Jim,

Thanks for your response. I thought you were mounting a particular
argument, but now I'm not sure. I respond below.

Jim.McAnany@... wrote:

> Thank you Dr. Sudduth for your response - I appreciate it.
>
> First, I did not ask for an 'account' of the SD - I asked for its
> deliverances.

Well, I take that to be asking for an account of the SD doctrine,
specifically an account of what its deliverances are. In fact, below you
go on to ask "how do you know it [i.e., the SD doctrine, etc] is true?"
I take this to be asking for an account.

> The conversation with Erik, I think, was leading to a
> "something I know not what" kind of thing. And then of course my
> question would obviously be how can a 'something I know not what' be
> knowledge (of divinity) in a properly basic way?

I agree that Erik ended his last post with a very open sort of claim
about SD beliefs. But why should this constitute the sort of problem you
mention, namely that such beliefs could not be bearers of truth or
warrant? Must a belief be "specific" and "detailed" to be true or
warranted? And if so, how specific? Moreover, Erik also referred to
beliefs like "there is a supreme being who created the world" and "I am
obligated to my creator." Now admittedly I can't quite wrap my mind
around your objection or concern here, Jim. However, it seems to me that
either you are saying that these sorts of beliefs can't be beaers of
alethic or epistemic properties OR you are saying that they can, but we
have no reason to suppose that they are produced by something like the
SD.

On the first possible concern, I don't see how the above beliefs are
"something I know not what"? Well, maybe these are something which "you"
know not what, but it wouldn't follow that others are as perplexed. So I
agree that you might have an epistemic problem here, but we are talking
about the epistemic situation of other folks too I think. Can't beliefs
like "there is a supreme being" or "a supreme being created the
Universe" be true or warranted? Or are these not specific enough? I
don't think this objection will get anywhere.

Regarding the second possible concern, there are a couple of ways of
handling it. I'll mention one. People, including non-Christians, do in
fact hold (some) true theistic beliefs, and theistic beliefs of various
sorts. Some of these beliefs are in fact held in a basic way; others are
not.

[As a side point, I do not think that Calvin believed that the SD
produced as specific and varied beliefs as Plantinga suggests. But
that's because I do not take the discussion in chapter 5 of book I of
the Institutes to be merely an account of triggering conditions of the
SD. I see the observations as premises in inferential reasoning, as many
other Reformed theologians have also. (As you know Reformed divines have
not spoken with one voice on the extent of immediate knowledge of God,
and its relation to mediate knowledge of God). In any event, for both
Calvin and Plantinga some theistic beliefs are held in a basic way. For
Calvin they are limited to broad beliefs about God as creator, of the
sort mentioned above.]

Of course merely because a theistic belief is held in a basic way, it
does not follow that it is the product of the something like the SD.
There is (human) testimony, which for some (children primarily I think)
is an immediate source of belief). There is also Alston's non-sensory
perceptual experience of God. Here the kinds of basic beliefs one could
have would be limited by the ways in which God could perceived
experientially, and Alston develops that in some detail. (That's for
another time though). There is also the internal testimony of the Holy
Spirit. Then there is Plantinga's SD module. There is also the appeal to
self-evidence or some such intuitive grasp of theistic propositions. (As
I develop in my book on natural theology, I think that some Reformed
theologians who refer to theistic belief as an intuitive truth actually
have in mind what Plantinga understands in his model).

The internal testimony of the Holy Spirit would not be relevant in the
case of non-Christians (at least on most views, since this is an
epistemic function consequent to regeneration), and yet they are
included in the subject class of of people with true theistic beliefs.
Here I am including not only Jewish and Islamic people, but people who
are not affiliated with any organized religion. Polls indicate America
is full of such folk. :) I happen to think that testimony is not an
immediate or basic source of belief for most adults, but that's another
matter. But even if we did consider testimony, many people will testify
to the fact that they came to belief in God quite independent of the
word of parents, friends, preachers, or television evangelists (though I
doubt that the latter would produce beliefs with much by way of warrant
- that was a joke.) Self-evidence is not a plausible candidate. One
reason why is that people often tie their holding religous beliefs to
"empirical" conditions, of the sorts that Plantinga and Alston mention.
So I really think that it comes down to the models presented by Alston
and Plantinga, as the most sensible candidates for properly basic
theistic beliefs. (If you would like to propose another that would be
great).

I'm not convinced that the Alston/Plantinga models are competing ones.
In fact, I think the relation between these two models is worth more
discussion at another time. For the moment, though, I think we will find
that there will be cases where people hold beliefs like there is a
supreme being, where this is not due to testimony (human or divine), nor
grounded in the kind of experiential conditions that Alston describes.
Hence, we are left - for the moment - with the Calvin/Plantinga model.

