TOC: Russian Anti-Westernism VI (Russ. 'Forum' 8:2, 2011)
[Please, excuse any cross-posting. Feel free to forward or publish.]

Dear colleagues,

we would like to bring to your attention the latest special issue of the
open-access Russian-language webjournal

"Forum noveishei vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i kul'tury" (vol. 8, no. 2, 2011)
available at:

http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss16.html

This issue, the previous five, and the following 2012 issue of the "Forum" are
devoted to anti-Western ideologies in contemporary Russia and their historical
roots.

Please, find below the latest issue's transliterated list of contents:
----------------------------

Forum noveishei vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i kul'tury 8:2 (2011)


I. Antizapadnye ideologicheskie techeniia v postsovetskoi Rossii i ikh istoki
(6)

Alan Ingram
Geopolitika i neofashizm Aleksandra Dugina v kontekste postsovetskoi Rossii

Jussi Lassila
Osmyslivaia politicheskii stil' "Nashikh": Bronzovyi soldat i antioranzhevoe
obshhestvo

Aleksandr Kuz’min
Stanovlenie i razvitie russkogo natsionalizma v Respublike Komi

Anton Sveshnikov
"No livonets - nash sosed, delo tut pokhuzhe": antizapadnye intentsii v detskoi
sovetskoi istoricheskoi literature (po stranitsam poemy N.P. Konchalovskoi
"Nasha drevniaia stolitsa”)

Boris Khavkin
Spory ob uchebnikakh istorii v postsovetskoi Rossii

Oksana Pakhlevska
Neoevrazizm, krizis russkoi identichnosti i Ukraina (chast' vtoraia)


II. Antiliberal'nye techeniia na postsovetskom prostranstve

Andreas Umland, Anton Shekhovtsov
Pravoradikal'naia partiinaia politika v postsovetskoi Ukraine i zagadka
marginal'nosti ukrainskikh ul'tranatsionalistov v 1994-2009 gg.

Kirill Galushko
Drugaia storona ukrainskogo regionalizma: kommentarii k stat'e A. Umlanda i A.
Shekhovtsova

Aleksei Lastovskii
Russkii natsionalizm kak ideologicheskii proekt belorusskoi identichnosti


III. Stranitsy noveishei istorii

Heinz Huerten
1870/71 i 1989/90: dva nemetskikh protsessa ob''edineniia v sravnenii


IV. Russkaia kul'tura na perelome (Interview Mariny Rakhmanovoi i Iriny Ziminoi.
Red. Leonida Luksa i Alekseia Rybakova)

Leonid Luks
Vstuplenie: Toska po "serebrianomu veku"

Vadim Abdrashitov (kinorezhisser)

Levon Akopian (muzykoved)

Lev Anninskii (literaturnyi kritik)

Anatolii Akhutin (filosof)

Andrei Volos (pisatel')

Alla Demidova (aktrisa)

Aleksandr Ivanov (direktor izdatel'stva "Ad Marginem")


V. Esse

Boris Khazanov
Ernst Juenger, ili Prelest' pravizny

Leonid Luks
Demokratiia, kotoraia ne sumela sebia zashchitit' - k 95-tiletiiu Fevral'skoi
revoliutsii

Antonina Zykova
Vybory v Gosdumu, bloggery i vlast': obzor sobytii poslevybornoi nedeli dekabria
2011 g.

Andreas Umland
Podorvut li ul'tranatsionalisty "beluiu revoliutsiiu" v Moskve?


VI. Korotko ob avtorakh
  ---------------------------

We have some more papers on Russian anti-Western ideologies, and are planning an
additional special issue of the "Forum" on this topic in September 2012. Please,
note that we are still accepting submissions for this issue - in particular,
texts on anti-Westernism in Russian literature and higher education. The final
deadline for additional papers for the last special issue has been extended
until 1 June 2012 - although we prefer earlier arrival of texts.

Some technical details for such submissions can be found in this - by now dated
- Call for Papers:

http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/CallForPapersRu.html

or, in English,

http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/CallForPapers.html

Please, use as a model text concerning the formal style for all accepted papers
this document:

http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/docs/forumruss14/7Shekhovtsov.pdf

The "Forum" is published by the Eichstaett Institute for Central and East
European Studies in Upper Bavaria, Germany. Previous issues are available at

http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forumruss.html

We shall be delighted to receive your submission for, and be grateful for any
comments on, our special issues and the journal "Forum."

Thank you.
Prof. Leonid Luks, Dr. Andreas Umland, Antonina Zykova
The "Forum's" editors
http://www.ku-eichstaett.de/forschungseinr/zimos/mitarbeiter/

THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM BULLETIN
A Biweekly Newsletter of Current Affairs
Vol. 6, No. 2(158), 2 March 2012
Compilers: Scott Littlefield & Andreas Umland

I   NEWS: 15 - 31 January 2012
II   SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS
III ANNOTATIONS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

[NOTE: When viewing an RNB issue in the Messages archive of the homepage and the
end of the text is truncated, scroll to the end of the message and click "Expand
Messages." Only then, the whole text of the - otherwise truncated - issue will
appear. When quoting from an article found here, please, mention the RNB, as the
source. Thank you!]
==============================


I   NEWS: 15 - 31 January 2012

Russia's Communists join forces with radicals ahead of polls
By: Marc Bennetts
RIA Novosti, January 17, 2012

MOSCOW, January 17 (Marc Bennetts for RIA Novosti) - Russia's Communist Party
entered into a pact on Tuesday with the radical Left Front movement in a
striking show of unity between two generations of opposition forces in the
run-up to March's presidential polls.
  "This is a historic and important moment," Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov
said as he signed an agreement that will see his movement support veteran
Communist Party head Gennady Zyuganov's bid to prevent Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin securing a third stint in the Kremlin.
  In return, Zyuganov pledged to implement the demands drawn up by the organizers
of recent mass protests against alleged electoral fraud at last December's
parliamentary polls if he become president.
  These demands include a rerun of the polls before the end of the year, the
dismissal of the unpopular election chief, Vladimir Churov, and "fundamental"
changes in electoral law.
  "We risk a split unless left forces rally around a single candidate," Udaltsov
said. "We are placing our stake on Gennady Zyuganov."
  The Left Front leader also said that Zyuganov, who enjoys the support of 10
percent of Russians, according to a survey carried out last week by the
state-run VTSiOM pollster, was the opposition candidate "most likely" to defeat
Putin at the polls. Nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head of the Liberal
Democratic Party, was Zyuganov's closest rival on nine percent.
  The same survey indicated that 45 percent of voters backed Putin, a figure that
would not be sufficient for a victory in the first round.
  The alliance is the first time that one of Russia's long established opposition
parties has openly cooperated with a radical movement such as Left Front, one of
a number of confrontational groups outside of the political mainstream.
  Zyuganov, 67, and Udaltsov 34, made for odd allies as they attended a news
conference in downtown Moscow to conclude the deal, with the former's suit, tie
and Communist Party pin in sharp contrast to the young activist's black top,
jeans and shaven head.
  The Communist Party leader has long been criticized over his inability  or
reluctance  to offer more than token opposition to Putin and his United Russia
party. He also spoke out against the initial wave of protests that hit Russia in
the wake of December's polls.
  Udaltsov, in comparison, is a rising star of Russia's newly revitalized
political opposition and spent most of December in jail on protest related
charges. He went on hunger strike while behind bars to draw attention to what he
says is his persecution by the authorities and still looked gaunt as he appeared
at Tuesday's news conference.
  But this unlikely alliance contains advantages for both sides, said analyst
Alexei Makarkin at the Center for Political Technologies.
  "Zyuganov gets access to Sakharov Avenue," he said, making reference to the
venue for December's 50,000-plus strong protest rally in Moscow, "while Udaltsov
receives the support of a powerful organization."
  Sergey Mikheyev of the Center for Political Assessment told RIA Novosti that
the deal was a sign that Zyuganov recognized the extent of popular discontent
among the educated urban electorate.
  "He is seeking to attract new voters, as he has almost no way otherwise of
reaching out to young people," he said.
  Zyuganov traditionally enjoys the support of older voters and inhabitants of
rural areas, rather than the Internet-savvy urbanites who have been the driving
force behind the recent protests.
  Despite attempts to present a united front at the signing of the deal, there
was a marked difference in the rhetoric of the two left-wing groups.
  While Zyuganov was careful to stress his party's adherence to "peaceful,
organized and disciplined" opposition to Putin's rule, Left Front members were
less willing to ease concerns of possible unrest around March's crucial vote.
  Left Front activist Alexei Sakhin said that while his movement also hoped for
the "non-violent dismantling of Putin's regime" Russia could find itself
"engulfed in civil war" if the authorities came down hard on protesters.
  There were also signs of early discord between the two sides. It had been
announced by Left Front on the eve of the meeting that Zyuganov could agree to
become president for a two-year "transitional period" in the event of his
victory in the polls, but Udaltsov said on Tuesday that negotiations would
continue on the issue.
  Analysts expressed doubts on Tuesday that the alliance would prove long lasting
and predicted that Zyuganov and the Communists would soon return to their
comfort zone of state-sanctioned opposition.
  "Zyuganov has been influenced by members of his circle in this alliance with
Left Front and Udaltsov," Alexei Mukhin, director of the Center for Political
Information think tank, told RIA Novosti.
  "But he now risks losing his more traditional supporters and will quickly
return to his previous position," he went on, adding that the Communist Party
leader's apparent newfound radicalism was mere "show."
  "This alliance will not even be short lasting," he said. "It will be over in an
instant."
-----

Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin discussed with Alexey Navalny prospects of the
dialogue between authorities and society
Interfax-Religion, January 18, 2012

Moscow, January 18, Interfax - On Wednesday, head of the Synodal Department for
Church and Society Relations Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin held talks with
renowned blogger and oppositionist Alexey Navalny.
  The meeting took place at St. Nicholas Cathedral on Three Hills as Father
Vsevolod is its rector.
  "It was an interesting and friendly talk. We talked about an hour, then
Mr.Navalny took part in our parochial fast meal on the Eve of Epiphany," the
priest told Interfax-Religion.
  Head of the Russian Public Movement Vladimir Tor also participated in the
meeting.
  "We discussed the recent rallies, Mr. Navalny told us about further plans of
the forces that are doubtful that elections were held correctly. We changed
opinions how to help develop the dialogue between various political and public
forces, dialogue between authorities and society," the interviewee of the agency
said.
  He did not comment how exactly the parties will help develop such a dialogue.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=8987
----

Putin bets on athletes and sports fans
www.russiatoday.com, January 20, 2012

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has made a move to win the hearts of sports
enthusiasts by personally meeting a group of football fans over a glass of beer
and promising them free air travel to the upcoming European Championship.
  Putin met with heads of football fan clubs, together with FIFA President Joseph
Blatter and UEFA President Michel Platini, in a beer restaurant in the center of
Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg.
  During the informal gathering, the Prime Minister touched upon particular
issues that are a source of concern to sports fans as Russia gets prepared to
host the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
  Putin, a leading candidate in next year's presidential race, mentioned the need
to improve road construction as one important aspect for hosting the event. "I'm
confident we'll change the situation for the better by 2018 because we're
obliged to do this," he said.
  The Prime Minister recalled that regional road maintenance funds were
established last year and they were accumulating excise duties from the sale of
gasoline. "I really hope these funds will work efficiently," Putin said, noting
that the excise duty hike will add more than 90 billion rubles for road repair
and construction by the year end. "Generally speaking, this is a good sum of
money," he said. Putin also believes that "we must put to jail" the bureaucrats
who are caught red-handed turning road construction into a personal bonanza.
  As for the upcoming European Championship being hosted by Ukraine and Poland,
Putin said he would request that major Russian air carriers Aeroflot and
Transaero provide football fans with free transportation to the games  possibly
as some sort of advertising initiative.
  Putin then said he would dedicate his next newspaper article to the question of
Russian nationalism  an issue that is increasingly being connected with football
fans.
  Two years ago, football fans launched numerous rallies in Moscow after a
Russian football fan was killed in a brawl with a group from Russia's North
Caucasus. During the protests, several thousand people held a protest march
right near the Kremlin. Police had to use force to prevent an escalation of
violence between the two groups.
  "If someone wants to destroy Russia one day he will hit on the national
question and nothing else," Putin warned. "We have a multinational country but
over eighty percent of our citizens are ethnic Russians. This is Russia's ethnic
foundation. But I want to tell everyone  ethnic Russians or not  our ancestors
were building Russia for a thousand years as a multi-national state." He told
the participants that any movement in the direction of a mono-ethnic state would
mean "throwing Russia and ethnic Russians back to the state of a
third-importance regional power."
  The article on national issue will be the second in a series of materials Putin
plans to publish in the run-up to the March 4 presidential elections.
  Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov said in an interview with RT that in the
first article the Prime Minister explained why he was going to run for the
presidency, together with his views on the main challenges facing our country.
  "And next week, we will all be expecting his new article that, as we recently
learned, will be devoted to relations between nationalities inhabiting the
Russian Federation. He considers this issue of international relations in Russia
to be one of the most important, and vitally important for a federation. We'll
be anticipating the appearance of that article, in which we're expecting the
Prime Minister's broad perspective on this issue," Peskov said.
----

Russian gays to appeal to ECHR against Moscow bans for 100 years ahead
Interfax-Religion, January 20, 2012

Moscow, January 20, Interfax - Moscow's Tverskoy Court has refused to compel
city hall to provide a reason for not allowing gay pride parades until 2112.
  The lawsuit was filed by Russian gay community leader Nikolay Alexeyev. "We are
asking the court to compel city hall to give a motivated reply to our activists'
applications," he said.
  The court has thrown out Alexeyev's civil lawsuit, an Interfax correspondent
said. The plaintiff has already vowed to file a cassation complaint with the
Moscow City Court within the statutory ten-day period.
  In 2011, gay activists, "having used a loophole in the laws, which do not set
any maximum periods for allowing cultural public events in the capital city,"
applied to the authorities for the approval of 102 gay pride parades between
2012 and 2112, Alexeyev told Interfax.
  According to the organizers, all parades were to take place in the Bolotnaya
Square in Moscow.
  "In reply, we received a letter citing a legal clause which regulates
conducting cultural public events in the capital city. We received neither
consent, nor refusal, although by law they are required to provide us with one
or the other within a 15-day period," he said.
  The gay pride parade organizers were not hoping to obtain permission, they were
just looking for a reason to take their case to the European Court of Human
Rights, Alexeyev said.
  "Each time we are refused, but Strasbourg ruled these decisions to be illegal.
But later we apply for another parade and are refused again. This time we
decided to appeal in Strasbourg against the future gay pride parades," the gay
community leader said.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=8991
----

Putin's second thesis tackles nationality question
Business New Europe, www.bne.eu, January 23 ,2012

Following a first article published January 16 on the country's political
development, presidential candidate prime minister Vladimir Putin took a deep
breath and dived January 23 into one of Russias thorniest problems national and
ethnic questions in an article published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
  Vladimir Putin launched his political career by launching a reconquest of
separatist republic Chechcnya in 1999, following attacks on Russia by terrorists
operating out of the Muslim republic. The war ended in victory but the
nationality question remains one of the burning issues that could still derail
Russia.
  Putin published a first lengthy article January 16 on his 'world view' in the
run up to presidential elections in March 2012, which are likely to see him
elected for a six year term, with the possibility of subsequent selection for
another six years.
  Now in a second article he has turned to tackling multi-ethnic Russia's vexed
problems of national identity and inter-ethnic relations.
  The article also notably formulates Putins response to a nascent political
movement that has found voice in recent anti-government protests, especially
November 2011s nationalistic Russian March, and in the spontaneous protests in
December 2010 in Moscows Manege by football fans: protests by ethnic Russians
against perceived privileged treatment of the peoples of the North Caucasus in
the form of vast budget subsidies for the region of which considerable amounts
get embezzled by local elites. The movement is personified by popular anti-
corruption blogger Aleksei Navalyni, who leans towards ethnic Russian
nationalism.
  Putin quoting the Kremlins favourite philosopher Ivan Ilyin reiterated his
conviction that Russia is a multi-national, multi-confessional country, and that
the four Russian religions Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddism share their
basic moral values. On the other hand, he also emphasized the leading role of
Russian culture as a state-forming culture, as the hinge holding the country
together. According to this argument there can be no talk of Russian
self-determination in opposition to the multi-ethnic state that exists: The
self-determination of the Russian people it is the multi-ethnic civilization,
held together by the Russian cultural core, he writes.
  Besides Russias traditional multi-ethnic nature, the second major and new -
ethnic challenge to Russian results from the enormous wave of migration from
Central Asia, with for instance 42% of GDP of Tadzhikistan now comprising
remittances from Tadzhiks working in Russia. Russia is now the worlds second
largest migration destination after USA.
  Almost inevitably, a whole skinhead movement of violent ultra-rightists has
risen in response to this wave of migrants from impoverished neighbouring
countries. Putin in todays article promised tighter immigration controls with
the introduction of a Russian language exam for migrant workers, and the
provision of educational programs for migrant workers.
  Putin, aiming squarely at the newly politicized middle-classes, called for a
culture of civil patriotism and said education should play an enormous role in
uniting the nation.
  His article contains few specific policy proposals besides the inevitable new
government body to tackle ethnic questions. He also failed to discuss what the
implications for the nationality question might be of the reintroduction of
elected heads of federal subjects, with the risk that North Caucasus electoral
campaigns might stoke the fires of separatism. US thinktank Jamestown Foundation
last week was already anticipating that the reinstatement of gubernatorial
elections would lead to the exit of the North Caucasus republics: With political
reforms possible in Russia, the North Caucasus may once again become the focal
point of countrys politics. Regardless of the results of the 2012 presidential
elections in Russia, the countrys leadership will face tough choices in the
North Caucasus. Retaining tight control over the region and democratizing Russia
may once again prove to be incompatible tasks for the countrys politicians,
Jamestown Foundation wrote.
-----

Putin slams ultra-nationalists after protests
By: Anna Smolchenko
AFP, January 23, 2012

MOSCOW  Prime Minister Vladimir Putin cautioned Monday against attempts to stir
up ethnic discord and warned that he was ready to ban nationalist parties as he
stepped up his Russian presidential campaign.
  But in a far-ranging article published on his campaign website, Putin also said
that he planned to toughen up immigration legislation, saying those who wanted
to work in Russia would have to pass basic tests.
  "I am deeply convinced that attempts to preach ideas about building a Russian
'national,' mono-ethnic state contradict our entire millenium-long history,"
wrote Putin.
  "If a multi-ethnic society is hit by a bacteria of nationalism it loses its
strength and durability. Connivance with attempts to foment ethnic strife and
hatred towards people of another culture or faith can trigger far-reaching
consequences."
  Putin, who is seeking to win back his old Kremlin job in a presidential
election on March 4, is struggling with the worst legitimacy crisis of his
12-year rule.
  Tens of thousands took to the streets last month in a wave of protest unseen
since the early 1990s.
  Nationalist movements of all hues have joined the nascent protest movement, and
many have openly called for a withdrawal from the unrest-infested North Caucasus
where Russia has fought two bloody wars against Chechen separatists in the past
20 years.
  Putin slammed attempts to inflame nationalist sentiments, saying the Russian
people throughout centuries served as the backbone of Russia's multi-ethnic,
multi-confessional state.
  "The Russians' great mission is to unite, bind together a civilisation," he
wrote punctuating his article with citations from 19th-century philosopher Ivan
Ilyin and his contemporary, historian Vasily Klyuchevsky and even the chronicles
of the ancient Rus.
  "We've lived together for centuries. And we will live together in the future.
And to those who want or are trying to divide us, I can say just one thing --
keep waiting," he said in the piece also published in the broadsheet newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
  Many observers have warned that Russia would plunge into chaos if nationalist
forces came to power, and some have accused Alexei Navalny, a 35-year-old
anti-Kremlin blogger and the protest movement's arguably most charismatic
leader, of openly flirting with ultra-nationalism.
  Navalny has denied the accusations.
  However in the same piece, Putin said the country would further toughen up
immigration legislation, and migrants who want to work in Russia would from next
year have to pass exams on the Russian language, history, literature and law.
  Travel within the country should also be monitored more thoroughly, he said,
proposing that Russian nationals who violate rules of internal migration or fail
to register with authorities on arrival to a different region in a timely
fashion, face stiff penalties including criminal charges.
  The strongman prime minister also said nationalist-leaning parties in the
country's various ethnic regions would be banned despite a recent drive to
simplify legislation for political parties.
  "We of course should develop our democratic, multi-party system," he said. "But
we can't allow one thing -- opportunities to create regional parties including
in the national republics.
  "This is a direct path to separatism," he said, warning that the same fate
would await regional governors seeking to play the ethnic card.
  Alexander Verkhovsky, director of Sova non-governmental organisation that
tracks racist violence, dismissed Putin's piece as pre-election populist
rhetoric.
  "Reasonable words next to unreasonable measures," he added, referring to the
proposals on migration.
----

Putin calls for return to basic values
Itar-Tass, January 23, 2012

KISLOVODSK, January 23 (Itar-Tass)  Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called for a
return to basic values but without driving oneself into medieval times.
  He described current times as "a renaissance of traditional religions".
  "All these religions are based on traditional basic values, moral and ethical.
Spiritual leaders, too, often lose their bearings. They think that the number
one benchmark is over there. But there is a struggle going on there for the
development of Islam. So it would be preposterous to go back and retreat
further. We need to raise moral values, rather than drive ourselves into
medieval times," Putin said at the Forum of the Peoples of South Russia on
Monday, January 23.
  He recalled Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir's presentation at the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference. "He took the floor and said: What are we
doing? Why do we suppress our women? Why do we make them wear the hijab and do
not let them get an education? We kill ourselves," Putin quoted him as saying.
  "I want to be heard by those who make these decisions. I quoted Mahathir at
random. But such are the realities of the Islamic world today. And he knew what
he was saying," Putin said.
----

Analyst: article on ethnic relations to increase Putin's chances of electoral
victory
Interfax, January 23, 2012

MOSCOW. Jan 23 (Interfax) - A Russian analyst has predicted that an article on
ethnic relations by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published on Monday
will increase his chances of victory in March's presidential election.
  "The word 'Russian' permeates the article, and I think that this all will go
down well with grateful (ethnic) Russians, who make up 80% of voters and Putin's
ratings will go up sharply," Sergei Markov told Interfax.
  The article, "Russia: The Ethnic Relations Issue," was published in
Moscow-based daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper).
  "Putin is one of few Russian mainstream politicians who pronounce the word
'Russian' often and when appropriate. Many politicians shun the word 'Russian.'
This means they are in a deadlock," Markov said.
  Markov credited Putin with paying a lot of attention to "Russian-non-Russian
conflicts in traditionally Russian regions."
  "This is correct because conflicts of this kind are taking bitter forms. He
makes the correct comment that they are not ethnic conflicts, that they simply
take on ethnic forms, while essentially it means the state is unable to protect
the rights of its citizens," the analyst said, explaining that "citizens" was a
reference to ethnic Russians.
  Ethnic Russians' "social status" has gone down, Markov said. "When the social
status of the main ethnic power is low, it weakens the country as a whole."
  Markov argued that the ethnic Russian people are in crisis and that the
reduction of the country's population caused by alcoholism, drug abuse and crime
is one symptom of this.
  "Therefore, the solution of the (ethnic) Russian problem means treatment for
these diseases and the restoration of the power of the Russian state," Markov
said.
  It is essential, Markov argued, that all Russian citizens have equal rights and
that Russia remain a multiethnic state. Creating a state of viable
multiethnicity is the chief mission of the ethnic Russians, he said.
  "The revival of the Russian people must be the main objective of all peoples of
the Russian Federation," Markov said.
-----

Church welcomes Putin's initiative to toughen migration rules
Interfax-Religion, January 23, 2012

Moscow, January 23, Interfax - The Russian Orthodox Church approves of Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's idea to toughen immigration rules in Russia.
Prime's views on interethnic relations were published on Monday by the
Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily.
  "It's good that migration problems were raised, and it was said that it is
necessary to minimize illegal immigration, to toughen migration rules and
sanctions for violating them. I believe majority of people will support these
measures and they will become legislative proposals in the nearest future," head
of the Synodal Department for External Church Relations Archpriest Vsevolod
Chaplin told Interfax-Religion.
  He reminded that many people in Russia urged to test migrants' knowledge of
Russian, "their understanding of our culture and our state system," and was
positive that these proposals were also included in Putin's article.
  Father Vsevolod agrees with Putin that the role of ethnic criminality in
corruption should be maximally exposed and "corruptive actions should be
stopped."
  "I'm glad that the Russian people is called a state-forming nation. I hope this
idea will be fixed in legislative and political establishments in our country,"
Father Vsevolod said.
  At the same time, he "absolutely agrees" that there should not be space for
hatred and hostility based on anyone's nationality. "Representatives of
different nations are suffering from displays of such hostility today and it
should be treated maximally tough as it can result in conflicts dangerous for
Russia's future," the church representative is convinced.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=8997
-----

Russia row over Nazi massacre site in Rostov-on-Don
BBC News, January 24, 2012

A row has erupted in Russia over the replacement of a Holocaust memorial plaque
in the southern city of Rostov-on-Don which named Jews as victims.
In August 1942 Nazi German troops murdered at least 27,000 people at Zmiyevskaya
Balka, regarded as the worst Holocaust atrocity in Russia.
More than half the victims were Jews, the Russian Jewish Congress (RJC) says.
A new plaque does not mention Jews, but "peaceful citizens of Rostov-on-Don and
Soviet prisoners-of-war".
The RJC, a secular foundation representing Russian Jews, says it will take legal
action over the unauthorised decision to replace the former plaque, which spoke
of "more than 27,000 Jews" murdered by the Nazis. That plaque had been put up in
2004.
According to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Centre in Israel, 15,000-16,000 Jews were
murdered by the Nazis in Rostov-on-Don from August 1942 to February 1943.
In the Soviet Union memorials commemorating victims of Nazi massacres spoke of
"Soviet citizens" rather than "Jews".
Violation admitted
The former plaque mentioning Jews has now been put in the Zmiyevskaya Balka
memorial hall, Rostov's Deputy Culture Minister Valery Gelas told Moscow Echo
radio.
He admitted that the rules for historical memorials had been broken, but said
the new plaque would remain and "we've done all we can".
He said the wording was in line with historical research and data presented to
the Rostov cultural authorities.
RJC president Yuri Kanner said the site was "Russia's Babi Yar" - a reference to
the notorious Nazi mass shootings of Jews near Kiev during World War II.
He said it was important to specify exactly who was shot at Zmiyevskaya Balka,
pointing out that in law the Nazi slaughter of Jews "is considered a separate
crime, with separate prosecutions".
"There could have been refugees from Poland, not necessarily Soviet citizens,
it's not a question of citizens," he told Moscow Echo.
He said he did not believe the plaque decision was a case of anti-Semitism,
rather that it was a local official's "attempt to do something to please
somebody".
A Communist MP on the Russian parliament (Duma) committee for nationalities,
Tamara Pletneva, said it was time to "forget our bitterness and live in peace".
"The memorial should commemorate all the war victims... the Soviet Union saved
Jews, Russians saved Jews... so why single out Jews? We shouldn't single out any
ethnic group."

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16697485
-----

Church will support neither side in political struggle
Interfax-Religion, January 25, 2012

Moscow, January 25, Interfax - Attempts to force the Church to side with any
particular political force will yield no result, the Moscow Patriarchate said.
  "We need to think a thousand times before replying, whether spontaneously or
emotionally and vehemently, to any call of this sort: be with us only and not
them, be with us against them, do not meet with Churov, do not meet with
Navalny, meet only with those who have been recommended to you," head of the
Synodal Department for Church and Society Relations Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin
said at the 20th Christmas Readings in Moscow.
  "Such pressure will no longer be productive in the future, but one has to
counter it by saying that the Church, while being open to all, is not prepared
to take one side against the other in a civil confrontation," the priest said.
  "The Church is for all people being able to speak out, to take part in the
political process, to influence the decisions of the state. But at the same
time, it will never be with those who are trying to destroy civil peace or
statehood as such," Father Vsevolod said.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9002
-----

Playing Nationalist Card May Be 'Fatal' for Russia – Putin
RIA Novosti, January 27, 2012

ST. PETERSBURG, January 27 (RIA Novosti)-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
urged on Friday his challengers in the presidential race to drop nationalist
slogans, warning of the possibly "fatal" consequences of fuelling Russian
chauvinism.
  The nationalist problem does exist in Russia, and it should be addressed
properly, Putin said during a meeting with WWII veterans in St. Petersburg.
  However, "instead of proposing solution to these problems... our politicians
have started to exploit these difficulties" in order to achieve "selfish
political goals," the premier said.
  "For such a multi-ethnic country as Russia, such behavior can be fatal and lead
to the destruction of the country," he added.
  Putin was responding to a veteran who expressed concern over slogans such as
"Russia for Russians" that he said have been frequently heard in Russia,
including in the media.
  Putin said he believed Russia's multi-ethnicity was an advantage: "The broader
and richer the genetic code is, the stronger the nation is."
  The most obvious addressee of Putin's remarks is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the
leader of the ultra-nationalist LDPR party, who will challenge Putin in the
March 4 elections along with three other candidates.
  Meanwhile, critics say both Russia's ruling elites and the opposition benefit
from flirting with nationalist sentiment.
  On Thursday, Putin pleased Russian nationalists by proposing an array of robust
measures, including stiff laws, to deal with soaring numbers of illegal
immigrants in Russia. The issue has long been a source of huge public discontent
among Russians who fear being "overrun" by people from former Soviet republics.
  Speaking during a meeting with the Federal Migration Service, Putin said his
friends told him that "in some large cities people are afraid of leaving their
homes on holidays" because of the fear of "strangers."
  Putin's proposals come less than a week after he wrote an article on modern
problems of multiethnic Russia as part of his election program. He said migrants
should respect the customs and traditions of regions they come to live in, and
that any aggressive or disrespectful behavior should be properly addressed by
the authorities.
  On Thursday, the prime minister proposed making exams in Russian, history and
the basics of Russian law mandatory for migrants from 2013. That, he said, will
help them to adapt in society.
-------

Orthodox believers conveyed a batch of tinned stewed meat to Moscow Krishnaites
in protest against burning Russian flag
Interfax-Religon, January 27, 2012

Moscow, January 27, Interfax - Representatives of Orthodox Resistance Movement
to Murdering of Children conducted an action and conveyed a batch of tinned
stewed meat to the Moscow Society for Krishna Conciseness.
  The Movement officials told Interfax-Religion, thus they reacted to the burning
of Russian state flag held near the Russian Embassy in India.
  "This disgraceful act has become one of the steps in the unprecedented campaign
of pressing on Russian court that was considering a claim to recognize a book
Bhagavad Gita As It Is an extremist material as it is spread by adherents of the
so-called International Society for Krishna Conciseness," the movement statement
reads.
  According to the authors of the document, anti-Russian action to support
Krishnaites was held by allies of the ultra-nationalist Indian People's Party as
"many international human rights advocates link cruel attacks on living in India
Christians and Muslims with activity of this organization (number of such
attacks often resulting in human victims exceeded 2000 last year)."
  "Outrageous for our times situation when some Indian states strictly restrict
religious freedom and a Hindu who wants to adopt Christianity or Islam is
subjected to fine or even imprisonment is also connected with this "party of
Russian Krishnaites advocates," the statement reads.
  Earlier Russian Muslims also announced that they launch an action "of
collecting and sending starving Indians humanitarian help in form of Halal
canned stewed meat."

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9015
----

Rogozin calls on Russian nationalists to assume rightful role
www.russiatoday.com, February 1, 2012

The head of the Russian defense industry, Dmitry Rogozin, has praised Vladimir
Putin's ethnic policy and called upon Russian nationalists to work hand in hand
with the country's authorities.
  The outgoing NATO envoy, who was appointed deputy prime minister in charge of
the defense industry this year, published his own article in the popular daily
Izvestia, which seeks to expand on afeature by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in
the same newspaper outlining his election manifesto on national and ethnic
issues.
  In today's paper, Rogozin praises Putin's article as an "unprecedented event"
that will have long-term benefits for Russian statehood.
  The deputy premier writes that the current trend of focusing on various smaller
ethnic groups within the Russian Federation is constructive, but the authorities
should not neglect the needs and problems of ethnic Russians. He also writes
that society must understand that focusing on the problems of ethnic majority is
not always extremist or supremacist.
  Rogozin gives several examples from history to support his thesis that the
leaders of the Russian state have turned to Russian nationalist ideas in times
of trouble.This helped them to survive at a time when "the push of
ethno-nationalism of the provinces the Soviet power perished and the USSR
collapsed like an ice floe along national administrative borders."
  He concludes that in times of crisis, the authorities must turn to ethnic
Russians as the main foundation of Russia's statehood. He adds that that moment
has arrived.
  The outgoing NATO envoy predicts that the new century, which started with wars
and shocks, will be really cruel. He goes on to reveal that four years of work
at NATO headquarters filled him with an anxiety about the fate of the world
which he has been unable to get over. Dmitry Rogozin believes that we have
arrived at a period when resources need to be redistributed.He also states that
the United States is no longer ashamed of its "hegemonic plans". He says that
international migration is overwhelming "European Christian civilization" which,
according to the Russian vice premier, is in the steepest decline in its
history.
  Rogozin warns his readers that a weak Russia will fall victim to a world that
only respects "brute armed physical force." He says Russians must concentrate
all their efforts on strengthening national unity and on the revival of Russia's
economic and military might, reanimate fundamental science and "get smarter
spiritually and stronger physically to oppose the internal and external threats
to our country."
  The deputy prime minister then blasted the Russian political opposition for
targeting Putin in their criticism, saying that "Putin is the only leader left
in Europe who has not been run over by a steamroller of American hegemonism."
The official claims that Putin's defeat will only give succour to American
politicians who dream of getting hold of the mineral riches of Siberian mineral
resources with the aid of traitors inside Russia.
  Dmitry Rogozin says Putin's article only opened the discussion on the national
problem and pledged that from now on, the issue of Russian nationalism will not
be hushed up.He said that the Prime Minister's article was the fruit of
cooperation between the government and some Russian nationalist organizations.
Rogozin then called upon the "patriotic movement" to bravely integrate itself
into official structures of the Russian Federation.
  Also outlined were such issues as the defense of ethnic Russians' rights in
foreign countries and highlighting the value of Russian culture and history. He
also objects against using the word nationalism when referring to certain
Russian organizations, and suggests the word patriotism instead.
  At the same time, Rogozin writes that the ongoing crisis requires the
consolidation of all "indigenous peoples of Russia" and all active and caring
citizens.
  Dmitry Rogozin ends his piece by reminding the public about his initiative to
create the Volunteer Movement in Support of the Popular Front  the movement in
support of the Army, Navy and defense industry. He announced the founding
congress of the organization will take place in Moscow on February 26.
-----

Patriarch Kirill warns people against rallies and urges not to listen to
populists
Interfax-Religion, February 1, 2012

Moscow, February 1, Interfax - Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia urges
believers to share his prayers about Russia as the country "is going through a
very responsible and difficult stage of its development."
  "Let's unite our forces. Orthodox people can't go to demonstrations, they stand
in queues to venerate the Belt of the Mother of God, and if the Belt had spent
more not a month (in Russia - IF), but half a year, then not three, but 40-50
million of people would have stood in this queue. We know it for sure as we live
in an Orthodox in its majority country," the Patriarch said after the Liturgy he
celebrated at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow on Wednesday, the
third anniversary of his enthronement.
  According to him, Orthodox believers "don't go to rallies, their voices are not
heard, they pray in silence of monasteries, in monastic cells, but their hearts
ache for the things happening with our people today."
  He urged people to be vigilant.
  "Remember that the loudest cry and the sharpest word are not always correct,
true and fair. Thus our nation was seduced twice, or even more frequently, for
the last hundred and something years," Patriarch Kirill reminded.
  "And we know that God punished all seducers, instigators, provokers. Where are
they in the history?" he said.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9030


==================


II   SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS

10 Issues to Watch in Russian Politics for 2012
By: Josh Wilson
The School of Russian and Asian Studies, January 18, 2010

There have been many major political events that have taken place in Russia over
the last month, and many more that can be expected to take place in 2012. The
following list consists of 10 issues that we feel will be the most important to
reshaping Russia's current political scene and forming its nascent civil
society. A hyperlinked version of this article can be found here:
http://www.sras.org/january_2012
   1. Continued Protests
Russia's opposition has vowed to maintain large-scale protests on a regular,
through infrequent basis. The next rally is tentatively scheduled for February
4. The opposition does, however, remain continuously active online and the next
rally is likely to draw tens of thousands again.
   2. The "Return" of the Communists
The biggest "winners" from the current discontent in Russia have been the
Communists. Many liberal voters voted for them because the Communists are seen
as the party best able to oppose Putin; the party gained second place in the
Duma with nearly 20% of all seats. Until another politician and/or party can
offer a strong challenge, the Communists are likely to continue to draw support
from unlikely sources.
   3. The "Fall" of Putin
Current polls show Putin with just 36% support, down from the 71% he received
when he last ran for president. However, his closest competitors have only
single-digit support. While the coming political season will be his most
difficult, and he may win only after a run-off election is held, he almost
certainly has enough public support to win. However, his campaign so far has
been seen by many as clumsy, from his candidacy announcement, to his initial
crude response to the protests, to his new political program that some have said
amounts to an ironic promise to fight his own legacy, to his recent pledge to
not participate in debates because he is "too busy." All of these moves have
become more fuel for his opponents rather than placating Russia's protesters.
   4. The Politicization of the Orthodox Church
The church sided with Russia's discontented soon after the first protests. Most
recently, Patriarch Kirill's Christmas sermon urged dialogue between society and
the authorities. Many commentators have speculated that Kirill, who is
politically adept and very well connected, is looking to improve his position
with both society and the authorities by becoming a mediator between them.
   5. Relations with the West
Putin's United Russia lost its legislative supermajority and parties that oppose
improved relations with the West have gained seats. Thus, Russia, after being
accepted to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations, may not actually accept the
invitation. The relaxed visa regimes negotiated with the US and Europe may face
a similar fate. Changes in US-Russia relations may come from the US as well.
Michael McFaul, America's new ambassador to Russia, has promised to renew
efforts to integrate Russia with the West. However, Republican contenders for
president in the US, including front runner Mitt Romney, have indicated they
would be more confrontational with Russia.
  6. The Return of Rogozin and Advances for Nationalism
Dmitry Rogozin is a nationalist politician who was appointed NATO ambassador
after his popular party, Rodina, was found guilty of "inciting ethnic hatred."
He has now returned to domestic politics as Deputy Prime Minister responsible
for the defense industry. He has created a new Rodina as a "social organization"
affiliated with Putin's People's Front. Some see this as an official effort to
reign in Russia's nationalists, who rioted in Moscow in December, 2010. It may
have the added effect of helping to weaken The Fair Russia Party, which absorbed
the original Rodina and many of its members but which has distanced itself from
nationalist ideology. Nationalism may also have a new, powerful supporter in the
opposition. The rising star of the protest movement, Alexei Navalny, sees
himself as a Nationalist Democrat (see below for more on Navalny). The current
protests are also an odd mix of liberals, nationalists, and communists, meaning
that if the protests gain more political voice, it is likely that these groups
will as well.
   7. Prokhorov and Kudrin
Mikhail Prokhorov, a Russian billionaire, and Alexei Kudrin, a former Finance
Minister, have both pledged to enter politics and represent Russia's middle
class and business interests. Prokhorov is registering to run for president and
Kudrin has pledged to form a political party that may (or may not) eventually
support Prokhorov. However, despite (or perhaps because of) Kudrin's political
weight and Prokhorov's billions, the two would-be politicians do not have wide
support among the electorate and are unlikely to be serious political forces in
time for the next presidential vote.
   8. Possible Reforms
The Medvedev Administration has moved fairly quickly to propose reforms that
reflect some of the protestor's demands. This includes simplifying the
registration procedure for political parties (the number of which have shrunk
substantially over the last decade), returning gubernatorial elections
(abolished under Putin), allowing the regions more autonomy by allowing them to
keep more of certain locally collected taxes (including those on cigarettes,
alcohol, and gasoline). Whether these will be passed and how they will be
enacted will be a major issue to watch in 2012.
   9. The Kremlin Shuffles
Several high-level personnel changes in Russia have been alternately read as
either 1) preparing for Putin's return to the presidency or 2) made in response
to the recent protests. Boris Gryzlov, who once famously said the Duma is "no
place for discussion" has been replaced as Duma Speaker by Sergei Narushkyn, who
is better known for statesmanship and compromise. Additionally, Vladislav
Surkov, known as the architect of "managed democracy," has been dismissed as
Deputy Chief of Staff and appointed Deputy Prime Minister. Whether this will be
a demotion or promotion is yet to be seen as his Deputy PM position was modified
before his arrival to include a vast array of social responsibilities ranging
from health care, communications, education, and modernization. Narushkyn's
former position as Head of the Presidential Administration is now occupied by
Sergei Ivanov, a long-time member of Putin's inner circle. More shifting in
government staff is likely as the presidential election approaches and after it
passes.
  10. Navaly's Rising Star
While the protests have been largely organized by members of the Solidarity
movement, the true star of the protests has become Alexei Navalny. A lawyer and
who made a name for himself as an anticorruption blogger targeting firms such as
Transneft and Gazprom, his current popularity can be credited to his charismatic
and forceful public speaking at the protests. Some say that, given time, he
could be a political force to challenge Putin. Others say that his public
support comes from being a non-politician and entering politics would be
difficult. Navalny considers himself a "Democratic Nationalist" and has
previously participated in the Russian March, an annual nationalist
demonstration. He has advocated potentially violent means of taking power if a
dialogue fails with the Kremlin. While other protest participants have also been
receiving attention of late (such as Gregory Yavlinsky of Yabloko who looks to
be making something of a comeback in national politics and Ksenia Sobchak, a pop
icon that has turned political over the past several months), it is Navalny who
is the main protestor to watch  not only for his wide popularity, but also for
his curious mix of politics.
----

Dear Russia Letter: Putin Addresses the National Question But Misses the Mark,
Experts Said
By: Dan Peleschuk
Russia Profile, January 23, 2012

In another pre-election article in the Russian press, Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin attempted to tackle the "national question" in Russia, offering proposals
to combat nationalism and to improve interethnic relations. But just weeks away
from the March 4 presidential elections, Putin's foray into the notoriously
complex ethnic question seemed to experts more like a shoddily constructed
election ploy than a concrete policy paper.
  In his article, published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on January 23 and titled
"Self-Determination of the Russian People: A Multiethnic Civilization Sealed
with a Russian Core," Putin dug deep into Russian history to argue the
uniqueness of the Russian multinational experience. What's more, he downplayed
the role of the American "melting pot" and criticized what he believes to be the
failure of European multiculturalism  while noting the Russian way of
recognizing nationalities yet maintaining central facets of Russian culture is
the way of the country's future.
  "The crisis of the 'nation state' model is itself responsible for the 'failure
of the multicultural project'  of states that have historically been built
exclusively on the basis of ethnic identity," Putin wrote. "And it is a
challenge that will face not only Europe, but many other regions in the world."
  Another major theme, however, seemed to be his assault on the burgeoning
nationalist movement in Russia, which has gained visibility in recent years
partly because of the Kremlin's own tacit approval of such ideology. Especially
in the past year, Kremlin-controlled opposition parties, such as Vladimir
Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Gennady Zyuganov's
Communist Party have stepped up their nationalist rhetoric and attracted greater
support, albeit at the expense of Putin's own. And, moreover, the Kremlin has
regularly sponsored nationalist projects, such as the Nashi or Young Guard youth
groups, or Russian NATO envoy and nationalist firebrand Dmitry Rogozin's Rodina
movement.
  Now, the prime minister seems to be on the offensive against nationalism, which
he argues would help unravel a historically multinational Russia. "I am deeply
convinced that attempts to preach the idea of building a Russian 'national,'
mono-ethnic state is contrary to the whole of our thousand-year history," he
argued. "Moreover, it is the shortest path to the destruction of the Russian
people and Russian statehood. And any viable, sovereign state on our land."
  On the same token, however, Putin also noted the danger of overly pandering to
individual ethnic groups and warned that all Russians should espouse a "civic
patriotism" and conform to a "single cultural code." Using this basis, he
discouraged the flourishing of national parties on a regional level, claiming
they are a surefire path toward "separatism."
  Experts noted that Putin is attempting to toe a fine line between preventing
both Russian nationalism and anti-Russian nationalism  both of which have the
potential to reach a boiling point. In reality, it is a deeply contradictory
policy, according to analyst Nikolay Petrov, that seems more likely to stir
further anti-Kremlin dissent than to stifle it. "If somebody will lead this
country in the direction of secessionism, it is Putin, and it would be done by
means of ignoring regional interests and trying to make all decisions at one and
the same center," said Petrov, an expert at Moscow's Carnegie Center.
  Unlike his previous platform article, published last week in the pro-government
Izvestia, Putin outlined concrete strategies for overcoming the national
question, which he claimed is a result of uneven economic development and social
intolerance in today's Russia. Among them is a proposal to introduce a common
cultural curriculum for universities across Russia, as well as to strengthen
immigration policy to combat illegal immigration. Yet most curious, perhaps, was
Putin's proposal to introduce a federal structure to tackle "national
development and interethnic accord"  a function once overseen by the Ministry of
Nationalities, but which has since fallen by the way side, according to Putin,
since the Ministry of Regional Development took over the task.
  But Petrov said he sees Putin's proposal for greater government oversight as
more of a political Trojan horse than a social solution. "His view of fixing
problems is strengthening the central state rather than the developing different
models in different places," he said. "This article is a kind of refusal from
any kind of federation."
  Others agreed, pointing additionally to the vagueness of Putin's language as a
sign of his poor comprehension of the national question. According to political
analyst Ilya Konstantinov, the policy paper is pure campaign fodder. "This
article leaves more questions than answers," he told Kommersant. "For example,
Putin criticized the European policy of multiculturalism. He says that Russia
has its own way, but what is it? It's not clear. He says there should be neither
assimilation nor enclaves. But what should there be? Putin is putting forward a
lot of fairly controversial ideas, but there remains no clear vision of how he
sees the future of nationality policy."
----

Russian TV pundit endorses Putin's article on ethnic relations
Channel One TV, BBC Monitoring, January 23, 2012

One of the highest-profile political commentators on Russian state television
has voiced strong approval for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's views on ethnic
relations, outlined in an extensive article for the Nezavisimaya Gazeta
broadsheet. In the 23 January edition of his regular slot on state-controlled
Channel One, Mikhail Leontyev, one of Putin's main cheerleaders in the Russian
media, said the Russian prime minister's analysis of the relationship between
the country's ethnic Russian majority and its numerous minorities provided the
only suitable basis for good relations between different ethnic groups. The
following is the text of Leontyev's commentary:
  (Leontyev) Putin has begun the promised publication of his programmatic texts
with an article on nationalities policy. This really is a programme that is
based on an absolutely specific world view, on an ideology that cannot be boiled
down to banalities and commonplaces. Putin starts by noting not simply the
escalation of interethnic problems right across the world, against the backdrop
of unprecedented migration flows. He speaks of the crisis being experienced by
the very model of the nation-state, in keeping with which, incidentally, the
overwhelming majority of modern countries were formed.
  (Female voiceover, narrating an excerpt from Putin's article) The failure of
the multicultural project has arisen out of the crisis being experienced by the
very model of the nation-state, a state which historically was built exclusively
on the basis of ethnic identity.
  (Leontyev) It was not Putin who dreamt up the failure of the multicultural
project. Merkel and Cameron, for example, have both spoken directly about this.
It's not clear what they're going to do with this in the future, but what
leaders of these nation-states can be permitted is absolutely unacceptable for a
Russian, ethnic Russian politician, if, of course, he's compos mentis. The idea
of building an ethnic Russian monoethnic nation-state offers the shortest
possible route to the destruction of the ethnic Russian people and Russian
statehood. This is the article's key point. And it is this very process,
launched 20 years ago, which is the main reason for our current interethnic
problems, in contrast, for example, to those experienced in the West.
  (Female voiceover, narrating an excerpt from Putin's article) In declaring
sovereignty 20 years ago, the deputies of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic), in the heat of the battle against the Union centre,
launched the process of creating nation-states, and, what's more, nation-states
even within the Russian Federation itself. What the initiators of the
sovereignty idea may possibly failed to have recognized was something that
everyone else, including those outside our state, understood very clearly and
very quickly. And the consequences were not long in arriving.
  (Leontyev) There could be no other interpretation of this mad initiative
undertaken by the Russian deputies of the time. And this process almost killed
off our country for good.
  (Female voiceover, narrating an excerpt from Putin's article) The situation was
much more dramatic than before the break-up of the Soviet Union. Our economy
disintegrated as a result of the 1998 crisis, our army ceased to exist, we
encountered the aggression of international terrorism and separatism and a civil
war broke out. And the remainder of Russia was placed on the brink of collapse.
  (Leontyev) In actual fact, the problem with a nation-state is that it cannot
integrate anyone within itself. To be more precise, it cannot integrate large
masses belonging to other cultures, let alone peoples who have historically
lived on its territories. And there is a unique type of state that has formed in
history - our Russia. As Putin defines this state, it is a polyethnic
civilization bound together around an ethnic Russian cultural core.
  (Female voiceover, narrating an excerpt from Putin's article) The ethnic
Russian people form the basis of the state, and the existence of Russia proves
that. The great mission of ethnic Russians is to unite, to bind together a
civilization. This civilizational identity is based on the preservation of the
ethnic Russian cultural dominant, which is borne not just by ethnic Russians,
but by all bearers of this identity, irrespective of ethnic group.
  This is Putin's formula of identity, and only on this basis can our country be
built. This identity is the only existing alternative to ethnic chauvinism. It's
quite another matter that this formula needs to be fleshed out and sustained. We
need to reproduce our common cultural codes, which are what turn us into a
single people. That is indeed the objective of the state in the fields of
education and culture. And that, by the way, is a very significant correction of
existing educational and cultural policy.
  (Followed by a brief interlude where, as usual, Leontyev illustrates his point
by playing a clip from a Soviet film)
  Indeed, the article ends with a reminder of our joint battle in the most
terrible war. That, indeed, is the most important cultural code which binds us
together, and which they have tried and are trying to beat out of us with every
means possible. As the prime minister noted, it will never happen.
-----

Russia: The Ethnic Issue -- 'The Self-Determination of the Russian People Is a
Poly-Ethnic Civilization Cemented by the Russian Cultural Core'
By: Vladimir Putin
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 23, 2012


For Russia -- with its diversity of languages, traditions, ethnic groups, and
cultures -- the ethnic issue is without any exaggeration fundamental. Any
responsible politician or public figure must realize that civil and interethnic
accord is one of the chief conditions of the very existence of our country.
  We see what is going on in the world and what very serious risks are piling up
here. The reality of today is growth in interethnic and interfaith tension.
Nationalism and religious intolerance are becoming the ideological base for the
most radical groups and trends. They are destroying and undermining states and
dividing societies.
  The colossal streams of migration -- and there is every reason to assume that
they will intensify -- are already being called a new "great migration of
peoples" able to change the customary way of life and look of entire continents.
Millions of people in search of a better life are leaving regions suffering from
hunger and chronic conflicts, poverty, and an unsettled social state.
  The most developed and prosperous countries that were formerly proud of their
tolerance have run right into the "exacerbated ethnic issue." And today -- one
after another -- they are declaring the failure of the attempts to integrate the
element with a different culture into society and secure no-conflict, harmonious
interaction of different cultures, religions, and ethnic groups.
  The "melting pot" of assimilation is misfiring and smoking -- and it is not
capable of "digesting" the ever-increasing large-scale migration flow.
"Multiculturalism" that rejects integration through assimilation became the
reflection of this in politics. It raises the "right of the minority to be
different" to an absolute and in the process does not offset this right
sufficiently -- with civic, behavioral, and cultural responsibilities in
relation to the native population and to society as a whole.
  Closed ethnic-religious communities that refuse not only to be assimilated but
even to adapt are becoming established in many countries. We know of quarters
and entire cities where already generations of newcomers live on social benefits
and do not speak the language of the country that they are living in. The
response to such a model of behavior is growth in xenophobia among the local
native population and an attempt to harshly protect its interests, jobs, and
social blessings -- from "competitors born elsewhere." People are shocked by the
aggressive pressure on their traditions and customary way of life and are
earnestly afraid of the threat of losing their national-state identity.
  Perfectly respectable European politicians are beginning to speak of the
failure of the "multicultural project." In order to preserve their positions,
they exploit the "ethnic card" -- they move to the field of those whom they
personally used to consider marginals and radicals. Extreme forces, in their
turn, drastically build up influence, seriously laying claim to state power.
Essentially it is being proposed to talk about forced assimilation -- against
the background of the "closed status" and drastic toughening of the migration
rules. Bearers of a different culture are supposed to either "dissolve into the
majority" or remain a separate national minority -- perhaps even one provided
with various rights and guarantees. But in fact they find themselves removed
from the possibility of a successful career. Let me say outright that it is
difficult to expect loyalty toward his country from a citizen who has been
placed in such conditions.
  Behind the "failure of the multicultural project" is a crisis of the very model
of the "national state" -- a state that was historically constructed exclusively
on the basis of ethnic identity. And that is a serious challenge that both
Europe and many other regions of the world will encounter. Russia a s a
"Historical State"
  Despite all the external similarity, the situation in our country is
fundamentally different. Our ethnic and migration problems are directly linked
with the destruction of the USSR, and essentially historically -- of greater
Russia, which became established on its own basis back in the 18th century. With
the deterioration of state, social, and economic institutions that inevitably
followed that. With the enormous break in development in post-Soviet space.
  After declaring sovereignty 20 years ago, the at that time deputies of the
RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), in the ardor of the
struggle against the "Union Center," launched the process of building "national
states," and even within the Russian Federation itself at that. In its turn, the
"Union Center," trying to pressure opponents, began to play a behind-the-scenes
game with the Russian autonomies, promising them higher "national-state status."
Now the participants in these processes are shifting the blame on one another.
But one thing is obvious -- their actions to an equal degree and inevitably were
leading to dissolution and separatism. And they did not find either the courage,
or the responsibility, or the political will to consistently and persistently
defend the territorial integrity of the Motherland.
  What perhaps the initiators of the "undertaking with the sovereignties" perhaps
did not realize -- all the others, including people outside the borders of our
state, understood very clearly and rapidly. And the consequences were not long
in coming.
  With the dissolution of the country, we found ourselves on the brink, and in
certain well known regions -- past it and into civil war, and, moreover,
specifically on ethnic grounds.
  We managed to extinguish these hotbeds with enormous exertion of efforts and
great sacrifices. But that, of course, does not mean that the problem has been
eliminated.
  But even at that moment when the state as an institution had become critically
weakened, Russia did not disappear. What Vasiliy Klyuchevskiy was talking about
as applies to the first Russian Time of Troubles occurred: "When the political
bonds of public order broke down, the country was saved by the moral will of the
people."
  And, by the way, our 4 November holiday -- the Day of National Unity, which
some people superficially call the "day of victory over the Poles," is in
reality the "day of victory over ourselves," over the internal hostility and
discord when the classes and nationalities became aware of themselves as a
unified commonality -- as a single people. We can by rights consider this
holiday the day of the birth of our civil nation.
  Historically Russia is not an ethnic state and not an American "melting pot"
where generally speaking everyone to one degree or another is a migrant. Russia
arose and developed over the centuries as a multinational state. A state in
which the process of mutual familiarization, mutual penetration, and the mixing
of peoples on a family, friendship, and work level was constantly underway.
Hundreds of ethnic groups living on their own land together with and alongside
Russians. The development of enormous territories that filled the entire history
of Russia was the joint work of many peoples. Suffice it to say that ethnic
Ukrainians live in the space from the Carpathians to Kamchatka. Just as ethnic
Tatars, Jews, and Belarusians do...
  In one of the earliest Russian philosophical and religious works, "Slovo o
Zakone and Blagodati" (Sermon on Law and Grace), the very theory of a "chosen
people" is rejected and the idea of equality before God is preached. And in the
"Povest Vremennykh Let" (Tale of Bygone Years -- The Primary Chronicle), this is
how the multinational character of the ancient Russian state is described: "Here
are just those who speak Slavic in Rus (ancient Russia): Polans, Drevlians,
Novgorod Slavs, Polochans, Dregoviches, Severians, Buzhans... And here are other
peoples -- Chud, Merya, Ves, Muroma, Cheremis, Mordva, Perm, Pechera, Yam,
Litva, Korsh, Neroma, and Liv -- these speak their own languages..."
  It was specifically about this special character of the Russian state system
that Ivan Ilyin wrote: "Do not eradicate, do not pressure, and do not enslave
foreign blood and do not strangle the life of a different tribe and a different
Slav, but allow everyone to breathe and give them the great Motherland... watch
over everyone, reconcile everyone, allow everyone to pray in his own way and
work in his own way, and recruit the best from everywhere for state and cultural
construction."
  The core that binds the fabric of this unique civilization is the Russian
people and Russian culture. It is specifically this core that different types of
provocateurs and our enemies will make every effort to try and tear out of
Russia -- through altogether phony talk about the right of Russians to
self-determination, about "racial purity," and about the need to "finish the
cause of 1991 and for good destroy the empire that lives off the Russian
people." In order ultimately to make people destroy their own Motherland with
their own hands.
  I am profoundly convinced that attempts to preach the ideas of building a
Russian "national," mono-ethnic state are contrary to our entire thousand-year
history. What is more, this is the shortest path to the destruction of the
Russian people and the Russian state system. And in fact any viable, sovereign
state system on our land.
  When people begin to shout -- "Stop feeding the Caucasus" -- wait and tomorrow
the appeal will inevitably follow -- "Stop feeding Siberia, the Far East, the
Urals, the Volga Region, and the Moscow Region..." Those who were leading the
way to the dissolution of the Soviet Union were acting under precisely those
formulas. As for the notorious national self-determination, which politicians of
the most varied orientations -- from Vladimir Lenin to Woodrow Wilson --
speculated on more than once while fighting for power and geopolitical
dividends, the Russian people defined themselves long ago. The
self-determination of the Russian people is the poly-ethnic civilization bound
by the Russian cultural core. And the Russian people have affirmed this choice
time after time -- and not in plebiscites and referendums but by blood. By our
entire thousand-year history. A Common Cultural Code
  The Russian experience of state development is unique. We are a multinational
society, but we are a single people. That makes our country complex and
multidimensional. It provides colossal opportunities for development in many
fields. However, if a multinational society is infected by the bacilli of
nationalism, it loses strength and endurance. And we must understand what
far-reaching consequences tolerance of attempts to inflame national hostility
and hatred for peoples of a different culture and a different faith can produce.
  Civil peace and interethnic accord are not a picture that is created one time
and is frozen for centuries. On the contrary, it means constant changes over
time and dialogue. It is the painstaking work of the state and society that
demands very subtle decisions and a weighed and wise policy able to ensure
"unity in diversity." It is necessary not only to observe mutual obligations,
but also to find values common for everyone. People cannot be made to be
together using force. And they cannot be forced to live together by calculation,
on the basis of weighing the benefits and costs. Such "calculations" work until
a moment of crisis. But at the moment of crisis, they begin to operate in the
opposite direction.
  The confidence that we can ensure harmonious development of the poly-cultural
society relies on our cul ture, history, and type of identity.
  You may recall that many citizens of the USSR who found themselves abroad
called themselves Russians. What is more, they considered themselves such
regardless of their ethnic affiliation. It is interesting that ethnic Russians
never, nowhere and in no emigration, constituted stable national diaspora
groups, even though in terms of numbers and quality, they were very
significantly represented. Because there is a different cultural code in our
identity.
  The Russian people are a state-forming people -- based on the fact of the
existence of Russia. The great mission of Russians is to unite and bind the
civilization. By language, culture, and "universal responsiveness," in Fedor
Dostoyevskiy's definition, to bind Russian Armenians, Russian Azeris, Russian
Germans, and Russian Tatars... To bind them in this type of state civilization
where there are no "national minorities" but the principle of recognition of
"belonging" is determined by a common culture and common values.
  This kind of civilization identity is based on preserving the Russian dominant
cultural idea whose bearers are not only ethnic Russians, but also all bearers
of that identity regardless of nationality. It is the cultural code that has
been subjected to serious hardships in recent years, that people have tried and
are trying to break. But all the same it has undoubtedly been preserved. At the
same time, it must be nourished, strengthened, and protected.
  An enormous role here belongs to education. The choice of an educational
program and the diversity of education are our unquestionable achievement. But
the diversity must rely on unwavering values and basic knowledge and ideas of
the world. The civic task of education and the system of education is to give
each person the absolutely mandatory amount of human knowledge that makes up the
basis of the self-identity of the people. And above all it should be a matter of
raising the role in the education process of such subjects as the Russian
language, Russian literature, and domestic history -- naturally in the context
of the entire wealth of ethnic traditions and cultures.
  In some leading American universities in the 1920s, a movement took shape for
studying Western cultural canon. Each self-respecting student was supposed to
read 100 books on a specially formed list. In some US universities, this
tradition has been preserved even today. Our nation was always a reading nation.
Let us conduct a poll of our cultural authorities and form a list of the 100
books that each graduate of a Russian school will have to read. Not memorize in
school but specifically read on his own. And let us make an essay on a topic
read a graduation exam. Or at least let us give young people the opportunity to
demonstrate their knowledge and their worldview in olympiads and competitions.
  State policy in the area of culture should set the corresponding requirements
too. I mean such instruments as television, films, the Internet, and mass
culture as a whole, which shape social consciousness and provide models and
standards of behavior.
  Let us recall how the Americans with the help of Hollywood shaped the
consciousness of several generations. What is more, by introducing not the worst
-- both from the standpoint of national interests and from the standpoint of
public morals -- values. We have something to learn here.
  Let me emphasize that no one is encroaching on the freedom of creativity --
this is not about censorship of speech and not about an "official ideology," but
about the idea that the state has the duty and the right to direct both its own
efforts and its own resources to accomplishing recognized social and public
tasks. Among them to shape the worldview that binds the nation.
  In our country, where the civil war has not yet ended in the minds of many and
where the past is extremely politicized and "broken up" into ideological
quotatio ns (often interpreted by different people in exactly opposite ways),
subtle cultural therapy is needed. A cultural policy that on all levels -- from
school textbooks to historical document studies -- would form the kind of
understanding of the unity of the historical process where the representative of
each ethnic group, just like a descendant of a "red commissar" or a "White
officer," would see his place. He would feel that he is an heir of "one for all"
-- the contradictory and tragic but great history of Russia.
  We need a nationality policy strategy based on civic patriotism. Any person
living in our country must not forget about his faith and ethnic affiliation.
But he must above all be a citizen of Russia and be proud of that. No one has
the right to place distinctive ethnic and religious features above the laws of
the state. But at the same time, the laws of the state themselves must take into
account the distinctive ethnic and religious features.
  I believe that a special structure responsible for issues of ethnic
development, interethnic prosperity, and the interaction of ethnic groups must
be created in the system of federal organs of power. At this point these
problems are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Regional Development, and
they are pushed behind the pile of routine tasks as being of secondary or even
minor importance, and that situation needs to be rectified.
  It should not be a standard department. Instead it should be a matter of a
collegial organ that interacts directly with the president of the country and
with the leadership of the government and has certain government powers.
Nationalities policy cannot be written and implemented only in the offices of
officials. Ethnic and public associations should participate directly in its
discussion and formation.
  And of course, we are counting on the active participation in this dialogue of
the traditional religions of Russia. Despite all their differences and
distinctive features, the basic, common moral, ethical, and spiritual values are
based on Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism, -- compassion, mutual
assistance, truth, justice, respect for elders, and the ideals of family and
work. It is impossible to replace these value guidelines with anything, and we
need to strengthen them.
  I am certain that the state and society must welcome and support the work of
Russia's traditional religions in the system of education and enlightenment, in
the social sphere, and in the Armed Forces. At the same time, the secular
character of our state must undoubtedly be preserved. The Nationalities Policy
and the Role of Strong Institutions
  The systemic problems of society very often find an outlet in the form of
interethnic tension. We must always remember that there is a direct dependence
among unresolved social and economic problems, the flaws of the law enforcement
system, the ineffectiveness of power, corruption, and conflicts on ethnic
grounds. If we look at the history of all the recent interethnic excesses --
practically everywhere we will discover this "trigger" -- Kondapoga, Manezh
Square, and Sagra. Everywhere there is an over-reaction to the absence of
justice and to the irresponsibility and idleness of certain representatives of
the state, lack of faith in equality before the law, impunity for the criminal,
and the conviction that everything has been bought and there is no truth.
  When talk turns to the idea that in Russia, and in particular in the historical
Russian territories, the rights of Russians are being encroached upon, it
suggests that the state structures are not performing their direct tasks -- they
are not protecting the life, rights, and security of citizens. And since the
majority of these citizens are Russians, the possibility arises to capitalize on
the topic of the "national oppression of the Russians" and clothe justified
social protest in the most primitive and vulgar form of interethnic rioting. And
at the same time to wail about "Russian fascism" at every opportunity.
  We must be aware of the risks and threats that are inherent in situations that
are in danger of moving into the stage of an ethnic conflict. And in the
appropriate, toughest way, without considering positions or ranks, evaluate the
actions or inaction of the law enforcement structures and the organs of
government that led to the interethnic tension.
  There are not a great many formulas for such situations. Not to raise anything
to a principle, not to make rash generalizations. A careful clarification of the
essence of the problem and the circumstances and settlement of mutual grievances
on each particular case where the "ethnic issue" is involved are needed. Where
there are no specific circumstances, this process must be public, because the
lack of operational information brings forth rumors that make the situation
worse. And here the professionalism and responsibility of the mass media are
exceptionally important.
  But there can be no dialogue in a situation involving rioting and violence. No
one must get the slightest temptation to "pressure the regime" toward particular
solutions using pogroms. Our law enforcement organs have proven that they handle
stopping these attempts quickly and effectively.
  And one more principled feature is that we, of course, must develop our
democratic, multiparty system. Decisions focused on simplifying and liberalizing
the registration procedure and the work of political parties are already being
prepared today, and proposals to establish the election of the heads of regions
are being implemented. All these are necessary and appropriate steps. But there
is one thing that must not be permitted -- opportunities for the creation of
regional parties, including in the national republics. That is the direct path
to separatism. Such a demand should undoubtedly be made on the elections of the
heads of the regions -- anyone who tries to rely on ethnic, separatist, and
similar types of forces and circles must be immediately excluded from the
election process within the framework of democratic and judicial procedure. The
Problem of Migration and Our Integration Project
  Today citizens are seriously upset and let me say outright -- angry -- at the
many costs related to mass migration -- both external and inside Russia. The
question is also heard of whether the creation of the Eurasian Union will lead
to greater migration flows, and hence, to the growth in the problems that exist
here. I believe that our position needs to be laid out very clearly.
  In the first place, it is obvious that we need to raise the quality of the
state's migration policy many times over. And we will try to accomplish this
task.
  Illegal migration can never be precluded altogether everywhere, but it must and
undoubtedly can be minimized. And on this level the clear-cut police functions
and powers of the migration services must be strengthened.
  But a simple mechanical toughening of migration policy will not yield a result.
In many countries such toughening leads only to increasing the proportion of
illegal migration. The criterion of migration policy is not in its degree of
toughness but in its effectiveness.
  In connection with this, the policy in relation to legal migration -- both
permanent and temporary -- must be differentiated as precisely as possible. That
in turn envisions obvious priorities and advantageous rules in migration policy
in favor of skills, competence, competitiveness, and cultural and behavioral
compatibility. Such a "positive selection" and competition over the quality of
migration exists throughout the entire world. There is no need to talk about the
idea that such migrants are integrated into the host society much better and
more easily.
  The second point. In our country internal migration is developing quite
vigorously, and people go to study, live, and work in other subjects of the
Federation and to the large cities. What is more, they are full-fledged citizens
of Russia.
  At the same time, whoever comes to regions with other cultural and historical
traditions must treat the local customs with respect. The customs of the Russian
and all other peoples of Russia. Any other behavior that is inappropriate,
aggressive, provocative, or disrespectful must meet the appropriate legal but
tough response, above all from the organs of power, which are often simply
indifferent today. We must look to see that all the norms needed to control such
behavior by people are contained in the Administrative and Criminal Codes and in
the regulations of the internal affairs organs. It is a matter of toughening the
law and introducing criminal responsibility for violation of migration rules and
norms of registration. Sometimes a warning is sufficient. But if the warning
relies on a particular legal norm, it will be more effective. It will be
understood appropriately -- not as the opinion of a particular policeman or
official, but specifically as a requirement of the law that is the same for
everyone.
  A civilized framework is also important in internal migration. Among other
things this is needed for the harmonious development of the social
infrastructure, medicine, education, and the labor market. In many regions and
megalopolises that are "attractive to migration," these systems are already
operating to the limit now, which creates quite a complicated situation both for
the "natives" and for the "newcomers."
  I believe that we should start making the rules for registration and sanctions
for violating them tougher. Naturally without violating the constitutional
rights of citizens to choose a place of residence.
  The third point is strengthening the judicial system and constructive effective
law enforcement organs. This is fundamentally important not only for external
migration but in our case, for internal as well, notably migration from the
regions of the North Caucasus. Without that objective arbitration of the
interests of different communities (of both the host majority and the migrants)
and perception of the migration situation as safe and fair can never be secured.
  What is more, the incompetence or corrupt nature of the court and the police
will always lead not only to the dissatisfaction and radicalization of the
society receiving the migrants, but also to "gangland-type settling of scores"
and a shadow criminalized economy taking root amid the migrants themselves.
  We must not permit the emergence in our country of closed, isolated ethnic
enclaves where often it is not laws that operate but various kinds of "criminal
codes." And above all the rights of the migrants themselves are violated -- both
by their own crime bosses and by corrupt officials from the government.
  Ethnic crime flourishes specifically on corruption. From the legal standpoint,
crime groups built on the ethnic, clan principle are in no way better than
ordinary gangs. But in our conditions ethnic crime is not only a criminal
problem but also a problem of state security. And it must be treated in the
appropriate way.
  The fourth point is the problem of the civilized integration and socialization
of migrants. And here it is necessary to once again turn to the problems of
education. It should not be a matter so much of the orientation of the
educational system to resolving problems of migration policy (that is by no
means the chief task of schools) but above all of high standards of domestic
education as such.
  The attractiveness of education and its value is a powerful lever, a motivator
of integration behavior for migrants on the level of integration into society.
While the low quality of education always makes migration communities even more
isolated and closed, only now it is for the long term, on the level of
generations.
  It is importan t to us that migrants be able to adapt normally to society. Yes,
strictly speaking a fundamental requirement for people who wish to live and work
in Russia is their willingness to assimilate our culture and language. Starting
next year an exam on the Russian language, on the history of Russia and Russian
literature, and on the foundations of our state and law should be made mandatory
for acquiring or extending migration status. Our state, like other civilized
countries, is willing to form and offer migrants the appropriate educational
programs. In some cases mandatory additional occupational training at employers'
expense is required.
  And finally, the fifth point is close integration in post-Soviet space as a
real alternative to uncontrolled migration flows.
  The objective reasons for mass migration -- this was already discussed above --
are the colossal inequality in development and conditions of existence. Of
course, reducing this inequality would be a logical way if not to eliminate, at
least to minimize migration flows. An enormous number of various kinds of
humanitarian and leftist activists in the West are advocating that. But
unfortunately, on the global scale, this beautiful, ethically irreproachable
position suffers from obvious utopianism.
  But there are no objective obstacles to realizing this logic in our country and
in our historical space. And one of the most important tasks of Eurasian
integration is to create for peoples and the millions of people in this space
the opportunity to live and develop in a dignified way.
  We understand that it is not because life is so good that people travel miles
away from home -- and frequently in uncivilized conditions -- to earn the
possibility of a decent existence for themselves and their families.
  From this standpoint, the tasks that we are setting both within the country
(the creation of a new economy with effective employment, the restoration of
professional communities, and equal development of production forces and the
social infrastructure throughout the country's entire territory) and the tasks
of Eurasian integration are key instruments for making it possible to bring
migration flows to a normal level. Essentially, on the one hand, to direct
migrants to places where they will cause the least social tension. And on the
other -- so that people in their home regions and in their small homeland can
feel normal and comfortable. People must simply be given the opportunity to work
and live normally in their own homes, in their native land, an opportunity that
for the most part, they are deprived of now. There are no simple solutions in
nationalities policy, and there cannot be. Its elements are scattered throughout
all spheres of life of the state and society -- in economics, the social sphere,
education, the political system, and foreign policy. We need to build the kind
of model of the state and a civilized community with the kind of system that
will absolutely be equally attractive and harmonious for everyone who considers
Russia his Motherland.
  We can see the areas where work needs to be done. We understand that we have
historical experience that no one else has. We have a powerful support base in
mentality, in culture, and in identity that others do not have.
  We will strengthen our "historical state" that we inherited from our ancestors.
The state-civilization that is inherently able to work to accomplish the task of
the integration of different ethnic groups and faiths.
  We have lived together for centuries. Together we were victorious in a most
terrible war. And we will continue to live together. And I can say one thing to
those who want or are trying to divide us -- don't hold your breath.
-----

Nationalist opponents face Putin's ire
By Charles Clover
Financial Times, 23 January 2012

Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, launched a pre-election attack on
nationalist opponents on Monday, accusing them of seeking "to destroy their
homeland" by promoting xenophobia and separatism.
The attack, in an article in the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, appeared to be
directed mainly at Alexei Navalny, who is emerging as the most popular in a
stable of opposition leaders, partly due to his hardline nationalist views.
The former lawyer turned blogger takes a tough stand on immigration and says the
Caucasus, which he refers to as "Russia's Gaza Strip" should be isolated
politically.
Mr Putin is almost sure to win the presidential election on March 4. However, a
weak showing would sap his authority once in office, particularly if he failed
to get 50 per cent in the first round and the contest entered a run-off.
Many of the prime minister's opponents have been arbitrarily excluded from the
presidential race or, like Mr Navalny, have chosen not to run.
The credibility of the election, already in doubt due to massive vote fraud in
December's parliamentary poll, was further damaged on Monday when it emerged
that Grigory Yavlinsky, a liberal leader, may not be allowed to run.
Russia's election commission said it found mistakes in about a quarter of the 2m
signatures of support Mr Yavlinsky had submitted as a requirement to enter the
race. Mr Yavlinsky called the announcement "a political decision" intended to
stifle competition.
Outside the Kremlin's carefully orchestrated "managed democracy", nationalism is
fast becoming the political centre of gravity. Large-scale immigration is
creating social tensions in Russia's big cities and Russians are questioning the
need to hold on to the warlike north Caucasus, which costs the federal budget
millions every year in subsidies.
According to a November opinion poll conducted by researchers at the Levada
Centre in Moscow, 59 per cent of the population supports the nationalist slogan
"Russia for the Russians", the highest level since 1998.
Taking up the issue on Monday, Mr Putin argued that minority nationalities were
an inseparable part of Russia and a further break-up into national enclaves, as
some have suggested, could not be permitted. He accused those who allowed the
break-up of the Soviet Union along nationalist lines of "not having the courage
or sense of responsibility or political will to stand up for the territorial
integrity of the motherland".
On contemporary Russia, the premier said: "The core, holding together the fabric
of this unique civilisation, is the Russian people, the Russian culture."
This was the core that "all manner of provocateurs and opponents will try to
wrest from Russia through talk of self determination, racial purity and the need
to finish the job begun in 1991 and finally destroy the empire sitting on the
neck of the Russian people", he said.
Mr Navalny tweeted in response to the article that it was "a bunch of nonsense"
written not by an expert but by "some journalist using Wikipedia".

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/feb46990-45de-11e1-9592-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ke\
LGR3yQ
-----------------------


Putin Says Nationalism a Danger to the State
By: Alexander Bratersky
Moscow Times, January 24, 2012

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin lashed out Monday at nationalists who call for
cutting off government funding to the North Caucasus as well as those who want
to create regional separatist parties, saying their positions could lead to the
collapse of Russia.
  While arguing for a return to the Soviet notion of "people's friendship," Putin
also called for tougher rules on internal migration as part of his position on
nationalist and ethnic problems as presented in an article published on both his
website and in the liberal-leaning Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
  Listing the nationalist riots at Manezh Square in 2010 alongside other ethnic
conflict zones around the country, Putin said the underlying problem for
everyone remains "directly linked" to "unresolved social and economic problems,
ineffective governance, corruption and multiethnic tension."
  "Nationalism, religious intolerance are becoming a base for radical groups and
movements," he said.
  The article is the second in a series prepared by Putin as part of his
presidential campaign, but some analysts said his arguments appear contradictory
alongside other parts of his agenda.
  Putin has long tread warily around the issue of nationalism  an area that
remains one of the most polarizing in Russia today. A 2011 Levada Center poll
found that 43 percent of Russians support the notion of "Russia for Russians"
and that a xenophobic sentiment is on the rise.
  Opposition groups from both the left and the right have blamed Putin's
government for allowing uncontrolled migration from the republics of the
Northern Caucasus and countries in Central Asia.
  In the article, Putin suggested that migrants wanting to work in Russia should
have to pass exams on Russian language and culture. He also suggested harsher
punishments for internal migrants who commit crimes in other parts of the
country.
  But independent political expert Stanislav Belkovsky said such a hardening of
rules only for internal migrants who "show disrespect toward traditions of
ethnic Russians" couldn't possibly be legal.
  "I think it is unconstitutional to make regulations regarding one particular
group," he said. "It looks like this text was written by people with a
particular point of view."
  Leading Russian migration specialist Vladimir Mukomel said the suggested policy
harkened back to tsarist-era legislation that prohibited Russians Jews from
settling in large cities.
  "Is this a new policy for settlement?" he wondered.
  He also said the article fails to distinguish between migrant laborers who only
desire to work and those migrants seeking to integrate in the society.
  In his article, Putin calls for the reopening of a state ministry regulating
national ethnic policy, a body that Mukomel points out was closed in 2001 under
Putin's earlier tenure as president.
  Putin also raised a red flag on the matter of regional separatism. Having once
called the collapse of the Soviet Union the "biggest geopolitical catastrophe"
of the 20th century, Putin said Russia might follow suit if separatism is
allowed to take root.
  Putin earlier threw his support behind liberalizing the registration process
for political parties, but said allowing regional or nationalist parties based
on the notion of separatism would set a dangerous precedent.
  "Those who would try to rely upon nationalists, separatists or similar forces
or circles ... should be immediately excluded from the election process, using
democratic and legal procedures," Putin wrote.
  Some experts saw the remark as a reference to Boris Yeltsin who is blamed by
opponents for allowing ethnic republics such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to
gain relative independence from Moscow.
  During the 1990s, Sverdlovsk's powerful Governor Eduard Rossel also threatened
to create a Urals republic.
  Putin has stated previously that he saw the notion of' "Soviet nationality" and
the uniting of different republics under one umbrella as a positive model for
modern Russia.
  In 2010, he even publicly clashed with President Dmitry Medvedev who said the
peaceful coexistence during Soviet times was only maintained through "tough"
methods.
  But opposition leader and political columnist Mark Feigin said the Soviet model
could not be repeated in modern Russia, as the core population is now ethnically
Russian, unlike in Soviet times.
  "Putin is trying to create U.S.S.R. 2.0, which will have a place for all the
nationalities, but Russia is no longer an empire," Feigin said.
  Putin's own record on national policy is somewhat mixed. While he has always
distanced himself from hard-line groups, he once called himself and Medvedev,
"nationalists in a good sense of the word."
  During a recent conversation with a group of Russian editors, Putin criticized
writer Boris Akunin  pen name of Georgian-born author Georgy Chkhartishvili  of
opposing the Russian-Georgian war because of his ethnic roots.
  Akunin has played a vocal role in the recent wave of protests spurred by
allegations of fraud in December's State Duma vote. A year before the rallies,
Russian authorities faced demonstrations by thousands of nationalists and
football fans who rallied on Manezh Square after police released several North
Caucasus nationals, suspected in killing an ethnic Russian fan.
  Opponents of various political stripes have long expressed outrage at the
problems in the Northern Caucasus, where Kremlin-supported authorities are
viewed by many as corrupt.
  Ramzan Kadyrov, president of Chechnya and a former warlord accused of human
rights violations, has lavishly rebuilt the once war-ravaged republic using
large subsidies from Moscow, which many critics say have been largely wasted.
  The Caucasus issue, once a banner of hard-line anti-immigrant groups has
recently been embraced by other Putin critics, such as prominent opposition
politician Alexei Navalny, who coined the phrase "Stop feeding the Caucasus" and
has joined in several nationalist rallies.
  While not mentioning Navalny by name, Putin wrote in his article that such
calls might lead other regions to repeat the similar slogans like, "Stop feeding
Siberia, the Far East, or the Moscow region."
  "Those kind of slogans were used by those who led the Soviet Union toward
collapse," Putin said.
  Belkovsky said Putin was guilty of "contradicting" himself with such a
position.
  "On one side he says he is against the slogan "Stop feeding Caucasus," but on
the other hand he is supporting Kadyrov," he said.
  But Putin's proposals received a warm response from Vsevolod Chaplin, senior
cleric of the Russian Orthodox church, who called them "bright."
  "I think that those measures would be supported by an absolute majority of
people and in the near future, they will become legal statutes," Chaplin told
Interfax on Monday.
  Chaplin's comments were in response to a statement from Duma speaker Sergei
Naryshkin who said Monday that some of Putin's proposals will be turned into
laws, RIA-Novosti reported.
-----

MINISTRY OF ETHNIC AFFAIRS WITH A QUESTION MARK: Premier Putin met with leaders
of the Caucasus republics
By: Anastasia Novikova
Izvestia, January 24, 2012

VLADIMIR PUTIN DISCUSSED ETHNIC ISSUE WITH GOVERNORS OF SOUTHERN PROVINCES
      Premier Vladimir Putin had his second programme article published - this
one centered on the ethnic issue - and immediately discussed the matter with
regional leaders of the southern provinces. The premier asked those present what
structure they thought ought to handle ethnic affairs in the government. The
government itself was in the dark and could not decide if it ought to be a
ministry, a unit within the Regional Development Ministry, or perhaps a
department within the government apparat. Putin informed regional leaders that
he was prepared to go by their
decision as long as the new structure was truly effective.
      Premier's Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said the government was still
thinking about whether or not to make the future structure a bona fide ministry.
The government apparat already includes a division of ethnic affairs at this
point. Unfortunately, this structure has failed to do anything worthwhile so
far, not in the least because it lacks the head.
      Peskov said, "No, we are not sure yet that it ought to be a ministry. It
will be something all right, either established from scratch or just a suitably
transformed existing structure. The idea is to have this structure whatever it
is wielding real power."
      Addressing representatives of the southern provinces, Putin told them to
come up with something truly effective.
      In fact, even the system of gubernatorial elections suggested by President
Dmitry Medvedev might be transformed. Putin announced that the draft laws on
gubernatorial elections and political party registration procedures would be
amended yet. He allowed for the possibility that the so called "presidential
filter" might be
installed after all, the one he had talked about in December.
      Putin said, "I talked about the so called "presidential filter" last month
if you recall. Well, the draft law as it is
allows for no such instrument. I suggest that we all think it through. It is up
to the federal center to maintain parity of
regional, ethnic, and religious interests."
      The premier announced that this new procedure of gubernatorial election
would boost regional leaders'
accountability. As for political parties, he said that it would be wrong to
establish regional, republican, and ethnic parties.
      "What we need are nationwide political structures. We need them to consider
development of territories but on the nationwide scale," said the premier.
"Establishment of regional or republican political parties is no laughing
matter. It will cost us stability."
      The heads of the southern republics suggested establishment of a ministry
of ethnic affairs and installation of the
"presidential filter" in gubernatorial election procedures. Yunus-Bek Yevkurov
of Ingushetia said that ethnic affairs were so serious a matter as to warrant a
special ministry.
      Yevkurov said, "As for the "presidential filter", I believe that it is a
must. Considering the size of the country, I think that some filter is needed
indeed."
      Ramzan Kadyrov of Chechnya said, "We do not care whether governors are
appointed or elected. It does not matter."
      Kadyrov said that he had reached the age when he wanted to be able to spend
more time with his family. "I want to quit politics quietly," he said. According
to Kadyrov, he could not care less whether his successor was appointed or
elected as long as Putin approved of the man.
------

Putin harnesses Russian nationalism to boost presidential bid: Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin says that multiethnic Russia cannot survive as a
US-style 'melting pot' but must find its own way.
By: Fred Weir
Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 2012

Moscow - Off and running in the presidential election that is now just over a
month away, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has penned a lengthy article on
nationalism, potentially Russia's most explosive issue.
  In the article, Mr. Putin warns that nationalist agitators, both those
representing the ethnic Russian majority and those speaking for the country's
multitude of small minorities, are growing voices of destruction that threaten
to drive Russia down the path of a Soviet-style breakup.
  It's Mr. Putin's second program statement in less than a month, reportedly
written by three speechwriters and republished on his official campaign website.
Experts say it raises some very real dangers posed by Russia's ethnic and
religious complexity, but offers only more state control and curbs on democracy
by way of solution.
  Among other things, Putin calls for tougher controls on internal migration and
illegal immigration from outside Russia, a clampdown on "separatist" political
parties, and the creation of a new state agency to regulate interethnic
relations. He suggests language testing for immigrants, to make sure they speak
Russian, and also calls for creation of a list of 100 books that embody the
"self-identity" of Russia, which would be mandatory reading for every Russian
student.
  Racist tensions are growing in Russia, particularly in large urban centers like
Moscow that host huge communities of darker-skinned and often Muslim "migrants"
from Russia's impoverished and strife-torn north Caucasus region, as well as
millions of "guest workers"  who often live in legal limbo  from the now
independent republics of former Soviet Central Asia.
  Though ethnic Russians make up about 80 percent of Russia's 140 million people,
many minorities are concentrated in 20 Soviet-era ethnic republics, where they
enjoy privileged status for their own languages and cultures. Moscow has fought
two brutal wars since the Soviet collapse to keep Chechnya, a Caucasus republic,
from seceding. Putin has warned that separatist passions could strike in many
places besides the North Caucasus, including Siberia and the Volga region.
  Just over a year ago, thousands of ethnic Russian ultranationalists rampaged in
downtown Moscow to protest what they called police inaction over the killing of
one of their own in a gang fight with youths from the Caucasus.
  "There is a serious threat of extremism," as Russia's ultranationalists become
increasingly politicized, says Alla Gerber, president of the Holocaust
Foundation in Moscow. "More and more people have adopted the ideology of 'Russia
for the Russians,' which means that everyone else is an 'alien'."
  No US 'melting pot' or European 'multiculturalism'
  Ms. Gerber says it's good that Putin has opened up this discussion, because
there has been too little official response to the growing interethnic threat to
Russia's social stability, but she worries that there are too many
contradictions in his thinking. "When discussing migrants, for instance, Putin
seems to adopt the ideas of the [ultranationalist] Movement Against Illegal
Immigration, and his only prescription is to toughen up on them, tighten all the
rules."
  Putin argues that Russia is a vast multiethnic entity, created on the ruins of
the vast Russian and Soviet empires, that cannot survive as a US-style "melting
pot" nor as a European "multicultural" society. Russia needs to find its own
way.
  "The Russian experience of state development is unique," Putin wrote. "Ours is
a multiethnic society. We are a united people. But when a multi-ethnic society
is infected with the virus of nationalism, it loses its strength and stability.
..."
  "The Russian people are state-builders, as evidenced by the existence of
Russia. This kind of civilizational identity is based on preserving the
dominance of Russian culture, although this culture is represented not only by
ethnic Russians, but by all the holders of this identity, regardless of their
ethnicity. It is a kind of cultural code which has been attacked ever more often
over the past few years; hostile forces have been trying to break it, and yet,
it has survived. It needs to be supported, strengthened and protected," he
wrote.
  Keeping the nationalist card under control
  While analysts say many of Putin's ideas sound OK, a few are head-scratchers,
such as his call for a crackdown on internal migrants whose behavior displays an
"inappropriate, aggressive, defiant, or disrespectful" attitude toward the
culture and customs of the majority. "This behavior should be met with a legal,
but harsh response," he wrote.
  "One has an unpleasant reaction to this article," says Lev Ponomaryov, head of
For Human Rights, a Moscow-based grassroots movement. "Some of it sounds like
cheap populism aimed at stealing the thunder of nationalist groups who are now
in opposition to his regime."
  Putin's logic is not fully spelled out, leaving dangerous ambiguities, Mr.
Ponomaryov adds. "For example, his idea that Russians are, historically, the
'state-forming' people could be interpreted different ways, and could be easily
abused. It could become a rationale for having more ethnic Russians in high
posts, for instance. If we heard these words out of the mouth of an avowed
nationalist politician, it [would] be truly scary," Mr. Ponomaryov says.
  On the other hand, Putin attacked key some Russian nationalist positions,
including the demand that the Russian government cut off economic subsidies to
the impoverished North Caucasus. Putin ridiculed that idea, which is strongly
supported by popular blogger and opposition leader Alexei Navalny, as the kind
of destructive thinking that led straight to the collapse of the Soviet Union
two decades ago.
  "Putin's basic idea is that different nations can exist [within Russia], but
there is no chance for them to enjoy self-determination. Also, Russia should be
as big as possible," says Nikolai Petrov, an expert with the Carnegie Center in
Moscow.
  "It's basically a position in favor of imperialism and Russian chauvinism, and
that will appeal to nationalists.... Putin is trying to play the nationalist
card, but mainly to keep it from slipping out of his control."
----

Putin: crackdown needed on illegal immigration
By: MANSUR MIROVALEV
AP, January 26, 2012

MOSCOW (AP)  Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Thursday that government
officials must crack down on migrant workers who break the nation's laws by
failing to register or get work permits, and on companies that profit by hiring
them.
  Putin, who is campaigning for Russia's March presidential election, was
addressing an issue that angers many Russians because Moscow is overrun with
immigrants who often sleep in basements and overcrowded apartments.
  Some 10 million labor migrants, mostly from ex-Soviet Central Asia, flock to
Russia visa-free annually. Many face abuses, low pay and enslavement, while
their presence triggers xenophobia and hate attacks in a country where
unemployment stood at about 7 percent last year.
  Violent xenophobic groups have flourished in Russia over the past two decades.
Their members kill and beat non-Slavs and anti-racism activists and crudely
denounce the influx of immigrants from Central Asia and Russia's Caucasus. Some
Russians and nationalist politicians have accused the immigrants of stealing
jobs and forming ethnic gangs.
  Putin, who is expected to win the presidential election, said Thursday that
people who violate immigration and labor laws should be barred from entering the
country for up to 10 years.
  He also said that Russians who profit by hiring and enslaving migrants, or by
issuing fake work and residential permits, should face criminal charges instead
of "symbolic fines."
  "We need to toughen sanctions against those who hire people without permits,
basically as defenseless slaves," Putin said in televised remarks addressing
immigration officials.
  He said that of the nearly 10 million foreigners now in Russia only 4 million
work legally.
  Ethnic Russians comprise two thirds of the country's population of 142 million,
but their birth dates are plummeting. The remaining third of Russia's population
are mostly from predominantly Muslim Caucasus.
-----

Nationalist 'ghost at feast' in Russia
By: Charles Clover in Moscow
Financial Times, January 26, 2012

Maksim Martsinkevich, nom de guerre "Machete", insists he is not a skinhead,
even though his pate is smooth as a cue ball. The 27-year-old does not like
being called a Nazi, though he once belonged to something called the National
Socialist Organisation and spent four years in jail, in part for shouting "Sieg
Heil!" at a political debate in 2007.
  He also insists that he is not a Russian opposition leader, even though he came
second in an internet vote to determine who should speak at a December 24
anti-Kremlin rally that attracted up to 100,000, the largest public
demonstration since the fall of the Soviet Union.
  Mr Martsinkevich was ultimately denied the stage by the organisers because of
his racist views and penchant for throwing the odd "roman salute" in public.
Over a cup of coffee at a Moscow Starbucks, however, he complains bitterly about
the hypocrisy of it all. "I didn't even want to speak," Mr Martsinkevich says.
"I just wanted to show that these other so-called opposition leaders are no
leaders. If they can't even win their own vote, what kind of power do they think
they are going to get?"
  The avowed white supremacist is the most extreme example of a perplexing issue
for Russia's anti-Kremlin protests, which began as a reaction to a December
parliamentary election that is widely believed to have been rigged and has
mutated into a street movement which has yet to define clear goals, aside from
its ubiquitous slogan "For free elections".
  In the current turmoil, hardline nationalism is the "ghost at the feast" in the
words of Alexander Verkhovsky, an expert on nationalism at Moscow's Sova Centre
think-tank. He says Russia, like much of Europe, is seeing a resurgence of the
far right. "It's natural. We had an empire, and it collapsed. All post-imperial
states see a rise in nationalism. The question is not whether or not there will
be a rise in nationalism, the question is what form it will take."
  While Mr Martsinkevich's internet vote success is ascribed by opposition
leaders to either a Kremlin provocation or a prank, it raises a real issue: much
of the groundswell of middle class protesters is made up of liberals, standing
up for universal human rights and freedoms. But much of it is not. Russian
nationalists see democracy as a means to an end, a path to power, but their
commitment to a pluralistic political system once they have achieved it is, at
best, an open question.
  One of the nationalists given the podium at the December rally, Vladimir Tor,
told the crowd: "We Russian nationalists are, more than anyone else, interested
in freedom and democracy in Russia, because we truly know and truly believe that
in fair elections power will go to the majority".
  That many nationalist have swung into opposition against Vladimir Putin, the
prime minister seeking to regain the presidency in elections this year, is
troubling for the Kremlin which considered such conservatives among their core
constituency. When Mr Putin came to power in 2000, he was cheered by many
nationalists as a strong ruler who wanted to restore Russian pride. However,
nationalists, like all independent political movements, have also felt the bite
of Mr Putin's authoritarian rule.
  "The Putin regime has sent 1,500 of my brothers to prison. That is more than
all the dissidents sent to prison under Brezhnev," Mr Tor said during his
speech.
  Mr Putin advocates a more imperial and militaristic brand of nationalism than
most Russians. He rarely has a press conference these days without hinting that
dark foreign forces are at work destabilising Russia. He has championed a 19tn
rouble ($614bn) spending binge re-equipping Russia's military and called for the
creation of a "Eurasian Union" of former Soviet states.
  However, most ordinary Russians seem more drawn to ethnic nationalism, rather
than nostalgia for great power. They are more concerned about immigration, which
has increased rapidly under Mr Putin due to Russia's economic growth; about
ethnic tensions between neighbourhood gangs; and the budget-draining federal
subsidies for the war-torn north Caucasus.
  According to a poll by the Moscow-based Levada centre, a sociological research
agency, 59 per cent of Russians "strongly" or "moderately" support the ethnic
nationalist slogan "Russia for the Russians", higher than at any time since the
poll was first taken in 1998.
  Nationalist Russians have deserted the Kremlin camp and swung into opposition,
joining a handful of liberal activists who have latched on to the middle-class
groundswell of protests.
  "We [nationalists and liberals] have very different views about the future
development of Russia. But we are united in seeking an end to the regime, free
registration of political parties, and free elections," Mr Tor says in an
interview.
  A synergy between liberals and nationalists is obvious to many in the
opposition: Russia's liberals have too many leaders and not enough followers,
while nationalists have the opposite problem. Liberal ideas were discredited by
the economic misery of the Yeltsin years, and the plethora of liberal parties
have trouble finding recruits. Meanwhile, polls such as the Levada centre's show
broad public support for nationalist ideas but there is a lack of credible
parties and popular leaders.
  The most successful opposition leaders have been those who can fuse liberalism
and nationalism. Alexei Navalny, the only opposition leader to beat Mr
Martsinkevich in the vote for speakers at last month's rally, is an avowed
nationalist, albeit a self-styled moderate one, as well as extolling democracy
and fighting corruption.
  He favours curbs on immigration and argues that the war-torn Caucasus should be
treated as "Russia's Gaza Strip" and politically isolated. He also attracts
controversy for addressing gatherings of extremist groups.
  Mr Navalny takes offence at the suggestion that he is a racist.
  "I would never consider any people 'second class'," he tells Boris Akunin, a
liberal author, in a published email exchange.
  In the Russian context, with its violent skinhead gangs, Mr Navalny is indeed a
moderate, though Mr Verkhovsky likens him to far-right European politicians such
as Geert Wilders and his Dutch Freedom Party.
  The alliances between liberal politicians are in some cases being formalised.
Liberals agreed at a meeting this month to share leadership of an umbrella group
called the Civic Movement of Russia with leftist hardliners and nationalists 
with all three groups given equal power on a steering committee.
  Ilya Yashin, a leader of the liberal opposition Solidarity movement, makes a
distinction between radical nationalists and "constitutional" ones. "I see
nothing wrong with a tactical alliance with constitutional nationalists," he
says.
  "I am certainly against what they say but their views certainly have a place in
the political system, and they are represented in most European parliamentary
democracies."
  Many democrats want to avoid seeing nationalism used to divide the opposition.
  Skinheads loyal to Mr Martsinkevich tried to rush the stage at the December
rally but were convinced to stand down  by other nationalists.
  Some also believe that Mr Martsinkevich may be supported by the Kremlin in an
effort to divide and discredit the real opposition. It is a charge he heatedly
denies, citing his time in prison.
  "They say I'm a Kremlin project. Where do they think I spent the last four
years  in Bali?"
-----

