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With Negro leaders, in and out of the US Congress, joining hands with the zionist and imperialist blocs running this country usurping Africa's role in settling it's own disputes, it is useful for us to look at what the AU has decided about the situation in western Sudan. As inept, insufficient, and backward as the AU can be, it is still the organization that represents Afrfica, certainly much more than the zionist lobby; the CBC; Jesse Jackson; the elements people like S. Booker work for; the so-called religious right in the Us; or the western governments; or for that matter the handpuppet of imperialism, the United Nations. Let us put a stop to this brother killing brother, brother killing sister, sister killing sister, sister killing brother; where ever we find it; but let us not be tricked into advancing the zionist and imperialist objectives and goals. African problems require African solutions. A insufficient AU is a better option than the US Congress, the British Parliament, the UN Security Council, the Bush Administration, the Knesset and other zionist entities, the moral majority-types, and the phoney white and Negro liberals pretending to speak for the interest of African humanity.
What follows is the defniitive AU statement on the situation in Darfur...
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
FIFTH SESSION
13 APRIL 2004
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
PSC/PR/2(V)
REPORT OF THE CHAIIRPERSON OF THE COMMIISSIION
ON THE SIITUATIION IIN THE SUDAN
((CRIISIIS IIN DARFUR))
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 1
REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
SITUATION IN THE SUDAN (CRISIS IN DARFUR)
I. INTRODUCTION
1. It will be recalled that, at its 4th ordinary session, held in Addis
Ababa, in March 2004, the Executive Council was apprised on the
developments in the Darfur region of the Sudan and the mediation efforts
by the Republic of Chad. The present report provides an update on the
efforts to address the prevailing situation in Darfur, including the
humanitarian crisis.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DARFUR REGION
2. Situated in the western part of the Sudan, the Darfur region is home
to an estimated seven million people. Over the past decades, the region
has been affected by intermittent low intensity conflict, arising from
competition over access to grazing land and water between farmers and
pastoralists; rivalries between communities over representation in the local
government structures; as well as impact of developments at national
level. The situation was aggravated by the widespread circulation of small
arms and light weapons, which exacerbated the level of violence in the
region.
3. The current conflict began in February 2003, when a group known
as the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), initially called the
Darfur Liberation Front, launched an attack on Gulu, capturing the city.
The SLA demands included, amongst others, the socio-economic
development of the region and the end to the activities of the tribal
militias. A number of other attacks took place subsequently, particularly on
El Fashir and Mellit, respectively the capital and the second largest city in
North Darfur. In response to these attacks, the Government forces
launched offensives against the SLA, including aerial bombings. Later in
2003, a second movement called the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
emerged and joined the SLA in waging armed attacks.
4. The Darfur crisis has spilled into neighboring Chad, which shares a
1,000 km long border with the Sudan. More that 110,000 refugees have
fled to Chad, and a number of ethnic groups affected by the conflict saddle
on both side of the border.
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 2
5. On 3 September 2003, in Abéché, under the mediation of President
Idriss Déby of Chad, the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the SLA
signed a Ceasefire Agreement. The Agreement provided for a forty-five
day cessation of hostilities; the control of irregular groups; and the
cantonment of SLA forces at locations to be agreed upon. In addition, the
parties agreed to lay the foundation of a lasting and comprehensive peace
in order to achieve socio-economic development. In this regard, it was
agreed that the negotiations to achieve such a comprehensive agreement
would begin 15 days after the signing.
6. On 4 November 2003, during the second round of peace
negotiations, the parties agreed to extend the ceasefire for a month. They
also committed themselves to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, and undertook to resume negotiations, with a view to reaching
a comprehensive agreement. Subsequently, another meeting was called in
N’djamena on 16 December 2003; however, it collapsed shortly after it
started.
7. Following the September Ceasefire Agreement, fighting largely
stopped between the GoS and the SLM/A. However, violence intensified
against the civilian population. A militia group called “Djanjaweed”
deliberately targeted civilians viewed as providing support to the SLA/M
and the JEM.
