Mickey Myers wrote:

> > I studied under Van Til and Frame at WTS in PA in the 70's. Since
> > then I have been, for the most part, out of touch with developments
> > since then. Would you be so kind to briefly compare and contrast the
> > major agreements/disagreements between Van Til and Plantinga.

Mickey Sudduth replied:

> Good question. I think James Anderson and David Byron are in
> a better position to answer this question. Where are these guys?
> Somewhere lurking on the list. :-)

<disengage lurking device>

Okay, I'll have a crack at this. It seems to be a question that comes up
fairly often -- perhaps a few of us could put together a comprehensive web
article sometime. Anyway, here are my immediate thoughts. My personal
biases will be quite evident, for which I make no apologies. :) Others
can add/correct as appropriate.

[shameless plug: anyone interested in discussing Van Til's writings and
applying his insights should consider subscribing to one or both of the Van
Til lists -- find details here: http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/vantil.html ]

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Points of Agreement
-------------------

[1] Both men acknowledge Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour. A obvious and
unsophisticated point, but important nonetheless. :) Praise God that He
has directed two such great intellects (and humble spirits) in the service
of the Kingdom.

[2] Both men have emphasised the determinative relationship between
metaphysics and epistemology, i.e. that a good theory of knowledge requires
a certain theory of reality. Indeed, both have gone so far as to argue
(albeit by different routes) that a specifically *theistic* framework is
necessary for human knowledge to obtain -- although Plantinga has been more
reserved in the statement of his conclusions than Van Til.

[3] As a correlated point, both have argued that a naturalistic metaphysic
leads to a debilitating skepticism in epistemology.

[4] Van Til argued passionately against the idea of epistemological
autonomy, i.e. the suggestion that disagreements between believers and
unbelievers can be settled by an appeal to 'religiously neutral' principles
of reason. It seems to me that Plantinga would concur with this position
(see, e.g. his closing comments in 'Reason and Belief in God' to the effect
that "there is ... disagreement in the first place [between theist and
nontheist] as to what are the deliverances of reason"), although it
certainly doesn't feature as prominently in Plantinga's work as in Van
Til's.

[5] In a similar vein, both have argued that the Christian philosopher
ought not to ply his trade from a position of pretended autonomy or
neutrality, as if that were a prerequisite of participation in the broad
philosophical community. On the contrary, Christian philosophy should be
conducted (unashamedly) within the bounds of, and building upon, Christian
doctrinal/doxastic commitments. On this point see Van Til, passim, and
Plantinga, esp. 'Advice to Christian Philosophers'.

[6] Both men endorse (in general terms) Calvin's view of the *sensus
divinitatis* -- the innate knowledge (or disposition to knowledge) of God
implanted in the human mind. As such, both hold to the 'proper basicality'
of belief in God: theistic belief can be warranted for a person (and, in
the 'normal' case, *should* be warranted) even in the absence of reasons,
evidential support, explicit arguments, etc. based on other items of
knowledge. (But see below for some differences.) Thus, both firmly reject
the idea that rational theistic belief must be supported by a foundation of
other more fundamental (and allegedly less controvertible) beliefs.

[7] Both have been critical of the project of natural theology, in part
because of the myth that good theistic arguments are *necessary* for
rational theistic belief, and in part because both thought that the
traditional arguments for God's existence were poor or outright fallacious.
(However, see below for some differences in their motivation for these
criticisms.) Plantinga has warmed to natural theology in more recent years
(compare 'God and Other Minds' with his lecture 'Two Dozen or So Theistic
Arguments), and some Van Tilians likewise (notably, John Frame). It is a
popular misconception that Van Til rejected *in principle* the formulation
of theistic arguments (or *non-transcendental* theistic arguments), but
see: http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/vtfem.html#AIII

Points of Disagreement
----------------------

[1] Plantinga's work stands squarely in the Anglo-American analytic
tradition, whereas Van Til's work is characteristically framed in the
conceptual apparatus and terminology of Continental idealist thought.
(This latter fact partly explains the neglect and superficial dismissal of
Van Til's work among contemporary Christian philosophers, although a number
of Van Til's students -- notably Frame and Bahnsen -- have done much to
translate his thought into a more 'palatable' form.) [Of course, this
point is not so much a *disagreement* as a difference in approach.]

[2] Also on the subject of style (yet with implications for substance),
Plantinga's work is characterised by exhaustive (and, for some of us,
exhausting!) analytic detail, with meticulously formalized arguments, while
Van Til paints in broad philosophical strokes with an eye for 'the big
picture' -- leaving the details for others, more so inclined, to fill in.
(William Lane Craig, unfairly in my opinion, wrote than Van Til was "not a
philosopher" on account, apparently, of this difference between the two
men.)

