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Don’t Worry, Be Stoic: Ancient Wisdom for Troubled Times. By Peter J. Vernezze. Lanham: University Press of
William O. Stephens
Readers of this journal are not the intended audience of this modest, little book. As the title implies, it targets a popular, American audience totally unfamiliar with Stoicism. The ‘ancient wisdom’ Vernezze imparts includes selected ideas from the Bible, Plato, Aristotle, and Zen Buddhism. Quips from Carl Jung (Jung 1971), Emerson (uncited), Thoreau, Victor Frankl (Frankl 1959), the Dalai Lama, Daniel Goleman (Goleman 1995), and Albert Ellis (Ellis 1998) also find their way into Vernezze’s reflections. The principal texts discussed are from Seneca, Epictetus, and—the author’s favorite—Marcus Aurelius. Vernezze disdains recent translations of Marcus and Epictetus by opting to use the antiquated Long (Long 1864) rather than either Hays (Hays 2002) or a translation of the last century, and the ageing Loeb edition (Oldfather 1925 and 1928) rather than Gill (Gill 1995) or, for Book 1 of the Discourses, Dobbin (Dobbin 1998).
The book consists of a two-page preface, a thirteen page ‘Introduction: Stoicism: The Path to Personal Liberation’, and thirty-three, two to four page sermonlike reflections, which the author accurately enough calls ‘essays inspired by Stoic thought’ (vii), endnotes, and a paltry index. Absent are any references to other scholars who have written on the Stoics. Consequently, since the author evidently makes no pretense of offering a contribution to serious scholarly work on Stoicism, it seems out of place to criticize this book on the basis of the usual scholarly standards. Perhaps Vernezze intends that some teachers of introductory philosophy courses could make use of his inspirational mini-essays for students unprepared to study pri
In the introduction Vernezze describes the Homeric warrior ethic, the Platonic Theory of Forms, and the Aristotelian ethic of the aristocratic good man as locating the normative standard of behavior as external to the individual. In contrast, Vernezze says Stoicism searches for an internal code of behavior. Vernezze has no interest in discussing how the Theory of Forms is vigorously challenged and refined in what most scholars take to be the later Platonic dialogues. Nor does he discuss the infamous tension between the life of theoria and the life of phronimos in the Nicomachean Ethics. Historians of philosophy who would cringe at painting with such broad, sloppy brush strokes could be excused for setting the book aside before reading further. Nevertheless, Vernezze’s interest is to emphasize that Stoicism is ‘the great democratizer of ethics’ (xv) since it imposes no theoretical constraints on who may achieve the human good, whereas the Homeric, Platonic, and Aristotelian views are all elitist in that these theories restrict the good life to the few. He then discusses two groups of critics of Stoicism. The first faults Stoicism by insisting that life is simply too chaotic and stressful to be lived in a state of constant tranquility. The second group sees the Stoic goal as attainable but undesirable, since it robs us of both the emotional highs and lows that enrich life and make it worth living (xviii). Vernezze responds to the first criticism by noting that Stoics insist that the life of tranquility is not achieved without great, sustained effort over a lifetime. He explains the disposition of joy and gentle spirit characteristic of the Stoic in reply to the second criticism.
His brief discussion of critiques and criticisms of Stoicism provides the point of departure for what remains. He aims ‘to utilize Stoic wisdom in order to transform our troubles and deal effectively with disappointment, difficulty, and destructive emotions’ (xx). Our afflictions as Americans, Vernezze argues, stem from the American dream, according to which we can have it all, i.e. we can be spiritually fulfilled, physically fit, financially successful, and sexually satisfied. Stoicism offers a sober remedy to this pernicious American ‘cult of optimism’, as Vernezze calls it, and the crushing disillusionment it inevitably brings. The first chapter of mini-essays, ‘Difficulties and Disappointments’, illustrates how to apply Stoicism to problems encountered in the external world. These problems are cars, money, vacations, obstacles on a jogging path, marriage, suicide, old age, and illness. The second chapter, ‘Destructive Emotions’, contains sermons on how to apply Stoicism to mental disturbance, ranging from petty inconveniences when traveling, waiting in line, house cleaning, and doing automotive maintenance, to dealing with severe hardship from being maimed, debility arising from self-hatred, mundane stresses of workplace and relationships, grief over the loss and suffering of loved ones, and anger management. The brief essays in the third chapter explore connections between Stoicism, eastern and western religious traditions, and spiritual practices.
How effective are these mini-essays? The quality is somewhat uneven. Vernezze’s welcome acquaintance with the Philoctetes (xxi) on the one hand is offset by his neglecting to identify ‘the mythical beast that sprouted several new heads for each one that was cut off’ (9) as the Hydra defeated by Heracles, who, of course, was an important exemplum for the ancient Stoics. More worrisome is his interpretation of the Stoic view of romantic love. One can certainly challenge his denial that there is anything to suggest that the Stoics ‘would disagree with the Greek view that love is a God (Eros)’ (17). Equally misleading is his assertion that the Stoics ‘do not so much condemn romantic love as ignore it’ (17). Reydams-Schils 2005, Inwood 1997, and Stephens 1996 all argue against Vernezze’s glib distortion on this point.
