Note: assumedly at this point Iran would only have a conventional
warhead on the missile.
___________________________
http://www.rense.com/general59/theSunburniransawesome.htm
The Sunburn - Iran's Awesome
Nuclear Anti-Ship Missile
The Weapon That Could
Defeat The US In The Gulf
By Mark Gaffney
11-2-4
A word to the reader: The following paper is so shocking that, after
preparing the initial draft, I didn't want to believe it myself, and
resolved to disprove it with more research. However, I only succeeded
in turning up more evidence in support of my thesis. And I repeated
this cycle of discovery and denial several more times before finally
deciding to go with the article. I believe that a serious writer must
follow the trail of evidence, no matter where it leads, and report
back. So here is my story. Don't be surprised if it causes you to
squirm. Its purpose is not to make predictions history makes fools of
those who claim to know the future but simply to describe the peril
that awaits us in the Persian Gulf. By awakening to the extent of that
danger, perhaps we can still find a way to save our nation and the
world from disaster. If we are very lucky, we might even create an
alternative future that holds some promise of resolving the monumental
conflicts of our time. --MG
Last July, they dubbed it operation Summer Pulse: a simultaneous
mustering of US Naval forces, world wide, that was unprecedented.
According to the Navy, it was the first exercise of its new Fleet
Response Plan (FRP), the purpose of which was to enable the Navy to
respond quickly to an international crisis. The Navy wanted to show its
increased force readiness, that is, its capacity to rapidly move combat
power to any global hot spot. Never in the history of the US Navy had
so many carrier battle groups been involved in a single operation. Even
the US fleet massed in the Gulf and eastern Mediterranean during
operation Desert Storm in 1991, and in the recent invasion of Iraq,
never exceeded six battle groups. But last July and August there were
seven of them on the move, each battle group consisting of a
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier with its full complement of 7-8
supporting ships, and 70 or more assorted aircraft. Most of the
activity, according to various reports, was in the Pacific, where the
fleet participated in joint exercises with the Taiwanese navy.
But why so much naval power underway at the same time? What potential
world crisis could possibly require more battle groups than were
deployed during the recent invasion of Iraq? In past years, when the US
has seen fit to "show the flag" or flex its naval muscle, one or two
carrier groups have sufficed. Why this global show of power? The news
headlines about the joint-maneuvers in the South China Sea read: "Saber
Rattling Unnerves China", and: "Huge Show of Force Worries Chinese."
But the reality was quite different, and, as we shall see, has grave
ramifications for the continuing US military presence in the Persian
Gulf; because operation Summer Pulse reflected a high-level Pentagon
decision that an unprecedented show of strength was needed to counter
what is viewed as a growing threat in the particular case of China,
because of Peking's newest Sovremenny-class destroyers recently
acquired from Russia.
"Nonsense!" you are probably thinking. That's impossible. How could a
few picayune destroyers threaten the US Pacific fleet?" Here is where
the story thickens: Summer Pulse amounted to a tacit acknowledgement,
obvious to anyone paying attention, that the United States has been
eclipsed in an important area of military technology, and that this
qualitative edge is now being wielded by others, including the Chinese;
because those otherwise very ordinary destroyers were, in fact,
launching platforms for Russian-made 3M-82 Moskit anti-ship cruise
missiles (NATO designation: SS-N-22 Sunburn), a weapon for which the US
Navy currently has no defense. Here I am not suggesting that the US
status of lone world Superpower has been surpassed. I am simply saying
that a new global balance of power is emerging, in which other
individual states may, on occasion, achieve "an asymmetric advantage"
over the US. And this, in my view, explains the immense scale of Summer
Pulse. The US show last summer of overwhelming strength was calculated
to send a message.
The Sunburn Missile
I was shocked when I learned the facts about these Russian-made cruise
missiles. The problem is that so many of us suffer from two common
misperceptions. The first follows from our assumption that Russia is
militarily weak, as a result of the breakup of the old Soviet system.
Actually, this is accurate, but it does not reflect the complexities.
Although the Russian navy continues to rust in port, and the Russian
army is in disarray, in certain key areas Russian technology is
actually superior to our own. And nowhere is this truer than in the
vital area of anti-ship cruise missile technology, where the Russians
hold at least a ten-year lead over the US. The second misperception has
to do with our complacency in general about missiles-as-weapons
probably attributable to the pathetic performance of Saddam Hussein's
Scuds during the first Gulf war: a dangerous illusion that I will now
attempt to rectify.