[3] Van Til and Plantinga evidently disagree on the nature of human freedom
and the extent of divine sovereignty. Van Til follows the Westminster
Confession of Faith, III & IX, on this point and is thus committed to a
compatibilist view of human freedom. Plantinga, on the other hand, is
firmly persuaded (more on the basis, I'd venture, of philosophical
considerations than biblical ones) that a libertarian, incompatibilist
position is correct. This is no small point, for the work of both men has
been profoundly influenced by their views on this matter. For example, Van
Til contends that God's comprehensive pre-interpretation, and therefore pre-
determination, of creation history (including free human actions) is a
precondition of its intelligibility (for those of us created "to think
God's thoughts after Him"). Plantinga's classic Free Will Defence (against
the deductive atheistic argument from evil) and his work on reconciling
divine foreknowledge with free human acts (see 'On Ockham's Way Out') both
presuppose a libertarian conception of human freedom.

[4] While both have been critical of natural theology, Van Til's complaints
have been driven primarily by a concern about the influence of commitments
to (or pretensions of) intellectual autonomy and neutrality in the
formulation of theistic arguments, the presentation of Christian evidences,
and the development of Christian apologetic methodologies in general.
Plantinga's objections, on the other hand, have been more motivated (at
least in his early work) by skepticism about what the 'classical arguments'
achieve and by his views, much influenced by the Reformed tradition,
concerning the proper basicality of theistic belief (which suggest that
natural theology is at best superfluous and at worst impious).

[5] Van Til championed the use of a *transcendental* form of argumentation
as the only method capable of rationally, objectively and decisively
adjudicating between philosophical systems with conflicting presuppositions
(with regard to the nature of reality, the nature of God, the nature of man
and his intellect, ultimate epistemic authorities, etc.). As a result, Van
Til glories in what he takes to be the unavoidable element of circularity
and precommitment in Christian theistic apologetics, not to mention the
striking correlative conclusion that "antitheism presupposes theism".
Plantinga's published works, as far as I know, have made no explicit use of
(or even commented on) transcendental argumentation in the apologetic cause
(although his 'evolutionary argument against naturalism' is arguably in the
spirit, if not the letter, of the negative transcendental critiques
prominent in Van Tilian thought). I think this is a point where there
could (and should) be much more fruitful dialogue between Van Tilians and
Plantingans, once prejudices and misconceptions on both sides have been
laid to rest.

[6] Van Til put a considerably greater emphasis on the radical *antithesis*
between the believer and the unbeliever with respect to epistemic and
ethical norms (although the fact that Van Til saw this antithesis as one of
*principle* rather than *practice* is often neglected even by his would-be
advocates, to the detriment of the Van Tilian cause). From my reading of
Plantinga, I surmise that he would endorse this perspective *to a point*,
but would by no means be comfortable with Van Til's more extreme
formulations of the matter. (I make no comment here on the motivation of
either party for their positions on this vexed issue!)

[7] While there is much commonality between Van Til's view of Christian
theistic belief as 'presuppositions' and Plantinga's 'properly basic
beliefs', Van Til invested 'presuppositions' with considerably more
significance. For example, Van Til attached a strong ethical component to
such beliefs (consider his 'covenant-keeping/covenant-breaking' motif; cf.
also Frame's exposition of presuppositions as 'basic heart commitments')
and also viewed them (or at least a significant subset) as possessing
*transcendental necessity*, i.e. as being necessary preconditions of
rational inquiry and debate.

[8] Finally, it appears that Van Til and Plantinga have slightly different
understandings of the *sensus divinitatis*. Van Til, placing much emphasis
on a popular Reformed interpretation of Romans 1, apparently sees this as
*actual knowledge of God* -- present in every human being, suppressed in
sin but ultimately ineradicable, and thus supplying the universal 'point of
contact' for the apologist. For Van Til, then, every believer knows God
(despite their profession) at a fundamental, deep-rooted, but potentially
accessible level. Plantinga, however, seems to conceive of the *sensus
divinitatis* less strongly; as an intellectual *faculty* or *disposition*
toward belief in God, whereby warranted belief in God is generated in
certain appropriate (and probably commonplace) circumstances. Thus,
Plantinga (as I understand him) would not go so far as to say that every
person *knows* God (whether in principle or in practice), only that every
person possesses a natural and normative God-given disposition toward
theistic belief, the effect of which has been considerably distorted by sin
such that not every person *actually* believes. (This common
acknowledgement of the noetic effects of sin suggest another point of
agreement between the two: both recognise the necessity of divine grace in
human knowledge of God, and the necessity of full-blown regeneration for
saving knowledge, although again Van Til makes much more of this than
Plantinga. I leave for another time the question of whether this implies
or requires a Calvinist soteriology on Plantinga's part. ;)

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Hope this helps! Comments welcome, as always.

Cheers,
James

P.S. For more on the relationship between Van Tilian thought and Reformed
epistemology, see Frame's review of _Faith and Rationality_, included as an
appendix in _The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God_. It's a bit dated now,
given Plantinga's more recent work, but it's helpful nonetheless.