III. AU CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CHADIAN AND SUDANESE
AUTHORITIES
8. Given the magnitude of the conflict in Darfur, especially the growing
humanitarian crisis, the Commission intensified its efforts to assist in
ending the conflict. On 5 March 2004, my Special Envoy for Sudan,
Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, visited Chad, where he held consultations
with the Foreign Minister, Nagoum Yamassoum, who was also Acting
Prime Minister, and the Political Adviser to the President, Ambassador
Ahmat Allami. My Special Envoy could not meet with President Idriss Déby,
as the latter was visiting the refugee areas in the affected parts of Chad.
9. During his discussions with the Chadian officials, Ambassador
Kingibe reiterated the AU’s view on the imperative of resolving the conflict
in Darfur. He also sought to find out ways that the AU could be of
assistance in resolving the Darfur issue, including in addressing the
humanitarian consequences. The Chadian officials briefed my Special
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 3
Envoy on the situation of the Sudanese refugees fleeing the fighting. They
undertook to convey the AU’s concern to President Déby, who, they
indicated, would contact me in order to discuss the way forward.
10. On 10 March 2004, my Special Envoy visited Khartoum, where he
held consultations with Vice - President Ali Osman Taha, Foreign Minister
Mustafa Osman Ismail and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tigani El
Fidali. Ambassador Kingibe stressed the AU’s grave concern with the
conflict in the Darfur region and the urgent need to find a solution . He
also sought from the Sudanese authorities an indication on the ways in
which the AU could help in resolving the conflict situations in the Sudan.
The Sudanese authorities indicated that, although the Darfur issue was
considered to be an internal one, they had no objection to the AU’s
participation in the N’djamena talks. However, they would need to consult
with President Déby.
IV. INTER-SUDANESE MEETINGS ON DARFUR
11. Subsequent to the visits of my Special Envoy to Chad and Sudan, I
had a telephone conversation with President Déby, and urged him to
continue with his efforts, assuring him of the AU’s continued support . On
26 March 2004, I dispatched to N’djamena an AU Team led by
Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director of the Peace and Security Department, to
assist the Chadian authorities with the inter-Sudanese meetings on Darfur.
Prior to the talks, the Team met with Mr. Abdelrahman Moussa, the
Chadian Minister for Internal Security, to explore how the AU could
support President Déby’s efforts. The Team expressed the AU’s readiness
to sensitize the international community for the mobilization of
humanitarian assistance for the Sudanese refugees in Chad.
12. The inter-Sudanese meetings began in N’djamena on 31 March
2004, under the auspices of President Idriss Déby. I attended the opening
ceremony, along with representatives of the international community,
including the UN, the EU, France and the USA. In my address to the
meeting, I, once again, reiterated my appreciation of President Déby’s
efforts and highlighted the importance of bringing peace to the Sudan as
a whole. I pointed out that the Sudan was a very important component of
the African continent and a bridge between different African cultures. I
urged the Sudanese to regard their diversity as strength of their nation.
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 4
13. It should, however, be noted that the Government of Sudan did not
attend the official opening on the ground that, apart the AU, no other
member of the international community was to be present, given the fact
that the problem in Darfur is an internal one.
14. After some shuttle diplomacy by the Chadian Mediation Team,
assisted by the AU , the parties finally presented the issues that they felt
needed to be addressed by the meeting. These presentations were done in
separate meetings, as the GoS was opposed to face-to-face meetings with
the SLA/M and the JEM. The GoS stressed the following:
Ø both parties need to agree on the principles that would guide
the negotiations and on the nature and extent of the crisis in
Darfur;
Ø proposed solutions to the crisis have to address the interest of
all the people in Darfur, as there are many other people who
have been affected but have not taken up arms against the
State;
Ø the problem in Darfur cannot be solved militarily, but only
through dialogue;
Ø until the resolution of the conflict, there must be a cease-fire
agreement to allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance
to all the affected areas in Darfur;
Ø the crisis in Darfur is an African problem – therefore, only the
Chadian Government and the African Union should facilitate the
talks, while the participation of other international observers
should be limited to the discussions on humanitarian matters;
and
Ø amnesty shall be given to those who have been involved in the
armed struggle.