Many years ago, Soviet planners gave up trying to match the US Navy
ship for ship, gun for gun, and dollar for dollar. The Soviets simply
could not compete with the high levels of US spending required to build
up and maintain a huge naval armada. They shrewdly adopted an
alternative approach based on strategic defense. They searched for
weaknesses, and sought relatively inexpensive ways to exploit those
weaknesses. The Soviets succeeded: by developing several supersonic
anti-ship missiles, one of which, the SS-N-22 Sunburn, has been called
"the most lethal missile in the world today."
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the old military establishment
fell upon hard times. But in the late1990s Moscow awakened to the
under-utilized potential of its missile technology to generate
desperately needed foreign exchange. A decision was made to resuscitate
selected programs, and, very soon, Russian missile technology became a
hot export commodity. Today, Russian missiles are a growth industry
generating much-needed cash for Russia, with many billions in combined
sales to India, China, Viet Nam, Cuba, and also Iran. In the near
future this dissemination of advanced technology is likely to present
serious challenges to the US. Some have even warned that the US Navy's
largest ships, the massive carriers, have now become floating death
traps, and should for this reason be mothballed.
The Sunburn missile has never seen use in combat, to my knowledge,
which probably explains why its fearsome capabilities are not more
widely recognized. Other cruise missiles have been used, of course, on
several occasions, and with devastating results. During the Falklands
War, French-made Exocet missiles, fired from Argentine fighters, sunk
the HMS Sheffield and another ship. And, in 1987, during the Iran-Iraq
war, the USS Stark was nearly cut in half by a pair of Exocets while on
patrol in the Persian Gulf. On that occasion US Aegis radar picked up
the incoming Iraqi fighter (a French-made Mirage), and tracked its
approach to within 50 miles. The radar also "saw" the Iraqi plane turn
about and return to its base. But radar never detected the pilot launch
his weapons. The sea-skimming Exocets came smoking in under radar and
were only sighted by human eyes moments before they ripped into the
Stark, crippling the ship and killing 37 US sailors.
The 1987 surprise attack on the Stark exemplifies the dangers posed by
anti-ship cruise missiles. And the dangers are much more serious in the
case of the Sunburn, whose specs leave the sub-sonic Exocet in the
dust. Not only is the Sunburn much larger and faster, it has far
greater range and a superior guidance system. Those who have witnessed
its performance trials invariably come away stunned. According to one
report, when the Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani visited Moscow
in October 2001 he requested a test firing of the Sunburn, which the
Russians were only too happy to arrange. So impressed was Ali Shamkhani
that he placed an order for an undisclosed number of the missiles.
The Sunburn can deliver a 200-kiloton nuclear payload, or: a 750-pound
conventional warhead, within a range of 100 miles, more than twice the
range of the Exocet. The Sunburn combines a Mach 2.1 speed (two times
the speed of sound) with a flight pattern that hugs the deck and
includes "violent end maneuvers" to elude enemy defenses. The missile
was specifically designed to defeat the US Aegis radar defense system.
Should a US Navy Phalanx point defense somehow manage to detect an
incoming Sunburn missile, the system has only seconds to calculate a
fire solution not enough time to take out the intruding missile. The US
Phalanx defense employs a six-barreled gun that fires 3,000
depleted-uranium rounds a minute, but the gun must have precise
coordinates to destroy an intruder "just in time."
The Sunburn's combined supersonic speed and payload size produce
tremendous kinetic energy on impact, with devastating consequences for
ship and crew. A single one of these missiles can sink a large warship,
yet costs considerably less than a fighter jet. Although the Navy has
been phasing out the older Phalanx defense system, its replacement,
known as the Rolling Action Missile (RAM) has never been tested against
the weapon it seems destined to one day face in combat. Implications
For US Forces in the Gulf
The US Navy's only plausible defense against a robust weapon like the
Sunburn missile is to detect the enemy's approach well ahead of time,
whether destroyers, subs, or fighter-bombers, and defeat them before
they can get in range and launch their deadly cargo. For this purpose
US AWACs radar planes assigned to each naval battle group are kept
aloft on a rotating schedule. The planes "see" everything within two
hundred miles of the fleet, and are complemented with intelligence from
orbiting satellites.
