Christoph,

No one has responded to your post on justification and internal rationality.
So let me jump in on this one.

You wrote:

"For if one condition of warrant is PF-rationality, including internal
downstream rationality, but the latter implies deontological
justification, well, doesn't justification then become a necessary
condition of warrant too?"

It seems to me that the response here could simply be this. The typical
justification requirement for warrant (by internalists) stipulates that
there is some duty or set of duties that we must always satsify in order for
*any* belief to have warrant. Plantinga's position only commits him to
saying that there will be circumstances in which epistemic responsibility
may be necessary for warrant, but this applies only on specific occasions
where it is demanded by internal rationality or proper function. Hence,
there may be situations where a belief is internally rational but fails with
respect to deontological justification. So it could be warranted but
unjustified (assuming that internal rationality is necessary for warrant).
Simply because internal rationality and justification overlap, the former
does not strictly speaking logically imply the latter. That relation is too
tight.

Suppose I begin to have experiences in which I am appeared to Elvisly.
As a result I form the belief that Elvis is alive. I know others in my
community
believe that Elvis is dead. But I am so convinced by my experience that
Elvis lives that I simply ignore the counter-evidence the people present to
me (e.g., news reports from August 16, 1977, testimony from family members).
Had I investigated the matter or considered their counter evidence I would
have changed my mind. But I just ignore it all and go on my merry way,
periodically having experiences in which I am appeared to Elvisly. It looks
like one could argue that I am violating some sort of intellectual duty
here, perhaps a duty to consider evidence against beliefs I hold but which
my community, including people I otherwise respect, rejects. But it looks
like I am nonetheless internally rational in believing that Elvis is alive
under these circumstances, for the relevant cognitive faculties are
functioning properly "downstream from experience."

On the other hand, suppose I stop having Elvis visions, but continue to hold
the belief that Elvis is alive. After reading a persuasive book on cognitive
pathologies I come to believe that my being appeared to Elvisly was the
result of contracting Presleyania Oikia, a rare cognitive disorder that
involves the production of Elvis sightings in the presence of large
accumulations of tacky 1970s furniture and home decor. Now here I have
plausibly acquired an undercutting defeater for my belief that Elvis is
alive. Internal rationality would demand that, if I continue holding these
new beliefs that I give up my belief that Elvis is alive. Perhaps it is also
the case that in these circumstances, I would be violating intellectual
duties of some sort if I continued to believe that Elvis is alive. In fact,
perhaps proper function here demands that I withhold belief given the other
beliefs I have. This case, unlike the other, will be one in which the
internally rational belief is also deontologically justified.

Hope this is helpful.

Peace,
Michael
--------------------------------------------

Dr. Michael Sudduth
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Saint Michael's College
Box #399
Colchester, Vermont 05439

Webpage: http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/