Robert (and Erik),
Let me give this one more try, with a little more epistemic grease. :)
(1) You wrote "I have been mis-understood, all I'm saying is - why don't we *reserve* the word grounds to basic beliefs that have their warrant conferred by a circumstance or experience, ie., 'properly' basic. ." Well, first, you have not been misunderstood at all. I took you to be at least arguing what you say here. If I didn't understand this to be one of your points, why would I be arguing the opposite?
But secondly, you are now being too modest. What you say here is not *all* you are saying. Well, it is not all you were saying. In your initial response you wrote: "In reformed epistemology, beliefs are only grounded in experiences or circumstances. Beliefs or propositions are not grounded in other beliefs [or] propositions." You are making a claim here about what goes on in Reformed epistemology, not merely recommendations for how the word "ground" should be used. You offered no evidence of this use of "ground" in Reformed epistemology. So what I did is provide references that show that in fact your claim here is false. Alston, in *Perceiving God* used grounds the way I suggest (see especially pages 72-74). And contrary to your initial suggestion Plantinga does not restrict the use of grounds to experiential circumstances even in "Reason and Belief in God." What he argues is that simply because a belief is not held on the evidential basis of other beliefs, it does not follow that such a belief is groundless. It hardly follows from this that a belief held on the evidential basis of other beliefs is not based on grounds.
Here I must take issue with what Dewey Hoitenga says in his book *Faith and Reason: From Plato to Plantinga* (p. 188). Hoitenga makes the sort of distinction you are trying to make between grounds (for basic beliefs) and evidence (for nonbasic beliefs). However, with all due respect to Dewey, I think he slipped up here. (Since Dewey is a subscriber to the list, he can respond to my objection if he likes). :)
First, Plantinga recognizes that some properly basic beliefs have nothing in the way of grounds, so in fact grounds are not necessary for a belief to be properly basic. (See *Warrant and Proper Function,* pp. 185-193; (cf. Warranted Christian Belief*, chapter 4). Secondly, there is no reason why beliefs can't be grounds given that Plantinga apparently understands grounds to be what is responsible for the formation and justification conferring conditions of a belief. Plantinga writes: "In each case there is some circumstance or condition that confers justification; there is some circumstance that serves as the *ground* of justification" ("Reason and Belief in God, p. 79). Prior to this he states relates a ground to what "plays a unique role in the formation and justification of a belief." The mistake I think is to take Plantinga's affirmation of non-propositional grounds to exclude propositional grounds. But this can only be done by conflating the concept of a ground with conditions under which the concept is instantiated, and with respect to the latter confusing a sufficient condition with a necessary one. Just because there are experiential conditions that sufficiently confer justification on a belief (Plantinga's only point), as well as constitute the causal source of the belief, it does not follow that there are no propositional conditions that confer justification on a belief. Furthermore, it is plausible to suppose that a person might hold the belief on the evidential basis of such propositional conditions.
[Note that in *Warrant and Proper Function* (p. 185), Plantinga distinguishes between beliefs being part of the justification conferring circumstances and holding a belief on the evidential basis of another belief. The former is consistent with a belief being properly basic; the latter not. What this suggests is that a nonbasic belief requires a causal relation to propositional evidence and the subject must take the grounds to be evidence for the belief.]
Plantinga would agree that other beliefs can play a role in the formation and justification of one's belief. Hence, they can also be grounds of a belief. If grounds refers to justifying or warrant conferring conditions (plus the causal element), then beliefs can be grounds too. What I hope you see here is that Plantinga does suggest (even in "Reason and Belief in God) something about the concept of a ground (pretty much what I said about grounds), but that concept implies that beliefs can be grounded in other beliefs (if they have justification conferring conditions).
In passing I note that in *Warranted Christian Belief*, I get the distinct impression that Plantinga is trying to distance himself from the idea of grounds being necessarily related to properly basic beliefs, even propely basic theistic beliefs. This is probably due to the development of his externalist theory of knowledge, as talk of "grounds" is deeply entrenched in the internalist tradition. Note that in chapter 4 the idea of grounds takes a very minor role, and in chapter 6 (where he develops the proper basicality model), as far as I can see *no* mention is made of "grounds." I hadn't noticed this until I went back and glanced through the chapter today. In chapter 4 he maintains that some properly basic beliefs do not have any grounds (where this entails being based on something, including an experience). Again, I think this is part of his movement toward externalism.