But US naval commanders operating in the Persian Gulf face serious
challenges that are unique to the littoral, i.e., coastal, environment.
A glance at a map shows why: The Gulf is nothing but a large lake, with
one narrow outlet, and most of its northern shore, i.e., Iran, consists
of mountainous terrain that affords a commanding tactical advantage
over ships operating in Gulf waters. The rugged northern shore makes
for easy concealment of coastal defenses, such as mobile missile
launchers, and also makes their detection problematic. Although it was
not widely reported, the US actually lost the battle of the Scuds in
the first Gulf War termed "the great Scud hunt" and for similar reasons.
Saddam Hussein's mobile Scud launchers proved so difficult to detect
and destroy over and over again the Iraqis fooled allied reconnaissance
with decoys that during the course of Desert Storm the US was unable to
confirm even a single kill. This proved such an embarrassment to the
Pentagon, afterwards, that the unpleasant stats were buried in official
reports. But the blunt fact is that the US failed to stop the Scud
attacks. The launches continued until the last few days of the
conflict. Luckily, the Scud's inaccuracy made it an almost useless
weapon. At one point General Norman Schwarzkopf quipped dismissively to
the press that his soldiers had a greater chance of being struck by
lightning in Georgia than by a Scud in Kuwait.
But that was then, and it would be a grave error to allow the Scud's
ineffectiveness to blur the facts concerning this other missile. The
Sunburn's amazing accuracy was demonstrated not long ago in a live test
staged at sea by the Chinese and observed by US spy planes. Not only
did the Sunburn missile destroy the dummy target ship, it scored a
perfect bull's eye, hitting the crosshairs of a large "X" mounted on
the ship's bridge. The only word that does it justice, awesome, has
become a cliché, hackneyed from hyperbolic excess.
The US Navy has never faced anything in combat as formidable as the
Sunburn missile. But this will surely change if the US and Israel
decide to wage a so-called preventive war against Iran to destroy its
nuclear infrastructure. Storm clouds have been darkening over the Gulf
for many months. In recent years Israel upgraded its air force with a
new fleet of long-range F-15 fighter-bombers, and even more recently
took delivery of 5,000 bunker-buster bombs from the US weapons that
many observers think are intended for use against Iran.
The arming for war has been matched by threats. Israeli officials have
declared repeatedly that they will not allow the Mullahs to develop
nuclear power, not even reactors to generate electricity for peaceful
use. Their threats are particularly worrisome, because Israel has a
long history of pre-emptive war. (See my 1989 book Dimona: the Third
Temple? and also my 2003 article Will Iran Be Next? posted at
http://www.InformationClearingHouse.info/article3288.htm )
Never mind that such a determination is not Israel's to make, and
belongs instead to the international community, as codified in the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). With regard to Iran, the International
Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) recent report (September 2004) is well
worth a look, as it repudiates facile claims by the US and Israel that
Iran is building bombs. While the report is highly critical of Tehran
for its ambiguities and its grudging release of documents, it affirms
that IAEA inspectors have been admitted to every nuclear site in the
country to which they have sought access, without exception. Last year
Iran signed the strengthened IAEA inspection protocol, which until then
had been voluntary. And the IAEA has found no hard evidence, to date,
either that bombs exist or that Iran has made a decision to build them.
(The latest IAEA report can be downloaded at:
http://www.GlobalSecurity.org)
In a talk on October 3, 2004, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei
made the clearest statement yet: "Iran has no nuclear weapons program",
he said, and then repeated himself for emphasis: "Iran has no nuclear
weapons program, but I personally don't rush to conclusions before all
the realities are clarified. So far I see nothing that could be called
an imminent danger. I have seen no nuclear weapons program in Iran.
What I have seen is that Iran is trying to gain access to nuclear
enrichment technology, and so far there is no danger from Iran.
Therefore, we should make use of political and diplomatic means before
thinking of resorting to other alternatives."
No one disputes that Tehran is pursuing a dangerous path, but with 200
or more Israeli nukes targeted upon them the Iranians' insistence on
keeping their options open is understandable. Clearly, the nuclear
nonproliferation regime today hangs by the slenderest of threads. The
world has arrived at a fateful crossroads.
A Fearful Symmetry?