15. On their part, the SLM/A and the JEM presented the following
negotiating positions:
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 5
Ø commitment to negotiate a temporary humanitarian ceasefire in
the Darfur leading to unrestricted and unconditional
humanitarian access;
Ø the Djanjaweed militias should be disbanded, as they constitute
the main threat to civilian life;
Ø a mechanism for a political solution should be envisaged that
would include face-to-face negotiations in the presence of the
Chadian Government, the UN, the USA, the EU, the AU and the
international humanitarian NGOs, as well as the establishment
of an international mechanism for verification of compliance
with any agreement that would be signed.
16. On the basis of the positions articulated by the two parties, the
Chadian Mediation Team, with the help of the AU and other members of
the international community, assisted in narrowing the gap between the
divergent views of the parties.
17. On 6 April 2004, on my way to Rwanda, for the commemoration of
the 10th anniversary of the genocide in that country, I visited Khartoum,
where I held consultations with President Ahmed Omer Hassan Al Bashir.
During those consultations, President Al Bashir indicated that he planned
to visit N’djamena on 11 April 2004, to meet with President Déby.
President Al Bashir stated that the situation was under control, and also
briefed me on the efforts already deployed by his Government to assist the
populations in need in Darfur, by facilitating the distribution of
humanitarian relief and ensuring the security and protection of civilians in
the region. On my part, I reiterated my concern over the humanitarian
situation in Darfur and the need for an early and successful conclusion of
the talks that were going on in N’djamena.
18. On 8 April 2004, under the auspices of President Déby of Chad and
the Chairperson of the AU Commission, as well as in the presence of
international observers and facilitators, the two parties signed a
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict and a Protocol
on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur. Under the
Ceasefire Agreement, the parties agreed, amongst others, to:
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 6
Ø cease hostilities and proclaim a cease-fire for a period of 45
days automatically renewable, unless opposed by one of the
parties;
Ø establish a Joint Commission and a Ceasefire Commission, with
the participation of the international community, including the
African Union;
Ø free all prisoners of war and all other persons detained because
of the armed conflict in Darfur;
Ø facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the
creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of emergency
relief to the displaced persons and other civilians victims of war,
in accordance with the Protocol on the Establishment of
Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur, referred to above.
19. The parties also undertook to:
Ø combine their efforts in order to establish a global and definite
peace in Darfur;
Ø meet at a later stage within the framework of a conference of
all the representatives of Darfur to agree on a global and
definite settlement of the problems of their region, especially
concerning its socio-economic development;
Ø contribute to create an environment conducive to negotiation
and stop hostile media campaigns.
20. Following the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, the AU Team
remained in N’djamena to plan the way forward with the Chadian
Mediation Team. On 10 April 2004, the Commissioner for Peace and
Security traveled to Khartoum and N’djamena. The Commissioner held
discussions with President Déby on the best way to ensure the speedy
implementation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and prepare
discussions on a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. He also held
discussions with President Al Bashir and other Sudanese officials. Finally,
he attended a meeting with Presidents Déby and Al Bashir.
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 7
V. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN DARFUR
21. Since the beginning of hostilities in Darfur, over a year ago, the
humanitarian situation has dramatically deteriorated. According to UN
agencies and human rights groups, attacks against civilians have increased
both in scale and brutality. It is reported that over 10, 000 civilians have
been killed since February 2003; more than 750, 000 people are estimated
to have been internally displaced, while another 110,000 people are
reported to have fled into neighboring Chad. The intensity of the conflict
has also resulted in the destruction of social infrastructure, thereby
exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.
22. It is against this background that the United Nations Secretary-
General issued, on 31 March 2004, a statement in which he indicated that
he was very disturbed by events in Darfur, where the continuing conflict is
having a devastating impact on the lives and well-being of the people. He
encouraged the parties to work intensively towards declaring an effective
humanitarian ceasefire and stressed that humanitarian organizations and
staff must receive safe, unimpeded access to all those in need. On 2 April
2004, UN Security Council Members also expressed their deep concern
about the massive humanitarian crisis. They called on the parties
concerned to fully cooperate in order to address the grave situation
prevailing in the Darfur region to ensure the protection of civilians and to
facilitate humanitarian access to the affected populations. They welcomed
the negotiations that were taking place in N’djamena under the auspices of
Chad and the AU, and called on the GoS and the opposition groups to
conclude a humanitarian ceasefire and to reach a political settlement to
the dispute.
