Having problems with message search?
Hello Keith
In your document dated
“Please do not copy these files to anyone else without permission of the author.”
Your present post is clearly granting permission and, indeed, requesting action, so here’s the information I have, which I suspect will be of interest to many other members apart from Anthony.
Best wishes
Gich
GLOSSARY A
EPICTETUS
[Note: it is beyond the scope of this book to make the references in the entries below
comprehensive and complete. Instead, they focus almost exclusively on Epictetus’
Discourses and Handbook, on the chapter on Zeno in Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of
Eminent Philosophers, and on Stobaeus’ Epitome of Stoic Ethics. Motto (1970) is an
excellent resource for following up references in Seneca. The Loeb edition of Marcus
Aurelius (Haines 1930) contains indexes and a Glossary of Greek Terms. Long and
Sedley (1987) is an excellent resource with primary source extracts and commentaries
arranged thematically, also containing indexes and a glossary.]
adiaphoros ‘indifferent’; the adiaphora are any of those things that are neither good
nor bad, everything, in fact, that does not fall under the headings ‘virtue’ or ‘vice’.
The indifferents are what those lacking Stoic wisdom frequently take to be good or
bad, and hence taken to be desirable or undesirable. Pursuing them, or trying to avoid
them, can lead to disturbing emotions that undermine one’s capacity to lead a
eudaimôn life. [See Discourses 1.9.12–13, 1.20.12, 1.30.3, 2.5.1–7, 2.6.1–2, 2.9.15,
2.19.13; DL 7.92/102–5; Handbook 32.2; LS 58; Stob. 2.7.5a/7/7a–d/7f–g.]
agathos ‘good’; something agathos is that which truly benefits the person who
possesses it, understood by the Stoics to be ‘virtue’, to be acquired by ‘following
nature’, by being motivated by the right sort of impulses and keeping one’s moral
362
character (prohairesis) in the right condition. For Epictetus, the essence of good is the
proper use of phantasiai, ‘impressions’ (Discourses 1.20.15), for this is what is eph’
hêmin, ‘in our power’ (Discourses 1.22.11–12). See also aretê, hormê, prohairesis,
phusis. [See Discourses 1.25.1, 1.27.12.1.29.1–4, 1.30.1–7, 2.1.4, 2.2.5/8, 2.8.4,
2.16.1–2, 2.19.13, 3.3.24, 3.10.18, 3.20, 3.22.38–44, 3.24.3, 4.1.132–3, 4.5.32.4.10.8–
9, 4.12.7–9, 4.13.24; DL 7.94–5/98–103; Handbook 6, 19.2, 24.3, 25.1, 29.7, 30,
31.2/4, 32.1; LS 60; Stob. 2.7.5a–b/5b1/5b6/5c–m/6d–f/7g/10/10b/11b–d/11f/11i.]
aidêmôn ‘self-respecting’, of someone who possesses aidôs, self-respect, honour, a
sense of modesty, or a sense of shame; for Epictetus, a key characteristic of the
prokoptôn’s prohairesis. Our aidôs is our own, and cannot be taken away, nor its use
prevented (Discourses 1.25.4). See also pistos. [See Discourses 1.3.4, 1.16.7, 2.1.11,
2.2.4, 2.8.23, 2.10.15/18, 2.20.32, 2.22.20/30, 3.7.27, 3.17.5, 3.18.6, 3.22.15, 4.1.106,
4.2.8, 4.3.1–2/7–9, 4.4.6, 4.5.21–2, 4.8.33, 4.9.6/9/11, 4.12.6, 4.13.19–20; Handbook
33.15, 40; Fragment 14; for aidêmôn together with pistos see Discourses 1.4.18–20,
1.25.4, 1.28.20–1/23, 2.4.2, 2.8.23, 2.10.22–3/29, 2.22.20/30, 3.3.9–10, 3.7.36, 3.13.3,
3.14.13, 3.17.3, 3.23.18, 4.1.161, 4.3.7, 4.9.17, 4.13.13/15; Handbook 24.3–5.]
apaideutos ‘uneducated’; the condition from which the Stoic prokoptôn tries to save
themselves by learning Stoic principles and putting those principles into effect. See
idiôtês. [See Discourses 1.8.8, 1.29.54, 3.26.28, 4.4.32; Handbook 5.]
apatheia ‘peace of mind’ (literally, ‘without passion’, that is, being free from
passion); a constituent of the eudaimôn life. One who enjoys peace of mind is
apathês. [See Discourses 1.4.3/28–9, 2.8.23, 2.17.31, 3.5.7, 3.13.11, 3.15.12, 3.21.9,
363
3.24.24, 3.26.13, 4.3.7, 4.4.9/36, 4.6.16/34, 4.8.27, 4.10.13/22/26; DL 7.117;
Handbook 12.2, 29.7.]
aphormê ‘repulsion’ (the opposite of hormê); that which motivates our rejection of
anything. [See Discourses 1.1.12.1.4.11, 3.2.2, 3.7.26/34, 3.12.13, 3.22.31/36/43,
4.11.6/26; DL 7.105–6; Handbook 2.2; Stob. 2.7.7c/9.]
apoproêgmenos ‘dispreferred’; used of adiaphoros (‘indifferent’) things, including
such things as sickness, physical impairment, death, pain, poverty, injustice, a ‘bad’
reputation, unpopularity, lack of practical skills, and so forth (conventionally ‘bad’
things, usually taken to disadvantage those who suffer them). Enduring any of the
dispreferred indifferents does not detract from the eudaimôn life enjoyed by the Stoic
sophos. See also proêgmenos. [See LS 58; Stob. 2.7.7b/7g.]
appropriate action see kathêkon
aprohaireta ‘things independent of the moral character’. Each is aprohairetos.