(2) You wrote: "Thus my comment to Erik about the word being ambiguous. I think that the interchange has shown this confusion already, QED." Well, I would agree that your interchange with Erik has shown confusion, :) but this is no strike against the use of grounds for basic and nonbasic beliefs. As I explain below (7), your suggestion about restricting grounds to basic beliefs is in fact irrelevant to Erik's initial problem.
Also I don't see any great problem of ambiguity in the commonly accepted use of grounds I have defended. Whatever confusion or ambiguity exists is to be attributed to poor presentation of the concept or failure of the reader to sufficiently grasp the issue. What is ambiguous about explicating a ground in terms of the causal and/or epistemic basis of a belief? And then recognizing that experiences and beliefs can satsify such conditions? Whatever ambiguity is present here can be sufficiently alleviated by adding the word propositional or non-propositional before grounds. Moreover, the context should make it clear whether one has propositional or non-propositional grounds in view. This is simply making an epistemic mountain out of a cognitive molehill.
(3) Your proposal is that we should use the words "grounds" only for basic beliefs. O.K. So.... all non-basic beliefs are groundless. That sounds quite queer to me. In any event, it certainly generates more confusion than using grounds for basic and nonbasic beliefs.
(4) You wrote: "Of course you *can* use grounds in this way and this is the way of common parlance- but I don't think this is helpful. (here, why not use justification.)"
First, I don't think I even understand your suggestion here. I have already explained the relationship of a "ground" to words like justification and warrant. That explanation makes it clear why "ground" cannot be used "instead of" or "as an equivalent to" justification. Appeal to "grounds" is something that one has need of in explicating the concept of justification. Secondly, my account is not a defense of the soft claim that one *can* use grounds the way I suggest. It is an argument that "grounds" should not be used the way you suggest. I have offered good reasons for speaking of both propositional and non-propositional grounds of belief. I understand your proposal quite well. In case you didn't notice, what I am a claiming is that your proposal makes little sense. My view on grounds is a consequence of the explication of the concept of a ground. But it doesn't appear that you have considered my points or their implications for the question at hand. If you want to argue that your position is plausible, it might be a good thing to engage my argument rather than simply restate your position.
(5) *What* is a ground in your view? You have not provided any explication of the *concept* of a ground in order logically to distinguish it from believing on the basis of propositions. If you did that perhaps it would be clearer whether one *ought* to restrict its use to non-propositional grounds. (3) above suggests that any such account of a ground is going to be quite problematic. The only time you hint at a concept of ground is when you say, with reference to basic belief in God. "ALL THIS IS ONLY MEANT TO CONFER PRIMA FACIE WARRANT TO BELIEF IN GOD." Well, if this is so, then I see no reason why other beliefs cannot confer warrant or prima facie justification on other beliefs. Hence, they would be grounds by your own admission. Erik was absolutely correct about this.
(6) In my post, I think I provided an answer that sufficiently resolves the difficulty Erik has proposed. Unfortunately you have provided no response to my argument, which is a shame because I love a good argument.
(7) I don't even see how your proposal answers Erik's problem. Even if you reserve the word grounds for basic beliefs, Erik's problem can be restated. If <God exists> is self-evidently entailed by beliefs like <God has created all this>, it seems that the former is really nonbasic. You then say, "But latter can't be a ground of the former because grounds refer only to what is non-propositional." But this response doesn't provide any evidence against the claim that <God exists> is nonbasic in this context. By your own definition nonbasic beliefs don't have any grounds, so the relevant point is not the belief that <God has created all this>, etc. can't be a ground for <God exists>, but that it can't be whatever is sufficient for the latter to be a nonbasic belief.
Erik's position is most easily answered as follows (summarizing my previous post).
Erik's Paradox: If Plantinga's paradigm theistic beliefs T are properly basic, then belief that G<God exists> cannot be properly basic, for it is logically entailed by T. But G and T are both supposed to be properly basic. So, G and T cannot both be properly basic.
Solution to Erik's Paradox: (a) A nonbasic belief is one that is held on the evidential basis of other beliefs. But (b) it is possible for a person S's belief B to logically entail another belief C without S's holding C on the evidential basis of B, even if S holds both B and C. Hence, it is possible for both G and T to be (properly) basic for the same person.
Erik's mistake is taking the relation of logical entailment between the beliefs p and q (i.e., p entails q) to be sufficient for q being nonbasic. But the entailment condition is neither sufficient nor necessary for a belief to be nonbasic.
In summary, I don't see any merit in adopting your position, and I find very good reasons to refuse to accept it. And Erik's paradox is easily solved.
Peace,
Michael
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