23. On 10 April 2004, the Embassy of Sudan in Addis Ababa sent a Note
Verbale to the Commission, informing it of the decision of the Sudanese
Government, on 7 April 2004, to set up a Ministerial Committee “to end
security and relief problems in Darfur region”. The Committee is entrusted
with the following:
Ø to control and disarm militias and non-regular forces that target
the civilian population or hinder the delivery of relief;
Ø to open all relief corridors and to secure unimpeded access to
the area for humanitarian assistance;
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 8
Ø to provide basic needs for affected population in the area; and
Ø to create a conducive atmosphere for the stabilization and
normalization of the situation in Darfur.
24. The Embassy informed the Commission that the Committee had
toured the affected areas on 8 April 2004, accompanied by the
Ambassadors of USA, EU, and France, as well as representatives of UN
agencies. The Embassy indicated that the representatives of the
international organizations had confirmed an improvement in the
humanitarian situation.
25. On 10 April 2004, the Foreign Minister of Sudan was reported as
having said that the Sudanese Government would begin an immediate
investigation to prosecute those responsible for the violence in the Darfur
region.
26. In view of the seriousness of the humanitarian situation, an AU
delegation led by Ambassador Mendoume-Nze, permanent representative
of Gabon to the AU and member of the AU Commission on refugees,
visited Chad from 13 to 20 February 2004. The delegation met with the
relevant Chadian Authorities, as well as with representatives of
humanitarian agencies providing assistance to the Sudanese refugees in
Chad. The delegation traveled to Adre, in the eastern part of Chad, along
the border with Sudan, to visit the assembly point of Farchana, as well as
to Abeche. The delegation was able to assess the situation and the needs
of the Sudanese refugees. It was also planned to field a humanitarian
mission to the Sudan. However, this could not be undertaken during the
expected timeframe.
VI. OBSERVATIONS
27. I welcome the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004
between the Government of Sudan, on the one hand, and the SLA and the
JFM, on the other. I call on the parties to comply with the terms of the
Agreement they have signed. I urge them to resume the negotiations
within the agreed timeframe.
PSC/PR/2(V)
Page 9
28. I am concerned by the humanitarian situation in Darfur. I appeal to
the international community to provide the much-needed humanitarian
assistance to the affected people of Darfur, as well as the refugees in
Chad.
29. I welcome the decision of the GoS to establish a Committee to
facilitate humanitarian access and the work of humanitarian agencies. I
also welcome the decision to investigate the violations committed in
Darfur. I wish to stress the urgent need to bring all those responsible for
these violations to justice, in line with the AU’s expressed commitment to
fight impunity.
30. The Ceasefire Agreement signed in N’djamena calls for effective
follow-up measures to facilitate its scrupulous and faithful implementation.
There is need for the AU to make all the required agreement to carry out
the responsibilities entrusted to it. In this respect, steps are underway to
designate AU representatives to the Ceasefire Commission and the Joint
Commission provided for in the Agreement.
31. It is, however, clear that for a region as large as Darfur, and with
poor infrastructure, the task of monitoring the compliance with the
commitments entered into by the parties would not be easy. I intend to
dispatch a reconnaissance mission to Darfur to asses the situation on the
ground and identify the requirements for an affective monitoring of the
Agreement. At the same time, consultations will be undertaken with AU
partners to secure financial and logistic support for the immediate
deployment of the Ceasefire Commission.
32. I wish to put on record my appreciation of President Déby’s efforts
and commitment. I would like to assure him of AU’s continued support for
the global negotiations that will start shortly with N’djamena. In this
respect, I should like to note that, during his discussions with the
Commissioner for Peace and Security, President Déby expressed his wish
to be guided, throughout the process, by the AU, which has the overall
leadership for the peace efforts in Darfur.
http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/visionandmission/popupen.htm
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