(Discourses 1.30.3, 2.13.10, 2.16.1; MA 6.41). See prohairesis.
aretê ‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’; in the context of Stoic ethics the possession of ‘moral
excellence’ will secure eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’). For Epictetus, one
acquires this by learning the correct use of impressions, following God, and following
nature. The virtues are the only things that are good (agathos); they are dispositions of
one’s prohairesis (moral character) that inform actions and duties generally. Four
primary virtues had been recognised since the time of Plato: phronêsis (prudence or
364
wisdom), sôphrosunê (temperance, moderation, or self-restraint), dikaiosunê (justice),
and andreia (courage or bravery). The other virtues were taken to be subordinate to
these four: perseverance is a type of courage, and kindness is a sort of justice, for
instance (see Stob. 5b2). The term arête does not occur in the Handbook. The
opposite of virtue, vice, is kakia. See kalos. [See Discourses 1.4.3–11, 1.12.16, 2.9.15,
2.19.13/17/21, 2.23.19, 3.3.22, 3.16.7, 3.22.59, 3.24.111, 4.1.164, 4.8.32; DL 7.89–
94/97–8/100–2/109/125–8; Stob. 2.7.5a–b5/5b7–11/5c/5e–g/5i/5k–l/6/6d–f/8/11g–k.]
askêsis ‘training’, ‘exercise’ or ‘practice’ undertaken by the Stoic prokoptôn striving
to become a Stoic sophos. The most important exercise for Epictetus is maintaining
the correct use of impressions. (Epictetus uses the term meletaô, ‘to practise, or train
oneself in something’, at Handbook 5.1.) See also phantasia. [See Discourses 2.9.13,
3.2.1, 3.10.7, 3.12; Handbook 14.1, 47; Stob. 2.7.5b4.]
assent see sunkatathesis and phantasia (impression)
ataraxia ‘imperturbability’; literally ‘without disturbance or trouble’, translated
variously as ‘peace of mind’, ‘serenity’, ‘calm’, ‘tranquillity’, or ‘impassiveness’; a
state of mind that is a constituent of the eudaimôn life. Someone possessed of this
state of mind is atarachos. [See Discourses 1.4.21, 2.1.21/33, 2.2, 2.5.2/7, 3.13.13,
3.15.12, 3.21.9, 3.24.79, 4.1.84, 4.4.36, 4.6.34, 4.8.27/30–1, 4.10.22, 4.11.22;
Handbook 12.2, 29.7.]
aversion see ekklisis
365
boulêsis ‘wish’; one of the three eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), experienced only by
the Stoic wise person. Boulêsis is defined as a eulogos orexis, a ‘reasonable desire’.
[See DL 7.116; Stob. 2.7.5b/9a.]
chara ‘joy’; one of the three eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), experienced only by the
Stoic wise person. [See DL 7.94/98/116; Ep. 59; Stob. 2.7.5b/5c/5g/5k/6d.]
caution see eulabeia
desire see epithumia and orexis
dispreferred see apoproêgmenos
distress see lupê and tarachê
duty see kathêkon
ekklisis ‘aversion’ or ‘avoidance’; opposite of orexis (desire), and along with orexis,
ekklisis should be exercised ‘in accordance with nature’ (Discourses 1.21.2). [See
Discourses 1.1.12, 1.4.1/11, 2.29.19, 3.2.1–3, 3.3.2, 3.6.6, 3.12, 3.14.10,
3.22.13/31/36/43, 3.23.10, 3.24.54, 3.26.14, 4.4.28/33, 4.5.27, 4.6.18, 4.8.20, 4.10.4–
5, 4.11.6/26; DL 7.104–5; Handbook 1.1, 2, 32.2.48.3; Stob. 2.7.10b.]
ektos ‘external’; ta ektos, ‘the externals’, are any of those things that fall outside the
preserve of one’s prohairesis, including health, wealth, sickness, life, death, pain –
366
what Epictetus calls the aprohaireta, which are not in our power, the ‘indifferent’
things. [See Discourses 1.15.2, 1.27.11, 2.2.10–15/25–6, 2.5.4–9/24, 2.16.11, 2.22.19,
3.3.8, 3.7.2, 3.10.16, 3.12.6, 3.15.13, 3.24.56, 4.3.1, 4.4.1–6, 4.7.10/41, 4.8.32, 4.10.1,
4.12.15; DL 7.95/106; Handbook 13, 23, 29.7, 33.13, 48.1; Stob. 2.7.5e/7a–b/11c.]
eleutheria ‘freedom’, a state of being, constitutive of the eudaimôn life, enjoyed by
the Stoic wise person in virtue of their capacity to maintain their prohairesis in the
right condition. In making the correct use of impressions and not assenting to false
judgements, the Stoic wise person is free from disturbing emotions, and so can never
be constrained or impeded by external events or the actions of other people. Those
who are free are ‘eleutheros’. The person who is free is said by Epictetus to be the
‘friend of God’ (Discourses 4.3.9). [See Discourses 1.12.8–15, 2.1.21–8, 2.2.13,
2.17.29, 3.5.7, 3.7.27, 3.13.11, 3.15.12, 3.22.16/39/42–4/84, 3.24.66–7/96–8,
3.26.34–5/39, 4.1, 4.3.7/9, 4.6.8–9/16–17, 4.7.8–9, 4.13.24; Handbook 1.2–4,
14.2.19.2, 29.7; Stob. 2.7.11i/11m.]
emotion see pathos
end see telos
eph’ hêmin ‘in our power’, ‘up to us’, or ‘depending on us’; namely, making the
correct use of impressions, by means of which we maintain our prohairesis in the
right condition. This is the most important concept in Epictetus’ treatment of Stoic
ethics. [See Discourses 1.1, 1.6.40, 1.12.32–4, 1.18.12, 1.22.9–10, 1.29.8, 2.1.12,
2.2.6, 2.5.4/8, 2.13.1–2/10–11, 2.13.32, 3.3.10, 3.24.1–3/22–3, 3.26.34, 4.1.65–
367
83/100/128–31, 4.4.15, 4.7.8–10, 4.10.8/28; Handbook 1.1–2/5, 2.1–2.14.1–2.18,
19.1–2, 24.1–2, 25.1, 31.2.32.1–2.48.3.]
epithumia ‘desire’, ‘appetite’ or ‘yearning’; one of the four primary pathê (passions).