Putin vs. Russia's New Nationalists
By: Lucian Kim
http://lucianinmoscow.blogspot.com, January 26, 2012

Vladimir Putin isn't a man who usually acknowledges his mistakes, but on Monday
he confessed that during his 12 years in power, his government had failed to
propagate tolerance and understanding among Russia's more than 100 ethnic
groups. "Unfortunately  and I must direct this criticism at myself as well 
government agencies are doing little on the federal level and virtually nothing
on the regional level, save for some formalities," Putin said, speaking  at the
Forum of the Peoples of Southern Russia in Kislovodsk, a former czarist outpost
in Russia's restless North Caucasus region.
  The astonishing admission came only hours after Putin had published an article
entitled "Russia's National Question", in which he wrote that "any responsible
politician or public figure must understand that one of the main conditions for
our country's survival is civic and interethnic harmony." He warned that Russian
nationalists were threatening to destroy what was left of Russia following the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.
In the convoluted treatise, Putin simultaneously appealed to Russia's
"polyethnic civilization" while pillorying Western multiculturalism, admitted
that corruption and bad governance were fueling ethnic conflict, and suggested
creating a government agency to deal with minorities  a decade after he
abolished a federal ministry dedicated to ethnic relations.
  The commentary, splashed across three pages in the liberal-leaning Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, was the second installment in a promised series of articles by Putin
laying out his vision for the country as a candidate in the March 4 presidential
election. In a photograph on the front page, Putin was shown donning a
traditional cap during a visit to Buryatia, the historically Buddhist region
squeezed between Lake Baikal and the Mongolian border.
  Last week Putin made his first campaign pitch in the pages of Izvestia,
basically arguing that he deserves a third  and possibly a fourth  presidential
term given his record as the man who had saved Russia from collapse. In this
week's article, Putin takes on Russia's most explosive issue in the same
rambling style, with moments of incisive analysis interspersed by conflicting
claims and cavalier optimism. Again, the reader gets the feeling that Putin is
trying to say something important, only it's not clear exactly what.
  The fall of the Soviet Union left the people living in Russia confused about
their own identity. While Estonians, Georgians or Armenians had the goal of
building their own independent nation-states, the new Russian Federation was
almost as ethnically diffuse as the Soviet Union. Russians had a weak sense of
national consciousness, because as the dominant ethnicity in the USSR, they had
unwittingly acquired the non-ethnic, imperial identity of Soviet citizens. At
the Kislovodsk forum, Putin remembered that when he was growing up, people
didn't make distinctions based on somebody's ethnic background. Of course the
Soviet Union's ethnic minorities never really gave up their languages or
identities, and "the national question" became the crucible that caused the
communist empire to break apart.
  In the article in Nezavisimaya, Putin outs himself as very much the Soviet man,
whose first allegiance is to a multiethnic state and not any one nationality:
"We are a multiethnic society, but we are one people." A person living in Russia
should be aware of his roots, Putin writes later. "But above all, he should be a
citizen of Russia and be proud of that. Nobody has the right to put their
ethnicity or religion above the laws of the land."
  While Putin's words seem to echo stock phrases uttered by politicians in the
U.S. or western Europe, they are grounded in a completely different logic. At
the beginning of his article, Putin takes aim at the "failure of the
multicultural project" in the West. Russia, on the other hand, is a unique
civilization that grew organically around a "Russian cultural core." In Putin's
thinking, Russia's multiethnicity is not predicated on fuzzy values such as
equality or tolerance; it is a reality on which Russia's very statehood depends.
  Putin assertion in 2005 that the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe" of the 20th century is often cited as evidence of a hankering for
totalitarianism or revanchist designs. But Putin doesn't mourn communism or even
the Warsaw Pact, he mourns the mighty state that he grew up in and pledged to
defend as a KGB agent. Putin is a statist, and it is his conviction that the
Russian state  whether it's called the Soviet Union or Russian Federation  must
be preserved at all costs.
  While Putin is often characterized as a nationalist, it would be more accurate
to call him an opportunist who exploits other people's prejudices when
politically expedient. Nothing indicates that he believes ethnic Russians are
superior to others. In his article, he writes that Russian identity doesn't
depend on somebody's ethnicity but on whether they have adopted the "cultural
code" of Russian civilization.
  (It's also a misconception that Putin hates America. He was trained to view the
U.S. as a worthy superpower rival and today has mixed feelings of envy and
admiration. In the Nezavisimaya article, for example, he writes that Russian
schools need a similar "Great Books" program as in the U.S. and credits
Hollywood for its role in propagating American interests and values.)
  If Putin saw Chechen separatists as the main threat to Russia's unity when he
came to power 12 years ago, he now appears to consider Russian nationalists the
biggest danger.
  Putin crushed Chechnya's aspirations for independence and installed a loyal
regime, now led by strongman Ramzan Kadyrov. What was left of the Chechen
guerilla movement morphed into an underground Islamic insurgency that spread
across the North Caucasus region and has carried out terrorist attacks in
Moscow. Putin's attempt to pacify the impoverished area with a flood of
petrodollars has yielded disappointing results. The motivation of corrupt local
elites to lift their people out of poverty decreases with every new payment out
of the federal budget.
   Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a generation of Russians has grown
up without the propaganda that preached a common identity and the brotherhood of
nations. Many young people, regardless of their social standing, have gravitated
toward Russian nationalism in the political vacuum that replaced communism.
Various people call themselves Russian nationalists, from pagans, skinheads and
monarchists to Panslavists, white supremacists and National Bolsheviks.
  The strand of nationalism seeking to capitalize most from the anti-government
protests that began last month belongs to the so-called national democrats
around blogger Alexei Navalny. National democrats openly discuss Russia shedding
the "imperial burden" of the North Caucasus, conquered by the czars in the 19th
century after fierce resistance. Other historically Muslim regions such as
Tatarstan or Bashkortostan, which have been part of Russia for hundreds of
years, would remain because no "civilizational fault line" separates them from
the Russian heartland. To nationalists, Putin is a traitor to Russia because of
the power he has surrendered to leaders such as Kadyrov. In October, Navalny
appeared at a small rally in Moscow with the slogan "Stop Feeding the Caucasus."
  In his article in Nezavisimaya, Putin lambastes Russian nationalists for their
"false talk about Russians' right to self-determination, 'racial purity' and the
necessity 'to complete the business of 1991 and finish off the empire that's
hanging around the Russian people's neck.'" He continues: "I'm deeply convinced
that attempts to advocate the idea of a Russian 'national' mono-ethnic state
contradict our 1,000-year history. Furthermore, it is the shortest way to the
destruction of the Russian people and Russian statehood  or any other
functioning, sovereign state on our land. When they start shouting 'Stop feeding
the Caucasus,' tomorrow another appeal will inevitably follow: 'Stop feeding
Siberia, the Far East, the Urals, the Volga Basin, Moscow Region...' This was
exactly the same formula used by those who led to the fall of the Soviet Union."
  As impassioned as Putin gets in his defense of a multiethnic Russia, something
doesn't quite click. If he believes so firmly that the country's existence
depends on interethnic harmony, why has so little been done to cultivate it over
the past decade? Putin is the first to admit that "we need a strategy of
national policy based on civic patriotism." In another passage, he writes that
"it's clear we need to increase the quality of our migration policy by an order
of magnitude."
  Putin sounds like an opposition politician lacking a team of advisers,
dispensing solutions both vague and commonplace. He proposes the creation of a
new agency to deal with ethnic relations that "shouldn't be a usual government
body." Young Russians should get a better civic education, while immigrants
should be required to learn Russian language and literature. The authorities
need to police migration more conscientiously; newcomers should respect local
traditions; and Russia should compete with other countries for the most
qualified immigrants. The necessary measures degenerate into a critique of
Russia's criminal justice system. Ineffective law enforcement agencies and
corrupt courts only exacerbate interethnic tensions, Putin writes.
  He makes every connection but the connection to himself.
-----

Russian Liberals Growing Uneasy With Alliances
By: MICHAEL SCHWIRTZ
New York Times, January 29, 2012

MOSCOW  About two and a half hours into a recent strategy session of Russia's
new protest movement, someone raised the question that could tear apart the
crazy-quilt alliance opposing Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin's power.
  "I'd like to ask on what basis extreme nationalists and ultra-right-wing groups
are allowed to participate in this civic movement," said Aleksandr Bikbov, a
mop-haired and bespectacled sociologist. "Especially," he added, "if they shout
antidemocratic slogans like 'Russia for ethnic Russians' from the stage."
  Before he could make his case, Mr. Bikbov was drowned out by a mixture of
applause and boos, prompting the moderator to remove his question from the
discussion. One audience member called him a "liberal fascist."
  As the nascent opposition movement prepares for its next major day of protest,
set for Feb. 4, the tentative embrace of an alliance with nationalists has
emerged as a defining step  but the consequences of such a move are far from
certain.
  For more than two decades, Russian liberals have been warning of the dangers
posed by nationalism, often portraying it as a greater threat to freedom and
stability in this multiethnic country than the soft authoritarianism of Mr.
Putin, Russia's once and probably future president. In recent years, the
nationalist movement has become large and increasingly malignant, responsible
for a pattern of racist violence against non-Slavs that includes kidnapping,
torture and murder. Nationalists have taken responsibility for several
beheadings.
  But in the effort to drive out Mr. Putin, the opposition, driven by liberal and
middle-class Russians, has nonetheless reached out to nationalists, seeing them
as a vital bulwark at a critical moment.
  "Without cooperation with the nationalists, this movement would not be
possible," said Anatoli Baranov, a longtime leftist activist and a leading voice
in the new protest movement. He credited the nationalists' long experience in
opposition politics, adding that cooperation with groups of all political
stripes was paramount at this early stage.
  "I understand that there are risks," Mr. Baranov said. "Certainly, among
nationalists, there are those I would not work with for hygienic reasons. But
many are reasonable."
  How much influence nationalists will come to exert on the new protest movement
is unclear. In their balaclavas and combat boots, they were clearly the black
sheep at two huge anti-Kremlin protests in December, where their vocal
denunciations of immigrants and calls for ethnic purity were often drowned out
by chants of "Fascism will not pass!"
  But it is clear that they have become a force in Russia that is politically
perilous to ignore. Long before protests became fashionable among members of
Russia's urban middle class, who turned out in droves for the December
demonstrations, nationalists had the monopoly on street theater, organizing
protests that drew thousands.
  Moreover, their ideas have a following that extends beyond the office buildings
and hipster cafes of Moscow and into the more conservative Russian heartland,
where the success or failure of the protest movement could be decided.
  Such is the popularity of nationalism here  often rallying around the slogan
"Russia for ethnic Russians"  that Mr. Putin has himself at times played at
co-opting the nationalist agenda for political gain.
  But recently, Mr. Putin has taken a different tack, most likely seeing a chance
to hurt the protest movement. In an essay about the nationalist question
published last week, Mr. Putin assailed "provocateurs and enemies" who he said
were trying to "rip out Russia's core with false talk of the rights of ethnic
Russians to self-determination and racial purity."
  "I am deeply convinced that attempts to propagate the idea of building a
Russian 'national' mono-ethnic state contradict all of our thousand-year
history," Mr. Putin wrote in the essay, which was published on his Web site.
  With the nationalist presence, an anxiousness has emerged within the protest
movement that has become more evident with the fading euphoria of the first
demonstrations. Many liberals said they had no choice but to work with the
nationalists if only to uphold the democratic nature of the movement.
  "We do not have a mechanism for excluding people who are legally allowed to be
around us in the protest movement," said Lev A. Ponomaryov, a veteran human
rights activist. "Though it is unpleasant for me and my colleagues that they are
there, this is a fact."
  Mr. Ponomaryov said he initially resisted the inclusion of nationalist leaders,
but relented when members agreed to sign a pact denouncing xenophobia and
racism. A delegation of 10 nationalists will join an equal number of
representatives from left-wing and liberal groups and a delegation of the
politically unaffiliated in the leadership committee of the so-called Citizens
Movement, which will coordinate future actions. There are limits to the
liberals' tolerance, however. When an avowed white supremacist, Maksim
Martsinkevich, nicknamed the Hatchet, made the top three in an online vote for
speakers at the second protest, organizers stepped in, denying him the
microphone.
  Others have threatened to break away if any of the nationalists are allowed to
remain. Several created a Facebook group called "Russia Without Hitler," which
has more than a thousand members. One of the group's founders, Konstantin
Borovoi, a businessman, has formed a splinter group that plans to hold its own
protest on Feb. 4.
  For their part, nationalist leaders have been keen to avoid inflammatory
statements, describing themselves as political moderates capable of compromise.
  "We are trying to maintain diplomatic relations," said Vladimir Tor, a
nationalist leader who has taken a leading role in the protest movement. "It is
as if we are all in the same life raft, and whether we like it or not we are
forced to find rational solutions to this crisis."
  He added, "We are not in anyway forgoing our basic values."
  The nationalists' agenda has been given a lift by Aleksei Navalny, the
anticorruption crusader who is the undisputed leader of the movement. In the
past, he has espoused nationalist views, particularly on immigration and the
volatile, mostly Muslim North Caucasus region, that make his more liberal
supporters perspire. In November, he was criticized for speaking at an annual
demonstration of nationalists called the Russian March.
  Many liberals insisted that the inclusion of the nationalists was a temporary
arrangement that would be adjusted if the movement gained major traction. The
question is who would stand to lose most if the nationalists left.
  "A portion of society that considered dialogue with radical nationalists
unacceptable now views them differently," said Oleg P. Orlov, director of the
prominent human rights group Memorial. "Does this mean there will be an increase
in support for such groups? This is a danger."
-----

Putin's new strategy: Vilify U.S.
By: Joel Brinkley
Politico, January 30, 2012

Listening to Vladimir Putin trying to salvage his career as his base of support
seems to be crumbling around him, the Russian prime minister sounds more and
more like all of those Arab dictators just before their own people turned on
them in angry revolt.  "Stability is something that can only be achieved through
hard work, by being open to change and ready for long-overdue, well-planned and
well-calculated reforms," Putin declared in an online campaign essay this month.
So said Syrian President Bashar Assad almost exactly a year ago, just before his
own country dissolved into protest, chaos and slaughter.  "If you didn't see the
need for reform before what happened in Egypt and Tunisia," Assad said in a Wall
Street Journal interview then, "it's too late to do any reforms." His "first
priority," Assad added, "is stability, even before food." And of course, during
his decades in office, Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian president, repeatedly
explained that all of his repressive measures were necessary to maintain
"stability."  Russia experts say they doubt Putin even knows how much he sounds
like those disgraced Arab autocrats - including a new dose of harsh,
anti-American rhetoric that presents a new challenge for President Barack
Obama's efforts to improve Washington's strained U.S. relationship with Moscow. 
"He's losing touch; he's lost it," said Leon Aron, a Russian who is director of
Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. "He's starting to believe,
like they all do eventually, that `Russia is moi. The country loves me. They
can't do without me.'"  Now Russia stands at a crossroads. United Russia,
Putin's political party, suffered a stunning defeat in December; it won barely
50 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections, and that was only after what
election monitors described as widespread ballot-stuffing and related fraud. 
The state holds presidential elections in March, and Putin is running for his
third term. No doubt the vote in December has him worried.  "What's been a
little sobering for them is that it's not an automatic win anymore," said
Stephen Sestanovich, former U.S. ambassador-at-large for Russia and the former
Soviet states who's now with the Council on Foreign Relations. "They really had
believed their own numbers, that 70 [percent] or 80 percent supported them."  So
Putin has put a new campaign strategy in place: vilifying the United States. 
His government began attacking Michael McFaul, the new United States ambassador,
before he had unpacked his bags - even though McFaul had been the White House
point man for Obama's new "reset" approach toward Russia. And Putin recently
remarked that the United States remained interested in Russia for just one
reason: His is the only country "that could destroy the U.S. in half an hour or
less."  Putin and others in his government are blaming the United States for
instigating the massive street protests that began shortly after the discredited
elections in December, as well as the Arab Spring revolts in Egypt, Libya, Syria
and elsewhere. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov devoted most of his annual news
conference this month to a wide-ranging attack on the United States - including
a stark warning that the U.S. could face "a very big war" by continuing, as he
put it, to encourage anti-government uprisings in the Middle East.  "They're
probably trying to create a political buzz," said Coit Blacker, a former senior
director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security
Council who is now a senior fellow at Stanford University. "Putin wants to make
it look like he is indispensable, the only one who can stand up to the U.S. You
denounce the U.S. and you increase your nationwide appeal."  But the question is
how that strategy is actually playing among the Russian people today. Is Putin
out of touch, as Aron remarked - just like Assad, Mubarak and the rest? Even
now, nearly a year into the Syrian uprising, Assad blames the violence on
terrorists and foreign-backed instigators. He refuses to acknowledge that any of
it has anything to do with his own autocratic behavior while Putin, Lavrov and
others in their government blame the United States. But are most Russians buying
that line?  "For those young people in their 20s and 30s," Aron said, referring
to the street demonstrators, "their reference point is not the U.S. or the Cold
War - not even the 1990s. It's what they see on the Internet today."  What
they've seen of Putin online is that staged dive in August to "find" treasure
that his office finally had to admit had been planted on the ocean floor for him
in advance. More recently came the doctored photo of opposition candidate Alexei
Navalny, supposedly standing with an alien. When that was debunked, an online
video put Navalny side by side with Adolf Hitler, making him seem like Hitler's
parrot.  The United States has not been a factor in the Moscow street protests,
and there's no apparent reason to believe the U.S. will play a significant role
in the next planned demonstration this Saturday.  Blacker noted, however, that
while educated young people in Moscow disparage Putin, outside the cities many
Russians are still responsive to Cold War rhetoric. Putin is speaking to them;
he's "not playing to Moscow." At the same time, Blacker acknowledged that the
same sort of urban/rural division also existed in Egypt a year ago, and that
didn't prevent protesters in Cairo from unseating Mubarak.  "Moscow is like
Cairo," he said. And Putin "probably doesn't know how much his words resonate
with those of Mubarak or Assad."  Russians and Russia-watchers in the West are
waiting anxiously to see how many people turn out for Saturday's planned
large-scale demonstrations - and how Putin's government deals with the
demonstrators. The presidential election is just a month later and Russian
experts say it's unlikely that Putin will win a majority of the vote without
ballot manipulation. Even when businesses bused thousands of their workers to a
rally in central Russia at Putin's behest on Saturday, the workers' enthusiasm
for the candidate was reported to be lukewarm at best.  "Fraud is integral to
the Russian system," Sestanovich said. As Blacker put it, "I do not foresee
circumstances under which they would stage what we would consider a fair and
free election. There's never been one."  Already, in fact, Golos, Russia's only
independent election-monitoring organization, was told late last week that it
had to vacate its offices or face continual power failures until March 6 - which
just happens to be two days after the election. Russian officials had accused
the group of trying to instigate an Arab Spring-style revolt in Russia.  Among
Russian officials, "there's awareness of the need for greater manipulation" of
the election results in March, Sestanovich said, "but also real concern about
how it will play out."  Those officials, the experts said, know that another
example of blatant fraud would likely bring thousands of angry Russians into the
streets again - and increase ferment within the government. After all, the
protesters in December came out because they were furious about fraud in the
parliamentary elections. Soon after, one of Putin's closest aides, Finance
Minister Alexei Kudrin, quit his job and joined the protesters, showing that
"the ice is breaking up," Sestanovich said.  "Those demonstrators are saying `we
want to get rid of this guy because he doesn't understand us,'" Aron said. "He's
stuck in the past," just like those Arab autocrats.  In that Wall Street Journal
interview a year ago, Assad said his country needed time "to build institutions
and improve education" before offering democratic reforms. As for Russia, in his
essay this month, Putin said a continuing "education revolution" is required
before Russia can enter "a new social reality."  Joel Brinkley, a professor of
journalism at Stanford University, is a former foreign correspondent and
Jerusalem bureau chief for The New York Times.

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/72181.html
------------------------

Putin's Nationality Dilemma
By: Peter Rutland
Moscow Times, January 30, 2012

In Prague, tourists line up to visit the "New-Old" synagogue, which was new when
it was built, in 1270. On Jan. 23, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published an
essay on the "national question" in Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Like the Prague
synagogue, Putin's article is something that is called new, but in fact, it is
quite old.
  The good news was that there is no sign of Putin playing the nationalism card.
Such fears were triggered by his reaction to the December 2010 clashes in Moscow
between Russian and North Caucasian youth when he met with soccer fans. While
calling for tighter controls on migrant workers in his article, Putin recognizes
that they are here to stay, and he defends the country's federal and multiethnic
structure.
  As political analyst Andrei Makarkin has noted, one important development this
past year has been that many ultra- nationalist leaders have given up on trying
to work with the Kremlin. Many of them have now formed an alliance with
democrats and Communists in opposition to the rigged Dec. 4 elections. Several
leading nationalists were given the right to speak from the tribune at the
protest demonstrations. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny has often deployed
nationalist rhetoric and promotes the "Stop Feeding the Caucasus!" slogan,
something that Putin's article specifically targets as dangerous for the Russian
state.
  Although Putin is rejecting an alliance with ultranationalists, the bad news is
that his approach is a thinly disguised recycling of Soviet nationality policy.
Writer Alexander Morozov has suggested that the core ideas in Putin's article
were taken from a 2010 Education Ministry proposal for promoting "polycultural"
education. But they are rooted in a much deeper-rooted discomfort with
recognizing the force of minority national identity. Putin's model is a
Russia-centric view that glosses over the fears and aspirations of the nonethnic
Russians who make up 20 percent of the country, a statistic that was nowhere to
be found in Putin's article.
  Putin argues that the traditional European nation-state is based on a closed
model of national culture. This meant that the Europeans were reluctant to
integrate Muslim immigrant populations. Instead they opted for a "multicultural
project," which Putin now deems a failure.
  Russia, in contrast, is a "multiethnic civilization with Russian culture at its
core," a tradition, which Putin says is rooted in the "expansive Russia" of
tsarist times. "Russia's state development is unique," writes Putin. "It is
neither an ethnic state nor an American melting pot."
  Russian identity, rather, is that of a "civic nation"  one that is rooted in
loyalty to the state. Putin argues that this is why Russians living in other
countries fail to organize themselves as a cohesive diaspora. Putin does not use
the term "Rossiisky," which former President Boris Yeltsin was fond of using to
denote civic as opposed to ethnic identity. This kind of statist nationalism is
unacceptable to ultranationalists who are driven by hatred of the West as an
external enemy and Muslims from the North Caucasus and Central Asia as an
internal enemy.
  But Putin goes on to say, "This kind of civilizational identity is based on
preserving the dominance of Russian culture." He calls upon Russian
intellectuals to preserve the country's "unified cultural code." This can only
be alarming to Russia's minorities who have seen their autonomy steadily eroded
over the past decade. For example, they have objected to the unified state exam
for university entrants, which was introduced two years ago, which can only be
taken in Russian.
  In fact there is nothing particularly unique about Russia's approach to
national identity. All modern states try to guarantee civic rights while also
resting on some common ethnic and linguistic foundation. Putin praises Russian
identity for achieving "unity in diversity"  perhaps not realizing that is the
official motto of the European Union since 2000 and is almost identical in
meaning to "e pluribus unum"  or "many united into one"  which the United States
adopted as its seal in 1782.
  The problem is that Russia faces ethnic and religious insurgencies in the North
Caucasus that have no equivalent in Europe or the United States. Moscow needs to
come up with some new ideas to tackle these problems. But after 12 years in
power, it would be unrealistic to expect any new thinking from Putin.
------

Nationalism Debate Has Become More Civilized
By: Olga Troitskaya
Moscow Times, February 1, 2012

On Jan. 23, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published an article in Nezavisimaya
Gazeta on Russia's nationalities and migration policy. Experts regard this as a
tactical move aimed at capturing supporters of the ommunist and Liberal
Democratic parties that both play to the nationalist tune. The broader question,
however, is why immigration has become a prominent issue in the country's
presidential campaign.
  Over the past decade, Russia experienced an inflow of labor migrants that
amounts to about 10 percent of its overall manpower. It is only natural that
while about 80 percent of Russians seek college degrees, low-skilled niches in
the labor market are being filled by immigrants.
  Within Russian society, attitudes toward immigration have so far been mixed.
Realizing the benefits of cheap migrant labor and using it extensively for
business and private needs, Russians are nevertheless reluctant to take
immigration for granted. The slogan "Russia for Ethnic Russians!" is becoming
increasingly popular: 58 percent supported this idea in 2011 compared with 43
percent in 1998. The share of those who think that immigration should be
restricted grew from 45 percent in 2002 to 64 percent in 2011, and in Moscow the
number grew to 78 percent.
  Several factors explain the current controversy over immigration.
  First and foremost, the economic costs of migration are broadly perceived to
outweigh its benefits. The structure of migration flows is heavily tilted toward
low-skilled workers. Immigration of highly qualified labor into Russia is
insignificant. It accounts for 20,000 to 40,000 specialists per year, which is
nothing compared with the millions of low-skilled migrants flooding in from the
post-Soviet republics in Central Asia, China, Turkey and Vietnam.
  Another problem is the predominantly informal character of migrant economic
activity. According to reliable estimates, there are between 3 million and 5
million illegal migrants in Russia  twice as many as the number of legally
registered labor migrants. Law compliance is weak even among the latter group.
More than 60 percent of legal migrants admitted in a recent survey that they had
bribed officials or submitted fake contracts to the Federal Migration Service to
get their documents. As a result of tax evasion, the federal budget loses about
$10 billion a year, not to mention indirect costs from the lack of control over
labor and technological standards.
  Surveys of the migrant population show that migrants usually earn less and work
harder than Russian citizens. An average hourly wage of a migrant worker is 40
percent to 50 percent below that of local workers, while a migrant's working
week is 50 percent longer  60 hours instead of the 40 hours prescribed by the
Russian Labor Code. This has convinced many that demand for migrant labor is
driven primarily by wage-dumping and not by real deficits on the labor market.
Moreover, there is no evidence that low-cost labor makes products cheaper in
Russia. The informal market in migration has given birth to a whole class of
dealers  private subcontractors and recruiting agencies who act as
intermediaries between employers and authorities and may also be selling the
final product. A dealer's profit can reach up to 150 percent of real labor
costs, thus inflating rather than reducing prices.
  Second, migrants have served as a lightning rod for political mobilization.
They are routinely assigned the blame for unresolved social and economic
problems, including unemployment, corruption and crime. At times, this not only
turned people's attention away from public policy failures, but also helped to
boost self-esteem among the Russians by shifting responsibility onto scapegoats.
  A third source of tensions stems from the unresolved internal conflict in the
North Caucasus. The topic of Chechnya has featured prominently in political
debates, especially during the current election season because it is viewed as a
promising way of rallying public support. The most common themes for speculation
are the massive transfers from the federal budget to Russia's southern
republics. Today, 62 percent of Russians support the slogan "Stop Feeding the
Caucasus!" Such rhetoric stirs up the negative sentiment toward all migrants
from the Caucasus region, whether they come from Russia's own republics or from
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.
  Finally, Russians increasingly perceive migrants from the former Soviet
republics as culturally different. The share of immigrants who grew up after the
demise of the Soviet Union and do not know the Russian language is rising. Over
half of the immigrants confess that their command of Russian is insufficient to
fill in the basic documents. Other fault lines are based on the Islamic-Orthodox
difference between migrants and Russians and the rural-urban contradictions that
have become manifest in almost any interaction between the two groups in large
and medium-sized cities.
  Popular discontent with immigration used to take the form of violence against
migrants from ultranationalist groups or sporadic clashes between indigenous
"locals" and "newcomers." Today, however, the conflict has taken new, more
civilized forms: from parliamentary discussions and television debates to
organized and relatively peaceful public actions. In other words, nationalism
may soon morph from Putin's favorite bugaboo into a powerful mobilizing force of
anti-government protests.
============================


III ANNOTATIONS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Demokratiia. Vlast'. Elity: Demokratiia vs Elitokratiia [Democracy. Power.
Elites: Democracy vs Power of elites]. Ed. by Ia.A. Pliais. Moscow: ROSSPEN,
2010. 216 p. ill., tables.   Politilogiia Rossii  Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN
9785824314571

This collection by Russian and German political scientists, pollsters and
experts tackles one of the main topics of modern political and social life in
the post-soviet period: the balance between the power of elites and the power of
the people. The work is divided into two sections: Transformation of elites in
the time of transition; Regional political elites.
----------------------

Kavkazskii Uzel: Strategiia Bezopasnosti Rossii na Kavkaze: Materialy
Mezhdunarodnogo Seminara. 27 Fevralia 2009 Goda [The Caucasus knot: Strategies
for the defence of Russia in the Caucasus: Materials of an international
seminar. 27 February 2009]. Comp. and ed. by A.A. Makhlai, E.I. Tsygankova.
Moscow: Fond "Rossiiskii obshchestvenno-politicheskii tsentr", [2009]. 117 p.
pbk. 14 x 20 cm. No ISBN

This is a collection of materials of the international seminar on the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict and terrorism at the Caucasus. Among contributors are
scholars, analysts, experts, diplomats, economists, and social activists of
several countries.
-------------------------

Genri, Ernst. K Voprosu o Vneshnei Politike Stalina [Zapiska]. Prometei [On the
foreign policy of Stlain. Prometheus: Novel]. Comp. by  M.S. Rostovskii; transl.
from English by VV. Simakova, T.B. Ivanova. Moscow: Russkii raritet, 2007. 463
p. [16 ill.] Hardcover. 17 x 24 cm. ISBN 9785703402009

This book is the first publication of current writings of the well known soviet
journalist Ernst Genry (Semen Nikolaevich Rostovskii, 1904-1990). E. Genry was
the first who warned the world about a coming war in his essays "Hitler over
Europe?" (1934) and "Hitler against the USSR?" (1936) published in London. The
volume includes his famous letter to the main soviet ideologue M. Suslov (1966)
and Erenburg (1965), other writings, and his philosophical novel "Prometei" (pp.
151-436). The novel, conceived in prison in 1952, had no chance to be published
even during the so called "thaw" period. Supplements. Name index
-----------------------------

Iakunin, V.I., Bagdasarian, V.E., Sulakshin, S.S. Novye Tekhnologii Bor'by s
Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennost'iu [New technologies of destruction of the Russian
Federation]. Moscow: Eksmo, Algoritm, 2010. 424 p. ill.   Proekt "Antirossiia" 
Hardcover. 13 x 20 cm cm. ISBN 9785699433698

This is the second edition of the collective monograph by scholars of the Center
for Problem Analysis and Civil Management Design. It is an analysis of the
threats to the Russian state from abroad, and political technologies which could
have a destructive impact on it to the point of dissolution of the Russian
Federation. The authors offer a program of political responses to these threats.
The monograph includes a lot of interesting data and results of surveys.
Illustrated with tables and graphs.
-------------------------

Kurginian, S.E. Aktual'nyi Arkhiv: Raboty 1988-1993 Godov [Actual archive: Works
of 1988 - 1993]. Moscow: MOF ETTs, 2010. 708 p.   Teoriia i praktika
politicheskikh igr  Hardcover. 13 x 20 cm. ISBN 9785701805178

Collection of works of the very well known Russian political thinker and expert
Sergei Kurginian. The articles analyze the most significant political events of
1988-93: the Vilnius unrest, ethnic conflict at Nagornyi Karabakh and Baku, "the
financial war" on the eve of the fall of the Soviet Union, the civil war in
Tajikistan, the October confrontation of El'tsin with the Russian parliament in
Moscow in 1993, etc.
----------------

Lal, Dipak (Lal, Deepak ). Pokhvala Imperii: Globalizatsiia I Poriadok  = In
praise of empires: Globalization and order. Translated from English. Moscow:
Novoe izdatel'stvo, 2010. 364 p.   Biblioteka Fonda "Liberal'naia Missiia"  pbk.
13 x 20 cm. ISBN 9785983791381

This book is based on the Henry Wendt Lecture by the well known economist Deepak
Lal, delivered at the American Enterprise Institute in 2002, In Defense of
Empires. The book  is addressed to a broad audience. Lal believes empires are
special -- and good. Specifically, they maintain peace and promote prosperity
better, Lal argues, than any other system -- and much of the book is a
historical overview of empires and their successes. Especially impressive: the
British Empire, creating "the first truly global economy, the first truly
liberal international economic order".
-----------------------

Slavin, B.F. Lenin protiv Stalina: Poslednii Boi Revoliutsionera [Lenin against
Stalin: The final battle of the revolutionary]. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2010.
150 p. pbk. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN 9785354013395.

This book deals with Lenin's views on the model of soviet socialism, his
criticism of Stalin's totalitarian approach, and his disagreement about "the
identity of two leaders - Lenin and Stalin". B. Slavin uses little known
documents and materials on Lenin's "strange illness" and cause of death. Boris
Slavin is a scholar at the Gorbachev-Fond, who belongs to the faction of
critical marxism and the left wing of the social-democratic movement.
-----------------------

Pravoslavnaia Entsiklopediia: Tom XXIII: Innokentii-Ioann [Russian Orthodox
encyclopedia: Volume XXIII: Innokentii-Ioann]. Ed. by Kirill, Patriarkh
Moskovskoi i Vseia Rusi. Moscow: Pravoslavnaia Entsiklopediia, 2009. 752 p.
Color ill. Hardcover. 21 x 29 cm. ISBN 9785895720424 (T.23)

This encyclopedia covers in detail the Russian Orthodox Church, other Orthodox
and Christian churches of the world, saints of all religions, other religions
and confessions. Started in 2000. Richly illustrated. Glossy paper. Previous
volumes and standing order are also available.
---------------------

Ippolitova, A.G. Semantika Natsionalizma v Kul'ture Sovremennoi Rossii [The
semantics of nationalism in the culture of modern Russia]. St. Petersburg:
Nestor, 2006. 156 p. pbk. 14 x 20 cm. Printing 300. ISBN 5303002373

This monograph studies nationalism from a cultural prospective. It analyzes the
semantics of nationalist artifacts, the interpretation of the nature of their
cultural antipode, special features of nationalist sub-cultures in the Russian
society.
--------------------

  Na "Kraiu" Sovetskogo Obshchestva: Sotsial'nye Marginaly kak Ob`ekt
Gosudarstvennoi Politiki. 1945-1960-e gg. [In the "gutter" of soviet society:
The social marginals as an object of government policy. 1945-1960]. Comp. by
E.Iu. Zubkova, T.Iu. Zhukova. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010. 816 p.   Dokumenty
sovetskoi istorii  Hardcover. 16 x 23 cm. Printing 800. ISBN 9785824314441

This book includes documents on the government policy in 1945-1960 towards the
socially marginal: beggars, homeless, wanderers, prostitutes, drunkards,
criminals and other marginal groups. The many people fell into a risk group not
by their own choice, but because of specific social circumstances: the war,
political exile, illness, lack of passport, etc. Most soviet laws treated these
people as "antisocial elements", "parasites", "spongers", etc. 272 documents.
Introductory articles, biographical notes, indices.
===========================

DISCLAIMER: The composition of RNB's issues does not necessarily express the
compilers' views. All topical English-language texts that come to the attention
of the compilers, and are related to Russian nationalism are, as far as that is
technically feasible, included.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The contents of RNB are compiled with the help of, among other
sources, CDI's "Johnson's Russia List," Monika Kirschner's "Ost-Verteiler," Sova
Center's "Xeno-News," UCSJ's "Bigotry Monitor" and "FSU Monitor," Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty's "Newsline," and E. Morgan Williams's "Action Ukraine
Report."
FAIR USE NOTICE: This issue of RNB may contain copyrighted material that is
redistributed for personal, scholarly use only. RNB is a single emission e-mail
to a limited number of scholars and professionals in the area of Russian studies
who have requested receipt of the list for scholarly and educational purposes.
RNB is distributed on a completely volunteer basis. The RNB compilers believe
that the use of copyrighted materials therein constitutes "fair use" of any such
material and is governed by appropriate law.

THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM BULLETIN
A Biweekly Newsletter of Current Affairs
Vol. 6, No. 3(159) - Special Issue, 3 March 2012
"Autumn 2011: The Ultra-right's Pre-Election Manoeuvres"
By Natalia Yudina and Vera Alperovich. Edited by Alexander Verkhovsky
SOVA Reports and Analyses, 14 February 2012
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2012/02/d23665/
Formatted for RNB by Parikrama Gupta

Contents

SUMMARY

RADICAL NATIONALISM AND XENOPHOBIC AGGRESSION IN AUTUMN 2011
- Violence
- Vandalism
- Public activity of ultra-right groups
- Nationalism in the political establishment

COUNTERACTION TO RADICAL NATIONALISM AND XENOPHOBIA
- Counteraction by society
- Criminal prosecution
- Penalty for violence
- Punishments for propaganda
- Administrative measures
- Federal List of Extremist Materials
- Deeming organizations extremist
- Other administrative measures

APPENDIX: STATISTICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

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========================


SUMMARY

This report was prepared during the height of the protest movement that followed
the December 4, 2010 State Duma elections. The movement's range and the
character were completely unexpected, in particular to the political activists
of various orientations who participated in it. Therefore, we are observing
autumn's events in the light of the new situation - as are radical nationalists,
who in any case have been unable to play a significant role in the December
events (we address this in greater depth in our yearly report). In order to
understand why things managed to happen the way they did, we must look at what
that took place right before the elections.

The autumn period [1] can be qualified as a time of unrealized hopes. Autumn
2011 seemed to begin with extremely favorable conditions for radical right
groups. Firstly, as the country was gradually waking up to political life,
radical nationalists seemed to have all the right preconditions for mobilizing
their comrades. Secondly, the authorities became more tolerant to public
actions. Thirdly, the radical right groups started to embrace ideas of
cooperation with the so-called system parties (established parties, i.e. those
registered by the Justice Ministry and allowed to run in parliamentary
elections) and to emerge from their marginal position.

However, as events unfolded, it became evident that the presence of favorable
conditions did not guarantee that they would be taken advantage of. Contacts
with the system parties diminished - probably due to the prohibition of
xenophobic rhetoric that came from the above before elections - and actions held
by the ultra-right did not reach record numbers, gathering roughly the same
amount of people as before. This includes the traditional Russian March, which
expanded to new regions of Russia, but drew as many attendees in Moscow as it
did the year before. However, it is worth noting that the ultra-right succeeded
in putting on political weight by organizing the 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus!'
rally that drew broad attention and was widely discussed. They also managed to
bring well-known anti-corruption blogger and Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny to
two of their public events (though his supporters did not come).

Although the nationalists' views are much more popular in society than liberal
views, the former remained unable to leave its marginal position; this is due to
their bad reputation with the politically active part of society, and a lack of
good organization and leaders that can be respected by the majority of the
movement.

Despite expectations and past experience, there was no outburst of violence this
autumn, and possibly due to pre-election activity, the level of violence
remained the same as in summer. It is also linked to the improvement of criminal
prosecution for racist violent crimes.

Unfortunately, we cannot report similar improvements regarding prosecution for
xenophobic propaganda. The number of sentences has increased as people are
punished for minor charges that, strictly speaking, should not be subject to
criminal prosecution.

The Federal List of Extremist Organizations has been supplemented actively,
reaching more than 1,000 items, though it has long been practically unusable.
Materials are added to it without output or with mistakes, and entries and
positions often duplicate each other.
It is telling that the Ministry of Justice proposed a bill planning to discharge
from itself the control and registration functions of maintaining the Federal
List and of issuing warnings to social organizations on the inadmissibility of
extremist activity. However, this initiative did not gain government support.
=====================


RADICAL NATIONALISM AND XENOPHOBIC AGGRESSION IN AUTUMN 2011

Violence

In autumn 2011, Sova center registered at least 28 individual victims of racist
and neo-Nazi motivated violence. Three people were killed, and 25 more injured.
However, we did not see the surge in violence that we expected; the data are
quite similar to those of summer 2011 (23 victims). In autumn 2010, we
registered 77 victims, with 10 of them killed.[2]
In all, 143 people suffered during the 11 months of 2011, and 18 of them were
killed. Apart from that, six persons received serious death threats. During all
of 2010, 439 people suffered and 43 of them were killed; five persons received
death threats. We must reiterate that our statistics are far from complete, we
become aware of attacks with a big delay - and see an increase of roughly twenty
percent per year. From year to year, information on racist attacks becomes less
and less accessible. In spite of concerns over 'interethnic conflicts' declared
in the media, reports on such attacks appear more and more rarely, with media
continuing to report on the incidents in a way that leaves their character is
unclear. As a result, it is often not possible to distinguish an everyday attack
from a racist one. But even accounting for these factors, it is indisputable
that the number of racist attacks has decreased.
We remind readers that we show attack data without considering those suffered in
the republics of the North Caucasus or in mass brawls. During the autumn months,
we encountered reports on such brawls twice, and in both cases they took place
in Stavropol Krai, itself in the North Caucasus (in September, in the Divnoe
village, and in October, in Suvorovskaya stanitsa). In both cases, the pretext
for conflict was a participant's T-shirt, carrying the inscription 'I am
Russian.' In the first case, the clash took place between representatives of a
Greek community and Cossacks, and in the other, between Caucasians and local
inhabitants. Both incidents reflect the tense atmosphere in the territory, and
precipitated a storm of comments on right radical blogs.

During the autumn months, attacks were registered in 13 regions of the country:
Moscow and the Moscow region, St. Petersburg; the Amur, Arkhangelsk,
Chelyabinsk, Kaluga, Novosibirsk, Rostov and Tomsk regions; the Primorye and
Stavropol krais, and the Republic of Buryatia.

The attack victims were generally representatives of informal youth groups
(eight persons injured), people of unspecified 'non-Slavic origin' (six
injured), members of religious groups (five injured), people with dark skin
(three injured, one killed), people from Central Asia (one killed, one injured),
people from the Caucasus (two injured), and people from other Asian countries
(one injured)[3].

According to these data, people from Central Asia have ceased to be the main
object of ultra-right attacks. However, we hesitate to make such a statement
because it is known that among six people of 'non-Slavic origin,' more than half
were victims of attacks committed by participants of the Russian March. We
cannot identify these victims with confidence, but can note that people visiting
ultra-right blogs and forums identify people of 'Asian origin,' which could
indicate people from Central Asia.

The number of attacks against representatives of youth subcultures and leftist
organizations has remained high and stable in our statistics during the last two
years. As it can be seen from the available data, this season they also became
the main targets of the ultra-right. First among them are musicians and
attendants of antifascist concerts; secondly, leftist social and political
activists (members of the SibAntiCap 2011 march in Tomsk); thirdly, ecology
activists (defenders of the Chelyabinsk city pine forest). In spite of varying
ideological orientations, all these groups often consist of anarchists and
representatives of leftist movements.

The tension in the 'ultra-left - ultra-right - police' triangle continues to
grow. It can be seen in particular in the fact that representatives of leftist
organizations who suffer attack blame the police for their involvement. For
instance, according to the participants of a march against capitalism in Tomsk,
the neo-Nazi group that attacked them was allegedly linked to a United Russia
deputy in the city Duma. Members of leftist organizations in Chelyabinsk who
suffered attack also wrote of a possible link between the attackers and police.

As we mentioned above, the statistics of autumn attacks were, as usual,
supplemented following the Russian March of November 4. We are aware of at least
two attacks in the Moscow Metro and one in the St. Petersburg Metro. We do not
consider clashes between Moscow 'marchers' and passers-by that expressed their
disagreement to be an appropriate way of celebrating a state holiday.

In this season we continued to see racism among football fans. In particular,
fans of FC Kuban wrote 'Bananas don't grow here! 88' on the asphalt near a
stadium in Krasnodar before a match between Kuban and Anzhi Makhachkala. They
also held a banner with the imperial black-yellow-white tricolor and a
xenophobic inscription. A player from Cameroon, Samuel Eto'o, joined Anzhi in
summer, and the number 88 is a traditional neo-Nazi symbol.
Provocative xenophobic videos are regularly published on the radical right wing
of the Web. The one that caused biggest public resonance appeared on 27
November, and purported to show a person from the Caucasus slitting the throat
of a Russian woman. The video seems to be staged in a manner similarly to those
of the Format 18 studio, though there are various theories regarding who stands
behind the video. It could be a provocation appealing to anti-Caucasus and
anti-Islamic attitudes in society, made according to instructions popular in the
beginning of 2009 [4]. However it could just as well have been made by people
from the Caucasus. There was even a theory that this was a way to bind a new
member of a 'Caucasian gang' with blood. The video was actively spread on the
Web and caused the expected negative reaction.
----------------

Vandalism

During autumn 2011, Sova registered at least 23 acts of vandalism, in 12 regions
of the country, that were motivated by hate or radical nationalist ideology.
Almost the same number was registered in summer 2011 (22 acts). Compared to
autumn 2010, the activity of vandals has reduced a bit (no fewer than 30 acts in
autumn 2010). In all, from the beginning of 2011, at least 76 acts of vandalism
were committed in 32 regions of the country.
The biggest plurality of acts was committed against Orthodox and Jewish targets
(five cases each). Almost the same amount was committed against Protestant and
Muslim objects (four cases each). We should note that the profanation of Muslim
tombs in Nizhny Novgorod we reported earlier did not cease. We were informed of
two such cases.[5] The buildings of new religious movements also suffered (three
cases), as well as monuments with ideological significance (two cases). It is
noteworthy that apart from a monument to Lenin (such monuments are regularly
vandalized), a monument to general Alexei Ermolov (conqueror of the Caucasus) in
Stavropol Krai was damaged with a xenophobic inscription. Apart from this, we
registered at least seven graffiti actions in Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Jewish
Autonomous Region, and the republics of Tatarstan and Mari El that drew public
attention.
The activity of vandals usually amounts to nothing more than neo-Nazi graffiti
(15 cases).[6] However, truly dangerous acts were committed as well, such as
explosions and arsons. Thus, an attempt to set fire to a Jehovah's Witnesses
building was committed in Yelets, an Orthodox church faced an arson attempt in
Moscow, a building of Pentecostals was set ablaze in Nizhnevartovsk, and in
Kaliningrad someone attempted to blow up a mosque.
----------------

Public activity of ultra-right groups

Ultra-right groups started the autumn period with a certain disappointment with
the fact that the contacts with so-called system parties (i.e. those registered
by the Justice Ministry and allowed to run in parliamentary elections), which
they were so actively establishing in spring and summer, bore no real fruit. The
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) did not include any member of the
Russian Committee established under the party's auspices in summer, in its
election slates. The Right Cause (Pravoe delo) (which had also flirted with
nationalists) virtually evaporated from the race after its leader Mikhail
Prokhorov left his post. Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossia) lost the leader of
OSA (the youth movement of adherents to the party) and member of the nationalist
organization People's Council (NS, Narodnyi sobor) Nikita Slepnev [7].
However, this situation did not spoil a generally positive mood. In the
beginning of autumn, the ultra-right was confident that its ideology was in high
demand in society, which they saw as confirmed by the fact that system parties
had made contact with them. The nationalists banked on public actions for the
autumn pre-election period, and organizers expected them to break all previous
records in number of attendees. In the first place, such numbers should have
been secured by the grade of right radical protest activity that grew as the
elections drew closer. Just as before, the anti-government mood was enflamed by
various reports on the allegedly inappropriate prosecution of adherents to
ultra-right ideology, on crimes committed by functionaries and officials of law
enforcement agencies, etc. The ultra-right did not avoid using its old and
time-tested methods of mobilization, exploiting not anti-government, sentiment,
but xenophobic moods first and foremost.

As we have noted so many times before, the method used most often is a publicity
campaign featuring violent incidents that pit ethnic Russians against ethnic
'strangers.'. In spite of all efforts no such incident became a public relations
bomb in autumn, although the constant flickering of such information undoubtedly
helped the ultra-right community to remain active.

The most explosive event could be the murder of FC CSKA fan Andrei Uryupin in a
brawl in Podolsk with a person from Dagestan, or the murder of FC Zenit fan
Roman 'Robin' Lovchikov in a brawl in St. Petersburg with a person from
Uzbekistan. In both cases, the ultra-right obviously expected the scenario of
the Manezhnaya Square riots in Moscow in December 2010 to repeat, but no such
thing happened.

The rally in memory of Uryupin was set for October 8 and was to be held on
Manezhnaya Square. At most 150 people showed up, and nearly 100 of them were
detained on their way there.

The rally in memory of Lovchikov, organized by the Russians (Russkie) movement
that took place on October 27 in St. Petersburg drew even fewer people despite
rather long preparations and widespread announcements. No more than 20 people
gathered near Gostiny Dvor, and the Russians' action was ignored by groups of
football fans.

Apart from the publicity of violent incidents, the Russians association
attempted to mobilize its adherents with the help of another anti-Islamic
campaign. In September, an announcement was published on the website of the
banned Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI, Dvizhenie protiv nelegal'noi
immigratsii), calling on adherents to petition Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin
demanding the restriction of the celebration of the Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha
on 6-7 November. [8]

The authors attempted to spark the anger of their readers by stressing that the
locations especially organized for Muslim holidays remain empty, while the
believers instead block roads in Central Moscow near the Prospekt Mira Metro
station. The text also included statements 'in defense of human rights,'
appealing to the hurt feelings of non-Muslims and the restricted freedom of
movement some citizens suffered. The initiative did not receive serious support,
much like the initiative a year before, when the ultra-right attempted to score
political points before the Russian March by protesting the construction of
mosques.
However, the highest stakes came with autumn's major traditional actions, i.e.
the one in memory of victims of 'ethnic criminals,' and the Russian March.

The preparation of these two events during a highly political period sharpened
the competition between ultra-right organizations, reviving a conflict between
the two most notable of them, the Russians (a coalition of the former DPNI,
Slavic Union (SS, Slavyanskii soyuz), National Socialist Initiative (NSI,
Natsional-sotsialisticheskaya initsiativa), and several other organizations),
and the Russian Social Movement (ROD, Russkoe obshchestvennoe dvizhenie). We
note that in winter, the not-yet-banned DPNI and ROD expressed disagreement over
which of them would lead the unification process in the radical right community.
In spring, when ROD did not join the Russians coalition, it became clear that a
competing project would soon appear made up of followers of ROD's Konstantin
Krylov. The transformation of ROD into the association that followed did not
lead to any crucial changes in the alignment of forces, though in autumn, it
made a new effort to establish a big organization around itself with a wide base
of adherents.

In the beginning of September, information appeared about the establishment of a
new coalition of ultra-right organizations, the Russian Platform (Russkaya
platforma), that comprised the ROD and the Russian Civil Union (RGS, Russkii
grazhdanskii soyuz) led by Anton Susov, and a bit later the Moscow Defense
League (Liga oborony Moskvy) led by Daniil Konstantinov, Stanislav Vorobyev's
Russian Imperial Movement (RID, Russkoe imperskoe dvizhenie), and several minor
organizations. The project's goal was to form an ultra-right 'civic movement'
that could influence the agenda through mass actions.

The list of issues marked as significant by the Russian Platform is not new.
Russia should be recognized as a national state of the Russian people, the
subsidy of the Caucasian regions should be cancelled ('Stop feeding Caucasus!'),
article 282 of the Criminal Code - which punishes for inciting hatred - should
be cancelled, firearms should be legalized, etc. [9] The organization's attempts
at pleasing everyone are clear through their choice only slogans that are sure
to be supported by a large number of adherents and would not cause argument and
controversy. The originators also clearly expected football fans to join their
actions, and it was especially for the football fans that the list included a
special item demanding the cancellation of 'all open and secret preferences for
Caucasian football clubs.'

The Russian Platform's first action was the all-Russian campaign 'Stop Feeding
the Caucasus!' (de facto started by the ROD and RGS in spring). The organizers
proposed holding numerous rallies under that slogan throughout the country,
attracting not only active adherents to nationalist ideology but also those
sharing anti-Caucasian views although they are not consistent nationalists.

Thus, the first conflict between the Russians and the Russian Platform took
place because of the Moscow action 'In Memory of the Victims of Ethnic
Criminals,' when the organizations comprising the Russian Platform decided to
hold their own event in Moscow under their own campaign. They proposed that
anyone who showed up could take part in the rally 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus!'
including organizations within the Russians coalition. The latter refused, and
as a result, on October 1 two ultra-right actions took place in Moscow.
The rally organized by the Russians took place near the Chistye Prudy Metro
station, close to the spot where the FC Spartak fan Yury Volkov had been killed.
According to various estimates, between 150 and 200 people took part in the
rally. The Russians were represented by Aleksandr Belov, Georgy Borovikov,
Dmitry Demushkin and Vladimir Ermolaev; the first three delivered speeches
before the audience, and Belov even read a prayer. Members of the action held
portraits of the 'victims of ethnic criminals' and laid flowers to the spot
where Volkov was killed. The Russians were unable to coordinate the rally with
the Moscow authorities, so the action was held in the form of a citizens'
gathering, which the police did not disturb.

After the rally, some participants attacked activists who gathered to hold the
March of Equality against the discrimination of women and LGBT people and
against all forms of xenophobia and discrimination, which also took place near
Chistye Prudy. Nationalists threatened the liberals and threw tomatoes at them.
The nationalists also tried to get an obscene chant going. One of the protesters
shot members of the rally with a paintball gun, and later, right radicals
followed members of the action to the Metro and attacked them. It is reported
that a brawl took place, and that gas had been dispersed. The clash was
interrupted by the police, who detained about 40 persons - both nationalists and
participants of the March of Equality.

The Russian Platform rally was coordinated with the approval of Moscow
authorities. The event took place as a march on the Taras Shevchenko embankment
and according to various estimates between 300 and 500 people attended,
including football fans. The leader of the Moscow Defense League, Daniil
Konstantinov, read out loud a list of people killed by 'ethnic murderers' (from
football fan Yegor Sviridov to former colonel Yury Budanov). Attendants then
marched from the Vystavochnaya Metro station to the Ukraina hotel, where they
held a rally demanding a visa regime between the republics of the Northern
Caucasus and the rest of Russia. After the action was over, about 100 attendants
aged 14 to 20, including football fans, gathered in a column without the
participation of the organizers, and went along Kutuzovsky Avenue lighting
flares and shouting the slogans 'Russia for the Russians, Moscow for the
Muscovites!', 'Cops are the shame of Russia!', and 'Fuck the Caucasus!' Police
began detaining the nationalists as they approached the House of Government.
About 30 people were detained, while the rest scattered.

After October 1, the leaders of competing organizations began accusing each
other of dividing the movement. Firstly, the Russians decided that the ROD had
used someone else's idea for the publicity of the 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus'
campaign; the idea of an action 'against ethnic criminals' was proposed by the
DPNI in 2009. Secondly, the idea of the campaign itself was criticized because
it could have led to the separation of the Caucasus region from Russia, whereas
the Russians allegedly stood for Russia's territorial integrity. Thirdly, the
Russians were angered by the location the ROD chose to hold its action.
Demushkin called Taras Shevchenko 'an enclosure for opposition,' and blamed the
ROD of 'bowing and scraping before officials,' of having agreed to 'walk in the
woods' in order to 'tell themselves loudly how bad the ethnic criminals are,
outcrying the wind from the river, being hidden from all citizens by a long
earth mound and kilometers of garages and industrial zones. [10]'

The ROD, for its part, declared that the Russians were simply 'drawing attention
to themselves' by having refused to take part in the action. Moreover, the
Russians were accused of intending to provoke nationalist activists to get into
unreasonable clashes with the police and to ultimately get themselves arrested,
because the action on the embankment was coordinated with the authorities while
that of the Russians was not.

The RGS also took part in the conflict. On his blog, Anton Susov criticized
Demushkin's statement on the murder of Ivan Agafonov. [11] Susov was indignant
at the fact that after having declared that the murder had been of an 'everyday'
character, Demushkin applied to hold an action in memory of the 'victims of
ethnic criminals.' In a discussion in the comments to Demushkin's post, Susov
accused the leaders of the Russians coalition of considering abandoning the
slogan 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus!' after having allegedly given a promise to
the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov during their a summer visit to the republic.
Actions in memory of the victims of 'ethnic criminals' took place not only in
Moscow but also in other cities: Kazan, Novosibirsk, St. Petersburg,
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Syktyvkar, and Tomsk. Only in St. Petersburg did the action
turn out to be relatively noticeable, drawing about 80 people, whereas in other
cities the number of participants did not exceed 20. Although neither Moscow
action drew masses, that of the Russian Platform became well known, just as the
organizers expected.

The conflict did not fade away and was soon flaring up around the main autumn
event, the Russian March. Thus, in the beginning of October, ROD activist Matvei
Tszen wrote in his blog on Livejournal.com, "Two organizing centers for the 2011
Russian March have formed. One around the Russians movement, the other around
the national democrats. The difference between them is that the Russians stand
sharply against the slogan 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus!' The national democrats,
for their part, consider this as one of the central political slogans of the
Russian nationalists and its absence would seem very strange indeed. Ramzan
Kadyrov's opinion on the subject is not important. Neither side wants to split,
although the Russians have de facto started preparing for the Russian March
separately.[12]".

Many of those who read the post thought its author was implying that the leaders
of the Russians movement had 'sold themselves to Kadyrov,' explaining why they
chose not to use the slogan. In response, Russians activist Sofya Budnikova
(ex-DPNI-Kursk) wrote a post on her blog, entitled 'Assholes or Provocateurs?'
where she stated that the reason of the renunciation of the slogan 'Stop Feeding
the Caucasus!' was that in the case of its use, the Russian March would surely
be banned - adding that she could not believe the ROD and the RGS could not
understand that.[13]

It would have been anyone's guess who would have finally taken part in the
Russian March if the organizations moved from squabbles to open confrontation.
However, this did not happen. The Russian Platform denounced confrontation,
probably due to the low number of participants at the countrywide action 'Stop
Feeding the Caucasus!' on October 22.
In Moscow, the action took place on Bolotnaya Square and gathered about 300
people. The organizers succeeded in attracting blogger Alexei Navalny, which
they considered one of their main achievements. Navalny spoke at the rally
together with the leaders of organizations that had joined the Russian Platform,
such as Konstantin Krylov, Vladimir Tor, Anton Susov and Daniil Konstantinov.
The leader of Democratic Choice (Demokraticheskii vybor, formerly part of the
PARNAS party (Party of People's Freedom, Partiya narodnoi svobody)) Vladimir
Milov also joined the action. The rally's list of speakers shows that that the
organizers expected not only ultra-right activists to attend, but also people
with soft nationalist views. But in spite of the wide publicity campaign and the
participation of Navalny and Milov, the action was not attended by significantly
more people than the organizers attracted the first one, in spring, before the
slogan 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus!' was decided a base for the all-Russian
campaign. The organizers' efforts to advertise the new initiative evidently did
not deliver the desired result.

In addition to Moscow, actions took place in St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk and
Pskov, and none of them gathered more than 100 people. We should note that in
Novosibirsk, the main slogan of the action mutated into 'Stop Feeding Moscow!'
so the action in the city can be attributed to the whole campaign by stretching
a point only.
However, one cannot state certainly that the campaign failed. Although the
rallies did not gather many attendees, the ultra-right and their action
succeeded in becoming a significant element of the agenda, perhaps for the first
time since the event on Manezhnaya Square. The slogan was discussed rather
thoroughly and was even mentioned during Vladimir Putin's live call-in show in
December.

The low number of attendees of the 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus!' action was not
the only reason the ROD finally agreed to take part in the Russian March. The
other incentive that prompted them to step aside from confrontation was
Navalny's decision to speak at the March, and we should note that since 2010,
the ROD's leadership honed in on Navalny as a possible leader of the ultra-right
movement, hoping to attract him to a joint project by any means possible. And,
as we can see from the popular blogger's participation in two radical right-wing
actions, they succeeded. However, it became clear at the same time that many of
Navalny's adherents are far from being inclined to attend nationalist events
together with him.

According to tradition, the Russian March took place in many Russian cities on
November 4.
The Russians, the Russian Platflorm (with Navalny in its column), the Union of
Orthodox Gonfalon Carriers (SPKh, Soyuz pravoslavnykh khorugvenostsev), the
Russian Image (Russkii obraz), People's Council, Orel Front (Orlovskii Front) (a
neo-Pagan group from Orel supposedly sharing ideas promoted by the Northern
Brotherhood (Severnoe bratstvo)), the Varyag movement, the Russian Sun
organization (Russkoe solntse) and, of course, many more or less organized
autonomous neo-Nazi groups.

The march finished with a rally, as usual. Among the speakers were Vladimir Tor
(who read the rhyming slogan 'Kremlin, listen to our order, stop feeding the
Caucasus!') and Alla Gorbunova (ROD), Ivan Mironov (charged and acquitted of
complicity in the attempted murder of then head of the electric power monopoly
RAO UES Anatoly Chubais), Thibault de Chassey, leader of the French Renovation
(Renouveau franc,ais) who called on a restriction of immigrants to Russia using
France as an example, Navalny, Belov, Konstantinov (all the three spoke against
the United Russia party, and Belov summoned people to take to the streets after
the elections), Georgy Borovikov (Russians, Russian Liberation Memory Front
(Russkii front osvobozhdeniya (RFO) 'Pamyat'' ) who said the time had come to
seize power and establish elite militarized brigades and units to impose a
Russian order. Dmitry Demushkin read the resolution of the rally, which finished
with the words 'Authorities, go away!'

The St. Petersburg action took place at South Maritime Park and gathered about
500 people. The participants stood under imperial flags, state flags of the
Russian Federation, banners of the Slavic Union and the NSI. The rally was led
by Dmitry Sukhorukov (St. Petersburg DPNI department) and Nikolai Bondarik
(RID), and finished with a performance by the leader of the Kolovrat band Denis
Gerasimov. [14] After the action was over, columns of about 200 to 250 young
people marched from the park to the Leninsky Prospekt Metro station, chanting
xenophobic slogans. In the Metro, the participants of the march insulted people
of 'non-Slavic origin.' Police were noticeably absent both in the carriages and
at the stations. As the right radical blogs report, 'there were two white
carriages,'[15] with one person severely beaten.
It can be noted that the march's territory has widened. It was held in at least
35 cities including Pyatigorsk, Rybinsk, Novomoskovsk, Smolensk,
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Vologda and Surgut, where such actions had never been
held before. In some cases, the organizers succeeded in gathering many times
more people than in previous years. However, the main actions, in Moscow and St.
Petersburg, turned out to be clearly less crowded than organizers had expected.
For instance, in Moscow 20,000 or even 25,000 people were expected to come,
whereas in reality, not more than 6,000 people gathered in Lyublino (with 5,500
a year before in the same place). A record was set, but it is hard to consider
it much of a success in 'the year after Manezhnaya.'

Autonomous right radicals who also seemed to have expected the bigger amount of
participants spoke again on the necessity 'to act, not to march.' On the
contrary, the year before, when it became possible to gather far more people
than had been expected, it was a cause for celebration in the community and
precipitated wide speculation on the rising 'national self-consciousness.'

After all, we should note that the ROD was not the only organization to have a
conflict with the Russians before the Russian March. In the beginning of
September, the Front of National Unity 'Imperial Union' (Front natsional'nogo
edinstva 'Imperskii soyuz') led by Sergei Semenov published a statement calling
on its adherents and activists to not take part in the Russian March on November
4 organized by the Russians in order to avoid becoming 'bargaining chips' for
those ready to collude with authorities. The Youth Imperial Union established an
alternative initiative group for the preparation of the Russian March, which was
consequently joined by the Russian Party of the National Great Power
(Natsional'no-derzhavnaya partiya Rossii), the Union of People's Socialists
(Soyuz narodnykh natsionalistov), the Council of Rus (Russovet), the all-Russian
religious union 'Russian People's Faith' (Vserossiiskii religiozny soyuz
'Russkaya narodnaya vera'), the Russian DPNI. As a result, on November 4 an
Imperial March with about 200 participants took place before the main Russian
March.

We are able to note that the ultra-right was unable to take advantage of a
favorable situation, concerning the authorities' policy towards opposition, and
more importantly, the pre-election mobilization of society as a whole and
time-tested adherents to their ideology in particular. It happened partly
because the legal organizations that could at least coordinate the activity of
separate members of the movement were in zugzwang. On one hand, they are seen as
too loyal and 'systemic' for the autonomous ultra-right. On the other hand, they
are too radical and 'extra-systemic' for the xenophobic majority of the Russian
population. And they are not able to make a decisive choice whether they are on
one side or on the other.
----------------

Nationalism in the political establishment

In autumn, president Dmitry Medvedev repeatedly demanded that parties withdraw
xenophobic rhetoric from their election campaigns. [16] According to the
campaigns, the system parties followed the recommendation - with the partial
(and traditional) exception of the LDPR. The 'Russian issue,' migration and the
Caucasus - which seemed to be the inevitable mainstream topics for the election
campaign in the beginning of the year - were mentioned only rarely and
implicitly during the campaign itself.

United Russia continued its cooperation with the moderate nationalist Congress
of Russian Communities (KRO, Kongress russkikh obshchin) and its former leader
Dmitry Rogozin. In the beginning of September, Rogozin attended the KRO
convention where he summoned the organization to support United Russia and
Vladimir Putin personally. Later, the KRO and United Russia made an arrangement
to sign a bilateral agreement (which was not realized). During his brief return
to big politics, Rogozin managed to provoke a scandal with his anti-Islamic
statements concerning the Eid al-Adha celebration [17] and by hold a meeting
with representatives of youth organizations in the building of the presidential
administration office, which was attended by a leader of the ultra-right Russian
Image.

Besides, regardless of the authorities' repeatedly voiced aspirations of
fighting xenophobia
and migrantophobia, a so-called anti-Tajik campaign was held in autumn. In
response to the convictions of Russian and Estonian pilots in Tajikistan (which
was evidently inappropriate), the Federal Migration Service started to actively
detain and demonstratively deport migrants who had come from that country. The
issue of the pilots' liberation was settled on the presidential level, so the
target audience of the deportation campaign could hardly have been the Tajik
authorities; more probably it was Russian citizens. It came as no surprise that
society saw this campaign as xenophobic. Further, it became a base for
cooperation between the authorities and the ultra-right organizations that
treated it as a positive development. For instance, in November the Moscow
Defense League and Bright Russia (Svetlaya Russia), led by Igor Mangushev,
declared that they had taken part in anti-Tajik raids in the Presnya region of
Moscow together with police officers. We consider such joint raids to be
inadmissible under the law.

Apart from this, anti-migrant sentiment was stirred up once more in autumn by
newly-appointed Moscow prosecutor Sergei Kudeneev's claim that every fifth
murder, every second sexual assault, every third robbery, and every fifth theft
in the capital was committed by a foreigner. [18]

Apparently, the calls made by President Dmitry Medvedev were the reason why the
contacts between system parties and ultra-right organizations diminished in
autumn. However, some parties still could not resist the urge to use the
xenophobic discourse in their election campaigns.

In this regard, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) was the
most active. For instance, in October, the party started to promote nationalist
Russian Concord (Russkii lad), which was established by the party in January but
is virtually non-functional, led by KPRF Duma deputy Vladimir Nikitin, chairman
of the Subcommittee on Migration Politics within the Committee on CIS affairs
and relations with compatriots. It was reported that 'it is proposed to
establish the Russian Concord movement as a mass social community of people,
Russian by spirit and world view, who have united in order to create a perfect
society in Russia on the grounds of a distinctive civilization project.[19]'
None of the well-known members of the ultra-right movement was invited to join
the organization. Perhaps it was established only in order to designate the
party's position concerning the 'Russian issue.' In October, the KPRF appeared
to be at the center of a scandal provoked by statements made by Samara KPRF
activist Sergei Igumenov on his blog. While Igumenov was a deputy candidate for
the Samara regional Duma, he published an anti-Semitic post in his blog under
the title 'Dirty Jews suck, foreigners are mourning - Sergei Igumenov is
registered as people's candidate'[20]. Besides, on November 25 another KPRF
activist, Pavel Grudinin, was removed from the ballot to the Moscow Regional
Duma. The reason was Grudinin's interview to Russian Reporter, where he made
several clearly discriminative statements. In particular, the candidate summoned
the audience not to sell apartments to migrants from Southern republics.[21]

LDPR activists have also not done without nationalist statements. For instance,
in the beginning of December, a scandal burst out due to anti-Semitic statements
by party deputy Andrei Tkachenko made at a round table during a free radio
broadcast for all the parties [22]. It is reported that the activist had
expressed nationalist views even before the beginning of the program, and had
insulted several radio anchorpersons by inquiring about their 'ethnic roots.'
Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky also made soft nationalist statements, for
instance, his words on the interethnic situation in the Komi Republic caused the
governor to declare Zhirinovsky persona non grata in the region until he
formally apologizes. We should note that in Novosibirsk, not only members of
ultra-right organizations but also Just Russia Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev (who
is well-known for his leftist political views), Novosibirsk Right Cause head
Sergei Dyachkov, and the leader of the local department of the Patriots of
Russia Alexander Mukharytsin, spoke at the Russian March.

However, when comparing with the spring and summer situations, when parties were
only developing their election strategy, in autumn the grade of xenophobia in
election campaigns dropped and nationalist rhetoric was almost fully supplanted
by general opposition rhetoric.
=================


COUNTERACTION TO RADICAL NATIONALISM AND XENOPHOBIA

Counteraction by society

In autumn, several traditional public events were held against racism and
xenophobia.
From November 9 to 16, the annual International Week of Tolerance was held under
the slogan 'Die Kristallnacht never again!'[23] This year, within the framework
of the Action Week, events took place in several Russian cities: Moscow, St.
Petersburg, Kazan, Kostomuksha, Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Petrozavodsk,
Rostov-on-Don, Samara, Saratov, Ulyanovsk and Voronezh.

On November 13 in St. Petersburg, a traditional picket in memory of the musician
and anti-fascist Timur Kacharava took place for the fifth time on Ligovsky
Avenue; Kacharava had been killed on that date by a neo-Nazi. The action
gathered several dozen people. Apart from that, the day before, St. Petersburg
anti-fascists held a ceremony to symbolically rename Kolokolnaya Street to Timur
Kacharava Street by sticking up a new street sign with the respective
inscription.

It is worth noting one more annual event, the March Against Hatred held in St.
Petersburg since 2004 after the murder of scientist Nikolai Girenko. This year,
it was the regional department of United Russia that organized the action. As
such, human rights activists decided against holding the event in order not to
'politicize' it.
----------------------

Criminal prosecution

Penalty for violence

In autumn 2011, courts displayed a diminished range of criminal prosecution for
racist violence accounting for the hate motive, compared to previous seasons.
During this period, at least 10 sentences were passed in nine regions, with 25
people convicted. This is less than during summer 2011, when 15 sentences
convicted 64 people. (In spring, there were 18 sentences against 76 persons.) In
all, from the beginning of 2011, 50 sentences were issued in 29 regions against
174 people.

The following Criminal Case articles were used to qualify violent crimes as
racist: Article 105 Part 2 Item 'k,' national hate motivated murder committed by
a group of people; Article 116 Part 2 Item 'b,' national hate motivated beating;
Article 115 Part 2 Item 'b,' hate motivated causing minor harm to health;
Article 213 Part 1 items 'a' and 'b,' hate motivated hooliganism.[24] Only in
one sentence during the period from September to November, was Article 282,
incitement of national hate, used. In the passing of this sentence, for the
attack against students with russophobic slogans,[25] the Resolution of the
Supreme Court Plenum #11 'On Court Practice in Extremist Criminal Cases' issued
on June 28, 2011 was taken into account [26] , according to which the use of
Article 282 for violent crimes is approved if they are aimed at inciting a third
person to hatred, for instance, by means of an ideologically motivated,
demonstrative attack in public.

The punishments were allocated as follows:

- five persons were released from punishment following expiry of a statute of
limitations;
- five persons received suspended sentences without additional sanctions;
- one person was sentenced to correctional labor;
- one person was sentenced to one year of deprivation of freedom;
- one person was sentenced to two and a half years of prison;
- two persons were sentenced to prison terms up to five years;
- six persons were sentenced to prison terms up to 10 years;
- one person was sentenced to 12 years of prison;
- three persons were sentenced to prison terms up to 20 years;
- five persons were sentenced to prison terms over 20 years;
- one person was acquitted.

The improvement in law enforcement quality is also demonstrated by the fact that
most of the convicts for violent crimes (20 of 25 convicts) were sentenced to
various prison terms in the period under report.

As it can be seen from the given data, suspended sentences were given to one
fifth of the convicts (5 of 25). The reduction of the share of suspended
sentences for violent crimes is a positive tendency, though some of the
suspended sentences seem dubious to us. Some members of group trials (sentences
in the case of a Nazi skinhead gang from Tomsk, and in the case of a group
attack in an electric train in the Moscow suburbs) were given suspended
sentences because the court could not prove their direct participation in the
attack. But a suspended sentence for a person in Tver who wounded an immigrant
from Tajikistan with a knife seems unreasonably soft to us.

During this period, at least three major gangs of neo-Nazi were convicted in
Tomsk, Nizhny Novgorod (convicts received between 21 and 25 years in a maximum
security colony), and Irkutsk (gangleader Yevgeny 'Boomer' Panov, who has
appeared many times before the court for racist attacks, was finally sentenced
in September to 18 years in a maximum security colony). [27]

Apart from this, we should mention two sentences issued for ideologically
motivated violent crimes although the motives were not represented in the
indictment. In November 2011, the Angarsk city court in the Irkutsk region
finally [28] issued a statement [29] in the case of a Nazi skinhead attack
against a camp of ecological activists in July 2007 that resulted in serious
injuries (eight persons) and the death of 21-year-old Ilya Borodaenko. Four
persons were sentenced to long terms of deprivation of freedom, and 16 were
given suspended terms.[30] The sentence aroused both the prosecution's and the
defense's doubts, and was appealed.

In October, people involved in the unrest on Manezhnaya Square in December 2010
were convicted as well. Five persons (three were members of the banned Other
Russia party (Drugaya Rossiya) led by Eduard Limonov) received between two and
five years in a maximum-security colony for taking part in mass disorders. The
severity of this sentence is hard to estimate, due to the insufficient practice
for cases on taking part in mass disorders. It is clear that the convicts were
not the instigators of the unrest, and it was not only them who took part in the
disorders, to put it mildly. One can suppose that this will not be the only
process, and that some other persons involved in the unrest will appear, but so
far we are unaware of any other people detained, nor of any investigation. [31]

Punishments for propaganda

From September to November 2011, at least 16 sentences for xenophobic propaganda
were issued in 12 regions (the Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Chelyabinsk, Kaluga,
Saratov, Tyumen, and Voronezh regions, the Khabarovsk Krai, Primorye Krai, and
republics of Adygea, Chuvashia and Komi) against 16 people. In all, from the
beginning of 2011, 68 such sentences were issued in 37 regions of Russia, with
68 people convicted.

In the vast majority of sentences (15 of 16), Article 282 Part 1 was used; in 11
cases it was the only article used; in four cases it was combined with Article
280 (public calls for extremist activity). There was a single sentence that used
only Article 280, in the case of an anti-Asian and anti-Semitic inscription on
the wall of a building in Khabarovsk.

The court rulings for propaganda during this period were allocated as follows:

- two persons were sentenced to deprivation of freedom;
- eight persons received suspended sentences without additional sanctions;
- three persons were sentenced to various fines;
- three persons were sentences to obligatory labor.

In autumn 2011, the share of suspended sentences for propaganda started to rise
again (eight of 17 persons) in comparison to previous periods (six of 20 in
summer 2011, five of 15 in spring). A lesser portion of convicts (six persons)
faced punishments not linked with deprivation of freedom. We consider obligatory
labor or fines to be more adequate punishments for such crimes.

We do not approve of suspended sentences for propaganda because they do not stop
most convicts who are convinced ultra-nationalist or teenagers and youths who do
not worry (yet) about their future. Only for a few convicts is a suspended
sentence a real punishment, because it can cause appreciable harm to their
reputation and career.
However we by no means stand for indispensable deprivation of freedom as a
punishment for such crimes. But in some cases, sentences to deprivation of
freedom are justifiable, such as in the case of 21-year-old Denis Kuznetsov (aka
Dima Skhe), leader of neo-Nazi group Nord-East-88, who received a real prison
term. While the members of his group are suspected of committing a series of
attacks and a murder, the group's ideological-operational leader did not take
part in the attacks, so he was sentenced for propaganda. Another similar
sentence seems questionable: Vladimir Masalovich was sentenced in the Republic
of Komi for posting xenophobic comments to articles on the web (we are unaware
of what his comments said). He was given eight months of deprivation of freedom
while serving the sentence in a colony settlement. We consider deprivation of
freedom for such a petty crime to be an excessive penalty.

Again, we are forced to state that the quality of prosecution for propaganda
remains unchanged. Courts still issue sentences for replicas on the web,
uploading films to file-sharing networks, xenophobic inscriptions and drawings
on walls. It seems that such activities should not be subject to criminal
prosecution, and instead should be considered in administrative courts.

In autumn 2011, we again saw cases where Article 2821 (organization of an
extremist community) was used.

In September 2011, a leader of the Northern Brotherhood organization (Severnoe
bratstvo), radical nationalist Anton 'Fly' Mukhachev, was convicted under that
article. He received nine years of deprivation of freedom (in combination with
Article 159 Part 4, fraud).[32] In the Republic of Bashkiria, 42-year-old
organizer of a cell of the Caucasus Emirate in Oktyabrsky village was sentenced
to one year of deprivation of freedom in a colony settlement (in combination
with Article 222 Part 1, illegal purchase, sale, transfer or carrying of weapon,
its main parts, ammunition, explosives, and explosive devices).[33] Finally, in
autumn activist of the association Rus the Spiritual Tribal Power
(Dukhovno-rodovaya Derzhava Rus') Nikolai Lozinsky was convicted under this
article in Krasnodar after having sent the organization's materials to the
regional government and law enforcement bodies. The court sentenced him to one
year of deprivation of freedom in a colony settlement. [34]
In all, Article 2821 was used in six sentences in 2011.
----------------

Administrative measures

Federal List of Extremist Materials

During the three autumn months, the Federal List of Extremist Materials was
supplemented three times and grew from 967 to 1031 items.

As before, materials were added to the list without output data or with
extremely generalized URLs (for instance, in one case the URL of a free file
sharing hosting www.ifolder.ru was given), with spelling or syntax errors (even
when mentioning the names of courts), and with repeats. [35]

In autumn, the list was supplemented by Islamic materials (texts of Hizb
ut-Tahrir including the Khilafah magazine and Kavkazcenter website and articles
published there);Jehovah's Witnesses materials; two websites of the banned
National Bolshevik Party (NBP); various racist materials including books,
newspapers and leaflets published by the publishing houses Russian Truth
(Russkaya pravda), Russian Bulletin (Russkii vestnik), Knight (Vityaz');
articles from magazines Arkaim and Atheneum (Atenei); a brochure of the Minin
and Pozharsky All-Russian People's Militia (NOMP, Vserossiiskoe narodnoe
opolchenie imeni Minina i Pozharskogo); and the texts 'Bared Teeth' (Oskal) and
'Smell of Death' (Zapakh smerti), which are popular among Nazi skinheads.

As this report was being written, the list comprised 1057 items. Thirty-eight
items were 'zeroed' (withdrawn while the numbering was maintained), five of them
removed because they duplicated others, and were 33 removed because court
rulings deeming the respective materials extremist were cancelled. Thirty-eight
items reflect duplicate court rulings (to say nothing of the items corresponding
to similar texts with different output data). One item duplicates a court ruling
already mentioned in the list.

Deeming organizations extremist

In autumn, the list of extremist organizations published on the Justice
Ministry's website has also been supplemented.[36] Now it comprises 28 items.
Three organizations were added:
the religious group of Sokolov O.V., Russkikh V.V., and Petin A.G. professing,
cultivating and spreading ideas of the doctrine of the Ancient Russian Inglist
Church of Orthodox Ingling Old Believers (Drevnerusskaya Inglisticheskaya
Tserkov' Pravoslavnykh Staroverov-Inglingov). The title is written as it appears
on the list, although the same doctrine is mentioned elsewhere therein,
including the word 'Ingliisticheskaya' (as in the organization's documents) that
was deemed extremist by the Maikop regional court of the Republic of Adygea on
December 12, 2008.  The interregional association Russian All-National Union
(RONS, Russkii obshchenatsional'nyi soyuz) was deemed extremist by a Vladimir
provincial court ruling on May 30, 2011. The interregional public organization
Movement against Illegal Immigration was deemed extremist by the Moscow
provincial court on April 18, 2011, and the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation on August 9, 2011.

The formal reason to ban the Inglings Old Believers in Adygea was that 'the
symbolic and cult practices of the group contained symbols so similar to Nazi
ones that they could be confused.' However, the court was likely to have other
grounds to close the organization: the Inglings' religious doctrine includes
openly racist statements (and has nothing to do with the Old Believers in spite
of the group's title), which was a reason to ban three such organizations in
Omsk in 2004. [37]

The first of the three organizations added to the list was banned in 2008
already, the two others in 2011. RONS is an Orthodox ultra-right organization
established in 1990.[38] It is not quite clear why the organization was banned.
It is reported only that materials confiscated from Vladimir RONS members during
a raid were deemed extremist. RONS actively led an ultra-right propaganda
movement and was involved in violent actions.

We have no doubts about the appropriateness of the ban of the third
organization, the DPNI. As we have written before, leaders and members of the
DPNI have repeatedly made truly dangerous inflammatory statements, and this
organization was directly linked to racist violence. [39]

It is remarkable that the Justice Ministry planned to transfer its functions of
control and registration of parties and non-profit organizations to other state
bodies in an October 2011 bill proposal. In particular, the Justice Ministry
proposed excluding from its duties the obligation to warn public and religious
organizations of the admissibility of extremist activity found in the law On
Combating Extremist Activity, its right to demand courts liquidate or ban public
organizations, and its obligation to supplement the List of Extremist Materials.
The ministry planned to pass these functions to the Prosecutor General's office,
but the bill received a negative response within other state bodies and is not
likely to be officially considered.

Other administrative measures

In autumn 2011, the Federal Service for the Supervision of Information
Technologies and Communications' (Roskomnadzor) list of anti-extremist warnings
to editorial staff was only very lightly supplemented.

The agency reported on only one warning, sent to the editorial staff of the
newspaper By Their Right Names (Svoimi imenami) [40] for publishing an article
by N.P. Zubkov entitled 'What to do? Revolution!' (Chto delat'? Revolyutsiyu!)
in issue 31 (48) released on August 2, 2011; and 'Smash the Rat Front!'
(Krysinyi front razgromit'!) and 'The People Will Win' (Narod pobedit!) in issue
33 (50), released on August 16, 2011. These articles summon readers to 'organize
motion at plants in Moscow and the Moscow region, and in the most important
regional strategic locations including war plants and storages,' and to 'attract
workers and servicemen in the ranks' for an armed struggle 'against the
anti-popular regime' in order to 'free the people' from living 'in slavery.'

This is the second warning to the newspaper. The first was issued for publishing
the article 'The Kremlin Incites a People's Revolution' (Kreml' tolkaet narod k
revolyutsii) in issue 11 (29), March 15, 2011. According to the law On Combating
Extremist Activity, media activity should be stopped if a warning given to its
editorial staff for extremism was not appealed in the court and if measures were
not taken at a stated time to remove violations that led to the warning, or if
new facts are revealed that indicate signs of extremism in the medium's
activities. There is a practice in Russian legislation to address courts after
the second warning has been issued, not contested or unsuccessfully contested in
the court. In October 2011, Roskomnadzor addressed the Moscow City Court calling
on an end to By Their Right Names' activities, in compliance with anti-extremist
legislation.

From September to November 2011, the practice of prosecution under various
articles of the Administrative Code continued. However, information on such
practices is still mostly unpublished, and it's impossible to make even an
approximate estimation of this activity.
We are aware of only four court rulings in the Kaluga, Omsk and Tyumen regions
and the Republic of Tatarstan. Two sentences were issued under Article 20.29,
mass distribution of extremist materials, for uploading songs and texts from the
Federal List of Extremist Materials to a file-sharing network. The two other
rulings were issued under Article 20.3 Part 1, propaganda and public
demonstration of Nazi attributes and symbols. Fans of FC Spartak Moscow were
blamed for the clashes at a match of the 27th round in the Premier League
between FC Rubin Kazan and Spartak on October 16 at the Central Stadium in
Kazan. The other case was against a businesswoman in Syzran (Samara region) who
made a picture with the title of a studio Gestapo Tattoo, and a page in a social
network and a website under the same name. In all the cases, the defendants were
fined.
=================


ENDNOTES

[1] We have used the materials of daily monitoring by the Sova Center (including
that performed in several regions). The monitoring was held with state support
allocated as grants according to the Direction of the President of Russian
Federation #127-rp of 2 March 2011.

[2] The number of people suffered increased by 20 people compared to what we had
written in the respective report last year.

[3] The classification of victims is made in respect of supposed motives of the
attacker(s).

[4] From January 2009, these instructions began to be spread as direct
guidelines for actions. According to them, neo-Nazi must throw fake explosives
with texts seemingly written from the part of Muslims or people from Caucasus.
Such actions meant to lead to the discriminative activity of special services
against people from Caucasus and Muslims living in the cities. It is expected
that such incidents would be replicated b the media. We have registered before
regular appearances of graffitti possibly committed  by Caucasian nationalists
or Islamists that turned out to be made by the ultra-right themselves. See
further in: Kozhevnikova Galina. Pod znakom politicheskogo terrora. Radikal'nyi
natsionalizm v Rossii i protivodeistvie emu v 2009 godu // Sova Center. 2011. 2
February (http://sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2010/02/d17889/).

[5] In all, from the beginning of 2011, at least 10 acts of vandalism were
committed at cemeteries in Nizhnii Novgorod against Muslim tombs. See further
in: Alperovich V., Yudina N. Spring 2011: Causes Ce'le`bres and New Ultra-right
Formations // Sova Center. 2011. 12 July
(http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2011/07/d22101/).

[6] We should note that we do not mention non-serial and not glaring cases of
graffitti.

[7] N. Slepnev My ne idem na s''ezd partii Spravedlivaya Rossiya // Blog on Ekho
Moskvy radio website. 2011. 23 September
(http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/nikitaslepnev/814574-echo/).

[8] Obrashchenie k meru Moskvy Sergeyu Sobyaninu po povodu predstoyashchego
prazdnovaniya Kurban - bairama // DPNI website. 2011. 10 September.

[9] Trebovaniya Russkoi platformy // Russian Platform website. 2011. 5
September.

[10] Dve tropki marshei protiv etnoprestupnosti // Pravda.Ru. 2011. 28 September
(http://www.pravda.ru/politics/parties/other/28-09-2011/1093203-etnomarsh-0).

[11] We should remind that the young man died on 19 August after a brawl with
mix fight champion Rasul Mirzaev. See on the incident and the response from the
part of the ultra-right community in: Alperovich V., Yudina N. Summer 2011: A
New Batch of Neo-Nazi Convicts and Dreams of a Second Manezh // Sova Center.
2011. 9 October
(http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2011/11/d22976/).

[12] Rossiiskaya Federatsiya na sluzhbe Allakha // [Matvei Tszen's journal].
2011. 6 October.

[13] Pridurki ili provokatory? // [Sofya Budnikova's journal]. 2011. 11 October.

[14] We should remind that the Russian Image held a concert of Kolovrat on 4
November 2009 on Bolotnaya Square during the Russian March. The concert gathered
about 2,000 people.

[15] 'White carriage' is a traditional Nazi skinhead action consisting of a raid
through a carriage or several ones with attacks at people of 'non -Slavic'
origin.

[16] See, for ex.: Medvedev o natsionalizme na vyborakh: ya sam russkii, no ya
kak za russkikh, tak i za drugie natsii // Gazeta.Ru. 2011. 11 November
(http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/11/11/n_2091773.shtml).

[17] Rustam Dzhalilov. Tipichnyi chinovnik. Islamofobskie zayavleniya Rogozina
vyzvali nedoumenie v obshchestve // IslamNews. 2011. 21 October
(http://www.islamnews.ru/news-93281.html).

[18] Predlagaem vashemu vnimaniyu interv'yu prokurora g. Moskvy Sergeya
Kudeneeva izdaniyu "Rossiiskaya gazeta" // Prosecutor General's official
website. 2011. 23 November (http://genproc.gov.ru/news/news-74267/).

[19] Rossii nuzhen "Russkii Lad"! // KPRF official website. 2011. 18 January
(http://kprf.ru/rus_soc/86743.html)

[20] Antisemitskie zayavleniya samarskogo aktivista KPRF // Sova Center. 2011.
11 October
(http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2011/10/d22\
750/).

[21] Yulia Vishnevskaya. Palnikolaich imeni Lenina // Russkii reporter. 2011. 31
October (http://rusrep.ru/article/2011/10/31/palnikolaich).

[22] Andrei Sokolov. Kandidata LDPR Tkachenko v natsionalizme // Komsomolskaya
pravda. 2011. 1 December (http://kp.ru/daily/25797.4/2778104/).

[23] The action is timed to the anniversary of die Kristallnacht (9 November
1938). Its annual organizers are the International Youth Network Against Racism
and Intolerance (YNRI), the International Youth Network of the Human Rights
Education and Civil Enlightenment (HRECE), the European network UNITED for
Intercultural Action, the Young Europe international network the international
Youth Human Rights Movement YHRM.

[24] We should remind that we consider the qualifying indication in this article
as an example of the imperfect legislation. See further in: V Moskve proshla
press-konferentsiya na temu "Shto poluchit art-gruppa "Voina" - gosudarstvennuyu
premiyu ili tyuremnyi srok?" //  Sova center. 2011. 21 February (http://
sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2011/02/d21026/).

[25] We mean the case of 30-year-old Rais Karabasov who attacked schoolers in a
village in Astrakhan region shouting russophobic slogans. Two sentences were
issued against him, one for the attack (Article 213 Part 1 and Article 116, both
without a qualifying indication), the other for shouting (Article 282). We
decided to merge these sentences (it would be more correct from the legal point
of view if the court did the same) for our statistics and mention the episode in
the section devoted to punishment for violence. The more so, when the court
issued a sentence under article 282, it took the preceding sentence for violence
into account and gave Karabasov eight months of deprivation of freedom.

[26] Tekst Postanovleniya Plenuma Verkhovnogo suda RF #11 "O sudebnoi praktike
po ugolovnym delam o prestupleniyakh ekstremistskoi napravlennosti" ot 28 iyunya
2011 goda // The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation website. 2011. 29 June
(http://www.supcourt.ru/Show_pdf.php?Id=7315). See also: Kommentarij "SOVY" na
Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo suda ob ekstremizme // Sova Center. 2011. 1
July (http://sova-center.ru/misuse/publications/2011/07/d22010/).

[27] Alperovich V., Yudina N. Op. cit.

[28] The case was considered only after the fourth attempt, all the previous
times, it returned to the prosecutor's office for specification.

[29] The attackers were convicted under Article 213 Part 2 (hooliganism
committed with objects used as a weapon by a group of people under previous
collusion) and Article 111 part 4 (deliberate causing severe harm to health
dangerous for a human's life committed by a group of people with hooligan
incentives carelessly leading to death).

[30] Including the aforementioned Yevgeny 'Boomer' Panov.

[31] Aleksandr Verkhovsky. Strannosti dvukh prigovorov // Grani.Ru. 2011. 28
October (http://grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/192712.html).

[32] Earlier, another leader of the Northern Brotherhood, Oleg Troshkin, was
convicted. See further in: V Moskve osuzhden odin iz liderov "Severnogo
bratstva" // Sova Center. 2011. 17 August
(http://sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2011/08/d22338/).

[33] The organization was deemed terrorist, its activities in the country was
banned in February 2010.

[34] In January 2006, a criminal case on administrative offence was instigated
against Lozinsky under Article 20.3 of the Administrative Code. He was charged
with public demonstration of symbols similar to Nazi ones so that they could be
mixed up, on the printed forms of the organization Rada of the Kuban land (Rada
zemli Kubanskoi) Rus the Spiritual Tribal Power that were received by the
Prosecutor General's office. Lozinsky was called to administrative account and
detained. In 2005, he received a warning from the prosecutor's office in Central
administrative district of Krasnodar on the inadmissibility of extremist
activity.

[35] In Autumn, the book 'Slavic Veda' by Aleksandr Belogorov (Moscow, Vityaz',
2004) that had already been put in the list was added once again (compare with
item 578).

[36] The full title of the list is 'The list of public and religious
associations, other non-profitable organizations against which courts passed
rulings that entered into effect, liquidating them or banning their activity on
the grounds provided by the Federal Law 'On Combating Extremist Activity'.

[37] See the ruling in: Sudebnoe reshenie o likvidatsii pravoradikal'nykh
organizatsii v Omske // Sova Center. 2011. 30 April
(http://sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/docs/2004/04/d8899/).

