John Hartung wrote:
Stephen Davis describes a Plantingan goal for Natural theology
(specifically theistic proofs) as showing that belief in God is as
reasonable as belief in other minds ("Theism, Reason, and Theistic Proofs"
-- or something like that). This point concerns internalist
justifications for theism. But Davis hope we can do better, showing that
theism is at least more reasonable than alternatives. What positive role,
if any, can TA's play in making the question of theism (or any other
question for that matter) decidable?

[Sudduth]
John, I don't see that reasons for supposing that theistic belief is as
reasonable as belief in other minds gives us any good reason for supposing
that theism is true, so it can't be a goal for natural theology (as
traditionally understood). And I don't think that this approach should even
be equated with "internalist" justifications of theism, as many internalist
justifications of theism require that theism is more probable than not and
are interesting in showing that to be the case (e.g., Swinburne). Also, in
*God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs* Davis says that Plantinga is not opposed
to theistic arguments. (He refers to Plantinga's 1991 "The Prospects for
Natural Theology"). So why must a Plantingian goal for natural theology be
construed as you say that Davis states, as opposed to theistic arguments?

But since you mention Davis' book, let me point out a few criticisms of his
account of Plantinga. My main problem with it is that Davis does not pay
any attention to Plantinga'a recent work, and this reduces the force of his
critical comments. This is especially clear in his treatment of the Great
Pumpkin Objection (an objection which in my view is based on several
epistemological confusions and hence is a highly overrated objection, in
all of its incarnations). For instance, he says that, according to
Plantinga, "Reformed epistemologists are not committed to allowing that the
crucial beliefs of Great Pumpkin believers are properly basic" (p. 87) and
"nothing in Reformed epistemology requires its defenders to allow that
Great Pumpkin belief is properly basic" (p. 88). Alas, the whole discussion
is vitiated by a fundamental weakness, namely that Davis at no point
addresses what is meant by "rationality," nor does he explain what the
Great Pumpkin *objection* actually is (hardly anyone does). Regarding the
former, is it deontological rationality? External rationality? Foley
rationality? Warrant? With respect to the latter, he says that the impasse
is this: "apologists for Great Pumpkin belief can insist that they are
responsible for their own criteria of proper basicality. . . .they can even
claim that there is a natural human tendency to formulate belief in the
Great Pumpkin. Where do we go from here?" (p. 88).

Well, people "can" do all sorts of things. So what? What kind of objection
is this? Is the objection here that these folks would be within their
intellectual rights in making these claims? Deontologically justified in
believing that their beliefs are deontologically justified (or warranted)?
Is it that they are warranted in asserting these things with respect to
their beliefs being deontologically justified (or warranted). Is he
claiming that we need to show that theism is true, as opposed to the Great
Pumpkin? And if so, what is the (epistemic) significance of the activity of
showing that theism is true? Does it confer warrant or justification, or
does it simply allow us to adjudicate rival claims to (religious) truth?
The "can" is fundamentally vague, and hence so is the objection. Perhaps
there is some confusion here between first- and second-order questions, or
between being justified and showing justification. Of course, Davis is not
introducing anything new here, for this is the very vagueness and confusion
present in nearly all forms of the objection. It takes Plantinga himself,
in *Warranted Christian Belief,* to untangle even Michael Martin's version
of it.

Truth be told, Plantinga admits that nearly any kind of belief can be
deontologically rational. So if we are talking about this sense of
rationality, then the Reformed epistemologist can admit that the belief in
the Great Pumpkin can be rational. What Davis says about the Reformed
epistemology stance on this issue is false, though he is basing it
correctly on what Plantinga said way back in 1983, but has since denied
repeatedly.

Now it seems to me that what happens in these sorts of criticisms of
Reformed epistemology is that people easily lose site of what Plantinga is
arguing and why. They assume that he is trying to answer a question that he
is not trying to answer. Naturally, they are disappointed in his answers.
Naturally; he asked a different question. Moreover, Davis proposes that
natural theology could help us with the Great Pumpkin impasse - though it
is still unclear what that impasse actually is. But since he has already
admitted that Plantinga is not opposed to theistic arguments (especially
with reference to apologetics and increasing the warrant of theistic
belief), how is the impasse Davis mentions a genuine impasse for the
Reformed epistemologists who can do exactly what Davis proposes anyway?
This is a very thin criticism of Plantinga. And since the real issue for
Plantinga is warrant and proper function, the chapter on Reformed
epistemology in Davis' book never gets to the heart of the issue. The
better questions are not answered because they are not even asked.