Epithumia is the yearning that the non-wise person directs towards anticipated events
and objects in the mistaken belief that they are of real benefit. [See DL 7.110/113;
Stob. 2.7.10/10b.]
eudaimôn ‘happy’ or ‘flourishing’; descriptive of the sophos (Stoic wise person). See
eudaimonia.
eudaimonia ‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’ or ‘living well’ was conceived by the ancient
philosophers as the telos, ‘end’ or ‘goal’ of life. For Epictetus, one achieves this end,
of living the eudaimôn (‘happy’) life, by learning the correct use of impressions,
following God, and following nature. More generally, the Stoics say that happiness
consists in living virtuously (DL 7.87/89). Zeno said that happiness is ‘a good flow of
life’ (DL 7.88, Stob. 2.7.6e) attained by ‘living in agreement’ (Stob. 2.7.6a). Someone
who enjoys eudaimonia is eudaimôn. See euroia biou; telos. [See Discourses 1.4.3,
2.4.9, 3.20.15, 3.22.26–30/39/60/84, 3.23.34, 3.24.2/16–17/52/118, 3.26.18, 4.1.46,
4.4.36/48, 4.7.9, 4.8.30–1; DL 7.88/89/95/97/104/128; Handbook 1.4; LS 63; Stob.
2.7.5b5/5g/6c–e/7g/8a/11g.]
eulabeia ‘caution’; one of the three eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), experienced only by
the Stoic wise person. [See Discourses 2.1, 2.2.14; DL 7.116; Handbook 48.1.]
368
eupatheia ‘good feeling’; possessed by the Stoic wise person (sophos) who
experiences these special sorts of emotions, but does not experience irrational and
disturbing passions. There are three eupatheiai experienced by the Stoic wise person:
(1) with respect to an anticipated good, whereas the non-wise person experiences
epithumia (desire), the wise person experiences boulêsis (wish); (2) with respect to
the presence of a supposed good, whereas the non-wise person experiences hêdonê
(pleasure), the wise person experiences chara (joy); and (3) with respect to an
anticipated evil, whereas the non-wise person experiences phobos (fear), the wise
person experiences eulabeia (caution). There is no ‘good feeling’ that correlates with
the non-wise person’s experience of lupê (distress) with respect to the presence of a
supposed evil. A ‘good feeling’ correlates with a correct judgement (and possibly is
the affective component of such a judgement) about what is truly good (virtue, and
action motivated by virtue), in contrast to a passion which correlates with a false
judgement. See pathos. [See DL 7.116 = LS 65F.]
euroia biou ‘good flow of life’; this is Zeno’s definition of eudaimonia (‘happiness’),
enjoyed by the sophos (wise person). Epictetus usually uses the abbreviated form, hê
euroia. In Handbook 8 he uses the verb euroeô which means ‘to flow well’, translated
as ‘all being well’. Other translators deploy a range of suitably synonymous
expressions: peace of mind, peace, happiness, serenity, tranquillity, well-being,
prosperity. See also eudaimonia, telos. [See Discourses 1.1.22, 1.4.1–5/27–8,
2.16.41/47, 2.18.28, 2.19.29, 3.10.10, 3.14.8, 3.17.9, 3.20.14, 3.22.26/39/45, 4.4.4–
5/22/37/39, 4.6.35, 4.7.9, 4.12.2; MA 2.5, 5.34, 10.6; Handbook 8; Stob. 2.7.6e/8a.]
369
eusebês ‘dutiful’ or ‘pious’; the disposition of someone who takes proper care of
their devotion to the gods. [See Discourses 3.2.4, 4.7.9; Handbook 31.4; Stob.
2.7.11g.]
excellence see aretê
external thing see ektos
fate see Peprômenê
fear see phobos
free / freedom see eleutheria
God see theos
good see agathos
hêdonê ‘pleasure’; one of the four primary pathê (passions). Hêdonê is the pleasure
that the non-wise person experiences when events or objects that are mistakenly
believed to be of real value are present. See pathos. [See Discourses 2.11.19–22,
3.7.2–18, 3.12.7, 3.24.36–7/71–2; DL 7.85–6/93/103/110/114/117; Ep. 51.5–6, 59.1–
2, 104.34; Handbook 34; Stob. 2.7.5a/10/10b–c.]
370
hêgemonikon ‘commanding faculty’, the controlling part of the soul (psuchê); the
centre of consciousness, the seat of all mental states, thought by the Stoics (and some
other ancients) to be located in the heart. It manifests four mental powers: the capacity
to receive impressions, to assent to them, form intentions to act in response to them,
and to do these things rationally. The Discourses and Handbook talk of keeping the
prohairesis in the right condition, and also of keeping the hêgemonikon in the right
condition, and for Epictetus these notions are essentially interchangeable. The
prohairesis and the hêgemonikon are in the right condition when they are maintained
‘in accordance with nature’ or ‘in harmony with nature’. [See Discourses 1.15.4,
1.20.11, 1.26.15, 2.1.39, 2.18.8–9/30, 2.22.25, 2.26.7, 3.3.1, 3.4.9, 3.5.3, 3.6.3, 3.9.11,
3.10.11/16, 3.15.13, 3.21.3, 3.22.19/33/93, 4.4.43, 4.5.4/6, 4.7.40, 4.10.25; Handbook
29.7, 38; LS 53H/
hormê ‘impulse to act’, ‘choice’ or ‘intention’ (more appropriately translated as
‘preference’ at Handbook 48.3); that which motivates an action. ‘Impulse is a motion
of the soul towards something’ (Stob. 2.7.9 = LS 53Q2). ‘Impulse is the stimulus to
action’ (
soul away from something’, is aphormê. [See Discourses 1.1.12, 1.4.11, 2.24.19,
3.2.2, 3.7.26/34, 3.12.4/13, 3.22.31/36/43/104, 3.24.56, 4.1.1/71–3, 4.4.16–18/28,
4.6.18, 4.7.20, 4.11.6/26; DL 7.85–6/108; Handbook 1.1, 2.2, 48.3; Stob.
