Christoph,

Let me address the relevant passages in *Warranted Christian Belief* to
which you have been referring.

In his initial discussion on internal rationality in *Warranted Christian
Belief*, Plantinga says:

"Internal rationality includes, in the first place, forming or holding the
appropriate sort of beliefs in response to experience, including both
phenomenal imagery and doxastic experience. . . .A person is internally
rational only if her beliefs are coherent, or at any rate sufficient
coherent to satisfy proper function. . . .Further, an internally rational
person will draw the right inferences when the occasion arises. . . .Still
further, given the beliefs she has, she make the right decisions with
respect to her courses of action - that is, the decisions required by proper
function. . . .And finally, if she internally rational, she will do what
proper function requires with respect to such things as perferring to
believe what is true, looking for further evidence when that is appropriate,
and in general being epistemically responsible."

Now it seems like you want to get a lot of mileage of the last phrase here.
But the entire list of behavior is qualified by "what proper function
requires with respect to. . .," not "what intellectual obligations demand
with respect to. . ." This is crucial, for as I have pointed out, it may be
that there are situations where proper function requires a mode of behavior
that is an epistemic duty. Perhaps given that I have acquired a defeater for
a particular sort of belief (e.g., one on which the truth of many other of
my beliefs depends), proper function requires that I look for further
evidence that could defeat the defeater. It may also be that there is such
an epistemic duty. But it does not follow that internal rationality as such
requires satisfying an epistemic duty, only that given some narrow range of
circumstances, what proper function demands is also an epistemic duty.

To put this otherwise, you seem to be reading the sentence as "if she
internally rational, she will in general be epistemically responsible,"
whereas I'm suggesting that we read the sentence as "if she internally
rational, she will do what proper function requires with respect to being
epistemically responsible." I think this makes a world of difference.

Now later Plantinga says:

"Internal rationality. . .has a dual aspect: on the one hand, it requires
proper function in the part of the cognitive system that lies "downstream
from experience"; on the other hand, it requires more generally that you
have done your best or anyway well enough with respect to the formation of
the belief in question. You have considered how it fits in with your other
beliefs, engaged in the requisite seeking for defeaters, considered the
objections that you have encountered, compared notes with the right people,
and so on." (page 255)

The first thing to note here is that Plantinga does *not* say that the
behavior associated with the second aspect of internal rationality refers to
intellectual duties. He only says that *internal rationality* requires the
sort of behavior he specifies. In fact, in the footnote for the quote from
page 255 he says: "This requirement of internal rationality [the second
aspect] may seem to overlap with justification. It does, if in fact there
are intellectual duties prescribing the behavior required by rationality."
Here he is simply agnostic about whether the behavior he is discussing under
the second aspect of internal rationality is a matter of intellectual duties
and obligations. Notice that he says that this behavior is prescribed by
internal rationality, not necessarily prescribed by intellectual duties.
Anyhow, the requirement that you have "done your best or anyway well enough
with respect to the formation of the belief in question" is a rather thin
intellectual obligation. Deontologists surely want more than that for
justification.

Now it may be that Plantinga should have explained things a little more
clearly in the book, but I don't think there is any contradiction in his
position. That's one of the good things about not being clear, one avoids
contradictions. :-)

Peace,
Michael
--------------------------------------------

Dr. Michael Sudduth
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Saint Michael's College
Box #399
Colchester, Vermont 05439

Webpage: http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/