[38] RONS' permanent chairman was Igor Artemov who had been a member of the
Vladimir provincial legislative assembly for several terms up to 2010.

[39] Alperovich V., Yudina N. Op. cit.

[40] This newspaper is successor to the To the Stand! (K bar'eru) closed in
April 2011. The latter is in turn successor to the Duel (Duel') newspaper also
closed after years of court hearings. See further in: Roskomnadzor trebuet
zakryt' gazetu "Svoimi imenami" // Sova Center. 2011. 7 October
(http://sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2011/10/d22722/).
===================


APPENDIX. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT STATISTICS
http://www.sova-center.ru/files/xeno/tables-eng-11-12-eng.doc

=============================

DISCLAIMER: The composition of RNB's issues does not necessarily express the
compilers' views. All topical English-language texts that come to the attention
of the compilers, and are related to Russian nationalism are, as far as that is
technically feasible, included.

CALL FOR PAPERS
[Please, feel free to forward, re-post or publish.]

"Antizapadnye ideologicheskie techeniia v postsovetskoi Rossii i ikh istoki 7
[Anti-Western Ideological Trends in Post-Soviet Russia and Their Origins, no.
7]"

- within a series of special issues of the Russian web journal

"Forum noveishei vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i kul'tury [Forum for Contemporary
East European History and Culture ]" at

http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forumruss.html

ZIMOS, the Institute for Central and East European Studies of The Catholic
University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, in Upper Bavaria, invites research papers
for the seventh special issue on Russian anti-Westernism of its
interdisciplinary Russian-language open-access web journal "Forum for
Contemporary East European History and Culture"
http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forumruss.html .

The Russian "Forum" has been published twice per year, since 2004, as a
scholarly WWW periodical supplementing ZIMOS's printed German-language "Forum
für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte." See
http://www.ku-eichstaett.de/forschungseinr/zimos/publikationen/zeitschrift_forum\
/

We are currently publishing a series of special issues of the Russian "Forum" on
anti-Western tendencies in Russia. The first six instalments of this project
have during the last three years been published here:
Special Issue 1: http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss11.html
Special Issue 2: http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss12.html
Special Issue 3: http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss13.html
Special Issue 4: http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss14.html
Special Issue 5: http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss15.html
Special Issue 6: http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss16.html

The project's origins, contents and rationale are briefly outlined in the
introduction to the series of special issues under the title "Rastsvet russkogo
ul'tranatsionalizma i stanovlenie soobshchestva ego issledovatelei" to be found
here:

  http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/docs/forumruss11/1UmlandVvedenie.pdf

Among the authors who have been participating in this project, so far, are
Marlene Laruelle (Washington, DC), Anastasia Mitrofanova (Moscow), John B.
Dunlop (Stanford), Viktor Shnirelman (Moscow), Evgenii Moroz († 2011, St.
Petersburg), Marina Peunova (Geneva), Anton Shekhovtsov (Sevastopol), Vadim
Rossman (Bangkok), Mikhail Sokolov (St. Petersburg), Valery Senderov (Moscow),
Boris Stepanov (Moscow), Martin Beisswenger (Notre Dame), Stefan Wiederkehr
(Berlin), Alan Ingram (London), Aleksandr Kuz'min (Syktyvkar), Mikhail Suslov
(Uppsala), Arthur Vafin (Moscow), Emil' Pain (Moscow), Frank Gruener
(Heidelberg), Ilya Yablokov (Manchester), Nikolai Sainakov (Tomsk),  Michael
Kirkwood (Glasgow), Martin Mueller (St. Gallen), Irina Trotsuk (Moscow), Oxana
Pakhlevska (Rome), Boris Khavkin (Moscow), Jussi Lassila (Helsinki), Markus
Mathyl (Passau), Anton Sveshnikov (Omsk) and Alexander Verkhovsky (Moscow).

Further authors who have earlier contributed to, or have recently agreed to
provide papers or essays for, the "Forum" related, in one way or another, to the
topic of Russian anti-Westernism are Ludmila Dymerskaia-Tsigel'man (Jerusalem),
Alexander Yanov (New York), Alexander J. Motyl (New Brunswick), Roger D. Griffin
(Oxford), Olga Malinova (Moscow), Vladimir Kantor (Moscow), Jardar Ostbo (Oslo),
Geir Flikke (Oslo), Per Anders Rudling (Lund), Andrey Kazantsev (Moscow), Assen
Ignatov († 2003, Cologne), Alexander Vatlin (Moscow), Ekaterina Dais (Moscow),
Aleksey Lastovsky (Minsk) and Sergey Magaril (Moscow).

We are still accepting suitable submissions for the following 7th special issue,
and are especially interested in papers focussing on specific or understudied
sub-themes within the general issue of anti-Western tendencies in current
Russia. See the Table of Contents of the previous 6 issues concerning topics
already covered, and possible desiderata.

We require properly footnoted, scholarly researched, well-structured, and
thoroughly edited Russian-language texts with a length of no less than 4,000 and
no more than 14,000 words. Papers should be based on primary as well as
secondary sources, which are fully listed and adequately presented, in
footnotes.

We are not only interested in original papers that have not yet been published
anywhere. We are also happy to re-publish papers that might have already been
printed in Russian or other languages before, but that are, so far, not freely
available in Russian language on the WWW. In the case that a paper has been
published in a Russian printed edition (journal, collected volume) or
non-Russian outlet before, authors will have to provide an explicit permission,
by the editors of the periodical, website or book where the article originally
appeared, for re-publication as a Russian-language PDF file in our open-access
web journal. We will usually not re-publish papers that are already available in
Russian on the WWW.

Papers accepted content-wise for publication will only be published in case of a
proper adaptation of its linguistic quality and formal style  (footnotes,
punctuation, headings, references, citations etc.) to the standards of the
"Forum" by the author/s, by 1 June 2012. Please, use this text as a model with
regard to the formal style required of the final editions of the papers to be
prepared for publication:

http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/docs/forumruss14/7Shekhovtsov.pdf

All versions of the papers should be submitted as MS Word Documents.

For authors who wish to publish an English-, German- or Ukrainian-language text
on the special issue's topic in Russian language, we can provide qualified
Russian translating services. Unfortunately, however, we do not have funds to
pay translators. Thus, we regret to state that the costs for translation, as
outlined below, will have to borne fully by the author her- or himself. In
addition, after provision of a draft translation by our expert-translator,
authors will be required to carefully check the translated Russian draft
version, before the translator produces the final version of the text for print.

The translator will, after delivering a satisfactory final version of the
translation, have to be paid, by the author/s, EUR0.07 per word of the English,
German or Ukrainian original version of the article, i.e., for instance, EUR350
for a 5,000-word article. The word count includes also non-Russian
bibliographical literature listed in the footnotes that will not be translated
into Russian or transcribed into Cyrillic, yet the formal style of which will be
adapted to the format of the "Forum" by the translator. The copyright of the
Russian version of the article remains with the translator until the author has
made payment for the translation.

Authors of texts that have been published in English, German or Ukrainian before
are advised to clarify with the editors of the periodical, book, or non-Russian
web site (where the paper originally appeared) whether re-publication in a
Russian-language web journal is permissible. The editors of the "Forum" will not
take responsibility for any violations of copyright.

Please, submit your text until either
- 1 May 2012 for non-Russian papers yet to be translated, or
- 1 June 2012 for Russian papers,
as an MS Word Document, to:
andreas.umland@... (with cc to anumland@...)
or as a hard copy to:

Dr. Andreas Umland
DAAD Lectureship Mohyla Academy
German Embassy
vul. Bohdana Khmelnitskoho, 25
UA-01901 Kyiv
UKRAINE

If you intend to submit a text, but are still working on its contents and style,
or on its translation into Russian, please, send us a brief message with the
title of your paper, and the expected final submission date.

We reserve the right to reject texts that either do not fit the concept of the
anti-Westernism project, or the format and quality of which do not correspond to
the "Forum's" standards.

We look forward to your submission!

Thank you.

The "Forum's" Editors
Prof. Leonid Luks, Dr. Andreas Umland, Antonina Zykova
http://www.ku-eichstaett.de/forschungseinr/zimos/mitarbeiter/

THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM BULLETIN
A Biweekly Newsletter of Current Affairs
Vol. 6, No. 4(160), 8 March 2012
Compilers: Scott Littlefield & Andreas Umland

I   NEWS: 1 - 15 February 2012
II   SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS
III ANNOTATIONS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

[NOTE: When viewing an RNB issue in the Messages archive of the homepage and the
end of the text is truncated, scroll to the end of the message and click "Expand
Messages." Only then, the whole text of the - otherwise truncated - issue will
appear. When quoting from an article found here, please, mention the RNB, as the
source. Thank you!]
==============================


I   NEWS: 1 - 15 February 2012

State will go on paying its debt to the Church - Putin
Interfax-Religion, February 2, 2012

Moscow, February 2, Interfax - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin believes
the state is indebted to the Church and promised to continue "paying this debt"
and set up new possibilities for traditional religions.
  "A lot has been done to restore religious organizations, to help them get on
feet from early 1990s," the Prime said at St. Daniel Monastery yesterday as he
came to congratulate Patriarch Kirill on the third anniversary of his
enthronement.
  "But for all the previous years the state inflicted so much damage to religious
organizations that the state is in debt before the Church and other religious
confessions," Putin said.
  He also noted that for last decades a lot has been done, "Orthodox churches,
mosques" were restored, "so many mosques have been built as never before." "But
I'll say it again: the state is in debt, even if we look at the material side of
this matter," he said.
  According to him, restored churches "make only the smallest share of what
should be done and what existed before, some things are impossible to restore."
  "We should work to improve the situation," the head of the government said.
  He assured that in future the state will pay much attention to religious sphere
and "the same way, quietly and rhythmically pay debts and create possibilities
for religious confessions."

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9032
-----

User access to Jehovah's Witnesses website restricted in Transbaikalia
Interfax-Religion, February 3, 2012

Chita, February 3, Interfax - The Chita District Court has partially granted a
request made by the Transbaikalia Territory prosecutor to restrict user access
to the Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia official website, the press service for the
territory's prosecutors reported on Friday.
  "The court has ordered OAO Rostelecom, OOO Svyazkomplekt, OAO Loktelecom, OOO
Prestizh-Internet and ZAO Transtelecom-Chita to restrict user access to the site
on the territory of the Transbaikalia Territory by filtering the name of the
site on DNS servers," the report says.
  According to the prosecutors, the website contains links to books that were
earlier recognized as extremist material and banned in Russia.
  The court decision can be contested for one month.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9036
-----

14 Million New Migrants Flocked to Russia in 2011
By: Natalya Krainova
The Moscow Times, February 3, 2012

Almost 14 million foreigners and stateless people legally arrived in Russia last
year, the head of the Federal Migration Service said at a news conference
Thursday.
Konstantin Romodanovsky announced that 13.8 million people had legally entered
the country in 2011, among them 9.7 million citizens of CIS countries.
Of the legal immigrants, about 2.7 million were from Ukraine, about 2 million
from Uzbekistan, less than 1.5 million from Kazakhstan and just less than 1
million from Tajikistan.
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia all had in the neighborhood of half
a million each, according to a diagram presented by Romodanovsky.
In 2011, migration officials registered almost 10 million foreigners and
stateless individuals, almost 810,000 more than in 2010, according to another
table on the FMS website.
The FMS press office could not immediately explain the discrepancy between the
14 million migrants mentioned by Romodanovsky and the 10 million migrants
indicated in the table.
It also couldn't provide a breakdown of how many of those 10 million immigrants
arrived legally.
Migration officials discovered almost 220,000 foreigners and stateless
individuals in Russia illegally in 2011, a drop of almost 27,000 from the 2010
figure, according to statistics posted earlier on the FMS website.
The table didn't say when these illegal immigrants arrived in Russia. Of the
220,000 illegal immigrants, about 76,000 left Russia voluntarily, and almost
29,000 were deported.
In addition, 428 were held criminally liable, and almost 218,000 were punished
for administrative violations, the FMS website said.
More than 5,600 illegal immigrants who were deported came from countries that
have a visa regime with Russia.
Emigrants from those countries agreed to help authorities after the FMS
requested their cooperation, Romodanovsky said, refusing to name the countries.
Romodanovsky also said Thursday that the FMS is proposing tougher penalties for
immigration violations.
Under the proposed regulations, foreigners who repeatedly violate Russian
migration laws would be banned from entering the country for five years instead
of three.
Also, the maximum prison term for organizers of illegal immigration would be
increased from five to 10 years.
Finally, the proposals oblige migrant workers hired to work in public service
occupations to pass a Russian language exam.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin came up with similar proposals at an FMS meeting
last week and in his article published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Jan. 23.
The FMS does not have enough employees to detect all illegal immigrants,
Romodanovsky said Thursday.
About 5,000 migration officials work across Russia, including about 940 in
Moscow, the Moscow region, St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, the FMS
chief said.
A table on the FMS website stated that 6,640 migration officials work across
Russia. That figure could not be immediately reconciled with the one given by
Romodanovsky.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/14-million-new-migrants-flocked-to-ru\
ssia-in-2011/452266.html#ixzz1mThjZDt2
--------

Racism and Xenophobia in January 2012
SOVA Center,  February 5, 2012

  January 2012 saw at least 11 people killed and 10 more injured in racist and
neo-Nazi attacks in Moscow and St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad, Voronezh and
Tver regions. The victims were non-Slavic individuals and anti-fascist
activists, primarily those participating in a January 19 rally in memory of
Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova, the lawyer and journalist who were
murdered in broad daylight in Central Moscow by a neo-Nazi in 2009.
  We classified at least four acts of vandalism as motivated by hatred or
neo-Nazi ideology. Targets included the "Russia" House of Culture in Serpukhov,
the Saratov United Russia party headquarters, the obelisk of St. Petersburg's
Smolensk Cemetery, and a cathedral in Petropavlosvk-Kamchatsky that was set on
fire.
  There were no convictions in January for racist violence or vandalism that
accounted for the hate motive.
  There were, however, at least two convictions against seven people for
xenophobic propaganda, in the Arkhangelsk and Ulyanovsk regions. Six individuals
were sentenced to compulsory labor under Article 282 of the Criminal Code, while
the other was put on probation under both articles 280 and 282. In another case,
a graffiti charge in Chita was dropped due to an expired statute of limitations.
  The Federal List of Extremist Materials was updated three times, on January 18,
21 and 23; paragraphs 1067-1072 were added. The updates include xenophobic
leaflets of the Pamyat Novosibirsk newspaper, and Muslim materials whose content
Sova has not yet had the chance to review.
  The month's most notable event was a pan-Russian series of rallies in memory of
Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova, held on January 19 in at least 23
cities across the country. Moscow's meeting was branded an anti-fascist rally,
and between 500-600 people attended.
  The meeting's speakers made a point of addressing the participation of
far-right factions in the civil protest movement that has formed following
December's fraudulent parliamentary elections. Indeed, though far-right groups
have not been present in great numbers at rallies, they have been well
represented in the demonstrations' coordination efforts, namely as part of the
Initiative Group and its "political faction," the Russian Political Committee.
  In January the Initiative Group assembled a civic movement, and came close to
assembling a Civic Council that would be made up of both nationalists and
leftist and liberal groups. The movement's Quota group is composed of dedicated
nationalists, and includes representatives from the Russian Platform and The
Russians movements. It is co-chaired by well-known far-right leaders Konstantin
Krylov, Vladimir Tor, Alexander Belov and Dmitry Demushkin.
  Following a statement by President Medvedev on possible reforms to the laws
regulating the establishment of political parties, far-right groups got to work
building theirs up. The most significant of these is the New Force party
project, led by Moscow State University of International Relations professor
Valery Solovey.

http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/news-releases/2012/02/d23588/
------

Russian patriarch calls Putin era 'miracle of God'
Reuters, February 8, 2012

MOSCOW, Feb 8 (Reuters) - The head of the Russian Orthodox church on Wednesday
called the 12 years of Vladimir Putin's rule a "miracle of God" and criticised
his opponents, at a gathering where religious leaders heaped praise on the prime
minister.
  Putin wants support from spiritual figures for his campaign to win his third
term in the Kremlin in a March 4 election. He is facing a growing protest
movement and needs to consolidate his core support to avoid a runoff.
  Putin has built his campaign on a contrast with the turbulent 1990s, when
millions were thrown into poverty after the collapse of the Soviet Union while
ethnic conflicts such as the war in Chechnya threatened to tear Russia apart.
  Patriarch Kirill, a bearded cleric seen as a modernising figure in the Russian
church, the largest in Orthodox Christianity, compared the period preceding
Putin's ascent to power to the 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.
  "What were the 2000s then? Through a miracle of God, with the active
participation of the country's leadership, we managed to exit this horrible,
systemic crisis," Kirill told a meeting at the ancient St. Daniel's monastery.
  "I should say it openly as a patriarch who must only tell the truth, not paying
attention to the political situation or propaganda, you personally played a
massive role in correcting this crooked twist of our history," Kirill said.
  Putin replaced the ailing Boris Yeltsin as president in 2000. He presided over
an oil-fuelled economic boom until the global economic crisis struck the country
in 2008.
  Banned by the constitution from running for a third consecutive term, Putin
stepped down in 2008 but remained in charge in the position of prime minister.
  He looks set to win the election despite the biggest opposition protests of his
rule but may be forced into a second round if he fails to get more than 50
percent of the vote in the first.
  OPPOSITION "SHRIEKS"
  Kirill called opposition demands to "ear-piercing shrieks" and said the
protesters represented a minority of Russians. He said Western consumer culture
was admired by many of Putin's opponents and was a major threat to Russia.
  "The majority, I assure you, are those who agree with what I am saying," Kirill
said.
  Kirill's speech was echoed by leaders of other faiths.
  "You had it right, the fact that they (opposition protests) took place on
Saturday suggests that it was not a Jewish business," Russia's chief rabbi,
Berel Lazar, told Putin.
  "We joked in the synagogue that it would have been better to come for a prayer
on that day."
  The gathering was also attended by four muftis from predominantly Muslim
Russian regions, a Buddhist lama, an Armenian bishop and representatives of
Roman Catholics and other Christian churches.
  "Muslims know you, Muslims trust you, Muslims are wishing you success," said
mufti Ravil Gainutdin. Mufti Ismail Berdiyev from the turbulent North Caucasus
added: "You are the only person who has shown the United States its place."
----

Putin vows Russia will defend persecuted Christians abroad
Interfax-Religion, February 8, 2012

Moscow, February 8, Interfax - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin promised on
Wednesday it would be one of the tasks of Russia's foreign policy to defend
Christians in other countries who are persecuted for their faith.
  "You needn't have any doubt that that's the way it will be," Putin said at a
meeting with Russian religious leaders when Metropolitan Hilarion, foreign
relations chief of the Russian Orthodox Church, expressed hope that Russia's
government would stand up for persecuted Christian communities abroad.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9050
-----

Religious values should be promoted more actively via TV - Putin
Interfax-Religion, February 8, 2012

Moscow, February 8, Interfax - Russian Prime Minister and presidential candidate
Vladimir Putin has suggested that "the Church's voice" does not sound often
enough on TV and called for allotting more airtime to this issue.
  "The voice of the Church and authoritative church figures and wise tutors and
preachers should sound in full force, including certainly on federal television
channels," Putin said at a meeting with members of faiths traditional in Russia
on Wednesday.
  Putin admitted that some channels allot airtime to religious organizations.
"However, this is clearly not enough, and misbalance between what has been
regularly annoying people of late and true moral values is so far evident,"
Putin said.
  The state should and will seek "to ensure appropriate reflection in the
informational environment of interests of people who attribute their worldview
to values of Orthodoxy and other traditional faiths," he said.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9047
-----

Majority of Russians believe homosexuality is a vice and speak against gay
prides
Interfax-Religion, February 10, 2012

Moscow, February 10, Interfax - 74% of Russians consider homosexuality as
vicious perversion of human nature while 15% believe it is a normal sexual
orientation, the poll by the Politekh social technologies agency commissioned by
the Russian Public Chamber shows.
  Besides, 79% of respondents expressed opinion that Russia should not allow
unisexual "marriages" (13% spoke for them), authors of the poll told
Interfax-Religion on Friday.
  87% of Russians spoke for banning gay parades, 9% stick to the contrary point
of view.
  82% of participants in the poll (against 13%) believe that homosexuals should
not be allowed to educational and other kind of work with children and youth.
  The poll was conducted by telephone, 1800 people aged over 18 were questioned
in 149 cities of 74 subjects of the Russian Federation.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9058
----

Medvedev gives high marks to FJCR efforts to maintain ethnic accord in Russia
Interfax-Religion, February 13, 2012

Moscow, February 13, Interfax - Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has sent a
telegram to participants in the 5th congress of the Federation of Jewish
Communities in Russia (FJCR).
  "I am happy to welcome you in Moscow at the congress of the Federation of
Jewish Communities in Russia. Your organization is doing a lot of work to revive
the spiritual and cultural traditions of Jews in our country and is doing a lot
of things to realize socially important educational and charity programs," the
presidential address was quoted as saying by the Kremlin press service on
Monday.
  "We greatly appreciate the consistent work done by FJCR to maintain ethnic
accord and develop dialogue with other Russian religions and your contribution
to the fight against xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and religious intolerance. No
doubt, all these things help preserve the cultural diversity of our country,
form an atmosphere of mutual respect, and strengthen stability in society," the
presidential address reads.
  The president wished the congress participants "fruitful work, success, and all
the best."

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9063
----

Russians Divided on St. Valentine's Day Celebration
RIA Novosti, February 14, 2012

MOSCOW, February 14 (RIA Novosti)-Western popular culture has deeply taken root
in Russian society since the fall of the Iron Curtain, yet St. Valentine's Day
celebrations have more opponents than supporters among Russians, the Superjob
research center statistics show.
  According to a recent public poll conducted by the organization, only 39
percent of Russians, most of them youngsters under the age of 24, are planning
to celebrate the holiday, while 44 percent said they were not going to.
  When asked why not to present a Valentine gift or a card to their partner, many
Russians say "our culture does not benefit from foreign holidays," with 35
percent admitting that they prefer to mark the Day of Family, Love and
Faithfulness, a Russian alternative to St. Valentine's Day, on July 8.
  Russia introduced the holiday, also known as the Day of St. Peter and St.
Fevronia, the Orthodox patrons of marriage, in 2008. First lady Svetlana
Medvedev is among the most active promoters of the new holiday, with a daisy
being its symbol instead of a red heart.
  Many Russians view Women's Day on March 8 and Men's Day on February 23, which
have been celebrated in Russia for decades, as more suitable days for gifts and
celebrations than St. Valentine's Day, the poll shows.
  Yet the number of those who are going to celebrate the holiday has slightly
increased from 37 percent last year. A romantic dinner, a bunch of flowers and
fluffy toys are among the most popular presents to mark the holiday, while a few
Russians, who appear to be more creative, say they are going to present a
lottery ticket, a poem or a pet to their beloved ones.
-----

Jewish group complains nationalism more "acceptable" in Russia
Interfax-Religion, February 14, 2012

Moscow, February 14, Interfax - An Orthodox Jewish association in Russia
complained that current public protests in the country have served to bring
nationalistic movements into the foreground as a side effect.
  "The most unpleasant part of the current public unrest is the fact that
nationalistic ideology has become a lot more acceptable for various social
strata," Borukh Gorin, spokesman for the Federation of Jewish Communities of
Russia, told a briefing.
  He argued that neither the government nor the judiciary is to blame for this,
but that it is a social issue. "One can be sitting at the same table with people
who preach ethnic strife or extremism for some of the most virtuous goals, for
example to feed orphans, but to drive out people from the Caucasus at the same
time," he said.
  "During December's events [mass protests against alleged fraud during
parliamentary elections] we were able to see that people whom, previously, one
couldn't have imagined standing on the same floor, happily marching in
neighboring columns, and this, in my view, is a very dangerous trend, because
this means that a low brand of nationalism has become fairly acceptable," he
said.
  He insisted on "greater fastidiousness" because "there can be no good work done
by dirty means."
  Gorin was speaking in an interval during a congress of the federation.
  The federation's president, Alexander Boroda, told the congress that "latent
anti-Semitism remains an inseparable part of the outlook of many Russians"
though only between 2% and 3% of Russians had openly identified themselves as
anti-Semites in recent years and the anti-Semitism issue "has vanished from
public political debates."
  The speakers at the congress included the head of the Synodal Department for
Church and Society Relations Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin.
  He said that Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia "pays special attention
to interreligious dialogues in Russia and throughout the Commonwealth of
Independent States, has extremely warm feelings for the Russian Jewish community
and cooperates with it as with a dialogue partner of many years."
  "We share the same challenges - challenges of unbelief, aggressive immorality,
intolerance, division and humiliation of people for ethnic and religious
reasons, and attempts to set people against each other in order to fish in
troubled waters. We should help each other in trying to remove all those
practices from the life of our nation. People professing various religions seek
to create our common life in peace and cooperation. I am sure that this is the
way it will always be. I welcome the hand of friendship that has been offered to
us, and I always offer my own hand," the priest said.
  supreme mufti of Russia's Central Spiritual Muslim Board Talgat Tajuddin also
took the floor. Starting his speech with the word "Shalom," he said members of
Russia's well-established religious communities "should be in the vanguard of
the work of building a healthy society and together counteract attempts to fan
intolerance and ethnic strife."

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9066
----------

Report: January 2012
By: Daniil Meshcheryakov
UCSJ, February 2012

Politically active groups continued to advocate for a nationalist agenda within
the broader protest movement. In recent discussions organized by the Public
Chamber of the Russian Federation called "The Nationalist threat in Russia:
Trends, Prospects and Countermeasures" the results of 2011 were discussed,
including the rise of xenophobia and a decrease in the number of hate crimes due
to better law enforcement.
January marked the beginning of the electoral campaign in Russia, and the most
important political event was the publication of an article by Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin called "Russia: the National Question" in the state newspaper.
The caused a strong reaction from the public. The fact that the Prime Minister
published an article on this subject shows its importance. Some of the articles
provisions may be included in his presidential platform. However, experts doubt
their feasibility. There are human rights concerns as well. It includes a
proposal to tighten the registration standards for migrants in order to counter
the flow of "illegal migrants" and social conflict. Also, despite the
recognition of the importance of education in developing adequate attitudes to
cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, Putin chose to focus on efforts such
as introducing compulsory examination of migrants in the Russian language,
Russian history, and Russian culture.
The wave of social activism caused by the falsification of election results in
December 2011 has resulted in a number of internal discussions within the civic
movement on whether or not to cooperate with the nationalists. They have decided
not to. The anti-fascist activists were united in honoring the memory of
murdered human rights journalists Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova in
22 Russian cities. This caused a violent reaction from the neo-Nazis who
attacked participants in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh.
On January 21, a rally of several hundred Moscow football fans was organized to
demand the investigation of the attack on the fan of the Spartak football team
member Alexey Ershov, who was wounded by Andronick Simonyan, an ethnic Armenian,
in September, 2010. The protesters made sure that the case had been sent to
court, echoing a similar incident last year. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Putin met
with football fans regarding the upcoming World Cup to be held in Russia in 2018
and promised to pay proper attention to the "national question" in Russia.
According to the Sova Center, in January 2012, at least 11 people suffered from
racist or neo-Nazi attacks. One native of Azerbaijan was killed and 10 people
were assaulted. The federal list of extremist materials, was updated in January
four times and seven new items were added to it, including several related to
Islamic fundamentalism and a brochure titled "Expansion from the South. Stop
it?!".

http://ucsj.org/2012/02/08/report-january-2012/#more-223
----

Statement in connection with events around referendum in Latvia about giving the
status of the second state language to Russian
MBHR, February 2012

In Latvia various public forces intently waited for decision of the
Constitutional court about fate of nation-wide referendum fixed on February 18
about giving the status of the state language to Russian. And now the
Constitutional court of Latvia rejected the demand of 30 deputies of Seim to
cancel the referendum.
  In Latvia considerable part of Russian-speaking people has no status of
citizenship. Confrontation between nationalistic forces and Russian-speaking
population takes place in the country; disturbance of franchise for considerable
part of Russian-speaking people is condemned by official European structures.
Under these conditions recognition of Russian as the second state language is
really crucial for Latvia not just regarding equalization of rights of
Lettish-speaking and Russian-speaking population but also for determination of
language of official circulation of documents, language of teaching in secondary
and higher educational institutions and other most important spheres.
  It is absolutely clear considering the above-stated that Russian-speaking
population eagerly desires approval of Russian as the state language.
Nationalistic forces categorically demand to leave the single state language,
namely Lettish. And such demand is based not just upon unwillingness to
recognize the language of "occupants" but also upon quite objective
apprehensions: Russian is most wide-spread in a small country, majority of
citizens of Latvia speaks it, and its recognition as the official one may
promote assimilation of non-Russians into Lettish cultural space and that of the
Lettish - into Russian cultural space, with subsequent regretful fate of both
Lettish language and ethnic culture.
  Experience of civilized countries in this matter is various: for example, in
USA a notion of "state language" is absent at all: English is accepted by
default as the most wide-spread language and legalized only in legislation of
some states. In Belgium, Canada several languages are recognized as state ones.
In France, Germany one state language is recognized.
  Thus, in Latvia various variants of official proportion of languages are
possible, and at present fierce combat of warring forces around this serious
problem is starting. Nation-wide referendums serve as tools for such combat like
this is accepted in civilized countries. Nationalistic forces were collecting
signatures for referendum on ban for teaching in Russian at schools, and now, on
the initiative of the society "Native language" more than 180 thousand
signatures were collected about holding of referendum on introduction of
amendments into the Constitution of Latvia giving the status of the second state
language to Russian.
  But a serious scandal started at once: nationalistic association "Everything -
to Latvia!"-TB/DNNL and majority of deputies from the party of prime-minister
"Unity" addressed the Constitutional court (CC) with request to estimate
legality of referendum basing upon fundamental laws of Latvia. The application
also includes stopping of referendum that was already announced and fixed for
February 18. Some other groups in Latvian parliament did not determine their
position on this problem yet.
  At the same time opponents of referendum do not conceal their intentions:
actually they are interested not in juridical legality of referendum but they
wish not to admit Russian as the second state language by all means. As the
representative of EL-TB/DNNL group Rainis Dzintars stated, "our wish is to prove
as soon as possible that the issue of Lettish as the only state language is not
a subject of discussion".
  Leader of society "Native language" Vladimir Linderman stated that in case of
cancellation of referendum people would go out to the streets and mass protest
actions would begin. Illegitimacy of adoption of statement of nationalistic
block was also confirmed by ex-chairman of the CC Aivar Eidzinsh: "The
Constitution envisages a specific procedure of initiation of referendum. So it's
impossible to assert now that the referendum is anti-constitutional. If CC
decides to bring an action it would act against the Constitution itself. This is
just a political game. Politicking! The ethnic card is simply played again,
that's all. I don't see a juridical ground in application of ethnic block into
the CC".
  Director of Moscow bureau for human rights Alexander Brod: "The fate of
referendum may be a reason for increase of confrontation in Latvian society.
There remains to hope that politicians and public figures of both camps would
show wisdom and would not admit dangerous development of events".

http://www.antirasizm.ru/index.php/englishnews/461-statement-in-connection-with-\
events-around-referendum-in-latvia-about-giving-the-status-of-the-second-state-l\
anguage-to-russian
=======================


II   SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS


Who is Mr. Navalny?
By Olga Khvostunova
Institute of Modern Russia, 18 January 2012

Anyone with even the slightest interest in Russian politics is familiar with the
name Alexei Navalny. During Navalny's relatively short public and political
career, he has managed to become the subject of various myths and has been
called a social climber, a nationalist, and a populist, among other things. Olga
Khvostunova analyzes Alexei Navalny's biography, his interviews and his blog in
an attempt to separate myth from reality.
Subject for Discussion
Recently Boris Akunin, a well-known Russian writer, called Navalny the brightest
contemporary political figure and the only relevant politician in Russia. At the
same time, according to April 2011 polls by the Levada Center (a Moscow-based
independent research organization), only 6% of Russian citizens knew who Alexei
Navalny actually is and what he stands for.  Such low awareness might be
explained by the fact that Navalny is a new type of politician: he relies mostly
on more modern means of communication, such as the Internet and his LiveJournal
blog, to stay in touch with his audience. But for the vast majority of Russian
citizens, heavily regulated by the Kremlin Russian state television is still the
main source of information. In a sense, Navalny was forced to use these new
technologies: the lack of freedom of speech in the Russian media forced many
opposition leaders like him to transfer their activities to the Internet.  If
the political and civil rights of Russian citizens were not so infringed upon,
if political competition in the country was not so heavily suppressed and
freedom of speech was not so limited, if corruption hadn't reached such
devastating levels, then Navalny might have chosen a different modus operandi. 
Observing Navalny's evolution as a public activist, politician, blogger, and
whistleblower, the conclusion is evident: the political regime in Russia has
transformed from Yeltsin's immature democracy into Putin's rigid
authoritarianism, and has thereby created its own enemy and opponent.
In Russia, mentioning Navalny's name or activities always provokes heated
discussions. The range of emotions and opinions on him is decidedly wide, and,
as a result of many different interpretations, facts from his biography and his
stated positions are often misrepresented.  For example, in one of his video
lectures, Sergei Kurginyan, a pro-Kremlin political scientist, suggested that
Navalny is plotting a revolution in Russia: "What does Mr. Navalny, whose
genesis is very clear to me, say? He has a fairly serious international project
in mind, one that is not far from what I would call an Egypt/Tunisia-like
scenario."  While debating the idea of nominating Navalny for President,
Vladimir Milov, a politician and opposition leader, doubted his management
skills: "Navalny is an awesome leader. But I'd like to remind everyone that
being the Russian President is a serious job, and a nomination for Presidential
candidacy is a big deal. Some tend to treat it as a 'retweet' or a 'Like' on the
social networks."  There is also Yevgeny Gontmakher, an economist from Russia's
Institute of Modern Development, who criticized Navalny for his nationalism:
"Navalny has confirmed his condemnation of the term Rossiyanstvo [being a
Russian citizen as opposed to being ethnically Russian - transl.], which he had
announced a few years before in the manifesto of the NAROD movement. This is an
unacceptable position for any real democrat, Russian or European."  The
well-known independent political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin, in his article about
Navalny, concluded that the latter should not be trusted in general: "What kind
of a 'project' is Navalny, for God's sake? He is just an ambitious, combative
person with an excessive hunger for power and an obvious adventurous streak. He
can transform anyone into a 'project' in order to advance himself. He has no
qualms about getting help from the U.S. or from Lubyanka [the name of the Moscow
square where the KGB is headquartered - transl.]. […] Navalny is actually
telling the truth. But one should be very cautious about trusting him. He is
certainly a product of his generation!"  In all of the above arguments, one
thing remains indisputable: Navalny's role in Russian contemporary political
discourse is unique and requires a closer look.
Grassroots Politics Myth #1: Navalny lacks political experience
It is a common belief that genuine political activities translate into endless
and highly explosive debates, lots of clever public speaking, parliamentary
struggles, exciting scandals, intrigues, and embarrassing disclosures. This is
how political careers are represented by the media, and, as a French sociologist
Pierre Bourdier put it in his article "On Television and Journalism," it is the
television media that should be blamed for anchoring this view in the public
conscience. In reality, however, about 99% of every politician's daily routine
is spent on thorough and boring work, trying to achieve his or her party's
goals. For obvious reasons, this work does not qualify as breaking news and
never makes it into the contents of newspaper articles.        Navalny's name
started to get some media attention around 2004. At the time, he had been
working for the Yabloko party and had already become head of the party's Moscow
chapter. As Navalny explains in Konstantin Voronkov's book Alexei Navalny:
Threat to the Crooks and Thieves (2011), his reason for joining Yabloko during
the 1999 parliamentary elections was that "it was the only consistent democratic
party that spoke about ideas and did not trade them for money, political
appointments, or [Presidential] posts." Navalny says he went into politics "to
ban certain people from power while empowering a number of others": "We wanted
to promote specific candidates, we wanted them to get elected, so that we would
be their aides. Most of all, I was interested in how political competition
worked, in the strategies of some candidates' fights against other candidates.
At the same time, we wanted to show that the election campaign didn't
necessarily mean stealing all the money while doing nothing for the people." 
Political rumors about the Kremlin raising the minimum percentage of votes a
party must get in order to enter the State Duma clearly influenced
Navalny:"Yabloko had plenty of problems, including the cult of personality of
its leader [Grigory] Yavlinsky, the party's partial transformation into a sect,
as well as its lack of management. Nevertheless, these were people who staunchly
defended their political views. They had an ideology, a value system, and
overall, they acted accordingly. […] When rumors about the minimum percentage
raise first came out, it was obvious that the restriction was aimed at Yabloko.
So I said, I'll join this party on principle! And I did."  For seven years
(2000-2007), Navalny worked for Yabloko, and for seven years he followed his own
daily political routine. Information about his party's projects is not easily
found in the Russian media, especially considering that the trend of pushing
opposition parties out of the public eye, which first started in the early
2000s, was gathering momentum. Navalny speaks about some of his projects in
Voronkov's book:  "We were the first to do 'street politics.' I was in charge of
organizing public events. […] It might seem strange now, but back then no one
was organizing actions on a regular basis. Everyone was doing it to coincide
with one or another important anniversary. We, on the other hand, decided to
invent occasions. That was very important, since at the time Yabloko was
declining in popularity and struggling for survival. [Sergei] Mitrokhin, head of
the Moscow chapter, who later replaced Yavlinsky as party president, supported
this idea. So when the 2003 elections came, I headed the Moscow campaign office.
We worked like crazy. For instance, a van with campaign materials would arrive
at 4 am. I would call [Ilya] Yashin and tell him: go to Biriulyovo and unload
this van. So then he would go and hire some Tajiks to help him unload this van.
Naturally, it was all fueled by pure enthusiasm. Our salary amounted to $300 a
month. But we were very politically motivated."  Yabloko failed to win Duma
seats in the 2003 elections, getting only 4.6% of the votes nationally. The only
region where Yabloko performed better than in the previous election was Moscow,
where the party managed to get over 10% of the region's votes. Yabloko's success
in Moscow allowed Navalny to work with the Committee for Protection of
Muscovites, a public organization that fought against illegal infill
construction in Moscow. Sergei Mitrokhin was the head of this organization, and
Navalny was soon appointed Executive Secretary. During this time, he offered
legal support to Muscovites by filing their complaints against illegal
construction, attended protests, and communicated with the press.  "My work with
the Committee for Protections of Muscovites got me started with what I do
today," says Navalny. "It is not an abstract ideology, it is about taking a
problem and making it political, while trying to solve it at the same time. […]
We fight against corruption, against illegal construction, against some very
specific people who are responsible for creating this system. One is surrounded
by politics and ideology here: if you vote for us and against them, you might
get to save your kids' playground."  Within several years, the Committee for
Protection of Muscovites managed to accumulate a great deal of information and
data on illegal infill construction in Moscow. Because of its limited
capacities, the Committee's attempts to bring public, media, city hall and
prosecutors' attention to this problem weren't always successful: "With its poor
financing, Yabloko had to confront the largest development companies in Russia
(like DonStroy) and fight the powerful construction lobby of then Moscow mayor
Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov's wife, Yelena Baturina, owned Inteko, a company that
controlled one-fifth of the construction market in Moscow. Despite this,
Navalny's Committee gained authority and respect among ordinary Muscovites.
Nationalism or Patriotism? Myth #2: Navalny is a nationalist
In 2007 Navaly quit Yabloko and, in a rather unexpected turn of events,
co-founded NAROD - the Russian national liberation movement (which also means
"people" in Russian). (A year earlier, Navalny participated in The Russian March
as an observer representing Yabloko. In 2008, he participated in the same march
as a member of NAROD.) In associating with nationalists, Navalny shocked and
alienated many of his former colleagues and liberal-democratic members of the
public at large. But reading the movement's manifesto, it becomes obvious that
Navalny's political and ideological views regarding nationalism are not so cut
and dry.        The key thread running though this manifesto is a strong
criticism of the existing regime and of the Russian government, responsible for
bringing Russia to the edge of a national catastrophe:  "An attempt to create a
new modern democratic state on the territory of the former Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic has failed. All the basic attributes of a
democracy - the concept of the separation of powers, the institution of free
elections, a federal form of government, local self-government, the independence
of the courts and many others - were liquidated. They were replaced with the
"vertical of power," a system of commercial clans who usurped the functions and
powers of government and saw power as a tool for gluttony and not as a tool to
serve the population."  Further on, NAROD's manifesto calls for political
change, so that Russia can start following a truly democratic path. Some major
values defended by NAROD include Russian national renaissance, freedom for all,
and a fair justice system. By national renaissance they meant "ending Russian
civilization's decline and creating the necessary conditions for the
preservation and development of the Russian people, their culture, language, and
historic territory." It is important to specify that the manifesto's authors do
not appeal to conventional nationalist philosophy, nor to ethnic romanticism.
Only elements of a liberal, civilized, so-called cultural nationalism can be
found in this manifesto, and not one example of the extremism inherent to the
National Bolshevik Party.  If one examines this manifesto while keeping in mind
the general political and social situation in today's Russia, a few contextual
issues become obvious. First, the lack of a distinct immigration policy of any
kind, the failures of the social reforms and national projects, and the
inability of the country's government to conceive a clear national idea or to
create an ideology of their own. All these factors increased social tension,
which, along with economic and political problems, created a demand for a
patriotic rhetoric that, for many reasons, was - in the media and public
discourse - labeled as nationalism.  Navalny and some of the other NAROD
manifesto signers then accused extremist organizations and the authorities of
manipulating nationalist themes towards their own interests and causing that
drastic switch in the public's perception of nationalism vs. patriotism:  "The
regime is trying to use people's patriotic sentiments to its own advantage. On
the other hand, national provocateurs undermine the country with their
xenophobia by calling for violence against 'aliens,' thereby creating an
extremely negative image of the nationalists."  In Voronkov's book, Navalny
clarifies his views:  "A modern nationalist differs greatly from what is usually
meant by this term. […] A nationalist is a real patriot who puts the interests
of the country and of the nation above his own interests. He doesn't think
nationalist themes are horrible, frightening or should be a taboo. The Russian
modern nationalist is very Europe-oriented, and Russian nationalism is much
closer to the European mainstream than it is generally believed to be."  Based
on Navalny's position on nationalism, one can conclude that due to the multiple
meanings and emotional perception of the term in Russia, his views could be - to
a certain extent - misinterpreted.  What Navalny's views essentially boil down
to, is an expression of his patriotism and his aspirations for a European way of
development for Russia.  Another possible explanation could be that Navalny
never really got to the bottom of his own views and understandings of
nationalism, possibly because of his active involvement with other projects
starting in 2007. These later projects turned him into a symbolic fighter
against the corrupt regime.  Anti-corruption Blog Myth #3: Navalny is a populist
Some claim that the anti-corruption investigations published in Navalny's blog
are conducted for his own political gain. But unlike many Russian Internet
populists, who shock their audience with scandalous exposures and leaks to the
media, Navalny's articles are backed by the diligent labor of his small law
firm's employees. Information published on Navalny's blog is the result of long
investigations, thorough data collection, the documentation of uncovered
violations, and of serious analysis.        Even a superficial look at Navalny's
blog posts makes it obvious that this man's goals are not to gain some abstract
political points but to restore Russian citizens' violated rights and freedoms. 
Navalny fights against endemic corruption at all levels of state and corporate
power. He applies methodic and consistent pressure on the government, requiring
it to fulfill its obligations to the people.  Alexei Navalny started his blog in
the spring of 2006. Initially, his principal goal was to publish transcripts of
the weekly Ekho Moskvy radio program "Urban Planning Chronicles" where he
participated as a guest commentator, speaking about the work of the Committee
for Protection of the Muscovites.  "Censorship was the reason I gradually got
involved in writing this blog," Navalny explains in Voronkov's book. "There was
no other way. Blogs of a similar format are not popular abroad because this kind
of information gets published in the press there. But here, all we can do is
write blogs. Abroad they have normal, functioning media. These type of scoops
are shown on TV. First, my acquaintances started following me on Livejournal -
political journalists, activists, et al. […] Over time my blog has become a real
media outlet."  It is worth mentioning here that after Navalny graduated from [a
Moscow] Law School, he also received a degree at the department of Securities
and Exchange from the Finance Academy. Navalny admits that he always enjoyed
following the stock markets, and then, in 2007, he ended up investing his own
money into valuable securities, buying blue chips from major Russian oil
companies, such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft, and others. Becoming a minority
shareholder allowed Navalny to request various confidential information on these
companies' activities.  "After becoming a shareholder, thus discovering all the
mayhem that went on inside these companies, I thought I should file a lawsuit to
defend all of the minority shareholders in Russia, on the account that my rights
were violated. I was being robbed by these companies," Navalny says in
Voronkov's book. "From a rational perspective, should a person like me, who has
$20,000 invested in stocks, sue Gazprom, VTB, Transneft and others? The answer
is no. Because all these suits will cost more than the potential dividends and
even more than the initial investments. I have always been revolted by these
corporate robberies. But I wouldn't go to court just to get my money back. I
don't conceal the fact that a large part of my motivation is to litigate on
behalf of the people, which is something that most are afraid to do. The issue
of oil exports from Russia is not just an issue for the shareholders of Rosneft
or Surgutneftegaz. It's a matter of justice. It's about redistributing national
wealth. This has always been the main thrust of my approach, even from the
beginning. This is why in 2007 I began to write and send out requests to all
these companies. Since I never considered my activities private, I started
covering them on my blog."  Gazprom, a Russian company with a gas monopoly,
became the first subject of Navalny's investigations. Navalny got interested in
the purchase of gas by Mezhregiongaz, a division of Gazprom, from Novatek, a
minor Russian gas company.  As a result of this transaction, Navalny explains,
the sellers "earned over $50 million, just by reshuffling a few pieces of paper
on their desks." Vedomosti (a major Russian newspaper) published a story about
this questionable transaction, and at the same time Navalny's blog post from
December 2008 became hugely popular on the Russian net. The Moscow Chief
Administration of Internal Affairs (CAIA) initiated a criminal case and even
brought formal charges against some of the high-profile executives of both
Mezhregiongaz and Novatek, but in the end, most of the charges were dropped due
to a "lack of evidence."  Navalny's second landmark blog post in November 2009
exposed a case of embezzlement in one of Russia's top banks, VTB. The post,
entitled "How VTB Robs the Coffers", revealed that in 2007, VTB Leasing (one of
VTB's divisions) purchased drill rigs from a Chinese partner through a dummy
intermediary company. The price VTB paid for the rigs was 1.5 times the market
price. Examining this questionable deal, Navalny came to the conclusion that the
embezzlement was worth up to $156 million. He forwarded all the documents
regarding the transaction to the Economic Crimes Directorate at the Moscow CAIA.
The Directorate then conducted its own investigation, reporting that no
violations were found. (Later, however, VTB Leasing president, Andrei Konoplyov,
was fired from his position.) Still, the fact that Navalny's post received
massive feedback from the Russian LiveJournal community represented another
serious step forward in his struggle against endemic corruption in Russian state
corporations.  Navalny's "How Transneft Robs the Coffers" blog entry represents
the third milestone in his struggle against corruption. The article still tops
the list of the Russian LiveJournal's most popular blog posts.  Then Navalny
went on exposing an even larger embezzlement scheme - the one involving
Transneft, a Russian oil-transporting monopoly. The scale of this embezzlement
was shocking: Navalny claimed that as many as 4 billion dollars were stolen at
every stage of Transneft's construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean
national pipeline. Navalny obtained this information from leaked reports on the
internal audit conducted by Transneft and the Russian Accounts Chamber. 
Navalny's post received major attention, and federal media outlets even
published their own articles on the problem. Even Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
was forced to make a public comment, saying that the case should be brought to
the attention of federal prosecutors. But such case was never initiated.
However, despite strong objections from Transneft CEOs (including President
Nikolay Tokarev and Vice President Mikhail Barkov), in early 2011, the Moscow
arbitration court compelled the company to give the minutes of relevant Board
meetings to shareholders. Navalny called this a big victory.  Creating his own
method of battling Russian corruption (now called the Navalny method) can be
also considered an important victory.  Navalny's blog posts contain documents
with enough evidence to file hundreds of lawsuits and initiate dozens of court
proceedings. In addition, Navalny has also asked his readers to target
government agencies and to file multiple complaints and requests. This should
push officials do their job, he explains.  A Promising Leader  In December 2011,
thousands and thousands of Russian citizens protested against the fraudulent
parliamentary elections. This unprecedented social upheaval demonstrated that
the political situation in the country is rapidly changing. Opposition forces
that had long been marginalized by Putin's regime had finally gained support
from the active sectors of the Russian population. In December 2011 it became
evident that Alexei Navalny could be considered one of the opposition leaders.
Perhaps, even, the one most feared by the regime.        In a recent public
lecture at the Moscow "Red October" club, Alexei Navalny somewhat ironically
noted: "If there were a thousand people like me, tomorrow we'd be living in a
different country." Pavel Ivlev, Executive Director of the Institute of Modern
Russia, couldn't agree more: "It is quite possible to defeat Putin's regime this
way, and a thousand Navalnys is what we need, in order to win this battle."  "If
any of the democratic opposition leaders ends up as President, it means the
revolution actually took place. And Navalny is one of those leaders - there is
no doubt about that," Ivlev continues. "He will become a hero if this
revolution, if/when it occurs. No one knows whether blood will be spilled, and
whether the big changes will happen tomorrow or in five years from now. But the
revolution, whether we like it or not, is inevitable. And Navalny shouldn't be
alone in this fight."  The Levada Center conducted an interesting poll of the
protesters who gathered on Sakharov Avenue on December 24, 2011. When protesters
were asked which of the opposition leaders they trusted the most, they responded
with journalist Leonid Parfyonov (41%), activist Alexei Navalny (36%), and
writer Boris Akunin (35%). At the same time, when asked whom they would vote for
in a presidential election, 22% of the respondents chose Navalny, followed
closely by his former party boss Grigory Yavlinsky (21%).  Navalny is not
ashamed of his political ambitions. Recently, he has been heard toying with the
idea of running for President. These political ambitions make many people
skeptical. Navalny has been accused of being immature, not experienced enough,
too straightforward, and uncompromising. And all of this criticism is justified,
to a certain degree. But, as mentioned before, the very nature of the current
Russian regime (including its corruption, clientelism, and total disregard for
public interests) creates a demand for tough opponents. In a sense, it was the
Russian authorities themselves who pushed Navalny into the political arena.  One
could argue that until one of the two collapses (either Navalny or the Russian
authorities), the struggle between them will continue. It is obvious that the
regime is not planning to withdraw. Navalny, too, claims he is not going to
surrender:  "I have a clear strategy and principles that I rely upon. There are
no 'opportunity windows', and no deadlines. You have to do what you think is
right without looking back. [The public] support[s] me today, and I am grateful.
And if they stop supporting me, I will continue doing what I do anyway. I will
take steps that are painful for authorities, steps to pressure [the regime].
RosPil's goal [the name of Navalny's anti-corruption project] is to apply
pressure to specific officials and administrative departments. Our slogan -
"United Russia is a party of crooks and thieves" - applies some very real
pressure upon a specific party. And I am sure that pressuring authorities is
effective. […] I consider a lawsuit against Gazprom effective and beneficial.
[…] Promoting this campaign about "the party of crooks and thieves" is
effective. If they decide to target me and publish biased articles about me, it
will only mean that my work is effective. And if/when they initiate a criminal
case against me, it will be the highest proof of my efficiency."  Mahatma Gandhi
once said: "First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you,
then you win." The latest developments, such as Navalny's imprisonment after the
unsanctioned rally on December 5, 2011, and the opening of a criminal case
against him, clearly demonstrate that the regime has entered the stage of
fighting Navalny. As for who will win this battle in the end, only time will
tell.

http://imrussia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=183%3Awho-is-mr\
-navalny&catid=1%3Alatest-news&Itemid=55&lang=en&showall=1
-----------------------

Russia risks to lose many disputed territories
Vadim Trukhachev
Pravda.Ru, 31.01.2012

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov admitted that the issue of ownership of
the South Kuril Islands will be decided by a referendum. Meanwhile, Japan is not
the only country that makes claims to Russia. Estonia is open about its claims,
while Germany and Finland express them indirectly. What would the results of the
vote be? Is there a risk that Russia loses the Southern Kuriles, a part of
Karelia and the Kaliningrad enclave?  Before the beginning of his visit to
Japan, Lavrov gave an interview to a Japanese television company NHK. When asked
about the status of the South Kuril Islands, Lavrov said: "In our case, this is
the matter to be decided through a referendum." However, Lavrov made a
reservation that this is not an immediate issue. One way or another, but a
high-ranking Russian official for the first time publicly acknowledged that the
status of a Russian territory could be decided by popular vote.  Meanwhile,
Lavrov's words are alarming. Japan is not the only country making territorial
claims. Estonia openly calls for the return of Pechora district of Pskov Region.
Only four years ago Latvia abandon its claim on Pytalovo district of Pskov
region. Some politicians in Finland openly raise the question of the status of
Vyborg, some areas of Karelia, and the port of Pechenga in Murmansk region. 
Kaliningrad region is another matter. Several years ago, a Bundestag
representative from the CDU spoke of creating "East Prussia". The hint is clear
as once this region had this name as part of Germany. In addition, certain
forces in Lithuania call this land "Lithuania Minor". Poland does not express
claims to Kaliningrad openly, but among the Poles, too, sometimes one can hear
about "Our Krulevets."  If the Russian authorities are ready for the referendum,
they must be certain that people will vote patriotic. But will they?
Japanologist Alexander Kulanov told "Pravda.Ru" about the ways the Japanese are
actively fighting for the minds, hearts and wallets of residents of the South
Kuril Islands.  "The Japanese are actively implementing programs for visa-free
regime, inviting residents of the Kurile to visit Japan. The purpose of all this
is to show how the Japanese live, and compare it with how they live. In
addition, Japanese channels have special broadcast for the Kuril Islands. We
have nothing to match this propaganda."  Of course, many are drawn to Japan
because it is far less expensive to get there than to other regions of Russia.
This is true for other residents of the Far East. Unfortunately, the federal
government often looks at the provinces from the point of view of natural
resources", Kulanov stressed.  People on the Sakhalin and Kuril forums now and
then express the view that they would live best as part of Japan. It is not
confined to the South Kuriles. In spring of 2008 it was reported that nearly
half of the population of the Pechora district of Pskov region have acquired
Estonian passports.  It was reported that the analysis of the situation showed
that the Estonian authorities were active in expanding its political, economic,
social and informational influence in Pechora region. The propaganda was
successful. For example, young people prefer to join the Estonian army over the
Russian one. The passport of the neighboring state provides free movement in
Europe.   Vyborg and Karelia are being actively developed by Finnish companies.
Local people are learning the Finnish language. One of the forums openly invites
to discuss the pros and cons of joining Finland.   Finally, the situation with
Kaliningrad region, experiencing the inflow of German capital, is not that
simple. The complexity of containment of the region for Russia is that it is cut
off from the rest of the country. The enclave is surrounded by the EU, and its
citizens regularly travel to Europe - more often than to the "big" Russia.
German capital began to flow here long before Lithuania and Poland joined the
EU. Germany officially makes no claims to the former East Prussia. Yet, six
months ago Der Spiegel magazine published an article stating that in 1990 the
USSR wanted to return "Konigsberg" to Germany.  The publication wrote that the
proposal was contained in a secret telegram sent to the German embassy in Moscow
by Mr.  Batenin, one of the top Soviet generals at the time. The Germans
clarified that Mikhail Gorbachev had nothing to do with it and Batenin acted on
his own behalf.    The problem exists in the Southern Kuriles, Vyborg and
Kaliningrad, and Pechora region. In all cases, the neighbors live better, and
the level of corruption is by several orders of magnitude lower than in Russia.
Does Russia risk losing the border areas as a result of the referendums? How
dangerous is the statement of Lavrov? President of the Academy of Geopolitical
Issues, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, spoke about this in an interview with
"Pravda.Ru":  "Russia's referendum is likely to confirm that Southern Kuriles
belong to Russia. Lavrov's statement, however, is sad as it means that Russia
has changed its policy. Previously, we firmly stated that we would not give up
the island, and our officials visited there. Now we excite the unhealthy
interest of the Japanese to the claim. We must cut off the issue once and for
all and have no controversy in this regard.  We have something to say to Japan.
Soon they will be washed away into the sea. We need to talk about investments in
the Far East and cooperation in high technology industries, the establishment of
infrastructure there. And only then talk about a referendum. If we do not invest
in the regions we will lose them. And not only the Southern Kuriles, but the
entire Far East inhabited by the people of other nations.  No bans will help.
Russia, and not Finland, should develop industry, agriculture, social
infrastructure in the north-west Russia. We need a large project that would tie
Vyborg to Russia. We need the people of border areas to perceive Russian
culture, Russian science, to embroil in the Russian space. At the same time, we
must enact laws to toughen the rules of the foreign presence in the border
regions.  With regard to Kaliningrad, Germany is already engaged in creeping
expansion - calmly, but firmly and consistently. As for Russia, there were
federal programs for the development of the region, but the money was stolen.
Russian business does not go there, there is no state planning. We have opened
the doors to foreigners and the Germans are taking advantage of it. We will lose
Kaliningrad unless we undertake a comprehensive development plan for the area
and attach them to Russia via state business. Because Belarus is the closest to
the region geographically, the area must be tied to it as well. We cannot give
competitors a reason even to think about the claims against us. "

http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/31-01-2012/120375-russia_dispute_territ\
ory-0/#
------------------

Prospects Improve for Mixing Politics and Faith
By: Alexander Bratersky
Moscow Times, February 2, 2012

A Soviet-era dissident and a star of 1990s politics, Viktor Aksyuchits, made his
name as the founding father of the Christian Democratic Movement  an effort to
forge a potent alliance of religion and politics that collapsed when he landed
on the wrong side of the 1993 effort to oust Boris Yeltsin.
  The 62-year-old Aksyuchits and his brand of Christian party politics may now be
ready for a comeback, invigorated by the promise of easier registration rules
for new political parties that has surfaced in the wake of the recent wave of
anti-government protests.
  The newly charged political atmosphere has reached all the way to the highest
levels of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has been anxious to facilitate
contacts with various political groups and politicians from Aksyuchits to
protest movement leader Alexei Navalny.
  In January, the Orthodox Church broached the subject of its role in politics
when senior religious official Vsevolod Chaplin said on his blog that the church
is "positive" about forging a position and is seeking contact with all kinds of
groups that share its values.
  "In Russia, a Christian party is not only a possibility  it already exists. It
only needs to be legalized," Aksyuchits said during a recent round-table
discussion in Moscow, on the issue of creating religious-based parties.
  He was referring to the Party of the People's Majority  a new political force
he said is ready to register as an official party following a recent amendment
signed by President Dmitry Medvedev in December. The new rules, which go into
effect in 2013, will recognize parties that collect just 500 signatures compared
to the 50,000 required today.
  While current Russian law prohibits the creation of religious-based parties,
Chaplin  who organized the Moscow round table  said it can easily be
sidestepped.
  "Nothing prohibits creating an Orthodox or Christian party, as long as it is
not formally mentioned in the name," said Chaplin, who heads the church
department dealing with relations with the government.
  A veteran politician, Aksyuchits has followed that advice to the letter. The
program platform for his newly created  but not yet registered  Party of the
People's Majority states that it is based on Christian beliefs, but can include
nonbelievers who share its conservative positions.
  Experts say the establishment of religious-based parties can carry risks.
  "Moving in the direction of religious parties often can carry with it
nationalistic tones," said John Farina, a professor of religious studies at
George Mason University, via e-mail from the United States. "The danger is that
religion then becomes mainly a way to divide people rather than a means of
social capital."
  Sitting next to Aksyuchits at the round table, Chaplin stressed that while the
Orthodox Church remains the most powerful nonpolitical institution in the
country, it will continue to keep its distance from Christian political
organizations.
  But he admitted that he recently facilitated contacts with emerging political
leaders, such as Navalny, a leading figure in the protest movement, but who has
been criticized for his nationalist positions, particularly for his role in the
far-right Russian March rally in November.
  "I think it is wrong to describe him as some mad führer. He is a smart and
intelligent man," Chaplin said of Navalny.
  Nationalist politicians have looked to establish a relationship with the
Russian Orthodox Church dating back to the 1990s, but church officials have
avoided direct contacts with groups they have considered marginal.
  But it hasn't stopped some church officials from blessing radical nationalist
organizations privately. In the mid-1990s many nationalist politicians had ties
with late St. Petersburg Metropolitan Ioann who endorsed nationalist and
anti-Semitic views.
  Roman Lunkin, a religious expert with the Europe Institute, said the majority
of parties that would emerge supporting Christian values also pursue a
"conservative" traditionalist agenda.
  "They might proclaim opposition to the ruling authorities and bureaucracy but
will also resist westernization  a path Russian society is going toward," Lunkin
said.
  He added, however, that he thought it was wise of the church to encourage
public discussion, regarding the political participation of churchgoers.
  The idea of creating religious-based parties did not receive such a warm
response from representatives of Jewish and Islamic groups who took part in a
round table hosted late last week by RIA-Novosti.
  "I don't support the creation of a Jewish religious party. We don't need
another Bund," said Rabbi Zinovy Kogan, referring to the Jewish Socialist party,
which fought the tsarist government in the early 20th century.
  A deputy head of the Council of Russian Muftis, Farid Asadullin, was even more
resistant, calling the creation of such a party a "provocative step."
  Other Muslim leaders, notably outspoken Islamic figure Geidar Jemal, agreed,
saying Muslim groups are "struggling to create an Islamic party."
  Lunkin said that although no parties could universally represent all Muslims,
Christians or Jews, many such parties might emerge when party registration laws
are eased.
  In the end, he suspects the Russian Orthodox Church will work with different
Christian groups, rather than create its own or back any single party.
  "Most of our politicians proclaim themselves as Orthodox believers and Orthodox
believers are among those who protest and among those who support the
government," Lunkin said.
----

Russia's liberal-nationalist cocktail: elixir of life or toxic poison?
By: Nicu Popescu
www.opendemocracy.net, February 3, 2012

Young, liberal figures such as Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Milov are building
bridges between democratic and nationalist wings of the protest movement. Will
this marriage prove a mix that mobilises a nation against the Putin regime, or
will it taint the legitimacy of both sides in years to come, asks Nicu Popescu?
  The existence of divisions among Russia's democratic forces is proverbial. But
the same can be said of Russian nationalism. Nationalism is a movement that is
not only increasingly split between an imperial, expansionist and cosmopolitan
version, on the one hand, and an introvert, defensive and anti-immigrant one the
other, but also in the throes of mutation as it attracts moderates and democrats
who would previously have given it a wide berth.
  This presents different challenges for everyone. The Russian government fears
that a nationalist-democratic consolidation on an anti-Putinist platform would
make a much more formidable adversary than the 'official' opposition allowed in
parliament. Russian democrats also have their own dilemmas as their flirtation
with nationalism is on the verge of evolving into a marriage of convenience, a
combination that could produce either their elixir of life or a toxic poison.
  From imperialist to defensive nationalism
  Nationalism is like software that can run on different platforms - from Windows
to Android. As nationalism normally has little to say about economic or social
policies, it can easily merge easier with other left- or right-wing ideologies,
increasing exponentially the number of mutations to which it can be subject.
  In post-Soviet Russia virtually all political forces  from Putin to the
Communists - have flirted with nationalism. Despite various ideological
platforms, the unifying feature of Russian nationalists for most of the 20th
century, in its right-wing imperial and left-wing communist forms, was a drive
for expansion and a 'bigger Russia'. As Russia grew bigger, other ethnic groups
were welcome, but they were also expected to acquiesce to the 'elder brother' in
the short term, and assimilate in the long-term.
  One of Vladimir Putin's recent pre-election articles dedicated to the 'national
question' largely subscribes to this view, even though he laments the
'inadequate, aggressive, defiant and disrespectful' behaviour of some migrants.
But such imperialist nationalism was based on a strong confidence in Russia's
state capacity, power of territorial expansion and cultural attraction. However,
the growing realisation of Russia's structural problems  from demographic crisis
to bad governance under Putin, topped by the economic crisis  has led to some
structural shifts in Russian nationalism.
  An increasingly obvious trend in the last few years is for the 'old'
expansionist nationalism to rapidly lose ground to a new breed of isolationist,
introvert and defensive nationalism that is primarily anti-immigrant and often
anti-imperial. Such nationalism is more concerned with maintaining Russia's
'Russianness' than with territorial expansion. The key source of this defensive
nationalism is the toxic mix of high immigration into Russia coupled with a
demographic crisis. With over 12 million migrants, Russia is the second biggest
recipient of inward migration in the world after the US, though as a share of
migrants per total population Russia only ranks 55th in the world.
  From the nationalists' perspective Russia's demographic crisis is two-fold. One
aspect is the decline of Russia's population, with the treat of further decline
due to the higher numbers of old than young. But from the nationalists'
perspective, graver still is the fact that the fall in numbers of ethnic
Russians due to emigration, high mortality and low birth rates is faster than
the overall demographic decline, the pace of which has indeed slowed, partly due
to immigration (primarily from  Central Asia and the south Caucasus) and higher
population growth among some Russian minorities, particularly in the north
Caucasus. So the fear is not only about Russia's decreasing population, but even
more so about the fact that Russia is becoming less ethnically Russian.
  The instinctive response to fears of relative demographic decline of ethnic
Russians is a growing 'fortress Russia' syndrome. At its core, Russia's
defensive nationalism rests on a much-diminished belief in Russia's power to
expand and assimilate its periphery, particularly the culturally distant Muslim
populations of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The nationalist schism is clearly
visible at nationalist marches parts of the crowd shout 'there is no Russia
without Caucasus' whereas other parts shout 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' and
'Migrants today, Occupiers tomorrow'.
  The Democratic-Nationalist Mix
  Now Russian nationalism seems to give birth to a new permutation  a merger of
the defensive type of nationalism with elements of democratic and liberal
thought.
  Some in Russia hope that this kind of mix will appeal to many young, urban,
middle-class Russians who often see themselves as liberals, hold democratic
views, despise Putin's regime, and are western-leaning (though not uncritically
so) while on the other hand being increasingly anti-immigration.
  The new liberal-nationalist fusion gradually trickles down into the political
process, as some democrats start to move towards the adoption of nationalist
views, while at the same time some nationalists seem to have moved towards the
centre ground. Vladimir Milov, a prominent Russian liberal, decided to take the
bull by the horns by initiating a liberal-nationalist fusion that aims to
reclaim nationalism from Russia's extremist groups.
  The liberal-nationalist mix has not yet crystallised in a series of coherent
views and leaders, let alone organisations. But it is starting to take some
shape. A good example is Alexei Navalny, the emerging star of the Russian
opposition. He is a hugely popular anti-corruption campaigner, the most popular
blogger in Russia and widely seen as the anti-Putinists' best hope. His success
is built on three pillars: anti-corruption campaigning, pro-democracy activism,
and a pinch of moderate nationalism. He goes about these activities by a very
savvy mix of internet activism (blogging, crowd-sourcing, etc.) and offline
actions (minority shareholders activism, court actions, monitoring of public
tenders, writing formal complaints to public institutions forcing them to
respond, etc.). Now Moscow is buzzing with talk of Navalny as Russia's future
president.
  Navalny himself is a democrat. He also has a strong record of taking part in
democratic groups and movements in the last decade. He is also in favour of the
separation of powers, transparency and other worthy causes. His declared belief
is that 'the purpose of the state is to ensure comfortable and dignified
conditions for its citizens, and defend their individual and collective rights.
A nation-state means that Russia should follow the European path, ie build our
own nice, cosy, but strong and solid, little European house.' Yet he also
attends the 'Russian March', a notorious annual gathering of nationalists. Asked
whether he supports the nationalist slogan 'Russia for Russians', he responded
that he supports the slogan 'Russia for Russian citizens'  a slightly more
inclusive slogan, demonstrating a tolerance of Russia's ethnic minorities who
are citizens, yet one which is still distinctly nationalist.
  It is still unclear whether Navalny is a strong believer in a nationalist
agenda or whether his professed nationalism is primarily a calculated strategy.
Either way, the combination of democratic rhetoric with an anti-corruption
agenda and nationalist undertones gives him a strong base from which to bridge a
range of societal groups in Russia beyond most other potential leaders in Russia
today.
  Refreshing or toxic?
  It is too early to tell whether the nationalist-democratic cocktail will prove
a toxic liquid or the ticket to the future for the so far marginalised Russian
democrats. Either way, the nationalist-liberal rapprochement sparks tensions
within both camps. Some expansionist nationalists are fuming that the liberals
are trying to turn the nationalists into 'cannon fodder for a liberal revanche'.
Whereas the liberals, as Andreas Umland points out, fear that nationalists could
subvert pro-democracy movements.
  Putin apologists seize on this. Some of them attack the popular Navalny by
drawing parallels between him and Kerensky, the Russian burgeois revolutionary
leader who came to power after overthrowing the Tsar in February 1917, only to
be forced out by a ruthless communist coup led by Vladimir Lenin eight months
later. The parallel is supposed to suggest that nastier forces will steal
whatever democratic advances Russia might make once Putin is out.
  But it is also possible that Russian democrats could expand their influence and
ultimately help co-opt the potentially strong force of Russian nationalism,
channeling it into a more democratic and pluralist direction. Either way,
Russian liberals are now engaged not only in a contest with Putin's system, but
also in a tense, but irresistible tango with Russian nationalism.
-----

Kremlin Resorts to Anti-Americanism
By Alan Cullison
The Wall Street Journal, 6 Febr. 2012

MOSCOW-The Kremlin is employing a familiar tool-anti-Americanism-to defuse
support for opposition leaders, casting them as puppets of the U.S.'s CIA and
State Department, as protesters calling for free elections over the weekend were
undaunted by sub-zero cold.  The question now, though, is whether the tactic
could fall flat among the millions of Russians who no longer rely on
state-controlled television for their news, and instead use the Internet. 
Though Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is expected to win in a tightly
orchestrated vote March 4, a greater uncertainty is how the Kremlin will handle
the aftermath, when it is likely to face allegations of vote tampering and
protests that the contest was rigged from the outset.  The Kremlin's
anti-American line-proffered by high officials and television programming beamed
over state-run channels-could daunt some of the criticism, Kremlin watchers say.
But it will hobble the avowed "reset" in relations between the Washington and
Moscow, which appeared to be in trouble this weekend as Russia joined China in
vetoing a resolution over the weekend calling for President Bashar al-Assad to
step aside.  Russia said it cast the veto because the U.N. resolution was
biased, illegal and would promote "regime change." U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton called the vote a "travesty" and said that it wasn't possible to
work constructively with Russia ahead of the vote. "I thought that there might
be some ways to bridge, even at this last moment, a few of the concerns that the
Russians had," she said. "That has not been possible."  A dose of hostility to
the U.S. has always been a feature of Kremlin rhetoric under Mr. Putin, who rode
to power on a promise to restore Russia's greatness and reputation abroad. But
Kremlin watchers say that a shriller tone in recent days could spell rockier
relations for as long as he faces political uncertainty.  Last week Russia's
main federal channel aired a documentary film, "A Bridge Over the Abyss," about
Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, stressing Mr. Putin's role in saving
the country from ruin, and featured a montage of footage showing him skiing
deftly down a mountain as if before an avalanche, outracing it.  The film cast
the U.S. and the West as a hindrance to Russia's revival. "It seems to me our
[foreign] partners don't want allies, they want vassals," said Mr. Putin in an
interview he granted to filmmakers. "They want to direct things, but Russia
doesn't work that way."  Mr. Putin's critics have meanwhile been savaged as
stooges of Washington. A separate documentary titled "Foreigners Will Help Them"
aired last week on another channel, featuring secret audio and video tapes of
Russia's opposition leaders, showing them in meetings in Moscow and Washington,
where they allegedly accepted instruction from U.S. officials.  The program
repeated allegations that U.S. ambassador Michael McFaul, a Stanford University
professor and longtime Russia specialist, had been dispatched to Russia last
month with a mission to weaken the country and discredit Mr. Putin. Soon after
his arrival, opposition members filed into the embassy to meet him "as if going
to work," the program alleged.  Analysts say the media campaign highlights Mr.
Putin's own trepidation over the presidential poll. The Kremlin holds tight
control over television and even over the candidates in the coming presidential
vote, since bureaucratic hurdles kept many from competing. But Mr. Putin
conceded last week that a second round of voting is possible, warning that it
would lead to "continued struggle and destabilization of the political
situation."  The Kremlin's nervousness has been heightened by Saturday's street
protests, when tens of thousands of Russians braved frigid temperatures to
protest both for and against the Kremlin.  Despite temperatures hovering around
zero degrees Fahrenheit, opposition groups turned out in the pale winter
sunshine to march in downtown Moscow against election fraud and against Mr.
Putin's planned return to the presidency next month.  Opposition organizers say
Saturday's turnout, at 120,000, was larger than the two previous anti-Kremlin
demonstrations held in the wake of the Dec. 4 parliamentary elections, which
were marred by allegations of widespread fraud. Police said 36,000 attended the
opposition meeting, but they have in the past understated the size of such
opposition rallies.  The anti-Kremlin protests, organized largely over the
Internet and mobilizing the previously apolitical middle class, have become the
largest political challenge to Mr. Putin in his 12 years in power.  But Saturday
also saw the largest pro-Putin demonstration in recent months, as thousands of
people gathered in a park in western Moscow to hear speakers denounce the
opposition protesters across town as "lackeys of America" seeking to sow
revolution and weaken Russia. Mr. Putin said as many as 190,000 turned out for
the pro-Kremlin rally, though witnesses say the actual number was far below
that.  As the vote approaches, Kremlin officials are sounding warnings that the
U.S. is feeding the protest movement in Russia by financing groups alleging vote
fraud, and funneling their reports onto Internet sites. A spokesman for Russia's
top investigative body, the Investigative Committee, said this weekend that
videotapes of alleged ballot stuffing during parliamentary elections in December
appear to be faked.  The spokesman, Vladimir Markin, noted that the videos were
distributed by servers in California, and said an investigation is under way. 
Russia's former ambassador to NATO wrote in the daily newspaper Izvestia last
week that Russia today faces dangers similar to those during the Russian
Revolution and World War II, when national leaders appealed to Russian
nationalism.  "Putin is the only leader left in Europe who has not been run over
by a steamroller of American hegemony," wrote Dmitry Rogozin, now Mr. Putin's
deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry.  Russia said it was
defending a key principle of international law-respect for state sovereignty-in
its veto of the Syrian resolution over the weekend. The Kremlin has long accused
the U.S. of using its promotion of democracy and human rights as a cloak for its
real interests as it topples governments in the former Soviet Union and-more
lately-in the Arab world so that it can install more friendly rulers.  That has
made Syria a domestic political issue for Mr. Putin, and a test of whether he
can appear strong and stand up to the U.S. before presidential elections March
4, said Nikolai Zlobin, director of the Russia and Eurasia Project at the World
Security Institute in Washington.  "If there were not elections in a month, then
I think that the Russian position would be different," he said. "Right now he
needs some help from the military industrial complex, some weapons sales, he
wants their votes."  Although many Russians may say they don't believe the state
television reports, they are nonetheless influential, said Vladimir Pozner, who
early in his television career became famous for explaining views of the Soviet
Union during the Cold War.  "Blaming things on other people such as the U.S. and
looking for the enemy outside has always been something that governments tend to
do in unpleasant situations," he said, adding that "it could be quite
effective."
-----------------------

Whispering campaign against anti-Putin lawyer Alexei Navalny continues among
some Voice of America Russian Service staffers
By BBGWatcher
BBG Forum, 07 February 2012

In their private conversations, some staffers in the Voice of America Russian
Service are calling an anti-corruption Russian lawyer and opposition leader
Alexei Navalny a liar and repeat these accusations, also in private, to top VOA
managers who in turn report them to members of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, sources tell BBG Watch. They are commenting on an alleged interview
with Navalny, posted and then removed from the VOA Russian Service website.
Navalny said that he had never given this interview to VOA and called it a 100%
fabrication.
Other VOA Russian Service staffers had doubts about the authenticity of the
interview, but it is not known whether they voiced them to anyone. Morale among
VOA employees is extremely low and many are afraid to voice their objections to
management decisions. Many experienced VOA Russian Service editors were retired
or pushed out and replaced by recent arrivals from Russia hired as contractors.
Some experienced journalists quit in disgust when their warnings that the
program content has a pro-Kremlin bias were ignored by the management.
On January 31, the VOA Russian Service posted a fake text interview with
Navalny, apparently obtained in an exchange of emails with someone in Russia.
They had to remove it the next day and apologize to Navalny, but some members of
the Service responsible for putting the fake interview online are now engaged in
a whispering campaign calling Navalny a liar. They accuse him in private
conversations of giving the interview and then changing his mind. These claims
are being repeated in private by top VOA managers to the Broadcasting Board of
Governors members. This suggests that they have no intention of reforming the
Russian Service and have not learned any lessons from their mistakes. Something
needs to be done.
Russian oppositionist Navalny says in his Twitter account that Voice of America
interview with him is 100 percent fake, Voice of America went nuts, and all
people in VOA Russian Service should be let go.
Alexei Navalny not only said that the alleged interview was "100% fake, he also
said that the Voice of America "has gone nuts" and that everyone in the Russian
Service should be let go. The person whom some members of the VOA Russian
Service now accuse in private of lying has been risking his freedom and even
life as every outspoken anti-Putin journalist and opposition leader in Russia
does.
Alexei Navalny is not a coward or someone afraid of telling the truth, and
accusing him of such is truly shameful. In April 2011, a VOA English Service
correspondent in Moscow James Brooke reported Navalny as saying: "If everyone
was scared, we would have a hard time living." Some of the VOA Russian Service
staffers are saying in effect that Navalny is too scared to admit that he had
given them an interview. It is well known that after his recent detention,
Navalny was avoiding media interviews and that he was a target of disinformation
campaigns and postings of fake photos of him by Kremlin supporters.
Alexei Navalny, whom some of VOA Russian staffers who recently came from Russia
and at least one of whom worked for the pro-Putin media before being hired by
the BBG, now accuse in private of being dishonest, has given his wife a list of
telephone numbers to call, just in case he disappears.
We think that these whispering accusations against Navalny are ludicrous and
outrageous, especially since they come from some of the Voice of America Russian
Service contract employees being paid by US taxpayers to transmit uncensored,
accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news to Russia. According to Navalny, who
is also a highly popular blogger in Russia, the Voice of America is harming him
and the pro-democratic opposition. This view is also shared by another highly
respected Russian journalist, also fighting Putin's censorship in Russia.
We need to get this story out to media and members of Congress. US taxpayers are
paying for Voice of America programs that harm the US and the anti-Putin
opposition in Russia. An independent journalist in Russia concluded in early
2011 that VOA Russian news have a pro-Kremlin, pro-Putin bias and downplay human
rights issues. This study was ordered, paid for by American taxpayers and
ignored by the BBG. BBG executives may not have even shared the results of this
study with BBG members and new Voice of America director David Ensor.  See: 
http://www.usgbroadcasts.com/bbgwatch/2012/02/07/voice-of-america-undermines-ant\
i-putin-opposition-at-us-taxpayers-expense/
We at BBG Watch urge everybody who cares about the Voice of America, about how
US taxpayers money is spent, about the vast majority of capable VOA journalists
who want to do their job right, and about Alexei Navalny and other leaders and
members of the pro-democratic opposition in Russia and elsewhere to call members
of Congress and media representatives and urge them to investigate and report on
the mismanagement at the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the upper
management of the Voice of America.
We want to point out that the Voice of America English news website failed to
report on the fake interview story.

http://www.usgbroadcasts.com/bbgwatch/2012/02/07/whispering-campaign-against-ant\
i-putin-lawyer-alexei-navalny-continues-among-some-voice-of-america-russian-serv\
ice-staffers/
-------------------------

Anti-Americanism in Russia
By: Fyodor Lukyanov
RIA Novosti, February 9, 2012

There has been an uptick in anti-American sentiment in the Russian blogosphere
recently. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that the failure of the
Phobos-Grunt mission  far from the only Russian space mishap in recent years 
could have been caused by emissions from an American radar station. The response
was powerful  we knew they were to blame! This was not the cause, but try
convincing anti-American Russians of that.
   Washington should cherish Russian anti-Americanism, as Russia is probably the
last important country in the world to sincerely believe in America's
omnipotence. Everyone else is talking about the end of the unipolar world,
waning U.S. influence, and how the United States must restrain its ambition.
  However, Russia is not interested in the facts. On the Russian internet and in
other public domains, Americans are behind everything. If Europe is in debt
crisis, America is to blame for protecting the dollar from the euro, trying to
destroy the rival currency. Rallies for honest elections in Russia are explained
as a U.S. conspiracy to launch a color revolution and establish a loyal regime
in Russia. Even abnormally hot weather in Moscow is blamed on America (such
claims appeared in the tabloids in the summer of 2010). Anti-American sentiment
was particularly pronounced a year ago as the Arab Spring unfolded in the Middle
East. About two-thirds of guests on Russian TV talk shows agreed that changes in
the region were definitely engineered by Washington. Not all of them could
explain why Washington was doing this, but you can always invent arguments to
support your cause.
  Anti-American sentiment is widespread in the world. It would be strange for a
leading world power, assured of its own moral supremacy and willing to use force
to protect its interests, not to encounter resentment and condemnation, even if
it is simultaneously admired for its many and diverse achievements and many of
its critics willingly go to live, study and work in the United States.
  Russia is not the most anti-American country. According to a survey conducted
by the Pew Research Center in 2009, more people have a favorable view of the
United States in Russia (44%) than in Turkey (14%), Pakistan (16%), Jordan
(25%), Egypt (27%) and Argentina (38%), even though these countries are either
nominally U.S. allies or close partners.
  Anti-American sentiment in Russia is not particularly virulent either. It does
not compare with the genuine, deep-seated anti-Americanism of left-wing
intellectuals in France. Their renunciation of the American way of life and the
American style of conduct is rooted in their belief that their culture is
superior, whereas in Russia anti-Americanism is rooted in an inferiority complex
borne of its defeat in the Cold War.
  The end of the global confrontation essentially destroyed Russia's
international stature. The United States gained almost everything that the
Soviet Union lost. Russian public and political consciousness is still unable to
process this, although the Soviet Union would have behaved in the same way if it
had won.
  The Russian attitude to America is a complicated mixture. It is partly cynical 
disbelief that a country can be guided by anything but mercantile
considerations. There is also the messianic inertia  both the Russians and the
Americans have always believed in the special mission of their nation, although
now it is hard to understand what is left of it. The internal trauma from the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is intertwined with a subconscious desire
to be like America and a simultaneous realization of the impossibility of
reaching this goal.
  To be fair, American policy perplexes even supporters of the United States.
America shocks the world with its deep conviction that as "the beacon of
freedom" it can sit in judgment of the rest of the world and make them do the
right thing, even by force. Meanwhile, American policy is often dogmatic, not
free of mistakes and certainly not morally beyond reproach. There is nothing
beyond reproach in international relations, but in the case of the United
States, the gap between words and deeds is sometimes shocking. Any criticism of
U.S. policy in Russia is attributed to persistent anti-Americanism, although
Washington gives sufficient grounds for justified criticism.
  We should replace our anti-Americanism not with love for America (which
sometimes develops into a bizarre form of worship in this country) but a calm,
rational and detached attitude to the United States  an interesting, intricate
and equally contradictory country   based on an understanding that the interests
of two enormous and completely different countries cannot coincide. Strategic
competition is a normal and natural thing. The United States is a powerful
country that plays the leading role in the world (at least for the time being)
and seeks dominance over its partners. However demonization of America, morbid
obsession with America, a compulsion to rebuff every remark by some ageing
senator who is still stuck in the Cold War merely reflect our phobias and
complexes rooted in Russian's fractured political consciousness.
  Several years ago, two American scholars, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman,
published an article about Russia entitled "A Normal Country" that caused an
uproar. They set out to prove that for all the unique features of post-Soviet
Russia, developments in Russia remain within the bounds of predictability and
that it should be approached without illusions or fatalism. It is time for a
Russian to write an article by the same name about America. It would help free
us from our paranoia and unjustified expectations of the United States.
-----

The Dinosaur
By: Eugene Ivanov
The Ivanov Report, http://theivanovreport.com, February 9, 2012

There is a trend among Russia watchers to ridicule the Liberal Democratic Party
of Russia (LDPR) and its eccentric leader, the dinosaur of Russian politics
Vladimir Zhirinovsky.  Famous for his larger-than-life personality, skillful
showmanship and occasional fistfights with fellow Duma deputies, Zhirinovsky is
often caricatured as a "clown" (which, incidentally, doesn't prevent him from
coming out of public polls as one of the most popular Russian politicians).  Yet
those who have taken the time to study Zhirinovsky's positions on issues would
be surprised to see that some important decisions of Vladimir Putin's 2000-2008
presidencies may have had their origin in the LDPR program documents.
  Recently, it was Putin himself who acknowledged Zhirinovsky's "sensible ideas."
During a public appearance, Putin recalled that following the 2000 decision to
divide Russia into seven federal districts headed by plenipotentiary
representatives, Zhirinovsky came to him to claim being the author of the
arrangement.  Indeed, one of the LDPR's stated strategic goals has always been
to transform Russia from an "amorphous" federation into a strong unitary state. 
LDPR asserted that the current national-territorial principle of state formation
with ethnic-based "national" republics and districts  threatens Russia's
integrity because of the danger of separatism.  To counter this threat, LDPR has
long advocated coming back to the structure of pre-revolutionary Russia  with
its division into 25-30 completely equal in their status territories
("guberniya").  Composed of about 5 million residents each, these territories
should be formed based strictly on geographic and economic considerations and
have elected legislative assemblies, but no constitutions of their own.  The
head of guberniya, governor, should be appointed by president.  It's easy to see
that by encompassing "traditional" regions  regardless of their status  and
creating a supra-regional level of authority, Putin's federal districts clearly
followed the territorial principle of state formation.  Furthermore, in 2004,
Putin scrapped popular elections of regional governors.
  Putin called the similarities between his scheme and the LDPR's proposals
"coincidental."  If so, it raises an interesting point: having become president,
Putin apparently didn't bother to take a look at the program documents of
political parties represented in the Duma.
  As a matter of fact, the list of "coincidences" is a bit longer.  In order to
make the structure of federal authorities fit the territorial principle of state
formation, LDPR called for a single-chamber Duma elected strictly by political
party lists.  The upper chamber of the parliament, the Federation Council, was
to be dissolved and replaced with the State Council.  In 2004, Putin eliminated
single-mandate electoral districts and introduced the strictly proportional,
party list, system of Duma elections.  Moreover, the creation, in 2000, of the
"advisory" State Council  composed of president and regional governors  have
certainly undermined the authority of the still existing Federation Council.
  There is nothing "coincidental" in the way Putin and Zhirinovsky view Russia's
political structure.  Both are devout statists and consider strong federal
authority as the major prerequisite for preserving the territorial integrity of
the country.  At the same time, the similarity of their positions with regards
to Russia's state formation could serve as a response to those who routinely
criticize Zhirinovsky for being too supportive of Putin.  Why would Zhirinovsky
oppose him if Putin has implemented the most important positions of the LDPR
party program?
  Zhirinovsky is an experienced presidential candidate: he ran in 1991, 1996,
2000, and 2008.  This presidential election is his fifth and likely the last. 
On Feb.1, the Izvestia daily published Zhirinovsky's program article, "Where
Russia should go."  With all due respect to other candidates' published
manifestos, this piece is the only one you can read without risking to fall
asleep.
  Zhirinovsky begins with his pet idea to replace the "non-Russian" word
"president" with something native: or .  He then proceeds to another pet idea of
his: to transform Russia into parliamentary republic with 5-7 political parties
represented in the Duma.  The Duma should form government and choose the head of
state, president, for a single 5-year term.
  It's almost a common place to call Zhirinovsky "ultra-nationalists;" yet his
article reveals not much "nationalist" and definitely nothing "ultra." 
Zhirinovsky repeats his mantra of the "oppressed Russian people" and  referring
to the fact that ethnic Russians constitute about 80% of the Russian population 
calls for pronouncing Russians the "state-forming nation."  He also reiterates
his well-known opposition to illegal immigration.  This is hardly more
"nationalistic" than Putin's proposal to regulate internal migration from the
North Caucasus region.  (In the United States, Mitt Romney, the leading
Republican presidential candidate, calls for the "self-deportation" of illegal
immigrants and is still considered a "moderate Republican.")
  The rest of the piece is a classic pre-election populism: drug and alcohol
abuse, declining standards of education, pitiful state of the armed forces, and 
Zhirinovsky's signature topic  hard life conditions for Russian women, "the best
and most beautiful in the world."
  In contrast to his perennial rival, the head of the Communist Party Gennady
Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky is cautiously supportive of the anti-Putin protests on
Bolotnay Square and Sakharov Prospect, saying that the Russian society is tired
of "being constantly lied" to by the authorities.
  Zhirinovsky is almost 66 and he looks old and exhausted.  It seems that the
only thing that has driven him in the past few years was his desire to
"transfer" LDPR to his son, Igor Lebedev, the head of the LDPR faction in the
Duma.  Lebedev, who's 40, is a competent and experienced parliamentarian; yet he
completely lacks his father's charisma and showmanship.  With Zhirinovsky having
been the face, soul and the mouth of LDPR for so long, it'll be extremely
difficult, if possible at all, for Lebedev to keep the party together.  Rather,
with Zhirinovsky gone, his party's ideas will be rapidly appropriated by other
political forces.  And so will be the LDPR electorate.
----

Frozen Conflicts Seen as Russia's Door into "Euro-Atlantic Security Community"
By: Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 28 February 9, 2012

The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), a high-profile group of Western
and Russian authors, proposes Western accommodation with the existing situation
in the four post-Soviet conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Karabakh). EASI has presented a study with policy recommendations, "Historical
Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts," to NATO at its annual Munich
conference on February 3-4. A companion study by the same group, "Toward a
Euro-Atlantic Security Community," contains some of the same recommendations
about those four frozen conflicts under the "human security" rubric. Both
documents are being submitted for consideration at NATO's summit in Chicago in
May (EASI Working Group: "Historical Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts"
and "Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community," www.carnegieendowment.org). 
Since NATO recuses itself from peacekeeping or crisis-management in the
post-Soviet conflicts, EASI's use of NATO as a launch pad for these
recommendations may seem surprising. EASI does not mention NATO at all in
connection with these "protracted" conflicts (it makes a few passing references
to NATO in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s). Clearly, EASI's recommendations
do not address NATO as an alliance. The priority addressees are the United
States and individual NATO member countries in the dual capacity of most of them
as European Union members. It is the US and EU, not NATO, who are being asked to
cooperate with Russia in conserving the existing situation on the ground in
those conflicts.  These recommendations form part of EASI's grand design for a
"Euro-Atlantic security community" ("security community in the wider
Euro-Atlantic region") in which Russia would be a leading participant alongside
the EU and US. The NATO alliance goes practically unmentioned, and the OSCE
would be employed as platform for some transactions among the main players. If
taken at face value, this is a version of "Euro-Atlanticism" with Russia in a
decision maker's role and without an explicit role for NATO.  EASI regards the
"regional disputes in the area of the former Soviet Union" as a "serious
obstacle to creating a security community in the larger Euro-Atlantic region,"
"threaten[ing] to undermine efforts to build Euro-Atlantic cooperation"
(Euro-Atlantic meaning the West and Russia in this innovative terminology). EASI
calls for circumventing that obstacle: partly through Western acceptance of
Russian interpretations of the conflicts, and partly by conceding a lead role to
Russia (implicitly or explicitly) in handling these conflicts. This concession
starts from the composition of the authors' group, where the Russian government
is heavily represented while the Georgian, Moldovan, or Azerbaijani governments
are not represented, and their views are ignored. The policy recommendations are
far from detailed; instead, EASI uses the broad brush while reserving many of
the specifics for follow-up discussion. The recommendations begin at the level
of definitions and semantics. Russia is never identified as a party to the
conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. Despite Russia's military interventions and
presence within those countries, EASI in line with Russia's view portrays those
conflicts as involving only local "parties" (Abkhazia and South Ossetia versus
Georgia; and even the "Transnistrians" [sic] versus Moldovans). EASI claims that
"the post-Soviet conflict zones [Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Karabakh] are zones of undetermined sovereignty," but this contradicts the
international consensus, which recognizes Moldova's, Georgia's, and Azerbaijan's
sovereignty in those territories.  EASI uses the term "borders" referring to the
Russian-drawn lines that separate Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of
Georgia. It makes no reference to Georgia's internationally recognized
territorial integrity, implicitly endorsing Russia's position against that of
the US, EU, and NATO on these issues. EASI uses the awkward term "Georgia
conflicts" to avoid implicating Russia as a party to the conflict.  The authors
identify the defunct Soviet Union, rather than Russia, as responsible for these
conflicts. EASI attributes them to "the legacy of the failure of the Soviet
system to manage disputes between autonomous areas and Union republics'
capitals." No mention is made of Russia underwriting the secessions militarily,
economically and politically during the intervening 20 years.  EASI takes no
position on how, when, or indeed whether to resolve these conflicts in ways that
would change the military and political situation on the ground. Instead,
prevention of clashes and "making life more secure and more bearable for the
people most directly affected by the conflicts should be the top priority." This
approach, at least, seems consistent with established Western policies,
emphasizing those worthwhile but minimalist goals, while de-prioritizing the
resolution of the conflicts. This is how the conflicts became "protracted," and
the region turned unnecessarily into an insecure "grey zone."  However, EASI
proposes an entirely new setup for political negotiations, dubbed a Joint
Stewardship by the EU, Russia, and the US (in that order). This setup would
handle security issues in Eurasia, with a corresponding Plan yet to be drafted,
and using the OSCE as a possible implementing mechanism (see accompanying
article).  On the whole, the recommendations emphasize minimal tinkering with
those conflicts, in an open-ended process over time, rather than seriously
attempt to resolve the conflicts. Conceding essential principles to Russia at
the expense of international law, EASI renders the political solutions even more
difficult than they already are. And it describes the proposed political
negotiations as a means toward another end: a reordered "Euro-Atlantic Security
Community" with Russia as one of the main decision-making centers.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38989&cHash=b78\
7b59eb321eeae0947303b26048790
----------------------

The Russia We Will Never Lose. Fighting Imaginary Separatism Is an Extremely
Costly Undertaking
By: Vadim Dubnov
Gazeta.ru, February 10, 2012