2.7.5b3/5b5/5b13/5c/5o/7/7a/7c/7e/9/9a–b/10.]
hupexhairesis ‘reservation’; the Stoic wise person undertakes all actions ‘with
reservation’, recognising that the outcomes of all actions are not ‘in their power’, for
only the intention to act, and to act with virtue, are in their power. Thus, in
371
undertaking any action, the Stoic wise person understands that they will succeed in
their action unless something intervenes, and if something does intervene, this is
accepted as how Zeus wants the world to be, and is not an occasion for feeling upset
and lapsing into passion. [See Handbook 2.2; MA 4.1, 5.20, 6.50, 8.41, 11.37 =
Fragment 27; Seneca, On Benefits 4.34.4, Tranquillity of Mind 13.2–3; Stob. 2.7.11s
= LS 65W.]
hupolêpsis ‘opinion’ or ‘assumption’; the Stoic prokoptôn guards against holding
inappropriate or false opinions – something that occurs if they do not make ‘proper
use of impressions’. The opinions we hold are ‘in our power’; thus maintaining one’s
prohairesis in the right condition is in part accomplished by holding appropriate
opinions. [See Handbook 1.1, 20, 31.1; Stob. 2.7.10.]
idiôtês a common, private, or uneducated person. Epictetus uses this term to denote
someone who is ignorant of philosophy (in particular, Stoic ethics), and who is in this
sense uneducated. An idiôtês is idiôtikos (‘uneducated’). In Handbook 5 Epictetus
also uses the term apaideutos, ‘uneducated’, and it is from this condition of being
uneducated that the Stoic philosophos tries to save themselves (the achievement of
which would be to attain eudaimonia), undertaken by maintaining one’s prohairesis
in the right condition, following God, following nature, and above all by making the
proper use of impressions. The Stobaeus text employs the term phaulos (‘worthless’;
‘inferior’ in LS) which, in this context can be regarded as a synonym of Epictetus’
idiôtês. [See Discourses 1.29.64–6, 2.12.2–4/10–11, 3.16, 3.22.87; Fragment 2;
Handbook 5, 17, 29.7, 33.6/13/15, 46, 48.1, 51.1; Stob. 2.7.5b10/5b12–
13/5e/6c/11b/11d/11g/11i–k/11m/11s.]
372
idiôtismos the way or manner of the idiôtês, the common, private, or uneducated
person (more appropriately translated as ‘vulgar’ at Handbook 33.15). [See Handbook
33.6/15.]
impression see phantasia
impulse see hormê
indifferent see adiaphoros
kakia ‘vice’; characteristic of the idiôtês, but alien to the sophos. Vicious actions
inevitably befall the agent who makes false judgements about what is really good and
bad, and about what constitutes the telos and the eudaimôn life. Thus, from the
perspective of Stoic ethics, all, or almost all people are vicious, being phaulos
(worthless), idiôtikos and apaideutos (uneducated). The prokoptôn is aware of their
deficiencies and turns to Stoic ethics for philosophical enlightenment and practical
remedies that will require commitment to Stoic training (askêsis). [See DL 7.93/95–
7/102/120; LS 61; Stob. 2.7.5a–b/5b1/5b8–10/5b12–13/5c/5e–g/6d/6f/7/11d/11f–
g/11k–m.]
kakos ‘bad’, ‘evil’ (more appropriately ‘fault’ in Handbook 33.9); the only thing that
counts as truly bad for the Stoic philosophos is kakia, ‘vice’ (whereas things
commonly understood to be bad are regarded as adiaphoros, ‘indifferent’, by Stoics).
[See Discourses 2.1.4, 3.3.1–4, 3.20.1–4, 3.22.23, 3.24.1–3, 4.10.8, 4.12.7–8/19–21;
373
Handbook 11, 12, 16, 24, 27.7, 30, 31.2, 32.1, 33.9, 53.1; LS 60; Stob. 2.7.5a–
b/5b1/5c–g/6d–e/7/10/10b–c/11g/11i.]
kalos ‘fine’, ‘beautiful, ‘honourable’ (more appropriately ‘proper’ in Handbook 2.2);
Epictetus describes the Stoic sophos as kalos kai agathos, ‘fine and good’. See
sophos. [See Discourses 1.7.2, 1.12.7, 2.10.5, 2.11.25, 2.14.10, 3.2.1/7, 3.3.1,
3.22.69/87, 3.24.18/50/95/110, 4.5.1/6, 4.8.24; DL 7.101; Handbook 2.2, 6, 10; Stob.
