Robert and Sean,
I've watched your discussion for a week or so now. Let me jump in and try to clarify a few things.
First, Sean, you are correct when you say that "grounds" can be used to designate propositions or beliefs. I see no reason to restrict that term to what is non-propositional (e.g., experience), and I can think of very few contemporary epistemologists who do that. Plantinga does not. (See Plantinga, *Warrant: the Current Debate*, pp. 10, 182; *Warrant and Proper Function,* chapter 10, especially pages 185-193). Certainly Reformed epistemologists in general do not do that. Alston, for instance, uses grounds to refer to basic and non-basic beliefs. So I must say that I was somewhat perplexed by Robert's observation.
Grounds are typically taken to be synonymous with the "basis" of one's belief. (See Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" in Alston, *Epistemic Justification*, p.99; cf. Alston, "An Internalist Externalism" in Alston, *Epistemic Justification*, p. 231). This involves a causal or psychological component, as well as an epistemic one. Hence, Robert, when you say that Sean's example of propositional grounds is simply a case where someone believes something "because* of other propositions, this is precisely why it should be called the ground of the person's beliefs. In the purely causal sense, a person S's grounds for holding some belief B is the reason *why* the person holds the belief, and the word "because" often plays that role. The ground is what either generated or sustains the belief. In the epistemic sense, a ground is what confers positive epistemic status on a belief. Certainly propositions (or by extension other beliefs) play this double role. Hence, it is appropriate to refer to them as grounds. The only confusion that can emerge from using the word ground to refer to both is if a person fails to indicate what sort of ground he is talking about, but since epistemologists also must speak generally about what causes (generates and sustains) a belief and what confers positive epistemic status on a belief, it is necessary to have some word that can be used for this. Grounds (and perhaps a bit more confusing, reasons) play this role.
Secondly, Sean, with respect to the problem you have introduced I suggest you read Plantinga on what he takes to be required for propositional grounds or evidence. (See *Warrant and Proper Function,* pp. 138; *Warrant: The Current Debate,* pp. 69-74). Although philosophers may agree about there being propositional grounds, they differ with respect to the specific conditions that are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for some proposition p to constitute such a ground. Here both causal and epistemic elements come into play. A relevant point for Plantinga here is that a proposition A does not confer warrant on another proposition B simply because B is entailed by A. That of course is precisely the sort of condition exemplifed in your case of <God created all this> entails <God exists>. But, according to Plantinga, entailment is neither necessary nor sufficient for one belief to confer warrant upon another belief. Plantinga also requires that (a) the person see the relevant evidential connection and (b) that the person accept the one proposition on the basis of the other (the causal element). Plantinga would say, I think, that a person who believes that <God exists> and also believes propositions like <God is forgiving me> does not hold the former on the evidential basis of the latter. Certainly one does not infer the former from the latter. This seems quite obvious since many people hold the belief that <God exists> *before* they form the sort of beliefs Plantinga says are, strictly speaking, properly basic.
So the mere fact that there is an entailment relation between the relevant propositions (or that there is some propositional content) doesn't itself logically entail that we have a case of nonbasic belief or of warrant being being conferred on one belief from another. For Plantinga you would also have to show that <God exists> is accepted on the evidential basis of <God is forgiving me>. But this is not shown merely by pointing out that one belief logically entails another. Many of my beliefs (including basic ones) entail other beliefs that I happen to hold in a basic way. I believe, for instance, that my fiancée is in next room and I also believe that someone is in the next room. The latter is self-evidently entailed by the former, but I don't hold the latter on the evidential basis of the former. I suppose one could, but in fact I don't. Similarly, I believe that there is a red piece of paper on my desk, and I also believe that there is a piece of paper on my desk. The former entails the latter, but I don't hold the latter on the evidential basis of the former. In cases like these, it is plausible to regard both beliefs as properly basic. The fact that basic belief B logically entails belief C is a logical truth.The fact that I accept C in a basic way involves a psychological fact. Even if B logically entails C, and I see this logical truth, surely I can accept both B and C in a basic way.
Plantinga's mistake I think, in the 1983 article, was his failure to make it clear that <God exists> can itself be taken as basic, even if the other sort of beliefs he refers to are typically also taken as basic. It seems to me that part of the problem here is that Plantinga has conflated Calvin's sensus divinitatis and the external witness in creation. I have pointed this out before (on the discussion group and in print). For Calvin the sensus divinitatis does *not* produce the sort of beliefs that Plantinga designates as properly basic, strictly speaking. The SD produces only a very vague notion of there being a Supreme being and that he is the Maker (Institutes Book 1, chapter 3). It is only after this discussion that we get an account of more specific beliefs about God that involve the various attributes of God (Institutes Book 1, chapter 5). Moreover, the Reformed theological tradition has often taken the proposition <God exists> as itself basic (e.g., as a self-evident, intuitive, or immediate truth of reason). There's no obvious reason why <God exists> and <God is forgiving me> can't both be basic. What is required is spelling out the range of immediate or non-propositional grounds of theistic beliefs.
Of course, as most of you know, I take it that propositions like God exists involve at least partial propositional grounds more often than Plantinga allows, and this is also true with respect to specific theistic propositions. But I say this not for the reasons that Sean has adduced.
Michael
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