It seems to me that there is a need to clarify exactly what sort of claims
Plantinga has argued for and why. To that end, let me propose the following
summary of what Plantinga has been up to since *God and Other Minds*. This
is only a summary, and I'll throw in some critical comments along the way.
:)

(1) In *God and Other Minds* (1967), Plantinga was concerned with the de
iure question regarding theistic belief: Is it rationally justifiable?
Following the opinion of the day, he regarded that question as distinct and
separate from the de facto question about the truth of theism. With respect
to the first question, he argued the parity thesis to which Davis refers,
specifically that theistic belief is epistemically analogous to belief in
other minds. Neither the arguments for nor against God are conclusive, much
like the situation with other minds. But then if belief in other minds is
rational, so is belief in God. They share the same epistemic boat.

Note the following points with respect to this argument. First, Plantinga
assumed, like many others, that the question of the epistemic status of
theistic belief was equivalent to the question of whether there was good
evidence for it. This is a position he subsequently denied and has
vigorously argued against in several publications since *God and Other
Minds*. Secondly, like others, he did not ask what rational justification
*meant.* Hence, he did not distinguish, as he has for some time now,
between deontological rationality (on the one hand) and externalist
rationality and warrant (on the other). Third, he presupposed a narrow view
of natural theology, from which he has since rightly moved away. Plantinga
later affirms plenty of good theistic arguments (see below).

(2) In "Reason and Belief in God" (1983) and several other papers from the
early 1980s Plantinga focused on the evidentialism, specifically the
*claim* that theistic belief is rational only if supported by or based on
propositional evidence, and the *objection* that theistic belief is not
rational because there is not sufficient evidence in support of it. In
other words, Plantinga is responding to an epistemic objection to theistic
belief (not an alethic or ontological objection). This is crucial to
understand the context and direction of his arguments. (He is not, for
instance, in these papers trying to adjudicate rival claims to religious
truth or show that theism is true - valuable as these goals may be).

So we have the evidentialist argument:

(a) If theistic belief is rational, then it is adequately supported by
propositional evidence.
(b) Theistic belief is not adequately supported by propositional evidence.
========================
(c) Therefore, theistic belief is not rational.

There are three ways to attack this evidentialist argument. One can argue
that (a) is false, that (b) is false, or that both are false. Classical
apologetics takes the (b) route. Why doesn't Plantinga do this (in "Reason
and Belief in God" and other earlier articles)? Because he thinks that (b)
is true? No. Because he is an inept philosopher who doesn't know how to
develop any theistic arguments? No. (We need only be reminded of his modal
version of the ontological argument and his "Two Dozen or So Theistic
Arguments" lecture). *He wants to dislodge what he regards as a long
standing false presupposition in philosophy and theology, which he himself
had bought into for some time, namely that the rational justification of
theistic belief stands or falls on the success of theistic arguments or
natural theology.*

Plantinga's aim then was to undermine the evidentialist argument by arguing
that (a) is false. He does this by showing that (a) is grounded in the
epistemology of classical foundationalism and epistemic deontologism (what
Plantinga currently refers to as the "classical package"). First, the
former is self-referentially incoherent and has the rather implausible (if
not absurd) implication that most of our commonsense everyday beliefs are
unjustified. Secondly, the latter provides no basis on which to argue that
theistic belief is rational only if based on argument, as a person who
holds theistic belief in a basic way does not necessarily violate any
intellectual obligations or duties. So Plantinga ends up arguing that (c)
is false. He argues that theistic belief can be (and is for some people, in
the appropriate circumstances)deontologically justified, even in the
absence of propositional evidence.

[I won't go into the possible ambiguities present in Plantinga's early
account of proper basicality, for instance the distinction between
"theistic belief *can* be properly basic" and "theistic belief *is*
properly basic for some people under certain conditions". See James
Sennett, *Modality, Probability, and Rationality: A Critical Examination of
Alvin Plantinga's Philosophy* (1992). I also discuss it in my D.Phil.
dissertation (1996).]

(3) In "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection" (1986), Plantinga
responded to some of Alston's critique of the argument of "Reason and
Belief in God" which grounded evidentialism in classical foundationalism.
Here Plantinga concedes that evidentialism need not be grounded in
classical foundationalism (even if that is the historical truth about the
matter), but it is a sinking ship even if developed on the basis of
coherentism - the primary alternative to classical foundationalism.
Moreover, Plantinga suggests that the evidentialist objection is better
developed not in terms of intellectual dutifulness or deontological
justification but in terms of cognitive defectiveness - thereby
anticipating the warrant theory he was shortly about to develop.

[I'm not convinced that Plantinga has knocked out evidentialism between (2)
and (3), as there are other versions of foundationalism (other than
classical foundationalism) on the basis of which evidentialist requirements
for theistic belief could be developed. Although Plantinga takes a broader
sweep in *Warranted Christian Belief,* I'm not thoroughly persuaded that
Plantinga has ruled out evidentialism in the way he apparently wants. I
think that James Sennett's points at this juncture in his book on Plantinga
are important, as well as the version of evidentialism I have been
developing that I regard as logically consistent with the central claims of
Reformed epistemology].