The plethora of printing errors that pepper the book are serious distractions. I counted thirty-three mistakes in spelling, punctuation, paragraph indentations, and grammar in 140 pages. Many of these errors damage the meaning intended. For example, confusing ‘imminent’ with ‘immanent’ yields: ‘What are we to do in the face of such obvious evidence that death can always be immanent?’ (18), and ‘many Christians diverge from Church teaching, believing that, when death is immanent, the sort of prolonged suffering we see all too often today in hospitals and nursing homes can in no way be intended by a benevolent Deity’ (21). The proofreader also confused ‘descrying’ with ‘decrying’ (60), ‘proceeded’ with ‘preceded’ (64). Such sloppy production reinforces the reputation of the University Press of America as a third-rate publisher.
The author’s use of the adjective ‘transcendent’ is troublesome. For example, one could take issue with his characterization of the Tao as a transcendent force (77). Similarly problematic is his ascription to the Stoics of ‘the notion of an eternal, transcendent force governing the universe’ (43). Gratefully, this inaccuracy is corrected a few sentences later when he notes that ‘the Stoic God is not, like the Judeo-Christian God, a separately existing Being, but is instead best understood as a rational ordering principle infused throughout the cosmos’ (43).
Yet Vernezze’s desire to underscore similarities between Stoicism and Christianity leads him to misread Marcus. Vernezze claims that ‘Forgiveness is an important concept in Stoicism. Like Positive Psychology, Stoics recognize the profound spiritual truth embedded in Christ’s counsel to love your enemies and to pray for those who persecute you…’ (68–69). To support this misinterpretation, Vernezze quotes Meditations 4.7: ‘ “Take away the opinion ‘I have been harmed’ and the complaint itself is taken away. Take away the complaint and the harm as well disappears” ’ (68). But Stoic magnanimity differs from Christian forgiveness. Forgiveness entails three stages: A wrongfully harms B; A and B recognize that A wrongfully harmed B; B releases A from moral condemnation. In contrast, the magnanimous person judges the act committed against her to be too trivial to constitute any real harm at all. The magnanimous Stoic makes no complaint against the putative offender, and thus the putative harm evaporates. The Stoic does not pray for those who persecute her, nor does she love them in the sense that Christ counsels. The Stoic does what she can to cooperate with and assist other human beings as fellow members of the social community of rational beings, but praying for those hostile toward her is a practice of Christian spirituality alien to a Stoic’s sensibility.
Vernezze’s eagerness to stress parallels between the story of Job and the Stoic attitude towards misfortune yields the objectionable claim that ‘by accepting the totality of what occurs with placid resolve, Stoicism approaches something akin to faith’ (84). If by this Vernezze means simply that the Stoics believed in divine providence and that the cosmos operates according to right reason, which is the same as Fate, which is the same as Zeus’ will, then his claim is innocent enough. But if by ‘faith’ he means instead belief in an unseen, otherworldly, supernatural justice that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence, then this is squarely at odds with the this-worldly naturalism, physicalism, and rationalism of Stoicism.
Vernezze is a bit careless when he writes that ‘Stoics believed they had responsibilities to all creatures’ (90), since the Stoics denied that nonhuman animals were rational creatures deserving of justice.
Despite these flaws, Vernezze does a decent job of explaining the basic appeal of Stoic thinking about everyday problems. The concise essays read well and succeed in lifting the worries from the kind of reader who, like the author, finds solace in Stoicism.
Department of Philosophy
Department of Classical and Near Eastern Studies
Bibliography
Dobbin, R.F. 1998. Epictetus. Discourses. Book 1. Translation with an introduction and commentary. Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series.
Ellis, Albert. 1998. A Guide to Rational Living. No.
Frankl, Victor. 1959. Man’s Search for Meaning.
Gill, Christopher. 1995. Epictetus. The Discourses, the Handbook, Fragments. Translation revised by Robin Hard.
Goleman, Daniel. 1995. Emotional Intelligence.
Hadas, Moses. 1958. The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca.
Hays, Gregory. 2002. Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. A new translation with an introduction.
Inwood, Brad. 1997. ‘Why Do Fools Fall in Love?’ Aristotle and After, edited by Richard Sorabji. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Supplement 68.
Jung, Carl. 1971. The Portable Jung.
Long, George. 1864. The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Translation.
Oldfather, W.A. 1925, 1928. Epictetus. The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments. Translation with Greek text. Loeb Classical Library.
Reydams-Schils, Gretchen. 2005. The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection.
Stephens, William O. 1996. Epictetus on How the Stoic Sage Loves.
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