2.7.5d/6e/11g–h/11k/11s.]
kata phusin ‘in accordance with nature’; the Stoic prokoptôn endeavours to maintain
their prohairesis ‘in accordance with nature’, accomplished by making proper use of
impressions, following God, and making manifest in their life the conviction that
virtue is the proper telos (‘end’ or ‘goal’) for all rational beings. Thus to live in
accordance with nature is one and the same as securing the eudaimôn life. That which
is not in accordance with nature is contrary to nature, para phusin, and ‘natural
things’ are ta kata phusin. (Epictetus also uses a range of essentially synonymous
expressions when he urges his students to ‘live in accordance with nature’, talking
also of ‘following nature’, and ‘living in harmony or agreement (sumphônos) with
nature’ – though the last expression occurs in only the Discourses and not in the
Handbook.) [See Discourses 1.11.5/8, 1.12.19, 1.15.4, 1.21.2, 1.26.2, 3.3.1, 3.4.9,
3.5.3, 3.6.3, 3.9.11/17, 3.10.11, 3.13.20, 3.16.15, 4.4.43, 4.5.5–6; DL 7.105;
Handbook 4, 6, 13, 30.]
kathêkon any ‘appropriate action’, ‘proper function’, or ‘duty’ undertaken by
someone aiming to do what befits them as a responsible, sociable person. The
374
appropriate actions are the subject of the second of the three topoi. [See Discourses
1.7.1–2/21, 1.18.2, 1.22.15, 1.28.5, 2.7.1, 2.8.29, 2.10, 2.14.18, 2.17.15/31, 3.2.2/4,
3.7.24–8, 3.22.43/69/74, 4.4.16, 4.12.16; DL 7.25/93/107–10/118; Handbook 30,
33.13, 42; LS 59; Stob. 2.7.5b2–3/5b9/6a/7b/8/8a/9/10b/11a.]
katorthôma a ‘right action’ or ‘complete or perfect action’ undertaken by the Stoic
sophos, constituted by an appropriate action performed virtuously. [See LS 59K–O;
Stob. 2.7.8/8a/11a/11e/11l/11o.]
lupê ‘distress’; one of the four primary pathê (passions). Lupê is the distress that the
non-wise person experiences when events or objects that are mistakenly believed to
be of real harm are present. Some translators, including Pomeroy 1999 (Stob.) use the
term ‘pain’ for lupê, and it is important to stress that in Stoic philosophy of mind, lupê
denotes mental pain, what someone suffers whilst in the grip of this passion (see
Garrett 1999). [See Discourses 3.13.11, 3.22.48, 4.1.84, 4.3.7, 4.6.8; DL 7.96/110–
12/118; Stob. 2.7.5b/5c/5g/10/10a–c/11i.]
nature see phusis
opinion see hupolêpsis
orexis ‘desire’; properly directed only at virtue, a type of ‘rational impulse’
constituted by a movement of the soul towards something. Epictetus says that we
should exercise desire and aversion ‘in accordance with nature’ (Discourses 1.21.1).
See hormê. [See Discourses 1.1.12, 1.4.1/11, 2.24.19, 3.2.1–3, 3.3.2, 3.6.6, 3.9.22,
375
3.12, 3.13.21, 3.14.10, 3.22.13/31/36/43, 3.23.9, 3.24.54, 3.26.14, 4.1.84, 4.4.28,
4.5.27, 4.6.18, 4.8.20, 4.11.6/26; Handbook 1.1, 2.1–2.14.1, 15, 31.4, 32.2, 48.3; Stob.
2.7.9/11f.]
passion see pathos
pathos ‘passion’; any of the ‘disturbing or violent emotions’ experienced
inappropriately and sometimes excessively by those who lack Stoic wisdom and
believe that externals really are good or bad, when in fact they are ‘indifferent’. (The
term pathos does not occur in the Handbook, and it occurs only sparsely in the
Discourses, though terms which describe someone’s experience of falling into
disturbing passions abound, and these include being miserable, distressed, hindered,
impeded, unfortunate, irritated, and wretched.) A pathos, according to the Stoics, is an
excessive impulse occasioned by assenting to a false judgement based on a
misunderstanding of what is truly good and bad, and can be regarded as the affective
component of such a judgement, or can be identified as the judgement itself (DL
7.111; LS 65G3). When you have a pathos you are said to have an ‘irrational and
unnatural movement of the soul’ (DL 7.110). The Stoics identified four primary
pathê, two directed at what we expect to happen, epithumia (desire) and phobos
(fear), and two directed at present circumstances, hêdonê (pleasure) and lupê
(distress): thus what we first longed for, we take delight in once we have it, and what
we first feared becomes the source of anguish when we the time comes to suffer it.
Other passions are classified under these four primary passions. Anger, sexual desire,
and love of riches, for instance, are types of desire (Stob. 2.7.10b = LS 65E). The
Stoic sophos does not experience these pathê, but does experience the eupatheiai,
376
‘good feelings’. The Stoic prokoptôn endeavours to make the transition from idiôtês,
whose life is circumscribed by the pathê, to sophos, who is entirely free from the
pathê – and in this sense they strive to eradicate or extirpate the passions; though, one
cannot directly extirpate a passion that one is already suffering any more than one can
prevent sugar from tasting sweet (for instance) once the slice of cake is already in
one’s mouth. The Stoic sophos simply stops experiencing the pathê because they no
longer make false judgements about what is good and bad, and about what constitutes
the telos and the eudaimôn life. Thus, the prokoptôn strives not to eradicate the pathê
directly, but to guard against making false judgements, which occurs, for Epictetus,
when one fails to make proper use of impressions. See also agathos, apatheia, ektos,
eupatheia. [See Discourses 1.27.10; 3.2.3, 4.1.115, 4.3.7, 4.6.16; DL 7.110–16; LS
65; Stob. 2.7.6d/10/10a–10e.]
peace of mind see apatheia; euroia biou
Peprômenê ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’, conceived of as one’s appointed lot in life. The key
feature of fate is its anankê (necessity or compulsion). The training that the Stoic
prokoptôn engages in, if successful, will result in their embracing their own fate, and
that of the world generally, as wholly acceptable and even desirable, no matter what
its character may be. [See Discourses 2.23.42, 3.22.95, 4.1.128–31, 4.4.34, 4.7.20; DL
7.149; Handbook 53.]