The danger of the country's collapse, with which the champions of the vertical
chain of command like to frighten the people in Russia, does not actually exist.
It is much more comfortable for members of the local elite -- in the oblasts and
in the republics -- to live on their cut of the funds doled out by the center
than to develop their regions independently.
  The history of the dramatic struggle against separatism runs through the entire
career of the main presidential candidate. The integrity the country won in
battle opened up new paths to greatness, and within the framework of all the
familiar and vague statements we can only be amazed by the insight with which
Aleksandr Dugin, the ideologist of the neo-Eurasian movement, firmly and
completely repudiated this theory: Russia can be either great or nothing at all.
This is not a mere declaration. This explains everything.
  A great state has to be governed in a special way, after all. Times have
changed, territorial acquisitions are no longer needed, and the very concept of
the state has lost some of its earlier meaning.
  The empire no longer exists -- it has not existed for at least the last 20
years. The problem of greatness has not changed, however, in the last century:
The remaining territory, on which the sun still never sets, still has to be kept
under strict control because territories have to mature before they can reach
the point of genuine federalism, of model states, lands, or provinces, just as
democracy requires a certain level of maturity.
  In the great model, governmental authority cannot simply be spread throughout
the territory. The leader of a great country who cannot tell the governor which
color he must paint his gubernatorial oblast committee building is not a leader
at all. Anyone who dares to say, even in jest, that the regions can take as much
sovereignty as they can digest will be disdained by his descendants. The next in
line will not make the same mistake. A great country must be governed by someone
with great authority, and this must be remembered by anyone wishing to govern
for a long time.
  And it is true that the only alternative to this greatness is the Russia that
is "nothing at all." This "nothing at all" does not mean it is a utopia or a
nonexistent place. It is not a country depending on nothing more than the price
of oil by virtue of its size. This country does not belong in the vast expanses
between Smolensk and Nakhodka because anyone overthrowing one great regime has
to proclaim another one, and he has to do it with enthusiasm. Governmental
authority is not shared in a great country, and if it is shared, it is not
shared for long -- only until the sharing regime is overthrown. Furthermore, the
similarity of the great country's hospitals to military field hospitals is also
due to the difficulties of the struggle for greatness. No one can cope with the
greatness of the vast expanses accumulated by ancestors. The burden of this
greatness can only be escaped by getting rid of these expanses. It is either the
vertical chain of command or nothing. That is what Dugin said.
  Does this sound absurd? Then why are we so seriously frightened by the threat
of the dismantling of Russia and what was the purpose of the battles waged by
the man who will be our president less than a month from now? This would mean
the danger did exist, but so did a means of escaping it, and he deprived us of
it! How would this disaster have taken place, and along which lines -- oblasts,
federal districts, oil fields and offshore deposits -- would the great country
have been divided?
  Setting aside the dangers of the careless handling of the nuclear arsenal, we
can look at the positive side of the matter. Skeptics would say that there are
dangers of a different type. Is it not possible, for example, that some oblast
might experience the same upheavals that Belarus, for example, experienced after
the breakup of the USSR? It is possible. But in the first place, it could not
possi bly be worse. In the second place, even the depressing example of Belarus
teaches us, among other things, that completely European political standards can
grow to maturity even under the most extreme form of oppression, and in contrast
to its great neighbor, little Belarus at least is not doomed to reproduce the
present regime.
  Regardless of the type of regime that might be established in Ulyanovsk Oblast,
for example, it will not try to convince its citizens that murrain is convenient
for those who do not want the oblast to get up off its knees, or for those who
did not steal the budget transfer meant for the oblast in Moscow. This alone
would do much to promote the restoration of moral standards and the transparency
of the budget-kickback process. And it would be interesting to watch the oblast
realize its new place in the world if its financial system were to depend on the
EBRD instead of an official in the Ministry of Finance.
  In addition to everything else, this disintegration could cheer up those who
are so concerned about the ideals of Eurasian integration. The disunited would
want a new process of convergence quite soon. Furthermore, this interest could
be expressed even by those who were not part of the united entity before, as in
the Continental Hockey League. It is true that this convergence probably will
occur without any consideration for the opinions of today's integrators, but the
desired formula for genuine federalization could be deduced automatically.
  This time, however, it would happen without integrity, greatness, and
separatism.
  In general, the idea that the breakup of the country would be preferable to the
great vertical chain of command might not sound like good news to some. There is
worse news, however: This breakup cannot happen. The reason is not that the
prime minister conquered the hydra of separatism. It cannot happen for the same
reasons that make this breakup sound preferable.
  In fact, all of the answers to all of these questions were evident back in the
days when checkpoints were set up on the borders of each federation component
and an extra kilogram of butter could not be taken across one of these borders
without paying a small bribe, which essentially performed the functions of
normal customs duties. This was quite indicative: Borders and customs duties
already existed, but budget transfers continued to be distributed.
  This was followed by the free-spirited experiments with the Urals Republic, and
people in Vladivostok wanted to restore the Far Eastern Republic. After that
there was Chechnya. And then there was a war. But there was no separatism and,
consequently, there was no heroic struggle against it. This could not have taken
place.
  An empire presupposes a special form of relations between the elite and the
unfortunate conquered peoples. But only the most naive advocates of freedom can
believe that the vertical chain of command is grounded in fear and oppression.
An empire probably ceases to be an empire precisely at the time that the elite
can be bought with equal ease in the original territory and the newer conquered
lands. Does anyone seriously believe that the Kremlin overseers base their
relations with their Dagestani colleagues on fundamentally different
considerations from the ones lying at the basis of their relations with the
leadership of Krasnodar Kray, for example? The existence of federal programs
influences the bottom line, of course. The existence of an armed underground
movement has a highly favorable effect on mutual pragmatism, and the existence
of a national liberation movement is like a budgetary Ali Baba's cave. All of
this, however, is generically united, just as the country is.
  The more people there are that truly believe in the ideological component, the
higher the stakes can be raised -- in the Urals and in Tatarstan. Furthermore,
the stakes have to be raised because people in the Kremlin also know, after all,
that someone has to take responsibility for frozen pipes and e mpty granaries
now that no one can be asked for a subsidy, a federal targeted program, or even
a preferential loan. What is the reason for all of these tribulations if
everything is working well, if the vertical chain of command has been perfected,
and even if something happens to it, experience has shown that the local elite
easily can be bought by any conqueror?
  When the empire with its party-vetted officials became a federation with
bureaucrats, it only grew stronger. So the main candidate is right to say: Don't
hold your breath.
  We have to wonder, however, whom he is addressing when he says this.
----

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Should Russia Be a National Russian State?
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Russia Profile 02/10/2012

Contributors: Vladimir Belaeff, Ethan Burger, Dick Krickus, Alexandre Strokanov
Russian presidential candidate and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published a
longwinded piece in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Russia's "nationality question."
Should Russia become a "Russian national state?" What could this mean in
practical terms? Is it the same as "Russia for the Russians," or could it be a
civic concept not unlike the notion of an "American nation" with its ethnic,
racial and religious diversity serving as a source of strength, rather than
weakness?
Putin seeks a middle ground between two incompatible positions - a call for the
recognition of the primacy of ethnic Russians, with demands for ethnic
minorities to respect the Russian "cultural code" and limits on non-Russian
immigration, and his harsh criticism of the central demand of the Russian
nationalists to establish a "Russian national state," where a national identity
would be defined as Russian with ethnic minorities having to surrender their
national and cultural identities for the sake of a Russian Orthodox
Christianity.
Putin argues that the call for a Russian national state would lead to the
breakup of the Russian Federation, just as the call for Russia's independence
from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s led to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. Instead, Putin promotes the concept of Russia as a multi-ethnic
civilization, where Russians are the "state forming ethnic group" but
non-Russians are free to pursue and cultivate their ethnic and religious
identities.
Human rights activists criticized Putin's call for a special role for ethnic
Russians as a manifestation of nationalism. For the real Russian nationalists,
Putin's position is too soft and fudgy, and they criticize him for not defending
the interests of ethnic Russians sufficiently.
A week after Putin published his piece, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, a
well-known leader of moderate Russian nationalists, published an op-ed in
Izvestia, in which he lauds Putin for recognizing the special role of ethnic
Russians and compares him to Stalin, who, during World War II, ditched the
communist internationalist dogma and played to the ethnic Russian sentiment to
rally the nation against the Nazi invasion. In a language unheard of since the
Stalinist purges against "enemies of the people," Rogozin brands opposition
figures as "traitors" and liberals in the government as "collaborators." Rogozin
clearly advocates "a Russian state" where ethnic Russians enjoy a privileged
status against the minorities.
The concept of the Russian national state has also been promoted by a popular
blogger and one of the leaders of the anti-Putin opposition movement, Alexei
Navalny, who sees it in civic, not ethnic, terms as a country where a Russian is
defined as someone who speaks Russian, observes the Russian laws and cultural
norms and wants this country to prosper, irrespective of his or her race,
ethnicity or religion. Putin distorts Navalny's concept into a racist,
nationalist plan, and seeks to position himself as the defender of Russia's
cultural diversity.
Should Russia become a "Russian national state?" What could this mean in
practical terms? Is it the same as "Russia for the Russians," or could it be a
civic concept not unlike the notion of an "American nation" with its ethnic,
racial and religious diversity serving as a source of strength, rather than
weakness? Whose concept of the Russian state is more conducive to Russia's
economic and social development - Putin's "multi-ethnic civilization," Rogozin's
"Russia for the Russians" or Navalny's "Russia as a civic nation?"
--Ethan S. Burger, Senior Lecturer, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention,
Faculty of Law, Innovation Campus, University of Wollongong, Australia
Most people defy (and often resent) classification by national, ethnic, or
religious group. Russia is replete with persons of mixed (and indeterminate)
origin.
The unofficial results of the 2010 Russian census indicate that roughly 80
percent of the approximately 142 million respondents indicated they were
"Russian" by nationality. I find this figure suspicious, since most people know
very little about their great-grandparents, who are unlikely to be uniform in
the ways demographers typically label people (or people label themselves).
According to Daisy Sindelar, the remaining approximately 20 percent of census
respondents selected one of the other 1,800 plus choices. She notes that "[i]n
additions to such simple, one-word appellations, there are also a dizzying
number of variations on a theme, for example, Adygs, Adygs who speak
Kabardinian, and Adygs who speak any language other than Kabardinian,
Circassian, or Shapsug." For those decided to avoid being pigeonholed, the list
also offers fanciful options such as "man of the world," "subbotnik," "pharaoh"
and the ethnically imprecise but increasingly popular "Siberian" (officials have
stressed that citizens have the right to choose whatever national designation
they prefer on their census form, or to choose none at all).
Article 26 of the Russian Constitutions states: each has the right to determine
and indicate [his] national [group]. No one may be forced to determine and
indicate [his] national [group]. Each has the right to use [his] native
language, to freely choose the language of communication, education, training
and creative work.
There might be some justification to make the Russian language the official
state language to facilitate communication among the country's inhabitants and
the efficiency of some areas of government operations. But if someone wanted to
transform the Russian Federation/Russia into a nation-state, it would require
the passage of a Constitutional amendment, which would be difficult to achieve.
Putin is right not to want to open this Pandora's box very wide. The risk of
emphasizing that Russians are the "state forming ethnic group" might have the
undesirable impact of discouraging immigration in and increasing emigration from
the country of non-Russians. It might make national minorities want to test the
limits of self-determination in potentially disruptive ways. "Russification"
should be an issue he should leave for right wing extremists.
With roughly 75 percent of the country's population living west of the Ural
Mountains and China, a country with roughly 1.3 billion people to the southeast,
fanning the flames of nationalism may give rise to certain risks. After all, the
Russian leadership has not been able to resolve the situation in the Caucasus.
In an ideal world, Russia will some day evolve into a "rule of law" state where
there is no distinction between nationality and citizenship.
Alexandre Strokanov, Professor of History, Chair of Social Science Department,
Director of Institute of Russian Language, History and Culture, Lyndon State
College, Lyndonville, VT
First of all, I am not sure that Frolov's interpretation of Navalny's ideas is
correct. Nor am I sure that Navalny (if he read this) would not deny Frolov's
interpretation of his position, as he denied his "interview" on Voice of America
that was made up from quotes from his own book and other publications. Nor am I
certain that the interpretation of Rogozin's position is accurate.
The fact that Vladimir Putin addressed this issue in his article is certainly
very important and gave him much credit among ethnically Russian and non-Russian
citizens of the country alike. This can be seen quite clearly on his site
(http://putin2012.ru/). Indeed, Vladimir Putin was the first Russian leader
since Stalin's time who addressed this tough topic for the country and expressed
his point of view in a clear way. Many observers can still remember Yeltsin's
mumblings about the sovereignty of ethnic republics and what came out of his
policies.
Vladimir Putin's concept of Russia as a multi-ethnic civilization, where
Russians are the "state forming ethnic group," but non-Russians are free to
pursue and cultivate their ethnic and religious identities, is the most adequate
and acceptable for the Russian Federation.
I am not going to comment on the "Russia for the Russians" slogan, due to its
obviously radical and absolutely unacceptable character. Let's focus on the
"Russian national state" in its, using Frolov's words, "civic concept, not
unlike the notion of an 'American nation.'"
This is, in my opinion, simply an attempt to present what is called
assimilation. As it is well known, and not only to historians, the native
population of North America was primarily exterminated by the Europeans. The
Columbus Day celebrated in the United States is a holiday for some and a day of
mourning for others. Later, immigrants from many European nations were also
assimilated and mostly lost their cultural identities, languages, traditions,
etc. The only exception today is Canadian Francophone Quebec.
I am currently teaching in the United States and I see every day the incredibly
poor knowledge displayed by the majority of American students with regard to
foreign languages or foreign culture. This is despite the fact that many of
these students' ancestors spoke in a variety of languages other than English,
and brought with them their own cultural identities that today are simply gone
and lost forever. Is this something to celebrate? Quite the opposite, I think it
is something that should be deeply regretted.
I seriously doubt that this is the path that the Russian Federation should take,
where many ethnic groups live compactly on the land inhabited by their ancestors
for hundreds of years, even before Slavic people colonized those areas.
Consequently, if assimilation did not work in the Russian empire and the Soviet
Union, it is not going to work today. Moreover, it is absolutely the wrong way
to go.
Finally, Putin's article clearly states that the Russian government will not
allow any serious attempts to cut off any piece of the country, under any
pretext and regardless of where such desire may come from: the leadership of
non-systemic opposition in Moscow or from any ethnic region. In particular, this
is a serious warning due to the obvious desire of some foreign powers to claim
that Russia, in its current size, is simply too big. It is also a response to
people like Navalny and their slogan "stop feeding the Caucasus." I think what
Vladimir Putin said to this new star of Russian ethnic nationalists was simply
brilliant. I might be wrong, it is hard to judge it from Vermont, but it seems
to me that this idiotic slogan lately became much less visible in Russia, which
means that Vladimir Putin just scored another point in the virtual debates
against his opponents.
-- Dick Krickus, distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Mary
Washington, former H.L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S.
Marine Corps University, Washington, DC
The answer to the question "why is Putin so preoccupied with the national
question" is obvious. He is wary that his liberal opponents will attract allies
who love Russia but don't have university degrees, eat sushi or enjoy foreign
vacations. As a consequence, Putin may be forced into a second round of
elections in March, and in its aftermath face a permanent and truly broad-based
opposition to his rule.
Up until this point, the vast majority of working people favored Putin because
they associate his stewardship with improved living conditions, relate to his
tough-guy rhetoric and credit him with making them proud of their country.
Unlike the educated and professional elite in Russia, their focus is parochial
and national, not cosmopolitan and international.
In mentioning the American experience, Putin can take comfort in knowing that
progressives there have had difficulty winning over voters who display the same
nationalistic sensibilities that are visible among ordinary Russians. In both
cases, class and cultural divisions serve as a barrier to alliances with
privileged middle class activists. Moreover, the latter ignore the concerns of
people who work in factories and perform menial tasks.
I observed this first hand years ago when I wrote speeches for Jerry Wurf, the
irascible but progressive president of the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees. At that time, reactionary elements of the business
community and supporters of Ronald Reagan had embarked upon a union-busting
campaign. It would eventually eviscerate the labor movement: when Reagan entered
the White House, about 30 percent of the labor force was unionized - today that
figure is about ten percent. A truly ominous setback for democracy, yet most
progressives in the Democratic Party greeted that event with a yawn.
While globalization has worked in the favor of the privileged middle class in
both America and Russia, it has proven to be a disaster for workers who have
lost jobs to low waged rivals in Asia and to automation. Furthermore, their
leaders have not exploited public authority to develop a strategic economic
program aligned with a changing international economy. Unlike its counterpart in
Beijing, the ruling elite in Moscow and Washington has failed to realize that
its greatest security challenge in the 21st century is the ability to cope with
the turbulence of globalization, and not the venom of deranged terrorists.
The privileged Russian middle class has been reluctant to align with the
nationalists, citing their bigotry, violent proclivities and presumed
reactionary political impulses. Such concerns are often uttered when Alexey
Navalny's name is mentioned, but they may be groundless. Yes, the feisty blogger
who was a major architect of the recent demonstrations has blistered the Kremlin
for pampering the Caucasus. But without claiming to be an authority on the man,
I recall that his complaint about massive aide to Chechnya was driven by his
claim that the money provided did not help the needy there, but the mafia that
dominates that forlorn society.
Furthermore, nationalist impulses are not always negative; they can unify people
otherwise divided by class, ethnicity, race and religion. Putin is right that
the United States has a different history than Russia, but the Americans have
created unity out of diversity by adhering to a set of common civic values and
practices. Moscow must do the same thing to achieve harmony in Russia among its
disparate ethnic communities.
The lesson for the progressives then is in their quest to create a democratic
Russia that promotes economic and social justice. They must engage people from
all walks of life and thereby enhance Russia's quest to become a normal European
country.
--Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, San Francisco, CA
The subject of Russian ethnic identity in the Russian Federation is so
contaminated with emotions from partisans and adversaries that a rational
discussion of realistic alternatives is drowned in a flood of conflicting
hormonal responses.
Russia is and will remain a multi-ethnic country. That said, several demographic
realties must be noted.
Up to 85 percent of Russia's population considers itself ethnically Russian. In
certain analyses, this qualifies Russia as a mono-ethnic country. Of the other
150-plus nationalities in Russia, the numerically largest ethnic minority is the
Volga Tatars, who account for just under four percent of Russia's population.
The less numerous nationalities in Russia, in total, account for the remaining
11 percent of the population. There are nationalities in Russia that number ten
thousand or fewer members - which is barely enough to sustain a linguistic and
cultural identity.
Another important reality is that ethnic separation inside Russia is physically
impossible.
One corollary of the above realities is that the wellbeing of Russia depends on
the wellbeing of ethnic Russians. One can take all the minority nations of
Russia and give them the highest imaginable level of comfort - but if this does
not involve the ethnic Russian 85 percent of the population, the country will be
miserable. Conversely, if 85 percent of a country's population increases in
comfort, this condition will propagate to the other 15 percent by the principle
of the tide that lifts all boats. We are speaking here of a modern society, with
minimal pathologies in ethnic policies. The above may not be politically
correct, but nature rarely is.
Nationalism as a political factor arose in the 18th century, and was strongly
present in the European revolutionary movement, commencing with the French
Revolution of 1789, which abolished loyalty to the monarch (an individual
person) to replace it with loyalty to "la nation." In our times, nationalism is
a strong political factor in most sovereign states and even the supra-national
associations like the EU respect the national identities of their member states.
Immigrant countries like the United States have been in the process of "nation
building" for the entire period of their historically recent sovereignty. The
now discarded model of "the melting pot" was one attempt to create a new
American nationality from the fusion of immigrant identities, primarily from
Southern and Eastern Europe. The "melting pot" has failed as a nation-building
paradigm for America, and no fresh solution has been found in the past 40 years.
We mention this because in Russia many commentators on ethnic matters have a
naïve hope for solutions from "the other side of the hill."
Russian nationalists, like everywhere in the world, are ideologically a mixed
lot. Some argue for reasonable and moderate solutions, which recognize the
ethnic diversity and interleaving of Russia, and balance practical recognition
of the importance of ethnic Russians in Russia without infringement of the
legitimate rights of Russia's other nationalities. And there are delusional
extremists who make bizarre proposals and cross into ethnic oppression and
violence. The recent terrorist acts in Norway teach us that suppressing the
issues of ethnic co-existence, imposing ideological solutions without open
mechanisms of acceptance, and symmetric ethnic tolerance and adaptation leads to
major tragedy. Suppressing Russian nationalism would be a grave mistake.
The physics of Russia as a country is such that it will always remain a
multi-ethnic society. Russian nationalists must recognize and sincerely accept
this reality. And ethnic Russians will remain the predominant nationality in
Russia for the foreseeable future - with all the obligations and privileges that
this status entails. This reality has to be understood and sincerely accepted by
all concerned.

http://russiaprofile.org/experts_panel/54257.html
---------------------

Late night talk show looks at ethnic, religious relations in Russia
NTV, February 12, 2012-BBC Monitoring

Inter-ethnic and interfaith relations were the main focus of the 12 February
edition of the "NTVshniki" talk show on Gazprom-owned NTV channel. Presenter
Anton Khrekov introduced the topic of "National interest" and asked studio
guests whether anyone could slaughter a sheep in the centre of Moscow or perform
Russian folk dances in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala. Studio guests were
politician Boris Nadezhdin, politician Vladimir Ryzhkov, presenter and member of
the Russian Public Chamber Maksim Shevchenko, chairman of the Islamic Committee
of Russia Geydar Dzhemal, politician and author of the report "Russophobia in
Russia" Andrey Savelyev, politician Leonid Gozman, Russian State Duma deputy
Aleksey Mitrofanov, film director and actor Mikhail Bogdasarov, Central Cossack
Forces Capt Sergey Matveyev and actress Yekaterina Shavrina.
  Asked to vote how Russian citizens should be called, over 61 per cent of the
audience voted to say they should be referred to as "Russkiye" (Russians) and 39
per cent "Rossiyane" (people of Russia).
  Titular nation in constitution?
  Answering a question on whether the Russian constitution should have the notion
of a titular nation and whether this group of people should have any privileges,
Andrey Savelyev said that "this historical entity must be strengthened at least
declaratively".
  Mitrofanov said that the Russian people formed the majority of the country's
peoples for the first time in hundreds of years. He added that this was a good
result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. "This is a plus of the USSR's
collapse because I do not want to live with Uzbeks," Mitrofanov added. When
asked by Shevchenko whether he was Russian and represented the majority of
Russians, Mitrofanov said that he was and told Shevchenko: "You say you are
Russian but you look like a Caucasian."
  Responding to a question on whether other ethnic groups should treat Russians
as a bonding element, Geydar Dzhemal said: "If Russians start to insist and they
are forced to insist that they are ethnic Russians, they will begin to seriously
lose to their opponents, such as the Americans, the French and others where
ethnic aspects are not taken into account. We have a similar situation with
Dagestan in Russia. How could one say there that he is an Avar, Dargin or Kumik
or say I am Dagestani. Dagestani is a completely different matter."
  Answering presenter Khrekov's question, actress Yekaterina Shavrina said that
there should not be a dominant Russian culture. She said that Russia's people
were residents of one country and shared good and bad days.
  Politician Boris Nadezhdin said that the notion of Russia as a multi-ethnic
country was a myth and that it was a mono-ethnic country instead since 81 per
cent of its population were Russians and because there were only four ethnic
groups that comprised more than 1 per cent of the country's population.
  Khrekov responded saying that he often visited Tatarstan and said that once all
citizens were declared to be Russians, they would declare their independence.
"And you will receive another Chechnya," Khrekov added.
  "I am Jewish," Gozman said and, after being interrupted several times, went on
to say that he personally did not care what would be written in the
constitution. "Are we strengthening peace in the country or endangering it with
such a decision," he asked. He added that if ethnic Russians were written into
the law as "state-forming" people, then "this would mean discrimination of all
others". "This means that 20 per cent of our fellow citizens who are not ethnic
Russian are told 'You, lad, are second-class,'" Gozman said. "This is a step
towards the country's collapse and war," Gozman added.
  Mitrofanov said that there were economic implications in the ethnic policy
debate and, after being repeatedly interrupted by the presenter and other studio
guests, said that "there is total collapse, as there is no Russia in terms of
media and financial aspects but only Moscow, the Caucasus and oil regions".
  Studio guests were also asked to comment on a video report depicting sheep
sacrifices in public places during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha.
  Shevchenko said that there should be more than four mosques in a city of 12m
people.
  Nadezhdin said: "It is not an issue. Pray in your mosques but you should not
demonstratively show your barbaric customs of slaughtering a sheep like this."
  Ryzhkov blamed the local authorities. "What we have just seen is a defect in
the work of the police and local authorities," he said.
  Asked if he would be willing to ban such manifestations of "unsanitary
activities", Capt Sergey Matveyev said that animal sacrifice in public places
was a complex of misunderstandings including the fault of the local authorities.
He added that it was not the job of Cossacks to ban such things and that the
executive power should deal with this.
  The talk show also focused on a video report talking about a class in
Yekaterinburg, which was comprised of different ethnic groups and contained only
one ethnic Russian child. After lengthy arguments, studio guests agreed that
state policies should discourage the formation of ethnic enclaves.
  Further in the talk-show, Aleksandr Agafonov, father of Ivan Agafonov, an
ethnic Russian who was killed in a fight with martial arts champion from
Dagestan Rasul Mirzayev, was invited to the studio. Studio guests debated
whether the fight was an ethnic conflict.
  Also invited to the studio were Muhammad Amin, step-father of Artem Nekrasov,
who defended ethnic Tajiks when they were attacked by skinheads and was taken to
hospital in a critical condition, and pilot Vladimir Sadovnichiy, who was kept
in custody in Tajikistan for eight months.
  Sadovnichiy said that people were the same everywhere and that the ethnic
question did not arise where the socio-economic conditions were favourable.
  Non-Russian president
  Towards the end of the talk show, studio guests and audience members were asked
whether they could accept a president who is not an ethnic Russian.
  Sergey Matveyev jokingly said that he wished a Don Cossack to be Russia's
president.
  Vladimir Ryzhkov said that a person's ethnicity did not matter but that he
thought an ethnic Russian would have a better choice.
  Mitrofanov said that it should be an ethnic Russian because they never ruled
the country.
  Andrey Savelyev said that only a person with a Russian spirit could rule the
country, stressing that he did not mean "Russian by blood".
  Boris Nadezhdin said that only a Russian person who lives in Russia and thinks
in Russian can be the country's president.
  Roman Bogdasarov, member of the Russia For All movement, said that anybody who
can defend Russia's interests could be its president.
  Aleksandr Agafonov said "ethnic Russian only" and Vladimir Sadovnichiy said "a
person with a Russian soul". Muhammad Amin said it could be anyone with Russian
citizenship. Maksim Shevchenko said that it should be anybody who can uphold
civil freedoms. Geydar Dzhemal said that the Stalin and Romanovs example showed
that ethnic minorities expressed the most imperialistic ambitions. Leonid Gozman
and Yekaterina Shavrina called for a fairly elected president.
  Meanwhile, 66 per cent of the audience voted to say "only Russian", 18 per cent
said "ethnicity is not important" and 16 per cent said "depends on what
ethnicity" a presidential hopeful had.
-----

Russia: enshrining homophobia
By: Kathryn Dovey
OpenDemocracy, February 13, 2012

This week in St Petersburg the local legislative body came one step closer to
passing a bill which would make it a prosecutable offence to promote  "sodomy,
lesbianism, bisexuality and transsexuality" to minors.
Section 28
Back in March 1988 the UK Government provided the precedent for this bill. It
passed a law [10] preventing local authorities from intentionally promoting
homosexuality or from promoting teaching in schools about the "acceptability of
homosexuality as a pretended family relationship". The provision became known as
Section or Clause 28. Although no criminal offence was attached to the
prohibition it was considered a significant setback for the rights of gay people
in the UK. Schools became nervous about what they could and couldn't explain to
pupils.
'Russia is not an easy country for the LGBT population. Annual pride marches
garner little public support, and violent police crackdowns are common.'
Fifteen years later, the Labour Government repealed [11] Section 28, and in 2009
David Cameron officially apologised [12] for it, recognising that it was
offensive to gay people. This brought to an end a long and protracted debate as
a result of a law purportedly designed to protect school children from becoming
aware of gay and lesbian relationships.
The remit of Russia's own Section 28 is far wider and more dangerous. It is part
of a worrying trend of homophobic laws being passed across Russia under the
guise of protecting minors.  The "gay propaganda" bill, as it has become known,
would make it a prosecutable offence to promote "sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality
and transsexuality" to minors. The offence would carry a fine of up to 5,000
rubles (100 GBP) for individuals and up to 500,000 rubles (10,000 GBP) for
organisations.
The language of the bill is so vague that it could catch anything remotely
gay-positive that minors could possibly see, such as the display of a rainbow
flag or wearing a T-shirt with a gay-friendly logo. Would this mean that the
work of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) organisations raising
awareness of suicides amongst the young LGBT population falls foul of the law?
Could same-sex parents be guilty of propaganda to their children and others?
With such a provision in place, the work of LGBT organisations and pride marches
would be severely hampered. There is a danger that the law would be used to
justify discrimination and even violence toward the LGBT community.
The bill unanimously passed its first reading in St Petersburg in November. It
passed on second reading on 8 February by a vote of 30 to 6. The third reading
will be on Wednesday, and if it is approved then it could be signed into law by
the St Petersburg governor.
The danger of federal legislation
The homophobic laws being promoted across Russia dangerously conflate
homosexuality with the crime of paedophilia by placing the offences together
under the same legislation. This risks stoking anti-gay sentiment. Already
similar laws have been passed in the Russian regions of Ryazan, Arkhangelsk, and
just a few weeks ago in Kostroma. If the bill becomes law in St Petersburg it is
likely that this could serve as a precedent for federal legislation.
Russia is not an easy country for the LGBT population. Annual pride marches
garner little public support, and violent police crackdowns are common. Indeed
at the December protests for fair elections in Russia, violence was reported
against LGBT participants and people carrying rainbow flags. In a positive
development, at the most recent rally in Moscow on 4 February, Igor Kochetkov,
chairman of the Russian LGBT Network, was able to speak to the gathered crowds
from the stage. Speaking [13] in December, he said: "We promote equal rights and
respect for human dignity for each and every one. There is nothing dangerous or
immoral about that."
In the UK back in 1988, there was a wave of activism as people took to the
streets to protest the introduction of Section 28, which was fiercely supported
by several religious groups and various individuals. Protests in Manchester drew
15,000 people, and 20,000 campaigned on the streets of London.  Section 28
became a focal point for LGBT organisations.  Norway criticised the UK over the
provision, and there were protests   in Amsterdam and New York. However, the
effects of Section 28, although damaging and discriminatory, pale into
insignificance when compared with the setbacks and attacks the LGBT community
will suffer in St Petersburg if this bill becomes law.
'The language of the bill is so vague that it could catch anything remotely
gay-positive that minors could possibly see, such as the display of a rainbow
flag or wearing a T-shirt with a gay-friendly logo.'
Ultimately, these laws are an attack on freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly everywhere. It is at times like this that all members of society need
to speak out to protect these fundamental rights from being eroded. Hugh
Williamson, the Human Rights Watch Europe and central Asia director, called [14]
the bill a "blatant attack on freedom of expression and a thinly disguised
attempt to silence Russia's LGBT community." The international LGBT organisation
AllOut.org is calling on people [15] to contact their foreign office
representatives to protest this proposed law and encourage condemnation from
governments elsewhere.
Today there is a window of opportunity to act. For this bill hangs in the
balance. Better to put the spotlight on St Petersburg now than to imagine a
Russian President in 21 years' time apologising for the damage done to the LGBT
community by the 'gay propaganda' laws of the past.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/kathryn-dovey/russia-enshrining-homophobi\
a
----

Putin's Cheat Sheet: Reflections of an Historian
By Alexander Yanov
Institute of Modern Russia, 14 February 2012

In a recent article, Vladimir Putin plagiarized points of a nationalist agenda 
from a number of sources. Historian Alexander Yanov discusses the lesser-known
inspiration for Putin's ideas, 19th century Slavophile thinker Nikolai
Danilevsky.      One couldn't say that Putin's "Russia: The National Question,"
published in Nezvavisimaya Gazeta in January, was well-received in the
blogopshere. For starters, the author was accused of plagiarism. It turned out
that at least one-third of Putin's text consisted of a layman's retelling of a
book by Alexandr Danilyuk, Alexandr Kondakov, and Valeriy Tishkov with the long,
academic title Concepts of Moral and Spiritual Development and
Character-Building for Russian Citizens  (Moscow. Prosveschenie: 2009.) A fine
book, but a cheat sheet nonetheless.  This should be embarrassing. It's not
fitting that a presidential candidate should copy his homework like a schoolboy
when trying to answer one of the critical questions facing Russia today.  And
yet, the discussion that followed was full of excuses for his behavior. People
would say things like:  "That bare-torsoed gentleman Putin is a cheater to top
it all off. How embarrassing."  "Stealing intellectual property is usually
illegal."  "No citation? Well, that's amoral."  "But it is normal for a paper to
have sources."  I can understand this indignation. But what many forgot in the
heat of the discussion was that Putin had borrowed only one-third of his article
from the respected academics - this third being the only decent part.  What
isn't immediately obvious to those who don't study history is that the article's
approach to the national question in modern Russia was borrowed (or stolen, as
some would say) not from the recent academic monograph, but from an old
Slavophilic myth found in "Russia and Europe" (first published in 1869) by
Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky.  Danilevsky is quite a popular figure among
contemporary Russian nationalists. But since not all political commentators are
well-read in nationalist literature, I will say couple of words about this
author. The Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1989 calls Danilevsky (1822-1885) a
thinker who justified "the czarist regime's chauvinistic aspirations to great
power." This rather blunt blurb from the Soviet dictionary is, curiously enough,
not far from the truth.  Suffice to say that Danilevsky was one of the writers
providing a theoretical basis for the counter-reform policies of Alexander III,
who led one of the most backwards regimes in Russian history. Anyone who has
ever read Danilevsky couldn't confuse him with any other author - that's how
talented he was! The rhetorical devices, the terminology, the very language of
Russia and Europe make it clear that it was this book that served as the primary
source for presidential candidate Putin's article on the question of
nationalism.  Where else could he have gotten claims, such as that Russia is a
"unique civilization" with an entirely individual "cultural code" and
"historical experience unlike any other nation's"? Why else would it be that the
word 'empire' is never once mentioned in this article, despite the fact that the
official name of the state for almost three centuries has been the Russian
Empire? Any why isn't there any mention of the brutal conquests of other nations
that make up the history of the Empire, but instead there are euphemisms like
"mastering great territories" and the "collective labors of many nations"? Who
else but Danilevsky could have considered such collective mastering the
manifestation of Russia's special "cultural code"? Could it be a mistake? 
Unfortunately for the quality of their critique, none of this was mentioned by
any the commentators in the blogosphere. Instead of trying to figure out the
origin of the article's archaic language, commentators took to making fun of a
trivial blunder. The blunder itself seems quite inexcusable, no doubt about it.
Or at least it does at first glance. Presidential candidate Putin had allowed
himself to sneer at the failure of the multiculturalist policies in Europe and
then, without taking a breath, he tasked Russia with "creating the conditions
for the harmonious development of a polycultural community." "But 'polycultural'
is the same thing as 'multicultural," smirked commentators, enjoying their small
triumph. Was Putin asking Russia to do what he had just sneered at?  Is it
really as obvious as seems? Was this really a mistake?  If the bloggers had
looked at the writings of Danilevsky, they would have found his myth of
completely autonomous "cultural-historical types" (in today's academic jargon
these would be called "local civilizations"), and seen that Putin did not
misspeak.  According to Danilevsky, the withering 'Roman-Germanic type' (which
is how he referred to Europeans) is nothing but clumsy, and thus, all of his
projects end up failing, even the best ones. The young, exuberant, and ambitious
Slavic type, on the other hand, can reanimate the failed Roman-Germanic projects
and make them work. This is why the so-called "harmonious development of a
polycultural community," which proved to be a failure with the Roman-Germans,
has a good chance of succeeding in Russia.  Considering the contemporary
cultural and political situations, Danilevsky's ideas seem unbearably outdated
(and in fact, they even seemed that way in the 1860s, when he first thought of
them).  But there is truth in the idea that for the "Roman-Germans," the failure
of their multiculturalism project is based in the crisis of the very "model of a
nation state-that is, a state with historical roots in a single ethnic
identity," while "historically, Russia is not ethnically-based," in the words of
Putin this time, and not Danilevsky. The problems of federalism  As we may see
in Putin's article, the traditional Slavophile concept of Russia was merely
taken to its logical conclusion, if not carried to the point of absurdity by the
historian Danilevsky (represented today by his intellectual heir, N.A.
Narochitskaya, who is most likely the one who delivered these ideas to the Putin
camp). The problem is that the decline of the nation-state model that Putin
speaks of has nothing to do with present-day Russia. Russia ceased to be a
nation-state almost five centuries ago, after it conquered the Kazan' czardom
(which had been a small Empire itself).  At the same time, the most
straightforward understanding of today's Russia is vis-à-vis the federalism that
Putin attempts to eliminate from the equation. Isn't it strange how presidential
candidate Putin not only avoids the Russian Empire's historical name, but also
its contemporary name, the Russian Federation? In his entire very long article,
the RF is mentioned only once, and even then in a negative context, as part of a
tirade about how the "deputies of the RSFSR (read: Yeltsin) had initiated the
process of building a 'nation state' while in the midst of a political struggle
with the "Soviet center."  However, with the exception of China, every
multi-ethnic and multi-religious nation comparable to Russia (i.e. Canada,
Brazil, the US, India, Australia) is a federation. And none of the nations
listed above are undergoing a crisis because of that. Most importantly, nowhere
among these states is the national question as acute of an issue as it is in
Russia.  None of the nationalities in any of these countries is demanding the
title of the official state nationality (which is what Putin encourages in
Russian nationalists). It's hard to imagine, for instance, a demonstration in
Canada where citizens call for a Canada for Anglo-Saxons, although the majority
of the Canadian population is indeed Anglo-Saxon.  It would be even harder to
imagine a movement that calls for the state to "stop feeding Quebec."  So
perhaps we can say that the acuteness of the issue of a national identity in
Russia was caused almost entirely by the absence of the federal model. And who
did his best to eliminate federalism in Russia? Right, Putin did. Appropriating
the myth  To return to the central subject of this essay, I don't think it will
require many further arguments to convince the reader that Putin's queer
conception of Russia as a "historical state" (as though other countries appeared
out of thin air) is surely plagiarized from Danilevsky.  Only this act
plagiarism has much graver implications than the one discussed in the
blogosphere. This (fictional) uniqueness of Russia as a "civilization-state" is
the very basis of Putin's rejection of federalism. But how could an effective
program for future development come out of lies about the country's past?  This
serious accusation demands serious proof. My argument is that these lies are
inherent in the work of Putin's ideological predecessor; Danilevsky will bear
witness against himself (and thus, against Putin) with his own texts. 
Danilevsky's main contribution to political philosophy (besides the
above-mentioned doctrine of "cultural-historical types" and his furious struggle
against the theory of evolution) was the theory that Russia had been built by
"collective exploration and ythe development of vast territories," which is the
very thesis used by Putin. According to this theory, all of Russia's conquests
were actually the Roman-Germans'. Danilevsky was very critical of the
imperialism of other nations. He called conquest "politically-motivated murder"
referring to "national murders and mutilations." Nothing like that could have
ever happened in the history of Russia!  When Russia and Europe was published in
1869, Russia looked very different from how it does today. Azerbaijan and
Northern Caucasus had been just recently been conquered, Central Asia was in the
process of being conquered; both Poland and Finland were part of the Russian
Empire, and, as a result, in constant upheaval. The political situation in which
Danilevsky had to prove his thesis was complicated to say the least. And yet,
with notable courage (unlike Putin), Danilevsky nonetheless attempted to prove
the un-provable. How he did it is another story.  We will follow Danilevsky's
arguments from North to South. Yes, he admits, Finland was conquered by Russia.
But do Finns really constitute a nation that could be murdered politically? "The
Finnish tribe, inhabiting Finland like all the other Finnish tribes, has never
led an historical life."  That is why its annexation to Russia " can be compared
to the fertilization of the soil a plant grows in." Generally all of the
"Finnish, Tatar, and Samoyedic tribes are predestined to merge with the
historical ethnos they are surrounded by, to become assimilated... They have no
right to political independence. You can't kill something that was never
living."  Of course, equating the Finns, Tatars and Samoyeds is completely
absurd. But you wouldn't confuse the Polish with the  Samoyeds, although Russia
governs them both. Danilevsky's reply, "Yes, unfortunately Russia rules Poland!
But it possesses Poland not by the virtue of conquest... but out of sentimental
generosity."  A fit of generosity that lasted for a century and a half.
Interesting, isn't it?  And what would he say about the ancient Christian
kingdom of the Georgians, who would also be difficult to confuse with the
Samoyeds? Indeed Georgia was exhausted by continuous battles with Turks and
Persians, when they asked the Russians to give them a hand. But what they
requested was help, not "political murder." Danilevsky insists that, "it was not
at all a conquest, we only offered a helping hand." A helping hand that made
Georgia lose its independence and become the province of a foreign empire... 
"Furthermore, along with Georgia, several Mohammedan khanates [modern
Azerbaijan] were conquered. We may as well call it a conquest, although the
people who were conquered only benefited from it."  So we do admit to some
conquests, without a single word about "national murders and mutilations," since
those who were mutilated only gain from having been murdered politically. "It
must be said,"  Danilevsky cedes through clenched teeth, "that the people of the
Caucasus were not happy about being conquered by the Russians."  So that's what
the "collective exploration and development of vast territories" really looked
like. I will not speak for the reader, but the impression I get from such
"arguments"  leaves no doubt that they constitute no more than a crudely
constructed myth. This is the most pressing problem: the misappropriation of
other people's intellectual property is one thing (we would leave this matter to
the criminal justice system), but a presidential candidate appropriating a myth
that falsifies the history of his homeland is a completely different matter.
This is politics, and manifestly deceitful politics at that.  Presidential
candidate Putin's article on the national question resembles a patchwork quilt
that his speechwriters hastily sewed together from a hodgepodge of ideas. Some
of Putin's speechwriters (for instance, the authors of Concepts of Moral and
Spiritual Development and Character-Building for the Russian Citizen) were
concerned with education in Russia's future, while others desperately longed for
Russia of the past. Some missed Soviet Russia, while others missed
pre-revolutionary Russia, but in both cases what they were missing was an
Empire. And in both cases, one built on false premises.

http://imrussia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=199%3Aputins-ch\
eat-sheet&catid=45%3Aconversationswithayanov&Itemid=81&lang=en
------------------

Why Russians Like Vodka More Than Lenin
By: Peter Cheremushkin
Moscow Times, Feburary 15, 2012

  When we witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union 20 years ago, we also witnessed
the fall of its monuments. The general impression was that we were observing
something unique and unusual. But the tendency to destroy old symbols and build
new ones is as old as humanity.
  When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, the first thing they did was to
start destroying monuments to the tsars and replace them many times over with
monuments to Communist revolutionary heroes.
  One of the first victims of this campaign was the great monument to tsar
Alexander III, which was removed from its pedestal on Ploshchad Vosstaniya. No
one cared about the artistic value of the monument, no one cared that it was
made by Paolo Troubetzkoy, arguably the best sculptor of Russian impressionism.
Luckily, the monument was not destroyed, and is currently placed at the entrance
to the Marble Palace in St. Petersburg.
  The issue of the old and new monuments in the post-Soviet space has attracted a
lot of media attention. One of the most interesting countries in terms of the
"war of monuments" is Ukraine, where old and new values identified in the
monuments continue to collide.
  Germany offers another example. After its unification in 1990, Germany did not
destroy or remove its Soviet monuments. Most of the monuments of the Soviet past
remain in place because Germany underwent a significant historical re-evaluation
of itself, and it made legal obligations to protect the monuments to the Red
Army warriors.
  At the same time, you can see portraits of Adolf Hitler in German museums,
which does not provoke pro-Nazi moods in society. In addition, a large memorial
complex to the victims of the Holocaust reflects a general mood of
reconciliation within German society and its past. That makes Berlin a unique
place, where you can see the remains of all regimes that existed on German soil 
the Weimar Republic, East Germany, the Third Reich  and the historical recored
remains largely uncensored.
  But not everything is this rosy in Germany. The war of monuments has touched
the country, and the discussion about whether to remove the monument to Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels has started in the German capital.
  Poland is a good example of a country where new values replaced old ones.
Poland's monuments to Soviet marshals and generals were removed and replaced by
monuments to John Paul II, victims of communism and the Katyn massacre. Marian
Konieczny, a famous Polish sculptor, said in a recent interview that today
Poland has more monuments to the Pope than it had to Stalin in the 1950s. In
November, I saw a photo of the unveiling ceremony of the monument to former U.S.
President Ronald Reagan in Warsaw. This seemed to be one more indication that
new heroes are replacing the fallen ones. Poland has clearly made its choice
regarding its values and its chosen path.
  But there is one exception to this tendency. In the small Polish town of
Poronino, where Lenin spent some time before the 1917 Revolution, the monument
to Lenin, which was first destroyed in 1989, was renovated in 2010 following a
decision by the local authorities. When asked for the reason, the mayor of
Poronino said, "It is the only way we could attract Russian tourists and their
money."
  But events elsewhere did not always take place as smoothly as in Poland. The
2007 decision in Estonia to remove a monument to a Soviet soldier  the Bronze
Soldier  sparked a wave of protests from the Russian-speaking community and
caused street riots in Tallinn.
  Similarly, the unveiling of a new monument to Stepan Bandera, the controversial
leader of the Ukrainian nationalists in the 1930s and 1940s who cooperated with
the Nazis, sparked a heated conflict in Lviv between those opposed to the
monument and local activists who were on a 24-hour alert to protect their
national hero.
  In 2010, Georgia destroyed the monument dedicated to soldiers who perished in
the Great Patriotic War with Nazi Germany between 1941 and 1945. The moment was
designed by the famous Georgian sculptor Merab Berdzenishvili, who was
well-known in the Soviet Union. The strongest protests were heard from Russia 
above all, from government officials. Russia even suggested that the whole
complex be removed to Moscow, but the monument was blown up by Georgian
officials before this plan could be enacted.
  Much of the monument debate focuses on whether a monument is a work of art or
merely an artifact. This issue never seems to goes away. Take, for example, the
2006 exhibit in Schverin of Arno Breker, Hitler's favorite sculptor. Or the
exhibits of Lev Kerbel, who erected monuments to Lenin worldwide.
  Can it be said that the artistic quality of monuments erected after the fall of
communism, such as many monuments to John Paul II, are genuine art or merely
symbols of change in history? In my opinion, the popularity of sculptor Zurab
Tsereteli is symptomatic of post-communist Russia. It also reflects the
country's imperial past and traditions that the scale of a monument has become
more important than its artistic value.
  The problem of the war of monuments in such countries as Ukraine and Russia is
complex and controversial. At the same time, it seriously undermines the value
of the monuments, their public and artistic value and largely devaluates the
monument as a piece of art.
  In the end, Russians show much more interest in harmless monuments with no
political or historical controversy  for example, the monument to a loyal dog in
Tolyatti, the Chuzhik-Pyzhik sculptor of a tiny bird in St.Petersburg, where
people of all ages flock to make a wish, or traditional cultural monuments like
the Pushkin monuments in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Then there is the planned
monument to vodka or the sculpture in Ulyanovsk devoted to Russians' favorite
letter in the alphabet  " ."
  People have much more support for these types of monuments than they do for
political figures. Perhaps this captures their attitude toward monuments better
than anything else.
====================


III ANNOTATIONS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Chirkov, Iu.G. Kniga Utopii: Russkii Eksperiment [Book of utopias: The Russian
experiment]. Moscow: URSS, LENAND, 2011. 447 p. pbk. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN
9785971003137.

The book is about how pure and human utopian ideals being brought in life turned
into the violent and bloody regimes, and how the dream of freedom and equality
ends with GULAG. The Russian experiment, the main subject of this book, was a
seventy year long base for testing the ideas of many utopians: from Plato and
Thomas Moore to Lenin and Stalin.
-----------------------

Padenie Berlinskoi Steny: Do i posle: Rossiiane o Vneshnepoliticheskikh
Protsessakh Proshlogo i Nastoiashchego [Fall of the Berlin wall: Citizen of
Russia about the foreign policy of the past and current]. Ed. by M.E. Gorshkov,
R. Krumm, V.V. Petukhov. Moscow: Ves' Mir, In-t Sotsilogii RAN, 2010. 184 p. 
Rossiiskoe obshchestvo v zarkale sotsiologii  Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN
9785777704832

This monograph is based on results of an all-Russian survey about the attitude
towards several events of Russian foreign policy: Soviet-German pact
(Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), the beginning of WWII, reunification of Germany, etc.
The study is conducted with the participation of the Fond Friedrich Elbert
Stiftung. Contents and summary in English.\
-------------------------------

Zdes' Zhivut Liudi: Chechnia: Khronika Nasiliia: Chast' 5: Oktiabr'-Dekabr' 2001
goda [People live here: Chechnya: Chronicle of violence: Part 5 October-December
2001]. Comp. by U. Baisaev, D. Grushkin; afterword by V. Shenderovich. Moscow:
Prava cheloveka, Pravozashchitnyi Tsentr "Memorial", 2010. 543 p. pbk. 14 x 20.5
cm. Printing 500. ISBN 9785771204253.

This is the fifth volume of the chronicle of violation of human rights in
Chechnya in 2000-2001, the first year of Putin's rule. It was inspired by
Vladimir Putin's speech in Brussels. Reproached with the repressions in this
region he asked to bring specific facts and names. This book continues the
tradition of dissidents of the soviet period, the tradition of documenting cases
of violations of law and human rights in Russia. The only difference is that so
far the contributors do not hide their names. It chronicles specific cases of
violations of human rights in Chechnia by federal authorities and the army.
Includes the names of the people responsible for these cases and of their
victims, locations, and dates. Also included is a list of people killed during
this period. Started in 2003. To be continued.
------------------------

Dugin, Aleksandr. Konets Ekonomiki [The End of economy]. St. Petersburg: Amfora,
2010. 480 p. Hardcover. 13 x 20 cm. ISBN 9785367014556

This book analyzes the world financial crisis from the Eurasian platform. It
attacks the liberal system of modern capitalism, and offers a new, non-liberal,
approach to overcoming the crisis.
-------------------

Fedorov, V.V. Russkii Vybor: Vvedenie v Teoriiu Elektoral'nogo Povedeniia
[Russian choice: Introduction into the theory of electoral behavior]. Moscow:
Praksis, 2010. 370 p. ill.  Obraz obshchestva  Hardcover. 12.5 x 20 cm. ISBN
9785901574799

This monograph analyzes the main trends in the electoral behavior of population
of Russia against the background of recent Russian political history. It also
covers the latest period: tandemocratia, course on conservative modernization,
evolution of the post crisis political system, "sovereign democracy" and
ideological war against the West.
------------------------------

Kolupaev, V.E. Pravoslavnaia Kniga Russkogo Zarubezh'ia Pervoi Poloviny XX Veka:
Iz Istorii Tipografskogo Bratstva Iova Pochaevskogo, Volyn'-Karpaty, 1903-1944.
[Russian Orthodox book abroad in the first half of the 20th century: From the
history of publishing by the Job Pochaevskii brotherhood: Volun-Carpathian Mts,
1903-1944]. Introd. By S.V. Bushuev. Moscow: Pashkov dom, 2010. 279 p. pbk. 14 x
20 cm. Printing 300. ISBN 9785751004323.

This monograph studies the history of publishing activities by the Russian
Orthodox Church abroad, particularly by the Russian reverend Job Pochaevskii
publisher-brotherhood as a part of Pochaevo Assumption Lavra in the 20th
century. The main attention is paid to two periods in the publishing activities:
the Civil war in Russia and the first wave of Russian emigration. Bibliography.
Indices.
---------------

Kuraev Andrei. Missionerskii Krizis Pravoslaviia [Missionary crisis of Russian
Orthodoxy]. Moscow: Nikeia, 2010. 299 p. Hardcover. 14 x 20 cm. ISBN
9785917610238.

This book by archdeacon Andrei Karaev is about the centuries long tradition and
the current state of missionary tradition of Russian Orthodoxy. The author
stresses the most important mission of the Church - saving the people of Russia.
-------------------------

Shkarovskii, M.V. Russkaia Tserkov' i Tretii Reikh [The Russian Orthodox church
and the Third Reich]. Moscow: Veche, 2010. 461 p.  Russkii vopros  Hardcover. 13
x 20 cm. ISBN 9785953350044.

This book tells the history of the Church revival on the occupied territory,
mostly Russian North (Leningrad and Pskov regions), the scale of this revival,
ideological and spiritual directions. The Russian church did not collaborate
with the occupiers, and did not became an instrument of their authority. The
Germans also failed to split the Church from within. (0.475 kg.). The book
continues the series of studies by the same author on this subject: Tserkov'
Zovet k Zashchite Rodiny: Religioznaia Zhizn' Leningrada i Severo-Zapada v Gody
Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (2005); Krest i Svastika: Natsistskaia Germaniia i
Pravoslavnaia Tserkov'
-------------------

Gumilev, L.N., Maniagin, V.G., Pleteneva, S.A. Khazary: Tainstvennyi Sled v
Russkoi istorii [Khazars, or a mysterious track in Russian history]. 2nd ed.
Moscow: Algoritm, Eksmo, 2010. 335 p.  Slavnaia Rus'  Hardcover. 12.5 x 20 cm.
ISBN 9785699406302.

This volume includes three historical studies about the Khazars: N. Gumilev.
Otkrytie Khazarii; V. Maniagin. Operatsiia "Belyi Dom": Khazary v Russkoi
Istorii; S. Pletneva. Khazary.
-------------------------

Lyskov, D.Iu. 1937. Glavnyi Mif XX veka [1937: The principle myth of the 20th
century]. 2nd ed. Moscow: Eksmo, Iauza, 2010. 288 p.  1937. Bol'shoi terror 
Hardcover. 13 x 20 cm. ISBN 9785699400669.

This book is interesting reading because it gives an alternative view of
Stalin's repressions based on NKVD documents: statistical data on GULAG
prisoners, their life style, rehabilitation, etc. The author claims to be
objective and impartial and rely only on statistics and fact. But can NKVD
documents be a reliable source? Appendices. This is the second edition of
Stalinskie Repressii: Velikaia Lozh' XX veka" (2009).
-------------------

Karrer d'Ankoss, E. (Carrere d'Encausse, Helene). Ekaterina II: Zolotoi Vek v
Rossiiskoi Imeprii [Catherine II: The Golden Age of the Russian Empire] =
Catherine II: Un age d'or pour la Russie. 2nd ed. Transl. from French by O.D.
Chekhovich. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010. 503 p. Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN
9785824313611.

This is an energetic and mostly romantic biography of Catherine II, who left a
very visible trace in Russian history. Bibliography. Name index.
------------------

Volkogonova, O.D. Berdiaev [Berdiaev]. Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 2010. 407 p.
[16 ill.]  Zhizn' Zamechatel'nykh Liudei: Seriia Biografii. Vyp. 1257 
Hardcover. 13 x 20 cm. ISBN 9785235033610.

This book is an intellectual biography of the well known Russian philosopher
Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdiaev (1874-1948), his circle in Russian and
emigration, and his philosophical works. Chronology of Berdiaev's life.
---------------------

Evropa v Rossii: Sbornik Statei [Europe in Russia: Collection]. Moscow: NLO,
2010. 457 p. Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN 9785867938024.

This book continues the series of mutual publications of Helsinki and Tartu
Universities. The collection studies those aspects of Russian culture,
particularly literature, from the 18th century to the present, which could not
be understood without studying them in a West-European context. The contributors
cover a wide area of writers and subjects: Sumarokov, Pushkin, Gogol',
Viazemskii, L. Tolstoi, magazine Apollon, O. Mandel'shtam, D. Kharms, M.
Tsvetaeva, etc.
------------------

Verkhovskii, A.M., Kozhevnikova, G.V., Sibireva, O.A. Xenophobia, Freedom of
Conscience and Anti-extremism in Russia in 2009: A Collection of annual reports
by the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis. Transl. to English by I.
Savel'eva. Moscow: Informatsionno-Analiticheskii Tsentr "Sova", 2010. 131 p.
ill., tables. pbk. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN 9785984180184.

A collection of annual reports summarizes all the major areas of research by the
SOVA Center for Information and Analysis in 2009. The first report addresses
pressing issues, such as the growth of radical nationalism, hate crimes, and the
efforts of government and society to combat these problems. The second report
focuses on the increasingly visible tendency to misuse legislation against what
is now referred to as 'extremism'. The third report explores various problems
relating to freedom of conscience in contemporary Russia. This is the fourth
annual report of the SOVA Center on this topic. Appendices include statistical
data and the cases which were tried in Russian courts on the "extremist"
charges. Previous volumes and standing order are available.
===========================

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THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM BULLETIN
A Biweekly Newsletter of Current Affairs
Vol. 6, No. 5(161), 10 March 2012
Compilers: Parikrama Gupta & Andreas Umland

I    NEWS: 15 - 29 February 2012
II   SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS
III  PRIMARY SOURCES

[NOTE: When viewing an RNB issue in the Messages archive of the homepage and the
end of the text is truncated, scroll to the end of the message and click "Expand
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==============================


I    NEWS: 15 - 29 February 2012

Nashi Movement May Be Dissolved Following Reshuffle in Political Organizations -
Newspaper
Interfax, Febr. 15, 2012 - JRL 2012-29

MOSCOW. Feb 15 (Interfax) - After the former leader of the Young Guard of United
Russia, Timur Prokopenko, was offered a position in the presidential
administration, the youth movement Nashi may be dissolved and the next youth
forum on Lake Seliger - cancelled, Izvestia daily reported on Wednesday.
  "The Young Guard does not rule out that Nashi will be shut down as a project
while the political weakening of the movement in its turn may put an end to the
famous annual camp of youth movements on Seliger," the daily reported quoting a
source on the organization.
"It is a big question whether Seliger will be held. Probably, there will be some
other camps but under a different brand name," he added.
Many veterans of the Nashi movement who constitute the majority of officials at
the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs are expecting dismissal and "honorary
retirement," the Young Guard believes.
An Izvestia source at the headquarters of 'V for Vladimir' campaign which
coordinates the actions of four youth movements noted that pressure on Nashi has
been growing.
"They are simply being ousted, slandered. Though it's not quite clear to me why
all this is being done. I think it will be much more difficult for the country's
leadership without Nashi," the source said.
The source felt that the headquarters will not lose its positions but will see a
serious reform after the March 4 presidential election.
Meanwhile, Prokopenko in an interview with the daily did not rule out the
possibility of the Young Guard merging with other youth movements remarking that
the new leader of the youth wing of United Russia should think of its future.
"In the future I plan working with all youth organizations. Youth is
indivisible," he said.

http://cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-nashi-dissolved-423.cfm#.Tz9GWc8_OdM.facebo\
ok
-------------------

Modern election campaigns in Russia dirtier than in 1990s - Zyuganov
Interfax, Febr. 16, 2012 - JRL 2012-29

MOSCOW. Feb 16 (Interfax) - State Duma elections in the early 1990s were fairer
than the election campaign of December 2011, Communist Party leader Gennady
Zyuganov told reporters. "The first election campaigns were fairer due to the
Soviet character and morals. All the dirty techniques were designed here, in
Moscow, while regional election campaigns were fairer," he said.
Zyuganov said he was indignant at the publication of compromising materials
about him.
"The Ne Dai Bog (God Forbid) newspaper aimed against me was published in Finland
in the 1990s, they did not dare to publish it here. Nine newspapers of the sort
were published in Samara alone in the December election campaign. Russia had
never witnessed such a dirty and disguising campaign before. Our election
observers had never before been dragged out of polling stations by their legs
with the police connivance," he said.
Zyuganov said that his campaign representatives distributing Communist Party
newspapers were attacked in Rostov on Wednesday.
"Our group distributing newspapers was beaten in Rostov yesterday. They attacked
Bessonov and my observers. They were put into a cage at the police station and
kept there until I asked the interior minister to stop that outrage. We also
offered to send special commissions to the Rostov region and Dagestan," he said.

http://cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-elections-dirty-420.cfm#.Tz9G451nPrA.facebo\
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--------------

Russia must stay "combat ready" - Orthodox Church
Russia Today, 17 February, 2012

Speaking on matters beyond the realm of the spiritual, a top Orthodox Church
cleric said Russia must play a greater role in responding to ongoing global
events that could deteriorate into a world war.
"There are many processes occurring in the world in which Russia should play a
much more active role," Vsevolod Chaplin, a high-placed cleric in the Russian
Orthodox Church, said in an interview with the Svobodnaya Pressa ('Free Press')
publishing house. "The economic and social contradictions that have cropped up
in the world are so powerful that they are sure to blow up into serious military
operations."
Chaplin said Russia's military must remain "combat-ready" to prevent the
outbreak of military incidents on or around its territory.
"In order to ensure that these military operations not unfold on our territory
or in the vicinity of our borders, we need to keep our armed forces combat
ready," Chaplin said.
Russia must actively participate in settling all situations that may lead to a
war, be it the Middle East or Central Asia, where the situation is also tense,
he added.
"By all accounts, we will not manage to escape a big war," Chaplin warned, while
adding that civilization's current trajectory "may lead to the annihilation of
cities."

http://rt.com/politics/russia-orthodox-church-military-world-war-587/
----------------

Latvians Reject Russian As National Language
Associated Press, February 18, 2012

RIGA, Latvia (AP) - Latvian voters resoundingly rejected a proposal to give
official status to Russian, the mother tongue of their former Soviet occupiers,
though the defeated referendum Saturday is expected to leave scars on an already
divided society.
Russian is the first language for about one-third of the Baltic country's 2.1
million people, and many of them would like to accord official status to the
language to reverse what they claim has been 20 years of discrimination.
But for ethnic Latvians, the referendum was a brazen attempt to encroach on
Latvia's independence, which was restored two decades ago after a half-century
of occupation by the Soviet Union following World War II.
Many Latvians still consider Russian - the lingua franca of the Soviet Union -
as the language of the former occupiers. They also harbor deep mistrust toward
Russia and worry that Moscow attempts to wield influence in Latvia through the
ethnic Russian minority.
"Latvia is the only place throughout the world where Latvian is spoken, so we
have to protect it," said Martins Dzerve, 37, in Riga, Latvia's capital. "But
Russian is everywhere."
With over 93 percent of ballots counted, 75 percent of voters said they were
against Russian as a national language, according to the Central Election
Commission results.
However, in the eastern region of Latgale, which straddles the border with
Russia, a majority of voters approved changing the constitution to make Russian
a national language. The region is Latvia's poorest and has a high percentage of
ethnic Russians and other minorities.
"Society is divided into two classes - one half has full rights, and the other
half's rights are violated," said Aleksejs Yevdokimovs, 36. "The Latvian half
always employs a presumption of guilt toward the Russian half, so that we have
to prove things that shouldn't need to be proven," he said.
The referendum sparked high voter participation, with more than 70 percent of
registered voters casting ballots - considerably higher more than in previous
elections and referendums. Long lines were seen at many precincts both in Latvia
and abroad, with voters in London reportedly braving a three-hour wait.
In Chicago, Mara Varpa, 57, said she voted against the proposal since Latvian is
an integral part of the national identity and should therefore remain the sole
official language.
"I don't think there should have been a referendum to begin with because it's
already in the constitution, but since there was I had to vote," Varpa said.
Though the Russians who spearheaded the referendum admitted they had no chance
at winning the plebiscite, they at least hope the approximate 25 percent of
support will force Latvia's center-right government to begin a dialogue with
national minorities.
Hundreds of thousands of Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians moved to Latvia
and the neighboring Baltic republics during the population transfers of the
Soviet regime. Many of them never learned Latvian and were denied citizenship
when Latvia regained independence, meaning they don't have the right to vote or
work in government.
According to the current law, anyone who moved to Latvia during the Soviet
occupation, or was born to parents who moved there, is considered a noncitizen
and must pass the Latvian language exam in order to become a citizen.
There are approximately 300,000 noncitizens in Latvia.
Politicians and analysts said the plebiscite will widen the schism in society
and that the government will have to undertake serious efforts to consolidate
the country's two groups.
Many fear the disgruntled minority will keep up the pressure by calling for more
referendums to change Latvia's constitution for minorities' benefit.
------------------

More Than Half Of Russians Concerned About Foreign Military Threat - Survey
Interfax - 20 February 2012

Moscow: Many Russians are still concerned about a foreign military threat to
Russia while they are confident the army will be able to protect them, a survey
has shown.
Whereas in 2012 some 47 per cent of citizens considered a military threat to
Russia real, in 2012 there are 55 per cent of them, the Levada-Centre pollster
shared with Interfax results of the all-Russian survey held in January.
According to it, 36 per cent of respondents see no such threat whereas two years
ago their share stood at 42 per cent.
Some 60 per cent of respondents are confident that the army will be able to
protect Russia in case of a true military threat, although their share has lost
three percentage points over two years. The number of sceptics has increased
significantly, from 22 per cent to 27 per cent.
Asked whether they want their near and dear to be on military service, 53 per
cent of respondents answered no, and 37 per cent said they would not mind.
The respondents' concern about their near and dear joining military service has
to do with abuse in the army (37 per cent). "Bullying" and "violence in the
army" are still named among the main problems of the armed forces.
Commenting on other reasons for this attitude, 21 per cent of respondents
mentioned the risk of death or injury of their near and dear, 15 per cent -
intimidation by officers, 14 per cent - difficult conditions of service, and 10
per cent each - army collapse and moral decay. Eight per cent consider military
service a waste of time, while 7 per cent mentioned crimes in the army,
Levada-Centre said.
Bullying and intimidation of young servicemen by officers and senior colleagues
are characteristic of most military units, 40 per cent of Russians said. Every
fifth respondent (19 per cent) said these were omnipresent.
The survey carried out by Levada-Centre among 1,600 respondents revealed that
there are more Russians who would favour the army's transfer to contract service
(51 per cent) than those preferring general conscription (43 per cent).
According to the pollster, in 2008 these shares stood at 48 per cent and 45 per
cent respectively.

http://cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-majority-russians-concerned-about-threats-4\
41.cfm
----

Pro-Putin Youth Groups to Guard Against 'Provocations'
RIA Novosti, 21/02/2012

The pro-Kremlin youth movements Nashi and Stal (Steel) plan to deploy 20,000
activists to Moscow streets as Russians prepare to vote in the presidential
election on March 4, the Nashi press service reported on Tuesday.
The pro-Kremlin youth movements Nashi and Stal (Steel) plan to deploy 20,000
activists to Moscow streets as Russians prepare to vote in the presidential
election on March 4, the Nashi press service reported on Tuesday.
Thousands of Nashi activists will be engaged "round the clock" on March 4-12
monitoring the streets and squares of Moscow to prevent "provocations," the
press service said in a statement
The two movements will oppose "any illegal attempts to destabilize the situation
or to place the results of the presidential election in question."
Earlier it was reported that Stal and the youth arm of Russia's ruling United
Russia party, Molodaya Gvardia (Young Guard), planned to hold rallies on
Moscow's Manezhnaya, Lubyanskaya, Teatralnaya, Bolotnaya and Revolution squares
and at other sites in the capital.
Nashi commissioner Maria Kislitsina reminded opposition protesters or, as she
called them, "representatives of the Russian opposition and their foreign
sponsors," that her movement had successfully responded to opposition
demonstrations on Triumfalnaya Square after disputed State Duma elections in
December.
"Nashi was able to answer the provocateurs that organized an unsanctioned rally
on Triumfalnaya Square on December 6, 2011, when we gathered greater numbers at
the square and we will be able to answer them now," Kislitsina said in the
statement.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120221/171437821.html
--------------

Percentage of Russians who attend church reaches 71% - poll
Interfax, 27 February 2012

Moscow - The number of Russians who go to temples increased considerably over
the past two decades. Sociologists have found that the most frequently observed
ritual is the placement of candles in church (it is observed by both believers
and non-believers).
Over the past 16 years, the number of Russians who go to church, mosque, or
synagogue increased from 57% to 71%. 7% of the respondents go to religious
buildings at least once a month, 30% go to religious buildings from time to
time, and 34% go to religious buildings rarely.
The number of Russians who do not go to temples has decreased considerably (from
42% to 26%), VTsIOM told Interfax, citing its study.
According to VTsIOM, 11% of Russians at a pension age and 11% residents of
Moscow and the Moscow region and only 5% of young people and people in villages
go to temples at least once a month.
83% of Orthodox respondents reported going to church. 11% of the respondents
said they go into churches rarely or from time to time.
The most frequently observed ritual in church is the placing of candles. 81%
percent of Russians who go to church reported observing it, and 80% of those who
go to church rarely and 82% of those who go to church from time to time said
they place candles in church. The ritual is equally observed by Orthodox
respondents (86%) and respondents who do not consider themselves believers
(81%).
The poll, which was conducted in 138 populated areas in 46 regions, territories,
and republics of Russia in mid-February, shows that a considerable number of
people who go to temples (38%) just speak to God, 31% read prayers, 27% kiss
holy relics, 33% give alms, 29% donate money to temples, and 9% go to temples to
sanctify things.
11% of those who go to temples told sociologists that they normally just watch.

http://cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-religion-russians-attend-church-494.cfm
===========================


II   SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS

A Partial Declaration of Human Rights: Tired of western criticism, Russia trains
its sights on practices elsewhere
By Oliver Bullough
Transitions Online, 31 January 2012

For years, Russia has tolerated the State Department's annual criticism of its
human rights situation, but not anymore.     It was in April that Moscow finally
lost patience. If America would not stop poking it with the human rights stick,
it said (though not in precisely those words), Russia would pick up the stick,
too. It appointed a human rights commissioner and promised to publish probes of
its own.     Its first publication, a "Report on the situation concerning human
Rights in certain states" came out last month [link in Russian]. It is extremely
revealing, though not perhaps for the reasons its author, Konstantin Dolgov, the
Russian Foreign Ministry's new commissioner for human rights, democracy, and the
rule of law, intended. "The idea is to show that problems in the sphere of human
rights and democracy are present in all states. No one is ideal," Dolgov
explained to Kommersant Vlast after the report was published on the Foreign
Ministry website.     "We do not accept attempts to persistently and intrusively
teach us democracy. Sadly, some of our partners have used such tactics. It is of
course important for them to carefully read the Russian report."     If they do
read the report, carefully or otherwise, they will find that many of its general
concerns - domestic violence in Finland, detainee abuse in Britain,
anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe - are identical to those in its American rival.
Many of the sources are the same, too. Dolgov's document is studded with
references to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House.    
This is strange, since the Foreign Ministry criticizes those international human
rights groups almost as much as it does Washington. One of Dolgov's first
statements, last May, was to attack Amnesty for its "politicized" decision to
name Mikhail Khodorkovsky a prisoner of conscience.     It is not these general
issues that make the American and Russian reports interesting, but rather the
individual cases they pick up on. The State Department lists dozens of cases in
an overwhelming barrage of information: murdered girls, bullied conscripts,
intimidated trade unionists. Dolgov has clearly decided to copy the approach,
right down to the bare minimum of text formatting used to present it.     But he
gets it terribly wrong.     Perhaps because he was a professor in the Foreign
Ministry's diplomatic academy rather than a human rights researcher, Dolgov
focuses on diplomacy. That means his examples are often not rights cases at all,
but perceived insults to the Russian government.
TARGET USA
The United States, of course, is his main target and occupies the first 17 of
the English-language version's 79 pages. Much of that is perfectly valid
criticism of Guantanamo Bay, gun laws, racism, and more. It is all very general,
and breaks no new ground, but it is welcome and seems motivated by the best
ideals. When he comes to specific cases, however, he betrays very different
impulses.     "Extraterritorial application of American laws leads to violations
of the basic rights and freedoms of Russians, including arbitrary arrests and
abductions from third countries, ill-treatment, criminal prosecution based on
the basis of evidence given by false agents, and doubtful evidence (cases
against Viktor Bout and Konstantin Yaroshenko are the most striking examples),"
the report says.     If Bout and Yaroshenko are really the best examples he can
come up with, you'd be forgiven from wondering what Dolgov actually means by
"basic rights and freedoms."     Bout, known as the "merchant of death," was
convicted in November of gun running and awaits sentencing in a U.S. jail.
Campaigners accuse him of selling weapons used in many of the most gruesome wars
since 1991. Russia was furious about his extradition from Thailand, where he was
arrested, possibly because he used to work for the security services. It is
peculiar for a human rights report to champion the cause of a convicted arms
smuggler, but perhaps not as strange as Dolgov's second example.     Yaroshenko
was arrested in Liberia with four tons of cocaine in 2010, extradited to America
and convicted. Quite how his case qualifies as a human rights violation remains
unclear from Dolgov's report, though Washington's failure to inform Moscow
before flying him to America explains the annoyance felt in the Foreign
Ministry.     Such annoyance is certainly the only way to explain Dolgov's
decision to highlight the case of Sergei Magnitsky. Magnitsky was a Russian
lawyer who exposed massive corruption, was arrested by the police officers he
was investigating, held for almost a year without charge, and left to die in
pre-trial detention. The scandal features in the State Department report, which
alleges that the police probe into the death is going slowly because "important
people are implicated." Washington has since barred officials involved in the
case from entering the United States in an attempt to spur them into action.    
Sergei Magnitsky In a paragraph of great tastelessness, Dolgov decides that
America is the real villain in the Magnitsky affair and criticizes its
"provocative political games." The treatment of top Russian officials, he
informs the world, "violates the presumption of innocence principle." If any
sentence condemns his report outright, it is this one.     But the report does
not stop with the Americans. It goes on to tackle the European Union, once more
covering traditional ground - the problems faced by Roma, by Muslims, the rise
in intolerance and xenophobia, domestic violence. Again, though, while the
general themes are decent, the specific cases suggest a definition of human
rights violations at odds with almost everyone else's.     In the State
Department report, every country is analyzed under a series of set headings,
which are based on the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Here, there is no such structure, and specific examples tend to appear only when
Russia is involved in some way. Sweden, which does not normally feature large in
human rights reports, gets a swipe for failing to extradite two Chechen
refugees, for example.     The largest portion of bile in the 47 pages devoted
to the European Union is reserved for those states with Russian minorities - the
three Baltic states, which get 16 pages among them, and Finland, which gets
five.     Dolgov highlights a series of child protection cases in Finland. It
would seem the only reason why he does is in each of them one of the parents was
Russian: it is hard to understand otherwise how they belong in a human rights
report. In the "Rantala case," for example, social workers took a half-Russian
child into care; then his mother, Inga, spirited him away to Russia and refused
to give him up.     "Inga does not plan to return to Finland, where she has to
appear before court on charges of inflicting bodily harm on her son, which was
the main reason why the boy was taken away from his parents," the report states,
without acknowledging that Russia's role in shielding an alleged abusive parent
makes the boy's current situation at best extremely troubling.     Moving on to
the Baltic states, where there are indeed serious concerns about the status of
ethnic Russians who have lived there since communist times, Dolgov fumes at
length about the locals' lack of gratitude to the Soviet Union.     "Of special
concern is the policy continued in all three Baltic states to rewrite the
history of World War II, the equalization of Nazi and Soviet regimes, attempts
to glorify Nazis and their local collaborators," he writes. He even singles out
a book, Bloodlands by Yale history Professor Timothy Snyder, for criticism. It
was praised as a work of near-perfect history by many critics but is rejected as
biased by Dolgov for comparing the terrors that Joseph Stalin inflicted on
Eastern Europe with those of the Nazis.     He ties the Baltic states' attempts
to re-interpret the results of World War II for themselves to a growth in
neo-Nazi activity and links it to mistreatment of ethnic Russians. The problems
started with schools, he says.     "In the view of local Russian experts, they
give a one-dimensional overview of the centuries-old Russian history with a
focus on Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Lenin, and 'bloody' Stalin. The school
history curriculum consciously portrays an unattractive image of a Russia that
people should be afraid of," Dolgov writes.     He favorably quotes accusations
by an ethnic Russian member of the Latvian parliament that the school policy,
which means some Russian speakers attend non-Russian-language schools, is
equivalent to genocide.     By this stage in the report, it has become clear
what specific violations really worry the Russian Foreign Ministry: the
extradition of Russians anywhere but to Russia; the non-extradition of people to
Russia; criticism of Russia's actions either present or past; perceived
persecution of any Russian speaker, whether he does or does not hold a Russian
passport.
TEN PAGES ON GEORGIA
And that is abundantly clear in the pages devoted to Georgia. Although Georgia
is not one of the "developed democratic states" that Dolgov said he would
describe, it earns 10 pages in the report, thus coming second only to America
for sheer volume of criticism. Dolgov dashes through the standard attacks on
Georgia, including admittedly some important allegations concerning its
treatment of ethnic minorities, before getting to the heart of his complaints.
"Russian citizens, primarily ethnic Georgians, coming to Georgia on private
business, become targets of provocations and abuse by Georgian special services.
Different spying scandals that are being invented become more and more
far-fetched," he writes.     There follows a list of cases in which Georgia has
jailed Russian citizens for drugs offenses, weapons offenses, or spying. The
convictions may be unfair, and in fact they probably are, but it is telling that
Dolgov did not detail a single case involving a non-Russian. In fact, this
section gives the final proof that this report is not about human rights at all;
it is about Russians' rights. And that suggests why Moscow still cannot
understand the criticism it faces.     If this report is anything to go by, the
Foreign Ministry does not consider human rights to be universal, but to depend
on one's citizenship. If that is how Russian diplomats think, it is hardly
surprising that they bridle when the State Department questions how Russia
treats Russians. It is not, they might think, any of America's business.     We
have been here before. In the 1980s, the Soviet government finally got fed up of
constant criticism of its human rights abuses. Those were the days of the
refuseniks, of Sakharov in Gorky, and of the psychiatric incarceration of
dissidents.     Soviet diplomats had previously rejected criticism as
interference in their internal affairs, but at the Ottawa human rights
conference in 1985 they changed course. They compiled their own dossiers on
health care, anti-Semitism and maternity benefits, and used them to counter
attack the west. Those were valid concerns, as are many of the issues raised by
Dolgov, but the tactic did not work. It just encouraged the western experts into
thinking the Russians wanted a dialogue, when they wanted nothing of the kind.
Then, as now, they wanted everyone to shut up.     In April, when the State
Department produced its latest report, the Russian Foreign Ministry suggested
that its "U.S. partners abandon the practice of publishing such provocative
research." The State Department, of course, has not done so and it is hard to
imagine this unfortunate report shaming it or anyone else into silence.
(Oliver Bullough is a former Reuters correspondent in Moscow. He is now Caucasus
editor for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and the author of Let Our
Fame Be Great: Journeys Among the Defiant People of the Caucasus. This
commentary originally appeared on openDemocracy.net.)

http://www.tol.org/client/article/22971-russia-democracy.html
----------------------

Mother's boys: conversations with the parents of Russia's neo-Nazis
Olesya Gerasimenko,
Open Democracy, 02nd February 2012

Russia's growing nationalist movement has alarmed many liberal commentators, who
wonder how the country that defeated Adolf Hitler could have given birth to so
many young men overtly sympathetic to his ideas. Journalist Olesya Gerasimenko,
who has covered several neo-Nazi trials, wondered where the defendants came
from: how Russian boys could go out and kill foreigners in cold blood. She
persuaded three of the convicted murderers' parents to talk to her.
I often observe them in court. They sigh and observe how their son - accused of
15 murders - has lost weight. They wink at him furtively. They beg the guard to
loosen his handcuffs, oblivious to the voice of the prosecutor: 'demonstrating
their own superiority over people of non-Slavic origin, they attacked the victim
K., whose external appearance indicated Asian ethnicity, and struck him with a
knife no less than 26 times in the head and other parts of the body, causing
wounds to the chest, which penetrated the right and left pleural and abdominal
cavities with damage to the right and left lungs, the left part of the
diaphragm, the spleen, the third and ninth ribs on the left, and the chest, as a
result of which the victim died from severe loss of blood'.
I want to ask: did you know, did you guess, did you support this? What were you
thinking when they were arrested? Do you believe the judges? Have you come to
terms with this? Are you proud, or are you ashamed?
But the parents of those nationalists convicted of violent crimes are rarely
asked about these things, and they themselves are not keen to talk. Only a few
agreed to meet me, and even they didn't agree immediately. 'And what views do
you yourself hold?' 'You're not interested in the documents.' 'You're not going
to actually print any of this!' But after 15 minutes of face-to-face
conversation it becomes clear that they do have something to say.
One has adopted the views of their only child and says that violence is
necessary. One blames the politicians that have incited adolescents to street
fighting. One cries, convinced of the innocence of his son. They are all
different, but they have all asked themselves one and the same question: 'am I
to blame for what happened?'
Elena Krivets, academic, mother of Vasily Krivets
Vasily Krivets is a 23-year-old nationalist. He was sentenced in 2010 to life
imprisonment for 15 murders. The victims were citizens of Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Russia. He was arrested, but escaped police custody
when taken to one of the crime scenes for a reconstruction and hid for almost a
year. He did not confess to a single one of the crimes and refused to give
evidence.
'Vasya is a warrior. And everything follows from this. When he was a child all
his little fingers were pistols, all of them shooting. Then he formed his toy
soldiers into armies. Then we played together, conquering Constantinople.
Gradually he gained an education. He's not the kind of warrior who just lashes
out with his fists and feet, but a warrior who understands history and
tradition. I myself have a degree in philosophy, and my husband was a political
scientist.
Our family line is an old one, we're Cossacks. So his love of history appeared
by itself. He started with the American Indians and the Civil War. Straight away
he wanted to go and save the American Indians. He investigated the Civil War
himself, and the White Army immediately interested him. He's now completely
debunked the myth of some great victory by the Red Army. He came to venerate the
Tsar, Nicholas II.
I had an aunt, a noblewoman, an aristocrat, she gave me a different
understanding of history, which differed from what the communists taught about
the Tsar, the Tsarina. She laid in me the foundations of religion. Vasily read
children's books about the Tsar. Somehow or other we were in St. Petersburg; we
were called into the University and he, 12 years old, asked us to buy him
Tikhomirov's academic volume on Russian history. We, laughing, bought it. At
home he leafed through it a bit and said - when I grow up, I'll read it. He was
already studying it in his first year of higher education.
There was a period when my husband and I were travelling in Egypt on business,
and the whole time there Vasya kept saying it was 'lost time'. I didn't
understand at all. I thought it would be interesting for a teenager to see
another country, to travel. I understood only later that he felt a deep sense of
his motherland, and he was homesick. Even in his young heart he felt that he had
been cut off from the life of the country.
When he was studying in years nine and ten he went to a Cossack Sunday school.
This was a club at his school. There were field expeditions, reconnaissance. I
myself taught Orthodox catechism there, Cossack history. I went there specially.
You should never let a child out of your sight, without knowing what and how he
will be taught. Never. A mother must always know exactly what a teacher is
telling her child. It is the parents, you see, not the teachers, who will answer
before God for that child.
'And it was then that I understood that there have always been individuals who
went to battle like this; rather than cautiously, correctly, with their eye on
the final outcome. Sometimes the outcome isn't important. In order to raise the
masses, you need a loud cry and a summons.'
When he finished school he said: 'I'm a soldier, I need to enter a military
institute of higher education'. But his intellectual inclination was more
towards the humanities. And in a military college you need to pass algebra. I
said to him: 'well, into what sort of military institute?' And he answered 'for
officers'. Well, he got in, and studied for about seven months. Then he ran away
because, as he said himself, the uniform was 1944-style, and he got into the
political science faculty instead. Our local church had a club for free style
wrestling, hand-to-hand fighting and such like. Vasya carried on going on
expeditions with them. They completed reconnaissance tasks there, you know, like
we used to play 'Summer Lightening' (a 'military-patriotic' game played in the
Soviet Union's pioneer camps - editor).
With time he began to notice what was going on. In particular that Moscow was
filling up with foreigners. And when he was around 16 years old he started to
fight them. He of course didn't say anything about it, but it was clear from the
jeans he wore, and from his requests that we buy a certain type of boots. Once
he mentioned that he had fought with black people over the drugs they were
distributing in the metro. I didn't see any fighting, but at home there was
always discussion over whether violence was necessary or not. I was always
against it. But he argued that it is right: that the Lord helps those who help
themselves; that we need action as well as prayers. And action for him, as for a
soldier, was to use his hands. It is only now that I agree with him. The court
case has been and gone, the sentence too, so you see how long it took me to
reach this position. And lots of people asked me why our lads went so openly,
nakedly, unarmed, to battle. And it was then that I understood that there have
always been individuals who went to battle like this; rather than cautiously,
correctly, with their eye on the final outcome. Sometimes the outcome isn't
important. In order to raise the masses, you need a loud cry and a challenge.
The arrest wasn't unexpected: we'd already had a similar experience with him. We
have Cossack ancestry, and Don Cossacks always fought with Turks - and the first
case we had was precisely with a Turk. That struck me. Then he had to be bought
out of trouble - well, not exactly bought out, but this case had to be covered
up by any means possible. It was a murder: there were three of them, two
survived, one died. From that moment on Vasily's views became clear. I
understood that I wouldn't change him. We didn't row, no, that would have driven
my son away from me. You must always protect your relationship with your child.
I needed not to lose him. After the incident with the Turk I said: 'Vas, first
pay off the debt - we are in debt - I can't do this myself, you help me. Study
and work for now'. I thought I'd found a brilliant solution. For some time at
least I could hold on to him.
Later he came to me himself and said: 'Mum, I've come to the conclusion that
it's time to take action'. I looked sadly at him and remained silent. And what
could I say?
Confrontation has increased: the town is full of foreigners from other races
with completely different mentalities, with whom we do not want to live. As a
result white parents will now go anywhere, even to the outskirts of Moscow, just
so to make sure there are only children like theirs in the classroom. Well, this
is now happening all over the world. And genetic research has shown that when a
person encounters someone of a different race, you see, he expends a huge amount
of inner energy in order to suppress his inner opposition to them. Even these
gay parades have started here. He also went to them, bashed the queers - well,
these people's mentalities are so alien. He asked: 'where will be the place for
my children?' And it's true, it's already impossible to raise children in
purity.
The government has a system in place to destroy our nation. Some people are
imprisoned for drugs, others for drunkenness, others again for screwing around.
Some people are stuffed full of money; this younger generation earns a good
wage. And only a few remain who can understand what is happening. And how does
the government find them? They need to provoke them, for example, to attack
foreigners. There were an awful lot of provocateurs in the movement. Parents
wrote to Putin saying that their children were being zombified, were being got
at through the Internet. If someone is by nature a nationalist, simply loves his
motherland, and he sees everything that is going on, then they stir him up.
'The political system is built like that: they blame lads for not liking
non-Russians.'
He understands now that he went against these blacks for nothing, that this
process is being controlled by the government and bureaucrats. And what's the
point of fighting these ordinary people? There's another million on their way
here. Confronting them has helped a little bit though. Everything counts.
We held out hope until the very last moment during the court case. We prayed to
St. Nicholas in the corridors, because they wouldn't let us into the courtroom.
But Judge Olikhver (chief justice in the case of Vasilii Krivets Natalia
Olikhver - editor) is possessed by demons, she felt the spirit. In the recesses
she would run out into the corridor and throw us out the door.
Despite the fact that they jail our children, we parents are united and think
about what is wrong in our lives, and where the truth lies. The government has
done us a favour by introducing us to each other. There are parents who take the
side of their children. And there are also parents who refuse to accept their
children's views, who won't accept the struggle. Some manage to deflect their
children. Some don't manage to.  To begin with I didn't agree with Vasily, but I
could hardly do nothing: freedom must take priority.
I work in the Academy of Sciences, researching a doctorate in history; I write
academic articles and teach. Vasily has been good for me, he's given me a lot.
He's cleverer than me. He digs something up and shares it with me. And I with
him.
What would I say to him, if he were to come out now and say that he was going to
carry on killing, fighting the system? Well, what can one say to a person whose
soul aches for the motherland and who is ready to give up his life for it? A
mother can only bless. And know, that she blesses unto death.'
Andrei Appolonov, engineer, father of Victor Appolonov
Victor Appolonov is a 22-year-old member of the National-Socialist Society North
(NSO-Sever) and was sentenced to life imprisonment for five murders. On the day
the sentence was announced he entered the courtroom shouting 'Yids, prepare to
die!' and 'Baburova croaked, and you'll croak too!' (for further detail see 'The
case of the thirteen [9]' in issue no. 29, 25 July).
'We immediately refused a lawyer, because they are useless. I think that's it's
useless to go to the Supreme Court too. This is a case that's been politically
ordered, so it's difficult to contest. The investigator told me himself that he
sits there like the Tsarist secret police: whoever needs to be sent down, he
sends down.
I've worked all my life as an engineer in a factory, politics never interested
me and I never subscribed to any party. But now, if you don't get interested in
politics, then sooner or later, politics will take an interest in you. I started
to look at what was happening only when they took my son, arrested him. And I
understood that power is simply being divided up between the clans on high, and
up there our children are expendable material. So there is politics here, which
came about because Putin is in office. Because of him, hundreds of lads are
sitting in prison. If it were only my son accused of murder or something else.
But it's impacting on so many people! In our group almost everyone is
unacquainted; they even lived in different towns - Sergiev Posad, Mytishchi,
Novgorod. And who's guilty here? Did their parents give them knives and say: 'go
out and kill'?
The political system is built like that: they blame lads for not liking
non-Russians - because of the colour of their skin or the slant of their eyes,
and there are articles in the newspapers that Russia's economy will rot without
immigrant labour. So it happens that someone is using their political power in
order to bring a cheap labour force over here. It's profitable for someone. That
same Tel'man, who built Cherkizon (a huge market in Moscow - editor), he needed
cheap labour. All this is robbing Russia of money.
Basically the territory of Russia is like a welcome mat. A representative of
another nationality can get Russian citizenship, but when he goes to Armenia
then he's an Armenian. All these people have their own countries, and Russians
don't. Putin, when he met with the youth after the protest on Manezh Square,
said that in the Caucasus - which is a part of the Russian Federation - they
have their own traditions, and he doesn't care who infringes them there. So the
former guarantor of the Constitution doesn't care about someone who is on the
territory of the Russian Federation. This is double standards.
We need to resolve the nationality question in Russia; to declare that Russia is
a Russian country; to write people's ethnicity in their passports again. You
cannot tell a Tajik or an Uzbek to serve Russia. But a Russian will understand
if you tell him he has to serve his country. In our country, Jews are holding
top positions, but I would never claim high office in someone else's country.
'We need to resolve the nationality question in Russia; to declare that Russia
is a Russian country; to write people's ethnicity in their passports again. You
cannot tell a Tajik or an Uzbek to serve Russia.'
Victor's views weren't unexpected, but what he was accused of was. He wasn't a
difficult child: he worked as a consultant in a bookshop, was at home in the
evenings, was interested in history. He wanted to go to an institute to study
history. He wasn't particularly sociable. He lived a fairly solitary life, read
loads of books, that's why he liked the bookshop too. The following year he was
due to be conscripted into the army. I didn't take any interest in whether or
not he wanted to go. Everyone goes usually.
Friends of the family were amazed when they found out about his arrest. They all
asked what on earth was going on. He didn't drink, didn't smoke. Of course he
was withdrawn sometimes, thinking about something or other. Not long before his
arrest he mentioned a sports club, but I thought, sport - that's a good thing.
I don't know where he got interested in all that, I don't know whether he came
to these opinions himself or not, because at 18 years old - as far as I remember
- interests change quickly. He is not an experienced person, naturally, and
politicians exploit the young.
I didn't read the case notes. Could he kill? I wanted to investigate this
independently, but the judges and investigators took this mission upon
themselves. This didn't suit me at all. And if only this was an isolated
example! But as I attended the court sittings I understood that this is a whole
system: one little group passing through after another, you see. And what, am I
supposed to say to my own son that he's guilty, when there's a whole system?
I honestly didn't expect a life sentence. I think this is revenge for the fact
that he openly says what he thinks. He sat in a pre-trial detention centre for
three years, then went to court, and I could see immediately that he'd become
more vicious. Moreover he was in a cell with all different ethnicities, people
arrested for drugs, robbery, theft. He got some experience there, began to
answer back to the judges and prosecutors in court. So because he began to
answer them like that, they used their authority and gave him a life sentence.
During a visit I asked him what he did with his time in the cell. He said he
played chess. 'With whom?' I asked. 'With an Uzbek'.'
Pavel Golubev, Retired Colonel, father of Sergei Golubev
Sergei Golubev was the youngest convicted murderer in the case of NSO-Sever. He
was 16 when he was arrested in 2007. He pleaded guilty to the murder of one
person and attempted murder motivated by racial hatred. He was sentenced to ten
years in a penal colony.
'Basically Sergei had nothing to do with this. Well, he went to a demonstration
against illegal immigration. And is there anyone who does support breaking the
law? On 1 May 2008 he was at that demonstration at VDNKh. 'Peace, Labour, May!
Guest-workers away!' And after the demonstration participants beat up some Tajik
or other - right in front of the local police station. Sergei was also there. He
said that he wanted to stop them, that they were starting a fight five metres
from the window of the police. He got detained, and they checked whether he
belonged to a youth organisation. And in the report they wrote that: 'he is not
a member of a gang, but shares the view that the Russian people and the Russian
Orthodox faith must flourish on the territory of the Russian Federation'. And
this was recorded as a nationalist viewpoint. No one told President Medvedev it
was a nationalist viewpoint when he said the same thing at a meeting of the
State Council in February 2011. And Sergei, of course, wasn't a member of the
NSO. He had some knowledge about that organisation, but even I've heard of it.
Nationalists at the oppostion protest on Bolotnaya Square on 11 December 2011,
which took place one year after the infamous Manezhnaya Square race riots [10].
Maria Pleshkova [11]/Demotix. All rights reserved.
He is a very capable boy generally. He got into an economics grammar school
sponsored by the Academy of Finance. But he didn't have the self-regard to
become a top pupil. It is an elite school with elite children, who are driven
there by their chauffeurs. Basically they try to force out any children who
don't give the teachers money. He had a high temperature one day, and for some
reason the class teacher kept him at school and wouldn't let him go home. He ran
away, jumped over the fence, ran across Prospect Mira in winter with no coat on.
Something snapped in him then. He lost interest in school completely. He sat in
lessons, looking out of the window, thinking his own thoughts. We took him out
of that school after that, and sent him to be examined at the psychiatric
hospital. The doctor said to me' 'you know, I see so many like him, the most
important thing is that he doesn't get sent to prison before he reaches 18.
After that everything will pass, he'll get distracted by work and love. But many
don't make it that far'.
Sergei rarely went out. He sat at his computer. I used to tell him to go out and
have a wander. He would take me to the window and ask if I really wanted him to
go out there. 'Do you see them sitting there, already pouring out drinks on the
bench? What's more, when evening comes, the darkies will bring weed. Do you want
me to join them?' I said that of course I didn't.
It scared me that he was going off into a virtual world. That's why I was even
glad when he decided to go out to a girl's birthday celebrations. (On 6 May 2008
at the Butyrka cafe on Dmitrovsky highway Vasilisa Kovaleva celebrated her 21st
with her then-boyfriend Mikhailov, with Appolionov and with Golubev. That same
evening the group killed two Uzbeks - editor.) He got to know Kovaleva via the
Iyupnternet. He liked older girls. She was a student in the faculty of
journalism, and he could talk to her about all sorts of things. I couldn't have
imagined how it would all end. He went out to her birthday.
He was a witness at that murder incident, the one they prosecuted him for. He
saw the struggle, the cries. He said that he felt sick. When they hit the woman
in the neck and she started bleeding, he didn't even see what happened to her,
he was pulled away. The investigators asked whether he tried to help the victim.
No? Well then, that means you're an accomplice.
Sergei said: 'as far as I'm concerned, be they blacks, Chinese, Tatars - it
makes no difference to me. I respect them all. They're all human beings'. When
he went to prison he was a Christian. He's now lost his faith. He said that if
God existed, He would not have allowed this to happen to him.
'I used to tell him to go out and have a wander. He would take me to the window
and ask if I really wanted him to go out there. 'Do you see them sitting there,
already pouring out drinks on the bench? What's more, when evening comes, the
darkies will bring weed. Do you want me to join them?'
They didn't let us meet for a year and a half. They tortured him twice. They
told him to write what they wanted him to write about the other lads, but he
refused. 'I don't know them, or what sort of people they are. If you know that
they are murderers, then you write that.' They promised to make life difficult
in the cells for him for that. They put some sort of lads in with him. They
burnt him with matches, beat him up, his shoulders, stomach, the small of his
back were all covered in bruises. I saw all of this at the court hearing about
the extension of his arrest. Sergei looked at me from behind the bars and asked'
'what should I do? I can't last much longer'. Do you understand - he looked me
in the eye and asked: 'what should I do? You're stronger than me, but they
string you up by the hands to see how long you last. Should I cut my own throat?
Either way, the judge has guaranteed that I won't get more than ten years. Maybe
I should stab one of them at night? Tell me what would be better?' And he looked
me in the eye. I said: 'better to cut them than yourself'. It ended with him
taking a sharpened implement and preparing to drive it into the eye or neck of
this lad, who noticed and left. The lawyer and I complained to whoever we could,
and they held an investigation in the pre-trial detention centre, and they
stopped bothering him.
And after a year his cellmates were ordered to beat him up again so badly that
they wouldn't even let us go to court. I asked him later whether he had managed
to get them back a bit, so it didn't feel quite so bad.
Even the detectives passed on their approval to me. Everyone thought that since
he was the youngest, he'd sign everything, but he wouldn't budge and said that
no one would persuade him to. His steadfastness amazed them. 'What a good lad we
have here'. Well, thanks, I thought, I'm glad.
How did he end up there? As the investigators said to me after his first year in
pre-trial detention centre: 'if we'd known from the start what evidence there
would be, we wouldn't even have arrested him. But now, you understand, how can
we let him out? He's underage, and responsibility would have to be taken for
this. So, you see, we'll treat him like the others, and he might get around five
years'. And then they explained further that I'd angered them by complaining to
the Moscow City Court that they hadn't allowed us to meet. Why, they asked, did
you behave like that? In a fit of anger they included five unnecessary years in
the indictment.
Then I gave further evidence in court. I told them about the torture, about the
false documents in the criminal case, about how no one had interrogated him for
a year. And that made the prosecutor angry with me. But of course I didn't
expect them to give him ten years. I thought that even a military court, a
troika, is not allowed to settle personal scores; all the more so that this was
based on the admission that they should have basically let him go. I was a
professional soldier myself, a colonel. I worked for a long time at a research
institute. Of course, when I became Sergei's legal representative I couldn't
work anywhere.
It has, of course, made him angrier. He's continually in the punishment block.
He says they have sworn an oath. 'Don't they know what to do with me? Haven't
they read the case notes?' After the sentence he said that he would never go and
fight for this country, like his grandfather who held a machine gun in his hands
and shouted that he was fighting for this motherland. He was patriotic before.
'If I get a call up for the army I'm not going to evade it. If they send me to
Chechnya - I'll go, I won't hide behind anyone's back'. And now he says that it
was the Russian Federation that passed this sentence on him. It found me guilty,
he says, of being a fascist, a murderer. That makes Russia my stepmother, not my
real motherland, and I'm not going to fight for her. 'Let the prosecutor's
children go and serve her.' That's what he says.'
A version of this article was first published in Russian on Kommersant. Vlast'
here [12]
Links:
[1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/russia-theme
[2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia
[3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/equality
[4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/russia
[5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/justice
[6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/internal
[7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/olesya-gerasimenko
[8] http://www.demotix.com/users/yurig/profile
[9] http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc/1681380
[10]
http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrei-loshak-svetlana-reiter/decency-hop\
e-friendship-real-story-from-moscows-race-riots
[11] http://www.demotix.com/users/pleshkova/profile
[12] http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1807563