(4) In the Plantinga/Quinn debates (which appeared in *Faith and
Philosophy,* 1985-1986) Plantinga argued - among other things - that his
earlier claim about theistic belief being properly basic for some people
includes (counter to Quinn's suggestion) sophisticated adults in the
contemporary world with a decent level of education. More specifically,
theistic belief could be properly basic even if there are defeaters lurking
in the neighborhood (such as Freudian wish-fulfillment, Feuerbachian
projection theories, or the problem of evil). Although Plantinga admitted
that defeaters could be a problem, he thought that EITHER basic theistic
belief could have enough warrant to defeat all such potential defeaters OR
they could be defeated by undercutting defeaters (natural theology is not
required), so theistic belief remains properly basic.

[For a critique on Plantinga's moves here, see my "The Internalist
Character and Evidentialist Implications of Plantingian Defeaters,"
*International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* June 1999).]

According to Plantinga, given some argument A for p, a rebutting defeater
for p is a reason for supposing that ~p, whereas an undercutting defeater
for p is a reason for supposing that A does not adequately support p.

(5) In several other papers (going back to 1979, and indeed part of the
arguments of *God and Other Minds*) Plantinga attempts to undercut
arguments against the truth of theism.

In the books and papers I have mentioned above, Plantinga has not argued
that it is likely that theism is true. He has undercut and rebutted the
evidentialist view and undercut atheological arguments. (Of course,
positive, though cautious, verdicts on theistic arguments are found, e.g.,
regarding the ontological argument in *God, Freedom, and Evil* (1974)

In short, he has argued:

(P1) Theistic belief can be deontologically rational in the absence of
propositional evidence.
(P2) Objections to the truth of theism are not good objections.

(6) In "Justification and Theism" (1987) Plantinga begins to develop the
idea of positive epistemic status as proper function. In "The Prospects
for Natural Theology" (1991) Plantinga states that although natural
theology is not needed for warrant (construed in terms of proper function),
theistic arguments could strengthen theistic belief to help nudge it over
the boundary separating true belief and knowledge (since knowledge requires
a certain degree of warrant and degree of belief affects the degree of
warrant).

[There are several interesting points that come out of Plantinga's
"Prospects" paper. Here's one. I think that Plantinga's comments about the
limited epistemic role of natural theology indicates that the design plan
for humans must include specifications for holding theistic belief at least
on the partial basis of theistic arguments, otherwise such arguments could
not increase the degree of warrant. But then some of his comments in "Re
ason and Belief in God" (1983) must be qualified if not significantly
altered, for instance when he says that the Christian "ought not" believe
in God on the basis of arguments (an "ought not" which in the paper is
ambiguous between the normativity of proper function and deontologism,
though I think he was thinking of the former).]

What is Plantinga's argument, though, for the claim that theistic belief
can be warranted without evidence? In the "Prospects" paper, he begins to
develop the idea - central to *Warranted Christian Belief* - that the
epistemological determination of what sorts of beliefs are warranted in a
basic way depends on one's metaphysical presuppositions. Why? Because the
question of warrant involves questions about proper function, and answers
about proper function presuppose how one thinks of the human person.

Plantinga states:

"So the dispute as to whether theistic belief needs argument - i.e.,
natural theology - to be warranted can't be settled by just by attending to
epistemological considerations; it is at bottom not merely an
epistemological dispute, but an anthropological and thus ontological
dispute." (p. 309)

This marks a crucial turning point in Plantinga's work, for from this point
forward the de iure question about warranted theistic belief is closely
tied to the de facto question about the truth of theism. In my view this
sets in motion a line of reasoning from *Warrant and Proper Function* to
his most recent *Warranted Christian Belief* that actually ends up
supporting the importance of natural theology. As he moves toward the idea
that the de iure question is best construed in terms of proper function,
and proper function is tied to metaphysical issues, the warranted status of
(basic) theistic belief stands or falls on whether theism is true or false.
And this provides an important role for natural theology.

[Elucidation. It is easy to go off track here. I did *not* say that the
warrant enjoyed by theistic belief depends on natural theology, but that
the warrant enjoyed by theistic belief depends on the truth of theism. In
that case, *showing* that theistic belief is warranted (in Plantinga's
sense) seems to require showing that theism is true (as well as showing
that warrant entails proper function, etc.). But one can be warranted in
holding a belief without showing that one is warranted in holding it.]