phantasia ‘impression’; phantasiai are what we are aware of in virtue of having
experiences. They are not limited only to what is sensed in perception, but include as
well what we are aware of when thinking abstractly, having memories, imaging
377
things, and so forth. An impression is an ‘imprint on the soul: the name having been
appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax’ (DL 7.45,
trans. Hicks), and this notion of what an impression is, we must suppose, derives from
Plato’s account in the Theaetetus (191c–e) of the mind being compared to a block of
wax that when impressed by perceptions or ideas, retains and remembers them for as
long as the impression lasts. Whereas non-rational animals respond to their
impressions automatically (thus ‘using’ them), over and above using our impressions,
human beings, being rational, can ‘understand their use’ (Discourses 1.6.13, 2.14.15)
and, with practice, assent or not assent to them as we deem appropriate. ‘The use of
impressions’ (hê chrêsis tôn phantasiôn) in this wider sense is an essential component
of making progress, and it is this capacity that Epictetus strives to teach his students.
See also prokopê, sunkatathesis. [See Discourses 1.1.7/12, 1.3.4, 1.6.13, 1.12.34,
1.20.5/7/15, 1.27.1–2, 1.28.10–12/30–3, 1.30.4, 2.1.4, 2.8.4/6, 2.14.15–16, 2.18.8–29,
2.19.32, 2.22.5–6, 2.23.7/40/42, 3.2.5/8, 3.3.1/17/20, 3.8, 3.12.6–15, 3.16.15,
3.22.25/43/103, 3.24.69/88/108, 3.25.6, 3.26.13–14, 4.1.74, 4.3.7, 4.4.13–14, 4.5.23,
4.6.25/34, 4.7.32, 4.10.26; DL 7.45–6/49–51, 7.118; Handbook 1.5, 6, 10, 16, 18, 19,
20, 34, 45; LS 39A (= DL 7.49–51), 62K (= Discourses 1.1.7–12); Stob. 2.7.5l/7a–
b/9/10c.]
philosophia ‘philosophy’; literally, the ‘love of wisdom’, the discipline in which, as a
Stoic, one immerses oneself in the pursuit of eudaimonia. [See Discourses 1.15.1–4,
1.26.15, 2.11.1, 3.10.6–7, 3.12.12, 3.13.23, 3.14.10, 3.15.12, 3.24.81, 3.26.13,
4.1.113, 4.8.9/18/34–6, 4.11.22–5; Handbook 22, 52.1; Stob. 2.7.11k/11m.]
378
philosophos ‘philosopher’; literally, one who ‘loves wisdom’, in Stoicism the person
for whom Stoic philosophy is a way of life, a way of engaging in affairs in which one
aims to flourish as fully as one may in the pursuit of eudaimonia. The Stobaeus text
employs the term spoudaios (‘worthwhile’; ‘virtuous’ in LS) which, in this context
can be regarded as a synonym of Epictetus’ philosophos. [See Discourses 1.1.25,
1.2.26/29, 1.4.1, 1.8.11–14, 1.9.1, 1.11.28, 1.18.1–2, 1.20.7, 2.9.13, 2.14.7–9/11,
2.17.1–3/30–1, 2.24.29, 3.7.1, 3.8.7, 3.9.11, 3.13.11, 3.15.10, 3.19.1, 3.24.31,
3.26.7/35–6, 4.1.83/132–43, 4.4.18, 4.6.12/33, 4.7.24/32, 4.8.4–23, 4.8.9/17–20;
Handbook 22, 23, 29.3–4/7, 32.1, 46.1, 48.1, 49; Stob. 2.7.5b8/5b11/5k–
l/6c/11b/11d/11g/11i–k/11m/11p–q/11s.]
phobos ‘fear’; one of the four primary pathê (passions). Phobos is the fear that the
non-wise person directs towards anticipated events or objects in the mistaken belief
that they are of real harm. [See DL 7.110/112; Stob. 2,7.5b–c/5g/10/10b–c.]
phusis ‘nature’; literally ‘growth’, the totality of everything, including the cosmic
forces and principles that create and sustain all things. Depending upon our point of
view and the emphasis we wish to make, phusis is also God, providence, fate; and
also logos, for the world is wholly rational because God brings about events according
to His necessarily good purposes. Each individual thing has its own phusis, its own
way of growing, behaving, and flourishing according to what is usual and beneficial
for the species of thing it happens to be. Thus, for example, it is natural for cows to
eat grass, but contrary to the nature of a person to do so. Such specific differences and
variations in the natures of different types of thing is accounted for by the way in
which God, conceived as active matter, blends with the passive material universe,
379
shaping matter into the diverse forms of which we are aware. Phusis is the supreme
organising and creative principle which brings about the phusis possessed by each
individual entity. Stoics hold that the rationality of Zeus/phusis/logos is manifest in
each human being taken to be (literally) a fragment of God, for everyone has the
capacity to reason, and this being the case, everyone has the potential to understand in
what the good life consists (eudaimonia) and how to attain it. For the Stoics, to
acquire eudaimonia one must ‘follow nature’, ‘live in accordance with nature’, or
‘live in harmony with nature’ – these are all essentially synonymous expressions –
which means both (1) accepting our own fate and the fate of the world, as well as
understanding what it means to be a rational being, and striving for virtue by means of
which we maintain our prohairesis in the right condition, and (2) doing what is
appropriate for the type of creature that we happen to be, which for human beings
includes doing what is required with respect to one’s social roles: to live in
accordance with nature, a mother for example must care for her child, and a judge
must dispense justice wisely and impartially. See aretê, hêgemonikon, and theos.