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/olesya-gerasimenko/mother%E2%80%99s-boys-\
conversations-with-parents-of-russia%E2%80%99s-neo-nazis
-----------------

Russia: Looking at Putin's Nationalist Dilemma
By Igor Torbakov [1]
EurasiaNet, February 8, 2012

Don't look now, but Vladimir Putin, the man who wants to reclaim the Russian
presidency in March, seems to be losing touch with one of his key constituencies
- nationalists.
This development has several important implications for Russia, as well as for
Russia's neighbors in Eurasia. It may improve the chances that Russia can find a
balancing point between republican political ideals and nationalism, thus
encouraging the development of a genuinely democratic nation-state. It just as
easily may stimulate attempts to change Russia's current state borders,
something that could have unpredictable repercussions.
In the aftermath of the November 2011 parliamentary election, which caused
unprecedented public protests, Putin's authoritarian political model has lost a
lot of its luster. Rampant official corruption and a significant spike in ethnic
tension, generated by the presence of labor migrants in Russian cities, have
helped fueled a sense of alienation among a broad swath of the population.
Hoping to reinvigorate his base, Putin published a lengthy article January 23 in
the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, headlined Russia: The National Question.
The piece is, at its core, campaign propaganda designed to persuade voters,
especially Russian nationalists, that Putin's brand of nationalism offers the
best way forward for Russia. Boiled down, it offers an eclectic mix of dated
tenets of what can be called imperial, or civilizational nationalism [6], as
well as a promise to strictly regulate labor migration.
For Putin, Russia is a "unique civilization" to which traditional notions of the
nation-state do not apply. While he repeatedly has described Russia as a
"multiethnic country," he also has argued that Russians are a "state-forming
people" whose "great mission" is to "unite and bind" a unique civilization.
While a multitude of ethnic groups may reside in Russia, "we are one people,"
united by "common culture and common values," according to Putin's vision. He
doesn't specify the nature of these binding values.
Putin goes on to make the case that his authoritarian political model is the
glue that keeps this unique civilization, in the form of the Russian Federation,
together. As such, the prime minister/president-to-be makes it clear that no
major policy changes are desirable, and that preserving the status quo provides
the best guarantee for the country's long-term stability.
But if Putin believed the Nezavisimaya Gazeta piece would solidify his
nationalist credentials, and mobilize nationalists behind him, he was sorely
mistaken. Instead of placing Putin in the forefront of the nationalist movement
in Russia, the article has shown the Kremlin to be behind the curve when it
comes to current trends in nationalist ideology.
Nationalism in Russia has undergone a dramatic shift lately, one that Putin,
apparently, has been slow to catch on to. Two competing strains of nationalism
have always existed in the country - one that can be described as imperial, or
statist nationalism, the other ethno-cultural. The first worshipped the state,
its power and international prestige; the second glorified the nation, its
culture and faith. Throughout Russian history, statists have tended to hold a
pragmatic view of nationalism, seeing it mostly as an instrument to strengthen
state institutions and bolster the authority of the ruling class. As such,
statists have traditionally favored territorial expansion, followed by efforts
to assimilate minority groups.
Radical ethnic nationalists, on the other hand, see no place for non-Russians in
the state. This strain of nationalism, naturally, has caused particular problems
for imperialists, whether they have been Russian tsars, Soviet commissars or
Putinists advocating "managed democracy" and relying on energy policy to expand
their influence in the near abroad.
In recent years, economic hardship has boosted the popularity of ethnic
nationalism at the expense of the imperial variety. This trend is underscored by
the growing popularity of the slogan "Russia for the Russians." Putin, who
clearly aligns himself with the imperial school, has been reluctant to
acknowledge this trend. Instead, he has tended to oversimplify the rise of
ethnic nationalists, casting them as trouble-makers whose ideas could encourage
the disintegration of the Russian Federation.
Another factor that Putin has been blind to is that the nationalist movement is
more fragmented than ever. Some younger and better-educated imperial-nationalist
thinkers have drifted away from worshipping the strong state, and have embraced
democratic values. These modernists now are calling for the merger of
nationalist and democratic principles, and are advocating the formation of a
broad national-democratic movement to fight the ruling authoritarian regime.
Finally, another branch of Russian nationalists, somewhat aligned with
ethno-cultural thinking, argues for the need to repudiate residual elements of
imperial, messianic and neo-Eurasianist doctrines. They prefer to concentrate,
as the late Alexander Solzhenitsyn suggested, on the reconstruction of a Greater
Russia.
Of course, what constitutes Greater Russia remains a tricky issue for all types
of nationalists. Unlike imperial nationalists of Putin's generation, younger and
more liberal-minded nationalists appear ready to accept the idea that the
creation of a democratic Russian national state probably entails the redrawing
of the country's borders. Some leading nationalist ideologues, such as Valery
Solovei, foresee the secession of the Northern Caucasus, Russia's classical
imperial possession, as well as the possible loss of other non-Russian
territories "during our lifetime."
While Russia may shrink in some places, it could expand in others. Solzhenitsyn,
for example, suggested in the early 1990s that Greater Russia should include
northern Kazakhstan, an area with a large ethnic Russian population.
It's unlikely the developing split between Putin and a sizable portion of the
nationalist movement will cost him the presidency. Despite the rising discontent
with his governing style, he remains a virtual shoe-in to win in March. But with
Putin doggedly clinging to his traditional imperial-nationalist views, there
could be trouble for his administration lurking just over the horizon.
So long as genuine federalism in the Russian Federation remains absent, the
state will be, in its essence, an imperial entity. Such a "mini-empire" as some
commentators have called it can be ruled only undemocratically, with an
unyielding Kremlin needed to keep both Russian ethnic nationalism and other
ethnic nationalisms in check.
Putin has lashed out against the slogan "Russia for the Russians" and has warned
that any attempts to set up region-based political parties will not be
permitted. Such statements indicate that force will be necessary to maintain his
vision of a "unique Russian civilization." But how forceful can Putin be, if a
large number of nationalists, perhaps a majority, are not behind him?
Editor's note:
Igor Torbakov is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies,
Uppsala University, Sweden.
Links:
[1] http://www.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/3632
[2] http://www.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/2346
[3] http://www.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/3279
[4] http://www.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/2717
[5] http://www.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/3758
[6] http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64282

Source URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64975
---------------

Russian Anti-Extremism Law Under Scrutiny in Case Against Anti-Fascist: A young
activist faces trial in Russia for membership in a "red anarchist skinhead"
group he claims does not exist.
By Alexander Tretyakov
Transitions Online, 10 February 2012

MOSCOW | Artyom Bystrov, a young man from Nizhny Novgorod, was working the night
shift as a security guard in an office building last April when police stormed
in, handcuffed him, and threw him into a police van.     Bystrov, 24, says he is
an anti-fascist, or "antifa." He says he was initially shocked by the arrest but
had anticipated something similar. He had been arrested several times before
over his participation in demonstrations and marches against right-wing
extremist groups.     He claims police threatened him and promised to release
him if he gave false evidence against fellow anti-fascists arrested at the same
time.     He says he was offered no explanation for and shown no documents
authorizing his detention. "I was simply told that they didn't care which of us
went to prison - me or my associates - so it was in my own interest to testify
against them. If I failed to do that I could easily be made a scapegoat. It was
plain and simple," he said.     Bystrov was charged with hooliganism, membership
in an extremist group, and intentional infliction of bodily harm and assault
based on hatred and enmity against a social group. Hearings in the case are set
to begin 10 March.     Bystrov's case has attracted the attention of human
rights defenders, who say it is a clear instance of the justice system being
used as a weapon against an innocent social activist.     Bystrov and the others
were accused of taking part in a street fight outside a club in Nizhny Novgorod
on the night of 31 October 2010, his lawyer, Dmitry Dinze, said.     "The club
has a surveillance camera that must have recorded what was happening, and it
could prove my innocence, because I was not there," Bystrov said. Footage from
the night in question has gone missing, he said.     All but one of the other
suspects were later released. One remains under house arrest.     Bystrov is
also accused of taking part in two assaults.     Nizhny Novgorod is Russia's
fifth-largest city, and ethnically diverse, yet activists and groups such as the
Moscow Bureau for Human Rights speak of a growing climate of xenophobia,
accompanied by demonstrations, and frequent beatings targeting members of ethnic
minorities.     "Both the city police and private security typically turn a
blind eye to the aggression of the nationalists. If, for instance, a group of
skinheads or even neo-fascists attacks an immigrant or a punk musician in the
street or in a club, then the guards pretend not to notice," said Olga
Sadovskaya, deputy director of the Russian Committee Against the Use of Torture,
headquartered in Nizhny Novgorod.     Bystrov began taking part in the growing
counter-movement in 2008. He also works with Food Not Bombs, a network of
volunteers who serve vegetarian meals to the homeless.       When Bystrov was
detained, he recalled, the police officers did not attempt to hide their
prejudice and nationalist views.     One of the police officers "claimed that
the anti-fascists were sponsored by the Jewish mafia who wanted to destroy the
Russian nation. And then he accused me of betraying my own nation," Bystrov
said.     Police say they found Bystrov's membership card for an organization
called Antifa-RASH in his apartment. Bystrov denies any knowledge of the group.
"I was staring in disbelief at the photograph of my membership card - which was
of course a fake - as the investigator was reading the organization's charter to
me," he said.     Dinze said the material on Antifa-RASH in the police file was
copied from Russian Wikipedia, including grammatical errors.     "Concocting
evidence is so easy in Russia," Nizhny Novgorod anti-fascist activist Oleg
Matryonin said. "The charter of this mythical Antifa-RASH organization has
nothing in common with genuine anti-fascist ideology."     RASH, an acronym for
Red and Anarchist Skinheads, is not an organized movement but a subculture
professing left-wing, anti-racist, and anti-capitalist views, according to a
post about Bystrov's case on the Russian website Noviy smysl.     Bystrov also
says he was tortured by members of the Interior Ministry's Center for Combating
Extremism.     "The officers used a torture method known as 'the envelope.' This
is when they cuff your hands behind your back, attach a rope to them and throw
it over a projection in the room, to haul the victim into the air," Dinze said.
"Artyom was tortured by three officers who tried to persuade him to give false
evidence against other anti-fascists."     Bystrov and Dinze say they reported
the abuse to police but were told there was not enough evidence to justify an
investigation of the claim.     Sadovskaya says police in Russia feel protected
by impunity.     "These guys know bloody well that they are likely to stay
unpunished," she said. "The center that dealt with Bystrov is no different from
others. Torture is the norm in Russia."     Sadovskaya said she knew of only a
handful of times when officers were tried and punished for using torture. "The
police behave as if they have been given carte blanche to use whatever methods
they find appropriate," she said.     Investigators meanwhile were boasting of
their success in detaining Bystrov, a member of "the extremist group
Antifa-RASH," according to a news release from the extremist crime department
published in June on the website of the Nizhny Novgorod police. The extremist
"was engaged in organizing attacks on residents of Nizhny Novgorod, including
soccer fans, rappers, and members of ethnic minorities. The extremist was driven
by political, social, and ethnic hatred," the release stated.     An analysis of
the case published in January by the extremist monitoring group SOVA said
investigators tried to link Bystrov and several other activists arrested at the
same time with an "extremist community" that they say arose in Nizhny Novgorod
in 2007. The group's objectives were to "prepare and commit extremist crimes,"
"promote the ideas of violent political change as a manifestation of fascism,"
and "establish anarchy" and the use of "violence motivated by ideological hatred
and hostility," the SOVA article said.     If convicted, Bystrov faces two to
five years in prison. His case has attracted attention from human rights
advocates and leftist groups. In June, several dozen protesters demonstrated in
his support in Nizhny Novgorod, and activists have set up a Facebook page to
raise the profile of the case.
(Alexander Tretyakov is a reporter for SOTV, a publicly funded Internet
television channel in Moscow.)

http://www.tol.org/client/article/22989-social-activism-minorities-russia-police\
-abuse.html?utm_source=TOL+mailing+list&utm_campaign=2905e24f59-TOL_newsletter2_\
14_2012&utm_medium=email#.TzraxdGsGKo.facebook
----------------------

Putin Chasing Imaginary American Ghosts
By Michael Bohm
The Moscow Times, 10 February 2012

Here we go again - another round of anti-Americanism from the Kremlin and
state-controlled media. We have heard claims that the United States is trying to
orchestrate an Orange Revolution in Russia many times before, but it was never
this intense.  Prime Minister Vladimir Putin sent the first signal in late
November when he called Russians who receive certain foreign grants "Judases"
and said it is necessary to strengthen the punishment for Russians "who carry
out the orders of foreign states." A week later, Putin claimed that U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton instigated the opposition protests.  The
gambit seemed to work. A Levada survey held shortly after showed that 23 percent
of those polled believed that the protesters were paid by the United States,
while 47 percent had difficulty answering.  Putin has taken a page from the
Soviet period, when sharp criticism of the ruling regime was tantamount to
perfidy. Remember how the Soviet mass media carried out a brutal campaign to
discredit dissident Natan Sharansky. He was then sentenced to 13 years of forced
labor in 1977 on false charges that he was a U.S. spy.  Mikhail Leontyev, host
of the "Odnako" program on Channel One, picked up on Putin's cues in his Jan. 17
show, implying that U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul has been sent to Moscow to
carry out an Orange Revolution. McFaul has a perfect background for this
mission, Leontyev said. After all, McFaul's academic specialty is revolutionary
movements and democracy, and he even wrote a book with the suspicious title
"Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin."  If
that were not enough, 20 years ago McFaul worked as a senior adviser to the
National Democratic Institute, a U.S. nongovernmental organization that is "well
known for its close ties to U.S. intelligence organizations," Leontyev said.  On
the same day, a short clip titled "Receiving Instructions From the Ambassador"
attracted nearly 1 million views on the Internet. As opposition leaders, such as
Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Ryzhkov, and human rights activist Lev Ponomaryov
were filmed approaching the U.S. Embassy on Jan. 17, they were each asked by NTV
reporters: "Why are you coming to see the ambassador? What is your goal?"  Yet
dual-track diplomacy - meeting with leaders in power as well as the opposition -
is an established norm all over the world. Incidentally, Russian diplomats in
Washington meet with prominent Republicans when there is a Democratic
administration in the White House and vice versa. (The only thing that is
prohibited in both countries is the direct foreign financing of political
parties and candidates.)  Take, also , the Institute for Democracy and
Cooperation, a Russian NGO located in New York that monitors human rights
violations in the United States - clearly an attempt to give the United States a
dose of its own medicine. The NGO's U.S. office is headed by Andranik Migranyan,
a prominent political analyst. Claiming that the U.S. National Endowment for
Democracy is fueling an Orange Revolution in Russia has about as much
credibility as claiming that Migranyan's NGO is  destabilizing the United
States.  Then, on Feb. 3, we learned from NTV's tabloid program titled "The West
Will Help Them" that McFaul is known as the "architect of Orange Revolutions"
and that Alexei Navalny was recruited to Yale University's World Fellows Program
to train him for his future mission: to fight the Putin regime.  During this
program, we were also told that the high-sounding missions of U.S.-funded
nongovernmental organizations - "defending human rights and building democracy"
- is only a cynical decoy. So is the "reset," McFaul's brainchild. All of this
"technology," developed in Langley and Foggy Bottom, is a prime example of the
United States' subversive "soft power" that helps destabilize its enemies and
execute regime change. The beauty of soft Orange Revolutions, political analyst
Vyacheslav Nikonov said in the program, is that they are cheaper than war, leave
fewer footprints and can achieve the same goals.  Finally, there was a high
concentration of anti-American bile at the pro-Putin, Anti-Orange rally a week
ago at Poklonnaya Gora. Political analyst Sergei Kurginyan screamed from the
stage: "We say 'No' to the American Еmbassy, where they [opposition
leaders] flock to the water trough like cows. Let's throw out this 'orange
trash.'" Political analyst Alexander Dugin also screamed from the podium, saying
the United States employs a "fifth column" of agents and spies within Russia and
wants to take control of its rich natural resources.  Over the past few weeks,
Kurginyan and Dugin, along with nationalist journalist Alexander Prokhanov and
Leontyev, have jumped from one popular political talk show to another on
state-controlled television spewing this anti-U.S. demagoguery.  Meanwhile,
Alexei Pushkov - host of the analytical television show "Postscriptum," known
for its critical views on U.S. foreign policy - has been appointed to chair the
State Duma's high-profile International Affairs Committee, while Dmitry Rogozin,
also known for his hawkish views on the United States, was promoted to deputy
prime minister.  Rogozin shocked many in a Jan. 19 interview on Ekho Moskvy when
he described with a serious expression on his face a scenario in which the
United States could launch a simultaneous, "lightening-speed, massive and
paralyzing" missile attack against all of Russia's land-based nuclear weapons.
This would not give Russia a chance to respond with a counterattack - except,
perhaps, for a few submarine-based missiles, but these would be easily
intercepted by even a modest U.S. missile defense system. This type of Cold War
hysteria takes us back to the apocalyptic year of 1983, if not 1962.  The notion
that the United States orchestrated Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004 is just
as ridiculous as the idea that the CIA orchestrated the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Similarly, the suggestion that Washington is orchestrating - or
is even capable of orchestrating - an Orange-like Revolution in Russia is
equally absurd.  Why, then, is the Kremlin chasing imaginary American ghosts?
First, there is no other country that can fill this spot. China is out of the
question because inflating tensions with its neighbor is too dangerous. On the
contrary, as the recent UN Security Council veto on Syria showed, China can be a
valuable Russian ally to help defy the United States. Islamic radicalism is also
not an option because that would throw a match into its own North Caucasus
tinderbox.  But attacking the United States is much safer. It is far away, and
Washington usually just ignores the bluster about U.S. plots as they do when
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez pulls the same antics.  Second, the old trick
of trying to smear the opposition and nongovernmental organizations as a
U.S.-funded fifth column still works on millions - particularly among
blue-collar Russians, a strong Putin constituency, for whom state-controlled
television is still their primary source of information.  Blaming outside forces
for Russia's woes has a long history in the country and has few limits, it would
seem. Even the Fobos-Grunt failure, like the Kursk sinking in 2000, was first
blamed on U.S. sabotage. The closer we get to the March 4 presidential election,
the more intense the anti-American hysteria becomes.  Putin has picked up where
the Soviet Union left off, but this tradition of blaming others goes far beyond
the Soviet period. In an 1898 letter to publisher Alexei Suvorin, Anton Chekhov
wrote: "When things are not going well in Russia, we always find someone else to
blame: the Jews, [German Emperor] Wilhelm II, the French anyone except
ourselves."  Indeed, things are not going very well for Putin and the Kremlin:
falsified elections in December that will likely have to be repeated on March 4,
sinking popularity, a political crisis, Syria and mass protests that are bound
to continue throughout 2012.  The United States is to blame for all of this.
Sounds convincing.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-chasing-imaginary-american-g\
hosts/452802.html
-----------------

Putin, Russia and the West: beyond stereotype
Fyodor Lukyanov,
Open Democracy, 10th February 2012

The BBC2 documentary 'Putin, Russia and the West' [9]  created a significant
stir with several attention-grabbing statements by its heroes - first and
foremost, of course, the admittance by Jonathan Powell (Tony Blair's former
chief of staff) that the 'spy rock' the FSB produced in 2006 was indeed a slip
up by the British intelligence agencies. This journalistic coup by the
filmmakers and surprising openness on the part of a high-ranking - albeit
retired - government civil servant caused a storm in Russia and Great Britain.
The series has other vivid and interesting moments. In particular, the sweet
story about how Sergei Ivanov and Condoleezza Rice, bored by classical
choreography, escaped from a performance of the Nutcracker together to watch a
contemporary ballet by Boris Eifman [10]. The words of the ex-president of
Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski [11] who actively participated in political
regulation of the crisis in Ukraine in 2004, about how Vladimir Putin suggested
sending Boris Yeltsin as the Russian representative to the conciliatory 'round
table' of candidates in Kiev. Leonid Kuchma's direct testimony that Putin
clearly intimated he should stop dragging his feet, and it was time to use force
to bring an end to the 'orange' uprising.
Details of the events which led to the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia,
already partly known but nevertheless important since they came directly from
the lips of participants. Finally, the dramatic and as yet unreported nuances
about just how difficult it was for Moscow and Washington to conclude the START
[12] treaty in 2009-2010. These are just especially memorable individual
incidents from a very rich and professionally made film which is not directing
attention at the current state of affairs, but is so objective and detached that
it could properly become a resource for the study of recent political history.
However, the main value of the four-part series is not in the truly amusing
anecdotes and obscure details, but in the filmmakers' skill in using them to
convey a picture of the person who decisively influenced Russian history at the
beginning of the twenty-first century - Vladimir Putin.
The paradox of Putin is connected with the fact that the perception of him in
the West, at a certain point in time (at a fairly early stage in his
presidential career it should be said) became detached from him as a person and
from Russia as the country he heads, and took on a life of its own. It is
impossible otherwise to understand why Time magazine nominated [13] Putin as the
most influential person in the world in 2007, and why in 2011 Forbes magazine
listed [14] him as the second most powerful person after Barack Obama, ahead of
the Chinese leader Hu Jintao.
The first nomination may be explained by the effect of the Munich speech [15]
(February 2007), which came as a complete surprise for many. Through her
president Russia, practically consigned to the political scrapheap for several
years already, not only announced her return to the premier league but even
began to threaten the world's grandees. But the rating in 2011, well now, that
was entirely irrational. The prime minister of Russia (even with the almost
imperial pall that surrounds him) simply by definition cannot have more
influence in international affairs today than the ruler of the People's Republic
of China. He simply can't, no matter who he is. And this is, as it happens,
clear evidence of the fact that Putin's image exists independently of its
material foundations, both personal and national.
Vladimir Putin as an individual is basically an ordinary person with a
surprising biography, who occupied the autocratic throne of an enormous country
by the will of historical logic and the chance confluence of circumstances. He
proved considerably more skilled at this work than anyone could have predicted
at the end of 1999, when the first president of Russia elevated his candidate to
second position. Putin became neither a puppet, as some had hoped, nor a
nonentity, as others had expected, and speaking objectively, his impact on the
country's history has been very great, although it will always be evaluated very
differently. The personal peculiarities of Putin, which became apparent fairly
quickly, defined both his success as a leader, and the limits of that success,
the borders of the worldview which he is unable to escape now or, probably, in
the future. Moreover, the example of Putin yet again confirms the banal
observation that the burden of power always leaves its mark, on everyone - even
the most capable leader changes irreversibly over the years. The mandatory
turnover of rulers is not simply a democratic whim but a means of national and
even personal self-preservation. All in all, it's a very human story.
Russia, the country which Putin governs, is essentially perceived in the world
as a decaying power. Besides dependence on certain successes to restore her
position, internal problems - demography, lopsided economics, endemic
corruption, inability to compete with developing neighbours - mean the
inevitable decline of her strategic role in the world of the future. Moscow's
equity in the global 'share capital' of international politics will fall,
although gradually and not without spikes, so there is no pressing need to pay
Russia that much attention. And this opinion is almost a consensus, shared in
the West and in the East, although people may feel differently about it.
Given this perception, it is hard to understand what has provoked the
demonisation of Putin which clearly exists in Western media and political
discussions, where the prime minister of Russia often features as almost the
personification of evil. The reason, it would seem, is not in him, but in the
internal insecurity of the West, in the growing sense that not everything is
proceeding quite as it should, and as might be desired, but what should be done
about it or how to correct the trajectory isn't clear. Vladimir Putin, by the
strength of his character, constantly and very openly (to the point of sheer
impropriety) indicates to western partners their mistakes and failures. He
criticises their hypocrisy and double-standards, appearing in the role of an
idiosyncratic Savonarola whose utterances are especially annoying because they
are often true. Moreover, it is true that the rabid denouncer is himself
certainly no kind of disinterested monk or zealot for truth and justice; he
plays by the same rules as everyone else but simply doesn't see the need to
dress this up in respectable ideological garb. And the fact that - whether by
force of luck or by force of a more realistic calculation - he furthermore
periodically outperforms his partners, compelling them to take the opinion of
that same declining Russia into account, adds a mystical halo.
The series, shown on BBC2, is good in that - in a calm and objective fashion -
it shows the real person of Vladimir Putin and an adequate picture of why under
his leadership the relationship between Russia and the West has developed
precisely as it has, and not otherwise.
Over the four part series it becomes evident how much Putin has changed. From a
young prime minister/president, guarded but ready to respond flexibly and engage
in direct dialogue, whose declarations (albeit often sharp to the point of
rudeness) seem frank, to the disillusioned leader at the beginning of the 2010s,
less tolerant and unwilling to accept doubt in his rectitude. He also talks
differently - much more smoothly and professionally, but one can no longer
detect in his words that (occasionally even scary) sincerity of 10-12 years ago.
Emotional and intellectual fatigue - that, if anything, is the main impression
conveyed by the Putin who is returning to the post of president.
The filmmakers show that the changes Putin and Russian internal politics
underwent in the 2000s are not the result of the Kremlin's arbitrariness or the
conscious development of an anti-western trend, but, as a rule, a logical and
natural response to the stormy progression of events in the world and in
post-Soviet space. In other words, the way the Russian course has developed is
by no means only the result of her internal inherent characteristics, but also
of external stimuli which have compelled a change in line and churned up the
psychological atmosphere. The original Putin was minded to make Russia part of a
kind of international 'concert' with the West. And the first years of his
presidency, probably right up to the 'orange revolution' in Ukraine, were times
when he tried to enter the western orbit from a variety of angles. Of course,
under conditions which he himself considered just, and which did not seem so to
[western] partners.
Unfortunately, this period in Russia's outlook fell within a period in which the
United States, governed by the neo-conservative administration of George Bush,
attempted to definitively bring to life their vision of the USA's complete
supremacy in international affairs. What is worse, to a significant degree the
spearheads of this approach proved to be directed where Russia would feel them
most acutely. Amongst the priorities of Bush's second term was the acceptance
into NATO of Ukraine and Georgia, the deployments of Third Site missile defence
installations in Poland and the Czech Republic whilst asserting the shared idea
of furthering democracy, although by that time it was already clear just how
pernicious the results could be.
The clash of Putin's 'constructive' with Bush's 'negative' had an almost fatal
outcome. Theoretically one could even in part rejoice that it culminated only in
a small local war in the Caucasus (for all its tragedy). But it drew a line
under the dangerous escalation and since then Russia and the West have gradually
entered a different stage, the contours of which are as yet impossible to
define.
The behaviour of the parties is difficult to predict because of the internal
difficulties they are facing (political and economic crises), and also the
cardinal changes in the global context connected with the growth of Asia.
(Incidentally the influence of the Asian, Chinese factor on relations between
Russia and the West falls beyond the scope of the four part documentary,
completely understandably - one cannot do the impossible. But this could become
the subject of the next project). Be that as it may, Putin is returning to high
office in conditions of complete uncertainty, and is taking on huge
responsibility. The programme is open ended and its makers consciously do not
draw any conclusions.
One can identify shortcomings in the documentary. Some events, it seems, have
been unjustifiably omitted. It's odd, all the same, not to mention the Munich
speech which has become a symbol and counterpoint of Putin's presidency from the
point of view of his relationship with the West. The first two episodes are more
rich and arresting than the second two, as if the makers had grown a little
tired of their material along the way. One could have added a couple of
attention grabbing details about the personal relationships of Putin with
western leaders; for me there weren't enough remarks by Silvio Berlusconi about
his friend Vladimir, which would have been colourful and eloquent without any
kind of commentary. However this is mere detail, and there is no limit to
perfection. And generally the creators of 'Putin, Russia and the West' may be
congratulated on their excellent work which, I hope, will also be shown on
Russian television at some point. As an example of genuine objectivity and
professionalism.
Links:
[1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/russia-theme
[2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia
[3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government
[4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/russia
[5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/editorial_tags/russia_eurasia
[6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/editorial_tags/russia
[7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/topics/history
[8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/authors/fyodor-lukyanov
[9] http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01b434y
[10] http://www.eifmanballet.ru/
[11] http://kwasniewskialeksander.pl/English
[12] http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/start-process/
[13]
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/0,28757,1690753,00.html
[14] http://www.forbes.com/powerful-people/
[15]
http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&men\
u_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=179&

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/fyodor-lukyanov/putin-russia-and-west-ris\
ing-above-stereotypes
---------------

The Ultra-Nationalist Virus in Russia's White Revolution: Right-wing extremists
could undermine the current democratization drive in Moscow
By Andreas Umland
Foreign Policy Journal, February 11, 2012

Repeating a recurring feature in Russia's recent history, Moscow's December 2011
protests have seen a new alliance between Russian democrats and
ultra-nationalists. In spite of their dubious reputation, the latter were
permitted by the meeting organizers not only to take part in the demonstrations;
a number of well-known radically nationalist politicians-most prominent among
them the notorious writer Eduard Limonov-were also allowed to give speeches to
the protesters. The justification for this was that the protest movement is
politically open and democratically oriented. Excluding one camp or another,
such goes the argument, would be in contradiction to the inclusive spirit of
this all-national movement. As the ultra-nationalists were swelling the ranks of
the anti-Putin demonstrations, they were permitted to join in-as were all other
groups that are against Russia's current regime, whether from the left or right.
The protest movement so-far has been defined less by what it stands for than by
what it is against.
One wonders, however, how far the democratism of the right-wing extremists goes,
and how they would behave in case they were to achieve power. To be sure, even
such radical nationalists as Vladlen Kralin (a. k. a. Vladimir Tor) and Ilya
Lazarenko were, in their speeches during the protests, speaking out in favor of
political liberalization as well as free and fair elections. However appropriate
these statements may have been as such, the ultra-nationalists' deeper beliefs
and political past suggest that what they may prefer instead of Putin's
authoritarianism is not a liberal democracy. Rather, one suspects, they have in
mind an illiberal ethnocratic, if not an eventually autocratic regime to be
headed by somebody who would be even more nationalistic and anti-Western than
Putin. The political activist and prolific blogger Kralin alias Tor
(http://tor85.livejournal.com/), for instance, is one of the leaders of the
infamous russocentric so-called Movement Against Illegal Immigration, and has
been an initiator of the expressly xenophobic 4th November "Russian Marches" of
the last years. Many of the Russian ultra-nationalists, like Kralin, are either
open or crypto-racists. They disdain the inclusiveness and permissiveness of
modern democratic societies, and see Russia as being a too liberal rather than
reactionary.
To be sure, the anti-Putinism of, at least, some of the ultra-nationalists is as
radical as, or even more profound than, that of the democrats. Yet, it may have
other sources and be of a different kind than the oppositional stance of the
various liberal, conservative, Christian, social, national and other democrats
that the protests brought together. Whereas the various democrats' alliance is
natural, the radical rightists' participation in the movement is not. With their
aggressive behavior during the December demonstrations, the ultra-nationalists
have already, to some degree, discredited the Russian mass action of civic
disobedience.
The case of Ilya Lazarenko who addressed the crowds at the December 10 Bolotnaya
Square demonstration illustrates the point. Not only is Lazarenko a former head
of the fascist micro-party National Front as well as anti-Christian pagan sect
Church of Nav labeled, by some observers, as "satanistic." In 1997, Lazarenko
was, in one of the rare anti-racist court trials of that time, found guilty of
hate speech and sentenced to a 1.5-year suspended prison term. Two years before,
in 1995, Lazarenko had published an article under the title "To Hell with
Elections-this Mondialist [i.e. US-American] Circus!"
Like all ultra-nationalists, Lazarenko has an ambivalent stance towards
democracy and elections. Radical nationalism, on the one hand, poses as
egalitarian in as far as it sees all members of the nation as being of equal
worth. Within this tradition, elections and people's rule can appear as
consistent implementations of nationalist ideology. On the other hand, however,
ultra-nationalism is exclusive in that it makes a distinction between members
and non-members of the nation (however defined). Moreover, ultra-nationalism is
organicistic, meaning that the nation is seen not just as an exclusive
community, but as a tightly knit organism. The members of the nation are cells
of a unified national animal which is in a deadly fight with other similar
organisms competing for power, money, territory etc. Elections appear, under
this viewpoint, as superfluous luxury, if not as a ridiculous exercise-"a
Mondialistic circus" in Lazarenko's words.
The cells do not need to choose the head of their organism. Who leads the nation
and who is led- are questions determined by nature. The Fuehrer knows the needs
of, and cannot do any harm to, the nation as he (very rarely: she) is an
integral part of the national organism. The nation is thus as such "democratic,"
and not in need of competitive elections. The people rule not through
procedures, but through their natural leader personifying the spirit and soul of
the nation. Needless to say, that the national organism cannot tolerate infected
cells or parasites. The whole national organism may be endangered by gangrene,
and have to cut off its "sick" parts-however, painful that may be.
Putin is seen by some of the ultra-nationalists as such an inadequate part of
the Russian national organism. He thus has to be replaced by a "healthy" and
"worthy" representative of the Russian nation. Neither would a President whose
"Russianness" or patriotism is questionable be acceptable-whatever electoral
support that person may receive. Nor would it be logical for Russia, after an
expected assumption of power by an adequate Russian, to remain formally
democratic. Once organic democracy is implemented-elections are not needed any
longer. Elections may be the means to achieve, but are not at the core of,
ultra-nationalism's organic political regime. This story illustrates how far
apart the ultra-nationalist and liberal understandings of "democracy" are.
However, there might be another, entirely different game currently going on now,
in Moscow.
The ancien regime is desperate to diffuse the protests without having to use
force and creating martyrs. The suspicion arises that an infiltration of the
democratic movement by neo-fascists may be the best chance, for Putin and Co.,
to split, discredit, confuse, and thus neutralize the movement. This "political
technology" would not be new. It was tried, by the Soviet ancien regime, as long
ago as 1989-1991. Back then, Vladimir Zhirinovskii's so-called
Liberal-Democratic Party was created and promoted by the Soviet government to
undermine the rising genuinely liberal-democratic movement in the dying USSR.
While the immediate effect of Zhirinovskii was negligible, the LDPR eventually
made its mark on post-Soviet history. It won Russia's first multi-party
parliamentary elections in December 1993, and played some role in undermining
the democratization drive of the 1990s. For instance, the LDPR's heavy presence
and aggressive rhetoric in the Russian parliament and public life in 1994,
facilitated the Russian President's decision to sent federal troops to Chechnya
in December of that year. Arguably, Yeltsin's Chechen adventure had its share in
undermining Russia's young democracy, and preparing the return of the old elites
and structures in 1999. Zhirinovskii may have thus-indirectly and
belatedly-fulfilled the mission of his godfathers of 1989.
We may be currently encountering not an identical, but somewhat similar
strategy. The current neo-Soviet authorities, like their Soviet predecessors, of
the late 1980s are under threat to lose their power, and unsure how to confront
the growing democratic movement. Knowingly or not, the ultra-nationalists in
Russia's civic movement might play a useful role for the ancien regime. Their
presence at the protests could do both, divide the democratic movement, and
provide a pretext for a clamp down, by the authorities. Moreover, the reputation
of the protests abroad has already, and may further be damaged through the
participation ultra-nationalists with a neo-fascist past. The Russian democrats
would thus be well advised to limit participation in the organization of, and
giving speeches at, future mass meetings to individuals with a more or less
clearly democratic orientation.

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/?p=14443
-----------------------

Alexei Navalny: Scourge of Russia's elite
By Daniel Sandford
BBC News, Moscow, 15 February 2012

One of the most influential new figures to emerge in Russian politics predicts
that Vladimir Putin's grip on power will crumble within a year and a half. 
Alexei Navalny became well known as an anti-corruption activist, using his
internet blog to expose widespread excesses and outright theft by Russia's
political elite.  But he is now becoming even more prominent as one of the
informal leaders of huge protests in Moscow. Tens of thousands took to the
streets in December and this month.  In a BBC interview - unusual because he
rarely speaks in depth to Western media - he explained why he believed the
government's time was running out fast.  "A lot of people inside the
establishment understand that corruption cannot be the foundation of the
system," he said. "You can't function like that forever, and it's not right, and
sooner or later it will come tumbling down."  "I don't think that Vladimir Putin
and his circle will be able to sustain the system he built for more than another
18 months." Putin 'usurped power'  When asked if Russia needed a peaceful
revolution he turned the question round saying "the truth is that the criminal
revolution was carried out by Vladimir Putin.  "He really usurped power, took
power in an illegal way. Vladimir Putin staged a revolution and what we need to
do now is to return power to the people."  He said he and others in the
opposition were surprised when 100,000 people took to the streets in the recent
protests, and warned that further fraud in the presidential elections would
provoke an even bigger reaction.  "If the falsifications on the fourth of March
- and we know there will be falsifications - are as obvious and irritating to
people as they were in December's Duma [parliamentary] elections I think even
more people will come out onto the streets."  Many liberals in Russia are
distrustful of Alexei Navalny because he attended the Russia March, a
nationalist demonstration with strong far-right connections. But he insisted
that his aim in going there was to make sure that the issue of immigration
control was not ignored by more mainstream Russian politics.  "When people say
the word 'nationalism' it immediately conjures up negative associations," he
admitted. "But the truth is that when we talk about so-called nationalist
topics, we're talking about real problems.  "Russia is in second place for
illegal immigration. My taking part in events that traditionally only
nationalists attend, and not liberals or democrats, comes from the fact that I
think we shouldn't leave the discussion of these very important questions to
marginal politicians."  Such strategies have given Alexei Navalny a much wider
appeal, beyond just the Moscow middle classes. He has supporters in small towns
right across Russia, the common thread being an internet connection, and a sense
of outrage at the levels of corruption in the country.  Almost half of Russians
now have access to the internet.  "TV is completely closed to us," he explained.
"All of the big traditional media outlets are under state control. That's why
the internet became for us the only instrument. We can do everything for free,
or almost for free, and we can reach out to quite a lot of people. So a lot of
political activists like me built their strategy on the internet, because they
know there is no other way." Media battlefield  This week a light-hearted
political programme called Gosdep on MTV Russia, on which he had been invited to
appear, was cancelled. Not just the one show, but the whole series.  It was
Alexei Navalny who first coined a famous phrase to describe Vladimir Putin's
United Russia Party: the "Party of Crooks and Thieves". His reward has been an
increasing number of pro-Kremlin videos posted on YouTube that attack him. 
"It's a sign that what I'm doing is working," he said. "I understood perfectly
that our job was to do something so that these crooks who are stealing from our
country live badly.  "Naturally they will try to make my life harder. The
growing pressure from the Kremlin shows that I really am being effective and my
work is a real threat to them."  He admitted that Vladimir Putin was still the
country's most popular politician, but said the true support was only around
30%, and even that was achieved by state control of television, and to a lesser
extent the newspapers.  "These days his popularity is based on a monopoly of the
media - Putin puts all his faith in television," he said. "They destroyed all of
the politicians around him, and there is this huge PR machine exclusively
serving him. But even this PR machine can't cope any more."  Alexei Navalny says
he is not running for election - yet - because the voting system needs to be
fixed first.  "Our task now is to secure fair elections," he explained. "That is
task number one. Once we have done that I am sure that great new politicians
will appear as candidates for the posts of prime minister, Duma deputies or
president. And I think I will be among those people and I will fight for a
leadership position."

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17040569
---------------------

Russian youth group outlives its usefulness: Hacked emails suggest that Nashi
could be closed down after the presidential election
By Shaun Walker
The Independent, 16 Febr. 2012

They have done yoga beneath giant portraits of Vladimir Putin, pelted the
British ambassador with eggs, and promised to come out onto the streets to quash
any stirrings of revolution in Russia. But rumours are swirling in Moscow that
Nashi, the pro-Kremlin movement that counts thousands of patriotic young
Russians in its ranks, could be living on borrowed time.
A group of hackers known as Anonymous, which in recent weeks has posted emails
copied from the hacked email accounts of Nashi leaders, announced yesterday that
they had found information that Nashi was to be closed down after next month's
presidential election.
The group did not say where the information had come from, but the rumour rings
true. Vladislav Surkov, the man believed to have created Nashi in 2005, was
recently nudged out of the Kremlin. The former Deputy Chief of Staff was thought
to control much of the internal political scene in Russia and be the ideologue
of Putinism. Mr Surkov has been assigned a new role as Deputy Prime Minister,
and is no longer in charge of youth policy.
Nashi and similar groups have been a key part of the Russian political landscape
in recent years. Each year, thousands of young Nashi activists have taken part
in residential camps on Lake Seliger in rural Russia, attending seminars on
politics and lifestyle, hearing how the opposition are political prostitutes in
the pay of the West, and often receiving flying visits from top government
officials including Mr Putin himself. They have been bussed into Moscow from the
provinces for mass rallies; they have picketed opposition activists; and they
harassed the former British ambassador for months after he addressed an
opposition conference. Their purpose is to prevent a repeat of Ukraine's Orange
Revolution in Russia.
The run-up to next month's presidential elections, when Mr Putin will seek a
return to the Kremlin, has been marked by exactly the sort of massed street
protests that Nashi was set up to prevent, but it seems that the group has
become an embarrassment rather than a help. The hacked emails showed how leading
Nashi activists planned to discredit opposition members and pay for
Kremlin-friendly blog posts.
If Nashi is closed down, it cannot be assumed that the Kremlin will stop
nurturing young activists. It may simply rebrand its youth wing. Anonymous said
in its statement that it suspected the same leaders would be involved, but that
the movement would be renamed.
Commentators were sceptical that a new group would make a difference. "Youth
policy in Russia is not seen as way for young people to develop, but instead as
a way for the authorities to use them," wrote the independent news website
gazeta.ru in an editorial. "Dynamic young people who are really interested in
what is going on in the country are either opposed to the current authorities or
determined to leave Russia as they don't see any prospects here."

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russian-youth-group-outlives-its-\
usefulness-6950316.html#
------------

Is Alexei Navalny sent to spoil the democratic party?
Daniil Kotsyubinsky
OpenDemocracy, 17 February 2012

Navalny's campaigns against corruption and his clever campaigning have won him a
central role in the protests against Putin. But Navalny has also many critics.
In his controversial article Daniil Kotsyubinsky, who saw how Navalny's
nationalism ruined a previous protest wave, wonders whether his programme might
not end up destroying the democratic movement.
It is surprising enough that Navalny, a fearless and powerful opponent of the
system, has risen to such a position of influence without any influential
political backer. On top of that, the government of the largest country in the
world has taken almost no action to stop the blogger and lawyer from rising to
his current status as a leading opposition leader.
Putin's political machine, which is quick enough to smear other opponents, has
not even attempted to work out how he gets the exclusive information he uses to
reveal corruption. Navalny himself boasted about the informants in government
who helped him uncover the embezzlement of $4 million during the construction of
Transneft's pipeline to the Far East.
'Navalny's broader political programme is also developing from the Russian
nationalism whose imperial and anti-liberal essence was laid out in that first
manifesto. Its crux is the preservation of the authoritarian-presidential model
of state.'
"We found the papers. [14] Not all of them, but the important bits," he wrote on
his blog. "Where we got them from I won't tell, but I will note that there are
many people working in the National Audit Office, as there are in Transneft, and
not all of them are swindlers."
He was laughing right in the authorities' face, despite their obsession with
finding spies, and speaking of himself only as a minority shareholder, and yet
Putin did nothing to stop him. In fact, the prime minister was surprisingly
reasonable about it.
"If a minority shareholder [15] is dissatisfied with something, it should be
checked," the prime minister said. "Let the Prosecutor's Office check, and other
supervisory bodies."
Alexei Navalny took part in last year's 'Russian March', joining thousands of
nationalists as they marched through the working-class Moscow neighborhood of
Liublino. The marchers called on ethnic Russians to 'take back' their country.
Some observers suspected the Kremlin was just playing for time and secretly
preparing its revenge. But a year has passed, and that revenge has not come.
Instead, Navalny has continued his unmolested digging unearthing of the
government's guilty secrets. He has not been summoned to the prosecutor's
office, and there has been no investigation into his finances, which is normally
how Putin's government begins its attacks on its opponents.
Some newspapers have queried where the money comes from to support Alexei
Navalny and his projects RosPil [16], RosYama [17] and now even Rosvybory [18].
Moskovsky komsomolets, for example, pointed out that Navalny has a "private
structure of income", and stated that he "does not reveal the sources of his
sponsorship and costs". It also said that "specialists in the PR market have
already more than once publically called into question the likelihood of the
RosPil project existing solely on the donations of citizens".
These newspapers are more or less independent, and were prepared to question
whether Navalny is what he says he is, but their stories were not picked up by
the Kremlin's media outlets. The Kremlin-controlled journalists also ignored the
contents of Navalny's email, revealed by hackers last year. This is peculiar,
since they are always happy to embarrass other opposition figures with
unlawfully-obtained compromising material: just look at the recordings of Boris
Nemtsov's phone calls, for example.
If Navalny is spattered at all by the Kremlin's mud-slinging, then far less of
it clings to him than to the others. A recent internet video called "Navalny is
a Neanderthal" was more counterproductive than anything. It contained no
incriminating facts and was so grotesque that, instead of turning people against
Navalny, it was more likely to bring him followers.
It certainly looks to me as if the authorities are trying to make sure Navalny
remains the most popular of the opposition leaders outside the political system.
In 2011, Navalny started RosYama.ru, a project that looks to combat fraud in the
road construction sector.
Last month, NTV showed a documentary [19] about how opposition leaders spent
their New Year holidays. Almost half of this blatant exercise in propaganda was
dedicated to Nemtsov. Among other things, it filmed his expensive holiday in the
Gulf with a young woman it claimed came from an escort agency. In comparison,
Navalny spent less than $10,000 on a trip to Mexico with his wife, and came
across as relatively restrained. Although some bloggers have accused Navalny
[20] of existing on American money, the documentary skirted around the fact he
had returned home via New York.
Again, it looks to me as if the Kremlin is looking after Alexei Navalny, in PR
terms, for some secret purpose.
Navalny himself is restraining his radical rhetoric and being careful in the
run-up to the presidential elections. Many of the protesters on the march of
February 4 were surprised by his refusal to speak, and less than convinced by
his explanation why he decided not to: "I do not intend to speak at the meeting
myself, because I'm not in favour of the same individuals getting up in front of
people time and time again".
I think the real reason he did not take the stage is more likely to have been
that Navalny got so carried away at the protest on December 24 with statements
like this: "I see here enough people to take the Kremlin and the White House. We
are peaceful people. But we cannot be patient forever", that he worried what he
would say in February. A radical start required a resolute sequel. But no sequel
followed.
To understand the peculiar relationship between the Kremlin and Navalny, you
need to look back at his work in the NAROD movement (Natsionalnoe Russkoe
Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie; the National Russian Liberation Movement. The acronym
Narod means "the People"). It was created in 2007 with the direct participation
of the director of the National Strategy Institute, Kremlin spin doctor
Stanislav Belkovsky.
'The important question is whether the Russian opposition can today unite around
the idea of Russian nationalism and a "good Stalin". And if it cannot, does that
mean Alexei Navalny is the same sort of divisive influence for the anti-Putin
movement as NAROD was for the dissenters?'
Belkovsky has a long history of helping Putin dispose of awkward opponents. He
is the ideologue-for-hire who, in June 2003, published a paper entitled The
State and the Oligarchy, which alleged that Russia's biggest businessmen were
preparing to overthrow the government. Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky was
named among the conspirators. Shortly afterwards Platon Lebedev, Khodorkovsky's
closest business partner, was arrested, followed by the Yukos head himself.
Some 18 months later, Belkovsky was dispatched to counter the threat of mass
protests which hung over the Kremlin after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
January 2005 saw demonstrations in Russia too, connected to the cancellation of
some state benefits and perceived attacks on small businesses.
Belkovsky's task was to split the protesters, and he attempted to separate
nationalists from liberals and thus weaken their position significantly. The
plan failed. Instead of liberals rejecting the nationalists, the opposite
happened. Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevik party toned down its traditional
nationalist rhetoric, and began to campaign on purely human rights grounds,
under slogans such as "Down with Autocracy!" and "Russia without Putin!" They
formed the "The Other Russia" coalition, and staged a series of dissenters'
marches across the country from 2007. The biggest and most significant of them
was held in St Petersburg on March 3. The Kremlin had to act fast, and the
degree of its concern was shown by the fact that chief ideologue Vladislav
Surkov himself came to St Petersburg to size up the situation.
Stanislav Belkovsky is a political analyst and communication specialist. In
2003, just before Khodorkovsky's arrest, his paper entitled 'The State and the
Oligarchy' alleged that Russia's biggest businessmen were preparing to overthrow
the government. In 2007, he helped to establish in St. Petersburg nationalist
NAROD coalition. Alexei Navalny was one of its leaders.
Within weeks, Belkovsky had prepared a new nationalist movement to poison the
liberals' coalition. This was NAROD. Sergei Gulyaev, leader of the St Petersburg
dissenters, a deputy in the legislative assembly of St Petersburg and a moderate
nationalist who until then had supported the common liberal position, became a
NAROD co-chair.
Alexei Navalny was at that time a member of the liberal Yabloko party. He had
gained some notoriety for taking part in the 2006 Russian March alongside
neo-fascists, and he also became co-chair of NAROD, along with National
Bolshevik Zakhar Prilepin [21]. Navalny attempted to draw a veil over
Belkovsky's role in NAROD's history: "for some reason lots of people are now
saying that Belkovsky is in charge of all this. This is an exaggeration.
Belkovsky is just a political technologist who is overseeing the process".
When NAROD was being created I was coordinator of the Petersburg Citizen's
Committee, and part of the Petersburg Opposition Coordinating Conference. I
remember very well that my colleagues in the Conference who joined NAROD did not
hide the fact that Belkovsky, specifically, was supervising and financing this
project. No one was prepared to say where he was getting the money from for this
undertaking, however.
The ploy was successful. The dissenters' movement split in two, into
nationalists and liberals, and the St Petersburg movement died.
In December 2007 Yabloko expelled Alexei Navalny, with party member Boris
Vishnevsky saying the move was a result of his vocal nationalism. "He became a
co-founder of the NAROD movement, calling himself a "normal Russian
nationalist". At the meeting of the party Bureau I voted for his expulsion,
after which Navalny yelled out "Glory to Russia" as he was leaving," Vishnevsky
has written.
Yevgeny Gontmakher [22], a member of the Institute of Contemporary Development
[23]'s board of management, has combed Navalny's blog, looking for signs of this
nationalism and found some very disquieting passages.
In August 10, 2008, after the Russia-Georgia conflict, he wrote [24]: "the
Georgian in the United Nations is an utter savage. A freak. I hope that someone
from our delegation, in the spirit of the Olympic principle "victory in the
changing rooms is just as important" will hit him in the face behind the scenes.
After we blitz Georgia, we need to get busy with Costa Rica. The impudent
grandpa in a yellow jacket rolled out a whole moralising lecture. The most
important thing is for our General Staff to find it on the map. Otherwise
they'll miss and hit Panama. Where our people are."
A few weeks later, on August 21, 2008, he turned his attention to ethnic
minorities in Russia, including Central Asians, who are disparagingly known as
chuchmeky. "On the neighbouring plot of land they're building an office block.
At precisely seven in the morning the chuchmeky beat sledgehammers on some sort
of bits of iron with simply hellish din and, incidentally, all the chuchmeky are
without helmets, of course. And then we wonder where the Tajiks found under
bushes with fractured skulls come from. It's always something along the lines of
"yet another skinhead attack"," he wrote [25].
In 2008 NAROD teamed up with two radical nationalist groups DPNI (the Movement
Against Illegal Immigration) and the Great Russia party to create the Russian
National Movement. Journalists asked Navalny, who was already considered NAROD's
main leader, why he had united with the ultranationalists. He was unapologetic.
"You know, for some reason the word "nation" grates on the ears of many
liberal-minded individuals. In America neither the president nor the
presidential candidates are ashamed to use this word," he answered.
"We think that nationalism can and should be built on a base of democratic
principles and that it does not present a threat to any other peoples.
Nationalism, specifically, may become that ideology which in some sense unites
the liberals, those on the left and those on the right. Namely this must become
the core of Russia's political system."
Navalny's liberal admirers are perhaps hoping that in recent years he has moved
away from Russian nationalism towards a European system of values, but he has
not. Navalny understands "European values" today exactly as he did during the
formation of the NAROD movement. In conversation with Boris Akunin, the
novelist, on January 3, he said he stood by every word of the NAROD movement's
original manifesto.
Even the fight against corruption, which is key for Navalny today, is directly
linked with hatred of immigrants. Just look at how Navalny justified his
attendance at the Russian March last autumn.
  "I come to this event and see that the majority of people are completely normal
individuals who consider themselves nationalists, national democrats. If we ask
them what the word "nationalism" means to them, they will not wander off in a
big ideological labyrinth, they will say, we are against corruption in the
authorities, we are against migration, and we are against the economics of the
oligarchs," he said.
Navalny's broader political programme is also developing from the Russian
nationalism whose imperial and anti-liberal essence was laid out in that first
manifesto. Its crux is the preservation of the authoritarian-presidential model
of state.
"The specifics of Russia, her dimensions, the makeup of the population and so
on, dictate to us that the president must be a more influential figure than in
the majority of European countries," he said.
In essence Navalny, for all his European-American-parliamentary talk, is
proposing a "good Stalin" model for Russia.
"The myth of Stalin is a myth of iron order, imposed by an iron fist. To debunk
it someone else must bring order without an iron fist, that is, simply by law,"
he told Akunin. "The head of state needs to establish moral and ethical
guidelines and carry out official instructions, and not earn billions for
neighbours in a dacha cooperative."
Thus, the ideal Russia, according to Navalny, is a country headed by a strong
ruler. He protects, above all, the interests of ethnic Russians. He personally
ensures the implementation of order and severely punishes "swindlers and
thieves".
It is not hard to see that this is, broadly speaking, pretty much the same tune
with which Vladimir Putin lulled the electorate in his own early days as a
politician. But the question is not to what degree Navalny resembles a "young
Putin". It is not even about what is good or bad about Navalny's political
platform.
The important question is whether the Russian opposition can today unite around
the idea of Russian nationalism and a "good Stalin". And if it cannot, does that
mean Alexei Navalny is the same sort of divisive influence for the anti-Putin
movement as NAROD was for the dissenters? If so, then for all his radical
rhetoric Navalny is destroying the protest movement. And that means he is
helping Putin stay in power.
'It is surprising enough that Navalny, a fearless and powerful opponent of the
system, has risen to such a position of influence without any influential
political backer.'
Navalny rarely indulges in nationalist rhetoric now. He focuses on attacking the
"party of swindlers and thieves", as he calls Putin's United Russia. But it is
clear that if the political revolution continues to gain momentum, questions
about the nature of his programme, and about the creation of a broad opposition
coalition based on it, will come up on the agenda. And here the ideas of Russian
nationalism and presidential authoritarianism propagated by Navalny will rise to
the surface, and start to destroy the opposition from within.
But suppose for a moment that, despite splits in the opposition leadership, the
people defeat all the Kremlin's political calculations and win their velvet
revolution. What will happen if in such a scenario Navalny, with his
authoritarian populism, surfs to the crest of the revolutionary wave?
Then I fear we would find ourselves back at the beginning: "long live the new
honourable and incorruptible President!"

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/daniil-kotsyubinsky/is-alexei-navalny-sen\
t-to-spoil-democratic-party
----

Vladimir Putin's election campaign slogan? Blame the U.S.
Vladimir Isachenkov
The Star, February 17, 2012

MOSCOW-It's a mantra of Vladimir Putin's presidential campaign: The United
States is working to weaken Russia and push it back into the chaos that followed
the Soviet collapse.  In a wave of anti-Americanism reminiscent of the Cold War,
the prime minister has cast his opponents as U.S. lackeys and the new American
ambassador has found himself under unprecedented attack, including being
targeted in an offensive YouTube video that implies he is a pedophile.  Putin's
posturing as a defender of national interests may help him win the March 4
election, but possibly at the cost of the "reset" of U.S.-Russian relations that
has been one of the foreign policy achievements of Barack Obama's presidency. 
"The current campaign is laden with anti-Americanism," said Sergei Oznobishchev,
head of the Institute of Strategic Assessments, a Moscow think-tank. "It's like
clothing they dust off and put on for certain occasions, currently for electoral
purposes."  Putin has frequently criticized the United States throughout his
12-year rule, first as president and then as prime minister, accusing Washington
of seeking to secure global domination. After a period of relative warmth thanks
to the reset, relations have worsened again over U.S. missile defence plans and
Moscow's support for the Syrian government despite its violent crackdown on
protests.  With the election approaching and pro-democracy protests gaining
momentum, anti-American rhetoric on state TV channels has risen dramatically in
pitch.  Shortly after the arrival in mid-January of U.S. Ambassador Michael
McFaul, who had served as Obama's Russia adviser and helped engineer the reset,
Channel One state television aired a program describing him as a "specialist in
the promotion of democracy" who came to Russia to organize "a revolution." As a
Stanford University professor, McFaul has written extensively on fostering
democracy.  A video posted on YouTube this week shows an anonymous pollster
asking people on the street in Moscow to compare photographs of McFaul with a
man convicted of pedophilia, and say which one looks like a pedophile. Everyone
in the video points to McFaul. The authors could not be tracked down, but the
video has the hallmarks of those made by pro-Kremlin youth groups to tarnish
Putin's enemies.  When McFaul met with representatives of the Russian
opposition, camera crews from Kremlin-controlled stations were waiting at the
gates to harass them and try to cast them as U.S. stooges.  McFaul has indicated
that behind the scenes, Russian officials have been more welcoming.  "Productive
meetings this week with Russian govt officials, even as we disagree on Syria,"
he tweeted on Feb. 8. "Sharp contrast with public anti-US statements."  In a
documentary broadcast this month by Channel One, Putin charged that the U.S.
wants to subdue Russia, fearing its nuclear might.  "Our partners don't want
allies, they want vassals," Putin said. He dismissed as lies U.S. assurances
that the planned missile shield is intended to counter a missile threat from
Iran, insisting that its real goal was to erode Russia's nuclear deterrent. 
Moscow has sought legal guarantees from the U.S. that the future missile shield
will not be directed against it; failure to reach agreement has fueled tensions
that may further escalate in May when NATO members are to sign an agreement in
Chicago on the U.S.-led missile defence.  The annual summit of the Group of
Eight, which includes Russia, is being held in Chicago at about the same time.
Putin is expected to attend, for what would likely be his first major foreign
trip after his likely election and inauguration in early May.  Putin's
anti-Americanism may have roots in his 16-year KGB career, but many believe that
it is really driven by political expediency rather than ideology.  Facing
growing public frustration over pervasive official corruption and rising social
inequality, Putin appears to be trying to redirect public anger at foreign
forces.  "Putin has revived the Soviet-era argument: We are poor because we are
surrounded by enemies," said Dmitry Oreshkin, a political analyst who was among
the founders of the League of Voters, a public organization set up to promote
fair elections. "That serves both as an explanation for the economic
inefficiency and an argument against a leadership change."  Anti-U.S. rhetoric
works well for Putin's core electorate of blue-collar workers, farmers and
public servants, many of whom harbour deep suspicions of U.S. intentions after
years of anti-American propaganda on state-controlled television stations. 
"People have been poisoned by television, and many sincerely believe in U.S.
aggressive intentions," said Alexander Konovalov, a political analyst.  He said
Putin has taken the risk of damaging ties with the U.S. because his desire to
return to the presidency outweighs other concerns.  "The focus now is on showing
the domestic audience that he doesn't fear standing up to the United States,"
Konovalov said.  Putin has accused the U.S. State Department of instigating the
protests that drew tens of thousands of people after a Dec. 4 parliamentary
election that was manipulated in favour of Putin's party. Russia's top
investigative agency then claimed that videos chronicling vote rigging were
faked and originated from a server in California.  Russia's only independent
election-monitoring group, Golos, dismissed the claim, saying the only specific
video the Investigative Committee had pointed at as fake was in fact genuine and
came from a server in Moscow, not California. Golos' statement was ignored by
state television stations.  State broadcasters also have given prominent
coverage to incidents involving Russian children adopted by American families.
The Foreign Ministry sprang into action over the weekend, accusing U.S.
authorities of failing to adequately punish parents charged with killing or
mistreating their adopted children and urging a suspension of further adoptions.
Despite the rise of anti-American rhetoric, few expect the current frictions to
escalate into a bigger conflict.  Putin doesn't want a showdown with the United
States, said Sergei Rogov, the head of the USA and Canada Institute, which
advises the Kremlin. He said Moscow and Washington may still agree on a missile
defence document that would assuage Russia's concerns before the Chicago summit.
"The newly elected Russian president would not like to begin his term in office
with a confrontation with the United States," Rogov said.  Oznobishchev said
that Moscow's economic interests, such as Russia's investments in U.S.
Treasuries and the Russian elite's assets in the U.S., would prevent it from
going too far in challenging Washington. Moscow also badly needs Western
investments and technology, he added.  "The need for modernization objectively
pushes Russia toward establishing closer ties with the United States, Japan and
Western Europe," he said. "It will not risk any serious rift with the U.S."

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1133041--vladimir-putin-s-election-cam\
paign-slogan-blame-the-u-s
-----------------------------

Putin running against US in election
Rick Moran
American Thinker, February 19, 2012

A nasty spate of anti-Americanism set off by Vladimir V. Putin has grown into
waves of attacks aimed at the new American ambassador and Russian opposition
leaders, raising questions about the future of U.S.-Russian relations.
The attacks started just before the December parliamentary elections and have
intensified as the March 4 presidential vote approaches. Although widely viewed
as aimed primarily at a domestic audience, they have grown shriller and more
aggressive, provoking debate about whether Russia is deliberately giving a cold
shoulder to President Obama's effort to promote more productive relations.
A main target of the attacks is Michael McFaul, the new ambassador, a longtime
democracy advocate and Russia expert who as a top aide to Obama has been an
architect of what the White House calls a "reset'' with Moscow.
The anti-American campaign bears trademark Soviet and KGB thinking, reflecting
the mindset of many of the high-level officials appointed by Putin as well as
their efforts to protect their power and privileges from the gathering
opposition.
U.S. officials say that they understand internal politics are behind the
fusillade but that the effect remains worrying, raising concern about whether
Russia recognizes the extent of the possible damage, simply doesn't care or is
foreshadowing a change in foreign policy. "It's getting to the point where it's
going to be hard to undo," said one administration official in Washington who
spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the
issue publicly.
Anti-Americanism is always popular in Russia. The people blame America for their
loss of empire and are bitter about what they see as American triumphalism in
winning the cold war.
But Putin is taking anti-Americanism to a new level.
Among recent incidents was a confrontation outside the U.S. Embassy shortly
after McFaul arrived in Moscow on Jan. 14. Opposition leaders who visited the
embassy for an unannounced meeting with McFaul and visiting Deputy Secretary of
State William Burns were accosted by a group of young people identifying
themselves as television reporters demanding to know the purpose of the visit.
The exchange was shown on the main television channel and on the Internet with
the suggestion that the Russian opposition was receiving its orders from the
Americans. Opposition leaders say they suspect the incident was a setup
facilitated by Russian government surveillance.
More recent Russian television broadcasts have included attacks describing
McFaul as a promoter of revolution. The barrage reached a new level of
offensiveness a few days ago when a video posted on the Internet drew
comparisons between photos of the ambassador and those of a notorious pedophile.
"Putin is choosing worse relations with the West to keep himself in power," says
Dmitri Oreshkin, a political analyst and writer who says that Putin is thinking
short-term tactics rather than long-term strategy. "Of course it's a KGB
mentality."
When one side shows itself to be over-eager in wanting better relations, the
other side finds it too easy to take advantage of that mindset. Putin feels he
can bash America with impunity because he knows Obama has invested a lot of
political capitol in his "reset" of relations. He has no worries that America
will abandon their current course - unless, of course, Obama is defeated in
November. Then all bets are off and Putin may pay a price for his whipping up
hatred against the US among the Russian people.

http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/02/putin_running_against_us_in_election\
.html
------------------

The Paradox Of Russia's Left
Tom Balmforth
RFE/RL, 19 February 2012

MOSCOW - Marching in protest under a sea of red flags swirling in the frosty air
at a recent demonstration, 31-year-old Yevgeny can't help but feel that a new
generation of Russian socialists is on the rise. And he could be right -- if it
weren't for all the stumbling blocks.
In the 1990s, Yevgeny supported the Communist Party but eventually became
disillusioned with its colorless and charisma-challenged leader, Gennady
Zyuganov, a fixture in Russian politics for decades. Zyuganov is making his
fourth run for the presidency in March.
Today, Yevgeny says his affinities lie more with the "Left Front," a loose
coalition of leftist groups that are not permitted to field candidates in
Russia's tightly managed political system. But even if they were, he confesses
he would be reluctant to vote for the Left Front's macho leader Sergei Udaltsov
whose firebrand style of street protesting may have wounded his political
credibility.
"I just don't know, I cannot say for sure. He just doesn't seem to be the kind
of leader that I could go and vote for," said Yevgeny, who did not want to give
his last name.
Yevgeny's predicament encapsulates the quandaries of Russia's left-leaning
electorate, which sociologists say comprise the lion's share of the country's
voters. Analysts say there is a glaring disconnect between the country's
socialist-leaning electorate, which favors heavy state intervention in the
economy and a strong social safety net, and the dearth of attractive options for
them to support at the ballot box.
Political Dinosaurs
Zyuganov, the Russian left's most visible personality, is largely viewed as a
political dinosaur more concerned with maintaining his comfortable position as a
permanent opposition figure acceptable to the authorities, than actually winning
power.
Sergei Mironov's center-left A Just Russia is tainted by the party's reputation
as a "pocket opposition" party established to do the Kremlin's bidding.
And Udaltsov's Left Front is unregistered and seen as too unwieldy and radical
to be viable electorally.
Mindful of the electorate's leftist mood, Prime Minister and presidential
candidate Vladimir Putin has increasingly campaigned on populist themes,
promising increases in social spending and higher salaries for state employees.
Boris Kagarlitsky, a sociologist, author, and leading socialist thinker, says
entrenched interests among the established left parties are preventing the
development of newer, and more palatable, options.
"At some point some kind of left party is going to emerge, but only when it is
able to get rid of the current left. Because at this point one of the biggest
obstacles to the left is the groups and formations of the left itself. They are
completely blocking development on this side of the spectrum," Kagarlitsky said.
As support for the United Russia party dwindled last year, the Communist Party
won a hefty swathe of the protest vote in the December parliamentary elections,
coming in second place with just under 20 percent.
The Communist surge was not surprising, says Aleksei Levinson of the independent
polling organization, the Levada Center.
"If we take the left to mean socialist ideas in the strict sense, and in the
Soviet notion of socialist ideas, then these represent the most widespread views
in the bulk of the population, and among the elite," Levinson said. "I believe
that the dominant views here are without a doubt the left."
But despite this, the Communists have been unable to expand their electorate.
Transforming itself into a more modern social democratic party might do the
trick, but Zyuganov has shown scant appetite for this, preferring instead to
peddle nostalgia for the Soviet Union.
Mark Galeotti, a professor at New York University, says this essentially
relegates Zyuganov's party to political irrelevance despite its status as the
largest opposition force.
"If there's going to be any kind of rekindling of the left and a reinvention of
the communists, it's going to take two things," Galeotti said.
"One is the Communist leadership itself deciding that actually they want to be
in power rather than maintain opposition, and more to the point you're going to
need other forces to reach out to the Communists."
In January, Udaltsov did in fact reach out to Zyuganov, pledging his Left Front
would back the 67-year old Communist leader in the March 4 presidential
election.
Support, But Few Votes
But given that the Left Front is such a loose coalition, analysts say it will be
impossible for him to translate that support into actual votes.
Mironov's A Just Russia has recently shown some potential of becoming a force on
the center-left. The party was founded in 2006 as a pro-Kremlin alternative to
the Communists and won 7.74 percent of the vote in the State Duma elections.
But the party steadily began distancing itself from the Kremlin, a process that
culminated in Mironov being removed from his post as speaker of the Federation
Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, last May.
Running on an opposition platform in December 2011, the party nearly doubled its
vote, winning 13.24 percent.
But Mironov, who is running in the March presidential election, is still not
trusted by anti-Kremlin voters due to his decades-long ties to Putin.
And that leaves the 34-year-old Udaltsov, who with his pale face, shaved head,
and upturned collar, looks more like a Maoist ascetic or a hero from the Matrix
movies than an opposition leader.
A rough-and-tumble firebrand, Udatsov says he has lost count of the number of
times police have detained him for public protests and says he spent around
three months behind bars last year. His prominence spiked late last year when he
was hospitalized after going on a hunger strike while in jail for participating
in unsanctioned antigovernment protests.
Udaltsov calls himself a social democrat and calls for the nationalization of
strategic industries and a tax overhaul that would redistribute income to the
poor. He says the economic hardship gripping the Western world and the Occupy
Wall Street movement in the United States show that the neo-liberal economic
model has outlived its usefulness.
For a new generation of leftists like Yevgeny and his girlfriend Darya, these
are the right words -- but they are nevertheless still searching for a new
champion who could be more viable at the ballot box.
"In general this system can produce more worthy leaders," Yevgeny said.

www.rferl.org/content/the_paradox_of_russias_left/24488988.html
----

Fearing West, Putin pledges biggest military buildup since cold war: Vladimir
Putin, less than two weeks away from presidential polls, pledged $772 billion on
arms over the next decade.
By Fred Weir,
The Christian Science Monitor - CSMonitor.com, February 20, 2012

Russia needs to launch a major military buildup to prepare for life in a
dangerous world where international law is breaking down, the West feels free to
intervene in sovereign countries, and rivals could invade Russia to seize its
rich trove of natural resources, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has warned.  In
his fifth programmatic article detailing what he will do if he wins a new
six-year presidential term in elections that are now less than two weeks off,
Mr. Putin pledged, among other things, the biggest rearmament program in Russia
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Over the next decade, Putin writes,
$772 billion to be spent on 400 new intercontinental ballistic missiles, 2,300
late-generation tanks, 600 modern combat aircraft - including at least 100
military-purpose space planes - eight nuclear ballistic missile submarines, 50
surface warships as well as a whole new inventory of artillery, air defense
systems, and about 17,000 new military vehicles.  "The processes of global
transformation currently underway may carry all sorts of risks with them, many
of them unpredictable," Putin wrote Monday in the government-owned Rossiskaya
Gazeta. "In a situation of global economic and other kinds of hardships, it may
be very tempting for some to resolve their problems at others' expense, through
pressure and coercion. It is no wonder that we already hear some voices saying
that it is 'only natural' that resources of global significance should soon be
declared as being above national sovereignty. We must exclude any such
possibility, even a hypothetical one, with respect to Russia. This means that we
should not tempt anybody with our weakness."  He also warns that US plans to
build a globe-spanning missile defense shield will have to be countered with new
generations of weapons designed to keep Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent
effective.  "We are forced to take decisive steps to bolster our national
aerospace defense system to counter the US and NATO efforts in the deployment of
missile defense," Putin writes. "One cannot be 'too patriotic' about this issue.
Russia's military response to the global US missile shield, including its
European part, will be effective and asymmetrical, a match for US missile
defense policy." Russians doubt feasibility of Putin's plans   In previous
articles, Putin has pledged to reform Russia's troubled political system, deal
with the rising threat of nationalism to the country's political stability, and
resolve the demographic crisis that could see Russia's population shrink by
nearly a quarter in the next four decades.  This is not the first time Putin has
promised to upgrade Russia's chronically underfunded and over-structured armed
forces, whose shortcomings were clearly displayed during the brief 2008 summer
war with neighboring Georgia. Many of the new weapons have been in the pipeline
for some time, but bottlenecks in Russia's severely degraded Soviet-era military
industry have led to breakdowns, lengthy delays, and complaints of substandard
products.  "Unfortunately all that Putin says about making our military industry
capable of delivering all these new weapons remains little more than slogans,"
says Alexander Golts, military expert with the online newspaper Yezhednevny
Zhurnal. "While Putin has a lot of good things to say about the course of
[structural] military reform, he has simply not taken on board the need for
sweeping reform of Russian military industry. Every year our military
procurement program fails to meet its targets, and there is no sign this is
going to change anytime soon."  Russia's armed forces have been dramatically
transformed over the past five years by a sweeping restructuring that has
eliminated the gargantuan Soviet "mobilization army," with its hundreds of
"phantom" divisions that are meant to be filled out by reservists in times of
war. Tens of thousands of top-level officers have been cashiered, the length of
mandatory male military service has been reduced from three years to one, and
about 100 mobile combat brigades - largely staffed by professional soldiers -
have taken the place of hundreds of unwieldy World War II-era armored divisions
as the core of Russia's army.  "There's a lot of good sense in this article,
including the projection that military conscripts will make up just 15 percent
of the armed forces by 2020," says Mr. Golts. "For the first time he has stated
that the goal is, effectively, to create a modern all-volunteer force. That is
to be applauded."  But many experts warn that even if the massive rearmament
program Putin is advocating is desirable and affordable for Russia, it may be
simply not feasible. The Soviet-era military-industrial complex, with its vast
webs of subcontractors, has shriveled and the skilled workers and engineers that
once populated it have long since disappeared.  According to Viktor Baranets, a
former Defense Ministry spokesman who writes a military column for the daily
Komsomolskaya Pravda, barely half of the more than 2,200 key Soviet-era military
factories are still operating, and many of them are on the verge of bankruptcy
today.  "This is the first time Putin has spoken about this in such a tough
way," says Mr. Baranets. "But in order for this plan to come to life, we need to
see our military industries restored and many new plants built. Putin has yet to
prove that he's got both feet on the ground with these promises, and that he's
not just making fools of people." Preparing for war with the West  The political
subtext in Putin's article is the scary suggestion that the world is drifting
into a dangerous phase in which international institutions like the United
Nations no longer work and Western countries feel free to intervene militarily
in sovereign states, as they did last year in Libya.  Moscow has firmly opposed
any kind of international action on the current crisis in Syria, and is actually
preparing to stage war games in southern Russia this summer to prepare for
possible fallout from a feared US military strike against Iran.  "Today, we see
how new regional and local wars break out one after another," Putin wrote. "We
see zones of instability and artificially maintained, managed chaos emerging.
Furthermore, we see how some are purposefully provoking such conflicts in the
immediate vicinity of Russia's borders. We see the fundamental principles of
international law being devalued and eroded."  A few experts argue that debates
about the feasibility of Putin's rearmament plans are beside the point, and that
his insistence on getting Russia ready for war with the West ought to be the
focus of public scrutiny.  "This is the vision of a very disturbed person, who
openly declares that the world is against him and Russia, and we need to build
defenses against everyone," says Pavel Felgenhauer, a military columnist for the
opposition weekly Novaya Gazeta.  "Putin's plan calls for spending enormous
amounts of money to prepare for war with America, to be a superpower player
again and surpass the West in the quality of our weaponry. This is not merely
unachievable, it's paranoid. The USSR, which was much bigger and more powerful
than Russia, was bankrupted by engaging in this sort of arms race. It's the
wrong direction entirely," Mr. Felgenhauer says

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0220/Fearing-West-Putin-pledges-bigge\
st-military-buildup-since-cold-war
----------------

Most Russians won't support nationalists
By: Leokadia Drobizheva
Russia: Beyond the Headlines, 21 February 2012

Leokadia Drobizheva, the director of the Center for Study of Interethnic
Relations of the Sociology Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, spoke
to the Ogoniok magazine about nationalism in modern Russia.
About the shades of nationalism
The notion of "nationalism" has many meanings. An ordinary Russian has always
regarded nationalism as a bad attitude towards representatives of other nations
and an exaltation of the nation to which the nationalist belongs. In Soviet
times, nationalism was interpreted as a wish to isolate and prioritize one's own
nation. Since the 1990s, however, there have been two concepts of nationalism.
The first is ethnic nationalism, interpreted as a national policy to achieve the
political objective of taking or retaining power. The second tradition is civil
nationalism, which is regarded as an aspiration for prosperity of your nation
and protection of its interests. When Vladimir Putin calls himself a nationalist
[during a recent meeting with political experts, he said: "I am a Russian
nationalist, too, and I, too, like the Russian people, don't wish them ill."],
he is referring to civil nationalism. Previously, Putin spoke about the nation
as a community of citizens. In his article "Russia: the National Issue," he
emphasizes the Russian, although he writes that Russia is a multinational
country. There are two points here: Putin believes that the Russians are the
binding force of the state, which is natural, because the Russians form the
majority and the Russian language and culture dominate. Even so, the statement
that the Russians are the state-forming nation is ambiguous, because the state
is formed by its citizens.
About Dmitry Rogozin's service
In his article "A Russian Answer to Vladimir Putin," Dmitry Rogozin attempts to
give reasons for the timing of Vladimir Putin's article and cites two historical
examples: the Romanovs, who were trying to enlist the conservatives' support
prior to the 1917 Revolution but were too late; and Joseph Stalin, who appealed
to the Russian people in hard times. In other words, Rogozin assumes that the
Russians are only remembered when there is a risk of losing power; so the reader
might get the idea that the government is somewhat shaky. We, as sociologists,
believe that Vladimir Putin's situation is different and the polls have proved
that he does not run these risks. It turns out that Rogozin didn't do the prime
minister any favors. You should not dramatize the national issue.
About the evolution of Russian nationalists
In the mid-2000s, "nationalist" in Russia meant skinheads. They were
characterized by clear xenophobic moods, while the movement as a whole must have
been controlled by the security services.
At the end of the first decade of the 2000s, "ideologists" became more active
alongside extremists, who organized periodical actions. The ideologist category
incorporated people of various groups. There is Dmitry Rogozin, who still heads
the Congress of Russian Communities and supports Vladimir Putin. Then, there are
nationalists connected with left-wing extremists. These include Sergei Baburin,
who has long been saying in public that the Russian people have been forsaken.
They tend to add habitual remarks about friendship among nations, though. The
third group is nationalists with liberal values - Alexei Navalny can be included
in this group. Once he said that he was a nationalist, then he called himself a
civil nationalist, but his values are always liberal. Finally, there are those
who believe that we should have an empire without national republics. Some of
these people used to be supporters of the LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of
Russia].
About the slogan "Russia for the Russians"
According to our sources, this slogan has at times been backed by 58 percent of
the population. But then we asked the respondents questions to see how they
interpreted the phrase. For instance, when asked whether Russians should have
priority for university education and employment, only about 20 percent of the
respondents replied in the positive. When we asked about support for the slogan
"Russia Only for the Russians," only 12 percent said they were in favor of this.
I assume that this constitutes the maximum electoral base of declared
nationalists.
Our institute recently issued a book called "20 Years of Reforms Viewed by the
Russians." The book presents the findings of a mass survey conducted in regions
with a predominant Russian population. The respondents were asked about their
main concerns. Of the top 20 answers, the leaders were the crisis of the
utilities system, low living standards, and deteriorating access to free
education. Such concerns as "the increase in the non-Russian population in
Russian regions" and "existence of interethnic contradictions" ranked 12th and
14th, respectively, mentioned by less than 20 percent of the respondents. The
interests of Russian people thus lie beyond the ethno-national framework, and
the same is true for other nationalities.
About the future of nationalism
The politicization of the ethnic theme is obvious, and Russian nationalist
trends have been most pronounced recently, along with democratic movements. Yet
the nationalists have no single party to unite them; most of their associations
are short-lived. Even so, most Russian citizens cannot support the nationalists,
because Russians have always taken pride in their ability to live in concord
with other nationalities. Even amid the influx of immigrants in the 2000s, the
share of people with a negative attitude towards contacts with other
nationalities did not exceed 30 percent. Russia can only strengthen its internal
bonds by overcoming contradictions through dialogue.
Leokadia Drobizheva is the director of the Center for Study of Interethnic
Relations of the Sociology Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/02/21/most_russians_wont_support_nationalists_14893\
.html.
----

Russia 'Faces Orange Revolution Threat' After Polls
By Marc Bennetts
RIA Novosti, 21 February 2012

The leaders of recent "For Fair Elections" protests in Russia are foreign-backed
revolutionaries seeking to emulate the so-called color uprisings that rocked
former Soviet republics in the 2000s, the organizer of an upcoming Anti-Orange
rally said on Tuesday.  "They don't need honest elections any longer and will
not recognize the results of the March 4 presidential polls in any case," rally
organizer and TV anchor Sergei Kurginyan told a news conference. "They are
threatening to bring thousands of people out on to the streets and paralyze
Moscow."  Kurginyan has gained prominence of late as a conservative figurehead
and was one of the main speakers at a January 4 mass rally in Moscow by
supporters of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.  "But this is just the beginning,"
he went on. "They already say if you don't want an Orange Revolution, then
you'll get a bloody one."  The Orange Revolution was a peaceful uprising
triggered by suspicions of vote-rigging in favor of pro-Russian candidate Viktor
Yanukovych at presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004. The revolt led to new
polls and the election of Western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko.  A 'Dangerous' Game
Kurginyan's rally takes place in Moscow on Thursday, just over a week before
presidential elections at which Putin is to seek a third stint in the Kremlin.
Demonstrations of support for Putin are due to take place throughout the city on
the same day and he is expected to make an appearance at a mass rally in south
Moscow's vast Luzhniki stadium.  But Putin's bid for a third term comes during
the biggest show of dissent since he came to power in 2000. Some 200,000 people
have attended anti-government demonstrations in Moscow alone since allegations
of vote fraud in favor of his United Russia party at December 4 parliamentary
polls.  Putin and his supporters have sought to portray the protests as the work
of foreign powers intent on regime change in Russia. In December, Putin accused
Washington of backing the demonstrations and said U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton had given opposition leaders "a signal" that they had acted on. 
In an opinion poll carried out by the independent Levada Centre after Putin's
comments, 23 percent of Russian said they agreed the protests were being
encouraged by the United States. Another 47 percent were unable to rule this
out.  State-run television also aired in January footage of leading opposition
figures visiting new U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, at the United
States embassy. The report was entitled "US embassy: Receiving instructions from
the new ambassador."  Putin supporters have also questioned the motives of
U.S.-educated opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny, the anti-corruption activist
who coined United Russia's popular, unofficial nickname of "The Party of
Swindlers and Thieves."  But protest leaders have consistently denied they are
being backed financially or politically by the West and have accused the Kremlin
of playing a "dangerous" game.  "This kind of rhetoric, 'look at those orange
revolutionaries, working for America,' and so on could easily lead to civil
war," protest organizer and environmental activist Yevgenia Chirikova told RIA
Novosti. "The authorities have started working towards dividing society." 
Chirikova's comments echoed those of presidential candidate and tycoon Mikhail
Prokhorov.  "If opposing parties fail to move toward each other, the worst case
scenario is a civil war," he said in late January.  Could Pro-Putin Rallies
Backfire?  A pro-Putin rally was also held in Moscow on February 4 and drew a
crowd of around 140,000, according to police. Independent eyewitness, including
a RIA Novosti correspondent, said the crowd was much smaller. Media reports also
said government employees had been coerced into attending the rally. Putin
agreed that this could have occurred, but said the effect on numbers should not
be "exaggerated."  But Moscow-based Carnegie Center analyst Lilia Shevtsova
suggested that "forcing" people to go to pro-Putin rallies could backfire on the
authorities.  "If the authorities keep forcing teachers, tractor drivers,
state-bank workers and so on to go to pro-Putin rallies, these people will
simply vote against him in March," she said. "The Kremlin's actions are
providing a catalyst for an Orange Revolution."  Kurginyan denied on Thursday
that people had been either paid or forced to go to the rallies.  "These were
good, honest people. I feel ashamed for those who say such things," he said. 
'If You Want A Fight, We Are Ready!'  In an apparent echoing of tactics used by
Orange Revolutionaries in Ukraine, opposition Left Front movement leader Sergei
Udaltsov told RIA Novosti in January that he and other protest organizers would
urge their supporters to "put up tents and not to leave the streets until the
elections are annulled" if they believe the March polls are fixed.  But
Kurginyan said on Tuesday that his Anti-Orange movement was ready to counter any
attempts to "turn Moscow into another Dushanbe" after the polls. His comments
referred to protests in the capital of the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan
after disputed 1991 presidential polls. The dispute eventually led to a civil
war in which at least 50,000 people died.  "If you want a fight, we are ready
for a fight," Kurginyan said on Tuesday. "We are the majority!" He stressed,
however, that he and his followers would prefer to avoid violence.  But despite
the hysteria, analysts suggested that there was little chance of an Orange-style
uprising in Russia at the moment.  "The political, economic and social factors
are not in place right now for an Orange Revolution," said Alexei Mukhin of the
Moscow-based Center for Political Information think tank. He added however that
a mass loss of trust in Putin could lead to the "political prerequisite" for a
revolt.  "His personal discredit would call into question the results of the
March 4 polls," he said.  And analyst Shevtsova agreed that there was, for the
moment, little likelihood of Russia experiencing Orange-inspired change after
the March 4 polls, citing the myriad political viewpoints on offer among the
bewilderingly diverse protest movement.  "For that to happen, it would be
necessary to have political organization and leaders who can offer a clear
alternative to the current authorities," she said. "And I can't see that
happening in the next two weeks or so."

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120221/171440562.html
----------------------

Russian Cultural Honour for a Controversial Syrian
By David M. Herszenhorn
The New York Times, 22 February 2012

MOSCOW - Amid the escalating violence in Syria and a diplomatic outcry over
Russia's actions blocking intervention by the United Nations, President Dmitri
A. Medvedev bestowed a prestigious cultural award on a Syrian writer and poet
who has publicly applauded the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and
expressed strong anti-Semitic views.
The writer, Ali Ukla Ursan, also known for close ties to Russia, was one of 11
foreign honorees to receive prestigious awards for their close ties to Russia at
a ceremony last week at Mr. Medvedev's presidential residence.
"I want to present each of you with Russian Federation state decorations,
decorations awarded in recognition of your great services," Mr. Medvedev said,
according to a transcript posted on the president's Web site. "Here today are
people who have made a special and very valuable contribution to developing
humanitarian relations and bring closer together everyone with an interest in
Russia, its language, history and modern life."
In accepting his prize, called the Pushkin Medal, Mr. Ursan, a former chairman
and now adviser to the Syrian Writers Union, made pointedly political remarks.
"I thank Russia for its wise policies," he said, according to the transcript. "I
thank this nation for its decisive and steady position against aggression,
terrorism and attempts to meddle in the internal affairs of other states and
people in the context of a unipolar world."
Throughout the nearly yearlong popular uprising in Syria and a lethal government
crackdown, Moscow has thrown President Bashar al-Assad a lifeline, providing
weapons and diplomatic support to help keep his government afloat.
In honoring Mr. Ursan, the Russian president lauded a writer who has displayed a
tolerance for terrorism - when aimed at the United States. On Sept. 25, 2001,
Mr. Ursan described his reaction to the collapse of the World Trade Center
buildings two weeks earlier. "My lungs filled with air, and I breathed in relief
as I had never breathed before," he wrote in Al Usbu Al Udabi a Damascus
literary magazine.
A spokesman for Mr. Medvedev, Aleksei Pavlov, said the current political
situation in Syria was not a factor in Mr. Ursan's selection for the prize,
which he said was apparently made several months ago. "He is a writer, not an
arms seller," Mr. Pavlov said. He added that Mr. Ursan "objectively" deserved
the award, based on his work developing partnerships between Syrian and Soviet
and later Russian writers, as well as his work on numerous translations of
Arabic and Russian literature.
Mr. Ursan did not immediately respond to an e-mail requesting comment and could
not be reached by telephone.
Under Russian law, the president is responsible for approving nominations for
the state awards, which are submitted by the Foreign Ministry.
Word that Mr. Ursan had been honored by Mr. Medvedev drew quick criticism from a
leading Jewish organization in Russia, and from the Simon Wiesenthal Center,
which combats anti-Semitism around the world.
"Our center was shocked," Shimon Samuels, the Wiesenthal Center's director for
international relations, wrote in a letter to Mr. Medvedev. "Ursan is an extreme
opponent of peace, normalization or even contact between Syria and Israel or
Israelis, having successfully contributed to sabotaging the 1999 peace talks
between two countries. He is a conspiracy theorist and apologist for terrorism."
Baruch Gorin, a spokesman for the Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia,
said a representative of Rabbi Berl Lazar, the chief Hasidic rabbi in Russia,
would voice consternation over the award to the presidential administration at a
meeting this week of Mr. Medvedev's Committee of Multinational Relations. "We
hope that it is not more than a stupid mistake," Mr. Gorin said.
Mr. Ursan's 2001 commentary was featured prominently in a report and documentary
by the Middle East Media Research Institute, a Washington group, on reaction in
the Arab world to the 9/11 attacks.
"My soul was inundated by tremendous bitterness, revulsion, disgust towards the
country that in the past half-century has racked up only a black history of
oppression and support for the aggression and racism of the Nazi Zionists and
for apartheid in South Africa," Mr. Ursan wrote.
He wrote about feeling momentary compassion for the innocent people "under the
ruins" but said that he was "overwhelmed" by anger toward the United States and
that the attacks should force American officials to rethink their policies.
Mr. Ursan has frequently spoken out against Israel and Jews. In the same
magazine in February 2000, Mr. Ursan wrote: "The covetous, racist and hated Jew
Shylock who cut the flesh from Antonio's chest with the knife of hatred, invades
you with his money, his modern airplanes, his missiles and his nuclear bombs."
Valery N. Ganichev, the chairman of the Russian Writers Union, said Mr. Ursan
was a well-regarded colleague who had visited Russia several times and also
played host to delegations of Russian writers visiting Syria.
"Among other things, he was awarded for the constant creative and spiritual
cooperation with the writers of Russia," Mr. Ganichev said. "He visited our
country many times. He knows Pushkin works very well."
Mr. Ganichev said he was unaware of Mr. Ursan's anti-American and anti-Semitic
writings and doubted that he would have praised the events of Sept. 11. But he
quickly added: "Actually, this is his own business. We are grateful that he was
interested in the Russian culture. Politics is a different matter."