And this brings to us to Plantinga today. Here we find three important
arguments: (i) the argument for the logical relation between the truth of
theism and warranted theistic belief, (ii) the argument that naturalism is
self-defeating (and so not rationally acceptable), and (iii) the argument
for the falsity of naturalism (and hence for the truth of theism).

(7) There is the conditional claim central to *Warranted Christian Belief,*
that if theism is true, then it is likely that (basic) theistic belief is
warranted. Plantinga argues for the truth of this conditional. And although
nothing in Plantinga's warrant theory supports the truth of the antecedent
of this conditional proposition, theistic arguments would do this.

(8)The naturalism defeated argument argues that a person who believes
naturalism (N) and evolution (E), and sees that the probability of our
cognitive faculties being reliable on (N) and (E) is either low or
inscrutable acquires an undefeated defeater for (N) and (E) and everything
else he believes. Since a person's belief is warranted according to
Plantinga only if he does not have an undefeated defeater for it, a person
who acquires this sort of defeater will not know any proposition. He is
epistemically bankrupt.

(9)According to the primary argument found in *Warrant and Proper Function*
(chapter 11) and *Warranted Christian Belief* (chapter 7 or 8), there is an
argument from the fact that our cognitive faculties are reliable to the
existence of God. In short, if theism is true, then we would expect our
cognitive faculties to be reliable. If naturalism is true, then we would
not expect our cognitive faculties to be reliable. So provided that a
probability is not assigned to naturalism that is significantly higher than
theism, we have on the basis of reliable cognitive faculties a reason to
reject naturalism and accept theism. There are clearly several issues that
need to be developed in detail in this sort of argument, but I'm only
drawing attention to the argument.

Moreover, the argument can be strengthened in Plantinga's opinion by adding
"proper function" into the picture. As he argued in "A Dozen (or so)
Theistic Arguments," and in *Warrant and Proper Function,* warrant is best
construed in terms of proper function. But proper function has no place on
naturalistic premises, but it finds its natural home in a theistic
metaphysics.

Plantinga told me last week that there is a sense in which the
presuppositonalist is correct when he says that the nontheistic worldview
of the unregenerate cannot provide an adequate epistemology. An adequate
epistemology entails proper function, and there is no such thing as
cognitive proper function (and the confluence of reliability and proper
function) on naturalistic metaphysical assumptions. Hence, we have here a
distinctly epistemological argument for God's existence, with significant
resemblance to the transcendental argument of presuppositionalism.

*Hence, although in *Warranted Christian Belief* Plantinga primarily argues
in support of the conditional claim linking the truth of theism and the
positive epistemic status of theistic belief, Plantinga also has provided
reasons for supposing that the antecedent of the conditional is true. At
any rate, Plantinga has certainly laid the foundations for the latter as an
important philosophical project. This should sufficiently refute the
commonly accepted notion that Reformed epistemology has no way to argue for
its claims about the positive epistemic status of belief in God, that it is
simply a version of fideism, or that Reformed epistemology is opposed to
theistic arguments.*

Nevertheless Plantinga continues to maintain that it is not necessary for a
person to have or work through such arguments to have warranted theistic
belief, even to a degree sufficient to transform true belief into
knowledge.

One should be careful here not to conclude that theistic belief would not
be basic either because one can offer reasons for it or because one does in
fact offer reasons for it. A foundational or properly basic belief is not
one for which no reason can be given. In principle one can give reasons for
foundational beliefs, either reasons for supposing that they are true or
reasons for their being properly basic. And if one did do either in the
case of theistic belief, it wouldn't necessarily alter the proper
basicality of one's own theistic belief, much less the basicality of
theistic belief for others. Of course the truth of the matter, as I see it,
is that theists ordinarily hold various theistic beliefs, some of them are
properly basic, others non-basic, some partially basic and partially
non-basic. But there is no straightforward argument from the premise that
"S offers reasons R for his theistic belief T" to the conclusion that "S
holds T solely (or even partially) on the evidential basis of R." But even
if the latter did follow from the former (with an additional premise or two
thrown into the mix) it would not follow that theistic belief is not
properly basic for others. And Plantinga's concern is with what he takes to
be the situation for most theists, namely that they believe in God, but in
a basic way (whether because of the SD, human testimony, or the internal
testimony of the Holy Spirit).

So to return to John's comments regarding Stephen Davis. Yes, we can do
considerably better than showing that theistic belief is as reasonable as
belief in other minds (though this itself is by no means a small
accomplishment given the traditional evidentialist objection). And Reformed
epistemology can in principle aim higher and has the resources to aim
higher than what Davis and others regard as a rather minimal aim. The only
question is: "how" shall we proceed? I think Plantinga's work on proper
function, theism, and naturalism provides some important and interesting
suggestions. But therein lies the way of natural theology, even if of a
different sort.

Peace,
Michael
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