Johnson's Russia List
#9047
3 February 2005
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A CDI Project
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www.untimely-thoughts.com
February 2, 2005
Is Russia's next revolutionary wave beginning?
By Gordon Hahn
Dr. Gordon M. Hahn, Visiting Scholar, George F. Kennan Institute for
Advanced Russian Studies

In April 2004 the present author wrote that 2003 was the year Russian
President Vladimir Putin's policies transformed Boris Yeltsin's 'managed
democracy' into a soft, 'stealth-like' authoritarianism.1 Since revolutions
come in waves, it was suggested that Russia's revolution from above of the
1980s and early 1990s and now decisively rolled back by Putin's
counter-revolution could return as a revolution from below, given an
economic crisis and/or political dangers inherent in upcoming socioeconomic
reforms.

The protests provoked by the Kremlin's poorly-planned monetization of
in-kind social benefits such as free transportation and medical care appear
to prove the point. Tens, if not hundreds of thousands of pensioners,
students, and others in some thirty regions of Russia from St. Petersburg
in the west to Sakhalin Island in the east have taken to the streets to
protest the transfer from free transportation and other benefits to a
system involving usually insufficient monetary payments. Even police and
military reportedly sympathize with the demonstrators, as they too are
negatively affected by the reform.

The public's resistance has been so powerful that tens of the regions have
decided to either dump the reform or break their budgets to better finance
the monetary benefits. The federal government is preparing to do the same.
Federal ministers have appeared on television being unusually contrite in
taking blame for a "failure." A first sign of an emerging revolutionary
situation is an ineffective government in crisis that cannot implement reforms.

Other facts supportive of this view are an economic downturn that may be
beginning and the housing reform to come next month. Financial insolvency
is often a precursor of revolutionary change. Although Russian tax
collection and hard currency reserves are at record highs for the
post-Soviet period and the economy has been booming there are signs of
trouble. An economy dominated by a corrupt state and raw materials exports
is vulnerable to internal and external shocks. Thus, even with oil prices
astronomically high, the Russian economy slowed significantly in the second
half of 2004. Year-on-year real GDP growth slowed from 7.4 percent in the
first two quarters of 2004 to 6.4 percent in the third and 4.5 in the
fourth. December yielded a 3.9 year-on-year growth rate, the lowest since
April 1999 and the Yeltsin era.

The housing reform by definition will touch every citizen of Russian,
excluding oligarchs and the homeless, whereas the already destabilizing
social benefits reform harmed only certain categories of citizens
(pensioners, students, etc.). Therefore, the consternation in reaction to
this reform is likely to spark even larger demonstrations. Should the state
be forced to back off yet another expenditure-reducing reform, the coffers
will be further stretched.

The demonstrations expose what an exaggeration the stereotype is that
Russians are blindly faithful sheep ready to succumb, even enthusiastically
step in time to any authoritarian's regime's marching orders. Many
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes similar to Russia's in Latin America and
elsewhere have been able to impose true austerity measures without
suffering such a public backlash.

However, along with facts supportive of the 'emerging revolution' argument
view, there are contrary ones. For several reasons it cannot be said the
Russian demonstrations as yet mark the onset of a revolution from below led
by a well-organized civil society. First, the demonstrations are dominated
by elderly pensioners (supported by a small number of students), those
least capable of sustaining either a violent or long peaceful
velvet-rose-orange revolution from below. Second, Russian civil society
suffers from a chronic resource deficit because of a Soviet legacy of state
control of allsorts of resources and the post-Soviet Russian state's
ownership, intimidation, or cooptation of big and medium-sized business.

Third, although some truly democratic elements such as Grigorii
Yavlinskii's Yabloko Party are participating, the demonstrations are
dominated by radical leftist parties such as the Gennadi Zyuganov's
Communist Party, Viktor Anpilov's Communist Workers' Party, and Eduard
Limonov's National Bolshevik Party. Thus, the demonstrations could signal
the rise not so much of civil society as of uncivil society and are likely
to support a communist authoritarian revanche rather than a democratic revival.

However, there are mid- to long-term dangers for the Putin regime. Social
protest can transform into nationalist revolution. This goes for both the
ethnic Russians and minorities. The nationalist and somewhat
Islamic-oriented Tatar Public Center has been leading demonstrations in
Kazan. Putin's federative counter-reforms have provoked a growing
disenchantment with Moscow as well as its trustworthy supporter in the
republic, Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, whose legitimacy and that
of his moderately nationalist, and pro-Moscow elite was based on the
republic's economic and political autonomy during the Yeltsin era. Tatar
history since the time of the tsars is replete with economic grievances
leading to revolts that quickly became nationalist in essence.

In neighboring Bashkortostan, Russian and Tatar democrats and nationalists
began protesting police brutality and the hard authoritarian rule under
President Murtaza Rakhimov months ago. They have protested his
Bashkirization policies for years. In December a protest reportedly turned
violent, and the Rakhimov regime reacted with a 'sweeps' operation in the
city of Blagoveschensk. Up to a thousand were arrested and beaten. Hundreds
were hospitalized, and there were even as yet unconfirmed reports of mass
rapes. Human rights activists Len Ponomarev and Ludmilla Alekseeva called
the raid the Chechenization of Bashkiria. Official federal and regional
investigations and human rights organizations' led to no criminal charges
against the police. The hardline Bashkir MVD chief, Rafael Divaev, has
refused to resign, and the demotion and 'reprimand' of others have not
assuaged the victims. Mass demonstrations calling for Rakhimov's
resignation because of Blagoveshchensk have now merged with those opposing
the monetization of in-kind benefits. Organizers of the former called for
an 'orange revolution on Ukraine's model, and orange reportedly has been
conspicuous in its sudden fashionableness among crowds.

Authoritarian modernization was possible in the 20th century's Chile, South
Korea, and Taiwan only because Pinochet was willing to spill blood and
because Seoul and Taipei wielded tightly-organized single-party
dictatorships. However, Yedinya Rossiya's place in Russia's political
system still does not amount to fully entrenched single-party rule. In lieu
of such a system's social controls, the regime may resort to more 'police
raid' (death squad?) violence against any mass demonstrations, particularly
if they should become extremely disruptive or unruly. The regime has
already crossed that threshold in Chechnya. Thus, Rakhimov's brutal
crackdown and the instability in Bashkiria and elsewhere may be a harbinger
of things to come.

1. (Gordon M. Hahn, "Putin's 'Stealth Authoritarianism' and Russia's Second
Revolutionary Wave," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Regional Analysis, 21
April 2004,
www.regionalanalysis.org/publications/regionalvoices/en/2004/04/616B350A-D9CD-49\
F5-9416ECAD7F5F1EAE.ASP



Uli Schamiloglu
Professor of Turkic & Central Eurasian Studies
Department of Languages and Cultures of Asia
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