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/europe/medvedev-honors-ali-ukla-ursan-a-\
controversial-syrian-writer.html
----

Russia Elections: Putin Warns Of Foreign Threat At Campaign Rally
NATALIYA VASILYEVA
The Huffington Post, 02/23/12

MOSCOW - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned against the dangers of foreign
influence on Thursday at a campaign rally attended by tens of thousands of
people, many of them state workers who were pressured to take part as a show of
support for a leader facing his first outburst of public discontent.  Putin is
running for a third term as president in a March 4 election and is almost
certain to win. During 12 years in power, he has sidelined his political
opponents and built up his image as the defender of a strong and prosperous
Russia. His approval ratings are still running at well above 50 percent despite
the largest opposition protests the country has seen since the 1991 Soviet
collapse.  Putin has tried to discredit the protesters by accusing their leaders
of being paid agents of the United States working to weaken Russia. His
references on Thursday were more subtle as he called on all Russians who
"cherish, care about and believe in" their motherland to unite.  "We ask
everyone not to look abroad, not to run to the other side and not to betray your
motherland, but to join us," he said from a makeshift stage in a soccer stadium
as a light snow fell on his bare head.  But he also warned the West: "We won't
allow anyone to meddle in our affairs or impose their will upon us, because we
have a will of our own."  The pro-Putin rally was held on Defenders of the
Fatherland, a national holiday that replaced the Soviet-era Red Army Day. As
participants marched in columns toward the stadium along the Moscow River, they
carried Russian flags and wore armbands in the national colors. Patriotic songs
from decades past blared from vans parked along the route.  They carried signs
saying "As long as we have Putin we have a strong country," "Vote for Putin,
vote for a stable country," and "There is no alternative."  Putin won his two
previous presidential terms in 2000 and 2004. After moving into the prime
minister's job, he remained Russia's No. 1 leader but has seen his support slip
amid growing public frustration with his rigid controls over the political scene
and rampant corruption.  The campaign rally came in response to the opposition
protests, which began in December after a parliamentary election that Putin's
party won through what appeared to be widespread fraud. The Kremlin has entered
into what has become a competition over crowd size, eager to show that it, too,
can bring tens of thousands of people out onto the street.  But while the
protests have been embraced by Russia's middle class and young urban
professionals, many of those who attended Thursday's rally showed little
enthusiasm. They included workers paid by or dependent on the state, including
teachers, municipal workers and employees of state companies. Some said they had
been promised two days off in return for attending.  Many people at the rally
were reluctant to explain why they had come or offered only perfunctory
statements in support of Putin. Some were brought by bus or train from other
cities around Russia. Thousands bolted for a nearby subway station at the end of
the march rather than enter the Luzhniki stadium to hear Putin.  An estimated
75,000 people filled the stadium, which had room for about 100,000 in the stands
and on the pitch.  Some march participants offered genuine praise.  "I love
Putin and Putin loves me," said Vladimir Gryzlov, a 68-year-old musician who
brought his accordion.  With him was 70-year-old Tatyana Goytseva, who like many
older Russians said she feared a return to the political turmoil of the 1990s
and felt secure under Putin's leadership.  "We are happy with it, but of course
the young people don't think the same," said Goytseva, a social worker who helps
the elderly. She said her three grandchildren were not voting for Putin.  Putin
has four challengers, including three veteran party leaders who long ago reached
an accommodation with the Kremlin and pose little challenge to Putin. The only
newcomer is Mikhail Prokhorov, a 46-year-old billionaire businessman who owns
the New Jersey Nets basketball team.  Prokhorov's candidacy has been viewed as a
Kremlin-approved effort to add legitimacy to the election and channel the
discontent of the protesters. Grigory Yavlinsky, the veteran leader of the
liberal opposition party Yabloko, was denied the right to run.  The Communist
and nationalist candidates held separate rallies in Moscow on Thursday, each
drawing 2,500 to 3,500 supporters.  Putin and his supporters have tried to add
an element of fear to the political situation by depicting the protesters as
revolutionaries intent on overthrowing the government, even though the
opposition leaders have consistently called for peaceful, democratic change. 
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin picked up the theme on Thursday.  "Ambitious
politicians are calling for a revolution," he told the crowd ahead of Putin's
arrival. "We won't allow any upheaval in the country."  A blue-collar worker who
traveled nearly 1,400 kilometers (900 miles) to speak at the rally also
disparaged the protesters.  "This is our country. It does not belong to those
loafers who are always grumbling," said Igor Kholmanskikh, who works at a plant
producing tanks and train cars in Nizhny Tagil.  Perhaps in honor of the
patriotic holiday, Putin framed the campaign as a battle for the future of
Russia.  "The battle for Russia goes on! Victory will be ours!" he said in
wrapping up his six-minute speech.  Lynn Berry contributed to this story.  (This
version corrects spelling of worker's name to Kholmanskikh instead of Khalmansky
in third paragraph from the bottom.)

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/23/russia-elections-putin-foreign-threat_n\
_1296167.html?view=print&comm_ref=false
-------------------------

Vladimir Putin evokes enemies of Russia in campaign speech: Presidential
front-runner Vladimir Putin doesn't specify who or what Russia would face in
battle but has described protest leaders as agents of the West.
By Sergei L. Loiko
Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2012

In a short but fiery presidential campaign speech, Russian Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin on Thursday called on voters to prepare for battle to protect the
country's future.  Government opponents and foreign influences are threatening
to weaken Russia, Putin told tens of thousands of people at a rally in Moscow
held on Defender of the Fatherland Day, a national holiday known as Red Army Day
during the Soviet era.  "We won't allow anybody to interfere with our internal
affairs and we won't allow anybody to impose his will on us because we have a
will of our own!" Putin told the crowd, largely made up of government workers
brought near the Luzhniki soccer stadium in chartered buses. "The battle of
Russia is continuing! Victory will be ours!"  Putin, who presents himself as a
defender of Russia, has about 50% support nationwide and is expected to win his
third presidential term in the March 4 election, in part because there are no
strong opponents on the ballot. Large antigovernment protests have been held
recently in response to parliamentary elections won by Putin's party that many
considered damaged by fraud.  In his speech Thursday, Putin did not specify who
or what Russia would face in battle, though he has described protest leaders as
agents of the West. He spoke of the 1812 battle of Borodino and quoted from a
school curriculum poem by Mikhail Lermontov: "'Let's die near Moscow like our
brothers!' And to die we promised and the oath of loyalty we kept."  Some in the
crowd praised the prime minister and former president and carried signs with
slogans such as "Putin Is Our President" or "Putin Is the Best," while others
showed little enthusiasm, at times hesitating to say why they were attending a
pro-Putin rally. Some said they were reminded of the Soviet era, when national
holidays meant every enterprise and organization was ordered to provide a
certain number of people equipped with paper flowers, balloons, banners and
posters of leaders.  The rally participants marched through the winter sludge
before entering the soccer stadium. Men with harmonicas mixed with the crowd,
playing popular songs.  Svetlana Petrova, a social worker from a Moscow suburb,
said she was not ordered to attend the rally. "No, I volunteered!" she said,
giggling. Her colleagues laughed.  One young municipal worker from Zelenograd,
an industrial town northwest of Moscow, who gave his name only as Nikolai, said
he and his fellow workers were offered an extra day off to compensate for the
time they spent demonstrating for Putin.  "Everyone agreed," he said quietly,
stepping away from his group. "No one wants problems with the administration." 
Many others said they attended the rally of their own accord because they wanted
to support Putin and vote for him.  Yevgeny Krasilich, an engineer from
Mosgortrans, a Moscow city-owned company in charge of municipal transportation,
said that under Putin his salary was constantly growing and that he had bought
an apartment, a dacha and a car. Krasilich, a father of two and grandfather of
three, said his company brought at least 5,000 members of its 30,000-person
workforce to the rally.  "I am happy with everything and I want my life to go on
the same way," Krasilich said. "Putin is our only hope and guarantee!"  Alexei
Stebennikov, who is unemployed, said Putin is a great talker and that he doesn't
drink or smoke and thus sets a good example for youths.  Denis Grishin, a
municipal worker from central Moscow who said he was enlisted by the
administration to come to the rally after his night shift, was holding a banner
which read in English: "In Putin we trust." Grishin said he didn't know the
meaning of the banner, which was handed to him by one of the organizers, and did
not want to vote for Putin.  "I don't want to vote for any of the candidates,"
he said. "I just came here to simply look at all this circus."  In front of them
were Cossacks dressed in trench coats and mutton fur hats and a big group of
middle-aged men and women representing the Industrial Wastes company. They were
drinking hot tea from plastic glasses and carrying portraits of a very
youngish-looking Putin.  Boris Dubin, a senior researcher with the independent
Levada Center polling organization, said Putin's approach Thursday stemmed from
the protests after the December parliamentary elections and showed the
authoritarian leader's increasing reliance on the rhetoric of confrontation and
war.  "The recent mass public protests  demonstrated that Putin's positions are
no longer as reliable as they used to be and this victory will not be accepted
by many," Dubin said. "Putin is flexing his war muscles today to a crowd which
doesn't want war and which doesn't see any danger to the country and they don't
fall for such rhetoric."

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-putin-rally-20120224,\
0,2675535.story
------------------

Putin's Unlikeliest Supporters: Tajik Migrant Workers
Tom Balmforth
RFE/RL, 25 February 2012

MOSCOW -- From police harassment to labor exploitation to skinhead attacks,
Karomat Sharipov knows better than most the problems ethnic Tajiks face in
Russia.
As the head of a Moscow-based support group that assists them with everything
from finding a job to battling fabricated criminal cases, he hears their tales
of woe on a daily basis.
And as somebody who has lived in Russia since 1996, he also understands how the
problems facing the Tajik and other Central Asian communities in Russia have
metastasized under Vladimir Putin's 12-year rule, a period where nationalist
sentiment has thrived.
But despite this, the mustachioed and charismatic Sharipov strongly supports
Putin's bid to return to the Kremlin for a third term -- and is lobbying other
Tajiks in Russia to do the same.
Sitting in his office in the Russian capital, he points to a portrait of the
prime minister on the wall behind his desk and says: "He is a man of words and
action! Look, it's written here. What do I think of Putin? He's a man of words
and action. Simple as that."
Sharipov's support for Putin may appear counterintuitive at first glance, but
analysts say it also reflects and reinforces the attitudes of much of the
country's Tajik community, whether they be migrant workers or Russian citizens.
Reclining behind a desk adorned with Tajik paraphernalia, Sharipov says as many
as 90 percent of Tajik migrant workers in Russia support Putin. There are no
polls on the political attitudes of Tajiks in Russia, making Sharipov's claims
impossible to verify. But anecdotal evidence does indeed suggest pervasive
support for Russia's most powerful figure.
In an effort to galvanize this backing, Sharipov organized a congress of the
Tajik diaspora on February 11 in which he called for those holding Russian
passports to vote for Putin in the March 4 election.
Not Rocking The Boat
According to some official estimates, 700,000 Tajik citizens are legally
registered to work in Russia, but rights workers say for every legal worker
there are two more working illegally. Sharipov estimates there are 2 million
Tajik citizens living in Russia in total.
Their fealty to Putin has several sources, analysts say. Part of it stems from
the fact that the prime minister and presidential candidate has cultivated a
strongman image similar to that of many Central Asian rulers.
Moreover, with so many Tajik migrant workers in Russia illegally, members of the
community understand that their compatriots' well-being is largely dependent on
the Kremlin's goodwill, and are thus reluctant to rock the boat. Community
leaders, therefore, are vigilant about doing the authorities' bidding.
The Tajik community's precarious situation in Russia was highlighted last
November when Russian authorities rounded up hundreds of Tajik migrants after
the arrest in Tajikistan of two pilots -- one of then a Russian citizen -- on
smuggling charges.
Andrei Grozin, director of the Moscow-based CIS Institute for Central Asia and
the Caucasus, says support for Putin is "widespread" among the Tajik diaspora in
Russia, adding that this stems from several factors, but the main one is their
vulnerability, which leaves them "100 percent dependent on the authorities."
At the time of the pilot scandal, there were widespread fears in the community
of mass deportations of Tajiks. And although this never happened, such a move
would have been catastrophic for Tajikistan, where remittances from Russia
account for around half of the country's GDP.
'Putin's Our Man'
The support for Putin has manifested itself in some curious ways. Journalists
have noted, for example, the disproportionate presence of Tajik migrants at
pro-Putin rallies recently.
And earlier this month, an online video of a man calling himself "Tolibjon
Kurbankhanov from Tajikistan" singing a heartfelt ode to Putin -- calling him a
"godsend" who saved Russia -- went viral.
Gavkhar Dzhurayeva, an ethnic Tajik attorney who heads the Moscow-based support
group Migration and Law, says she personally supports Putin -- as do many of her
colleagues. She adds that it's largely pragmatism that drives many Tajiks to
back him.
That certainly appears to be the case for Sirojiddin, a 33-year-old undocumented
migrant who has been working on Moscow construction sites for several years.
"I don't need a visa to work. I've been working here for so many years without
even having a work permit, so many years," he says. "Out of all the parties and
politicians I think that Putin is the most worthy candidate for us."
The other candidates running for president on March 4, like Communist leader
Gennady Zyuganov and ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have done little to
win the support of Central Asians in Russia. And billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov,
who is running as a liberal alternative to Putin, has said he would impose a
visa regime on Tajik migrants.
Alisher Usmanov, a 42-year old former soldier who arrived in Moscow earlier this
month, says only Putin can avert crises in Russia and the surrounding region.
"If not him, then who can understand Russia and pull it out of the ditch?" he
asks. "Russia is the locomotive of the post-Soviet space. As long as it is not
good in Tajikistan, we will continue coming to Russia and ask our Russian
brothers for help and work."
Editor's note: RFE/RL's Uzbek Service contributed to this report

http://www.rferl.org/content/tajik_migrants_emerge_as_putins_unlikeliest_support\
ers/24495004.html
----

Popular Russian Nationalist in Government Creates New Movement
Lyudmila Alexandrova
Itar-Tass World Service, 27 February 2012

A new national-patriotic movement has been created in Russia at the initiative
of one of the most charismatic politicians in the Vladimir Putin team, Deputy
Prime Minster Dmitry Rogozin, in charge of the defense-industrial complex, until
recently Russia's envoy to NATO. The movement has received support from the
Russian Orthodox Church. It looks like in the context of inter-ethnic tensions
in Russia the authorities are trying again to create a "healthy" nationalist
movement. However, according to some analysts, the constituent congress looked
more like an anti-opposition rally.
On Sunday, Moscow saw the constituent congress of the Volunteer Movement of the
All-Russia People's Front in support of the army, the navy and the
defense-industrial complex. Activists of the Rogozin-led Congress of Russian
Communities, employees of the defense-industrial complex and the Cossacks have
formed the backbone of the new movement.
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin initiated the congress with reliance on
support from Vladimir Putin. The latter sent a message of greeting to the
participants, saying the creation of a new organization was an "exceptionally
important and useful business." The head of the Russian Orthodox Church,
Patriarch Kirill, addressed the congress, too.
Central to the movement's program is Vladimir Putin's newspaper article Russia:
the Nationalities Question. The main tasks of the movement are the revival of
the defense-industrial complex and military science in Russia; creation of an
advanced and effective system of military-patriotic upbringing of youth;
unification of the sound public forces on the basis of the national-patriotic
ideology, the principles of democratic development and scientific-technological
progress.
"Our policy must be that of a steel fist in a velvet glove. Our policy should be
able to beat enemies into partners, partners into neutrals, and neutrals into
allies and friends," said Rogozin. "No one should have any doubts inside this
glove there must be a steel fist, firm and ready to crush any aggressor or group
of aggressors, should they dare attack Russia."
The congress looked more like an anti-oppositional rally against the threat of a
"color revolution", says the daily Kommersant. Patriarch Kirill promised to pray
for God's protection of the Russian people from deceitful, disgusting and
slanderous propaganda. And Rogozin has suggested countering the white ribbon -
the symbol used by oppositional demonstrators - with the victorious
orange-and-black striped ribbon of the order of St. George.
"How very mean and disgusting this liberal anti-Russian propaganda really is,"
Rogozin said to draw a storm of applause.
Patriarch Kirill, for his part, warned that even with a good economy and army
the country may lose "freedom, sovereignty and independence."
"Historical Russia, which we had called the Soviet Union, fell apart without a
single shot fired, and the once great country is no more," he said to have
warned that there is such a threat now and that "well-organized and coordinated
information flows" are working against the masses.
"The information impact," said Patriarch Kiril, "is continuing inside the
country and outside it," and young people are most vulnerable to it. These days,
he said, the mass media and the Internet are propagating an ideology of
"consumption and richness." "All this discussion went into high gear in the
run-up to the elections. There is a risk that all those who share these ideas of
unrestrained consumption and wealth, the idea the Motherland is there where you
get paid more and where life is easier, these forces may come to power in Russia
some day. I am praying to God for protection from deceitful, ugly, disgusting
and slanderous propaganda."
In its resolution the Volunteer Movement's congress proclaimed as the main task
the revival of the defense-industrial complex, promotion of patriotism and
support for Vladimir Putin in achieving the goals he had identified. Rogozin
said he had no immediate plans for reforming the movement into a political
party.
Rogozin has long positioned himself as a campaigner for the rights of the
Russian people. Back in 1993, with reliance on the Russian communities in the
CIS and the Baltic countries, and also in Russia's ethnic autonomies Rogozin
created a people's patriotic movement called the International Congress of
Russian Communities (CRC), which incorporated practically all Russian diasporas
and public and political organizations and centers of ethnic autonomies of
Russia, the other former Soviet republics and some other countries. In the
subsequent years he actively campaigned for the protection of the rights of
Russians in the Baltic countries, Yugoslavia and the CIS countries and
participated in the liberation of several dozen hostages in Chechnya.
Then in 2004-2005 he led the Rodina (Motherland) faction in the State Duma, and
then a party of the same name. Experts say Rodina had been created with the
Kremlin's blessing in order to take votes away from the Communists. However, the
party's strong national-patriotism and the popularity and poor controllability
of Rogozin, who began to ignore instructions from above, scared the authorities
and in 2006 the Rodina project was in fact closed down, and Rogozin himself
found himself on the sidelines. In 2007 he declared the intention to back the
initiative of creating a party called Great Russia. The constituent congress of
the new party took place, but the party was not registered.
Nevertheless, Rogozin was forgiven and in 2008, appointed Russia's envoy to
NATO. He held the position until his new appointment as Russia's deputy prime
minister responsible for the military-industrial complex. Rogozin's imminent
return to Russia's big politics has been rumored for a long time - after all,
the country has not very many charismatic politicians so sincerely loyal to the
national leader. These days, on the eve of the presidential election, experts
say, Rogozin's nationalism and aggressive mode of expression is in greater
demand than it has ever been.

http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/353016.html
----

Zyuganov - power to the people?
Yulia Ponomareva
Moscow News, 27 February 2012

Transforming the theory of convergence of Communism and capitalism into reality,
the current leader of Russian Communists, Gennady Zyuganov, rides a BMW 7 to
work every day. In modern Russia, it's a cross the chief of a parliamentary
party has to bear.
"The presidential directorate, which provides cars to the Duma, just won't
accept any other options or solutions," Zyuganov told Echo Moskvy back in 2010.
To make his cross even heavier, the presidential directorate equipped Zyuganov's
car with a blue flashing light, commonly known as a migalka, making him the only
Communist to have one of the most abhorrent privileges on busy Moscow roads �
the right of way.
Speaking of cross bearing, arguably the world's main cross bearer could not even
dream of how highly atheists would speak of his legacy as he took his burden to
Calvary. But Zyuganov seems set to dismantle every stereotype. "The Code of the
Builder of Communism [a list of a Communist's principles issued in 1961] is an
adapted Sermon on the Mount," he argued at a recent meeting with the creative
intelligentsia at Falanster bookstore in Moscow.
Zyuganov, who holds a doctorate in philosophy, artfully fends off
straightforward questions about his attitude towards religion. He told
Kommersant last week that that he believes in "the country, people, talents, and
blisters that labor gives."
Another sensitive question Zyuganov often has to face at his 67 years of age is
why he seems averse to the idea of giving way to younger Communist leaders after
losing three presidential elections. "Men are ageless," Zyuganov told
Kommersant. "Age is a state of the soul."
Zyuganov takes proper care not only of his soul but the body as well working out
for 40 minutes or walking five to seven kilometers every day. A professional
mountain climber, Zyuganov has climbed the Caucasus' highest peak, Mount Elbrus,
six times.
He plays sports, cards and even billiards, which he could probably make money on
in case he is ever out of the Duma. "That who can't play the billiards, tennis,
volleyball and preferans has robbed his old age," he says on his official
website.
Still, Zyuganov believes that he already is rich. "I have eight grandchildren. I
have met my commitments to the state in full in this sense," he told Kommersant,
as a means of stinging one of his opponents, billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov.
"Prokhorov is still is a bachelor at 47," Zyuganov says. "He hasn't given birth
to anyone, hasn't heard children's laughter... How can someone like that run for
president?"
His main opponent, Vladimir Putin, can expect to be deprived of presidential
immunity as soon as Zyuganov becomes president. However, Zyuganov abstains from
accusing Putin of being corrupt himself. "There's his gang that steals
wantonly," he told author Sergei Minayev in an interview.
In case elected president, Zyuganov will stay in power for six years calling
early Duma elections on Dec. 1, 2012, which was one of the demands put forward
by protesters at Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue. Zyuganov himself never
turned up to the rallies stating that he supports their demands, however.
"We sent our party member, Oleg Smolin to Sakharov but he was never given the
floor," Zyuganov told Minayev as a means of explaining his absence from popular
protest rallies.
Even though the leaders of the protest movement may have hurt his feelings and
the feelings of his fellow party members, Zyuganov sees some of them in his
future government. Alexei Navalny, for instance, could be invited to work at the
Accounting Chamber.
Under President Zyuganov, Russia can expect extensive nationalization. "We'll
hold a national referendum on the nationalization of the mining industries,
railroads, gas pipelines, military industries and the liquor industry," he told
Kommersant.
However, Russian oligarchs are likely to avoid being prosecuted for the
loans-for-shares auctions of the 1990's. "I won't settle old scores," Zyuganov
told Minayev.
Yet it may be that as a candidate, Zyuganov has the right to look back at the
"wild 90's" with some fondness, it was back in 1996 that he got his highest
result ever in a presidential election that famously saw Boris Yeltsin using the
support of independent candidate Alexander Lebed in order to win.

http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-zyuganov-power-people-485.cfm
----

Putin: US seeking 'absolute invulnerability': In a piece published yesterday, a
few days ahead of elections, presidential candidate Vladimir Putin took a tough
stance on several foreign policy issues that will put Russia at odds with the
US.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent
The Christian Science Monitor - CSMonitor.com, February 28, 2012

A more world-weary and mistrustful Vladimir Putin appears set to return to
Russia's presidency in polls slated for next Sunday.
Mr. Putin's hardening suspicions toward the West in general, and the US in
particular, are on full display in the latest of the lengthy policy manifestos
that have comprised the main substance of his campaign over the past two months.
In this one, a 6,060 word missive published in the state-owned weekly
Moskovskiye Novosti yesterday, he lays out a foreign policy vision that suggests
a fresh chill in US-Russia relations may follow his return to the Kremlin.
Already Moscow is moving to block Western initiatives in the Middle East,
drawing a tougher line on US plans to install an anti-missile shield in Europe,
and seeking to strengthen ties with the East, especially China.
His main foreign policy concern is that Russia is being encircled by NATO
expansion into former Soviet territory and its strategic nuclear deterrent is
threatened by US missile defense plans.
"It seems that NATO countries, and especially the United States, have developed
a peculiar understanding of security which is fundamentally different from our
view," Putin writes. "The Americans are obsessed with the idea of securing
absolute invulnerability for themselves, which, incidentally, is a utopia, for
both technological and geopolitical reasons. But that is exactly where the root
of the problem lies. Absolute invulnerability for one nation would mean absolute
vulnerability for everybody else."
A domestic crackdown on foreign-funded nongovernment organizations and a
politically active civil society could also be in the cards, some experts warn,
as Putin reiterates accusations that Western powers are using such groups for
"political engineering" in Russia and other countries.
"If we take each of the points in this long article one-by-one, we won't find
anything new. But taken together, in combination, this article acquires a
straightforward anti-American sense," says Dmitry Suslov, an expert with the
Council on Foreign and Defense Policies, a leading Moscow think tank.
"This is deeply concerning, since it creates the impression that chances for
improvement in US-Russian relations will diminish [after Putin is elected].
Putin is clearly disillusioned with the US, even angry at it in his view America
is to blame for everything that's going wrong in the world today, even
terrorism, and Russia must prepare itself to act as a counterbalance to the US,"
he adds.
Defying the 'itch for military intervention'
Putin argues that Russia wants to be part of the global order, "but everything
we do will be based on our own interests and goals, not on decisions other
countries impose on us. Russia is only treated with respect when it is strong
and stands firm on its own two feet. Russia will call a spade a spade. We have
presented our arguments more than once. But unfortunately our Western partners
ignore and dismiss them."
Exhibit A, in Putin's view, is the way Western pro-democracy meddling in
countries affected by the Arab Spring revolts, particularly Libya, resulted in
more bloodshed and the victory of intolerant forces. Though Russians initially
sympathized with the aspirations of Arabs, he writes, "it soon became clear that
events in many countries were not following a civilized scenario. Instead of
asserting democracy and protecting the rights of the minority, attempts were
being made to depose an enemy and to stage a coup, which only resulted in the
replacement of one dominant force with another even more aggressive dominant
force."
This is why, after acquiescing to Western intervention in Libya, Russia has
drawn the line at any international involvement in Syria's increasingly civil
war-like crisis.
"Sadder but wiser, we oppose the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions
that may be interpreted as a signal to armed interference in Syria's domestic
development," Putin writes. "The logic of such conduct is counterproductive and
very dangerous. No good can come of it. I cannot understand what causes this
itch for military intervention."
Putin also claims that Western-sponsored regime changes always lead to
anti-Russian outcomes. "It appears that with the Arab Spring countries, as with
Iraq, Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local
commercial markets and are being deprived of large commercial contracts," Putin
argues. "The niches thus vacated are being filled by the economic operatives of
the states that had a hand in the change of the ruling regime."
Worse could be coming if trouble erupts in the Persian Gulf, he continues.
"Russia is worried about the growing threat of a military strike against Iran.
If this happens, the consequences will be disastrous. It is impossible to
imagine the true scope of this turn of events," Putin adds.
Blocking US interference in Russia
In seven articles since the election campaign began, Putin has outlined, among
other things, his plans to reform Russia's troubled political system, to combat
the scourge of nationalism, solve Russia's galloping demographic crisis, and
rebuild a world-class military machine.
Though there is nothing new in Russia's objections to the Pentagon's missile
defense schemes, some experts detect a change of tone that suggests Putin will
link any chance of future cooperation to US concessions on this matter.
"Putin says, indirectly, that no red line has yet been crossed and it's still
possible to improve relations. But the US must stop insisting on deployment of
an anti-missile system in Europe" as the price, says Alexander Konovalov,
president of the independent Institute for Strategic Assessments in Moscow.
"Connecting all possible progress in international relations with the
anti-missile issue is somewhat surprising. Even Russian cooperation in
Afghanistan, where NATO is clearly fighting for Russian interests, appears to
get linked to the anti-missile system."
Some experts also see worrisome domestic implications in Putin's attack on the
role of what he calls "pseudo-NGOs," which he accuses of aiming to exploit
internal difficulties and promote revolution. In December, as a protest movement
against electoral fraud began to take to the streets of Russian cities, Putin
alleged they were acting on orders from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
"There must be a clear division between freedom of speech and normal political
activity, on the one hand, and illegal instruments of 'soft power,' on the
other," Putin writes. "The activities of 'pseudo-NGOs' and other agencies that
try to destabilize other countries with outside support are unacceptable."
Six years ago, in a wave of "anti-terrorist" measures, Putin launched a sweeping
crackdown on politically-active NGOs, which winnowed their numbers and limited
their ability to operate in Russia.
"Clearly on display in this article are Putin's very strong suspicions toward
civil society. He sees foreign-funded NGO's being utilized by unfriendly powers
and basically stated that they should not be allowed to exist," says Mr. Suslov.
"You don't have to read deeply between the lines to worry that we may see a
fresh assault on NGO's after the election. It's a very worrisome signal."

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0228/Putin-US-seeking-absolute-invuln\
erability?cmpid=addthis_facebook#.T03XITuqC_I.facebook
===================


III PRIMARY SOURCES

Vladimir Putin: Russia and the Changing World
RT, 27 February 2012

In the run-up to Russia's presidential elections, prime minister and
presidential candidate Vladimir Putin has published his seventh article in which
he defined Russia's niche in a "changing world."
In my articles I have already mentioned the key challenges that Russia is facing
internationally today. Yet this subject deserves a more detailed discussion and
not only because foreign policy is an integral part of any national strategy.
External challenges and the changing world around us affect our economic,
cultural, fiscal and investment policies.
Russia is a part of the big world, economically, culturally and in terms of
information flow. We cannot be isolated, and we do not want to be isolated. We
expect our openness will bring the people of Russia more prosperity and culture
and will promote trust, an item that has been in short supply lately.
At the same time, everything we do will be based on our own interests and goals,
not on decisions other countries impose on us. Russia is only treated with
respect when it is strong and stands firm on its own two feet. Russia has
practically always had the privilege of pursuing an independent foreign policy
and this is how it will be in the future. Furthermore, I strongly believe that
the only way to ensure global security is by doing it together with Russia, not
by trying to "demote" it, weaken it geopolitically or undermine its defensive
potential.
The goals of our foreign policy are strategic rather than short-term. They
reflect Russia's unique role in international affairs, in history and in the
development of civilization.
We will certainly continue our active and constructive efforts to strengthen
global security, to avoid confrontation and effectively neutralize such
challenges as nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and crises, terrorism
and drugs. We will do all we can to help Russia obtain the latest technological
advances and help our businesses achieve a decent position on the global market.
We will also seek to avoid unnecessary shocks as a new world order emerges based
on the new geopolitical reality.
Who undermines trust?
As before, I think that indivisible security for all nations, unacceptability of
the disproportionate use of force, and unconditional compliance with the
fundamental principles of international law are indispensable postulates. Any
neglect of these norms destabilizes the world situation.
It is in this light that we view certain aspects of US and NATO activities that
do not follow the logic of modern development and are based on the stereotypes
of bloc mentality. Everybody knows what I am alluding to. It is NATO expansion,
including the deployment of new military infrastructure and the bloc's
(US-sponsored) plans to set up a missile defense system in Europe. I could have
ignored the subject had not they been playing their games in the immediate
proximity of Russia's borders, undermining our security and upsetting global
stability.
We have presented our arguments more than once, and I will not repeat them in
detail here. But unfortunately our Western partners ignore and dismiss them.
We are concerned because, even though it is not yet clear how our "new"
relationship with NATO will work, they are creating facts on the ground. This
definitely does not promote trust. Furthermore, this kind of conduct has a
negative effect on global issues, as it prevents us from developing a positive
agenda in international relations and stalls the process of readjusting them in
a constructive vein.
A string of armed conflicts under the pretext of humanitarian concerns has
undermined the principle of national sovereignty, which has been observed for
centuries. A new type of vacuum, the lack of morality and law, is emerging in
international affairs.
We often hear that human rights are more important than national sovereignty.
This is definitely true, and crimes against humanity should be punished by an
international court. But if this principle is used as an excuse for a
presumptuous violation of national sovereignty, and if human rights are
protected by foreign forces and selectively, and if, while "protecting" those
rights, they violate the rights of many other people, including the most
fundamental and sacred right, the right to life, this is no longer a noble
effort. This is merely demagoguery.
It is important for the UN and its Security Council to be able to offer
effective resistance to the dictate of a few countries and to lawlessness in
international affairs. Nobody has the right to hijack the prerogatives and
powers of the UN, especially as regards the use of force with vis-a-vis
sovereign nations. I am referring primarily to NATO, which seeks to assume a new
role that goes beyond its status of a defensive alliance. All these matters are
extremely serious. We remember how the nations that fell victim to
"humanitarian" operations and the export of "airstrike democracy" appealed in
vain to international law and even simple decency. Nobody listened, and nobody
wanted to listen.
It seems that NATO countries, and especially the United States, have developed a
peculiar understanding of security which is fundamentally different from our
view. The Americans are obsessed with the idea of securing absolute
invulnerability for themselves, which, incidentally, is a utopia, for both
technological and geopolitical reasons. But that is exactly where the root of
the problem lies.
Absolute invulnerability for one nation would mean absolute vulnerability for
everybody else. We cannot agree to this. Of course, many nations prefer not to
raise this question openly for a variety of reasons. But Russia will always call
a spade a spade and speak openly about such matters. I would like to stress once
again that violation of the principle of common and indivisible security
(accompanied by repeated assurances that they are still committed to it) may
have extremely serious consequences. Sooner or later, those consequences will
also affect the nations that initiate such violations, whatever their reasons
are.
The Arab Spring: lessons and conclusions
A year ago the world witnessed a new phenomenon - nearly simultaneous
demonstrations against authoritarian regimes in many Arab countries. The Arab
Spring was initially received with hope for positive change. People in Russia
sympathized with those who were seeking democratic reform.
However, it soon became clear that events in many countries were not following a
civilized scenario. Instead of asserting democracy and protecting the rights of
the minority, attempts were being made to depose an enemy and to stage a coup,
which only resulted in the replacement of one dominant force with another even
more aggressive dominant force.
Foreign interference in support of one side of a domestic conflict and the use
of power in this interference gave developments a negative aura. A number of
countries did away with the Libyan regime by using air power in the name of
humanitarian support. The revolting slaughter of Muammar Gaddafi - not just
medieval but primeval - was the manifestation of these actions.
No one should be allowed to employ the Libyan scenario in Syria. The
international community must work to achieve an internal Syrian reconciliation.
It is important to achieve an early end to the violence no matter what the
source, and to initiate a national dialogue - without preconditions or foreign
interference and with due respect for the country's sovereignty. This would
create the conditions necessary to introduce the measures for democratization
announced by the Syrian leadership. The key objective is to prevent an all-out
civil war. Russian diplomacy has worked and will continue to work toward this
end.
Sadder but wiser, we oppose the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions that
may be interpreted as a signal to armed interference in Syria's domestic
development. Guided by this consistent approach in early February, Russia and
China prevented the adoption of an ambiguous resolution that would have
encouraged one side of this domestic conflict to resort to violence.
In this context and considering the extremely negative, almost hysterical
reaction to the Russian-Chinese veto, I would like to warn our Western
colleagues against the temptation to resort to this simple, previously used
tactic: if the UN Security Council approves of a given action, fine; if not, we
will establish a coalition of the states concerned and strike anyway.
The logic of such conduct is counterproductive and very dangerous. No good can
come of it. In any case, it will not help reach a settlement in a country that
is going through a domestic conflict. Even worse, it further undermines the
entire system of international security as well as the authority and key role of
the UN. Let me recall that the right to veto is not some whim but an inalienable
part of the world's agreement that is registered in the UN Charter -
incidentally, on US insistence. The implication of this right is that decisions
that raise the objection of even one permanent member of the UN Security Council
cannot be well-grounded or effective.
I hope very much that the United States and other countries will consider this
sad experience and will not pursue the use of power in Syria without UN Security
Council sanctions. In general, I cannot understand what causes this itch for
military intervention. Why isn't there the patience to develop a
well-considered, balanced and cooperative approach, all the more so since this
approach was already taking shape in the form of the aforementioned Syrian
resolution? It only lacked the demand that the armed opposition do the same as
the government; in particular, withdraw military units and detachments from
cities. The refusal to do so is cynical. If we want to protect civilians - and
this is the main goal for Russia - we must make all the participants in the
armed confrontation see reason.
And one more point. It appears that with the Arab Spring countries, as with
Iraq, Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local
commercial markets and are being deprived of large commercial contracts. The
niches thus vacated are being filled by the economic operatives of the states
that had a hand in the change of the ruling regime.
One could reasonably conclude that tragic events have been encouraged to a
certain extent by someone's interest in a re-division of the commercial market
rather than a concern for human rights. Be that as it may, we cannot sit back
watch all this with Olympian serenity. We intend to work with the new
governments of the Arab countries in order to promptly restore our economic
positions.
Generally, the current developments in the Arab world are, in many ways,
instructive. They show that a striving to introduce democracy by use of power
can produce - and often does produce - contradictory results. They can produce
forces that rise from the bottom, including religious extremists, who will
strive to change the very direction of a country's development and the secular
nature of a government.
Russia has always had good relations with the moderate representatives of Islam,
whose world outlook was close to the traditions of Muslims in Russia. We are
ready to develop these contacts further under the current conditions. We are
interested in stepping up our political and trade and economic ties with all
Arab countries, including those that, let me repeat, have gone through domestic
upheaval. Moreover, I see real possibilities that will enable Russia to fully
preserve its leading position in the Middle East, where we have always had many
friends.
As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, to this day the "magic recipe" that will
produce a final settlement has not been invented. It would be unacceptable to
give up on this issue. Considering our close ties with the Israeli and
Palestinian leaders, Russian diplomacy will continue to work for the resumption
of the peace process both on a bilateral basis and within the format of the
Quartet on the Middle East, while coordinating its steps with the Arab League.
The Arab Spring has graphically demonstrated that world public opinion is being
shaped by the most active use of advanced information and communications
technology. It is possible to say that the Internet, social networks, cell
phones etc. have turned into an effective tool for the promotion of domestic and
international policy on a par with television. This new variable has come into
play and gives us food for thought - how to continue developing the unique
freedoms of communication via the Internet and at the same time reduce the risk
of its being used by terrorists and other criminal elements.
The notion of "soft power" is being used increasingly often. This implies a
matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of
arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence. Regrettably,
these methods are being used all too frequently to develop and provoke
extremist, separatist and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and
to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries.
There must be a clear division between freedom of speech and normal political
activity, on the one hand, and illegal instruments of "soft power," on the
other. The civilized work of non-governmental humanitarian and charity
organizations deserves every support. This also applies to those who actively
criticize the current authorities. However, the activities of "pseudo-NGOs" and
other agencies that try to destabilize other countries with outside support are
unacceptable.
I'm referring to those cases where the activities of NGOs are not based on the
interests (and resources) of local social groups but are funded and supported by
outside forces. There are many agents of influence from big countries,
international blocs or corporations. When they act in the open, this is simply a
form of civilized lobbyism. Russia also uses such institutions like the Federal
Agency for CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, International Humanitarian
Cooperation, the Russkiy Mir Foundation and our leading universities who recruit
talented students from abroad.
However, Russia does not use or fund national NGOs based in other countries or
any foreign political organizations in the pursuit of its own interests. China,
India and Brazil do not do this either. We believe that any influence on
domestic policy and public attitude in other countries must be exerted in the
open; in this way, those who wish to be of influence will do so responsibly.
New challenges and threats
Today, Iran is the focus of international attention. Needless to say, Russia is
worried about the growing threat of a military strike against Iran. If this
happens, the consequences will be disastrous. It is impossible to imagine the
true scope of this turn of events.
I am convinced that this issue must be settled exclusively by peaceful means. We
propose recognizing Iran's right to develop a civilian nuclear program,
including the right to enrich uranium. But this must be done in exchange for
putting all Iranian nuclear activity under reliable and comprehensive IAEA
safeguards. If this is done, the sanctions against Iran, including the
unilateral ones, must be rescinded. The West has shown too much willingness to
"punish" certain countries. At any minor development it reaches for sanctions if
not armed force. Let me remind you that we are not in the 19th century or even
the 20th century now.
Developments around the Korean nuclear issue are no less serious. Violating the
non-proliferation regime, Pyongyang openly claims the right to develop "the
military atom" and has already conducted two nuclear tests. We cannot accept
North Korea's nuclear status. We have consistently advocated the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula - exclusively through political and
diplomatic means - and the early resumption of Six-Party Talks.
However, it is evident that not all of our partners share this approach. I am
convinced that today it is essential to be particularly careful. It would be
inadvisable to try and test the strength of the new North Korean leader and
provoke a rash countermeasure.
Allow me to recall that North Korea and Russia share a common border and we
cannot choose our neighbors. We will continue to conduct an active dialogue with
the leaders of North Korea and to develop good-neighborly relations with it,
while at the same time trying to encourage Pyongyang to settle the nuclear
issue. Obviously, it would be easier to do this if mutual trust is built up and
the inter-Korean dialogue resumes on the peninsula.
All this fervor around the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea makes one
wonder how the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation emerge and who is
aggravating them. It seems that the more frequent cases of crude and even armed
outside interference in the domestic affairs of countries may prompt
authoritarian (and other) regimes to possess nuclear weapons. If I have the
A-bomb in my pocket, nobody will touch me because it's more trouble than it is
worth. And those who don't have the bomb might have to sit and wait for
"humanitarian intervention."
Whether we like it or not, foreign interference suggests this train of thought.
This is why the number of threshold countries that are one step away from
"military atom" technology is growing rather than decreasing. Under these
conditions, zones free of weapons of mass destruction are being established in
different parts of the world and are becoming increasingly important. Russia has
initiated the discussion of the parameters for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle
East.
It is essential to do everything we can to prevent any country from being
tempted to obtain nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation campaigners must also
change their conduct, especially those that are used to penalizing other
countries by force without letting the diplomats do their job. This was the case
in Iraq and its problems have only become worse after an almost decade-long
occupation.
If the incentives for becoming a nuclear power are finally eradicated, it will
be possible to make the international non-proliferation regime universal and
firmly based on existing treaties. This regime would allow all interested
countries to fully enjoy the benefits of the "peaceful atom" under IAEA
safeguards.
Russia would stand to gain much from this because we are actively operating in
international markets, building new nuclear power plants based on safe, modern
technology and taking part in the formation of multilateral nuclear enrichment
centers and nuclear fuel banks.
The probable future of Afghanistan is alarming. We have supported the military
operation on rendering international aid to that country. However, the NATO-led
international military contingent has not met its objectives. The threats of
terrorism and drug trafficking have not been reduced. Having announced its
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the United States has been building, both
there and in neighboring countries, military bases without a clear-cut mandate,
objectives or duration of operation. Understandably, this does not suit us.
Russia has obvious interests in Afghanistan and these interests are
understandable. Afghanistan is our close neighbor and we have a stake in its
stable and peaceful development. Most importantly, we want it to stop being the
main source of the drug threat. Illegal drug trafficking has become one of the
most urgent threats. It undermines the genetic bank of entire nations, while
creating fertile soil for corruption and crime and is leading to the
destabilization of Afghanistan. Far from declining, the production of Afghan
drugs increased by almost 40% last year. Russia is being subjected to vicious
heroin-related aggression, which is doing tremendous damage to the health of our
people.
The dimensions of the Afghan drug threat make it clear that it can only be
overcome by a global effort with reliance on the United Nations and regional
organizations - the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and the CIS. We are willing to consider much greater
participation in the relief operation for the Afghan people but only on the
condition that the international contingent in Afghanistan acts with greater
zeal and in our interests and that it will pursue the physical destruction of
drug crops and underground laboratories.
Invigorated anti-drug measures inside Afghanistan must be accompanied by the
reliable blocking of the routes of opiate transportation to external markets,
financial flows and the supply of chemical substances used in heroin production.
The goal is to build a comprehensive system of anti-drug security in the region.
Russia will contribute to the effective cooperation of the international
community for turning the tide in the war against the global drug threat.
It is hard to predict further developments in Afghanistan. Historical experience
shows that foreign military presence has not brought it peace. Only the Afghans
can resolve their own problems. I see Russia's role as follows - to help the
Afghan people, with the active involvement of other neighboring countries, to
develop a sustainable economy and enhance the ability of the national armed
forces to counter the threats of terrorism and drug-related crime. We do not
object to the process of national reconciliation being joined by participants of
the armed opposition, including the Taliban, on condition they renounce
violence, recognize the country's constitution and sever ties with Al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups. In principle, I believe it is possible to build a
peaceful, stable, independent and neutral Afghan state.
The instability that has persisted for years and decades is creating a breeding
ground for international terrorism that is universally recognized as one of the
most dangerous challenges to the world community. I'd like to note that the
crisis zones that engender a terrorist threat are located near Russian borders
and are much close to us than to our European or American partners. The United
Nations has adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy but it seems that the
struggle against this evil is conducted not under a common universal plan and
not consistently but in a series of responses to the most urgent and barbarian
manifestations of terror - when the public uproar over the impudent acts of
terrorists grows out of proportion. The civilized world must not wait for
tragedies like the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001 or another
Beslan disaster and only then act collectively and resolutely after the shock of
such cases.
I'm far from denying the results achieved in the war on international terror.
There has been progress. In the last few years security services and the
law-enforcement agencies of many countries have markedly upgraded their
cooperation. But there is still the obvious potential for further anti-terrorist
cooperation. Thus, double standards still exist and terrorists are perceived
differently in different countries - some are "bad guys" and others are "not so
bad." Some forces are not averse to using the latter in political manipulation,
for example, in shaking up objectionable ruling regimes.
All available public institutions - the media, religious associations, NGOs, the
education system, science and business - must be used to prevent terrorism all
over the world. We need a dialogue between religions and, on a broader plane,
among civilizations. Russia has many religions, but we have never had religious
wars. We could make a contribution to an international discussion on this issue.
The growing role of the Asia-Pacific Region
One of our country's neighbors is China, a major hub of the global economy. It
has become fashionable to opine about that country's future role in the global
economy and international affairs. Last year China moved into second place in
the world in terms of GDP and it is poised to surpass the US on that count,
according to international - including American - experts. The overall might of
the People's Republic of China is growing and that includes the ability to
project power in various regions.
How should we conduct ourselves in the face of the rapidly strengthening Chinese
factor?
First of all, I am convinced that China's economic growth is by no means a
threat, but a challenge that carries colossal potential for business cooperation
- a chance to catch the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy. We should seek
to more actively form new cooperative ties, combining the technological and
productive capabilities of our two countries and tapping China's potential -
judiciously, of course - in order to develop the economy of Siberia and the
Russian Far East.
Second, China's conduct on the world stage gives no grounds to talk about its
aspirations to dominance. The Chinese voice in the world is indeed growing ever
more confident, and we welcome that, because Beijing shares our vision of the
emerging equitable world order. We will continue to support each other in the
international arena, to work together to solve acute regional and global
problems, and to promote cooperation within the UN Security Council, BRICS, the
SCO, the G20 and other multilateral forums.
And third, we have settled all the major political issues in our relations with
China, including the critical border issue. Our nations have created a solid
mechanism of bilateral ties, reinforced by legally binding documents. There is
an unprecedentedly high level of trust between the leaders of our two countries.
This enables us and the Chinese to act in the spirit of genuine partnership,
rooted in pragmatism and respect for each other's interests. The model of
Russian-Chinese relations we have created has good prospects.
Of course, this is not to suggest that our relationship with China is
problem-free. There are some sources of friction. Our commercial interests in
third parties by no means always coincide, and we are not entirely satisfied
with the emerging trade structure and the low level of mutual investments. We
will also closely monitor immigration from the People's Republic of China.
But my main premise is that Russia needs a prosperous and stable China, and I am
convinced that China needs a strong and successful Russia.
Another rapidly growing Asian giant is India. Russia has traditionally enjoyed
friendly relations with India, which the leaders of our two countries have
classified as a privileged strategic partnership. Not only our countries but the
entire multipolar system that is emerging in the world stands to gain from this
partnership.
We see before our eyes not only the rise of China and India, but the growing
weight of the entire Asia-Pacific Region. This has opened up new horizons for
fruitful work within the framework of the Russian chairmanship of APEC. In
September of this year we will host a meeting of its leaders in Vladivostok. We
are actively preparing for it, creating modern infrastructure that will promote
the further development of Siberia and the Russian Far East and enable our
country to become more involved in the dynamic integration processes in the "new
Asia."
We will continue to prioritize our cooperation with our BRICS partners. This
unique structure, created in 2006, is a striking symbol of the transition from a
unipolar world to a more just world order. BRICS brings together five countries
with a population of almost three billion people, the largest emerging
economies, colossal labor and natural resources and huge domestic markets. With
the addition of South Africa, BRICS acquired a truly global format, and it now
accounts for more than 25% of world GDP.
We are still getting used to working together in this format. In particular, we
have to coordinate better on foreign policy matters and work together more
closely at the UN. But when BRICS is really up and running, its impact on the
world economy and politics will be considerable.
In recent years, cooperation with the countries of Asia, Latin America and
Africa has become a growing focus of Russian diplomacy and of our business
community. In these regions there is still sincere goodwill towards Russia. One
of the key tasks for the coming period, in my view, is cultivating trade and
economic cooperation as well as joint projects in the fields of energy,
infrastructure, investment, science and technology, banking and tourism.
The growing role of Asia, Latin America and Africa in the emerging democratic
system of managing the global economy and global finance is reflected in the
work of the G20. I believe that this association will soon become a
strategically important tool not only for responding to crises, but for the
long-term reform of the world's financial and economic architecture. Russia will
chair the G20 in 2013, and we must use this opportunity to better coordinate the
work of the G20 and other multilateral structures, above all the G8 and, of
course, the UN.
The Europe factor
Russia is an inalienable and organic part of Greater Europe and European
civilization. Our citizens think of themselves as Europeans. We are by no means
indifferent to developments in united Europe.
That is why Russia proposes moving towards the creation of a common economic and
human space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean - a community referred by
Russian experts to as "the Union of Europe," which will strengthen Russia's
potential and position in its economic pivot toward the "new Asia."
Against the background of the rise of China, India and other new economies, the
financial and economic upheavals in Europe - formerly an oasis of stability and
order - is particularly worrying. The crisis that has struck the eurozone cannot
but affect Russia's interests, especially if one considers that the EU is our
major foreign economic and trade partner. Likewise, it is clear that the
prospects of the entire global economic structure depend heavily on the state of
affairs in Europe.
Russia is actively participating in the international effort to support the
ailing European economies, and is consistently working with its partners to
formulate collective decisions under the auspices of the IMF. Russia is not
opposed in principle to direct financial assistance in some cases.
At the same time I believe that external financial injections can only partially
solve the problem. A true solution will require energetic, system-wide measures.
European leaders face the task of effecting large-scale transformations that
will fundamentally change many financial and economic mechanisms to ensure
genuine budget discipline. We have a stake in ensuring a strong EU, as
envisioned by Germany and France. It is in our interests to realize the enormous
potential of the Russia-EU partnership.
The current level of cooperation between Russia and the European Union does not
correspond to current global challenges, above all making our shared continent
more competitive. I propose again that we work toward creating a harmonious
community of economies from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which will in the future
evolve into a free trade zone and even more advanced forms of economic
integration. The resulting common continental market would be worth trillions of
euros. Does anyone doubt that this would be a wonderful development and that it
would meet the interests of both Russians and Europeans?
We must also consider more extensive cooperation in the energy sphere, up to and
including the formation of a common European energy complex. The Nord Stream gas
pipeline under the Baltic Sea and the South Stream pipeline under the Black Sea
are important steps in that direction. These projects have the support of many
governments and involve major European energy companies. Once the pipelines
start operating at full capacity, Europe will have a reliable and flexible
gas-supply system that does not depend on the political whims of any nation.
This will strengthen the continent's energy security not only in form but in
substance. This is particularly relevant in the light of the decision of some
European states to reduce or renounce nuclear energy.
The Third Energy Package, backed by the European Commission and aimed at
squeezing out integrated Russian companies, is frankly not conducive to stronger
relations between Russia and the EU. Considering the growing instability of
energy suppliers that could act as an alternative to Russia, the package
aggravates the systemic risks to the European energy sector and scares away
potential investors in new infrastructure projects. Many European politicians
have been critical of the package in their talks with me. We should summon the
courage to remove this obstacle to mutually beneficial cooperation.
I believe that genuine partnership between Russia and the European Union is
impossible as long as there are barriers that impede human and economic
contacts, first and foremost visa requirements. The abolition of visas would
give powerful impetus to real integration between Russia and the EU, and would
help expand cultural and business ties, especially between medium-sized and
small businesses. The threat to Europeans from Russian economic migrants is
largely imagined. Our people have opportunities to put their abilities and
skills to use in their own country, and these opportunities are becoming ever
more numerous.
In December 2011 we agreed with the EU on "joint steps" toward a visa-free
regime. They can and should be taken without delay. We should continue to
actively pursue this goal.
Russian-American affairs
In recent years a good deal has been done to develop Russian-American relations.
Even so, we have not managed to fundamentally change the matrix of our
relations, which continue to ebb and flow. The instability of the partnership
with America is due in part to the tenacity of some well-known stereotypes and
phobias, particularly the perception of Russia on Capitol Hill. But the main
problem is that bilateral political dialogue and cooperation do not rest on a
solid economic foundation. The current level of bilateral trade falls far short
of the potential of our economies. The same is true of mutual investments. We
have yet to create a safety net that would protect our relations against ups and
downs. We should work on this.
Nor is mutual understanding strengthened by regular US attempts to engage in
"political engineering," including in regions that are traditionally important
to us and during Russian elections.
As I've said before, US plans to create a missile defense system in Europe give
rise to legitimate fears in Russia. Why does that system worry us more than
others? Because it affects the strategic nuclear deterrence forces that only
Russia possesses in that theatre, and upsets the military-political balance
established over decades.
The inseparable link between missile defense and strategic offensive weapons is
reflected in the New START treaty signed in 2010. The treaty has come into
effect and is working fairly well. It is a major foreign policy achievement. We
are ready to consider various options for our joint agenda with the Americans in
the field of arms control in the coming period. In this effort we must seek to
balance our interests and renounce any attempts to gain one-sided advantages
through negotiations.
In 2007, during a meeting with President Bush in Kennebunkport, I proposed a
solution to the missile defense problem, which, if adopted, would have changed
the customary character of Russian-American relations and opened up a positive
path forward. Moreover, if we had managed to achieve a breakthrough on missile
defense, this would have opened the floodgates for building a qualitatively new
model of cooperation, similar to an alliance, in many other sensitive areas.
It was not to be. Perhaps it would be useful to look back at the transcripts of
the talks in Kennebunkport. In recent years the Russian leadership has come
forward with other proposals to resolve the dispute over missile defense. These
proposals still stand.
I am loath to dismiss the possibility of reaching a compromise on missile
defense. One would not like to see the deployment of the American system on a
scale that would demand the implementation of our declared countermeasures.
I recently had a talk with Henry Kissinger. I meet with him regularly. I fully
share this consummate professional's thesis that close and trusting interactions
between Moscow and Washington are particularly important in periods of
international turbulence.
In general, we are prepared to make great strides in our relations with the US
to achieve a qualitative breakthrough, but on the condition that the Americans
are guided by the principles of equal and mutually respectful partnership.
Economic diplomacy
In December of last year, Russia finally concluded its marathon accession to the
WTO, which had lasted for many years. I must mention that, in the finishing
stretch, the Obama administration and the leaders of some major European states
made a significant contribution to achieving the final accords.
To be honest, at times during this long and arduous journey we wanted to turn
our backs on the talks and slam the door. But we did not succumb to emotion. As
a result, a compromise was reached that is quite acceptable for our country: we
managed to defend the interests of Russian industrial and agricultural producers
in the face of growing external competition. Our economic actors have gained
substantial additional opportunities to enter world markets and uphold their
rights there in a civilized manner. It is this, rather than the symbolism of
Russia's accession to the World Trade "club", that I see as the main result of
this process.
Russia will comply with WTO norms, as it meets all of its international
obligations. Likewise, I hope that our partners will play according to the
rules. Let me note in passing that we have already integrated WTO principles
into the legal framework of the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan.
Russia is still learning how to systematically and consistently promote its
economic interests in the world. We have yet to learn, as many Western partners
have, how to lobby for decisions that favor Russian business in foreign
international forums. The challenges facing us in this area, given our priority
of innovation-driven development, are very serious: to achieve equal standing
for Russia in the modern system of global economic ties and to minimize the
risks arising from integration in the world economy, including Russia's
membership in the WTO and its forthcoming accession to the OECD.
We are badly in need of broader, non-discriminatory access to foreign markets.
So far, Russian economic actors have been getting a raw deal abroad. Restrictive
trade and political measures are being taken against them, and technical
barriers are being erected that put them at a disadvantage compared with their
competitors.
The same holds for investments. We are trying to attract foreign capital to the
Russian economy. We are opening up the most attractive areas of our economy to
foreign investors, granting them access to the "juiciest morsels," in
particular, our fuel and energy complex. But our investors are not welcome
abroad and are often pointedly brushed aside.
Examples abound. Take the story of Germany's Opel, which Russian investors tried
and failed to acquire despite the fact that the deal was approved by the German
government and was positively received by German trade unions. Or take the
outrageous examples of Russian businesses being denied their rights as investors
after investing considerable resources in foreign assets. This is a frequent
occurrence in Central and Eastern Europe.
All this leads to the conclusions that Russia must strengthen its political and
diplomatic support for Russian entrepreneurs in foreign markets, and to provide
more robust assistance to major landmark business projects. Nor should we forget
that Russia can employ identical response measures against those who resort to
dishonest methods of competition.
The government and business associations should better coordinate their efforts
in the foreign economic sphere, more aggressively promote the interests of
Russian business and help it to open up new markets.
I would like to draw attention to another important factor that largely shapes
the role and place of Russia in present-day and future political and economic
alignments - the vast size of our country. Granted, we no longer occupy
one-sixth of the Earth's surface, but the Russian Federation is still the
world's largest nation with an unrivaled abundance of natural resources. I am
referring not only to oil and gas, but also our forests, agricultural land and
clean freshwater resources.
Russia's territory is a source of its potential strength. In the past, our vast
land mainly served as a buffer against foreign aggression. Now, given a sound
economic strategy, they can become a very important foundation for increasing
our competitiveness.
I would like to mention, in particular, the growing shortage of fresh water in
the world. One can foresee in the near future the start of geopolitical
competition for water resources and for the ability to produce water-intensive
goods. When this time comes, Russia will have its trump card ready. We
understand that we must use our natural wealth prudently and strategically.
Support for compatriots and Russian culture in the international context
Respect for one's country is rooted, among other things, in its ability to
protect the rights of its citizens abroad. We must never neglect the interests
of the millions of Russian nationals who live and travel abroad on vacation or
on business. I would like to stress that the Foreign Ministry and all diplomatic
and consular agencies must be prepared to provide real support to our citizens
around the clock. Diplomats must respond to conflicts between Russian nationals
and local authorities, and to incidents and accidents in a prompt manner -
before the media announces the news to the world.
We are determined to ensure that Latvian and Estonian authorities follow the
numerous recommendations of reputable international organizations on observing
generally accepted rights of ethnic minorities. We cannot tolerate the shameful
status of "non-citizen." How can we accept that, due to their status as
non-citizens, one in six Latvian residents and one in thirteen Estonian
residents are denied their fundamental political, electoral and socio-economic
rights and the ability to freely use Russian?
The recent referendum in Latvia on the status of the Russian language again
demonstrated to the international community how acute this problem is. Over
300,000 non-citizens were once again barred from taking part in a referendum.
Even more outrageous is the fact that the Latvian Central Electoral Commission
refused to allow a delegation from the Russian Public Chamber to monitor the
vote. Meanwhile, international organizations responsible for compliance with
generally accepted democratic norms remain silent.
On the whole, we are dissatisfied with how the issue of human rights is handled
globally. First, the United States and other Western states dominate and
politicize the human rights agenda, using it as a means to exert pressure. At
the same time, they are very sensitive and even intolerant to criticism. Second,
the objects of human rights monitoring are chosen regardless of objective
criteria but at the discretion of the states that have "privatized" the human
rights agenda.
Russia has been the target of biased and aggressive criticism that, at times,
exceeds all limits. When we are given constructive criticism, we welcome it and
are ready to learn from it. But when we are subjected, again and again, to
blanket criticisms in a persistent effort to influence our citizens, their
attitudes, and our domestic affairs, it becomes clear that these attacks are not
rooted in moral and democratic values.
Nobody should possess complete control over the sphere of human rights. Russia
is a young democracy. More often than not, we are too humble and too willing to
spare the self-regard of our more experienced partners. Still, we often have
something to say, and no country has a perfect record on human rights and basic
freedoms. Even the older democracies commit serious violations, and we should
not look the other way. Obviously, this work should not be about trading
insults. All sides stand to gain from a constructive discussion of human rights
issues.
In late 2011, the Russian Foreign Ministry published its first report on the
observance of human rights in other countries. I believe we should become more
active in this area. This will facilitate broader and more equitable cooperation
in the effort to solve humanitarian problems and promote fundamental democratic
principles and human rights.
Of course, this is just one aspect of our efforts to promote our international
and diplomatic activity and to foster an accurate image of Russia abroad.
Admittedly, we have not seen great success here. When it comes to media
influence, we are often outperformed. This is a separate and complex challenge
that we must confront.
Russia has a great cultural heritage, recognized both in the West and the East.
But we have yet to make a serious investment in our culture and its promotion
around the world. The surge in global interest in ideas and culture, sparked by
the merger of societies and economies in the global information network,
provides new opportunities for Russia, with its proven talent for creating
cultural objects.
Russia has a chance not only to preserve its culture but to use it as a powerful
force for progress in international markets. The Russian language is spoken in
nearly all the former Soviet republics and in a significant part of Eastern
Europe. This is not about empire, but rather cultural progress. Exporting
education and culture will help promote Russian goods, services and ideas; guns
and imposing political regimes will not.
We must work to expand Russia's educational and cultural presence in the world,
especially in those countries where a substantial part of the population speaks
or understands Russian.
We must discuss how we can derive the maximum benefit for Russia's image from
hosting large international events, including the APEC Leaders' Meeting in 2012,
the G20 summit in 2013 and the G8 summit in 2014, the Universiade in Kazan in
2013, the Winter Olympic Games in 2014, the IIHF World Championships in 2016,
and the FIFA World Cup in 2018.
Russia intends to continue promoting its security and protecting its national
interest by actively and constructively engaging in global politics and in
efforts to solve global and regional problems. We are ready for mutually
beneficial cooperation and open dialogue with all our foreign partners. We aim
to understand and take into account the interests of our partners, and we ask
that our own interests be respected.

http://rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/
----

Bar Radicals from Rallies - Putin: Radicals and extremists should be barred from
public rallies of law-abiding citizens, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
said on Wednesday
RIA Novosti 08/02/2012

Radicals and extremists should be barred from public rallies of law-abiding
citizens, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday.
"The organizers of these events should not gather everyone in one place and then
ask law enforcement agencies to separate them out," he said at a meeting with
religious leaders.
"The approach should be this: draw a line between those exercising their
Constitution-guaranteed rights and those who take advantage of the situation for
their own purposes."
Alexander Boroda, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia,
said that nationalist groups often take part in demonstrations, using them to
incite ethnic hatred.
The anti-Putin demonstration that took place in Moscow on Saturday was comprised
of four distinct columns of participants: nonpartisan, leftist, liberal and
nationalist.

http://en.rian.ru/society/20120208/171218339.html
===========================

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The contents of RNB are compiled with the help of, among other
sources, CDI's "Johnson's Russia List," Monika Kirschner's "Ost-Verteiler," Sova
Center's "Xeno-News," UCSJ's "Bigotry Monitor" and "FSU Monitor," Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty's "Newsline," and E. Morgan Williams's "Action Ukraine
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Director of the King's Russia Institute
King's College London 

King's College London wishes to appoint a Director for its Russia Institute. The
academic level for the appointment is open. While the field for the appointment
is open, there is particular interest in the fields Russia and global politics,
ethics and governance, entrepreneurship and development, the politics of
development, and social change. The post holder is expected to lead in
developing the Institute as a premier locus for research and teaching on Russia.
It is anticipated that this appointment will be followed by further lectureships
in the Institute.

The position is available from 1 September 2012.The annual salary
will be within the standard range for academic appointments: from
£33,343 to £47,809 for Lecturer, £49,169 to £58,231 for Senior
Lecturer/Reader or a minimum of £58,148 for Professor (all inclusive of
£2,323 London Allowance).


Further details and application packs are available on the King's website at
www.kcl.ac.uk/jobs or alternatively by emailing Human Resources at
jcmbjobs@.... All correspondence should state the job title and the
reference number A9/BVP/002/12-JM. The closing date for receipt of applications
is 1st April 2012.
Equality of opportunity is College policy

Lecture and discussion:

Paper title: "The Concept of Generic Fascism and Its Application within the
Post-War Context: The Example of Post-Soviet Russia" (presented in Russian
language)


Andreas Umland, Dr. phil., Ph. D., DAAD Associate Professor of German and
European Studies, Department of Political Science, National University of
"Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland

When: March 19th, 2012 -- 19:00 - 20:30
Where: Ukraine, Kyiv, vul. Mezhyhirska 21, "Smoloskyp"


Further information and pre-registration on this Facebook event site:

https://www.facebook.com/events/341725169196749/

Relevant Russian-language publications:
http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland/Papers/91029/_
http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland/Papers/89670/_2004-2006_
http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland/Papers/83962/_

Workshop -- Call for Papers

*Mega-events in Eastern Europe*
*Date: 29 -- 31 October 2012 *
*Location: Lviv | **Ukraine***
* *
*Guest Speaker*
Elena Trubina (Ural State University | Russia)
* *
*Academic Coordinator*
Martin Müller (Universität St. Gallen | Switzerland)
* *
*Organisers*
Center for Governance and Culture in Europe | Universität St. Gallen |
Switzerland | www.gce.unisg.ch
Center for Urban History of East Central Europe | Lviv | Ukraine |
www.lvivcenter.org

*Scope*
A
  number of countries in Eastern Europe are currently preparing to host
global mega-events. Among the largest are the 2012 UEFA European
Football Championship in Poland and Ukraine, the 2012 Eurovision Song
Contest in Baku, the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok, the 2013
Universiade in Kazan, the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi and the
2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia. The requirements for hosting mega-events
such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup are similar all over
the world and set through standards and contractual requirements. Yet,
the processes for planning for them as well as the outcomes differ
vastly between countries. The focus of the majority of research on
mega-events in Western countries is increasingly at odds with the
practice of awarding them to emerging economies and has so far elided a
substantial engagement with cross-national variations in their
organisation and impacts.
This workshop seeks to initiate a
discussion on the new wave of mega-events in Eastern Europe. In so
doing, it aims to develop an understanding of the variegated
institutional, economic and cultural constellations and recombinant
forms of rule that have emerged in Eastern European states and cities
(Pickles 2010; Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2011) and shape the trajectories
of mega-events (Müller 2011). How, for example, are mega-events an
epiphenomenon of globalization with at the same time rather specific
regional variations? How do reforms in urban governance and the
introduction of new planning processes relate to the organisation of
mega-events (Gel'man 2003, 2009; Stanilov 2007; Tsenkova and
Nedovic'-Budic' 2006)? What is the role of the state in the preparation?
  How are mega-events used for branding and place promotion (Young and
Kaczmarek 2008)? In examining these processes, we expect to find both
convergence and divergence in the organisation of similar events in
other parts of the world.

While one focus of the workshop will be
  on the urban and regional impacts of mega-events, we encourage
submissions with a sound theoretical grounding that might discuss a wide
  range of themes related to mega-events in Eastern Europe, such as:

- planning processes

- governance

- urban regeneration

- architecture

- economic impacts

- social impacts

- the role of the state

- public attitudes

- environment and sustainability

- globalization and regionalization

- urban image and place promotion

- atmosphere

- security and surveillance

- national and regional identities

- discourses of modernity

- ...

*Format*
The format of the workshop will be a small-group, intense discussion of a
selection of about six to ten papers.

*Logistics*
The
  organizers welcome *paper proposals* (maximum 500 words) *by 30 April
2012*. Upon acceptance, the selected participants will be asked to
provide a full-length working paper as the basis for discussion by 01
October 2012. The workshop will take place in Lviv (Ukraine), host city
of Euro 2012, from 29 to 31 October. Accommodation and board will be
provided. Bursaries to defray travel costs will be available. Please
send your proposals to martin.mueller@... <mailto:martin.mueller@...>.

*Publication*
Publication of a special issue in an international peer-reviewed journal will be
pursued. **

* *

*Relevant literature*:

Gel'man,
  V. 2003. In search of local autonomy: the politics of big cities in
Russia's transition. /International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research/ 27 (1):48-61.

---------. 2009. Leviathan's return: the
policy of recentralization in contemporary Russia. In /Federalism and
local politics in Russia/, eds. C. Ross and A. Campbell, 1-24. London:
Routledge.

Müller, M. 2011. State dirigisme in megaprojects:
governing the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. /Environment and Planning
A/ 43 (9):2091-2108.

Pickles, J. 2010. The spirit of
post-socialism: common spaces and the production of diversity. /European
  Urban and Regional Studies/ 17 (2):127-140.

Stanilov, K. ed.
2007. /The post-socialist city: urban form and space transformations in
Central and Eastern Europe after socialism/. Dordrecht: Springer.

Sýkora,
  L., and S. Bouzarovski. 2011. Multiple transformations: conceptualising
  the post-socialist urban transition. /Urban Studies/ 49 (1):43-60.

Tsenkova,
  S., and Z. Nedovic'-Budic' eds. 2006. /The urban mosaic of
post-socialist Europe: space, institutions and policy/. Physica:
Heidelberg.

Young, C., and S. Kaczmarek. 2008. The socialist past
  and postsocialist urban identity in central and eastern Europe.
/European Urban and Regional Studies/ 15 (1):53-70.

Prof. Dr. Martin Müller
Center for Governance and Culture in Europe
Profile Area "Cultures, Institutions, Markets"
Universität St.Gallen
Varnbüelstr. 19 | 9000 St.Gallen | SWITZERLAND
Phone  ++41-(0)71-224-31 15
martin.mueller@...
www.martin-muller.net

Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

10th Annual Academic Fellows Terrorism Studies Program
Location: Israel
Deadline: 2012-03-30 (in 14 days)

The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies is accepting applications
for its 10th annual Academic Fellows Terrorism studies program.
This unique program provides university professors with a detailed
understanding of the terror threat that faces our nation and sister
democracies and is centered on a 10-day course taught in conjunction
with Tel Aviv University.


The program takes place entirely in Israel and runs May 27th to June 6th, 2012
(travel inclusive). Participants interact with academics, diplomats, military
and intelligence officials, and politicians from Israel, Jordan, India and the
United States. They also visit military bases, border zones and other security
installations to learn the practical side of deterring terrorist attacks. All
expenses are paid by FDD.  The deadline for applications is March 30, 2012.
For more information on the program, please visit
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/project/campus-programs/. 

Dana Murphy
Email: dana@...
Visit the website at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/project/campus-programs/

THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM BULLETIN
A Biweekly Newsletter of Current Affairs
Vol. 6, No. 6(162), 20 March 2012
Compilers: Fabian Burkhardt, Parikrama Gupta, Vildane Oezkan & Andreas Umland

I   NEWS: 1 - 15 March 2012
II   SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS
III ANNOTATIONS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

[NOTE: When viewing an RNB issue in the Messages archive of the homepage and the
end of the text is truncated, scroll to the end of the message and click "Expand
Messages." Only then, the whole text of the - otherwise truncated - issue will
appear. When quoting from an article found here, please, mention the RNB, as a
source. Thank you!]
==============================

I   NEWS: 1 - 15 March 2012

Orthodox Church calls for punishing performers, organizers of stunt at Christ
the Savior Cathedral
Interfax-Religion, March 1, 2012

Moscow, March 1, Interfax - The Russian Orthodox Church believes all those
connected with a recent extravagant performance at the Christ the Savior
Cathedral in Moscow should be identified and strictly punished.
"It is difficult to say what motives those girls were guided by. But this needs
to be found out. I think all the chain of the organizers of this shameful show
should be disclosed, so that its participants and organizers give testimony,"
Head of the Synodal Department for Church and Society Relations Archpriest
Vsevolod Chaplin said on Soyuz television channel.
It was reported earlier that the feminist punk group called Pussy Riot performed
a song near the altar at the Christ the Savior Cathedral on February 21, which
many believers perceived as blasphemous. The cathedral security service
apprehended the girls. They later described their performance on Twitter as "a
punk prayer."
Police have opened a criminal case on disorderly conduct charges (Article 213 of
the Russian Criminal Code).
The priest suggested that a special inquiry is needed to understand the degree
to which the video featuring this show, which is now available on the Internet,
could be considered extremist.
"It openly preaches hatred to Orthodox believers, contains insults, and provokes
a response to what was said from Orthodox believers, or perhaps from some other
groups as well, like [Vladimir] Putin's supporters or someone else of the kind,"
he said.
"Any attacks on things and objects sacred to people should be punished severely,
just as attacks on government symbols or graves are punished now," he added.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9113
-----

Eight U.S. Baptists fined in Ivanovo for breaking immigration rules
Interfax-Religion, March 1, 2012
Ivanovo, March 1, Interfax - Eight U.S. citizens have been fined in Ivanovo for
violating the migration laws, spokeswoman for the regional office of the Russian
Federal Migration Service Vitaliya Zagumennikova told Interfax.
"A preacher and seven parishioners from the Harmony Baptist Church from the
state of Pennsylvania arrived at the regional center with tourist visas, but
were involved in humanitarian and charitable activities at boarding schools and
orphanages where they conducted training seminars, quizzes and religious
readings," the press secretary said.
The U.S. citizens were fined 2,000 rubles each for violating Article 18.8 part
two of the Russian Code of Administrative Offenses (violation by a foreign
national of the Russian immigration rules), Zagumennikova said.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9109
-----

Orthodox Church urges elites that formed in Russia in 1990s to be accountable to
society
Interfax-Religion, March 1, 2012

Moscow, March 1, Interfax - The Russian Orthodox Church is calling on the elites
to realize their responsibility to the people.
"We know how some fortunes were made - sometimes they were made honestly,
sometimes they were made only thanks to access to a signature of the first
person in the country in the 1990s, and sometimes they were made on blood and
heinous crimes," Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, the head of the Synodal Department
for Church and Society Relations, said on Soyuz television channel on Wednesday
evening.
The priest admitted that he did not know whether it is worth revising everything
that was done in the 1990s, "but the very behavior of these people who acquired
some political influence and economic resources at the time to affect affairs
surrounding us should be changed," he said.
"They are no longer the lords. The lords are the people, and therefore they [the
elites] must be accountable to society and learn not to offer sops to this
society but change accordingly to this society's expectations," he said.
In describing the current situation in Russia, Father Vsevolod suggested that
"the social and economic system is endangering a huge moral wound in the
people's souls, and therefore this system should be changed."
Most people in Russia do not want to change the government, he said.
"The people want changes - not revolutionary ones and not something our Western
partners are dreaming of, but ones that would enable the people to really solve
problems that have become longstanding worries for years, and this concerns the
recent years as well," Father Vsevolod said.
Among these problems are "the Russian people's status, which is not stipulated
in our laws and our political system, conflicts between immigrants and the
indigenous population, and monstrous injustice," he said.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9110
-----

Krishnaites are project of Indian government, their book contains extremism,
Russian Justice Ministry expert believes
Interfax-Religion, March 2, 2012.

Moscow - Head of the Expert Council for State Religious Expertise under the
Russian Justice Ministry Alexander Dvorkin believes Bhagavad Gita As It Is with
the commentary written by the founder of the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness Swami Prabhupada is an extremist book.
"The main idea of the PR-campaign launched by Krishna followers and their allies
is that the great monument of ancient Indian literature, holy book of Hinduism
Bhagavad Gita is under trial and the world classic can be banned. But it's a
lie," Dvorkin, who is also a renowned expert on sects told Interfax-Religion on
Thursday.
As was reported, the Leninsky District Court late in December last year rejected
the Tomsk Prosecutor's appeal to recognize the holy for Krishnaites Bhagavad
Gita As It Is with Prabhupada's commentaries an extremist book. Process in Tomsk
caused protests of Indian politicians and public. The theme of "prosecutions
against Hindu in Russia" became top news in leading Indian media.
The interviewee of the agency said that all claims of the Prosecutor Office
referred to Prabhupada's commentaries as for example "they contain rude and
insulting statements about people belonging to other religions."
"There is sex discrimination, there are indications that a person shouldn't be a
patriot as a person who loves his Motherland and children is similar to pig,
camel, donkey and so on. Children are considered a "side products of the body,"
and thus equaled to defecations. Such quotations can take several pages," he
said.
Dvorkin also notes that Society for Krishna Consciousness does not belong to
traditional Hinduism as it is impossible to become a Hindu, you can only born in
the caste - Hinduism is unthinkable without caste system.
He reminded that the Communal Bharatiya Janata Party first came to power in
India in the 1990-s, its ideology was based on religious nationalism, and it
offered a version of neo-Hinduism. They were the first to exploit the idea of
"guru on export."
"Communalists understood that guru who go to Western countries and their newly
converted adepts play rather important political role, can be agents of
influence and bring real income. As all these guru then come back to India and
many Western people who fell in their nets come after them to see them, to live
beside them and certainly bring their money with them," the expert said.
According to him, though Communalists are not in power, the Indian National
Congress, which changed them, "realized that guru on export is a profitable
thing and started supporting pseudo-Hinduism projects in the West.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9114
-----

Alleged Islamists arrested in Novosibirsk had North Caucasus links
Interfax-Religion, March 5, 2012

Moscow, March 5, Interfax - Russia's National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC)
claimed that 11 militants with North Caucasus connections had been arrested in
the Siberian city of Novosibirsk on Saturday.
"Members of the gang have been complicit in a series of violent assaults and
other brutal crimes in the Novosibirsk region. Money obtained by the bandit
group in a criminal way was transferred to bandit underground ringleaders in
[the North Caucasus republics of]
Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan to finance terrorist activities," the NAC said
in a statement made available to Interfax.
It said the group had plotted a series of sabotage acts and murders of police
officers in order to take hold of their weapons.
The statement did not name those arrested, pleading official secrecy.
Five assault rifles, three pistols, two under-barrel grenade launchers, TNT,
plastic explosive and other components for making bombs, four grenades, 2,000
cartridges, portable radio sets, laptop computers, camouflage uniforms, "one of
the so-called black flags of jihad, and religious extremist literature" were
seized from the detainees.
In an earlier statement, the NAC said five of the detainees had belonged to an
Islamist organization called Novosibirsk Jamaat.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9118
-----

Church to teach Russian to migrants
RIA Novosti, March 7, 2012

Following on a proposal by president-elect Vladimir Putin, the Russian Orthodox
church announced plans to teach Russian language and culture to labor migrants
from former Soviet countries.
A test language and culture course will open in Moscow, with more to follow
nationwide if the idea works out, the press service for the capital's eparchial
council said on Wednesday.
The program is supported by the Federal Migration Service, the press service
said. It did not specify when the course will begin.
Putin, who won the presidential elections on Sunday, said in a campaign article
last month that labor migrants should be required to take tests in Russian
language and culture to qualify to work in the country.
About 1.2 million foreigners legally traveled to Russia to work here in 2011,
and a further 3.5 million could be illegal migrants, according to data from the
Federal Migration Service. Many of them come from former Soviet republics in
Central Asia, as well as Ukraine.

http://en.ria.ru/world/20120307/171844840.html
-----

Putin has negative feelings about Pussy Riot performance at cathedral -
spokesman
Interfax-Religion, March 7, 2012

Moscow, March 7, Interfax - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has negative
feelings toward the extravagant performance that the feminist punk group Pussy
Riot staged recently at Christ the Savior Cathedral, Putin's press secretary
Dmitry Peskov said on Dozhd television channel.
Asked whether Putin expressed any reaction to the incident, Peskov replied,
"Negative."
Peskov said he was unaware of the contents of the song performed by the punk
group. "We did not report the contents of the song to Putin," he said.
Speaking about the incident in general, Peskov said, "The matter probably
implies a complex tangle of such notions as religious norms, faith, insult of
believers' feelings, and so on."
"Certainly, only a court can find the truth here," he said.
At the same time, "considering that the matter involves a church, this
performance cannot be called anything but horrendous," he said.
It was reported earlier that Pussy Riot performed a song near the altar at
Christ the Savior Cathedral on February 21, which many believers perceived as
blasphemous. The cathedral security service tried to apprehend the girls, but
they managed to flee. They later described their performance on Twitter as "a
punk prayer."
A criminal case on disorderly conduct charges has been opened against the
performers, who are now facing up to two years in prison.
Three members of the group were detained recently. One of the women and an
activist of the Voyna (War) art group, Pyotr Verzilov, were questioned and
released from police but were obliged to appear before an investigator on March
6. Two others were detained.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9125
-----

Russian feminist punk rock musicians' arrest appealed
Interfax-Religion, March 11, 2012

Moscow, March 11, Interfax - Lawyers have appealed the arrest of two members of
a feminist punk rock band for performing a song inside one of Moscow's largest
Orthodox churches that outraged clergy and worshipers, Nikolay Polozov, a lawyer
for the artists, told Interfax.
On March 5, Moscow's Tagansky Court confirmed an order that Maria Alyokhina and
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, performers of the Pussy Riot band, stay in custody until
April 24.
Pussy Riot sang a song in front of the altar in the massive Moscow's Cathedral
of Christ the Savior on February 21 that the group described as a "punk prayer"
but many of the worshipers who were present saw as blasphemous.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9130
-----

St. Petersburg governor signs ban on propaganda of homosexuality
Interfax-Religion, March 11, 2012

St. Petersburg, March 11, Interfax - Governor of St. Petersburg Georgy
Poltavchenko has signed amendments to the local law on administrative offences,
which envisions criminal liability for the propaganda of homosexuality and
pedophilia among minors.
The law will take effect 10 days following its official publications, the city
administration said on Sunday.
The propaganda of homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexualism and transsexualism
among minors will carry a fine of 5,000 rubles for individuals, 50,000 rubles
for officials and from 250,000 to 500,000 rubles for legal entities.
Public activities to popularize pedophilia will carry an administrative fine of
5,000 rubles for individuals, 50,000 rubles for officials and from 500,000 to 2
million rubles for legal entities.
The city legislature passed a bill, submitted by United Russia faction member
Vitaly Milonov on February 29, which proposes introducing administrative
liability for those popularizing homosexuality, transsexualism and pedophilia.
Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch urged the city governor to reject the bill. HRW's
director for Europe, Hugh Williamson, said attempts to put homosexualism and
pedophilia on the same footing are unacceptable.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9131
-----

St. Petersburg "anti-gay" law is discriminatory - rights activists
Interfax-Religion, March 12, 2012

Moscow, March 12, Interfax - Human rights activists find that the law banning
so-called homosexual propaganda signed by the governor of St. Petersburg
violates the European Convention on Human Rights.
According to earlier reports, St. Petersburg Governor Georgy Poltavchenko signed
a law banning "homosexual propaganda" among minors.
"We, human rights activists and civil activists, are expressing extreme concerns
about the adoption of some discriminatory legislative acts in the Ryazan,
Arkhangelsk, and Kostroma Regions and now in St. Petersburg," the human rights
activists said in a statement received by Interfax on Monday.
The statement was signed by the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Young People's Human
Rights Movement, and the Russian Gay Lesbian League.
The human rights activists said the St. Petersburg governor has signed a law
banning homosexual propaganda despite criticism from Russian human rights
ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, who characterized such laws as violating human rights.
The civil activists said the law has been criticized the legal department of the
St. Petersburg legislative Assembly and a number of prominent experts in the
sphere of psychology, sociology, and law.
"The laws banning 'homosexual propaganda' illegally restrict citizens' right to
freedom of assembly and association and their right to search for and
disseminate information. These laws are based on prejudice and demagogy
speculating on the interests of children's protection," the statement says.
"While opposing the sexual exploitation of minors and violence against them, we
contend that such laws fan social feud by causing an increase in xenophobia and
violence in society and may also increase the number of suicides among
teenagers," the human rights activists said.
"We are concerned about the rapid increase in fascist tendencies in Russian
society. Such legislative initiatives only fuel them. We call on Russian society
to pay attention to the adoption of this law in St. Petersburg because it could
be followed by restrictions of the rights of other minorities, including
religious and ethnic. Those who now applaud the 'triumph of traditional values'
may soon find that they have been banned as well," the statement says.
"We have no doubt that these laws will be recognized as violating the
international obligations of the Russian Federation in the sphere of human
rights, in particular, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. No doubt that they will negatively impact the international image of
the Russian Federation," the statement says.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9136
-----

Gays to protest against St. Petersburg homophobic law near schools
Interfax-Religion, March 12, 2012

Moscow, March 12, Interfax - Gays are planning to stage a protest in St.
Petersburg against a bill signed into law on Sunday, banning the propaganda of
homosexuality among minors.
"As soon as the St. Petersburg law is published and takes effect, we will
definitely, as promised, come to St. Petersburg and stage protests outside a
number of children's institutions and challenge the law at Russian courts and
the European Court of Human Rights," organizer of Moscow gay pride parades
Nikolay Alexeyev told Interfax.
The signed law "runs counter to the Russian international commitments, in
particular, those resulting from the European Convention," he said.
The same bills were passed or are about to be passed in four Russian regions,
including Ryazan and Kostroma, and the movement activists continue to challenge
the regional authorities' decisions in court, Alexeyev said.
It was reported that on Sunday St. Petersburg Governor Georgy Poltavchenko
signed into law a bill banning propaganda of homosexuality among minors.
The document is due to become a law ten days after its official publication.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9133
-----

Fear Voiced That Planned Russian Law Would Bar Opposition From Winning
Parliament Seats
Johnson's Russia List, March 12, 2012

MOSCOW. March 12 (Interfax) - A senior opposition figure has expressed overall
satisfaction with the first meeting of a government-opposition working group
debating a draft law on political parties, but expressed fear that the planned
law would result in "the fragmentation of the political scene."
The Kremlin "is willing to take account of our principal suggestions, including
those that would simplify (parties') registration," Konstantin Merzlikin,
secretary of the Federal Political Council of the People's Freedom Party, told
Interfax.
The People's Freedom Party (PARNAS) is one of Russia's parties that have been
refused official registration.
Merzlikin said he had "raised the issue of the possibility of forming election
blocs." Most of those present were glad he had, he claimed.
"But, unfortunately, this issue remained stalled a bit, though it is a matter of
principle. One kind of gets the impression that the new concept (for the planned
law) may lead to the fragmentation of the political scene," he said.
"There already are 68 registered organizing committees for setting up parties,
and there is a risk that more than 100 political groups will emerge, and if it's
only separately that all of them are able to take part in elections, it will be
very hard to overcome the passage threshold," Merzlikin said.
"But the possibility of electoral alliances is a subject for another law. We
were assured that we would come back to this issue in April. We hope that that's
the way it will be, so that the opposition is able to form coalition lists for
the elections in October," he said.
Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov, who was also present at the meeting, said
consensus had been reached there that sections should be included in the
proposed law "that would make it binding on the Ministry of Justice to, first of
all, provide consultation during the phase where (registration) documents are
prepared and, secondly, certify the documents."
"This would eliminate reasons for (the ministry) to deny registration under the
pretext that the documents fail to meet legal criteria," Udaltsov told Interfax.
He said the bill on political parties would undergo its second reading on March
20 and that other draft laws would do so later.
"Before March 15, all the amendments will be submitted to the State Duma
Committee on Public Organizations, where we have also been invited," Udaltsov
said.
"Because of an accelerated pace there was no chance to hold a public hearing on
amendments to the law 'On Political Parties,'" he said. "There are public
hearings on other draft laws planned for the start of April."
The working group, headed by Vyacheslav Volodin, deputy chief of the
presidential staff, was put together after a meeting between President Dmitry
Medvedev and leaders of unregistered parties.
The group includes members of several unregistered parties.
It also includes members of the four parties represented in the State Duma -
United Russia, the Communists, the Liberal Democrats and A Just Russia, - and of
three parties that have no seats in the lower house but are registered, Yabloko,
Patriots of Russia and Right Cause.

http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-fear-law-bar-opposition-from-duma-seats\
-571.cfm
-----

Russian Police Summon Anti-Putin Activist
RFE/RL, March 13, 2012

MOSCOW -- A popular anticorruption crusader and leader of Russia's protest
movement against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin says he has been summoned for
questioning by Moscow police.
Aleksei Navalny, a lawyer, became publicly known for his popular website
exposing corruption schemes.
Navalny wrote on his blog on March 13 that police want him and his associates
for questioning later this week regarding his anticorruption blog.
He is one of the figureheads of the protest movement against Putin and his
victory in the March 4 presidential voting.
Navalny wrote that the stamp on the letter he received is from the police unit
that investigates extremism.
Navalny spent 15 days in police custody for trying to lead an unsanctioned march
in December in the first major protest against official results of the
fraud-tainted parliamentary polls which handed a win to Putin's ruling United
Russia party.

http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_police_summon_antiputin_activist/24514294.ht\
ml
-----

St. Petersburg Governor Signs Law Against 'Homosexual Propaganda'
RFE/RL, March 14, 2012

The governor of Russia's second-largest city, St. Petersburg, has signed a new
law against "homosexual propaganda" -- defying complaints that it discriminates
against gays.
City hall announced on March 11 that St. Petersburg Governor Georgy Poltavchenko
had signed the law on March 7.
The regional law -- which applies only to St. Petersburg -- threatens fines for
anyone found "making public actions among minors for the propaganda of
homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexuality or transgenderism."
Another article levies fines for "propaganda of paedophilia."
The law comes into force 10 days after being officially published.
Human rights groups had called on Poltavchenko to veto the law on grounds that
it appears to equate homosexuality with paedophilia and risks being used
arbitrarily by authorities to crack down on gays.

http://www.rferl.org/content/st_petersburg_homosexuality_law/24512104.html
-----

Pussy Riot girls charged - lawyer
Interfax-Religion, March 14, 2012

Moscow, March 13, Interfax - Hooliganism charges have been brought against
members of the Pussy Riot punk group over a scandalous action in the Church of
Christ the Savior in Moscow, lawyer Nikolay Polozov has told reporters.
"My clients Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina have just been indicted
for hooliganism under Part 2, Article 213 [hooliganism committed by a group of
persons] of the Russian Criminal Code," he said.
Investigators intended to interrogate the girls as defendants but they refused
to testify.
On February 21, Pussy Riot staged a performance near the sanctuary of the Church
of Christ the Savior. The girls explained that it was a "religious service" in
punk style. A criminal case on hooliganism charges was opened. Three Pussy Riot
girls were detained and two of them were taken into custody. They responded with
a hunger strike.
On Wednesday, the Moscow City Court will hear an appeal against their arrest.
The Pussy Riot action has triggered a public outcry and polarized the Orthodox
world with Church hierarchs and the majority of believers insisting that the
feminists be prosecuted, while others think that they should be forgiven.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9138
-----

Four people detained at Moscow City Court building
Interfax-Religion, March 14, 2012

Moscow, March 14, Interfax - Four supporters and opponents of the punk group
Pussy Riot were detained near the Moscow City Court on Wednesday.
Pyotr Verzilov, an activist from the art group Voyna, told Interfax that David
Abramov and two other Pussy Riot supporters have been detained.
In the meantime, about a dozen orthodox activists are conducting a picket near
the court building. They are holding placards saying "Blasphemers should be
punished in accordance with Article 213 of the Criminal Code." The article deals
with hooliganism committed by a group of people.
Alexander Bosykh, the head of young people's projects at the Congress of Russian
Communities, who opposes the punk group, has also been detained. "He was accused
of attacking someone," Dmitry Pakhomov, a member of the Council of Orthodox
Public Associations of the Synodal Department on Liaison between the Church and
Society, said.
Supporters and opponents of Pussy Riot periodically exchange verbal spats.
Protesters and journalists continue coming to the court building.
According to earlier reports, the Moscow police on Wednesday morning tightened
security near the Moscow City Court building, where the complaints about the
arrest of two Pussy Riot members will be considered.
On February 21, the feminist punk group Pussy Riot gave a performance near the
entrance to the altar of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The young women
said their performance was "a punk prayer."
A criminal case was opened on the basis of the article of the Russian Criminal
Code dealing with hooliganism. Three of the women have recently been detained,
and two of them have been arrested. They have gone on hunger strike to protest
their arrest. The Moscow City Court will consider their appeal on Wednesday.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9146
-----

Rights activists consider women arrested for performance in cathedral "prisoners
of conscience"
Interfax-Religion, March 14, 2012

Moscow, March 14, Interfax - Several prominent Russian human rights activists
and public figures called for releasing two members of the feminist punk group
Pussy Riot from prison, where they have been put for a controversial performance
at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
"We are calling for immediately releasing the arrestees and stopping their
criminal prosecution," says a statement signed by human rights activists
Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Lev Ponomaryov, Lilia Shibanova, and Yury Jibladze, writer
Andrey Piontkovsky, opposition politician Sergey Davidis, and some others.
"We consider the arrested Maria Alyokhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova prisoners
of conscience being persecuted for expressing their views and are calling on
international organizations to recognize them as such. We are calling for
launching a public campaign in their defense to help return legal democratic
standards in our country," they said.
"There is no law in the Russian Federation prohibiting the reading of
non-canonical prayers at an Orthodox church. There was no insult addressed to
the believers in the church, or attacks on the Orthodox Church or Christian
religion. Therefore, strictly following the letter and the spirit of the Russian
law, there can be no criminal prosecution," the statement says.
"The arrested young women have in fact been charged with blasphemy, which throws
our justice system 95 years back. This is the first instance of arrest on
blasphemy charges in our country. Such charges ended only with fines earlier.
This breaks the last barrier on the way of turning Russia into a clerical state,
in which disagreement with the church policy is treated as a crime," it says.
On February 21, the feminist punk group Pussy Riot gave a performance near the
entrance to the altar of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The young women
said their performance was "a punk prayer." A criminal case was opened on the
basis of the article of the Russian Criminal Code dealing with hooliganism.
Three of the women have recently been detained, and two of them have been
arrested. They have gone on hunger strike to protest their arrest. The Moscow
City Court will consider their appeal on Wednesday.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9143
-----

Human Rights Watch opposes Pussy Riot prosecution
Interfax-Religion, March 14, 2012

Moscow, March 14, Interfax - The international human rights organization Human
Rights Watch has criticized the decision made by the Moscow City Court to keep
under arrest two members of the punk group Pussy Riot who recently made a
scandalous stunt in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
On Wednesday, the Moscow City Court upheld the arrest of Pussy Riot members
Maria Alyokhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, declining their lawyers' complaints.
"We believe that the talks of criminal liability are incommensurate and
inexpedient," Anna Sevortyan, the head of the Human Rights Watch Moscow office,
told Interfax on Wednesday.
"The proposed punishment of up to eight years of criminal liability is
absolutely incommensurate with the girls' actions," she said.
"This is a situation where several channels of public tension, between the
Church and the Church public and the state and the secular publish, have
clashed," Sevortyan said.
On February 21, the feminist punk group Pussy Riot gave a performance near the
entrance to the altar of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The young women
said their performance was "a punk prayer." A criminal case was opened on the
basis of the Russian Criminal Code article dealing with hooliganism. Three of
the women have recently been detained, and two of them have been arrested.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9149
-----

Moscow Patriarchate calls on Moldova not to pass law recognizing homosexuality
as normal
Interfax-Religion, March 14, 2012

Moscow, March 14, Interfax - The Moscow Patriarchate has cautioned the Moldovan
administration about adopting a law on non-discrimination, which the country
needs to pass to enter the EU.
"There are things that cannot be neglected even to improve the financial
situation of people. If society's moral health depends on the adoption of a law
on non-discrimination, the choice should be obvious. Moldovan leaders should put
care for their people and protection of their country's interests first," Maxim
Parshin, the head of the regional relations department of the Synodal Department
for Church and Society Relations, told Interfax-Religion on Wednesday.
If a law "recognizing homosexuality as normal" is approved, it may cause "a
serious conflict in society and can potentially lead to moral and demographic
deterioration of people," Parshin said.
"The Russian Church assumes that the development of the modern Moldovan state
should not lead to denial of its spiritual roots. The future of the country
should be based on the traditions that the people of Moldova have followed for
centuries," he said.
Parshin said discrimination can and should be prevented in ethnic and religious
issues, but it "should not put before people a moral choice."
Parshin recalled that international law allows restrictions of human rights to
protect the rights of other persons and morals. "However, the people who support
the adoption of this bill in Moldova apparently don't care about that," he said.
The bill on non-discrimination drew protests from the Orthodox people of
Moldova. In particular, protests against the bill have been conducted in the
city of Beltsy and the nearby villages.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9150
-----

Theaters May Be Forced to Show Russian Films
The Moscow Times, March 14, 2012

The government is discussing a possible move to institute a quota for screen
time given to Russian films in movie theaters, Kommersant reported Wednesday.
The policy being discussed in correspondence between the Economic Development
Ministry and the Culture Ministry would mandate that a minimum of as much as 24
percent of screen time be given to the films, which are often less popular than
foreign productions.
In a letter to the Culture Ministry, Deputy Economic Development Minister
Stanislav Voskresensky advocated for supporting Russian films and said they
remain popular for longer because they are of higher quality.
Voskresensky cited similar quotas in Western countries, including France, where
he said 43 percent of screen time is required to be devoted to foreign films.
Producers have said the support would have little effect, and that these films
would be shown "in closets."
Voskresensky also suggested import quotas restricting foreign films, noting
China's policy limiting such films to 30 per year.
An unnamed source in the film industry told Kommersant that quotas have been
discussed for quite some time, with Russian producers forming the main block of
support.
The source said that while Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had effectively blocked
import quotas, the idea of a screen-time minimum has general support and now
falls under the authority of Deputy Prime Minister Vladislav Surkov, who is a
member of the cinematography council in charge of such projects.
Theater attendance in Russia and the CIS rose last year by 16 percent, with
revenues reaching a total of $1.2 billion. Income from Russian films accounted
for only 16 percent of that figure.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/theaters-may-be-forced-to-show-russia\
n-films/454676.html
-----

Russian Protest Leader Udaltsov Jailed
RIA Novosti, March 15, 2012

Russian opposition leader Sergei Udaltsov was sentenced to 10 days behind bars
on Thursday after being arrested at a weekend rally to protest Vladimir Putin's
victory at March 4 presidential polls.
"My supporters and I only wanted to walk peacefully after the rally to Pushkin
Square - this is not forbidden, we are free citizens," Left Front movement
leader Udaltsov, 34, said in court.
He also announced he would go on hunger strike in protest at the court's
decision. He spent most of December in jail on protest-related charges and went
on hunger strike while behind bars to draw attention to what he says is his
persecution by the authorities.
Udaltsov was detained after leading dozens of protesters who had broken off from
a March 10 approved rally to march toward Pushkin Square, the traditional
gathering place for Soviet-era dissidents, and was charged with failing to obey
police instructions.
Police also detained Udaltsov - along with dozens of other people - after a
rally at the square on March 5.
Fellow protest leader Alexei Navalny was fined 1,000 rubles ($34) on Thursday
for his part in that protest.
Udaltsov was one of the key figures behind the mass demonstrations that rocked
Russia after disputed parliamentary polls in December. His Left Front movement
signed a cooperation deal with the Communist Party in mid-January and analysts
have suggested he could eventually succeed veteran party leader, Gennady
Zyuganov.
He has also called for a million-strong rally to take place in Moscow on May 5,
two days before Putin's inauguration.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120315/172189415.html
-----

Russians Prefer Iran over U.S. - Poll
RIA Novosti, March 15, 2012

More Russians than ever support Iran in its standoff with the United States,
though most of the populace is against the country taking sides in international
disputes, according to a new poll by state-run VTsIOM.
Thirteen percent of Russians think Moscow should side with Tehran in case of its
military conflict with the United States, a seven-percent increase from 2010,
according to a survey released on Wednesday.
Support for the United States stood unchanged at 3 percent. Sixteen percent said
Russia should look after its own interests, 22 percent thought it should not
interfere and 29 percent said it should act as a mediator in case of a conflict.
The responses go in line with the general perception of the West: 25 percent of
the respondents - the biggest figure since 2001 and an 11-percent increase from
2010 - think Russian-American ties are strained or downright bad, while 42
percent consider them good or normal and 26 percent believe them chilly,
compared to 49 and 33 percent, respectively, in 2010.
The trend for Europe was the same, with 13 percent of Russians speaking about
strained or bad ties with European Union, up from 6 percent in 2010. Still, 58
percent spoke favorably of Russian-European relations, while 20 percent attested
them as chilly.
Thirty-eight percent of the polled said Russia should not ignore criticism from
the West, while 50 percent said it should dismiss the rebukes. Of the latter, a
combined 66 percent put the criticism down to hostile intentions from the West,
while 29 percent said Western countries do not understand Russia.
The populace was also polled on the uprising in Syria, which claimed thousands
of lives since last March, and came out divided, with 29 percent upholding a
neutral stance, 23 percent backing Syria and 13 percent siding with the West.
The remaining 35 percent were undecided.
The poll, held late February, covered 1,600 respondents nationwide and had a
margin of error of 3.4 percentage points.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120315/172190499.html
-----

The All-Russian Muslim Board offers to punish Pussy Riot with years of forced
labor
Interfax-Religion, March 15, 2012

Moscow, March 15, Interfax - The optimal punishment for Pussy Riot girls, who
were detained for a hooligan action in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, will
be community work.
"For example, they could be sentenced to several years of community works near
the church," head of All-Russian Muslim Board executive committee Muhammedgali
Huzin told Interfax-Religion on Thursday.
He reminded that there had always been many punishments besides imprisonment in
Russia and one of them was work and instructions.
"There's no need to imprison them so that they continue - at our expense - to
represent victims or heroines. They better work and redeem their guilt with
hard, physical work: while hands work doing mechanical job (for example,
shoveling up the garbage in Moscow streets), the head can be occupied with
useful thoughts - may be thus the nonsense will go out of their heads," the
mufti said.
He also wonders why certain people "prevent the Russian Church from reaching its
goal - justice" in Pussy Riot case.
"Someone says that the girls didn't know what they did: they are too young and
too thoughtless... However, they invented a name for their action and called it
a "punk prayer service!" And what does it mean they didn't know? They didn't
know that it's a church? They didn't know what normal people do in the church?
Certainly they knew! So we insist they should be punished so that other won't do
the same!" Huzin said.
According to him, the task is "to protect others and save their souls by
publicly punishing those who infringe on the Almighty and the church, His
shelter on our Earth."

