List: I am thankful to Carl for initially referencing here my MCG discussions on the possible definition of trust in Information Theory terms. I am also ...
Ed Gerck
egerck@...
Mar 4, 1998 7:31 pm
210
{This message was apparently not sent to all list members, so I am sending it a second time. My apologies if someone receives it twice} List: I am thankful to...
Ed Gerck
egerck@...
Mar 5, 1998 10:52 pm
211
Chris, I know that each of the lists PKIX, SPKI and "cert-talk" tend to have little patience with academic discussions on modeling. If you find a list that is...
Tony Bartoletti
azb@...
Mar 6, 1998 2:16 am
212
... OK, Tony, I'll beat you up. :) I think it's important to note that SPKI's lack of a global directory structure (such as X.500), if that's what you're...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 6, 1998 3:48 am
213
{Cross-posting between cert-talk and spki, as received} All and everyone ;-) Due to a catastrophic change in the DNS servers that answer for *.softex.br (a...
Ed Gerck
egerck@...
Mar 6, 1998 8:09 pm
214
Carl, I do believe SPKI can support a global solution, where employed within a suitable set of practices and interrelations. I do agree also that any global...
Tony Bartoletti
azb@...
Mar 6, 1998 8:47 pm
215
Ed, my apologies for not responding to you. My own e-mail has been badly misbehaving, with some messages taking two days to get from one of our servers to...
Bob Jueneman
BJUENEMAN@...
Mar 6, 1998 11:00 pm
216
Final Call for Papers Fifth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security San Francisco, California November 3-5, 1998 Sponsored by ACM SIGSAC Papers...
Gene Tsudik
tsudik@...
Mar 9, 1998 9:43 pm
217
... I just submitted new drafts for -theory- and -examples-. They're available at ftp://ftp.clark.net/pub/cme/{theory,examples}.txt for those who don't want to...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 11, 1998 6:48 am
218
New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure Working Group ...
Internet-Drafts@...
Mar 12, 1998 5:42 pm
219
New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure Working Group ...
Internet-Drafts@...
Mar 12, 1998 5:42 pm
220
... http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn/ecourier.htm showed up on another list, but looks interesting. ... Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.3 ...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 12, 1998 5:57 pm
221
... I wish people would stop using the naked word "trust". US currency says "In God we trust". I can't think of any human I trust without qualification. For...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 12, 1998 5:57 pm
222
New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure Working Group ...
Internet-Drafts@...
Mar 12, 1998 5:56 pm
223
New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure Working Group ...
Internet-Drafts@...
Mar 12, 1998 5:58 pm
224
... I look at X.509 names as just another formatting for SDSI names. That is, one can form (name <509-root-key> <CA-name-1> <CA-name-2> ... <leaf-name>) and...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 12, 1998 6:21 pm
225
New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure Working Group ...
Internet-Drafts@...
Mar 12, 1998 6:21 pm
226
... Eric Rescorla of Terisa made a strong request at the last SPKI WG meeting (in DC) for public keys to carry just key parameters and raw algorithm names, not...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 12, 1998 6:22 pm
227
... Am I missing something here? The same characteristic is available with a naked public key, with no certificate, right? What you really count on in this...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 12, 1998 6:49 pm
228
... To be coherent with the text, and to the other announced texts, the last sentence above should delete the word "trust" and use "authorization" instead. The...
E. Gerck
egerck@...
Mar 12, 1998 7:34 pm
229
If you don't put the hash algorithm in the key, then if there were a weak hash algorithm, people could forge signatures using that hash. They could take an...
Hal Finney
hal@...
Mar 12, 1998 7:50 pm
230
... However, it is perfectly fine for someone to use the word trust in a naked way (ie, intransitive), without being "sloppy"or using implicit language. For...
E. Gerck
egerck@...
Mar 12, 1998 7:58 pm
231
... To: Hal Finney <hal@...> Subject: Re: public key algorithm naming cc: spki@... Date: 03/12/98, 16:00:29 ... And how is that different from putting...
Angelos D. Keromytis
angelos@...
Mar 12, 1998 10:14 pm
232
... Hal, I believe that all 3 of the options I listed (I), (II) and (III) prevent someone sneaking up with a weak hash algorithm and faking a claim of...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 12, 1998 10:18 pm
233
... In the context it was written, I belive there was no particular implication that "absolute" or "unconditional" trust was meant. The observation was made in...
Tony Bartoletti
azb@...
Mar 12, 1998 10:23 pm
234
... IMO, the hash algorithm you use to sign is as important a part of "you" as your key parameters are. It serves to define you as much as anything, in the...
Matt Fredette
fredette@...
Mar 12, 1998 10:37 pm
235
... To: spki@... Subject: Re: public key algorithm naming Date: 03/12/98, 16:41:29 ... But with digital signatures, it's the owner of a key who is going to ...
Angelos D. Keromytis
angelos@...
Mar 12, 1998 10:47 pm
236
... Tony, I'm sure that none of us is thinking of unconditional, unquestioned, unqualified trust when we use the word "trust" alone. However, I believe that's...
Carl Ellison
cme@...
Mar 12, 1998 10:50 pm
237
... [snip] OK, I understand. I will strive not to take such shortcuts in the future (even if it means more typing - huff huff :) ___TONY___ Tony Bartoletti...
Tony Bartoletti
azb@...
Mar 12, 1998 10:59 pm
238
... [...] ... This works in a lot of cases, but I'm not sure that it works in general. In many scenarios it is difficult for a requester to know a priori all...