[See Discourses 1.2.6, 1.4.14–15/18/29, 1.6.15/21, 1.9.9, 1.11.5/8, 1.12.19, 1.15.4,
1.16.4, 1.17.18, 1.19.25, 1.20.5, 1.21.2, 1.22.9, 1.26.2, 2.5.24, 2.6.9, 2.11.6, 2.13.11,
2.14.22, 2.20.15, 2.23.42, 2.24.12/19/101–2, 3.1.3/30, 3.4.9, 3.5.3, 3.6.3–4, 3.7.28,
3.9.11/17, 3.10.11, 3.13.20, 3.16.15, 3.23.12, 3.24.1/102, 4.1.121/125, 4.4.14/28/43,
4.5.5–6, 4.8.40, 4.10.8/26, 4.12.2; DL 7.87–9/105/108/147–9/156–7; Handbook 1.2–
3, 2.4, 6, 13, 26, 27, 30, 48.3, 49; Stob. 2.7.5b3/5b5/5m/6/6e/7a–
f/8/8a/10/10a/10e/11i.]
pistos ‘trustworthy’, of someone possessing pistis, trustworthiness; for Epictetus, a
key characteristic of the prokoptôn’s prohairesis. See also aidêmôn. [See Discourses
380
1.3.4, 2.2.4, 2.4.1–2, 2.14.13, 4.5.14, 4.13.19–20; Stob. 2.7.11m; for pistos together
with aidêmôn, see Discourses 1.4.18–20, 1.25.4, 1.28.20–1/23, 2.4.2, 2.8.23, 2.10.22–
3/29, 2.22.20/30, 3.3.9–10, 3.7.36, 3.13.3, 3.14.13, 3.17.3, 3.23.18, 4.1.161, 4.3.7,
4.9.17, 4.13.13/15; Handbook 24.3–5.]
pleasure see hêdonê
preferred see proêgmenos
proêgmenos ‘preferred’; used of adiaphoros (‘indifferent’) things, conventionally
taken to be good and advantageous, including such things as health and wealth, taking
pleasure in the company of others, and so forth. Enjoying any of the preferred
indifferents is not in itself constitutive of the eudaimôn life sought by the Stoic
prokoptôn. See also apoproêgmenos. [See DL 7.102/105–7; LS 58E–F, Stob.
2.7.7b/7f–g.]
progress see prokopê /prokoptô / prokoptôn
prohairesis ‘moral character’; the capacity that rational beings have for making
choices and intending the outcomes of their actions, sometimes translated as will,
volition, intention, choice, moral choice, moral purpose. This faculty is understood by
Stoics to be essentially rational. It is the faculty we use to ‘attend to impressions’ and
to give (or withhold) assent to impressions. Those things which are outside the scope
of one’s prohairesis are the aprohaireta, which are aprohairetos and ‘external’
(ektos), and ‘not in our power’ (ouk eph’ hêmin); see Discourses 1.30.3, 2.16.1,
381
3.3.14, 3.8.1–3. See also hêgemonikon, sunkatathesis. [See Discourses 1.1.23,
1.4.18–21, 1.8.16, 1.12.9, 1.17.21/23/26, 1.19.8/16/23, 1.22.10, 1.29.1–3/12/24,
1.30.3, 2.1.4–6/9–10/12/39–40, 2.5.4–5, 2.6.25, 2.10.8/24–9, 2.13.10, 2.15.1, 2.16.1,
2.22.20/26–9, 2.23.5–29, 3.1.40/42, 3.2.13, 3.3.8/14–19, 3.4.9, 3.5.7, 3.7.5, 3.8.1–3,
3.10.18, 3.12.5/8, 3.16.15, 3.19.2, 3.22.13/103, 3.23.5, 3.24.12/56/106/112, 3.26.24,
4.1.84/100, 4.4.18/23/33/39, 4.5.12/23/32, 4.6.9–10, 4.7.8, 4.10.1–2/8, 4.12.7/12/15,
4.13.21; Handbook 4, 9, 13, 30.]
prokopê ‘progress’; what the Stoic prokoptôn tries to maintain by applying the
principles of Stoic ethics, by living virtuously and, in particular for Epictetus, by
‘following nature’, ‘following God’, and making ‘proper use of impressions’. [See
Discourses 1.4.1–21, 3.2.5, 3.8.4, 3.19.3, 4.2.4–5; DL 7.91; Ep. 75.8–18; Handbook
12.1, 13.1, 51.2–3; Stob. 2.7.7b.]
prokoptô to make progress.
prokoptôn ‘one who is making progress (prokopê)’ in living as a Stoic, which for
Epictetus means above all learning the ‘correct use of impressions’. See phantasia.
[See Handbook 48.2, 51.2.]
proper function see kathêkon
repulsion see aphormê
reservation see hupexhairesis
382
right action see katorthôma
Sage see sophos
self-respecting see aidêmôn
sophos the Stoic ‘wise person’ or ‘Sage’, who values only aretê and enjoys a
eudaimôn life. The sophos enjoys a way of engaging in life that the prokoptôn strives
to emulate and attain. The philosophos (philosopher), in contrast to the idiôtês
(‘uneducated person’), is someone who has taken up the training that is required to
make progress (prokopê) towards the condition enjoyed by the sophos. Epictetus also
refers to such a person as phronimos, ‘wise’ (Discourses 2.21.9, 2.22.3, 3.22.37,
4.1.92), as spoudaios, ‘good’ (Discourses 1.7.3/29, 3.6.5) and as kalos kai agathos,
‘fine and good’ (Discourses 1.7.2, 1.12.7, 1.23.3, 2.10.5, 2.11.25, 2.14.10, 2.21.11,
3.2.1/7, 3.3.1, 3.22.69/87, 3.24.18/50/95/110, 4.5.1, 4.8.24; see also Stob.