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9153
-----

Legal status of Russian Church's diocese of Vienna officially confirmed in
Austria
Interfax-Religion, March 15, 2012

Moscow, March 15, Interfax - On March 7, the Federal Bulletin in Austria
published an extract from the official document concerning the establishment of
the Russian Orthodox Church's Diocese of Vienna and Austria, the Synodal
Department for External Church Relations reports.
The Diocese of Vienna was established by the Russian Orthodox Church's Holy
Synod decision made in 1945, but it has not been officially recognized by the
Republic of Austria until recently.
The publication of an official document signed by the Federal Minister of
Education, Culture and Arts Claudia Schmid has completed the process of the
registration of the diocese.
The text of the official notification states that in accordance with Par. 3-a of
the Federal Law of June 23, 1967, on the External Legal Relations of the Greek
Eastern Church in Austria, the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate),
through its representative leader of the Moscow Patriarchate Office for
Institutions Abroad, Archbishop Mark of Yegoryevsk, has made a request to issue
a notification concerning the establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church's
Diocese of Vienna and Austria.
The statute of the Diocese of December 15, 2011, has been confirmed by the
supreme church authority - Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, the
document states. After this confirmation it has become possible to issue an
official notification about the establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church's
diocese in Austria.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9154
====================


II SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS

The Caucasus and Russia's new nationalism
By Christopher Leigh

Post-Soviet Politics, 29 January 2012

(In-text references have been omitted from this post for clarity, but a
bibliography of texts cited is at the end.)
As the Soviet Union fractured and broke up, scholars wondered which forms of
nationalism would emerge in the newly-independent states of the great,
multi-ethnic empire. In the Russian Federation, nationalism and Russian national
identity have been continually debated by both the people and the political
elite. This post analyses the evolution of post-Soviet Russian nationalism, with
particular reference to its recent - largely populist, extra-parliamentary and
grass-roots - incarnation, manifested best in the 'Russian March' and 'Stop
feeding the Caucasus' movements. The latter phenomenon, gaining publicity during
the public protests which followed the 2011 Duma election, has focussed on
attacking the federal financing of the republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia and
Dagestan. Its composition - the fusion of a number of smaller nationalist groups
- provides a clear picture of the wider trend at work in the evolution of modern
Russian nationalism. Instead of remaining a tool of Kremlin ideology used to
reconcile civic difference and orchestrate the national agenda from above,
modern Russian nationalism is resurgent as a popular, bottom-up movement with
grievances symptomatic of a state undergoing transition, modernisation and
social flux.
To form a tentative hypothesis explaining the path nationalism is taking in
modern Russia, we may turn to the classic theoretical literature on the subject;
namely Gellner's work on nations and modernity and then Anthony Smith's
celebrated theory of ethnosymbolism, which both translate well to the Russian
context. Smith's conception of the ethnie; 'a named human population with a myth
of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, an
association with a specific "homeland" and a measure of solidarity' can
accurately apply to the ethnic Russian population whom the modern nationalists
largely comprise of, and claim to represent. Gellner's definition of nationalism
as 'a principle that holds that the political and national unit should be
congruent' is evocative of the Russian nationalist desire to forge a renewed
political entity in which the rights of the Russkii majority have primacy.
In short, the 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' movement is a response to the nascent
modernity of post-Soviet Russia and the changes it brings - in immigration,
crime, welfare and federal funding - whilst also being grounded in the tension
between different ethnosymbolic traditions forced to inhabit the same emerging
political space. These ideas will be the yardstick against which we can assess
the provenance and motivation behind the 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' movement
and the development of the ideology that engendered it.
Building the nation: contextualising the evolution of modern Russian nationalism
In the years following the Soviet break-up, scholars analysed the emerging
nationalisms that arose both in former Union republics and Russia's new
ethnofederal subjects. The ethnic Russians themselves, whether in Russia or in
the Russian diaspora across the post-Soviet space largely failed to politically
mobilise in the same way, remaining submissive to the economic 'shock therapy'
being waged around them. Anatol Lieven has characterised this lack of interest
in renewing the Russian national identity as 'the exhaustion of Russian
idealism', arguing that, with the withdrawal of Soviet internationalism, ethnic
Russians were left without a defining national idea on which to build a new
identity. Speaking in 1991, nationalist firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovskii
described Russia as 'the most humiliated and insulted nation'.
The 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' movement highlights the reversal of this ennui.
Nationalism has become sufficiently important to bring large numbers to the
streets and for 58% of respondents in a recent Levada survey to say they support
the term 'Russia for Russians'. The movement evidences the broad shift from the
downtrodden 1990s nationalism of Zhirinovskii's LDPR and the Communist Party to
a popular nationalism projected on to the ethnic Other. Marlène Laruelle has
compared 1990s 'red' nationalism - which held the West as its principal Other -
with the patriotic nationalism of United Russia:
[. . .] the first nationalism is that of the defeated. It expresses a refusal of
the post-Soviet world and of the pauperization resulting from the reforms of the
1990s. [. . .] the satisfied nationalism of United Russia is that of the
winners, of those who have profited from the changes of these last two decades.
The first sort of nationalism has not disappeared; it can be seen with the
development of the skinheads and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration. After
its main battle theme, national identity, was revived by the authorities, this
first nationalism shifted its focus onto a second object, namely the migration
question [. . .].
Laruelle's analysis is right in acknowledging that there is still a plurality of
views in Russian nationalist thought, from patriotic Communism to Dugin's
Eurasianism. The overwhelming trend, however, is to movements like 'Stop feeding
the Caucasus', which reject the corruption and ineffectiveness of public
politics and its shallow brand of sanctioned nationalism.
The migration question Laruelle mentions is the main concern of all major
nationalist groups. Unburdened by the Soviet system, in which resources - human
and capital goods - were moved at the behest of central planners, large numbers
of people have moved to Russia's  urban centres in search of work. Most arrive
from Central Asia and the Caucasus. The latter is largely terra incognita to
most Russians who don't have ancestral ties to the region, demonstrating how the
call of modernity has upset the ethnic balance of many regions, fermenting
nationalism.
Overall, the problem with nation-building in the wake of a collapsed empire, as
one scholar argues, is that 'the existing borders were drawn by the imperial
power not to reflect actual ethnic and national differences, but for its own
convenience'. 'Stop feeding the Caucasus', in this sense, tells us that modern
Russian nationalism is a response to the federal nature of modern Russia, in
which 'nation' and political space are not one whole. The extreme anger felt by
nationalists towards the ethnic Other also shows how failed any attempts to
build civic nationalism were in Russia in the 1990s.
Fed up with Federalism? Statism and Russia's 'new nationalism'
Putin has described himself as a gosudarstvennik; a statist, commited to the
preservation of a strong and secure Russia as a 'community of citizens'.
However, the task of ruling such a vast state, with so many constituent federal
subjects with wildly divergent economies and local governance structures,
necessitates a high degree of intervention from the Centre. This is especially
true in Chechnya, which Russian nationalist groups say receives 90% of its
federal budget from Moscow. The idea that this funding is solely being channeled
towards Chechen criminal gangs and the ruling kleptocracy of Ramzan Kadyrov is
common in the nationalist community and amongst the wider Russian public, with
30% of those polled in a 2011 survey claiming the defining feature of Kadyrov's
leadership is his clan's full control of the republic.
The underlying issue in the nationalist's desire to cut off federal funding to
Chechnya is the perceived preferential treatment the republic is receiving,
making obvious the extreme inequality in federal financing across Russia. Head
of the National Democractic Alliance, Alexei Shiropaev has described how a 'new
nationalism' has evolved as a result of Moscow's flawed North Caucasus policy:
'Russians need their own Kadyrov'. This is a logical consequence of the
development of the old Russian nationalism: reactionary ideology oriented on
authoritarianism, a closed society, paternalistic, archaic and medieval moral
values. Old Russian nationalism openly declares disdain for democracy, civil
rights and dislike of 'persons of a certain nationality' [. . .]. The vector of
the old Russian nationalism - the Eurasian, the Horde, the Imperial, the
anti-Western - this Russian nationalism is trying to gain support for the most
odious regimes, whether it's Chechnya, or Iran. It is objectively a pro-Putin
political movement, which speculates on the most reactionary remnants and
stereotypes of Russian society.
The anger over federal funding of the North Caucasus has made the nationalist
movement into a serious opposition group. As Russia's internal security depends
on maintaing strict control of the Caucasus, it is unlikely there will be any
respite to the funding, but the national discourse over the issue tells us that
Russian nationalism has evolved past the traditional Russian 'imperial-thinking'
expansionism that Shiropaev describes. It has become a movement which, having
closely observed Putin's pyrrhic victory in Chechnya, is unsure whether the
volatile ethnic regions Russia has fought for so many times are really worth
fighting for. 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' might be a movement containing extreme
nationalist elements, but a large part of its message is based on a latent
tiredness with the violence stemming from its most volatile regions.
The development of an 'uncivil society'
The growth of 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' and similar movements is reflective of
the rise in what Andreas Umland has termed Russia's 'uncivil society'. This
network of 'nonstate institutions and networks in Russian society contain
ultranationalist, fundamentalist, and protofacist subsectors whose nature casts
doubt on the use of the construct civil society to designate them'. Modern
Russian nationalism then, has developed an eco-system of websites, media
outlets, groups and associations to spread its message in the same way that
political parties do, with charismatic leaders such as Dimitri Demushkin of the
now-banned Slavic Union, performing a similar function to the LDPR's
Zhirinovskii. Indeed, the rapprochement between the LDPR and the main
contemporary nationalist groupings was evident in a 2011 roundtable, held in the
State Duma, on 'the Russia question'. The rising popularity and appeal of modern
nationalism has resulted in a clear sign of entry to the mainstream; co-option
by a party represented in the Duma.
The SOVA Centre, which monitors Russian nationalism, has argued that nationalist
organisations are forming new, stronger alliances following the banning of a
number of groups. Their aim is to 'evade total marginalization due to the
accumulation of resources, and secondly to burst onto the field of public
politics by demonstrating a 'unified nationalist front"'. State attempts to ban
different sections of this emergent 'uncivil society' suggests the threat they
feel from a popular nationalist bloc. The gradual merger and consolidation of
different groups, with the influence of more mainstream political figures like
Zhirinovskii suggest that federal funding of the North Caucasus is becoming a
more politically volatile issue.
Navalny
Out of the myriad personalities in Russian nationalism, Alexei Navalny has
proved the most compelling. Popularised in the role of anti-corruption blogger,
shareholder activist and doyen of Russian liberals, Navalny's star has been
rising of late. But it is the undercurrent of nationalism underpinning much of
his public commentary that is potentially most important to the future of
Russian politics. Uniting Russia's burgeoning protest movement on a platform of
anti-corruption and fair elections, Navalny is also admired by many for his
participation in the annual Russian March and his expressed desire to 'stop
feeding the Caucasus'. The flakiness of Russia's opposition is infamous, with
many parties being creations of the Kremlin necessary only to draw votes away
from the Communists and LDPR at election time. In contrast, Navalny is the first
opposition figure who appears genuine and who could possibly unite the dispersed
liberal vote and wage war on Putin. This is what the Kremlin is afraid of.
The exact character of Navalny's nationalism, and the potential nationalities
policy of any political party he may come to lead, will determine how the issue
is discussed in Russia over the next presidential term. What is for sure is that
the conversation over Russian nationalism is now out of the Kremlin's hands. The
currents of change and political awakening surging around in modern Russia will
decide what identity the majority of Russians will strive for, not the Kremlin
propaganda machine.
Conclusion
Geoffrey Hosking's description of Peter the Great ruling over a 'multi-ethnic [.
. .] service state' sounds remarkably similar to the country that the Russian
government currently oversees. Russia's vast population, with its ethnic
differences previously drowned out by the tune of the Soviet Internationale, is
experiencing the profound change that adjusting to a new political space brings.
The 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' movement signifies how the feeling of imperial
expansionism fuelling nationalist rhetoric in the 1990s has been displaced by a
widespread popular desire to actually allow the secession of restive republics
like Chechnya. A November 2011 Levada poll of 1500 people across Russia showed
that 34% advocated a separation of Chechnya from Russia, with a further 23%
saying that they felt neutral about a possible secession.
Migration, modernity and ethnic factors underly this considerable shift in the
preferences of the Russian people. The incredible growth Russia experienced
during the 2000s inured the population to a prosperity-for-stability deal with
the Kremlin. The flow of money towards the Caucasus palliated the security
situation there and was tolerated when living standards were rising, but the
economic crisis of 2008 signalled an end to the popular acceptance of statist
federal subsidies.
The evolution of Russian nationalism, then, is a path of defeat, modernisation,
crisis and renewal. 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' highlights the initial failure
of post-Soviet nation-building policies, the weakness of civil society and the
transparency of patriotic, Kremlin-nationalism created only to justify 'the
interests of the ruling class, which by promoting confusion between the public
and the private has succeeded in carving up the most profitable political,
bureaucratic and economic functions.' Ironically, the migration caused by the
aggressiveness of Moscow's North Caucasus policy is now the main factor causing
nationalists to call for the region's starvation or secession. Ethnic tension is
rarely combustive when all sides are enjoying prosperity; it is only ignited
when inequalities emerge, so 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' also attests to the
drastic social change, economic transition and loss of values in the Russia of
the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
Bibliography
Wayne Allensworth, The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernisation and
Post-Communist Russia, Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History from Rus to the Russian
Federation, London: Allen Lane, 2001.
Mark N. Katz, 'Nationalism and the Legacy of Empire', Current History, 585,
1994, 93, pp. 327-331.
Marlène Laruelle, In the Name of Nation: Nationalism and Politics in
Contemporary Russia, New York NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, New Haven CT and London:
Yale University Press, 1998.
Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 3rd ed., London and New York:
Routledge, 2002.
Michael Schwirz, 'Russian Anger Grows Over Chechnya Subsidies', New York Times
(NY, USA), 8 October 2011.
Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, 'Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the LDPR',
Russian Analytical Digest, 102, 2011, pp. 14-16.
Oxana Shevel, 'Russian Nation-building from Yel'tsin to Medvedev: Ethnic, Civic
or Purposefully Ambiguous?', Europe-Asia Studies, 63, 2011, 2, pp. 179-202.
Anthony D. Smith, 'A Europe of Nations. Or the Nation of Europe?', Journal of
Peace Research, 30, 1993, 2, pp. 129-135.
Vera Tolz, 'Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in
Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 1998, 6, pp. 933-1022.
Andreas Umland, 'Toward an Uncivil Society? Contextualizing the Decline of
Post-Soviet Russian Parties of the Extreme Right Wing', Demokratizatsiya, 10,
2002, 3, pp. 362-391.
Online Sources
'Kadyrov's Chechnya Remains Highly Dependent on Russian Subsidies', Eurasia
Daily Monitor, 198, October 27 2011, 8
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38577>.
'Russian Nationalist leader threatens with popular uprising, if Caucasus is not
ceded from Russia', Kavkaz Center, 25 January 2011
<http://www.kavkaznews.com/eng/content/2011/01/25/13386.shtml>.
'Natsionalizm v covremennoĭ Rossii', Levada Tsentr, 4 February 2011
<http://www.levada.ru/press/2011020407.html>.
'Rossiyane ob obstanovke na Severnom Kavkaze, natsionalizme, politike i
finansirovanii regiona, lozunge "Khvatit kormit' Kavkaz"', Levada Tsentr, 15
December 2011
<http://www.levada.ru/15-12-2011/rossiyane-ob-obstanovke-na-severnom-kavkaze-nat\
sionalizme-politike-i-finansirovanii-regio>.
Alexei Shiopaev, 'Dva vektora v Russkom Natsionalizme',
Natsional-Demokraticheskiĭ Al'ians, 18 June 2011
<http://nazdem.info/texts/247>.
'Vnimanie! Vstuplenie vethnopoliticheskoe dvizhenie "Russkie"', Slavyanskiy
Soyuz, 19 March 2010 <http://www.demushkin.com/content/articles/318/3323.html>.
'Spring 2011: Causes Célèbres and New Ultra-right Formations', SOVA Center for
Information and Analysis, 12 July 2011
<http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2011/07/d22101/>.
'Russian Nationalists Divided Over Caucasus Slogans', RFE/RL (Moscow), 3
November 2011
<http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_nationalists_divided_over_caucasus_slogans\
/24380500.html>.
Thomas Grove, 'In Russia, nationalists turn on Putin', Reuters, December 1 2011
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/01/us-russia-nationalism-idUSTRE7B013220\
111201>.

http://www.postsovietpolitics.com/2012/01/29/the-caucasus-and-russias-new-nation\
alism/
-----------------------

Putin's tone and theme represent a throwback to the 2007 hard line speech in
Munich
By LEGVOLD, Robert
Valdai Club, 2 March 2012

Anyone who, as I do, believes that a working strategic partnership between
Russia and the United States is both desirable and feasible will read Prime
Minister Putin's February 27 article on foreign policy with disappointment. Nor
will anyone who, as I do, believes that Europe, the United States, and Russia
should be taking concrete steps to transform this vast area into a genuine
Euro-Atlantic security community focused on 21st century security challenges and
capable of bringing critical leadership to an increasingly fragmented and
stressed global order find in it much inspiration.
While Putin emphasizes Russia's desire to have constructive relations with all
parts of the world, from the United States to China, Latin America to Southeast
Asia, and avoids threatening retaliation in response to actions he criticizes
(including NATO's missile defense plans), both the tone and theme of his
comments represent a throwback to the hard line speech he gave to the Munich
Security Conference in 2007. That is how the article will likely resonate within
Western governments.
His mind appears to be principally on three things: what he sees as the
principal threat to Russian interests-although not necessarily framed as a
threat to Russian security. It is a dual challenge raised by the West and, in
particular, the United States. One half of the threat is NATO and the United
States' disregard for Russian concerns as they go about their military plans
coupled with their readiness to interfere in Russia's internal affairs (their
"political engineering" projects, as he calls it). The other half stems from
these countries' willingness to intervene militarily in the Arab Middle East and
wherever they believe so-called humanitarian interventionism justifies it.
His second focus is on positioning Russia in a global setting where the West
remains important, but power is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific. Without
suggesting that Russia can afford to turn its back on Europe and the United
States, he stresses the rising importance of BRICS-now with an "S," because he
adds South Africa. He implies that not only can Russia increase its leverage in
international affairs by collaborating with these states, but that his country's
values are more in tune with theirs.
But it is his third concern that seems to be central: namely, a preoccupation
with gaining economic advantage in a turbulent global economy-a world in which
the European economic anchor for Russia's external economic relations is in deep
trouble, and the Asia-Pacific beckons as an economic opportunity, but one that
Russia is not well-placed to seize.
Each of these three concerns raises important questions that he does not answer
and for which he may not have an answer. In the case of the first, does Russia
really want to see itself alienated from the values that animate Western culture
(of which Russia is historically so much a part), simply because he and his team
do not like the human rights standards that Europe and the United States urge on
Russia-standards that a growing portion of Russian citizens insist on as well?
Granted Putin's legitimate concern over the unknown consequences when outside
powers intervene against violent regimes, such as that in Syria, should the
emphasis be exclusively on what Russia objects to in Western behavior as opposed
to how the international community can act together to deal with the chaos and
violence erupting in this part of the world?
As for the "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific-a phrase he borrows from Hilary
Clinton-Putin evidently does not see this as an alternative to a Western option,
but does he view it as a way of balancing Russia's western option, that is, a
way of generating leverage in dealing with Europe and, above all, the United
States? Or does he envisage it as complementary-as the basis for a constructive
synergy between an ever more positive relationship within the Euro-Atlantic
region and an ever more elaborate relationship with Russia's Asia neighbors?
Indeed, has he even thought through the implications of these choices?
Third, when it comes to reorienting Russia's international economic priorities,
how far and fast does he think Russia can go, when its energy market dependency
will for the foreseeable future be on Europe and when the foreign investment
requirements that Russia has can only be met by the West? Moreover, since the
prospect of incorporating Russia into the economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific
region will require adapting and modernizing Russia's Far East to these
processes, is he developing a viable, concrete strategy for achieving this?
Beyond this challenge, how ready is Russia to enlist in the priority that ASEAN
and much of APEC now assign to economic integration, not merely to trade and
investment cooperation, when it has yet to resolve how it intends to relate to
the more advanced process of integration to its West?
There is a fourth area that is surprisingly missing from the February 27
article-viz., any serious discussion of Russia's relations with its immediate
post-Soviet neighbors. That, intentionally or not, may be a healthy thing. It
avoids what is often a sour subject when dealing with Europe and the United
States and a prickly subject with many of the neighbors themselves. And it
spares him from dwelling on futuristic and ill-formed ideas like his October
proposal for a Eurasian Union.
At the same time, there are minor encouraging notes in his commentary, such as
not ruling out the possibility of reaching an agreement on missile defense
cooperation and a readiness to pursue further arms control measures with the
United States; a positive reading of Russia's accession to the WTO and a
commitment to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty. Still, the essay is
dominated by grumbling over the way Russia is being treated by the outside world
and a testy warning that Russia will not be pushed around. When it comes to the
guidelines Russia means to follow "in a changing world," there is a considerable
element of wanting to have one's cake and eat it too. Coming from the United
States, a country whose leaders have on more than one occasion been guilty of
the same, I can attest that this serves policy very poorly-and is certainly not
solid ground on which to build a coherent and sustainable foreign policy
strategy.
(Robert Legvold is Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus, Columbia University,
and Director of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative.)

http://valdaiclub.com/politics/39663.html
--------------------

Putin Aide Says Foreign Hands Are Behind Protests
By ELLEN BARRY
New York Times, February 3, 2012

MOSCOW - On the eve of a third major antigovernment demonstration, a trusted
aide to Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin said that Russian intelligence services
"two or three years ago" reported that there were plans for the outbreak of
street protests in Moscow, implying that a blueprint for political unrest was
drawn up in Washington.
The aide, Dmitri S. Peskov, Mr. Putin's spokesman, said in an interview on
Thursday that the authorities saw the protests as evidence of growing demands
for political participation, especially among the urban middle class, and would
introduce "significant changes in terms of liberalizing and modernizing our
political system."
But he also reiterated Mr. Putin's earlier claim that the United States has
played an important role by sending money "to provoke the situation." He said
that Russian intelligence services had long warned that protests were planned,
using information gathered from various countries.
"Listen, we knew two or three years in advance that the next day, after
parliamentary elections, we will have a scandal and we will have people going
out and saying, 'Listen, guys, these elections are not legitimate, because there
are hundreds of violations and they have stolen our voices,' " Mr. Peskov said.
"We knew this in 2010. We knew that it would happen."
"And we know now that on the fifth of March we will have the same scenario," he
added.
He said that the authorities knew of Web sites prepared to publicize election
violations, including fabricated ones, after the March 4 presidential elections,
and that they have the wording of the statement that will be issued by election
monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
"It's so ridiculously predictable," he said.
Asked whether he believed that the protests were being orchestrated in this way,
Mr. Peskov said, "I don't believe that. I know it."
Mr. Peskov's remarks reflect the struggle going on at the top of Russia's
government over how to respond to the wave of political dissent after December's
parliamentary elections. After unusually large crowds gathered to protest
electoral fraud, a range of officials said that they were a signal from voters
that Mr. Putin's highly centralized political system should open up to allow new
players. This has been accompanied by persistent claims that the protests were
planned by the United States in order to undermine Mr. Putin.
A particular target has been Golos, an election monitoring group that is mainly
financed by Washington and publishes accusations of electoral violations.
Mr. Peskov said Mr. Putin had been focusing intently on the growing demands of
Russia's middle class, and that in this sense last December was "extremely
positive for all of us, and for the country."
"Ten years ago we hadn't had any middle class," he said, just a group of workers
struggling to secure cars, apartments and financial security for their families.
"Now, they got it. And the interesting part of the story is that they want to be
involved much more in political life."
He said that a set of changes announced by President Dmitri A. Medvedev in
December - which would return direct election of governors and lower the
threshold for creating political parties - were a response to voters' demands.
These demands, he said, did not come as a surprise to Mr. Putin.
"He is the one who feels the country; he's the one who knows the country from
inside," Mr. Peskov said. "And he is the one who knows, let's say, different
parts of the society. He knows the problems of those who are poor. He knows the
rich. He knows the middle class. And he was interested, from the beginning, to
get a clear understanding."
He said the prime minister was "doing his best to understand what is the source
of dissatisfaction," but had found demands rigid and frustrating.
"Regularly, he looks at people, he listens, he watches," he said. "The problem
is when people are shouting 'return our voices' - we have never stolen their
voices. And when they cry 'Putin, go away!' he feels the support of millions of
people in this country who shout, 'Putin, stay! Putin, help! Putin, be with us!'
"
Mr. Peskov said that if elected, Mr. Putin would not "tighten the screws" by
cracking down on dissent. But Mr. Peskov would not speculate on whether Mr.
Putin would allow presidential power to be weakened. "We have to give him a
right to choose whether to increase or decrease the amount of authority," Mr.
Peskov said. "Because he will be elected as a general manager of this country.
Let him perform his duties. So when you elect a C.E.O. of a company, you trust
him until the next board. Then the board comes together and says, 'Is he
effective? Yes, he is. Then let him continue. Is he effective? No, he is not,
let's have another one.' "
He seemed unruffled by the prospect of Saturday's protest, or others expected
after next month's election, which Mr. Putin is virtually assured of winning. In
a country of 135 million, the opinion of 100,000 protesters cannot make
elections illegitimate, Mr. Peskov said. But new technology has made it easier,
he acknowledged, gesturing at a smartphone in the room.
"This thing can be used as a perfect tool for education and saving lives," he
said. "At the same time, you can buy a child prostitute using this. You can buy
drugs, can't you? And you can provoke riots very easily using this thing. And it
is being done here, like in lots of countries."

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/world/europe/putin-aide-promises-significant-c\
hanges-in-russian-political-system.html?_r=1&src=tp&smid=fb-share
----------------------

Report: Racism in Russia
UCSJ, February 2012

Public authorities have once again shown interest in the problems of
nationalism. President Dmitry Medvedev said that the fight against extremism and
in particular the opposition to attempts to "play the ethnic card" must be one
of the main areas of work for the recently renamed police. In response to the
publication of an article by Vladimir Putin, "Russia: the National Question,"
the Ministry of Regional Development has prepared a draft concept of the federal
program called "Strengthening the unity of the Russian nation and the ethnic and
cultural development of the peoples of Russia".
Also, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) sent the Government a draft of the
"Concept of State Migration Policy through 2025″, on the development of
which experts have worked for over 10 years. The Concept is based on the
necessity of foreign migrants for economic development in Russia. Accordingly,
the main objective of migration policy is in the words of Konstantin
Romodanovsky, director of the Federal Migration Service, "make sure profit from
migration exceeds the costs."
Questions of migration also came up in the presidential election, despite the
lack of pre-election debates and discussions. On February 7, the Prime Minister
and presidential candidate Vladimir Putin said that he does not support
introducing a visa regime with the republics of the former USSR. Meanwhile,
presidential candidate and businessman Mikhail Prokhorov has called for the
closure of the borders between Russia and Central Asian countries and the
introduction of a visa system.
One reason for the lack of more disagreement among the candidates is that the
energies of the opposition were not directed toward candidates but the movement
"For Fair Elections" in which the nationalists also took part in meetings on
February 4 in at least in 20 cities.
Nationalists also help rallies particular to their interests. A notable event
was the public right-wing campaign "Mirzayev must be in prison!" held in four
cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, on February 18. The reason for
organizing these events was the decision of a court to free athlete Rasul
Mirzaev, accused of the murder of 19-year-old Ivan Agafonov.
In Moscow, according to various estimates, from 150 to 600 people gathered at
the rally, and after its completion, some participants formed a convoy and
headed to Manejnaya Square, chanting anti-Caucasian and other slogans and
attacking those they passed who were not of Slavic appearance.
Nationalists were further angered by the dismissal of the Supreme Court of the
appeal against the life sentencing of Alexei Vojvodin, the leader of the
neo-Nazi group that carried out assassinations and attacks on foreigners in St.
Petersburg. Specifically, he is charged with organizing the murder of
anti-fascist anthropologist Nikolai Girenko in 2004.
In worse news for human rights organizations and LGBT groups, on February 29,
deputies of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly adopted a bill to ban "the
propaganda of homosexuality and pedophilia among minors." Those who are found
promoting homosexual activities among youth will be fined $16,000.
Unfortunately, the governor did not direct his efforts toward preventing violent
crime. In February, according to the SOVA Center, as a result of racist and
neo-Nazi attacks,  at least 12 people were injured, two of which (a native of
Central Asia from St.Peterburg and anti-fascist Nikita Kalinin from Samara) have
died. Violent incidents were reported in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladimir,
Volgograd, Moscow and the Samara regions.
Such extreme actions may be supported by a sizable portion of the Russian
people. On the eve of presidential elections the Public Opinion Foundation
conducted a study which showed that the slogan "Russia - for Russians" is
supported by a minority of respondents (11%). The same number supports the
actions of Nazi skinheads (10%).
Still, the Federal list of extremist materials was updated four times. Its
number increased from 1074 to 1081 and includes materials from the radical
Islamist sites hunafa.com and djamaattakbir.com, leaflets by "Hizb ut-Tahrir",
and the book "Russian World Order" by science fiction writer Yuri Petuhov.

http://ucsj.org/2012/03/11/report-racism-in-russia-february-2012/
-----

Zyuganov - power to the people?
By Yulia Ponomareva
Moscow News, 27/02/2012

Transforming the theory of convergence of Communism and capitalism into reality,
the current leader of Russian Communists, Gennady Zyuganov, rides a BMW 7 to
work every day. In modern Russia, it's a cross the chief of a parliamentary
party has to bear.
"The presidential directorate, which provides cars to the Duma, just won't
accept any other options or solutions," Zyuganov told Echo Moskvy back in 2010.
To make his cross even heavier, the presidential directorate equipped Zyuganov's
car with a blue flashing light, commonly known as a migalka, making him the only
Communist to have one of the most abhorrent privileges on busy Moscow roads -
the right of way.
Speaking of cross bearing, arguably the world's main cross bearer could not even
dream of how highly atheists would speak of his legacy as he took his burden to
Calvary. But Zyuganov seems set to dismantle every stereotype. "The Code of the
Builder of Communism [a list of a Communist's principles issued in 1961] is an
adapted Sermon on the Mount," he argued at a recent meeting with the creative
intelligentsia at Falanster bookstore in Moscow.
Zyuganov, who holds a doctorate in philosophy, artfully fends off
straightforward questions about his attitude towards religion. He told
Kommersant last week that that he believes in "the country, people, talents, and
blisters that labor gives."
Another sensitive question Zyuganov often has to face at his 67 years of age is
why he seems averse to the idea of giving way to younger Communist leaders after
losing three presidential elections. "Men are ageless," Zyuganov told
Kommersant. "Age is a state of the soul."
Zyuganov takes proper care not only of his soul but the body as well working out
for 40 minutes or walking five to seven kilometers every day. A professional
mountain climber, Zyuganov has climbed the Caucasus' highest peak, Mount Elbrus,
six times.
He plays sports, cards and even billiards, which he could probably make money on
in case he is ever out of the Duma. "That who can't play the billiards, tennis,
volleyball and preferans has robbed his old age," he says on his official
website.
Still, Zyuganov believes that he already is rich. "I have eight grandchildren. I
have met my commitments to the state in full in this sense," he told Kommersant,
as a means of stinging one of his opponents, billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov.
"Prokhorov is still is a bachelor at 47," Zyuganov says. "He hasn't given birth
to anyone, hasn't heard children's laughter… How can someone like that run for
president?"
His main opponent, Vladimir Putin, can expect to be deprived of presidential
immunity as soon as Zyuganov becomes president. However, Zyuganov abstains from
accusing Putin of being corrupt himself. "There's his gang that steals
wantonly," he told author Sergei Minayev in an interview.
In case elected president, Zyuganov will stay in power for six years calling
early Duma elections on Dec. 1, 2012, which was one of the demands put forward
by protesters at Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue. Zyuganov himself never
turned up to the rallies stating that he supports their demands, however.
"We sent our party member, Oleg Smolin to Sakharov but he was never given the
floor," Zyuganov told Minayev as a means of explaining his absence from popular
protest rallies.
Even though the leaders of the protest movement may have hurt his feelings and
the feelings of his fellow party members, Zyuganov sees some of them in his
future government. Alexei Navalny, for instance, could be invited to work at the
Accounting Chamber.
Under President Zyuganov, Russia can expect extensive nationalization. "We'll
hold a national referendum on the nationalization of the mining industries,
railroads, gas pipelines, military industries and the liquor industry," he told
Kommersant.
However, Russian oligarchs are likely to avoid being prosecuted for the
loans-for-shares auctions of the 1990's. "I won't settle old scores," Zyuganov
told Minayev.
Yet it may be that as a candidate, Zyuganov has the right to look back at the
"wild 90's" with some fondness - it was back in 1996 that he got his highest
result ever in a presidential election that famously saw Boris Yeltsin using the
support of independent candidate Alexander Lebed in order to win.

http://www.themoscownews.com/politics/20120227/189493693.html
--------------

Candidates exploit nationalism in Russia poll
By: Christopher True
Al Jazeera, March 1, 2012

MOSCOW: Dmitry Dyomushkin held forth on his ultra-nationalist views, sitting in
a cafe in Merino, a rundown suburb in the south of Moscow.
He had founded the Slavic Union, called the Slavyansky Soyuz, or "SS", in 1999.
The organisation was banned by the Moscow City court in April last year, saying
it promoted a nationalistic supremacy similar to the ideology of Nazi Germany.
Asked if he supported the views of Adolf Hitler, he side-steps a direct answer.
But he does say he believes that former Soviet republics with majority Muslim
populations, such as Chechnya and Ingushetia, should be thrown out of the
Russian Federation.
Scores of his supporters have been arrested for hate crimes and several are
serving life sentences for murder.
Dyomushkin says his organisation is mainly concerned with the rights of Russians
in Russia and tackling growing immigration, particularly from the Caucasus.
More than a million migrant workers come to Russia each year, mainly from
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Caucasus seeking a better life and work
conditions.
Many of them stay in the country illegally, sending much of their wages back to
their homelands.
While Dyomushkin represents the unpalatable side of nationalism in Russia, many
of his sentiments are widely shared among Russians.
Several polls show about 60 per cent of the country's people agree with the
sentiment "Russia for the Russians".
Some flats in Moscow have signs reading: "I only rent to Russians."
Many Muscovites complain of people from Azerbaijan holding a monopoly on the
capital's street markets and people from Armenia taking all of the construction
jobs.
Several of the candidates running in Russia's March 4 presidential election have
looked to profit from this growing anger and subsequent support for the far
right by hardening their views on immigration and adopting an increasingly
nationalistic tone.
Ethnic affiliations
In January, Vladimir Putin, Russia 's prime minister who is running for a third
term of president, suggested closing the door for up to 10 years to migrants who
have repeatedly violated Russia's migration laws.
Russia has a visa-free agreement with most former Soviet republics and Putin
said that he realised that many illegal migrants get extradited from Russia and
then "go home at our expense and come back".
Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist Party's candidate, has called for a plan to
reinstate ethnic affiliations in Russian passports.
During the Soviet Union this "nationality" category was used to facilitate
discrimination against Chechens, ethnic Germans and Jews in Russia.
In a televised debate on Wednesday, Mikhail Prokhorov, the only independent
candidate in the race, called for stricter border controls and visa regulation
to prevent illegal immigration.
'Stop feeding the Caucasus'
Many Russians have also become increasingly angry about the vast amounts of
money the central government continues to spend in regions on the fringes of its
territory.
Several billion dollars have been spent in the northern Caucasus alone, while
Russians argue that funds are lacking for education and healthcare in their own
country.
In September, far-right groups launched a campaign under the slogan "Stop
feeding the Caucasus!" against what they said was the "excessive" financial
support for the region.
The campaign, which saw rallies in several of Russia's main cities, was
organised by nationalist groups, the Russian Public Movement and the Russian
Civil Union.
The slogan was in fact invented by Alex Navalny, the anti-corruption blogger
seen by many as the informal leader of the protest movement that has flowered in
the last few months in Russia.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the presidential candidate of the nationalist Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia, is using the "Russia for Russians" slogan to find
support for an end to the billions of dollars being sent to the Caucasus.
Zhirinovsky has also distributed 12 million copies of a brochure in which he
says the government "takes money from the pocket of the working Ivan and gives
it to the bandit Mohammed, who cuts Ivan up in pieces and buys himself a third
Mercedes".
The Liberal Democratic Party took 12.5 per cent of the vote in parliamentary
elections in December.
Speaking to Al Jazeera, Tanya Lokshina, deputy director of Human Rights Watch's
Moscow office, said: "It is considered acceptable for public officials to make
xenophobic statements, as long as they are not considered inflammatory, I mean
they wouldn't call for murder, and that in itself has quite an impact on the
public at large."
Soviet suppression
The recent historical roots of Russia's increasing nationalism and
anti-immigration views are easy to plot, as are the Kremlin's previous attempts
to gain advantage from them.
During the days of the Soviet Union, nationalist views were suppressed - both
the Russian feelings about the smaller republics and the aspirations of those
republics themselves.
Following the collapse of Communism, many of these frustrations were set free
and far-right groups began to gather supporters, exercising their new found
freedoms.
Groups such as the Slavic Union complained that the Russian people, the "elder
brother" nation during Soviet times, were increasingly being put at a
disadvantage by their younger upstarts.
Under Putin's second term as president, from 2004, the number of members of
far-right groups increased significantly, as did their attacks on immigrants.
Worried about the Orange Revolution taking place in Ukraine, where a campaign of
civil disobedience brought about a re-run of a widely discredited presidential
vote, Putin turned a blind eye to such attacks.
Many attacks on immigrants, including murders, were not recorded as hate crimes
and police were discouraged from following up cases.
Speaking to Al Jazeera, Vera Alperovich, a researcher at the Moscow-based Sova
Centre, which conducts research and informational work on nationalism and
racism, says the far-right groups began to see themselves as "untouchable".
Unsurprisingly, the attacks increased until 2008 when the government saw the
far-right groups as being more dangerous than any benefits they could bring to
defending the state.
As a result, between 2009 and 2010, nearly all the main protagonists were
arrested and the number of hate crimes dropped dramatically.
However, Lokshina says the action came too late and far-right groups had become
a well organised and entrenched part of Russian society.
Dangerous game
In the last couple of years, Putin, who is widely expected to win Sunday's vote,
has again changed course, attempting to woo nationalist sentiments.
In December 2010, Putin laid flowers on the grave of a Spartak Moscow football
fan, Yegor Sviridov, who was shot dead in a fight with migrants from the North
Caucasus region earlier that month.
The incident had sparked race-hate riots and ethnic clashes across Russia,
including a violence between more than 5,000 football supporters and police
outside walls of the Kremlin.
Lokshina says Putin's gesture was widely seen as being as supportive of Russian
nationalist values over those of non-Russians.
Speaking in January, Putin said: "Russia is not going to close itself off from
the outside world but we must by all means toughen our migration policy,
including labor migration regulations."
The prime minister also said that from 2013, immigrants should be subject to
immigration status examinations on Russian language, history, literature and
civics.
Pandering to nationalistic instincts, it seems, is in vogue in the run up to the
polls.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/russianelections/2012/03/201231625364\
48660.html
-----

Communist Kremlin hopeful looks to a new generation
By: Thomas Grove
Reuters, March 2, 2012

NOVOMOSKOVSK, Russia (Reuters) - A flashy campaign advertisement sets the scene
after Russia's presidential election: Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov
steps out of a black Mercedes in front of the Kremlin, the seat of power since
Soviet times.
After three failed attempts to win the presidency, the perennial loser of
Russian politics is trying to convince the country once again to vote him into
the top office in Sunday's election.
Addressing the frustration of many Russians who feel powerless to end Vladimir
Putin's dominance, a voiceover in the advertisement asks: "No choice?"
"There is always a choice," it says, flashing to footage of the stern-faced
Communist leader.
Zyuganov has fed off of the largest protests Putin has faced in his 12-year
rule, seeking support from young voters who do not remember the Soviet Union or
his past failures and simply refuse to vote for Putin's third term in office.
He says he is injecting new life into the ranks of a party which until recently
has evoked images of poor pensioners nostalgic for the days of Soviet glory,
waving red flags and clutching portraits of Stalin.
"We have the youngest, strongest and most dynamic team in the whole country,"
Zyuganov told a packed hall at a university in the small western city of
Novomoskovsk, on St. Tatiana's Day, celebrated as student's day in Russia.
"And the youth stand behind us," said the 67-year-old former physics and
mathematics teacher.
Zyuganov, who climbed the rungs of power as an apparatchik in the Soviet Union's
Communist Party, is forecast by pollsters to come a distant second to Putin, who
hopes to avoid a runoff by winning more than 50 percent of the vote.
He has to fight off his image as a pushover, a willing cog in Putin's political
system who is satisfied with second place as long as he and his party retain a
swathe of seats in parliament, where the Communists are the second-largest
faction.
Zyuganov denies it. He says he was first cheated out of an election win in 1996,
when an ailing President Boris Yeltsin staged a stunning comeback and beat him
in a runoff after a campaign marred by corruption allegations.
The other three candidates challenging Putin face similar suspicions.
"Zyuganov himself wouldn't know what to do if he woke up on March 5 and found
out that the country had made him Russia's new president," said one of his young
advocates, also a lawmaker.
In a country that preserves Bolshevik Revolution leader Vladimir Lenin's body on
show in a tomb outside the Kremlin but still struggles with the legacy of 70
years of Communist rule, the inroads Zyuganov has made with young people
represent a sea change for a party that had seemed destined to die out with a
generation.
WHITE RIBBONS, RED RIBBONS
Shivering in a light snow on a Sunday afternoon, Dmitry Usoltsev, 20, stood on
Moscow's Garden Ring road with thousands of others protesting against Putin and
his decision to return to the Kremlin.
Born the year after the Soviet Union collapsed, he said neither of his parents
ever voted for the Communists, but for him, Zyuganov and his platform is the
only way to reform.
"I want a system that isn't afraid of reforms and can carry them out. Putin
can't do this because he's afraid," said Usoltsev, wearing a white ribbon - a
symbol of the protests.
"In the current political climate, I'm voting for Zyuganov, because he actually
has realistic and oncrete measures that can reform the court system, the
military, the education system,"
the law student said.
The biggest opposition protests in Putin's Russia were sparked after a December
election gave Putin's United Russia party a parliamentary majority despite
widespread allegations of electoral fraud.
Putin became prime minister in 2008 after eight years as president. Sunday's
election is expected to see him return to the country's most powerful position.
Zyuganov says his party was cheated out of an election victory in the December 4
poll and he has aligned himself cautiously with the protesters. He has avoided
participating in the protests themselves, but has joined their calls for a rerun
of the December vote.
Sergei Udaltsov, a scrappy street protester who leads the Left Front opposition
group, has publicly supported him.
The barrel-chested, bass-voiced Communist leader also inked a deal with one of
the chief protest leaders, anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, to take
responsibility for thousands of citizens who have signed up to monitor the
presidential election for fraud.
Not everyone, however, accepts the politician who has a bust of Lenin in his
office and has published books on the achievements of Soviet dictator Josef
Stalin's brutal reign.
A SOVIET MIX
In Novomoskovsk, a city of 130,000 some 200 km (120 miles) south of Moscow,
Zyuganov mixed a message of rejuvenation with rhetoric heavy on references to
Soviet glory.
During the Soviet era, the city throve on chemical manufacturing and industrial
farming.
With employment dropping and young people leaving for bigger cities to seek
jobs, Novomoskovsk is a prime target for Zyuganov's efforts to win over part of
Putin's provincial electorate.
Addressing students, he promised to nationalize Russia's oil and gas companies,
reform the education system and spread more equally the vast wealth that many
Russians believe to be concentrated among Putin's circle of friends.
The message holds an attraction for some who have never experienced the Soviet
Union but have heard of the security it once provided.
"If Zyuganov wins he would increase production at factories, he will provide
jobs. People wouldn't move to Moscow to find work if there were worthwhile jobs
here," said Sergei Vasilkov, 21, a student at the institute.
"Our city is standing empty. There's no work. The young people are going to
Moscow, and the only people who are left are pensioners and alcoholics, everyone
else is gone."

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/02/us-russia-election-communist-idUSTRE82\
10EJ20120302
-----

The Man Vladimir Putin Fears Most:
Alexei Navalny, the rising star of Russia's opposition, on his political
strategy and why the latest czar is 'trapped' by power.
By: Matthew Kaminski
Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2012

Moscow - The outcome is a foregone conclusion. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,
Russia's paramount ruler since 2000, will reclaim his old job as president in
Sunday's elections. The drama comes in the aftermath.
Anticorruption blogger and activist Alexei Navalny will be in the middle of
it-as he has been over the past three months of Russia's unexpected political
awakening. By the tens of thousands, Russians shed their fear and apathy to
protest December's fraud-ridden parliamentary elections and Mr. Putin's hold on
power. From a crowded stage of opposition figures, Mr. Navalny has emerged as
the charismatic and fresh face of the movement.
The next phase will test him and the opposition. The series of large
demonstrations after December exposed the shallowness of support for Mr. Putin
in the large cities and public frustration with the political stagnation and
lack of accountability in Russia. Yet the rallies forced no notable government
concessions. Though weakened, Mr. Putin gets a new term and possibly energy to
reverse his slide or to crack down.
Among the opposition, Mr. Navalny has carved out the harder line. He says it's
time to "escalate" with regular protests, a permanent encampment in downtown
Moscow, and maybe calls for nationwide strikes. "We need a real tent city in the
heart of Moscow," he says. The opposition wants political reforms, including the
return of direct elections for governors and easing rules on political parties,
and elections for a new Duma next year and for president in 2014.
"All our protests were very kind of friendly," Mr. Navalny says. "I'm not going
to appeal to violence or aggression-of course not. But the mood of the protests
should be more and more political. It's not just about the fun, hipster stuff.
It has to be a kind of real political protest. The Kremlin should understand
these tens of thousands of people will never leave the streets. We will never
consider Putin as a president with legitimacy."
As the authorities here know, protests and the occupation of public spaces were
used in Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and last year's uprisings in Egypt and
Tunisia to depose authoritarian rulers. Suggesting the depth of official
paranoia, Moscow police earlier this week rounded up a few activists in a car
who turned up in the city center to pass out free tents, keeping them in jail
overnight.
Escalation carries risks for the opposition. Confrontation with police and the
Kremlin's Nashi youth shock troops may scare away middle-class Muscovites who
pinned white ribbons to their coats and joined in the winter's protests.
Some would prefer to start small to revive Russia's experiment with democracy,
running candidates in local elections and building new parties. Some want
compromises with the authorities, who might look to co-opt parts of the
movement. Not Mr. Navalny, who says any change will be "driven by 1% of the
population, the politically active part, which lives in the capital," and sees
no other option to force the Kremlin's hand.
To start it off, the anti-Putin coalition wanted to hold a Monday evening rally
on Lubyanka, down the street from Red Square. As we talk on Thursday night, an
aide enters to tell Mr. Navalny that the city and his opposition colleagues have
agreed instead to use Pushkin Square. He makes a sour face and bites his tongue.
Mr. Navalny wanted it in the center of town, but to keep everyone happy he won't
criticize the decision.
The Kremlin acts as if it fears Mr. Navalny most of all the dissident figures.
Websites and television stations friendly to the regime have tried to smear him
as a CIA operative or Hitler-like nationalist. His emails were hacked into and
published. He is the sole opposition leader still barred from state-controlled
television.
"I'm on the very blackest part of the black list," says Mr. Navalny. When
television host and Putin family friend Ksenia Sobchak invited him on her
popular show on Russian MTV, it was yanked off the air-everyone presumes on
government orders. "Sometimes it seems to me that there is a small crazy guy in
the Kremlin who works for me," Mr. Navalny jokes. "Relatively few people watch
such shows. But because they banned it, there are millions of Russians now who
wonder, 'Who is he? Why do they fear him so much?'"
Mr. Navalny, who is 35 years old, leads no party. He oversees a staff of 11 and
works from an office of four rooms and barren walls off the Moscow ring road. A
couple of young men sit behind laptops and work on his latest civic Internet
initiative to register election monitors for Sunday's vote. The Kremlin barred
credible challengers and put Mr. Putin up against several stalking horses. Yet
election day won't come without suspense. Thousands of people in big cities are
going to fan out to prevent and document the fraud everyone expects will be
needed to assure Mr. Putin his first-round victory.
Russia last saw this level of civic engagement in the late glasnost years of the
Soviet Union. Many of the people behind the current protests have no memory of
it. Until recently, opposition politics was the province of marginal activists
and Moscow intellectuals beaten down by 12 years of Mr. Putin's "sovereign
democracy."
Yet in a matter of weeks, politics went mainstream, even cool. How much so is
shown by the presence of Ms. Sobchak, a 30-year-old who runs her own fashion
line, at the rallies: The so-called "Paris Hilton of Moscow" is the daughter of
the former St. Petersburg mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, who was Mr. Putin's mentor.
"It's a very positive sign when all this establishment-the TV people, the
writers-who enjoyed life in the Putin years are now escaping it," says Mr.
Navalny. "They're deserters."
The Internet virtually created the Navalny phenomenon. Trained as a lawyer, he
got into politics through the liberal Yabloko (or Apple) party. He missed out on
the politics of the 1990s, a toxic decade of economic chaos. In contrast with
older, less popular opposition figures like Boris Nemtsov or Mikhail Kasyanov
who served in government, he brings no baggage from that time.
Mr. Navalny dabbled with youth and nationalist groups in the 2000s. Nothing took
off. He then found a calling and voice as an anticorruption activist. He bought
small stakes in large companies and tried to invoke shareholder rights to open
their books. Another effort involves looking into government procurement
contracts to find fraud. In Russia, poking into corruption is a serious health
risk.
Mr. Navalny publicized his findings on his LiveJournal blog, which has become
one of the most popular blogs in Russia. His writing style in posts and tweets
is personal, emotional and direct. He can turn a phrase, and stuck the memorable
"party of crooks and thieves" label on the ruling United Russia Party. He also
brings a common touch, rare among the Moscow liberal crowd, to his public
speaking.
Internet entrepreneur Anton Nossik says the Web offered "a platform for
samizdat." It freed Mr. Navalny in another sense, providing an easy way to raise
money directly and quickly online. Other NGOs have since adopted his funding
model.
Three days before the elections, Mr. Navalny fields calls at his office. Wearing
blue jeans and a blue shirt, he has an easy charm about him in his confident
English. He is saltier in Russian. Mr. Navalny spent a semester at Yale as a
"world fellow" in 2010, which Kremlin propagandists say was part of an American
"program to initiate an 'orange coup' in Russia."
It would be inaccurate to say that Mr. Navalny leads the movement, which
includes many different faces from the worlds of media, art, business and
politics. There are also concerns voiced about his "nationalist tendencies." He
clashed with opposition leaders to let ultra-nationalist speakers on stage at
the rallies. He has called for a visa requirement for people from Central Asia
and said that ethnic Russians are mistreated in neighboring ex-Soviet republics.
Yet for now, the nationalism seems to be worn lightly, and if anything is a
political asset. "The left liberals thought it was dangerous to talk about such
things-that it will bring problems because it will touch the dark side of the
Russian soul, and all that sort of stuff, but it's totally bull-," he says.
"People in their kitchens discuss such problems. That's why I am supported more
widely [than they are] because I discuss these problems."
Others question his tactical judgment. He provoked the police into arresting him
after the first large rally in December. In jail for 15 days, he missed an
opportunity to submit an application to run for president. He says it was
pointless; the Kremlin would have disallowed his candidacy.
The Kremlin faces its own tough choices. Barring an Egypt-style overthrow, any
transition from Mr. Putin to someone new may have to include security guarantees
for him and his family. Previous leader Boris Yeltsin negotiated such an
arrangement with Mr. Putin. But the former KGB colonel could also "escalate," to
use Mr. Navalny's word, the confrontation with the opposition.
Against Mr. Navalny's office wall sits a large framed photograph of two men
smiling and shaking hands: Libya's late Moammar Gadhafi and Vladimir Putin. It
is a gift from a real-estate mogul who relies on the Kremlin for his good
fortune but has turned against Mr. Putin. "The guy told me, 'the worst enemy is
the former friend,'" says Mr. Navalny.
'Putin did a lot of good stuff from 1999 until 2003," he says, referring to Mr.
Putin's early years, when the economy recovered and some reforms were
introduced. But it's the high price of oil that has kept the economy going and
notably enriched a clique of Putin friends from St. Petersburg. "People don't
believe in positive changes anymore. It's 20 years that he wants to keep
absolute power. It's obvious now that his system of power is based on
corruption, and people around him depend only on money and corruption."
As his popularity has slid, Mr. Putin's rhetoric has hardened. Earlier this
week, he said the opposition would fake evidence of electoral fraud to embarrass
him-maybe even kill one of their leaders. Mr. Putin also was badly rattled by
the Arab uprising, most of all Gadhafi's fall and murder.
Pointing to the dead Libyan leader in the photograph, Mr. Navalny says, "The
history of this guy drives [Putin] crazy. He thinks the only way for him to be
alive and healthy and rich is to be president. It's a big problem for us. This
guy is trapped."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203986604577257321601811092.html
-----

The Lord of the Crowd
By Alya Kirillova
Das Magazin, 4 March 2012

Last week we had Alexey Navalny at Hard Day's Night show. He is Russia's famous
opposition blogger fighting against corruption. Two days before I twitted that
"we have @navalny this Tuesday, I hope this wouldn't be my last show". My tweet
has been retweetet many times. Why? Navalny is very popular now and the last
time, when he came to any TV show, the best thing happened with this show is
that it hasn't been aired, or, how it happened with Kseniya Sobchak's TV show on
MTV, were canceled by MTV.  I remember his speech at Prospect Saharova rally.
Also I remember a guy who has spoken before Alexey Navalny. Some Nazi. I didn't
know his name, and I was trying to ask someone, but nobody had an answer or the
answer was: "Eeemmm some Nazi… we don't know." This Nazi was very aggressive and
shouting something about Russian people, sovereign Russia… He was very loud, I
had the feeling that he wanted to be heard in Siberia. In the last 3 minutes he
became hoarse, and that was a prize for all of us.  Next speaker was Navalny,
now, with his famous "YES OR NO" speech. I was in the crowd and I remember that
feeling while he was speaking from the stage some people were supporting him
with every word, like "We are the state" YEEEAAAAA, or "We will go out to the
streets, yeeaaaahhh"… Other people were listening to Navalny very carefully but
they didn't rush to play along with him. So, me too. I don't trust Alexey
Navalny, I don't support him.  No doubt, he is the most powerful person I saw
for the last time in opposite Russia. He is very smart, young, very attractive
person and very thought-out politician. As you know, he didn't run for the
president of Russian Federation, which I think is a very smart and thought-out
politician decision.  Some people think this is Navalny playing with Nazism;
that this is his way of coopting the contingent the Kremlin has used to scare
average people. (Remember Manezhka? Over 10 000 Nazis came out for their action
in December 2010, and look at this video, they are just trying to kill people
right in subway. This is the 21 century, and last year it happened!) Others
don't see anything problematic in Navalny's marching alongside fascists. Still
others - the fascists themselves - accept him as their own. It's interesting
that Navalny is the one person who tries to unite the un-unitable: the
intelligentsia and the fascists. And both groups think he's one of theirs.  We
had our yearly final TV show, we took 8 persons of the year and made 8 big
stories about them. And one of those people was Alexey Navalny. I am as a video
director of these stories, and I can tell you, Alexey Navalny's story was my
favorite. I didn't take a time do decide what should I do for visualisation. I
was pretty sure, after his speech I had only one association. I don't want to
explain it to you, I would like to show you my video. You don't have to
understand in Russian, to see what I was trying to say with my visualisation. 
Lord of the crowd. I don't trust him, I argue with my friends about him, but I
can't help this feeling that Navalny is a very power-hungry and authoritarian
politician. Last week he has been here, at my tv show. He looks out very
attractive, emits sexuality, he is very confident and very pleased with himself.
He is happy. Speaks only on the case, precisely, clearly.  Yes, he talks maybe
the right things, but I was very confused, when we asked Alexei Navalny about
his nationalist "flirting". He answered with aggression: "I don't care what
people say. If somewhere some liberal publicist would write something about me,
I don't care! I know what I'm doing, and I know many people who support me in my
way."  This is very interesting. Just imagine, Navalny is our president. some
part of society doesn't agree with his policy, some liberal publicists writes
articles about his policy, whole Facebook and Twitter asks him to change
something, and what kind of reaction would be expected? "I don't care! I know
what I'm doing"? It reminds me on Putin's reaction. About Bolotnaya and our
white ribbons Putin said: The first thought he gets in his mind about these
white ribbons - condoms. Yes, condoms, the first thing in his mind was that
60'000 people wearing condoms on their breasts. And also he says: "People are
protesting, this is their right, but I know, that only my way is right. I know
many people, who support me!"  Definitely Navalny looks out like a future
president of Russian Federation. It seems this is in Russian blood to choose
such an authoritarian leader. Probably after 20 years my son will go out to the
streets with slogan: "Navalny go away yourself!"

http://blog.dasmagazin.ch/2012/03/04/the-lord-of-the-crowd/
-----------------------

Will Russia Become a Democracy?
By Andreas Umland
Ballots and Bullets, 4 March 2012

The Russian democratic tradition goes back at least as far as December 1825 when
a group of young Russian aristocrats, who became known as "the Decembrists,"
unsuccessfully tried to end Russian autocracy. This democratic tradition was, in
the 19th century and early 20th century, continued by the Westernizers (and,
partly, even by the Slavophiles), social revolutionaries, social democrats
(Mensheviki), as well as constitutional democrats of the declining Tsarist
regime. During Soviet rule, the Men of the Sixties ("shestidesiatniki") within
the Soviet intellectual elite, the anti-Soviet human rights activists of the
1960s-1970s, and so-called "informals" of the glasnost-induced Soviet civic
movement of the late 1980s helped to prepare Russia's democratization that
started, around 1990, as a result of Gorbachev's perestroika. Most of the older
activists of the current protest movement were either themselves members or have
been inspired by the ideas, spirit and activities of this earlier generation of
the late Soviet and early post-Soviet democrats. Symbolically, the 24 December
2011 demonstration (see picture) took place on a Moscow street named after
Andrei Sakharov - Soviet Russia's most prominent human rights activist who,
shortly before his death, played some role in bringing down the communist system
in 1989.
While the historical rootedness of the current protests may look encouraging,
the actual history of the Russian democratic movement, however, is not. Whether
in 1825, 1905-1918 or 1987-1999 - all of Russia's democratization attempts have
ultimately failed miserably. The current re-democratization drive may become
victim to factors similar to those which subverted, for instance, Gorbachev's
and Yeltsin's introduction of political pluralism: disunity among the liberals,
anti-Western paranoia, and imperial nationalism.
First, today, as in the early 1990s, Russia's democratic movement may turn out
to have too many rather than too few charismatic leaders. A possible strategy of
the ancient regime during upcoming elections may be to register several
pro-liberal candidates who would split the liberal vote among themselves. This
would, as in previous post-Soviet Russian elections, ensure that the most
serious alternative to the Putin and his "United Russia" party may again become
the communists, e.g. as in previous presidential elections, CPRF chairman
Gennady Zyuganov. One could, for instance, imagine a situation, in which Putin
will have to stand in a second round facing Zyuganov who may have gotten fewer
votes in the first round than the sum of the votes for liberal or semi-liberal
candidates taken together. Whether this will happen or not, one fears that - as
in 1917 or the 1990s - Russia's democratic movement will again become victim to
its disunity, and the personal ambitions of its leaders.
Second, paranoia with regard to the West may again undermine Russian
democratization. NATO's expansion to the East as well as bombing of Serbia were
factors that weakened the pro-Western Russian liberals who, in considerable
numbers, turned themselves against the West in the late 1990s. What was overseen
at this time was that the major driving force for NATO expansion was less
American eagerness to include into NATO, for instance, the Baltic states than
these countries' pressure on the West to become parts of the Atlantic alliance.
In August 2008, Russia demonstrated in Georgia vividly what exactly the Baltic
countries had been afraid of, and why they had been so insistent to become parts
of the Western defence community. Without NATO enlargement, we might have gotten
by today not only a pseudo-state called Republic of South Ossetia, but perhaps
also "The Free City of Narva."
Russian hysteria about NATO's bombardment of Serbia was in 1999 already strange
as the air raids were, to significant degree, carried out by German, French and
Italian war planes, i.e. done by countries with which Russia was trying to build
special relationships, at the same time. The whole episode looks bizarre today:
Serbia has now for months been knocking loudly at the doors of the European
Union demanding entry, Serbia's President Boris Tadic and European Commission
President Jose Manuel Barroso can be seen here on the right. Although several
member countries of the Union had been bombing Serbian military targets some 12
years ago.
Anti-Westernism, in particular anti-Americanism, is still a major current in the
Russian collective psyche, in particular in intellectual discourse. It was a
major source of legitimacy for pre-revolutionary Tsarism (in spite of Russia
then being an ally of France and Britain), Soviet communism, and neo-Soviet
Putinism. Post-Soviet fear of a possible Western subversion of Russian identity
and sovereignty will most probably be used by both, the official nationalists in
the ancient regime, and extra-parliamentary ultra-nationalist groups to attack
the liberal movement and question its patriotism. We may soon observe that
anti-Westernism becomes the basis for a rapprochement between Russia's
authoritarian state and "uncivil society," meaning the multitude of
semi-political Russian groupings that are impregnated with, or propagate openly,
racist, xenophobic, fundamentalist, occultist, differentialist, ethnocentric,
or/and similar ideas.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, Russia's imperial temptation could become
a major challenge to the new Russian democratization. Will the December 2011
protesters of the White Revolution fully accept the independence and sovereignty
of the former Soviet republics, above all of Ukraine and Belarus?
The historical namesakes of Russia's today would-be revolutionaries, the
Decembrists of 1825 as well as the Whites of 1918-1922 were unable to discard
the imperial paradigm. The historical Whites, for instance, remained mostly
staunchly imperial nationalists. They insisted, during their Civil War against
the Bolsheviks, that Russia should be "united and undivided." By that, the
Whites meant that the national minorities in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and
Central Asia would not gain independence, but continue to belong to the Russian
empire. A popular saying in Ukraine since then has been that "Russian democracy
ends where Ukraine's independence begins." Will Russia's new revolutionaries
resist the imperial temptation, focus on their own country, and let the other
post-Soviet nations go? Will democratic leadership manage to prevent
ultra-nationalists form hijacking the current protest movement, and from leading
the upheaval ad absurdum?
Russia's old elites before and after the October Revolution, the CPSU
apparatchiks of the Soviet stagnation period of the 1970s-1980s, and Putin's
team during the last years failed, in their own ways. Yet, the declines of
Russia's authoritarian regimes were also fundamentally similar. These descents
all happened against the background of Russia's rulers' excessive attention to
the outside world rather than to problems at home. The Russian White
revolutionaries of the early 21st century would be well-advised not to step in
the same trap as the Whites of the early 20th century. They should concentrate
themselves on, and they should turn Russia's attention to, her own problems.
Russia will become a law-ruled democracy once it stops seeing herself as a
civilizational centre engaged in a geopolitical struggle beyond her borders.
Once the Russians discard the mirages of "The Third Rome" and imperial
greatness, they will finally become free.

http://nottspolitics.org/2012/03/04/will-russia-become-a-democracy/
---------------------

United Russia, Dividing Russia
By: Maxim Edwards
The Independent, blog, March 4, 2012

Putin's United Russia cannot have become more divisive since December's
Parliamentary elections, which reminded the Kremlin in the rudest possible terms
that Russia is indeed a Federation. Uniting Russia, whether Russia wants it or
not, heavy-handed centralisation was the name of the game until the extent of
the party's dependence on country's Republics - its autonomous, non-Russian
regions - was revealed.
The cancellation of elections for regional governors in 2004 and the Chechen
President's controversial call that Republics' Presidents be renamed 'Heads'
were just two examples of true Federalism fading away, as fleeting as the
invisible ink on a ballot from Chuvashia (perhaps the most bizarre antic from
December's elections). Derided by populist, far right groups such as
Zhirinovsky's paradoxically named Liberal Democratic Party- Russia's Republics
have often been run through regional strongmen, using loyalty to Moscow to
preserve their generous levels of autonomy.
In Chechnya, more votes than the number of registered voters were cast for the
ruling party, so popular was it in the region. The Republics of Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan and Mordovia polled 78%, 71% and 91% respectively whilst Russian
regions such as Yaroslavl and Kostroma, just 29% and 30% each. This is a party
which finds itself in the unenviable position of having to cater both to
ethnically non-Russian Republics on whose support it is now much more dependent,
and ethnic Russian nationalism. Putin's open letter to Russia's Nezavisimaya
Gazeta on Russia's inter-ethnic relations was a nod to everybody yet a promise
to nobody- declaring a near complete U-turn on many of the earlier centralist
policies towards the Republics, whilst declaring the ethnic Russian people the
glue which holds the Federation together.
In Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan- arguably Russia's gutsiest Republic (during
the 1990s even declaring its laws superior to the Russian Constitution), the
excitement is palpable. Medvedev's declaration that 2012 would be the Year of
Russian History was reacted to by Tatar radical activist Fauzia Bayramova
declaring a Year of Tatar History. Tatar nationalists picketed the Turkish
consulate in Kazan on numerous occasions demanding support for their cause from
Ankara. Tatarstan's repeated attempts to have the Tatar language written in a
Latin script peculiarly similar to Turkish led Moscow to sign a law demanding
all languages in Russia to be written in the Cyrillic alphabet. Within the Kazan
Kremlin stands the enormous Kul Sharif mosque, named in homage to the Imam who
died fighting Ivan the Terrible's forces in 1552. It overshadows the cathedral
built by the Tsar to commemorate his seizure of the city, a key moment in
Russia's early expansion.
The Russian language discerns between the adjectives Rossiysky (from the
territory of Russia) and Russky (ethnically Russian)- and Tatarstan testifies to
the fact that, to the irritation of Russia's right, the two are not yet
synonymous. Russia's economic and foreign policy relies heavily on energy
reserves, and it is surprising that oil-rich Tatarstan, playing with fire, has
not yet got its fingers burnt. Tatar President Rustam Minnikhanov, who has
refused to change his title to 'Head' as is demanded of him, has over the past
month made statements urging support for Putin. It would just be 'insulting' if
Tatarstan did not 'adequately appreciate' everything '[Putin] has done for this
Republic', he told a press conference earlier this month. Often in Russian
politics, lines are there to be read between.
Minnikhanov himself is a protégé of former Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiev, a
powerful figure in Tatarstan and across Russia whose leadership of the region
throughout the turbulent years of the 1990s ensured the oil-based stability
Tatarstan enjoys today. He too is opposed to centralism which would rob the
Republics (and their ruling elites) of many of their powers. Shaimiev, who
recently declared Putin the 'only choice' in elections, has almost universal
acclaim amongst Tatars- Russia's third largest ethnic group.
Ask many Kazan Tatars their opinion of the bureaucrats in Moscow and the venom
flies. They are unpardonable swindlers, corrupt biznesmeny rather than real
politicians. However, Shaimiev, or Mintimer-abi (Daddy Mintimer) as he is
sometimes known, often cannot be worthy of enough praise. Putin, a Russian, will
always be 'one of them', an unpopular Russian bureaucrat. Shaimiev, a Tatar, is
'one of us', a distinction which simply doesn't exist in ethnically Russian
provinces where the leading party has lost credibility. This is the driving
legitimacy behind the leadership of Russia's autonomous regions and the Kremlin
knows it.  The question now is whether the leaders of Russia's Republics will
try and extract concessions in exchange for their continued support. If they do,
and if United Russia falls, would the opposition- who count nationalists among
their number- make regions such as Tatarstan pay more than oil profits?
Putin speaks atrocious Tatar, and if he wants a repeat performance of December's
election from Tatarstan, he should improve his accent. December's elections were
just the dress rehearsal. Leaders like Minnikhanov do not completely control
their Mini-khanates but their say will influence how loyal their Republics
remain to Moscow. Could 2012 see United Russia become a divided party relying on
non-Russian voters? Ivan the Terrible's work, 460 years on, is evidently not
quite finished.

http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2012/03/04/united-russia-dividing-russians/
----

Racism and Xenophobia in February 2012
SOVA Centre for Information and Analysis, March 5, 2012

At least twelve people were injured, and two killed, as a result of racist and
neo-Nazi attacks this February. Violent incidents were reported in Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and the Vladimir, Volgograd, Moscow and Samara regions.
Overall, at least 25 people fell victim to xenophobic violence this year in
Russia, with two of those dying from their injuries.
This month vandals damaged a monument to the victims of Stalin's repressions in
St. Petersburg, and the local Kremlin in Kolomna. Additionally, unknown
individuals in Petersburg threw a homemade explosive device into a local
Uzbek-owned shop. As such, 2012 has seen no fewer than seven acts of xenophobic
vandalism to date.
One notable event was the right-wing public campaign "Mirzayev should be behind
bars!" held in several Russian cities on February 18. The campaign was organized
in response to a Zamoskvoretsky District Court (of Moscow) decision to grant
bail to Rasul Mirzayev, a Dagestani mixed martial artist accused of killing
19-year-old ethnic Russian Ivan Agafonov; the Moscow City Court had reversed the
decision prior to the campaign. About 300 people gathered in Moscow for a
demonstration in connection with the case. After the end of the rally,
participants formed a convoy and headed for Manezh Square, chanting
anti-Caucasian slogans and attacking non-Slavic street cleaners along the way.
Nationalists took a prominent part in the February 4 demonstrations "For Fair
Elections," which took place in many cities across the country.
Two sentences were handed down in February (in St. Petersburg and the Irkutsk
region) for violent crimes where the court recognized the hate motive. The
decisions convicted four people: three received suspended sentences, while one
was sentenced to 13 years in a penal colony.
As such, at least six of these indictments have been levied against nine
individuals so far this year.
In terms of xenophobic propaganda, five sentences were given this month in St.
Petersburg and the Kemerovo, Kursk and Tyumen regions. These processes convicted
five people: two were fined, one received a suspended sentence, one was
sentenced to educational measures, and one to compulsory treatment.
Nine such sentences have condemned 13 individuals since the beginning of the
year.
The Federal List of Extremist Materials was updated four times - on February 6,
7, 9 and 27 - to add paragraphs 1074-1081. Added to the list were radical
Islamic materials from the websites hunafa.com and djamaattakbir.com; leaflets
of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir movement; and a new science fiction novel by Yuri
Petukhov, who is known for his nationalist and anti-American views.

http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/news-releases/2012/03/d23800/
-----

Russia's Minorities Help Putin Back to Power
By: Geoffrey T. Smith
WSJ blog, March 5, 2012

So you thought the strongman Vladimir Putin was a nationalist, the darling of
his ethnic Russian kin?  Think again. Figures from the Central Election
Commission suggest strongly that he scored most heavily in regions where
Russians are thin on the ground, and where it's easiest to massage the vote.
According to Russia's Central Election Commission, Mr. Putin scored most weakly
in the historic Slavic heartlands of ancient Rus, and got his best results where
ethnic Russians are relatively few, especially in the regions of the North
Caucasus. It's precisely here that Mr. Putin's forces have, for over a decade,
had to assert themselves first through an all-out war, then through a broader
and lower-intensity but still frequently lethal campaign against local
separatists and militants.
Mr. Putin received 99.8% of the vote in Chechnya, and 93.2% in Dagestan, the
republic where much of the unrest has migrated since Mr. Putin's protégé Ramzan
Kadyrov consolidated control over Chechnya. Given that Amnesty International
estimates that over 2% of Chechnya's population was killed between 1999-2007,
and given the long and growing list of judgments against Russia in the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg over the conduct of its troops there, this
would be somewhat akin to Cortes storming to electoral victory in Tenochtitlan,
or Oliver Cromwell romping home in the Drogheda and Wexford by-elections of
1650.
The story is the same in Ingushetia and Karachaevo-Cherkassiya in the south and,
just as intriguingly, in the strongholds of the Russian Federation's two largest
ethnic minorities, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.
By contrast, the President-elect scored worst of all in his own capital, the
richest and most sophisticated district in the country. Moscow city was the only
electoral district where Mr. Putin failed to score an absolute majority, getting
only 47% of the vote. And in the regions around Moscow-the heartland of medieval
and Renaissance-era Muscovy, the picture was scarcely any better. In Yaroslavl,
Kostroma, Orel, Vladimir, Tver and Arkhangelsk, Mr. Putin scored well below his
national average of 63.6%. Even in St Petersburg, his home town, he only scored
61.9%. In the region around Moscow, according to his opponent Mikhail Prokhorov,
Mr. Putin's campaign was dependent on bussing supporters from one polling
station to another to secure a relatively uninspiring 56.9%. Mr. Putin and his
campaign staff dismiss such claims.
The pattern seems clear: Mr. Putin's support is strongest where the European
culture of political plurality has barely, if ever, taken root: regions where
local strongmen can be relied upon to get the vote out with no questions asked.
In areas with a higher quota of ethnic Russians and generally more advanced-if
often decaying-economic infrastructure, his support is markedly weaker.  Far
from championing the "korennoy narod"-the roots of the nation-as he once
boasted, Mr. Putin has ridden back to power on the back of Russia's minorities,
or rather on the lieutenants that Mr. Putin appointed for them.

http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2012/03/05/russias-minorities-help-putin-bac\
k-to-power/
----

Navalny, Dozens Others Detained at Rallies
By: Jonathan Earle and Alexander Bratersky
The Moscow Times, March 6, 2012

The opposition showed its resilience on Monday night, drawing thousands to a
Pushkin Square rally in the freezing cold to protest Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin's landslide victory in the weekend presidential election.
The rally, addressed by opposition leaders and presidential candidate Mikhail
Prokhorov, was peaceful. But a crowd of 400 to 500 people, including
journalists, refused to leave afterward, and a wall of OMON riot police officers
swooped down on them, roughly herding them into the nearby metro.
Police detained about 250 people during the rallies, including anti-corruption
blogger Alexei Navalny and Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov. All detained
demonstrators have been released, police said, Interfax reported.
Police also held Other Russia opposition leader Eduard Limonov and about 50 of
his supporters at an unsanctioned rally on Lubyanskaya Ploshchad.
On another downtown square, Manezh, tens of thousands of pro-Putin supporters
rallied with banners with a portrait of a stony-faced Putin, while some wore
ominous-looking red armbands reading, "Are you ready to kill?" Asked what the
slogan meant, one young man said it referred to what would happen to Putin's
opponents if they didn't stop their protests. He did not elaborate.
The atmosphere on Pushkin Square was smaller and less cheerful than at past mass
opposition rallies, which started in early December to demand free and fair
elections. The motley crowd spanned the political spectrum, from Communists to
ultranationalists, as well as a group of self-described anarchists, who at one
point chanted, "Revolution, revolution!"
"We'll keep gathering until Putin leaves," said Arkady, 60, a pensioner.
The remarks by Arkady, who like many people on the square were reluctant to give
their last names, seemed at odds with government predictions that the protest
movement would peter out.
"In a proper democracy, the losers should reluctantly or readily accept the
obvious, and the results of this election are obvious," said Sergei Ivanov, head
of the presidential administration, Interfax reported.
Opposition leaders declared Sunday's vote illegitimate over what they called
widespread irregularities. "There were violations at every polling station!" one
of them, Yevgenia Chirikova, told the crowd.
Allegations of widespread fraud during the Dec. 4 State Duma elections gave
birth to the protest movement, which has since grown into a call for democratic
reform.
Navalny is increasingly seen as the leader of the movement, and several
protesters said they would have voted for him in Sunday's election.
Navalny punctuated his brief address to the crowd with the rallying cry, "We
have the power!" But the crowd didn't unite in chorus as Navalny might have
hoped.
After standing outside in the freezing cold in uncomfortably cramped quarters,
many had already headed for the exits.
Several participants interviewed by The Moscow Times said they had voted for
billionaire Prokhorov.
"There was no alternative," said Konstantin, 47, a businessman.
Prokhorov spoke briefly from the stage, thanking supporters and calling on
participants to join his political party, which he has promised to launch this
month.
"Welcome, free people of Russia!" he said to a strong chorus of cheers and
clapping.
It was unclear, even among protesters, how far they were willing to go to
achieve their demands.
Talk of tent cities earlier this week proved unfounded for now, but several
participants didn't exclude that possibility when the weather got warmer.
On Sunday, Vladimir Ovchinsky, a former senior Interior Ministry official,
warned on Rossia state television that Monday's rally and any future ones would
not be peaceful.
That prediction also proved incorrect, although protesters conceded that
radicals in the opposition movement might eventually resort to violence.
The protesters maintained, however, that the government would bear responsible
for any bloodshed.
"Power changes hands either through elections or through revolution," said
Sergei, 30, a manager, adding that at this point it was the government's choice.
Valery, 38, a builder, said he didn't know what was next for the opposition but
that he would continue to protest on behalf of his wife and four children.
"If there's violence, we'll have civil war. But if Putin doesn't leave
peacefully, we'll also have civil war," he said.
Anton Glotov, a 40-year-old artist, attended the rally in a cage. "I'm freer in
here than out there," he said. "It's all a matter of perspective." He added that
violent clashes were unlikely.
About 12,000 Interior Ministry troops were in Moscow providing security,
including 6,300 who were brought in from surrounding regions, Interfax said.
A total of 6,000 regional OMON riot police officers   about a quarter of all
OMON in Russia   will be in Moscow through March 9 to assist local riot police,
Novaya Gazeta reported Friday.
The rally on Pushkin Square was one of several that took place on Monday.
About a kilometer from Pushkin Square, more than 50,000 people gathered at a
Young Guard-organized rally on Manezh Square to support Putin, police said. A
reporter saw that the square was packed and police were turning people away,
saying there was no room.
People at the rally spoke highly of Putin. "The only man whom I can believe and
respect is Putin," said Roman, 65, a retired driver who was bused in from Tambov
by rally organizers.
Others said they were bused in from Ryazan and other cities near the capital.
"I support Putin because I remember how it was under the Communists when I was
small, but now my son can have anything that he wants," said Irina, 30, from
Moscow.
She added, though, that she holds two jobs to make ends meet. She said the
people who back the opposition didn't work.
After the rally, demonstrators listened to a free concert by the Ukrainian pop
duo Potap and Nastya.
The square filled up quickly as young people who were not associated with the
rally but attracted by the music pleaded with police officers guarding the
perimeter to be let in to listen.
Meanwhile, police detained at least 50 Other Russia opposition activists,
including the group's leader Eduard Limonov, as they tried to stage an
unsanctioned rally near the Central Elections Commission headquarters on
Lubyanskaya Ploshchad, Interfax reported.
A police officer declared, "Respected citizens, your event is not sanctioned,"
and then began grabbing people, said a Moscow Times reporter at the scene. There
were at least 100 people on the square, but at least a third were journalists,
many of them with cameras. Every time police went to detain someone, a frenzy of
media would immediately appear around them.
Earlier Limonov wrote on his blog that the rally was to "defend the opposition's
honor" after opposition leaders contributed to Putin's overwhelming election
victory.
"Putin's presidential campaign didn't have a theme before December. Then it
appeared: The revolt of the pro-Western elite against the Russian people and
their chief, Putin," he wrote.
Scattered pro-Putin and opposition rallies were held around the country. In St.
Petersburg, police detained about 70 opposition activists at a unsanctioned
gathering of 800 to 2,000 people on St. Isaac's Square, news reports said.
Some politicians said the rallies must end.
"The sooner the rallies stop, the better. There's work to be done," said Sergei
Mironov, who placed last in the presidential election, Interfax reported. "I
believe Vladimir Putin's victory in the first round was completely objective,"
he said.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/navalny-dozens-others-detained-at-ral\
lies/454207.html
-----

The End of the Thaw -- The West is Preparing For Confrontation With the Kremlin:
Every movement and all the initiatives made by the West or NATO in Vladimir
Putin's eyes are seen as an efforts to harm Russian interests
By Michael Binyon
The Ukrainian Week,  7 March 2012

With the return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency, the West is bracing
itself for a sharp new confrontation in relations with the Kremlin.
For the past four years, relations with Russia have been improving. President
Medvedev talked the language of reform, and encouraged Western companies to
invest in Russia. He promised to ease restrictions, to improve financial
regulations, strengthen the rule of law and fight corruption. At the same time,
he negotiated the "reset" of US relations with Moscow and signed a new arms
control agreement with President Obama. There have been sharp disagreements -
notably at the start of his presidency with the brief war between Russia and
Georgia. But in other areas, especially the Middle East and efforts to prevent
Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, Medvedev offered a more co-operative Russian
face to the international community, even if not many pledges on fighting
corruption and opening up the economy were realized.
The contrast with the early Putin presidency was notable. Putin had shown
himself a prickly partner, quick to take offence and to lash out at what he saw
as Western attempts to "dictate" to Russia. His presidency ended just as the
world economy went into sharp decline. Russia was acutely affected in the years
2008-2009, and Putin, now Prime Minister, was preoccupied with the attempt to
halt the rapid fall in Russia's growth, shore up faltering energy prices and
seek the support of Russia's main trading partners.
Russia has recovered economically. But Putin appears to have lost none of his
suspicions of Western intentions, especially his resentment at US global
leadership and what he sees as Western and NATO attempts to threaten Russia's
interests and to limit its influence. In a remarkably combative article,
published in Moscow News a week before the presidential election, he issued a
stark warning to America and its Western allies that Moscow would not accept any
limitation on its sovereignty, foreign policy or commercial activities. He
declared that in a range of areas, especially in the Middle East, he would
oppose Western policies, stick by Russia's friends and allies such as Syria and
not allow the West to use human rights and the Arab Spring to undermine Russian
influence.
"We intend to be consistent in proceeding from our own interests and goals,
rather than decisions dictated by someone else," he said at the start of his
long article. He went on to challenge NATO, saying that "some aspects of US and
NATO conduct contradict the logic of modern development, relying instead on the
stereotypes of a block-based mentality". The West had "brushed aside" Russian
concerns, had created facts on the ground that were counterproductive to
confidence building, and was guilty of double standards in its selective support
for human rights. Western policies to the Arab world, he said, were based on
"outright demagogy", and were undermining the sovereignty of independent
countries.
It is clear that the Arab Spring has deeply worried Putin. He accused the West
of intervening in Libya in order to strengthen its position, establish military
bases and replace "one dominant force with another even more aggressive dominant
force". The flashpoint in the coming months will be Syria. Russia has tied
itself irrevocably to the Assad government, which relies on Russian arms exports
and gives Moscow its only overseas naval base. Putin was furious at the
"hysterical reaction" to Moscow's veto of the UN Security Council resolution
calling on Assad to resign.
The West fears that Putin is not simply returning to the old zero-sum mentality
in global strategy; what has angered him almost as much is the growth of Western
"soft power", especially non-governmental organisations, aid groups and what he
calls "pseudo-NGOs", which he says are determined to undermine Russia's
traditional alliances, and shut Russian diplomacy and commercial interests out
of the Middle East and other parts of the world.
He is also clearly worried by Western encouragement of social media - the
bloggers and internet users who have so effectively undermined authoritarian
Arab regimes. The example has encouraged many bloggers in Russia, and this has
sharply reduced Putin's popularity, produced a new and vocal opposition from the
young and the urban middle class and suddenly left him looking politically
vulnerable.
All this, he suggests in his article, is part of a Western plot to weaken
Russia. And he gave the West a warning that he would hit back sharply.
Of course, some of these threats may be election rhetoric. Putin was appealing
to the nationalist vote and needed to bolster his image as a tough leader who
would raise Russia's prestige and influence in the world. But already the
reaction in Western capitals has been one of alarm. And the fear is that if
Putin feels domestically less secure, he will sharpen the confrontation with the
West to distract attention from the protests and to give himself greater freedom
to crack down on his critics at home.
Some Western governments have already begun to prepare for a new Cold War with
Russia. In Britain, three former foreign secretaries recently called for new
sanctions targeting 60 named individuals in the Russian government and security
services responsible for the death in prison on Sergei Magnitsky, the
anti-corruption lawyer who uncovered a $200 million tax fraud involving interior
ministry officials and police. British politicians said the proposal, to be put
to Britain's parliament, was topical because of the deteriorating political
situation in Russia and widespread concerns about its human rights record.
Germany will probably maintain reasonable relations with the Putin presidency,
partly because of its crucial economic and energy links with Russia. But the
Obama presidency has already run into difficulties with the appointment of its
new ambassador, Michael McFaul, who was Obama's adviser on Russia and who made
the deliberate decision to bypass Putin and negotiate only with Medvedev on the
"reset" of relations. Moscow has already accused McFaul going beyond his role of
ambassador by interfering in Russian affairs. The real reason for the anger,
however, is that McFaul speaks fluent Russian, knows many opposition leaders and
was outspoken in his criticisms of Putin when he headed the Carnegie Institute
in Moscow for some years. Putin does not forgive or forget his enemies.
Some Western analysts say that Putin cannot afford a new confrontation with the
West at a time when Russia desperately needs new investment and modernisation of
its industries and infrastructure. Putin, they argue, is shrewd and pragmatic.
His instincts were clearly on display in his outburst against Western policies.
But as President will he now be guided by the need for global co-operation and
Western technology to get Russia moving again? If so, perhaps the two sides
will, after all, find a way of living with the new - or, rather, old - leader in
the Kremlin.

http://ukrainianweek.com/Politics/44322#.T1nVPNy0xA0.facebook
-------------------

East European nationalism: condemned in Russia, forgiven in the Baltics?
By Dmitry Babich,
Voice of Russia, 12 March 2012

The recent nationalist march in Vilnius, held under the slogan "Lithuania for
Lithuanians" did not get nearly as much attention in the US media as similar
nationalist marches in Moscow. The mainstream American media somehow omits
several unpleasant facts about those marches, which do not fit its worldview.
Here are these facts.
First, the last "Russia for the Russians" march in Moscow in November 2011 was
attended by several opposition leaders lionized by the American media - Alexey
Navalny and Vladimir Milov, among others. Second, some European countries can no
longer acquiesce to the policy of "closed eyes" which the US and the EU have
been conducting towards petty Baltic nationalisms and the local state-sponsored
glorification of the Baltic battalions at Adolph Hitler's service in 1941-1945.
For example, Poland is more and more often undertaking official protests against
the mishandling of the Polish minority in Lithuania. Israel has long voiced
concern about the rehabilitation of Nazi criminals in all three Baltic countries
- Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In this context, it gets more and more
embarrassing for the US and the EU to ignore the persecution of the Russian
minority in Latvia and Estonia, which is much worse than the attitude of the
Lithuanian authorities to the local Poles.
The neo-Nazi slogans, chanted and carried on banners at the Vilnius march
("Lithuania for Lithuanians," "Skinheads for Lithuania, Race and Nation") looked
and sounded especially embarrassing in the Lithuanian capital, a home to about
220,000 Jews before the World War II. Vilnius (or Wilno, in Polish) used to be
called "the Jerusalem of the North." The city had been "an ethnic fruit cake" of
four large communities until 1939 - namely, Poles, Jews, Lithuanians and
Russians. In 1939, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the subsequent
occupation of Poland, Vilnius ceased to be a Polish territory and became a
capital of Lithuania. Purged of its Jewish population by German Nazis and their
Lithuanian collaborators in 1941-1944, the city is now witnessing some tensions
between its Polish and Lithuanian communities. According to the Polish Gazeta
Wyborcza, these tensions were provoked by the ethnocentric policy of the
government of the newly independent Lithuania.
"Since becoming independent of the Soviet Union in 1991, the governments of all
three Baltic states - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - have been pursuing
ethnocentric policies aimed against the local ethnic minorities," said Vladimir
Simindey, the head of Istoricheskaya Pamyat history foundation in Moscow, a
former resident of Latvia. "Until this policy was directed against the local
Russians, the European Union and the United States did not pay much attention to
it. Now that it starts to irritate even Poland, concerned about the education
opportunities and national identity of ethnic Poles in Lithuania, it becomes
more and more difficult for the West to ignore it."
In Lithuania, controversy is exacerbated by such issues as the spelling of
Polish names. Even the liberal and pro-European Gazeta Wyborcza acknowledges
that it would have been absurd for the greatest Polish national poet Adam
Mickiewicz, who identified himself  as "a Lithuanian Pole," to be forced to
spell his name as Mickievicius, as the Lithuanian grammar requires. The recent
"school strike," held by Polish school students and teachers in Vilnius,
highlighted this problem, which had been long familiar to nearly a million of
Russians living in Latvia and Estonia.
Nil Ushakov, the ethnically Russian mayor of Riga, Latvia's capital, has to
spell his name as Nils Usakovs, in line with Latvian grammar requirements. The
same goes even for ethnically Russian hockey players from the world-famous
Latvian hockey team, who become known to the world as Pantelejevs, Vasiljevs and
Semjonovs instead of Panteleyev, Vasilyev and Semyonov. The problem, long
dismissed by the European and American politicians as "one more outburst of
Russian nationalism," flared in the case of the Polish minority in Lithuania.
Marek Siwiec, a deputy of the European Parliament from Poland, said that the
actions of the Lithuanian government deserve a special investigation in
Brussels. The head of the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania, Woldemar
Tomaszewski, tried to attract the attention of European officials to the plight
of Polish schools, forced to switch to Lithuanian in teaching even such
"neutral" subjects as mathematics or physics. Angry teachers, students and their
parents made cancelation of these plans the main slogan of their "school strike"
in September 2011.
Similar action by Russian students and teachers in Latvia, provoked by the
forced "Latviazation" of 60 percent of the subjects taught at Russian language
schools in Latvia, had been largely ignored by the EU and its members, including
Poland.
"Is it any wonder in this situation that the Lithuanian and Latvian Nazi
sympathizers and veterans of the local SS battalions feel themselves at ease
marching in Riga or Vilnius?" asks Yevgeny Proshechkin, the head of the
Moscow-based Antifascist Center, who recently returned from a fact finding
mission to the Baltics. According to the New York Times, immediately after the
declaration of Lithuanian independence in the early 1990s 50,000 Lithuanian
nationalists, including those who had collaborated with the Nazis, were pardoned
by a special law." New York Times
That move provoked outrage in the Simon Wiesenthal Center tracking Nazi
criminals worldwide. The problem stays unresolved until today. Efraim Zuroff,
who has been heading the Nazi hunt after Wisenthal's resignation in 2005, was
especially dismayed by the cases when Nazi criminals were cleared of the charges
to standing applause in the court. But that is the dire reality of today's
Eastern Europe.

