Hello Jim,
Thanks for this post to Russ. Let me jump in and make a few comments.
>But then there's Heb 11:3 - by faith do we perceive these things.
>Hence the discrepancy - How can the unregenerate be said to know these
>things when Heb ascribes such knowledge to faith? Now, perhaps there
>are many ways to resolve the discrepancy - here is one of my attempts(I
>include it because it is sympathetic -I think- to the RE perspective,
>but some may differ):
>
>let's call the first distinction 'awareness of propositions'
>and the second 'knowledge of propositions'. I do this since it seems
>within the RE perspective to make 'belief'(assensus) a vital
>(necessary?) ingredient to 'knowledge'. Assent to a proposition (that
>is True of course) seems to be the bedrock.
> So, perhaps the unregenerate can be (painfully?) aware of the
>Christian propositions and yet reject them as bunk - not believe them
>to be true, but reject them, believe them to be false. Well, I guess
>it's obvious they can't be said to 'know' those props then by my second
>definition (in sympathy to RE). But they are aware of them, and can be
>held accountable for rejecting the Truth that they 'hold'/'know'.
[Michael] Jim, the first part of your distinction is sympathetic to RE only
in a trivial sense. No one, Reformed or otherwise, denies that unregenerate
people can understand the meaning of theistic propositions, though
apparently plenty of Christians do not even achieve that sort of excellence.
:) You don't need to appeal to Reformed theologians for the distinction in
question. But the second part of your distinction strikes me as quite
contrary to the spirit of RE. In this second part, you characterize your
denial of natural knowledge of God as sympathetic to RE. Which Reformed
epistemologist denies natural knowledge of God? Moreover, as I have said on
several occasions, the consistent voice of the Reformed tradition maintains
that unregenerate people have some propositional knowledge of God. This was
Calvin's view, the view of the Protestant scholastics, the major Calvinistic
Confessions, the Puritans, Dutch Neo-Calvinists, and all American Calvinists
I can think of (with the exception of Gordon Clark and possibly Herman
Hoeksema).
>I mean it seems pretty easy to think that some unregenerate may be fully
>aware that the Christians believe "God has framed the worlds by the
>Word of His Mouth, so that what is seen was not made out of things
>which are visible" and further that Christians regard this as the
>Truth, and even further that those who don't accept these props are
>liable to God's condemnation.
[Michael]
Yes, this seems very easy for me to believe too. In fact, I've never met
anyone who denied it. But understanding the meaning of a (true) proposition
is not the same as having propositional knowledge of it, unless you can
present a convincing case that belief is not a necessary condition for
propositonal knowledge. Some have attempted this, but most epistemologists
haven't found
such attempts very impressive. And more to the Reformed point, I do not
think that in affirming that unregenerate people can have theistic knowledge
that Reformed theologians have merely meant that unregenerate people
understand the meaning of theistic propositions. This is Gordon Clark's
view, but this is just another point where his position is heterodox when
evaluated in the light of mainstream Reformed theology, whether one makes
that evaluation today or in the 18th century.
>The unregenerate are spiritually unable until regenerated by God's
>Spirit to believe these props - they are unable until faith dawns in
>them to take these props as the Truth.
[Michael] Well, this is precisely the point of disagreement between yourself
and the overwhelming majority of Reformed theologians. They have not been
willing to follow the Clarkian line you are espousing. (You are also
assuming that the faith in Hebrews in 11:1 is saving faith. Kuyper and
others have presented strong arguments to the contrary on that point. See my
previous post. I think you need to address their arguments).
>And (by my second def) it's not
>until they take such props to be Truth that such props become
>'knowledge' for them. For a prop to have warrant, I suppose it's basic
>that a prop be taken as the Truth - assensus,believed,etc... By grace
>through faith is where we meet.
[Michael] Right, but there are plenty of true theistic propositions that
unregenerate people believe. And those beliefs would constitute knowledge
for them given a wide variety of epistemological theories (internalist and
externalist). There is no biblical basis on which to argue that unregenerate
people hold no true theistic beliefs. You would be better off arguing that
such beliefs fail to constitute knowledge since they lack warrant. That
would be a more sensible route in my view.
>
>I will leave aside (for now) the question as to what bearing this may
>have on the Natural Theology question (to which I am obviously
>unsympathetic) - why?
[Michael] Jim, I suppose I am more sympathetic to Kierkegaard's arguments
against natural theology (and perhaps Barth too) than the sort of objection
to natural theology that is apparently generated from the sort of argument
you have going here, though I hasten to add that your arguments have been
more interesting than the fantastically implausible objections to natural
theology mounted by Gordon Clark. (I mention Clark only because we've spent
considerable time discussing him in personal correspondence, and to my
knowledge you have presented the best arguments in defense of his ideas,
though I know you do not agree with him on every point).
>
>Well, my feet start to shift: I just am not sure the distinction that
>I just made satisfies the verses - afterall doesn't the verse in Heb
>say that by faith we perceive, but Rom 1:20 says by nature we perceive?
> OK, so, Maybe the perception via nature rises only to the level of
>awareness, whereas the perception of faith rises to knowledge.
[Michael] Part of the problem here is that you haven't specified what you
understand by "knowledge." (For instance, some Reformed theologians want to
make certainty a necessary condition for warrant, and then argue that
inferential reasoning cannot produce theistic knowledge. That sounds like an
interesting argument, except that they generally don't define the word
"certainty." Others deny that unregenerate people can have an adequate
system of theology by reason alone. Hence, they lack knowledge in something
like the medieval sense of scientia). At the end of the day, there may be
only a verbal dispute between us, though you seem to want to deny that the
unregenerate have any true theistic beliefs (which I cannot accept). So
until more fundamental epistemological questions are answered, or at least
bracketed into the discussion in some way, I have a hard time determining
whether I agree or disagree with you.
At some point, I will send you a draft of a chapter in which I attempt to
answer the question about the extent of theistic knowledge unregenerate
people have, and I do this in the light of several different internalist and
externalist theories of knowledge. Perhaps you will find this helpful.
Peace,
Michael