If a showdown over Iran develops in the coming months, the man who
could hold the outcome in his hands will be thrust upon the world
stage. That man, like him or hate him, is Russian President Vladimir
Putin. He has been castigated severely in recent months for gathering
too much political power to himself. But according to former Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev, who was interviewed on US television
recently by David Brokaw, Putin has not imposed a tyranny upon Russia
yet. Gorbachev thinks the jury is still out on Putin.
Perhaps, with this in mind, we should be asking whether Vladimir Putin
is a serious student of history. If he is, then he surely recognizes
that the deepening crisis in the Persian Gulf presents not only
manifold dangers, but also opportunities. Be assured that the Russian
leader has not forgotten the humiliating defeat Ronald Reagan inflicted
upon the old Soviet state. (Have we Americans forgotten?) By the
mid-1980s the Soviets were in Kabul, and had all but defeated the
Mujahedeen. The Soviet Union appeared secure in its military occupation
of Afghanistan. But then, in 1986, the first US Stinger missiles
reached the hands of the Afghani resistance; and, quite suddenly,
Soviet helicopter gunships and MiGs began dropping out of the skies
like flaming stones. The tide swiftly turned, and by 1989 it was all
over but the hand wringing and gnashing of teeth in the Kremlin.
Defeated, the Soviets slunk back across the frontier. The whole world
cheered the American Stingers, which had carried the day.
This very night, as he sips his cognac, what is Vladimir Putin
thinking? Is he perhaps thinking about the perverse symmetries of
history? If so, he may also be wondering (and discussing with his
closest aides) how a truly great nation like the United States could be
so blind and so stupid as to allow another state, i.e., Israel, to
control its foreign policy, especially in a region as vital (and
volatile) as the Mid-East.
One can almost hear the Russians' animated conversation:
"The Americans! What is the matter with them?" "They simply cannot help
themselves."
"What idiots!"
"A nation as foolish as this deserves to be taught a lesson"
"Yes! For their own good."
"It must be a painful lesson, one they will never forget. "Are we
agreed, then, comrades?"
"Let us teach our American friends a lesson about the limits of
military power..."
Does anyone really believe that Vladimir Putin will hesitate to seize a
most rare opportunity to change the course of history and, in the
bargain, take his sweet revenge? Surely Putin understands the terrible
dimensions of the trap into which the US has blundered, thanks to the
Israelis and their neo-con supporters in Washington who lobbied so
vociferously for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, against all friendly and
expert advice, and who even now beat the drums of war against Iran.
Would Putin be wrong to conclude that the US will never leave the
region unless it is first defeated militarily? Should we blame him for
deciding that Iran is "one bridge too far"?
If the US and Israel overreach, and the Iranians close the net with
Russian anti-ship missiles, it will be a fearful symmetry, indeed.
Springing the Trap
At the battle of Cannae in 216 BC, the great Carthaginian general,
Hannibal, tempted a much larger Roman army into a fateful advance, and
then enveloped and annihilated it with a smaller force. Out of a Roman
army of 70,000 men, no more than a few thousand escaped. It was said
that after many hours of dispatching the Romans, Hannibal's soldiers
grew so tired that the fight went out of them. In their weariness they
granted the last broken and bedraggled Romans their lives.
Let us pray that the US sailors who are unlucky enough to be on duty in
the Persian Gulf when the shooting starts can escape the fate of the
Roman army at Cannae. The odds will be heavily against them, however,
because they will face the same type of danger, tantamount to
envelopment. The US ships in the Gulf will already have come within
range of the Sunburn missiles and the even more-advanced SS-NX-26
Yakhonts missiles, also Russian-made (speed: Mach 2.9; range: 180
miles) deployed by the Iranians along the Gulf's northern shore. Every
US ship will be exposed and vulnerable. When the Iranians spring the
trap, the entire lake will become a killing field.
Anti-ship cruise missiles are not new, as I've mentioned. Nor have they
yet determined the outcome in a conflict. But this is probably only
because these horrible weapons have never been deployed in sufficient
numbers. At the time of the Falklands war the Argentine air force
possessed only five Exocets, yet managed to sink two ships. With enough
of them, the Argentineans might have sunk the entire British fleet, and
won the war. Although we've never seen a massed attack of cruise
missiles, this is exactly what the US Navy could face in the next war
in the Gulf.