http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_03_12/68264667/
-----

Jews in Russia
By: Alexei Bayer
The Moscow Times, March 12, 2012

After last December's elections to the State Duma, a number of Russian citizens
went to the studios of the web TV channel Dozhd to tape a short message
explaining why they and their country need free and fair elections. While
speaking, each held a handwritten sign with his or her name and occupation.
Recently, someone gathered still photographs of participants with Jewish last
names and made a YouTube video, set to a Jewish tune and accompanied by the
statement: "We, Russians, don't deceive one another."
The obvious intention of this anti-Semitic prank was to show that the opposition
to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's regime consists mostly of Jews (and a handful
of members of other ethnic groups) and that a true Russian patriot should not
rock the boat but support the status quo. This, of course, used to be a typical
trick of Soviet propaganda, when dissidents' Jewish names were, whenever
possible, prominently mentioned. When dissidents were not Jews, as in the case
of leaders of the dissident movement such as writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn and
physicist Andrei Sakharov, the KGB spread rumors that they were. Or they said
Sakharov, a naive and innocent academician, was under the spell of his devious
Jewish wife Yelena Bonner. Then, as now, the implication was that only Jews
would want Russia to be free, democratic and join the community of nations on an
equal footing, and not as a pariah state.
(A curious variation on this splendid theme is the belief among extreme Russian
nationalists that Russia is ruled by the Jews. There used to be murky circles in
the Soviet Union of my childhood in which it was held that Leonid Brezhnev and
his Politburo were Jews. Today's nationalists, monarchists and other "real
Russians" like to point out that Putin's entourage includes people with names
like Abramovich, Fridman and Rotenberg and that his first political patron was
St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. Ironically, Sobchak's daughter Ksenia, a
television journalist, is also featured prominently in the anti-Semitic video
that attacks the pro-democracy movement.)
Officially, Russia has 200,000 Jews, but if children of mixed marriages and
those who for one reason or another downplay their Jewish origins are included,
the number rises to about 650,000. That's impressive, considering that in recent
decades so many have left. Russia's Jewish community is still large and vibrant.
When I was in Moscow in January, I was fortunate enough to be given a private
tour of the Museum of the History of Jews in Russia by Hillel Kazovsky, а
leading expert in Jewish artistic avant-garde. It is one of Moscow's newest
museums, and it houses the amazing private collection of businessman Sergei
Ustinov. Each of its several rooms is devoted to a different aspect of Jewish
life, including religion, family, politics, literature and theater. Even
funerals are covered, with one of the most stunning artifacts being a
horse-drawn hearse set against a panoramic color photograph of a Jewish cemetery
in Ukraine.
The collection traces the Jews' 200-year transition from an insular community on
the fringes of the empire into its mainstream. Russia and the early Soviet Union
saw a flowering of Jewish life and culture. Much of it was in Yiddish and some
in Hebrew, but the most important story was the crossing over and melding of
Jews into the Russian world. In the late 19th century, musician Anton
Rubenshtein and landscape painter Isaac Levitan were purely Russian, not Jewish
artists, as were hundreds of Jews who came to prominence in the Silver Age after
1900. They became assimilated, but on their own terms, retaining a separate
identity. It was the Russian culture instead that, like all of the world's great
cultures, expanded to incorporate other influences.
Numerous Jews who became active in politics (mainly on the left) were Russian
politicians, just as businessmen, engineers, scientists and professionals were
part of Russia.
The Jewish world shown at the museum gave rise to a remarkable burst of energy
across Central and Eastern Europe. This world has now disappeared. In 1939, when
the number of Jews worldwide peaked at 16.7 million, fully one half lived in the
broad swath running north-south between Berlin and Moscow. Now, hardly any Jews
remain in Poland or Romania, while Hungary and Ukraine have about 100,000
between them.
Russia is the only country in this cradle of contemporary Jewish culture where
any significant number of Jews remain. The nice thing about the ugly episode
with the anti-Semitic video is that it proves that the Jewish community is
thriving in the mainstream of Russian society and that it will endure,
regardless of what anti-Semites have to say about it.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/jews-in-russia/454458.html#ixzz1ov\
228wfG
  ----

Russian Politics: The Burden of National Myths
By: Mykola Riabchuk
Open Democracy Russia, March 13, 2012

National myths have always played an important part in Russian politics, from
15th-century 'Moscow as the 3rd Rome' to Soviet, and now Russian, views of
USSR/Russia's role in the region. The power of the myths is such that a putative
opposition government could well end up as no more than a clone of Putin and his
regime, says Mykola Riabchuk
The danger looming in some Arab countries that radical Islamists might hijack
anti-authoritarian revolutions poses a similar question in respect of future
anti-government protests in Russia: how powerful and how radical are the
nationalists within the protesters' camp, and how far would they proceed with
their presumed radicalism if the incumbent regime were at some point to crumble?
In the short to middle term this looks unlikely, though the regime's inability
to deliver much-needed reforms in the country, to curb corruption, and to
re-establish some sort of legitimacy for its rigid authoritarian policies, must
all be considered potential contributory factors to the eventual inevitability
of such a collapse.
Radical parties/groups or mere individuals in any political coalition are in a
tricky position. On one hand, the dividing line between the radical and
not-so-radical groups is often fluid and situation-related. On the other, any
political opposition, especially anti-authoritarian, requires the broadest
mobilization possible, involving opposition members of various colours and
ideologies, who will quite naturally once more go their separate ways when
victory has been achieved.
'Very few Russian nationalists are disciplined, courageous, and honest enough to
recognize that the much-needed emancipation of the Russian nation from the
Russian empire requires primarily that they liberate themselves from the
imperial myths and complexes deeply entrenched in the Russian psyche.'
This was the case in most of the post-communist countries where democratic
movements pursued an agenda that was not only anti-authoritarian but
anti-imperialist and national-liberation. They all had a significant nationalist
element, though this is now largely ignored or underestimated, probably because
the deeply entrenched anti-nationalistic bias in Western scholarship and
politics regards nationalism as incompatible with liberalism and democracy.
Russian imperialism
Russia is an imperial nation, but Russians have been always reluctant to frame
their nationalism in terms of national liberation, though attempts have been
made to represent Yeltsin's rebellion against Gorbachev and the ultimate
dissolution of the Soviet Union as the emancipation of the Russian nation from
the Russian empire. Within this model of thought, Russia is usually seen as the
main, if not sole, victim of Russian imperialism:
'Russia was never an empire in the traditional Western sense of the word. If it
was indeed a prison for anyone, it was for the Russians, who gained nothing from
exploiting the colonies because Russia had no colonies - it had peripheries, to
which it gave more than it took. One can understand why these borderlands were
necessary: fundamentally the logic was based on military-political
considerations. Russia is caught in the world's crosswinds, at the heart of
Eurasia, protected from enemies by neither mountains nor seas.
The use of the double-headed eagle as a Russian coat of arms goes back to the
15th century. With the end of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Grand Dukes of
Muscovy came to see themselves as the successors of the Byzantine heritage. In
1625 the double-headed eagle appeared with three crowns, interpreted as a symbol
of unity between Great Russia, Little Russia (Ukraine) and White Russia
(Belarus).
Some territories - indeed the Caucasus - were necessary acquisitions only
because they at the time were the sole means of putting an end to the constant
incursions and halting the aggression. But the peripheries were not subjected to
systematic exploitation because the Russian tsars had not learned this European
science. Alas, it was the Russian people who carried all the burdens and
obligations of nation-building. If anyone was enslaved - in the direct meaning
of the word - it was the Russians.' (Konstantin Krylov blog [13] in Russian).
The Russians were disadvantaged by their oppressive empire, whether ruled over
by tsars or commissars. Their development was undoubtedly held back, but they
enjoyed many privileges that other nationalities did not. As a group, they were
spared from many dreadful policies, such as the extermination of the native
populations (Siberia and the Far North), mass enslavement (Central Asians),
genocide (Ukrainian peasants and Kazakh nomads), summary deportation (Chechens,
Balkars, and Crimean Tatars), persecution (Poles and Germans), segregation
(Jews), and more.
The professed self-victimization of Russians tends to obscure all these
'peripheral' developments, by promoting instead the myth of the 'mission
civilisatrice'. It also opens up the dangerous possibility that they will
abdicate the responsibility for the colonialism and imperialism that Russians as
the main imperial stakeholders do bear, and, even more dangerously, shift that
responsibility on to 'others' - Georgians, Poles, Ukrainians and, of course, the
Jews who arguably ruled the Russian empire.
Imperial myths
Very few Russian nationalists are disciplined, courageous, and honest enough to
recognize that the much-needed emancipation of the Russian nation from the
Russian empire requires primarily that they liberate themselves from the
imperial myths and complexes deeply entrenched in the Russian psyche. The myth
of a primordial 'Slavic-Orthodox unity' [Slavia Othodoxa] and eternal
'Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian brotherhood' is crucial for the entire Russian
(imperial) identity. Invented at the turn of the 17th century to portray Muscovy
as the dynastic-cum-political and ecclesiastic-cum-spiritual successor to
medieval Kyivan Rus, it effectively derailed the eventual development of modern
(national) Russian identity, as well as the modern national identities of
Ukrainians and Belarusians. The newborn Russian empire successfully appropriated
all the sacred, primordial, spiritual features of 'Slavia Orthodoxa' but imbued
them also with state symbolism and a political agenda - something that never
happened on that scale with similar pre-modern phenomena such as Muslim 'ummah'
or Western 'Pax Christiana'.
'The post-Soviet elites quite naturally resist any radical de-Sovietization of
their fiefdoms since they cannot but feel that unmaking Soviets (or imperial,
heavily mythologized 'Orthodox Slavs') into Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians
would mean, in particular, remaking obedient quasi-feudal subjects into free,
self-confident citizens.'
The imperial identity that was forged in this way appeared to foster essentially
pre-modern non-civic values and paternalism. Formed by specific imperial
discourses and practices, it still is supported, in modified forms, by the
dominant powerbrokers in both Russia and Belarus and, with some fluctuations, in
Ukraine. The post-Soviet elites quite naturally resist any radical
de-Sovietization of their fiefdoms since they cannot but feel that unmaking
Soviets (or imperial, heavily mythologized 'Orthodox Slavs') into Russians,
Ukrainians and Belarusians would mean, in particular, remaking obedient
quasi-feudal subjects into free, self-confident citizens.
Unfortunately, it is not only the Russian government that is unable to recognise
the problem. With the exception of a tiny group of committed liberals, the
opposition fails to see it. In some cases they may agree to look again at
Russian imperialist policies in the Caucasus and elsewhere, but they do not
challenge the myth of 'Kyivan Russia' as the cornerstone of imperial identity
and a major source of imperial resentments and anxiety. Nor they are eager to
promote radical de-Sovietization, even though the entire project of making
modern Russians without unmaking Soviets is highly problematic.
Alexei Navalny
Alexei Navalny, one of the opposition leaders who defines himself as a liberal
nationalist, explicitly supports the need to restore the 'organic unity of
Russia's past,' from Kyivan Rus to the USSR. [Manifesto [14], in Russian].
Neither 'Kyivan' nor Soviet myths are seen as obstacles to a new Russian
identity or, more generally, the modernization of Russia. This makes him more of
a liberal imperialist than a liberal nationalist. When asked openly by Boris
Akunin: 'Do you regret that the USSR is no longer in existence?' he prevaricated
only slightly:
'Everybody wants their country to be bigger, richer, stronger. That's perfectly
normal, and it's what I want as well. .... The USSR was destroyed not by
external forces, but by the Communist Party, the State Planning Committee and
the Soviet political elite. ... That is historical fact. Another fact is that
the core and the foundation of the Russian empire and the USSR was our country -
Russia. And Russia remains, both economically and militarily, the dominant state
of the region. Our task is to preserve and build on that. ... We should not
deliberately be making plans for any expansion; our task is to become strong and
rich ourselves, and then our neighbors will be part of our zone of influence;
they won't have any option.' [Akunin blog [15], in Russian].
While he emphasizes Russia's soft, rather than hard, power, he can certainly be
regarded as a liberal. But his intention to build on Russia's economic and
military [sic] dominance in the region sounds ambiguous enough to make all the
neighbours nervous. Especially in view of his full support for recognizing the
independence of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria - hardly sustainable
without Russian military occupation.
Observers are probably right when they interpret the ambiguity of many Navalny
statements as a pragmatic (one might say opportunistic) desire to avoid
alienating potential allies from either the liberal democratic or the radical
nationalistic camp. His own views, however, on two crucial issues that
determine, or rather obstruct, the development of a modern civic Russian
identity - the Soviet legacy and 'East Slavic unity' - are not very different
from those of his arch-rival Vladimir Putin.
Russian nationalism: imperial vs ethnic
In this regard, two strains of nationalism that have been competing in Russia
for nearly two centuries  - imperial/statist and ethno-cultural - have something
very important in common: both of them are essentially non-civic. One of them,
as Igor Torbakov notes [16], 'worships the state, its power and international
prestige'; the other one 'glorifies the nation, its culture and faith'. In
practical matters, however, the difference is marginal: as soon as ethnic
nationalists assume power, they pragmatically become statist. Realpolitik
constrains radicals almost everywhere, and there are no reasons to believe that
Russia, substantially integrated in the global economy and international
institutions, would be any exception.
'In fact, the main problem of today's opposition, and of Mr. Navalny in
particular, is that they would most likely simply become a reincarnation of Mr.
Putin and his regime.'
Economic hardship and ethnic resentment, allied with a general discontent with
'imperial-style' government, have resulted in the greater 'popularity of ethnic
nationalism at the expense of the imperial variety'. However, this does not mean
that radical nationalists are going to assume power in Russia or, even if they
are, that they would pursue more jingoistic and fascist policies than the
current incumbents.
In fact, the main problem of today's opposition, and of Mr. Navalny in
particular, is that they would most likely simply become a reincarnation of Mr.
Putin and his regime. Probably less corrupt and presumably more committed to
genuine reforms, but nevertheless burdened with the same national myths and
which will considerably hamper any attempts to modernize the country.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mykola-riabchuk/russian-politics-burden-o\
f-national-myths
-----

Putin's Pipe Dream for Building a Modern Army
By: Alexander Golts
The Moscow Times, March 13, 2012

Listening to Vladimir Putin's statements during his presidential campaign, you
would think the country was at war.
The national leader was constantly calling upon the Russian people to defeat the
enemy, presumably the United States. To give substance to his fear-mongering,
Putin held a record number of meetings with defense and security agencies,
including a specially convened gathering of military unit commanders, the elite
Taman mechanized-infantry brigade and experts at the federal nuclear weapons
center in Sarov. At each meeting, participants asked prepared questions
concerning the threat of a foreign-
financed Orange Revolution. Putin answered by saying the country would act in
strict accordance with the law, which is to say that the siloviki will be
willing to crush the protest movement, if necessary.
One way or another, Putin had to make a number of substantive statements on how
the armed forces should be organized. To this end, he published a detailed
article on the subject in Rossiiskaya Gazeta last month and referred to it in
subsequent meetings with members of the military.
The most interesting aspect of that article was that Putin decided to share
responsibility with Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov for implementing military
reforms. For the first time, he explained that the reforms were not enacted for
financial reasons, but to move away from the model of a mass-
mobilization army. Describing the military legacy he inherited from the Soviet
era, Putin wrote about the inability of a mass-mobilization army to meet
21st-century security threats. In specific, Putin referred to the
ineffectiveness of the armed forces during the second war in Chechnya from 1999
to 2000.
"There was only one way out," Putin emphasized. "We had to build a new army."
Of course, Putin didn't explain why it took eight years after the end of the
second Chechen war to start the reforms. The reform plan was proposed to Putin
back in 2001, but he refused to implement it because he would have had to fire
thousands of military personnel. According to those who were directly involved
in this plan, Putin did not want to play the same role for the military that
liberal economist Yegor Gaidar had played for the country during the period of
shock-therapy economic reforms in the early 1990s. As a result, the country's
useless military units and depots remained in existence for another eight years,
while the military budget disappeared into the mass-mobilization "black hole."
Instead, Putin conveniently waited until Dmitry Medvedev took over as president
in 2008 to make drastic cuts to the officer corps.
One of Putin's largest illusions is creating a professional army - or "smart
defense forces," as he calls it, a term he borrowed from Russia's archenemy
NATO. According to Putin's plan, the number of conscripts should be reduced to
300,000 by 2017, and to 147,000 by 2020.
One key requirement to become a professional soldier will be previous experience
as a concript. The idea is that once this plan is implemented, the armed forces
will no longer have to draft hordes of young men who are physically unfit and
who have no real interest in serving in the army. Of the 147,000 conscripts, the
overwhelming majority will be qualified, healthy young men who are committed to
further serve as professional soldiers once their conscript term has been
completed.
Military service would thus be transformed from an onerous obligation - and, at
times, basically slave labor - to a privilege. To help improve the prestige of
the military, the government plans to pay for soldiers' tuition at leading
Russian and foreign universities and to mandate that those who served in the
military be given preference if they apply for government civil service jobs.
Unfortunately, this beautiful-sounding plan has little chance of becoming
reality. The weakest point in Putin's plan concerns his promise to supply the
military with modern equipment. Putin claims that by 2020 the armed forces will
receive hundreds of new missiles and aircraft along with dozens of ships and
submarines, but he doesn't explain how this miracle of finance and defense
industry will be pulled off.
Putin sadly notes that "Russia's defense research centers and production
facilities have been slow to modernize over the last 30 years," and adds that
"the excessively closed system has already led to a decline in competitiveness,
inflated prices for military goods and exorbitant profits that have gone not
into modernization, but into the pockets of individual businesspeople and
officials."
But Putin fails to mention that he himself is responsible for these problems.
After all, as president he corralled dozens of separate defense firms into
several huge state corporations, a parody of the grossly inefficient Soviet-era
defense industry. Worse, it seems that Putin has no plans to abandon the idea
even now. On the contrary, he promised to build "a single operating algorithm
for vertically integrated entities."
The other issue is how Putin will be able to deal with the problem of the
influence of large lobby interests. Take, for example, Uralvagonzavod, the
country's only tank manufacturer. Putin himself bowed to pressure to place an
order for 2,300 tanks to be built over the next 10 years despite a recent
statement by General Staff head Nikolai Makarov that the military would not be
purchasing any tanks in the next five years due to their substandard quality. It
is another question entirely how Russia will be able to produce 2,300 tanks -
even bad ones - in 10 years, especially when they have not even been designed
yet.
In general, it is difficult to imagine how Russia will find the means and
know-how to make it a global leader in defense technology. The only concrete
proposal has been to create yet another bureaucratic agency for military
innovation and another one to oversee the fulfillment of defense contracts.
But Putin's most absurd idea was his appeal to military analysts to assess the
national security threat for the next 30 to 50 years. Only a fortune teller or
wizard could accomplish this. Perhaps Central Elections Commission head Vladimir
Churov can lend a hand here.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putins-pipe-dream-for-building-a-m\
odern-army/454543.html
-----

Gay Law's Author Rejects Criticism
By: Sergey Chernov
The St. Petersburg Times, March 14, 2012

St. Petersburg Governor Georgy Poltavchenko signed into law a controversial bill
against "promoting sodomy, lesbianism, bisexualism and transgenderism to minors"
Sunday, drawing a new wave of criticism from around the globe.
On Monday, the Human Rights Watch described Poltavchenko's failure to use his
right of veto to stop this "deplorable" legislative initiative as "profoundly
disappointing" and urged the prosecutor's office of St. Petersburg to "use its
authority to insist that the city Legislative Assembly annul the law."
Criticism of the new law also came from the diplomatic quarters of St.
Petersburg.
"I am concerned that this legislation does not match Council of Europe
guidelines on preventing discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgendered people (LGBT)," Gareth Ward, the U.K. Consul General, wrote in
emailed comments this week.
"I hope that St. Petersburg remains an open and welcoming city for all, and that
the important activities of Russian LGBT organizations to support gay people
will be able to continue."
The law will take effect on March 21, 10 days after its official publication.
The Legislative Assembly lawmaking committee chair, Vitaly Milonov, who authored
the bill in November, dismissed the criticism.
Speaking by phone Tuesday, Milonov, a deputy for the United Russia party, said
the bill was inspired by society's demands, though he did not mention any
specific incidents.
"If society believes that some model of behavior doesn't correspond to society's
interests, then society reacts to it," Milonov said.
"We will be very happy if this bill isn't applied even once, because it's not
directed against somebody specifically or in regard of a specific case, but it
does outline certain additional rules of behavior toward minors."
Answering criticism from the LGBT rights organization Coming Out's chair Igor
Kochetkov, Milonov argued that the law would not be used against the media,
which, he said, is regulated by federal law.
"It has nothing to do with Kochetkov, either - if, of course, he doesn't go to a
school and start talking about how wonderful it is to be a homosexual," he said.
"[The law] will only affect children's environments."
Milonov said his law would not apply to LBGT pride events.
"As a person, I am profoundly against gay parades, because I am an Orthodox
Christian and demonstration of the sin of Sodom is repelling to me, and if, God
forbid, I happened to see a crowd of those citizens - like they do in Berlin,
I've seen photographs where men with all sorts of dildos are running semi-naked
- it's natural that I'd try to take my children aside, so that they would not
see this perversion," he said.
"But I am a lawmaker, and I don't try to impose my personal and religious
beliefs onto anybody. That's why I have no right to restrict the freedom of
assembly, marches and demonstrations, because this freedom is guaranteed by
Article 31 of the Constitution and I have no right to violate it, and am not
going to."
Milonov is, however, planning to complain about the German industrial metal band
Rammstein's stadium concert that took place in St. Petersburg last month.
Rammstein's set includes a spoof simulated anal sex dildo routine.
"I'll ask prosecutors to give an evaluation of this and probably take
prosecutor's measures against the promoter," he said.
"There was an imitation of a homosexual act on stage and a non-imitation of
sexual exposure - with demonstration of male sexual parts.
"Rammstein is a matter of taste, but the problem is that children older than 14
were let in to the concert. The promoter should have warned people that the
concert contained scenes of an erotic nature and restricted admission to
children under 16 or maybe even 18, but it wasn't done."
"When singers show their sexual parts to children, I believe it's an insult to
the children of St. Petersburg."
Milonov, who is a member of a parish council of a local Orthodox church, said he
saw the video footage of the routine on a newspaper's website.
"I couldn't even watch it to the end," he said.
"I am not allowed to see such things, I am a church man, but it was shown to
14-year-old teenagers!"
The St. Petersburg law has been criticized as violating Russia's international
human rights obligations. Milonov sees an international gay lobby as being
behind this criticism.
"One should not try to expand Russia's obligations concerning guarantees of
human rights and freedoms to the excessive defense, or rather lobbying, of the
gay community's interests," Milonov said.
"We know that the gay community is a most powerful lobbying structure. They have
their office in Brussels, they are welcome at the United Nations, the European
Council and so on, but this is a problem of Europe; why should we copy European
laws? Not everything that they have in Europe is acceptable for Russia."
The new law introduces fines for offenders, set at 5,000 rubles ($167) for
individuals, 50,000 rubles ($1,665) for officials and 250,000 to 500,000 rubles
($8,325-$16,650) for businesses.

http://www.times.spb.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=35296
====================


III ANNOTATIONS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Karrer d'Ankoss, E. (Carrere d'Encausse, Helene). Nikolai II: Prervannaia
Preemstvennost': Politicheskaia Biografiia [Nicholas II: Interrupted tradition:
A Political biography] = Nicolas II: Le transition interrompue: Une biographi
politique. Transl. from French by E.D. Bogatyrenko. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010. 446
p. ill., maps. Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN 9785824314120

According to the author of this new political biography of Nicholas II, the tsar
opened Russia for modernization and allowed significant changes in the state
system and economy. Was the revolution the inevitable price for modernization?
This monograph covers the twenty year reign of Nicholas II. Maps. Name index.
---------------------

Iliushenko, Vladimir. Otets Aleksandr Men': Zhizn'. Smert'. Bessmertie [Father
Aleksandr Men': Life. Death. Immortality]. 2nd upd. and enl. ed. Moscow: Tsentr
Knigi BGBIL im. M.I. Rudomino, 2010. 656 p. [32 ill.] Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm.
ISBN 9785738003486

Aleksander Men' was a Russian Orthodox priest and a theologian, tragically
assassinated in 1990. Vladimir Iliushenko compiled various materials of this
religious leader: Men's letters, diaries, speeches, articles; poetry and
humorous sketches on Men's birthdays; letters to Men' from his followers and
parishioners; Men's unknown texts. Most of these documents have never been
published before. The book is illustrated by photographs of father Men' and his
circle. Vladimir Iliushenko is a historian, writer and social activist. He was a
spiritual son of A. Men'.
----------------

Khomiakov, A.S. Uchenie o Tserkvi [Studies on the Church]. St. Petersburg:
Russkaia Simforniia, 2010. 600 p. Hardcover. 16 x 23 cm. ISBN 9785910550395

This is a collection of works of the Russian religious writer and poet Aleksandr
Khomiakov (1804-1860). Several works are included in this volume. Tserkov' Odna
and Neskol'ko Slov Pravoslavnogo Khristianina o Zapadnykh Veroispovedaniiakh,
are united by one thought that a Christian cannot be saved outside the Church,
the Church owns the whole truth, and that a person becomes truly free, creative
and whole only by joining the Church. Khomiakov believed that Russia may and
should save Europe, taking the lead in the education of the world. Also includes
are his articles and poems (1831-1860). The volume is introduced with articles
by Mefodii and Kirill Zinkovskii, and by Iu.F. Samarin. Supplements (three
biographical essays): Khomiakov by N.M. Zernov; A.S. Khomiakov by I.M. Andreev;
and Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov by Iu.E. Kondakov
-----------------------

Krotkov, V.O. Ot SSSR k Rossii - Avtoritarnaia Transformatsiia Rubezha XX-XXI
Vekov [From USSR to Russia - The authoritative transformation on the turn of the
20th -21st centuries]. Moscow: MGU, 2010. 640 p. Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm. Printing
500. ISBN 9785211058569

This monograph  analyzes a  transformation of the character of socio-economic
and political spheres of Russian life from 1985 to 2009. The author defines the
current political regime as an authoritarian state and reveals peculiarities of
its stages in terms of the historical transformation of Russia. Bibliography
(465 sources).
-------------------

Mardzhanly, Musa. Armianstvo. Rossiia. Kavkaz [Armenians. Russia. Caucasus].
Moscow: Flinta, 2010. 96 p. pbk. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN 9785976509559

The history of relations of the Armenians with autochthonous peoples and new
settlers in the South Caucasus and the attempts of Armenians to adapt ethnic
groups to Armenian customs. This intention is now known as 26 "Armenias".
-------------------

Sapronov, P.A. Rossiia i Svoboda [Russia and freedom]. St. Petersburg:  RKhGA,
2010. 672 p. Hardcover. 14 x 21 cm. ISBN 9785888124116

The phenomenon of freedom is studied in this book as an end-to-end reality of
Russian history and culture. Contents: Metaphysical and historical dimension of
freedom; Reality of freedom in Russian philosophical and fiction literature;
Historical reality of Russian freedom. ------------------------

Kapto, A.S. Pakt Molotova-Ribbentropa: Mistifikatsiia ili Real'nost' [The
"Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact": Mystification or reality]. Moscow: ISPI RAN, 2009.
104 p.   Argumenty istiny  pbk. 14 x 21 cm. Printing 550. ISBN 9785755604192

This work analyzes the legal and political meaning of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact. The author, a professor of philosophy, deals with the Soviet-German
agreement of August 23d, 1939, and the documents signed by both sides, as well
as with mystifications around the so called "secret protocol".
----------------

Talina, G.V. Vybor Puti: Russkoe Samoderzhavie Vtoroi Poloviny XVII - Pervoi
Poloviny XVIII Veka [Choice of path: Russian autocracy in the second half of the
17th - first half of the 18th centuries]. Moscow: Russkii mir`, 2010. 446 p.  
Pro patria: istoriko-politologicheskaia biblioteka  Hardcover. 12 x 20 cm. ISBN
9785895771556

The monograph studies reforms in the second half of the 17th - first half of the
18th centuries. Contents: Monarchy and monarchs: From the Orthodox kingdom to
empire; Supreme government organs: From Boyar Duma to Senate; State management:
From Prikaz to Collegium; From uezd to gubernia; State service: From serving "by
class" to fitness for government service; Military forces: From "voisko" to
"army"; State-Russian Orthodox Church: From patriarchate to Synod. Bibliographic
references.
--------------------

Valuev, Dmitrii. Nachala Slavianofil'stva [The origins of Slavophilism]. Comp.
and comm. by Iu.V. Klimakova. Moscow: Institut russkoi tsivilizatsii, 2010. 363
p.   Russkaia tsivilizatsiia  Hardcover. 12 x 20 cm. ISBN 9785902725442

The book is the first publication of works by the outstanding Russian historian
and thinker Dmitrii Alekssandrovich Valuev (1820-1845) who made a great
contribution to Slavophilism. Comments and bibliographical references.
---------------------

Prokhanov, Aleksandr. Oko: Roman [Eye: Novel]. St. Petersburg: Amfora, 2010. 672
p.   Chitat' modno  Hardcover. 13 x 20 cm. ISBN 9785367013337

This novel is about the construction of the atomic station in 1980s. The USSR
has just survived the Chernobyl breakdown. Will people have enough will to start
from the beginning?
===========================

DISCLAIMER: The composition of RNB's issues does not necessarily express the
compilers' views. All topical English-language texts that come to the attention
of the compilers, and are related to Russian nationalism are, as far as that is
technically feasible, included.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The contents of RNB are compiled with the help of, among other
sources, CDI's "Johnson's Russia List," Monika Kirschner's "Ost-Verteiler," Sova
Center's "Xeno-News," UCSJ's "Bigotry Monitor" and "FSU Monitor," Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty's "Newsline," and E. Morgan Williams's "Action Ukraine
Report."
FAIR USE NOTICE: This issue of RNB may contain copyrighted material that is
redistributed for personal, scholarly use only. RNB is a single emission e-mail
to a limited number of scholars and professionals in the area of Russian studies
who have requested receipt of the list for scholarly and educational purposes.
RNB is distributed on a completely volunteer basis. The RNB compilers believe
that the use of copyrighted materials therein constitutes "fair use" of any such
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REFERENCE REQUEST: When quoting from a text found here, please, indicate RNB as
a source for your citation. Thank you.

Anti-Semitism in Central Eastern Europe. Ideas, Politics and Praxis of
Jew-Hatred from a Comparative Perspective, ca. 1880-1939 Warsaw, 14-16 February
2013

Central Eastern Europe bears particular significance for the history of
anti-Semitism. This region was home to a large number of Jews, who were not only
among themselves culturally divided, but also separated from their
linguistically and denominationally heterogeneous environs. Those professions
which in the process of the rise of market economy took over central functions
in the economic life were oftentimes dominated by Jews. As a consequence,
social, particularly ecclesiastic actors thus began to link economic,
civilizational and national discourses to the Jewish question, which thus became
a central part of the communicative construction of modern national (and also
Jewish) communities. These discourses took place in a legal and political
framework set by imperial multi-ethnic states. The diverse nationalities and
societies of Central Eastern Europe were thus in particularly close contact.
Christian-Jewish relations and contacts were for most people
  a part of everyday life. Anti-Semitic discourse and praxis were thus closely
intertwined.
With the collapse of the empires and the creation of national states after World
War I, anti-Semites attempted to turn the discrimination of Jews in the context
of minority politics or nation building into state policy.
The Jewish Historical Institute (ŻIH) and the German Historical Institute (DHI)
in Warsaw are organizing a joint conference, which aims to explore the dynamics
of Jew-hatred, the continuities and turning-points in the context of incisive
historical events and developments. The object is to delineate the interrelation
between the political and ideological field on the one hand and social practices
on the other.
The conference thus also aims to contribute to a theoretical and methodological
discussion within the field of research on anti-Semitism, which gives
considerations to the specific regional and historical situation in Central
Eastern Europe. We ask for contributions in the following fields.

A. Political Anti-Semitism
Within the investigation period, as a result of parliamentary practice and the
development of a sophisticated newspaper market, a political landscape came into
being which galvanized and changed the discussion of the Jewish question by
integrating new voters and readers. Modern mass communication substantially
gained importance, thus making anti-Semitic scandals with a significant degree
of notoriety possible and creating media events (esp. so-called ritual murder
cases), that could be interpreted in terms of the anti-Semitic agenda of
political newspapers.
The anti-Semitic discourse was used to mobilize voters, to formulate modern
communities and to guide parliamentary praxis. Moreover, it was exploited and
modified by linking it to economic and social phenomena in the context of the
implementation of the capitalist economic system, for instance in the form of
agitation for consumer and agricultural co-operatives and so-called “Christian
shops�. How far did the economic nationalism of the interwar period, which was
supposed to turn the former imperial periphery into national economic centers,
include – among protectionist measures directed “outwards� –
anti-Semitic issues directed “inwards�? What were their relations to
nationalistic discourses of the pre-World War I period?
What were the relations of anti-Semitic actors such as parties, newspapers and
individual intellectuals to political, economic and cultural questions such as
the disappearance of traditional culture, the rise and fall of liberalism, the
development of new forms of mass communication and the modern, national
community without, or respectively within the national state? What was the
connection between the propagation of anti-Semitic ideas and programs and the
dynamism of the political landscape, particularly the political commitment of
the Catholic Church and of Jewish representatives? Which groups advocated
positions which included Jew-hatred? How prominent was anti-Semitism in their
programs in general? How did these groups position themselves vis-à-vis the
state? What social echo did the propagation of anti-Semitic conceptions elicit?
Did attempts to pass anti-Semitic laws yield results? What turning points are
evident in the different empires,
  countries and later national states in the course of the investigation period?
The affirmative reference to anti-Semitism as a conscious attitude toward Jews
inherently meant referring to systems of belief that were based on putatively
scientific arguments. What place did racism and miscellaneous scientific
discourses such as biological anthropology, medicine, empirical criminology or
psychiatry have regarding the formulation of the “Jewish question� and the
propagation of so-called “rational anti-Semitism�? What reception and
transfers of racist ideas are evident in the discussion of the “Jewish
question�?

B. Violence and Social Practices of Jew-hatred
Discourse and social practice influenced each other vice versa. The study of
political anti-Semitism thus requires re-constructing the interrelations between
everyday encounters and conflicts between Christians and Jews. How did political
agitation and decisions influence social praxis and what events and conflicts
were taken up in political discourse? Therefore, the conference will pay special
attention to discriminatory practices against Jews. Both organized and
spontaneous acts of collective violence, demonstrations, boycott and exclusion
of Jews will be discussed and put in a comparative perspective. What were the
material, symbolic and ideological aims of the participants? What place did
physical action against Jews have among anti-Semitic, nationalistic,
paramilitary or student organizations? When and how did they manage to win over
certain circles or institutions for anti-Semitic actions? How did they justify
the implementation of violence? How
  did the state react towards these forms of political violence on the executive,
legal and legislative level?

C. Resistance against Anti-Semitism
In order to understand the social meaning of anti-Semitism, it is vital to
examine reactions and open resistance. Historical witnesses of anti-Semitism and
the attitude of social and state institutions such as parties, churches,
governments and local and international organizations deserve special attention.
How did Jews act on the institutional, intellectual and political level? What
were the possibilities and limits of co-operation with non-Jewish organizations?
What were the consequences of physical and media-related resistance or of
self-defense?
We kindly ask for paper proposals of approximately 1 page length including a
curriculum vitae with reference to language skills in English, German or Polish
until April 30th 2012 to konferencja@.... With reservations regarding the
respective financing commitment, the organizers will bear costs for travelling
and accommodation.

Tim Buchen
Deutsches Historisches Institut
Palac Karnickich
Al. Ujazdowskie 39
00-540 Warszawa
Poland
Email: buchen@...

Source
http://www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=193191

International Conference: World War II, Nazi Crimes, and the Holocaust in the
USSR
December 7-9, 2012 Moscow, Russia

Organizers Blavatnik Family Foundation Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies,
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Centre for European, Russian and
Eurasian Studies, Munk School of Global Affairs, and Centre for Jewish Studies,
University of Toronto Centre franco-russe de recherché en sciences humaines et
sociales de Moscou Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Department of
History, Georgetown University German Historical Institute Moscow Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History National Research University Higher
School of Economics, Moscow

Call for Papers

The National Research University Higher School of Economics; the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies; the Blavatnik
Family Foundation; the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the
Munk School of Global Affairs and the Centre for Jewish Studies at the
University of Toronto; the German Historical Institute Moscow; the Centre
franco-russe de recherche en sciences humaines et sociales de Moscou;  Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History; and Georgetown University's Center
for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Department of History, with the support of
the Centre d’études des mondes russe, caucasien, et centre- européen at the
École des hautes études en sciences sociales, invite applications for a
conference on World War II and the Holocaust in the Soviet Union.

The conference will be held December 7-9, 2012, in Moscow, Russia, at the Higher
School of Economics.  In the past decade, three related fields, each
interdisciplinary in its own right, have developed exponentially but sometimes
in isolation: the study of wartime Stalinism, the study of the Nazi occupation
of Soviet territories, and the study of the Holocaust in the East. This
conference will bring together the latest research conducted in all humanities
and social science disciplines in order to foster new analytical perspectives
and cross-fertilization in these and other key areas. The conference seeks to
highlight new research in such areas as evacuation, refugees, and displaced
persons; atrocities, mass killing, and mass graves; forced and slave labor; the
dynamics of complicity, collaboration, and various forms of resistance; everyday
life on the front and under occupation; understudied victims; occupier
perspectives on the War and the Holocaust,
including such acts as the starvation of Soviet POWs, and their contributions to
the history of National Socialism; new perspectives on the Soviet wartime
experience and the impact of war on the Soviet system; the study of the Soviet
home front; Soviet-German interactions and entanglements, both in specific
locales and in systemic terms; the cultural politics of representation and
commemoration in the aftermath; gender; and communities and identities forged
around the unprecedented experiences of war on the Eastern Front in World War
II.  The conference is intended to be interdisciplinary. Proposals for new,
original, and previously unpublished papers are welcome from scholars in all
relevant academic disciplines, including from doctoral students who have
advanced to candidacy. Applicants interested in presenting a paper should be
currently researching or completing projects exploring the topics and issues
listed above, broadly understood. Successful
applicants will be required to submit a copy of their presentation in advance of
the conference for circulation among commentators, other panelists, and
conference participants.  The conference will be conducted in English and
Russian. Simultaneous translation will be provided.  The deadline for receipt of
proposals is May 15, 2012. Participants will be selected and notified no later
than June 1, 2012.

To propose a paper for this conference, please send: (1) a cover letter
addressing your specific interests in the study of World War II and the
Holocaust in the Soviet Union; (2) your curriculum vitae; and (3) an abstract of
no more than 500 words of your proposed paper to Krista Hegburg, Program
Officer, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum,
at khegburg@..., and to Dr. Galina Zelenina, Senior Research Fellow,
Center for the History and Sociology of World War II, the Higher School of
Economics, Moscow, at gzelenina@....  Submissions must include the speaker’s
name, institutional affiliation, current position, contact address, and email.
Proposals may be in either Russian or English, but Russian-language proposals
should include an English abstract or summary. Applicants may apply individually
or suggest a panel. Applicants who are accepted may submit their full-length
papers in either English or Russian. For
applicants whose papers are accepted and indicate that they need financial
support, the conference organizers will provide lodging for the duration of the
conference and a stipend to help defray transportation costs.  A limited number
of junior scholar travel stipends will be available to partially defray costs
for graduate students and junior scholars from post-Soviet states to attend the
conference. Applicants must be advanced graduate students or recent Ph.D.
recipients no more than three years beyond conferral of their degree, and must
reside in one of the countries that formerly comprised the Soviet Union.
Scholars enrolled in graduate programs or teaching at universities outside of
these countries are not eligible for junior scholar travel stipends.  To apply
for a post-Soviet junior scholar travel stipend, please submit: (1) a curriculum
vitae that indicates your current academic affiliation; (2) a statement of
interest of not more than 750 words
addressing your specific interest in attending the conference, background in the
area of study, and how attendance will benefit the candidate’s research,
teaching, or future publications; and (3) a supporting letter from an academic
advisor, department chair, or dean that addresses the candidate’s qualifications
and research as well as his/her potential as a scholar to Krista Hegburg,
Program Officer, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, at khegburg@....
Statements of interest and CVs must be submitted in English; the supporting
letter may be submitted in either English or Russian.

The deadline for receipt of application for the junior scholar travel stipends
is June 1, 2012. Participants will be selected and notified no later than July
1, 2012.

Dear Sir, Madam,

It is our pleasure to invite you to the launch of "Fascism. Journal of
Comparative Fascist Studies," the new open access journal published by Brill and
NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Find the content of the
journal at: www.brill.nl/fascism . Join us for discussions and related topics
at: www.facebook.com/fascismjournal

The launch will take place in the conference room of the NIOD Institute for War,
Holocaust, and Genocide Studies, on

Tuesday April 17th 2012, from 15.30 till 18.30.

The program for the afternoon:
-          Opening remarks by dr. Madelon de Keizer ("Fascism" Editor-in-Chief,
senior researcher at NIOD)
-          Marti Huetink (editor at Brill)
-          Dr. Wim van Meurs (Board of Editors, Radboud University Nijmegen)

The official program is followed by a reception.

Address: Herengracht 380, Amsterdam

Your attendance will be greatly appreciated. Please RSVP via
d.de.visser@...

ABOUT
"Fascism. Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies" is a peer reviewed open access
e-journal, published twice a year in April and October by Brill and NIOD
Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (Amsterdam, The Netherlands).
Fascism seeks to provide the burgeoning international field of research into
fascism and extremism with a forum that is not restricted by national borders,
nor by expertise. It is directed towards a wide audience of interested fellow
specialists, geared towards informing policymakers and social workers, and to
engage students.

Fascism is a full Open Access journal, which means that all articles are freely
available, ensuring maximum, worldwide dissemination of content.

Fascism is funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific research (NWO)
through its Incentive Fund Open Access – Journals in the Humanities program.

Kind regards,
Madelon de Keizer (Editor-in-Chief)
Marjo Bakker (Managing Editor)

Fascism. Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies | Herengracht 380, 1016 CJ
Amsterdam (NL) | Telephone +31 (0)20‑5233 873 | E‑mail
fascismjournal@...

Victor A.Shnirelman
(Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow)

"The Myth of the Khazars: Ideology of Political Radicalism in Russia and its
Roots"

Moscow: Bridges of Culture – Gesharim, 2012. 312 pp. (In Russian)

    The Khazar myth provides the old myth of Jewish conspiracy with new,
seemingly powerful arguments, as well as a justification for Russia’s leading
role in the struggle against this mortal threat. This view of the past is
manifested in several ways. It was developed in the early 1950s by some
patriotic archaeologists who tried to prove that the Khazar Empire was just a
“parasite state." In the 1970s the Khazar myth became an integral part of
Russian chauvinist science-fiction and belles-lettres, and was used by activists
of the Russian nationalist movement in their struggle against "World Zionism."
The historian Lev Gumilev made a special contribution to this development by
depicting Khazaria as a “chimera" whose goal was to exploit mercilessly the
subjugated Slavic population. The Khazars or their most active segment were
indiscriminately identified with the Jews.
    The author analyzes how and why the "Khazar issue" was treated in Soviet and
post-Soviet historiography, belles-lettres,  the mass media, and textbooks, and
how this issue is related to antisemitic discourse. Science fiction and
belles-lettres are especially important in this respect since Neo-Nazi trends
manifested by this literature have become prominent and have contributed to
preparing the ground for "scientific antisemitism" in contemporary Russia. The
"Khazar issue" and its implications are also examined as they are featured in
ideological discussions of contemporary Russian chauvinist political movements.
For this purpose, articles in contemporary Russian nationalist periodicals are
considered. Actually this study demonstrates an importance of a combined
analysis of various texts (books, magazines, newspapers, web-sites) and
comparative studies of historiography, which usually have a low prophile in
studies of the contemporary Russian
  antisemitism.
        Ethnocentric myth-building is analyzed in terms of its content and
meaning, social and ethno-political context, its producers and their strategies.
The book demonstrates how the "Khazar myth" is embedded into antisemitic
discourse and related to the idea of a "Judeo-Mason plot."  It also illuminates
major differences between various factions within the Russian nationalism in
their attitude and interpretation of the “Khazar episode�. Finally, the
author argues that the “Khazars� turned to be a euphemism which is commonly
used by those Russian antisemites who would like to avoid being accused for
antisemitism.

CONTENTS
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. The Khazar Kaganate
Chapter 3. The Khazars Enter the Russian-Jewish Dialogue
Chapter 4. The Khazars in the Early Soviet Discourse
Chapter 5. The Artamonov Affair
Chapter 6. Lev Gumilev and the "Khazar Chimera"
Chapter 7. The "Anti-Khazarism" of Contemporary Russian Nationalists
                  7.1 The Neo-Eurasians
                  7.2 The Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists
                  7.3 The Neo-pagans
                 7.4 A Theory of the "Khazar Disaster"
                 7.5 Combined concepts
Chapter 8. The Khazars in Soviet and post-Soviet Textbooks and Belles-lettres
                       Textbooks
                       Belles-lettres
Chapter 9. The Kazars and Politics
Chapter 10. The Khazars in Ukrainian Historiography
Chapter 11. Conclusion: The "Khazars" as a Euphemism
Bibliography
Index

One can order the book through http://www.gesharim.org/, or Ozon.ru

Call for papers:

Observing Islam, Observing Each Other:
Western and Soviet Perceptions of Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus

Venue: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow, 25-27 June 2012.

The aim of this conference is to discuss the interactions between Western and
Soviet/post-Soviet Islamic Studies, specifically with relation to the study of
Islam and Muslim societies in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

-        How did the Cold War influence interpretations of Islam, in the East
and in the West? How did scholars in Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia look
at Western writings on Islam in the Soviet Union, and vice versa? What did we
know about each other, how did we differ in our focus of research and in our
interpretations, and where did we meet or even cooperate?
-        What diversities can be identified within Soviet studies of Islam and
within Western (partly ?Sovietologist?) studies, including Muslim emigré
scholars? What was the effect of Perestroika in the field of Islamic Studies,
including in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics of the USSR, and how were
these changes perceived in the West?
-        Where did scientific research interact with the production of Islamic
literature in the Caucasus and Central Asia, by Muslim writers?
-        What kind of epistemological critiques of the discipline were developed
in East and West? A major impetus for the transformation of Western Oriental
Studies came from Edward Said?s book Orientalism (1978), which sparked heated
debates on the political implications of research. Were these critiques
discussed in the Soviet Union?
-        Finally, which are the lasting effects of the politicization of
Oriental/Islamic Studies in the Soviet Union and in the West?
These are just some of the broader questions that will be addressed in the
sections of the Conference.

Our call goes out to senior scholars who would like to share their experiences,
and especially to junior scholars who are now working on these or closely
related issues, from whatever disciplinary angle. We are especially interested
in contributions by colleagues from Central Asia and the Caucasus, but also from
Russia and the West.

Conference contributions will be limited to 15 minutes, followed by much room
for discussion. Proposals for papers should include an abstract (of 1-2 pages,
with references) as well as the address and position of the applicant.

The conference will be organized by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with the Department of European
Studies of the University of Amsterdam and the Department of Oriental Studies of
the University of Bonn. The event is generously supported by the Volkswagen
Foundation (Hanover, Germany). For a limited number of participants we will be
able to offer financial support for travel and accommodation. The selection of
papers will be carried out on the basis of their scientific merits. Contributors
whose papers are accepted will also obtain visa support. It is planned to
publish the most topical contributions in a special volume after the event.

Please send your application by 15 April 2012 to both of the following two
addresses:

Dr. Vladimir Bobrovnikov (IVAN, Moscow):
vladimir_bobrovn@...

Alfrid K. Bustanov (Univ. of Amsterdam):
a.bustanov@...

Chechnya: rationales of violence and war experiences
Paris, 22-23 October 2012

CALL FOR PAPERS

http://russiaviolence.hypotheses.org/conference-chechnya-2012/chechnya-rationale\
s-of-violence-and-war-experiences

Since 1994, the Chechen war has been qualified in diverse ways by actors and
observers - colonial war, counter-terrorist operation, restoration of
constitutional order, war of extermination. This profusion - or perhaps
confusion of qualifiers reveals a multitude of explanations for the causes, aims
and consequences of the war, and often hints at the exceptionality of the
conflict. The aim of this conference will be not only to sum up, renew and
enrich existing research on the Chechen war, but also to put the phenomena of
violence at work there in a comparative perspective that takes into account the
renewal of the historiography of 20th century wars.

The Chechen war, which broke out in 1994 and began again in 1999 after a 3-year
cease-fire, played a central role in Russia's political evolution. Several
studies (Tishkov, Hughes, Dunlop, Lieven, Evangelista) have shown how the
Chechen war was linked with the collapse of the USSR and the reconfiguration of
the political system and Russian federalism, but also the role played by that
war in certain important Russian political events (Yeltsin's re-election in
1996, his resignation in 1999 in favour of Prime Minister Putin, whose
popularity was on the rise thanks to the war).

Although estimates of the number of victims of the first (1994-96) and second
wars (since 1999) remain a subject of debate (Cherkassov, Maksudov), as do the
periodisations of these wars, studies by NGOs suggest tens of thousands of
deaths in the two wars. Since 1999, those missing number in the thousands -
testimony to the repressive system put in place to "fight against terrorism".
The policy of systematic filtering of the population aimed particularly at men
(Le Huérou, Regamey) was accompanied by numerous acts of violence (torture,
rape, summary executions). The coming to power of Akhmad Kadyrov, succeeded on
his death in May 2004 by his son Ramzan, meant a change in the rationales of
violence and a "Chechenisation" of the conflict, which leads to the use of the
notion of "civil war".

At the present time, the violence taking place in the whole of North Caucasus is
analysed as a combination of a spread of war violence from Chechnya and of
rationales proper to the Republics of North Caucasus (Merlin). The question of
the spread of rationales of war violence into the whole of Russian society is
also raised, there being so many Russian soldiers and officers today having gone
through Chechnya, but policemen especially (Le Huérou, Sieca-Kozlowski).
Bombings and hostage-takings linked to the Chechen conflict also raise the issue
of Moscow's handling of terrorist acts (Dunlop).

Because Kadyrov was installed by Moscow in order for Chechnya to re-enter into
Russia's fold, his power paradoxically raises the question of the degree of
autonomy of a Republic whose leader claims to govern while not adhering to
Russian laws (on women's rights in general), and Chechnya's place in today's
Russia's political game (Malashenko, Lokshina). Another important element in
Moscow-Grozny relations is the memory of the deportation of Chechens in 1944,
the aim of an official mobilisation policy by pro-Russian Chechen authorities.
Lastly, even if relative and truncated, the policy of amnesty for combatants
suggests an "end of war" policy in which the issue of justice is not broached at
any moment whatsoever.

It is the whole of these tendencies and rationales of violence at work that the
conference will re-examine, drawing on deeply renewed research in war studies
done in the past twenty years from the perspective of history, political
science, anthropology, international relations, philosophy and law. Occasionally
borrowing from anthropology (Audoin-Rouzeau, Ingrao), recent historical research
has built up the concept of the culture of war (Becker, Horne), studying the war
experience of combatants (Duclos, Reno, Debos) and suggesting several
explanations for war violence. Putting forward the notion of trivialisation and
brutalisation (Mosse, Bartov), examining issues such as consent
(Audouin-Rouzeau, Becker, Browning) or the extent of constraint (Rousseau,
Cazals), they also emphasize specific acts of violence, particularly torture and
sexual violence (Branche, Virgili). Other research points to a need to pay
particular attention to post-war moments
  (Cabanes, Capdevilia, Duclos, Jardin, Picketty), to the situation of former
combatants (Delaporte, Edele, Prost, Oushakine) and to forms of transitional
justice (Saada, Lefranc, Nadeau, Delpla, Rousso). Finally, we will address
questions such as how conflicts fit into an international dimension and discuss
the role of international actors and issues of labelling and qualifying a
conflict (Lindemann).

Our objective in this conference - which will mainly focus on the history of
Chechnya since the end of the Soviet period and the collapse of the USSR - is
therefore not only to examine political, economic and social trends having
marked the Republic, but to reflect on conditions determining the production of
knowledge on this war from a comparative perspective, thanks to specialists on
other conflicts who will participate as discussants.

We will be interested in the most relevant tools, methods, questionings for
furthering understanding and analysis of this conflict, and will pay particular
attention to the various existing sources, to the way they are used by different
actors, as well as historians. We will pay attention to a precise chronology of
the last twenty years, attempting to replace events in the context of the era,
so as to avoid any anachronism or temptation to re-interpret the past in light
of the present. Finally, though many research works emphasize the consequences
of the conflict on how Russia has evolved, we will emphasize the consequences of
this conflict on Chechnya and Chechen society.

The questions we wish to address can be grouped under four main themes:

How to work on this war?

This question, unavoidable for a conflict as contemporary as that of Chechnya,
is in fact a dual one. As an ethical and political question, it is actual for
all researchers in the domain of extreme violence (Sémelin, Zawadzki, Le Pape,
Siméant, Vidal). If it is necessary that we discuss this war, which took place
right in front of us, is it possible to produce knowledge which is purely
academic and involves neither taking a stand nor action? How can we work without
endangering, worsening the condition of persons who are the object of extreme
acts of violence, at the very time when these acts of violence are taking place?

Then there is the question of sources. The war in post-Soviet Chechnya began
less than twenty years ago, and has given rise to a profusion of journalistic
sources, humanitarian or human rights NGO reports, testimonies gathered by the
latter which are extremely valuable sources (Lokshina, Sokirianskaia); numerous
actors and witnesses can be questioned. At the same time, Chechnya was and has
to a great extent remained inaccessible: in addition to the dangers inherent in
any armed conflict were those of the chaotic period between the two wars marked
by hostage-taking and assassinations, besides the entry prohibitions put in
place by the Russian authorities as of 1999. Still today, Chechnya remains a
dangerous region where the foreign visitor or researcher is under strict
control. In this context, what do existing sources tell us and what sources are
used by and are usable by researchers?

Political rationales of violence

Our aim here is to analyse acts of violence committed against civilians as well
as their perpetrators, from the point of view of the military and police
rationales at work in the conflict. In this case, two problems arise- the
qualification and labelling of the conflict (war, anti-terrorism) and the
consequences of this naming on the war terrain; what relationship is there
between the naming of the enemy by the political power and the practice of acts
of violence on the terrain?  Are there borrowings of anti-terrorist practices
from other countries, as well as from Soviet counter-insurrection practices? In
what way does the conduct of the war reflect the situation in the military, but
also, in what way does it bring about reforms and reorganisations? How to
evaluate the role played by R. Kadyrov's armed forces in this violence? What are
the relations between the boeviki, independentist and/or Islamist combatants and
the civilian population? How to
  analyse the recourse to terrorism and its evolution during the war years? From
the legal perspective, what links are there between the various stages of the
conflict (jus ad bellum/ in bello/ post bellum) that enable us to speak of its
breaking out, taking place, and of issues of after-war justice/reconciliation.
Finally, how to record the Chechen war in the long history of wars and
characterise it with the tools of "war studies"? Is the distinction between
"old" and "new" war (Kaldor) operational in the case of this conflict?

War experiences and socio-cultural consequences of the war

We would like to examine the existing sources, testimonies, memoires, narrations
and fictions to try to understand what was lived by those who went through the
war. First of all by the civilian populations, whether they remained in Chechnya
or fled the conflict. Whereas the Russian population living in
Chechnya-Ingushetia during the Soviet era left the territory gradually,
beginning in 1991, what were the effects of the war on Chechen society, and on
the different peoples/persons living in Chechnya before the war? What were the
economic consequences and issues brought on by the war? How to analyse the
evolution of religion and religious practice, as well as the political
mobilisations of religion? How did social cohesion evolve in its various forms
and what role in these upheavals is played by the teïp, traditional organisation
in clans (Sokiranskaia)? What specific forms of violence were women exposed to,
how did their role evolve and, more generally,
  how did gender relations evolve during the war? Can we speak of a
"re-traditionalisation" today, and if so, how can it be explained? What about
the formation of a diaspora and of Chechen communities in exile, what type of
social links connect those who left - and sometimes returned to Chechnya?

We will also examine the war experience of combatants, particularly in terms of
"war trauma", but also in the translation of these reactions into resistance and
disobedience movements. How the rationales of violence proper to police and
military institutions play themselves out on the terrain, and how, inversely,
violence and the war experience influence the behaviour of policemen and the
military once back in Russia, outside of Chechnya.

Phases of "non-war" and ends-of-war

Contrary to the temptation to see the history of Russian-Chechen relations only
structured by war and confrontation, we will also examine times of "non war".
First of all, the years between 1970-1980, a peaceful period, though not without
tensions which remains to be re-explored. Second, the events of the beginning of
the 1990s, after the fall of the USSR, the nature of the political relations
between Moscow and Grozny and the modalities of negotiations or
non-negotiations, as well as the role of the various actors involved. Finally,
how to qualify the period between 1996-1999 ("interwar", "end-of-war") and the
present period?

For all these periods, we will ask what legal relations were set up between
Grozny and Moscow, how the status of Chechnya evolved and how the issue of
recognition intervened in the process. What were the forms of political
management of Chechnya by Moscow and what forms of government in Chechnya itself
were given priority? How is Chechnya managed by Moscow from the viewpoint of the
whole North Caucasus? How to analyse relations between Chechen and Russian
elites, whether before and during the wars, and today, under Ramzan Kadyrov? How
were economic relations with Moscow and the rest of Russia established, how did
Chechnya fit into the networks and what role did it play in the circulation of
various flows - economic and financial, legal and illegal? Finally, we will ask
how, during these 20 years, issues of justice and impunity were addressed, in
particular, the importance of internal justice mechanisms in comparison with the
possibilities and limits of
  international justice; notably in the absence of Russia's ratification of the
Rome statute founding the CPI.

The inter-disciplinary conference is open to the contributions of historians,
sociologists, researchers in political science and international relations,
cultural studies, literature and the cinema, as well as specialists in military
questions. Although the conference will focus mainly on Chechnya since the fall
of the USSR, contributions on earlier periods are also welcome, as are proposals
involving a comparison between the Chechen case and other conflicts.

Schedule

Persons wishing to participate should send to chechnyaviolence@... a
resume of 300 to500 words along with a short biographical note (no CV) for May
4th 2012.

Participants accepted will be informed by June 1st 2012.

Participants will be requested to provide an abstract of approximately 5-7 pages
(3000-5000 words) for September 15th 2012.

Working languages: French, English, Russian (presentations are possible in these
three languages, French-Russian and Russian-French translation only will be
available).

Information: http://russiaviolence.hypotheses.org, chechnyaviolence@...

This conference is organised by the research project Understanding Violence in
Russia: War, Institutions, Society thanks to the support of the "Emergence(s)"
Programme of the City Hall of Paris.

Organising Institutions: Centre d'étude des mondes russe, caucasien et
centre-européen (CERCEC) (CNRS/EHESS); Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme,
Paris; Université Libre de Bruxelles-; Centre d'études franco-russe, Moscow.

Organisation Committee: Françoise Daucé (University Blaise Pascal
Clermont-Ferrand/ CERCEC(EHESS/CNRS)), Anne Le Huérou (CERCEC(EHESS/CNRS)), Aude
Merlin (ULB-CEVIPOL, Brussels), Amandine Regamey (University Paris
I/CERCEC(EHESS/CNRS)), Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (CERCEC (EHESS/CNRS),
PIPSS.ORG)

Scientific Committee Alain Blum (CERCEC (EHESS/CNRS)), Raphaëlle Branche
(University Paris-1, CHS, IUF), Marielle Debos (University Paris Ouest, ISP),
Jean-Vincent Holeindre (Panthéon-Assas University (Paris 2), Centre Raymond-Aron
(EHESS)), Mary Kaldor (London School of Economics), Julie Saada (Artois
University), Aglaya Snetkova (Centre for Security Studies, ETH, Zurich), Katia
Sokirianskaia (International Crisis Group, Moscow), Maïrbek Vachagaev
(Association for Caucasian Studies, Paris), Vanessa Voisin (CEFR-IRICE)

THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM BULLETIN
A Biweekly Newsletter of Current Affairs
Vol. 6, No. 7(163), 6 April 2012
Compilers: Fabian Burkhardt, Parikrama Gupta, Vildane Oezkan & Andreas Umland

I   NEWS: 16 - 31 March 2012
II  SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS
III ANNOTATIONS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

[NOTE: When viewing an RNB issue in the Messages archive of the homepage and the
end of the text is truncated, scroll to the end of the message and click "Expand
Messages." Only then, the whole text of the - otherwise truncated - issue will
appear. When quoting from an article found here, please, mention the RNB, as a
source. Thank you!]
====================


I NEWS: 16 - 31 March 2012

Communists Want Referendum Over Russia NATO Base
16 March 2012
RIA Novosti

The Russian Communist Party has demanded that two referendums, an all-Russian
and a regional one, be held over the projected deployment of a NATO transit base
in the Volga city of Ulyanovsk, the party's press service said on Friday.
Presently, Moscow is in talks with the United States on an unprecedented
transport agreement, under which non-lethal cargos from Afghanistan would be
flown to an airport in the city of Ulyanovsk in the Volga region, and then
transferred to Europe by train.
Moscow says the offer would ease the strain on the alliance's supply chain to
forces in Afghanistan.
The agreement on the NATO Afghan cargo transit hub is not coming into force yet,
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Wednesday. "This draft agreement…
has not come into force yet, it has not yet been considered by the government,"
Lavrov told State Duma members.
"We demand that a referendum "Do you approve of the deployment of a NATO base in
the city of Ulyanovsk?" be held among the residents of the Ulyanovsk Region
before the final decision is taken," the communists said in a statement issued
on their website.
An all-Russian referendum should "answer a question on how to preserve Russia's
sovereignty, integrity and independence," the party said.

http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120316/172212823.html
---------------------

Nationalists want to form "big and ambitious" party
19 March 2012
Interfax

MOSCOW - The Russkiye nationalist movement plans to establish a political party
with an initial membership of about 20,000, movement leader Dmitry Demushkin
told Interfax on Monday.
"We have decided to form a party. Members of the Russkiye Supreme Political
Council cast their votes; there was only one vote against and all the others
were for, so the party will be formed," he said.
If the amendments to the Law on Political Parties are passed, the minimal
membership of a party eligible for registration will be cut to 500, Demushkin
said. "We do not want a party of 500 members. We want our party to be big and
ambitious. We will submit about 20,000 files to show that we are not a dwarf
organization," he said.
"There is a contest for the party name and emblem," Demushkin said. "Work in the
regions will start when the party name and emblem are approved. We will merge a
large number of regional organizations; we have been doing that for three
months. After that, the party will hold constituent conferences in regions."
"We need a party not just to be represented in politics. Many regional entities
wish to take part in local elections on our behalf, which makes the party
vital," he said.
The movement will stop its activity when the party is formed, Demushkin said.
The presidential amendments to the Law on Political Parties, which have been
passed in the first reading at the State Duma, cut the minimal party membership
to 500 (from the current 40,000).
The State Duma is expected to pass the bill by the end of March, and the
Federation Council will put it to vote on March 28.

http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-nationalists-want-big-ambitious-party-6\
10.cfm
----

Samba upset by racism happening "in view of children"
19 March 2012
BBC News

Russian club Anzhi Makhachkala have called on Lokomotiv Moscow to identify the
fan who threw a banana at Congo's Christopher Samba on Sunday.
The incident, which Anzhi have described as "idiotic", took place in Moscow as
the hosts won 1-0.
"We are assured that representatives of ... Lokomotiv will settle this issue and
the guilty will be identified and punished," Anzhi said in a statement.
Samba said he was saddened by the incident happening close to children.
Lokomotiv have said they will publish findings of their investigation into the
incident on their official website, while the Russian Football Union (RFU) has
also launched its own investigation.
"The incident with Samba was simply outrageous and I've instructed our ethics
committee to look into this," RFU chief Sergei Fursenko told reporters.
"I'm very upset that such misconduct took place in view of children who were
sitting on those very stands," former Blackburn Rovers player Samba told Anzhi's
official website.
Samba throws the banana back into the crowd (photo courtesy of Sovsport.ru)
"It can serve as a bad example for them. I try not to think about racism. I just
want to believe that such problems do not exist on a global basis. Maybe I am
mistaken but I do want to believe in it.
"As a rule any scandal of this kind is a result of a misconduct committed by one
silly person. I don't want to react to this."
Samba joined Anzhi from Blackburn Rovers in late February and was playing only
his third league game for the club.
The BBC's Rafael Saakov in Moscow says that the All-Russian Supporters' Union
has expressed its "appreciation" for Samba's words on how this was an
"individual act" and how he didn't "inflate this story to the scale of the
universe".
Lokomotiv, who initially rejected the accusations of racism, says the club is
investigating the incident with the help of video evidence.
"The club's Security Department is currently studying the videos and is
collecting the comments of eyewitnesses of the incident," Lokomotiv said in a
statement.
"So far, video reports viewed by the club members don't give a clear picture of
what has happened."
"We would also like to note that Lokomotiv fans are among the most intelligent
in the Premier League and have never been noticed in racist abuse."
Nonetheless, fans of the club attracted unwanted attention in 2010 when hoisting
a banner displaying a banana and the words 'Thanks West Brom' after Nigeria's
Osaze Odemwingie was sold to the English side.
Shortly afterwards, RFU officials denied the actions had racial undertones.
"In Russia 'to get a banana' means 'to fail a test somewhere'," said then
director general Alexei Sorokin.
Sorokin is now the CEO of the Organising Committee for Russia's hosting of the
2018 World Cup, a Fifa move which received criticism in some quarters because of
the country's track record with racism.
Last year, another Anzhi player, 38-year-old Brazilian veteran Roberto Carlos,
was twice the victim of banana attacks at Saint Petersburg and Samara.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/17434648
----

Russian Orthodox Church recommends Berezovsky to form Antichrist Party
19 March 2012
Interfax Religion

Moscow, March 19, Interfax - Businessman Boris Berezovsky may be successful in
the establishment of an Antichrist party, the Moscow Patriarchate believes."I am
glad that Boris Abramovich is not the first person proposing to establish a
party based on Christian or Orthodox values. There are six organizing committees
of similar parties already. Hopefully, this broth will produce something tasty,"
Chairman of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society
Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin told the Interfax-Religion.London resident,
businessman Berezovsky has announced the decision to form a party based on
Christian and Democratic values."I propose to call it the Christian Democratic
Revolutionary Party of Russia or the Resurrection Party," Berezovsky wrote on
LiveJournal on Monday."Christian because love and freedom are the cornerstones
of our party ideology. Democratic because only a democratic political system in
Russia can ensure the implementation of our ideology. Revolutionary because a
shift from pagan to Christian mentality means revolution. The Resurrection Party
because we will announce the party's establishment on Resurrection Day, April
15," he said.Berezovsky "may take a much more colorful niche and a highly
promising one if he reads the Apocalypses attentively," Rev. Chaplin said."He
may form an Antichrist party and even run for this post. I believe that his
words and deeds give him a perfect chance [for that] if they are analyzed from
the position of Christian morals. Even his latest statement fits many prophecies
describing the Apocalyptic Beast (an Antichrist name in the New Testament)," he
said.Antichrist is a historically unique figure, and one "has to travel a lot by
the path followed by Boris Abramovich and offered by him to others" for aspiring
for this mission, he noted."Yet he is a talented, resolute and smart person. He
may be successful, who knows. At least a person of such scale may learn to make
false miracles necessary in such cases," he said.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9165
-----

Russian police tortured extremism suspect: rights group
20 March 2012
Agence France-Presse

MOSCOW - Russian police in a Moscow suburb tortured a young man suspected of
extremism, pulling out his fingernails and threatening to rape him with a
truncheon, a rights group said on Tuesday.
Leading rights group Memorial said the man, Farid Eldarov, was tortured by
police in the suburban town of Khimki during questioning after a raid targeting
suspected Islamist extremists.
It was the latest claim of police brutality after a male suspect died from a
police beating and reported rape with a champagne bottle in the central Russian
region of Tatarstan in a case that prompted a top-level investigation.
Police used a number of brutal methods in an attempt to force Eldarov to testify
against another suspect, Memorial said, after its lawyer interviewed the man in
the detention centre.
"They cut off his fingernails halfway down. Then they put a noose on his neck
attached to the wall at head height so that it suffocated him when he moved, and
started beating him," Memorial said.
"They dislocated his arms and legs, smashed his fingers and toes and threatened
to rape him with a truncheon and send a photo of the act around prisons," it
said.
One policeman told the victim who originates from the mostly Muslim region of
Dagestan, "We will force you to love Russians," it said.
Eldarov hit two of the policemen in the face and has been charged with violence
against officials, a criminal offence that could see him jailed for five years.
He remains in detention, a decision Memorial called illegal.
Russia's Investigative Committee is looking into police violence after the
shocking death of Sergei Nazarov, 52, in the city of Kazan on March 10 focused
attention on brutal methods used on suspects.
Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev denounced Nazarov's killing, and seven
officers at the station have been jailed pending trial during investigation of
three cases of police brutality.
The Investigative Committee said Tuesday that 28 people had come forward in the
past day to report abuses by police in the city.

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Russian+police+torture+extremism+suspect+right\
s+group+says/6329176/story.html#ixzz1qVFPF9Dq
----

Court turns down appeal in 'Bhagavad Gita' extremism case
21 March 2012
Ria Novosti

TOMSK - A Tomsk court turned down a prosecutor's appeal on Wednesday to classify
the Russian translation of the "Bhagavad Gita As It Is" as extremist, ending a
long legal battle over the text.
In summer 2011, Tomsk prosecutors initiated a case to impose a ban on the
Russian translation of "Bhagavad Gita As It Is," written by the founder of the
International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) A.C. Bhaktivedanta
Swami Prabhupada, claiming that the scripture promotes extremism.
According to Tomsk University experts cited by the local prosecutor's office,
the dogma described in the book incites religious hatred, humiliates the dignity
of people on the basis of sex, race, nationality, language, origin and attitude
toward religion.
A Tomsk district court ruled against the prosecutors' request to recognize the
book as extremist in December 2011. The Prosecutor's Office then challenged the
ruling.
The President of the Association of Indians in Russia Sanjeet Kumar Jha thanked
the court for its decision after it turn down the prosecutor's appeal.
"We are thankful to the Russian justice system that such a decision was taken
and thank the Russian scientists who devoted their life to studying this topic
and stood up for the book," Kumar Jha said.
Kumar Jha said Indian society had "followed the legal process and were worried
as the Bhagavad Gita is an ancient text and a heritage of mankind."
Tomsk's Society for Krishna Consciousness spokesperson Alexander Shakhov said
his group had written an open letter to Russian President Dmity Medvedev and
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, asking them to intervene in the case and
seeking a change in the law to make it inadmissible to prosecute sacred texts.

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120321/172298211.html
----

Russian Court Upholds Ban on Scientology Books
21 March 2012
Ria Novosti

A Moscow regional court upheld a lower court's ruling to ban books on
Scientology by the group's founder, L. Ron Hubbard, on grounds of inciting
extremism, the tvrain internet channel said on Wednesday.
A Moscow regional court upheld a lower court's ruling to ban books on
Scientology by the group's founder, L. Ron Hubbard, on grounds of inciting
extremism, the tvrain internet channel said on Wednesday.
Scientology, founded by Hubbard in the U.S. in the early 1950s, is one of the
most controversial religious movements of the past century and is often
described as a cult. A court in Shchyolkovo in Moscow region first banned
Hubbard's books last June.
Hubbard's books on Scientology "seek to form an isolated social group whose
members are trained to perform their functions generally aimed against the rest
of the world," the court said in its ruling.
Russian regional courts have upheld and dismissed rulings against Hubbard's
books since 2010.
"No other country [but Russia] looks for extremism in religious literature,"
Scientology supporters have said.
Scientology is treated with caution in many countries. France has recognized it
as a totalitarian sect and the Church of Scientology in France has been fined
for making its members spend exorbitant sums of money on tests and vitamins.
Germany has branded Scientology as unconstitutional.
The group has a strong following in Hollywood and its adherents include actors
John Travolta and Tom Cruise.
The U.S. government commission on religious freedom (USCIRF) put Russia on a
watch list of countries requiring "close monitoring" in its 2012 annual report
on Tuesday, for reasons including its actions against Scientology.
Earlier on Wednesday, a court in Tomsk, Siberia, turned down a prosecutor's
appeal to classify as extremist a Russian translation of Bhagavad Gita As It Is,
a commentary on a Hindu philosophy book, ending a long legal battle over the
text.

http://en.rian.ru/crime/20120321/172303524.html
----

Russia criticized over gay issue beyond universal values - Lavrov
21 March 2012
Interfax

Moscow, March 21, Interfax - Homosexualism is unlikely to be accepted in Russia,
said Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov."Attempts to load universal approaches with
one's own additional views of the human rights, as is the case, let's say, with
sexual minorities, which periodically causes such a nervous reaction from the
European Union to our attempts to protect our society from the propaganda of
homosexuality - I believe, these attempts go beyond the universally accepted
values," Lavrov said in an interview with the Kommersant FM radio station."Given
that the overwhelming majority of our country's population profess the Orthodox
Christian faith, or at least follow the Orthodox Christian traditions, such
makeweights added to the universal values will barely produce any shoots," the
minister said."After all, other civilizations, non-European ones, too have their
own values which are unlikely to take root on the European soil," the Russian
foreign minister added.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9171
----

Patriarch Kirill's organization backs up the law against homosexual propaganda
21 March 2012
Interfax

Moscow - The World Russian People's Council supports St. Petersburg governor
Georgy Poltavchenko as he has recently signed a law to ban promoting
homosexuality and pedophilia among the under-aged. "Statements made by certain
opposition ideologists who say that by signing the law Poltavchenko "blocked his
way to governors at free elections" as "opposition won't forgive him" look
ridiculous. Such statements only stress that such "opposition" exists in a
narrow immoral social stratum and its interest are from the interests of Russian
people," the Council says in its statement conveyed to Interfax-Religion.
According to its authors, critics of the law, for example, international
organization Human Rights Watch, which demands to cancel the adopted law,
infringe on Russian citizens' right to protect public morality and their
children. "It is an expression of the perverted human rights concept that
considers rights of homosexual preferable to the rights of overwhelming majority
of people - followers of normal family lifestyle," the Council stress in its
statement. The World Russian People's Council considers necessary not only to
oppose this trend in Russia, but also urges western and world societies to take
joint actions as their rights to protect public morality and human dignity "are
roughly violated by legislation of certain countries.""In the epoch when
"immoral totalitarianism" advances and cruelly destroys traditional nature of
human personality and Christian spiritual heritage, Russia in eyes of millions
of Europeans and Americans may and should become a stronghold of moral norms and
true human values," the statement writers believe.The World Russian People's
Council is an international public organization set up in 1993. The organization
is led by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia. The Council received a
special consultative status at the UN in 2005.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9172
----

Russia Launches Anti-Racism Football Taskforce
21 March 2012
RIA Novosti

MOSCOW - The Russian Football Union has launched a dedicated taskforce to tackle
racism in the game, just days after a banana was thrown at Anzhi defender
Christopher Samba after a game, the federation said Wednesday.
  "The RFU's ethics committee has decided to create a special working group made
up of members of the committee," the federation said on its website, adding that
the body would address "racism, xenophobia and extremism."
The banana was apparently thrown from the VIP seats at Lokomotiv Moscow's
stadium after a 1-0 league win for the home team, and landed near Samba, who
threw it off the pitch.
Russia is set to host the 2018 World Cup, but there are fears it could be
disrupted by racism, as the domestic game has been plagued by racist incidents.
Earlier this season, Anzhi's Roberto Carlos was the victim of two incidents
involving bananas, while fan groups at Spartak Moscow have been known to
celebrate Adolf Hitler's birthday at games.
Russian Premier League clubs Zenit St. Petersburg and Krylya Sovetov were each
fined $10,000 after their fans racially abused Roberto Carlos.
After a meeting of the federation's disciplinary committee Wednesday, it was
announced that the Samba case would be dealt with at an unspecified later date.
Last week, the federation ordered Torpedo Moscow to play their next home game
behind closed doors after fans shouted racist slogans and threw snowballs at
Ivorian-born Alania Vladikavkaz defender Dacosta Goore.

http://en.ria.ru/sports/20120321/172309951.html
----

Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin regrets Orthodox believers failed to exterminate
Bolsheviks
22 April 2012
Interfax

Moscow - Head of the Synodal Department for Church and Society Relations
Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin is sure that believers should be tough and unbending
in standing for their shrines. "In fact, I am sure that our believers should
have responded in a different way than they did in the 1920s when Lenin
initiated repression against them. They should have responded with the whole
power of armor and people's resistance against Bolsheviks," the priest said at
his meeting with TV Department students of Moscow State University.According to
him, it was "a moral thing worthy for Christian behavior - to exterminate as
many Bolsheviks as possible to defend the things that are holy for a Christian
and throw down the Bolshevik power".Father Vsevolod found it difficult to say
what prevented believers from doing it - "poor organization, insufficient
decisiveness or natural mildness of a Russian person.""The whole Orthodox
tradition and the Gospel of Christ in this case command people to defend
themselves, even using the power of armor, against illegality of pseudo-power
that was usurpative and had never been legal," he summed up.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9175
----

Russian punk band were doing devil's work, says leader of Orthodox church:
Patriarch Kirill condemns calls for leniency after Pussy Riot performed
unsanctioned show in Moscow's main cathedral
25 March 2012
The Guardian

A feminist punk band who staged an unsanctioned performance in Moscow's
principal cathedral were doing the work of the devil, according to the head of
the Russian Orthodox church.  Patriarch Kirill said that "the devil laughed at
us" when Pussy Riot performed their song Virgin Mary, Mother of God, Expel
Putin! in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour less than a fortnight before
presidential elections.  Three alleged members of Pussy Riot, who wear colourful
balaclavas to hide their identities, have been arrested since the "punk prayer."
They remain in prison awaiting trial on hooliganism charges and deny taking part
in the 21 February show. All face sentences of up to seven years.  Patriarch
Kirill appeared annoyed by calls for leniency. There were people who sought to
"justify and downplay this sacrilege", he said. "My heart breaks from bitterness
that amongst these people there are those who call themselves Orthodox."  Some
members of the Orthodox church initiated an open letter to the patriarch earlier
this month, calling on him to "maintain a Christian attitude" and for all
criminal charges against the accused to be dropped.  Two of the three imprisoned
women, Maria Alyokhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, have young children and were
arrested the day before Vladimir Putin won a third term as president in a vote
marred by fraud allegations.  While he avoided mentioning Pussy Riot by name,
Patriarch Kiril said the group's members "believe in the strength of propaganda,
in the strength of lies and slander, in the strength of the internet, in the
strength of the media [and] in the strength of money and arms".  Other songs
played publicly by the band, which is closely linked to Russia's opposition
movement, have included "Putin Pissed Himself", "Death to Prison, Freedom to
Protest", and "Fuck the Sexist, Fuck Putin's Henchman."  Vladimir Putin's press
secretary has said that the president-in-waiting reacted "negatively" when told
about Pussy Riot's cathedral performance.

https://apps.facebook.com/theguardian/world/2012/mar/25/pussy-riot-devils-work-k\
irill
-----------------

Over 30 clerics killed by extremists in Dagestan since late 1990s
26 March 2012
Interfax Religion

Makhachkala, March 26, Interfax - Gitinamagomed Abdulgapurov, the imam of the
central mosque in Buynaksk, became the 34th prominent cleric to have been killed
in Dagestan since 1998, Dagestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov told the
republic's Security Council. "They are attempting to convince us that the cause
of the violence is poor work of law enforcement bodies, unfair laws, abuse of
powers by law enforcement officers. This is a lie. Having no arguments against
the true connoisseurs of Islam, extremists resort to murder," he said.The
Buynaksk imam and his bodyguard were killed in a terrorist attack on Friday
morning.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9189
-----

Russian Church deplores UK ban on wearing crosses at work
26 March 2012
Interfax

Moscow - The Moscow Patriarchate has deplored the ban in Britain on wearing
religious symbols in the workplace and described it as a manifestation of
totalitarianism."Those Western liberals who are actually forcing totalitarian
regime standards on free people are making a big mistake," Metropolitan
Hilarion, the head of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church
Relations, said on Rossiya 24 television.These people have not gone through
reprisals against the Church "and therefore they do not know what it feels like
when your cross is being ripped off your neck," he said.The Metropolitan said he
had had an experience of living in Britain and he could see "liberal and
Anarchist patterns spreading fast in the public space."Reports said earlier that
the British government wants to defend its ban on wearing crosses at work in the
European Court of Human Rights."The introduction and even a discussion of such
standards looks like a symptom of some madness or extreme moral decay," he said,
adding that believers will never put up with this and will fight.The Strasbourg
Court will hear the suits, filed by four Christians, who lost their cases in
British courts and who protested religious discrimination.Archpriest Mikhail
Dudko, the sacristan of the Russian Assumption Cathedral in London, said
recently that one of the parishioners, a woman, lost her job for wearing a cross
at work, even though it was not visible. The woman said she had asked her
manager to allow her to wear the cross and promised to stick it up with scotch
tape, but her request was ignored.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9192 \
----

Communist Leader Zyuganov Warns That Russia Might Go Through Revolution
March 27, 2012
Interfax

Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov is convinced that the Russian
leadership has absolutely exhausted its governance resources and will be
replaced either peacefully or through a revolution in a not very distant future.
"By planning our party's strategy and tactics, we should consider two principal
scenarios: the first one is an evolution scenario, which envisions elections to
the State Duma in 2016 and presidential elections in 2018. The second scenario,
the likelihood of which is increasing, is exacerbation of the economic and
political crisis involving the replacement of the top government either through
early elections or through an extra-parliamentary way,"
Zyuganov said in an interview published in the Tuesday issue of Pravda.
"It is true that there is no revolutionary situation yet, but it can ripen
quickly and unexpectedly. The people are tired of living in an atmosphere of
lies, violence, and soullessness, and it is becoming increasingly harder for the
authorities to be hypocritical, lie, and govern in an old way. The hopes that
'everything will somehow sort itself out' are vanishing, and a new era, an era
of determined changes, is coming," Zyuganov said.
The presidential power "has fully exhausted its resources," Zyuganov said. "The
country has approached a strategic turn in its history and come up to the line
behind which is either disastrous disintegration or radical modification," he
said.
"While the authorities are making vain attempts to prove their popularity, the
process of aversion toward them is increasing among the broadest strata of
society," Zyuganov said. In particular, he mentioned problems that United Russia
is experiencing now as the ruling party. "By formally winning the parliamentary
elections and retaining power, United Russia has almost absolutely lost its
authority and has turned from the leading party into a party of frauds and
thieves in the masses' eyes. United Russia's fall is obvious, and we are now
witnessing the death throes of another, the sixth in succession, image of a
ruling party," he said.
------------------

Anti-gay bill submitted to Russian parliament
29 March 2012
Interfax

Moscow, March 29, Interfax - A bill imposing administrative punishment for
propaganda of homosexuality among minors has been submitted to the State
Duma.The Novosibirsk regional Legislative Assembly has proposed amending the
Code of Administrative Offences so that an ordinary individual guilty of
propaganda of homosexuality among minors should face a fine varying from 4,000
to 5,000 rubles. An official guilty of the same offence would be fined 40,000 to
50,000 rubles and a legal entity from 400,000 to 500,000 rubles.The authors of
the bill insist that their proposal cannot be viewed as one violating
constitutional rights of individuals.The bill authorizes Interior Ministry
officials to compile administrative offence reports for public activities aimed
at propagating homosexuality among minors, and judges would be authorized to
consider such administrative offences."Propaganda of homosexuality has gained
momentum in contemporary Russia," and this propaganda is being spread both
through the media and through "active organization of public actions propagating
homosexuality as a norm," says an explanatory note to the bill.The Novosibirsk
lawmakers believe such information is especially dangerous to children and
teenagers, as they are unable to seriously assess it."This is why the younger
generation should be primarily protected against homosexuality propaganda, and
this bill is intended for this very purpose," the note says.

http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=9206
====================


II SURVEYS, ANALYSES, COMMENTS

Putin's paranoia could have consequences for U.S.
By TRUDY RUBIN
The News Tribune, 14 March 2012

Can Washington have a working relationship with a Russian leader who thinks
Americans are out to destroy him? After a week of listening to official
anti-American rhetoric in Moscow, I find it hard to see how.  Vladimir Putin,
newly elected to a third presidential term (after an interval as prime
minister), has made clear he believes Washington has him in its crosshairs. 
"Nobody can impose their policy on us," he proclaimed to a cheering crowd at his
victory rally near the Kremlin. "Our people could recognize the provocation from
those who want to destroy the country. The Orange scenario will never work
here."  Putin was referring to the 2004 Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, where
street protests overturned a pro-Russian, antidemocratic president. The Russian
leader thinks the United States directed the Orange Revolution. He also thinks
that Russians protesting rigged elections are paid by the United States.  "Putin
really believes that the United States is out to get him and intends to have a
regime change in Russia," says Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow
Center.  Indeed, the depth of Putin's paranoia is more germane to future
U.S.-Russian relations than whether he rigged the election (even had his margin
not been padded by fraud, he still would have won).  Some argue that Russian
foreign policy won't change much under Putin 2.0. After all, President Barack
Obama's cooperative relationship with outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev - the
so-called "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations - required a green light from Putin.
Moreover, U.S. officials have received assurances from high-level Russians that,
with the election over, U.S.-Russian relations can return to a more normal keel.
But it's hard to imagine cooperation on issues such as Iran and Syria with a man
who feels such personal animosity toward the United States. Consider the
following: U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul was met with a barrage of hostility
after he arrived in Moscow in January; he was accused on state-controlled TV of
being sent to foment a revolution.  McFaul was a chief architect of Obama's
"reset." However, he has long been involved with nongovernmental organizations
that promote democracy, which makes him suspect to Putin. McFaul upset the
Kremlin when, the day after presenting his credentials, he met with opposition
activists, along with visiting Deputy Secretary of State William Burns.  The
unprecedented vitriol directed McFaul's way indicates the depth of Putin's
suspicions about U.S. intentions.  Anti-Americanism was a central feature of the
Russian leader's presidential campaign, playing on the innate suspicions of
Russians raised to think the United States was hostile. In the run-up to the
election, I heard anti-American rhetoric on state TV talk that was so strident
it would have shocked Politburo members in the former Soviet Union.  TV stations
also aired documentaries describing U.S. "plots" to attack or dismember Russia -
and alleged American schemes to make Putin resign.  Of course, such agitprop was
aimed at boosting the votes for Putin by tarring opposition activists as foreign
agents. And it worked: Small wonder that a cabbie who voted for Putin asked me,
with deep sincerity, "Why does America want to destroy us?"  However, Russian
political analysts tell me Putin's anti-Americanism has much deeper roots than
electioneering. It springs in part from his KGB indoctrination and from his
feeling that Washington rebuffed him in his first term as president.  Smarting
from Russia's lost superpower status, and from NATO's expansion into Eastern
Europe, he was angered at the Bush administration's assertion of global
dominance and its Iraq war. So, says Trenin, Putin fell back on "fantasies of
alliance with Europe or China vs. the United States."  To be fair, Russia's
interests in Syria and Iran do differ from America's.  "Most of those in the
Putin entourage think Syrian President Bashar al-Assad can tough it out and he
will be extremely grateful to Russia," says Georgi Mirsky, one of Russia's
leading Middle East experts. Russia sells arms to Damascus and can dock its
ships in the Syrian port of Tartus, the only Mediterranean fueling station to
which it has access.  And Putin is bitter that his support for humanitarian
intervention in Libya led to a NATO military intervention - and regime change in
Tripoli.  As for Iran, says Mirsky, "the Russian foreign ministry believes
Iranian leaders are rational, not fanatics, and not determined to produce a
bomb."  If Putin were merely using anti-Americanism to win votes, one still
might imagine some U.S.-Russian cooperation on issues where security interests
overlap. Those would include stabilizing Afghanistan, or maybe even curbing
Iran's nuclear program by nonmilitary means in order to avoid more Middle East
bloodshed.  But if anti-Americanism has become Putin's guiding principle - a
very personal and deeply held conviction - then it's hard to imagine such
cooperation. Challenged at home, Putin will regard Washington's continued (and
justified) support for Russian civil society as a scheme to remove him. In that
case, cooperation with Washington would seem a sign of weakness.  "If Putin sets
the U.S. up as public enemy No. 1, it could have consequences," says Trenin. It
would mean more tensions in the Middle East and Europe. The reset of the "reset"
may depend less on rational factors and much more on what is going through
Putin's mind.

http://www.thenewstribune.com/2012/03/14/2065978/putins-paranoia-could-have-cons\
equences.html#storylink=cpy
------------

The state religion habit
By Tim Wall
The Moscow News, 15 March 2012

If, as Karl Marx once famously observed, "Religion is the opium of the people,"
today's Russian Orthodox Church is in danger of turning this habit into a
state-sponsored addiction program.
As the authorities' reaction to the "punk prayer" of feminist band Pussy Riot
shows, to question the burgeoning ties between Church and State is regarded as
"heresy" or even "blasphemy" in some quarters.
Now many Orthodox Christians may be horrified by the idea of a punk band
performing in a church, just as working-class Communists are offended by luxury
stores for the elite opening in GUM, across the way from Lenin's mauseleum, or
democratic-minded Russians are appalled by celebrations for Stalin.
When Pussy Riot staged their first protest, against Vladimir Putin on Red
Square, the authorities' response was fairly lenient. But the reaction when they
attacked the twin monopolies of power - the Kremlin and the Church - has been
ferocious, threatening to jail non-violent protesters for up to seven years.
It is arguable whether personalizing the issue - attacking Putin himself, rather
than systemic problems such as the Church's close links with the state, business
and military elites - was the best way to put forward their case.
But the official, completely unjustifiable reaction to the Christ the Savior
protest has highlighted the virtual monopoly relationship that exists between
Church and State.
The Church's role in the recent election campaigns, discouraging believers from
going to opposition rallies and de facto backing Putin's candidacy, shows how
close we have come to an official state religion.
This was underlined recently when the Patriarch was granted an official
residence inside the Kremlin.
But it is not just ordinary citizens who should fear this Stalinist-style state
orthodoxy. It's the authorities who should beware, too.
It only takes a quick look at the fate of other theocracies, such as Charles I's
in Britain in 1649 to Russia itself in 1917, to see what happens when religions
stop playing the role of honest mediator between the state and society.
History shows us that they often fail to protect unpopular governments from the
people's wrath - and they also tend to share their fate.

http://www.themoscownews.com/editorial/20120315/189538641.html
----

Bite your tongue: Russians wearying of Western criticism
By Robert Bridge, RT
Russia Today, 15 March, 2012

The next time you want to slam Russia, consider this: according to the results
from a national poll, Russians are increasingly opposed to outside (Read:
Western) disapproval of their internal situation.
The Levada Center, a polling agency, released data on a nationwide survey taken
in February that shows a marked trend toward domestic opposition to outside
criticism - from the West in general, and the United States in particular.
The percentage of Russians who believe that Moscow should stop paying attention
to criticism from the West has surged five percentage points in the last two
years, jumping from 45 per cent in 2010 to 50 per cent this year.
In 2007, just 38 per cent of Russians reported similar sentiments toward the
West.
Researchers from the polling organization said the majority of interviewees (40
percent) are of the opinion that the West regards Russia as a competitor and is
thus attempting to weaken the country;  another 29 per cent of respondents
believe that Westerners generally have a poor understanding of Russian life and
therefore are more prone to criticize it. Still others (26 per cent) say the
West criticizes Russia because the former has an inherently unfriendly attitude
to the country.
As to what stance Russia's leadership should take in light of this western
tongue-lashing, 39 per cent of those polled believe Russia should keep a greater
distance from the United States; another category of the respondents (34 per
cent) felt that the present relationship with the United States should be
preserved; 15 per cent are of the opinion that relations between the former Cold
War rivals should become even closer.
Concerning the overall condition of Russia-US relations, 10 per cent of the
respondents described the relations as good or friendly; 32 per cent said they
were normal; 26 per cent, lukewarm; 21 per cent, tense and 4 per cent, hostile.
According to the Levada Center, in the past two years alone, the percentage of
Russians who hold a negative attitude toward the United States jumped six
percentage points, to 45 per cent.
Meanwhile, the attitude on the Russian street to the nature of relations between
NATO and Russia is also witnessing a rather dramatic change.
One year ago, 5 per cent of Russians polled said that Russia should seek
membership in the western military alliance. Today, that figure stands on shaky
ground at just 3 per cent. At the same time, the number of supporters of
Russia-NATO cooperation in the interests of common security shrunk from 29 per
cent to 26 per cent, while the number of those calling to counter NATO expansion
by forming defense unions has increased from 21 per cent to 23 per cent.
Finally, 36 per cent of those polled leaned toward a more isolationist defense
strategy, saying Russia should refrain from joining any military alliances, an
increase of 5 percentage points in over a year's time.
The Levada Center is an independent, non-governmental polling and sociological
research organization, named after its founder, the first Russian professor of
sociology, Yuri Levada (1930-2006).

http://rt.com/politics/russia-pol