2.7.11g/11s). See also philosophos, philosophia, prokopê, prokoptôn. [See
Discourses 3.13.22, 3.22.67, 4.1.6; DL 7.94/117–25; Handbook 53.2; Stob.
2.7.5b8/5b10–12/11b/11k/11m–n/11s.]
sunkatathesis ‘assent’ (noun); a capacity of the prohairesis to judge the significance
of impressions. It is because we are prone to making incorrect judgements that
eudaimonia eludes us and we are vulnerable to the pathê (passions) under whose
influence we lapse into vice. See also pathos, phantasia. [See Discourses 1.17.22–3
383
1.18.1, 1.28.1, 2.17.5, 3.2.2, 3.7.15, 3.12.14/104, 3.22.42–3, 4.1.69, 4.4.13, 4.6.12/26,
4.10.2, 4.11.6; DL 7.91; Handbook 45; Stob. 2.7.7b/9b/11m.]
tarachê ‘distress’, ‘disturbance’, ‘trouble’; what one avoids when one enjoys
ataraxia. [See Handbook 1.3, 3, 5, 12, 28.]
telos ‘end’ or ‘goal’; that which we pursue for its own sake and not for the sake of
any other thing. The Stoics accepted the traditional conception of the telos being
eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’), but argued that this consists solely in aretê
(moral excellence); the telos, then, can be attained by ‘living in accordance with
virtue’ (Stob. 2.7.6e). Epictetus formulates the end in several different but closely
related ways. He says that the end is to maintain one’s prohairesis in proper order, to
follow God, follow nature, live in accordance with nature, or live in harmony with
nature – all of which count as maintaining a eudaimôn life. The means by which this
is to be accomplished is to apply oneself assiduously to the ‘three topoi’. The earlier
Stoics defined the end in a range of related ways: Zeno says it is ‘Living in
agreement’; Cleanthes added to this, saying it is ‘Living in agreement with nature’;
Chrysippus defined it as ‘Living in accord with our experience of what happens
naturally’ (see LS 63B); Diogenes of Babylon says that the end is ‘Being circumspect
in selecting and rejecting the things in accordance with nature’; Archedemus says it is
‘Living so as to complete everything that is appropriate’; and Antipater says it is
‘Living so as always to select what is in accordance with nature whilst rejecting what
is contrary to nature’ (see Stob. 2.7.6a/6e). [See Discourses 1.12.5, 1.20.15, 1.30.4,
4.7.20; DL 7.87–9/96–7; LS 63; Stob. 2.7.5b3/5b5/5k/6a–c/6e.]
384
theos ‘God’, who is material, is a sort of fiery breath that blends with undifferentiated
matter to create the forms that we find in the world around us. He is supremely
rational, and despite our feelings to the contrary, makes the best world that it is
possible to make. How we understand and relate to God is of central concern to
Epictetus. God is characterised as (a) omniscient (Discourses 1.14.9–10); (b) the
father of everyone (we all are ‘sons of Zeus’ ;1.3.1–2, 1.9.6, 1.13.3–4, 1.19.12), (c)
who has made everyone to be happy (eudaimôn) and to enjoy peace of mind
(eustatheia ;3.24.2), (d) who (as a matter of fact) protects us and cares for us (1.17.27,
3.24.3), and (e) can be actively called upon to protect us (2.18.29), (f) who has given
us what we need, including the virtues and the faculty of making proper use of
impressions (1.1.12, 1.6.28–9, 1.25.3, 1.29.3–4, 2.16.13–14, 2.23.6–9, 3.24.3,
4.1.100, 4.5.34), and (g) who is wholly providential (1.16, 2.14.11, 2.23.2–4, 3.17).
The Stoic’s relationship to God is characterised by their (h) regarding God as their
benevolent creator and friend (1.16, 3.26.28/37); (i) being a friend to God (4.3.9,
3.24.60); (j) not blaming God for misfortunes or hardships (1.14.16, 3.10.13,
3.22.13/48, 3.24.58, 4.7.9); (k) endeavouring to do God’s will, to obey Him and
please Him (2.6.9–10, 2.7.13, 2.16.42, 3.1.37, 3.24.110, 4.1.99, 4.3.9, 4.12.11), to
‘follow God’ and accept the fate that He bestows on them and on the world (1.12.1–7,
1.20.15, 1.30.4, 4.7.20; Handbook 53.1–3); (l) showing reverence to and being
thankful to God (1.4.32, 2.23.5, 3.7.26, 4.4.18, 4.7.9); (m) understanding that
everyone is literally a part (meros) or fragment (apospasma) of God (1.14.6, 1.17.27,
2.8.10–14, Ep. 31.11), that they share His reason (1.9.5) and strive to join His
fellowship (koinônia) (2.19.27); (n) serving in the post assigned to them by God
(1.9.16/24, 1.16.21, 3.22.69, 3.24.99; Handbook 22); (o) bearing witness to God’s
work and their own capacities (1.29.46–9, 3.24.112–13, 3.26.28, 4.8.31); (p) singing
385
praises to God (3.26.29–30); and (q) imitating God (2.14.11–13). God is a frequent
topic throughout the Discourses; for God as ‘the Giver’, see 4.1.103–7, 4.4.47,
4.10.14–16, Handbook 11; for arguments for the existence of God see 1.6.1–11 and
2.14.25–8. See also Zeus. [See Discourses 2.23.42; DL 7.119/124/134–9/147–8;
Handbook 1.3, 15, 22, 29.2, 31.1/4–5, 32.2, 53.1/3; LS 46/54A–B, Stob.
2.7.5b2/5b12/10c/11g/11k/11s.]
topoi ‘topics’. The ‘three topics’ or ‘fields of study’ which we find elucidated in the
Discourses
(Message over 64k, truncated.)
Offline 
Send Email