Try and imagine it if you can: barrage after barrage of Exocet-class
missiles, which the Iranians are known to possess in the hundreds, as
well as the unstoppable Sunburn and Yakhonts missiles. The questions
that our purblind government leaders should be asking themselves,
today, if they value what historians will one day write about them, are
two: how many of the Russian anti-ship missiles has Putin already
supplied to Iran? And: How many more are currently in the pipeline?
In 2001, Jane's Defense Weekly reported that Iran was attempting to
acquire anti-ship missiles from Russia. Ominously, the same report also
mentioned that the more advanced Yakhonts missile was "optimized for
attacks against carrier task forces." Apparently its guidance system is
"able to distinguish an aircraft carrier from its escorts." The numbers
were not disclosed.
The US Navy will come under fire even if the US does not participate in
the first so-called surgical raids on Iran's nuclear sites, that is,
even if Israel goes it alone. Israel's brand-new fleet of 25 F-15s
(paid for by American taxpayers) has sufficient range to target Iran,
but the Israelis cannot mount an attack without crossing US-occupied
Iraqi air space. It will hardly matter if Washington gives the green
light, or is dragged into the conflict by a recalcitrant Israel. Either
way, the result will be the same. The Iranians will interpret US
acquiescence as complicity, and, in any event, they will understand
that the real fight is with the Americans. The Iranians will be
entirely within their rights to counter-attack in self-defense. Most of
the world will see it this way, and will support them, not America. The
US and Israel will be viewed as the aggressors, even as the unfortunate
US sailors in harm's way become cannon fodder. In the Gulf's shallow
and confined waters evasive maneuvers will be difficult, at best, and
escape impossible. Even if US planes control of the skies over the
battlefield, the sailors caught in the net below will be hard-pressed
to survive. The Gulf will run red with American blood.
From here, it only gets worse. Armed with their Russian-supplied cruise
missiles, the Iranians will close the lake's only outlet, the strategic
Strait of Hormuz, cutting off the trapped and dying Americans from help
and rescue. The US fleet massing in the Indian Ocean will stand by
helplessly, unable to enter the Gulf to assist the survivors or bring
logistical support to the other US forces on duty in Iraq. Couple this
with a major new ground offensive by the Iraqi insurgents, and, quite
suddenly, the tables could turn against the Americans in Baghdad. As
supplies and ammunition begin to run out, the status of US forces in
the region will become precarious. The occupiers will become the
besieged.
With enough anti-ship missiles, the Iranians can halt tanker traffic
through Hormuz for weeks, even months. With the flow of oil from the
Gulf curtailed, the price of a barrel of crude will skyrocket on the
world market. Within days the global economy will begin to grind to a
halt. Tempers at an emergency round-the-clock session of the UN
Security Council will flare and likely explode into shouting and
recriminations as French, German, Chinese and even British ambassadors
angrily accuse the US of allowing Israel to threaten world order. But,
as always, because of the US veto the world body will be powerless to
act... America will stand alone, completely isolated.
Yet, despite the increasingly hostile international mood, elements of
the US media will spin the crisis very differently here at home, in a
way that is sympathetic to Israel. Members of Congress will rise to
speak in the House and Senate, and rally to Israel's defense, while
blaming the victim of the attack, Iran. Fundamentalist Christian talk
show hosts will proclaim the historic fulfillment of biblical prophecy
in our time, and will call upon the Jews of Israel to accept Jesus into
their hearts; meanwhile, urging the president to nuke the evil empire
of Islam. From across America will be heard histrionic cries for fresh
reinforcements, even a military draft. Patriots will demand victory at
any cost. Pundits will scream for an escalation of the conflict.
A war that ostensibly began as an attempt to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons will teeter on the brink of their use.
Conclusion
Friends, we must work together to prevent such a catastrophe. We must
stop the next Middle East war before it starts. The US government must
turn over to the United Nations the primary responsibility for
resolving the deepening crisis in Iraq, and, immediately thereafter,
withdraw US forces from the country. We must also prevail upon the
Israelis to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and open all of
their nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors. Only then can serious talks
begin with Iran and other states to establish a nuclear weapon free
zone (NWFZ) in the Mid East so essential to the region's long-term
peace and security. 10/26/04 "ICH"
*Mark Gaffney's first book, Dimona the Third Temple? (1989), was a
pioneering study of Israel's nuclear weapons program. He has since
published numerous important articles about the Mid-East with emphasis
on nuclear proliferation issues.