheme to send his delegates to all the republics and
oblasts where Poles were known to reside. It was decided that the
delegates would be located in the capitals of those republics or
oblasts. They, in turn, would choose trusted men who would be located
in the capitals of the regions, and these would be helped by
assistants attached to the actual settlements of the Poles. The
prerogatives of these officials were spelled out in a mutual
agreement between the Polish Embassy and Vyshinsky.
In the beginning of September this plan was put into operation, and
the names of the delegates and their places of assignment were
sub¬mitted to the Narkomindel. The Embassy was informed that the
local Soviet authorities were not only unwilling to extend any help
to these representatives but that they even began to ostracize them.
They were also informed that no instructions were received from the
Narkomindel. Intervention with the latter did not bring immediate
results, but the Poles did not give up.
By the beginning of December 1941 the representatives of the Embassy
were located in the following republics, krais, oblasts, or regions:
1. Akmolinsk Oblast, Kalininski Region
2. Aktyubinsk Oblast
3. Altai Krai
4. Alma-Ata Oblast
5. Arkhangelsk Oblast
6. Gorky Oblast and Region
7. Irkutsk Oblast, Nizhne-Udinsk Region
8. Irkutsk Oblast, Bodaibo Region , ^
9. Yakut ASSR, Aldai Region
10. Komi ASSR
11. Komi ASSR, Letsk and Pryluzhsk Regions
12. Kirov Oblast, Nagorsk Region
13. North Kazakhstan Oblast, Krasnoarmeysk Region
14. Mari Republic, Gorno Mari Region
15. Novosibirsk Oblast, Tomsk Region
16. Novosibirsk Oblast, Asino Region
17. Novosibirsk Oblast, Zhyryansk Region
18. Novosibirsk Oblast, Suzun Region
19. Pavlodar Oblast, Bayan-Aul Region
20. South Kazakhstan Oblast
21. Semipalatinsk Oblast
22. Semipalatinsk Oblast, Bel-Agatsk Region
23. Semipalatinsk Oblast, Georgevsk Region
24. Semipalatinsk Oblast, Zarma Region
25. Semipalatinsk Oblast, Urdzhar Region
26. Semipalatinsk Oblast, Kokpekty Region
27. Semipalatinsk Oblast, Novoshuldinsk Region
28. Semipalatinsk Oblast, Ayaguz Region
29. Sverdlovsk Oblast, Krasnouralsk Region
30. Sverdlovsk Oblast, Revda Region
31. Tadzhik SSR
32. Uzbek SSR"
The Soviet authorities were not too happy about this network of the
Embassy. Several delegates, mainly in Sverdlovsk, Arkhangelsk, and
Tashkent were confidentially invited to collaborate with the NKVD.
When they refused, their usefulness as representatives of the Embassy
was finished. The work of others was handicapped by the outright
refusal of local authorities to cooperate.
This difficulty was partially overcome when the Embassy sent a team
of roving representatives, Prof. M. Hitzman and Dr. R. Szumski,
together with an officer of the NKVD. They traveled 8,000 kilo¬meters
and brought back very valuable material. Three other teams were
dispatched without NKVD representatives (the NKVD was unwilling to
appoint any) and this was a cause of protests from the Soviet
A certain amount of chaos was created when General Anders sent
military teams to take over control of the civilian population. The
considerable confusion lasted until Ambassador Kot imposed civilian
supremacy and confined military activity to its own sphere.