So, yes, I think that there are theistic beliefs held by some people
that satisfy the following conditions: (1) the beliefs are true, (2)
they are more reasonably construed as held in a basic way than nonbasic,
and (3) they are more reasonably construed as being basic in Plantinga's
sense than in other senses. Paradigm cases of such beliefs would include
"there exists a supreme being," "the Universe was created by a supreme
being" and "we are obligated to this being." And just to remind you of
the point from my earlier post, the fact that not everyone holds these
beliefs is not relevant. (I leave aside the argument that in fact
everyone does hold such beliefs, but do not affirm them, due to
self-deception).

>
>
> But now you inject that the SD gives all a Reformed epistemologist
> could hope for (whatever that may be) except that it is malfunctioning
>
> due to 'the noetic effects of sin'. Huh?

Where did I say this?

> Are these Reformed doctrines properly basic beliefs?

Which Reformed doctrines?

> What is their source?

If you are referring to the kinds of beliefs that support an account of
the SD, then the answer would be: these beliefs have different sources.
I should think that many of the supporting beliefs are inferentially
arrived at; others may be basic (though not outputs of the SD). But I'm
not sure I even know what you are talking about at this point Jim.

> And isn't it just to'mold' the 'something I know not what' by saying
> it gives what weReformed epistemologists want as long as we
> incorporate it into our framework?

No.

> And I'm sure the pantheist does the same 'molding' as it
> were.

Well, people do all sorts of things. Not relevant Jim, if only for the
fact that this not what Reformed epistemologists do.

> How do you know your framework is the Truth as opposed to any
> other?

Ahhhh, let's see. . . .

"Because I deduced it from Scripture" (Clark, Robbins)
"Because it is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of any
predication" (Van Til)
"Because God caused me to hold the belief" (McAnany)

:)

Seriously though, I'm not sure which proposition you are asking me to
give an account of. (I thought you were not asking for an account? :))
But the short answer to your question is: you reason it out. I know this
sounds paradoxical. :)

Now let's be clear on two different kinds of epistemic propositions that
we can argue for with reference to theistic belief.

(1) If theism is true, then it is likely that the SD model is correct
(as an account of how theistic beliefs can have warrant)
(2) the SD model is an epistemically possible model.
(3) It is likely that the SD model is correct.

And then there is also the attempt to argue (4) for some given epistemic
objection to theisticbelief, this objection is inadequate (i.e., to
argue for an undercutting defeater against epistemic objections to
theistic belief).

Plantinga, as I understand him, is doing arguing (1), (2), and (4), not
(3). These moves are made in WCB for instance. Of course, this is not to
say that one (even a Reformed epistemologist) can argue for the truth of
(3). Surely he can, and he ought to do so in my view. But how? One way
would be to engage in the project of natural theology. To the extent to
which one has reasons for supposing that theism is true, then (assuming
that (1) is true), you also have reason (indirectly) for supposing that
(3) is true. This is one reason why I think that natural theology is
important, but that's another matter.

So Jim let's get clear on the distinction between arguments for

(A) There is a likely model M of how theistic belief has warrant given
the truth of Christianity or theism.

(B) There is independent reason for thinking that M is true.

Sometimes I get the impression that you wan to deal with (A); other
times (B). For instance, you often chide the use of Christian
presuppositions in providing answers to your epistemological questions.
But I don't know why, since I know from our many correspondences that
you would do the same. Let's avoid the double standard if we can.


> I did not ask for an account, I asked for what it gives.

This is asking for an account, especially when you ask (as you did
above), how do you know that it is true. I don't see how one can say
what the SD delivers, let alone justifying its epistemic significance,
independent of a larger framework explaining and justifying the whole
notion. That's just me.

> You say that
> it gives - well whatever - Theism? Calvinism? Plantingaism? -
> whatever.

I "said" this? I don't think I even implied it Jim.

> But the only way you can say that is by appealing to other
> propositions within your framework.

This does not follow.

> But now are the givings up of the
> SD properly basic?

Why can't they be? I must have missed the argument here Jim. I have
reasons for supposing that some belief B is properly basic. That
wouldn't entail that B is not itself properly basic. This is just
another level confusion. And my reasons are not, as I have clearly
stated, themselves necessarily all the deliverances of the SD, even
though some of them could be. For instance, suppose Plantinga is right
about (1) above. Suspose further that there is a God is a deliverance of
the SD. There might be reason for supposing that there is a God (via
natural theology). In that case, I have reasons for supposing that the
consequent of (1) is true, even though for others (or me) the antecedent
of (1) is properly basic. And the reasons for the conditional (1) itself
would be....well...read Warranted Christian Beief. :)


> Haven't you set up a criteria (your framework) with
> which to decide which set of props the SD gives (and to judge the
> Truth
> or Falsity of other said deliverances)? Is this criteria properly
> basic? What is its source?

Q.E.D. :)

Michael (last night in Kentucky)