I'm sending this response with some new formatting so I hope it is readible.
I'm trying out the new formatting to see if it clears up problems some have had
reading my posts, though not necessarily readers on this discussion list.

Greg Welty, could you comment on self-deception. See below. Thanks.

Michael

[Erik]
In reflecting on my claim, and your comments, I see I wasn't being clear.
Where I was going with my comments is more along these lines:

Paul, being one who knows God in a sense which unbelievers do not, is in a
"privelaged position" epistemologically and relationally, that is, he knows
that he is in "right fellowship" with God. If Paul were to talk to Peter,
and say "god is good", P. would know this to be so from his own
expereinces, but if Paul were to talk to the pagans on Mars hill and say
"god is good" it would not have the same sort of impact, they neither have
the sort of knowledge a Christian would have of God (whatever that is) norwould
they be righly related to him.

[Michael Sudduth] This seems roughly correct, though I think it is important to
distinguish between the propositional knowledge question and that something else
here that you describe as "same sort of impact" and being "rightly related to
him [God]."

I suspect that the difference here with regard to "propositional knowledge"
between the Christian and pagan would typically be one of (i) quantity of
theistic knowledge and (ii) the grounds or sources of theistic knowledge. The
Christian also knows that God as Redeemer (not simply as creator) and surely
that adds more to the body of knowledge regarding God's goodness. The Christian
revelation brings a more comprehensive understanding of, for instance, the
implications of a proposition like "God is good." So *in that sense* the
Christian has a different sort of propositional knowledge. Moreover, the
Christian's grounds for (some of) his theistic knowledge could very well include
the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, and this might make a difference to
how well theistic beliefs retain their positive epistemic status diachronically,
especially given the presence of defeaters.

Calvin of course rarely is concerned merely about propositional knowledge.
Rather it is knowledge that involves piety, that moves us to worship, reverence,
and love of God, which as Calvin says "a knowledge of his benefits induces." For
the Christian there is certainly an existential impact missing from the pagan's
knowledge, though even Christians can get stuck in times of a cold heart.

[Erik]
But both unbeleivers and Christians can do 'natural theology', but Paul's
would be more effective, even if he limited himself to general revelation,
on account of the sorts of experiences and truths he is able to gather aboutGod
from his being in this "privalege position."

[Michael Sudduth] Yes, I think this is correct. Calvin certainly thinks that
unregenerate folk are subject to much error due to the noetic effects of sin and
hence are not able to read the external witness in creation aright. hence, they
lack, in varying degrees, the propositional knowledge possessed by most
Christians. It is reasonable to suppose that some of the unbeliever's noetic
defects are healed in regeneration and that the process of sanctification itself
brings greater clarity to the believer as he gazes upon the theater of God, and
especially as he brings to bear on his experience and theological reflections
the testimony of Scripture.

[Erik]
It would seem that, then, if one is a reciepent of
special revelation, one can go back and reflect upon what one should have
believed about God on the basis of natural revelation (what Plato and
Plotinus should've believed perhaps?) and turn this into an apologetic, and
either bring others to christ or bring them to a more complete knowledge ofthe
God whom they choose to reject. In this sense, one does more effective,more
relibable natural theology.

[Michael Sudduth] Right.

[Erik]
Unbelievers have access to the same sort
of natural knowledge of God in a broad sense, it is possible that they
should figure it out for themselves; they just don't see it as easily or as
readily -- "They look without seeing; listen without hearing." When Paul
spoke to those on Mars hill, he was telling them only things (i think) which
were deducible in principle from the sorts of arguments and evidences thateven
unbelievers have access to; Paul was just in a better position to
formulate and articulate this argument since he knew the God about whichhe
spoke.

[Michael Sudduth] Yes.

At any rate, this is my main point: a Christian who does natural theology
will testify to the existance and nature of God in such a way, when it is
coupled with the knoweldge that persons should have about God given
"natural" experiences, will impart a degree or quality of knowledge of Godto
the unbeliver which they would otherwise not be able to formulate ontheir own. I
suppose this is a form of testimonial knowledge.

[Michael Sudduth] Roughly, yes, except I'm not sure what you mean by *quality*
of knowledge, because earlier it looked as thought you had in mind quantity of
knowledge - though I admit the quantity/quality distinction gets tricky. There
are certainly are epistemically significant consequences to the believer's
having multiple sources for his theistic belief: Scripture, the internal
testimony of the spirit, religious experience, effects of regeneration, and
testimony in various other forms.

[Erik]
Does this mean that if we preach, and our preaching is true, that those
preached to have been told truths they don't belive -- that they would only
be denying the fact that they knew ( or should konw) such things? Is this
a sort of externalistic form of knowledge of God that does not depend on
thephyscological belief state of the one who knows such thigns? Hmmm.

[Michael Sudduth] I'm a little confused here. Most externalists don't deny that
believing p is a necessary condition for knowledge. The question, then, is
whether believing p is compaible with verbally denying p. Yes. it seems so. What
about believing p and believing that you don't believe p? I'll let Greg Welty
answer this issue, as it relates to self-deception.

[Erik]
If so, if statments Christians affirm are true, those preached to would
knowthese truths as well, on account of true testimonial witness, while
nevertheless believing such things to be false.

[Michael Sudduth] I don't think one can know p without believing p, though -
depending on how belief is understood - it is possible for one to know p and
believe that one doesn't believe p.

[Eric]
I don't think this argument is succeful though; it seems roughily equvilent
to:If statements made by mathematicians are true, those told about such
truthswould know these truths as well, on account of testimonial witness,
whilenevertheless believing such things to be false (or at least
incomprehensible, unaffirmable, etc.)
Surely, being told about calculus doesn't entail that the hearer would know
calculus...

[Michael Sudduth] Right, because the person must also believe the proposition
in question.

Michael