-------- Original Message --------
From: "greenmannowar" <cdmaman@...>
Subject: [frameup] 3 reports from defense link.mil just BEFORE Sept 11
To: frameup@yahoogroups.com
I was just poking around the defenselink.mil site to see what was
posted just before Sept 11 2001.
I came up with some pretty interesting stuff.
What do you guys make of this ???
--------
Three reports of interest on the defencelink US military website.
First, Bechtel, Raytheon, BAE and Halliburton were rewarded LARGE
contracts according to info posted to the Defenselink military site
on Sept 10th 2001. Some of these contracts had to do with WMD's, a
phrase rarely used before 911.
The second article is about Anthrax!!!??? ( Sept 6 2001)
The third article has to do with taks about Iraq This was posted to
the link Tuesday, Aug. 21st 2001 (very interesting conversation)
---------------------------------------
1)
CONTRACTS
ARMY
Parsons Delaware Inc., Pasadena, Calif. (DTRA01-01-D-0010); Bechtel
National Inc., San Francisco, Calif. (DTRA01-01-D-0011); Washington
Group International Inc., International Alliances, Cleveland, Ohio
(DTRA01-01-D-0012); Raytheon Technical Services Co., Reston, Va.
(DTRA01-01-D-0013); and Brown & Root Services, Division of Haliburton
International Inc., Arlington, Va. (DTRA01-01-D-0014), are together
being awarded an estimated $5,000,000,000 indefinite-
delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. An appropriation number and
dollar value will be issued with each delivery order. The objective
of this contract is to provide safe, secure, efficient and accurate
planning, organizing, management, integration, reporting, operations,
maintenance, logistics, construction and eradication support
resources to accomplish the elimination of solid/liquid-fueled
rockets and air-breathing weapons, bombers, submarines and other
platforms, disposal of the residual products and by-products of such
systems, elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) support
infrastructure and production facilities to include chemical and
biological capabilities, storage and accounting for sensitive items
of these systems and their warheads which are to be retained, non-
proliferation of WMD expertise and sponsorship of collaborative
efforts between WMD development experts and their respective
laboratory and research facilities and design, estimation,
construction, and demolition of horizontal (e.g., trenching, roads
and railroads) and vertical (e.g., buildings, bunkers, and towers)
structures. Work for Parsons Delaware Inc. will be performed in the
former Soviet Union (90%) and Fairfax, Va. (10%); for Bechtel
National Inc. in the former Soviet Union (90%) and McLean, Va. (10%);
for Washington Group International Inc. in the former Soviet Union
(90%) and Cleveland, Ohio (10%); for Raytheon Technical Services Co.
in the former Soviet Union (90%) and Reston, Va. (10%); and for Brown
& Root Services in the former Soviet Union (90%) and Arlington, Va.
(10%). Completion is expected by Sept. 6, 2006. There were 72 bids
solicited on April 4, 2001, and six bids were received. The Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Va., is the contracting
agency.
Raytheon Technical Services Co., Reston, Va., is being awarded a
$3,698,959 increment of a $7,397,918 cost-plus-award-fee/award-term
contract with a cumulative total of $29,798,155, for support services
to operate and maintain a semi-automated system to monitor vehicles
and cargo loads exiting from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in
Russia. The contractor will provide logistics, maintenance, food
preparation, health care and linguistic support for Strategic Army
Reductions Treaty inspection activities at a remote site located in
Votkinsk, Russia. Work will be performed in Russia (70%), Reston, Va.
(20%), and Germany (10%), and completion is expected by Jan. 8, 2010.
There was an announcement on the World Wide Web on May 18, 2001, and
one bid was received. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort
Belvoir, Va., is the contracting activity (DTRA01-01-C-0059).
NAVY
BAE Systems Applied Technologies Inc., Rockville, Md., is being
awarded a $5,673,048 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to provide
engineering and technical services in support of the NATO Seasparrow
Surface Missile System, Target Acquisition System, MK48 Guided
Missile Vertical Launching System and the Evolved Seasparrow Missile
and associated improvements thereto. The contract contains options
which, if exercised, would bring the total cumulative contract value
to $36,263,762. Work will be performed in Arlington, Va. (70%);
Silver Spring, Md. (20%); and Norfolk, Va. (10%), and is expected to
be completed by January 2007. Contract funds in the amount of
$497,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This
contract was not competitively procured. The Naval Sea Systems
Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., is the contracting activity
(N00024-01-C-5402).
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/c09072001_ct412-01.html
----------------------------
2)
DIA Hopes to Grow Anthrax Variant to Test Vaccine
The Defense Intelligence Agency hopes to grow a Russian- engineered
variant of anthrax to test the effectiveness of the vaccine given to
U.S. troops. A 1997 medical journal reported that Russia might have
developed a modified anthrax strain.
Concerned about its possible use as a biological weapon, DIA
officials requested a sample from Russia, but to date have received
none, Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke said in a Sept. 4 press
briefing. DIA earlier this year started to look into the coordination
and approvals needed to develop the strain and test the vaccine, she
said.
Clarke stressed no scientific work has been done so far in developing
this strain and that the proposed work, codenamed Project Jefferson,
would be in compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
WASHINGTON, Sept. 6,
2001http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/n09062001_200109061.html
-----------------------------------------
3)
Iraq Q:A: ( out of context)Q: I'm Tom Gjelton with NPR. Can you say
what you see going on between Syria and Iraq in terms of possible
security cooperation? And slightly larger than that, in the event of
a Middle East war, what do you see as sort of the alignment of Arab
states there right now and the likelihood that they would be able to
work together?
Rodman: Well, I don't want to talk about a Middle East war. It's
something I think about, but I'd rather not -- I don't think we
should be talking about it. It is a dangerous situation in the region
now, for obvious reasons. And the very fact that you would ask a
question like that is a symptom of, you know, how precarious things
are.
The Syrian-Iraqi relationship is intriguing. There's a rivalry that
goes back many decades, yet in the present environment they seem to
have common ground in trying to complicate life for the United States
and for Israel. So there's a trend toward radicalization. I
shouldn't -- well, I wouldn't -- maybe that's overstating it. But it
has its practical implications. There's a pipeline which, you know,
the Syrians made some promises to Secretary Powell about, something
we're looking at very closely.
I don't know what -- I mean, I think there is a danger of conflict in
the Middle East that is disturbing, but I don't want to speculate. I
don't want to fuel speculation about what it might look like. I think
we have friends in the Arab world, I think, whose relationship with
us is solid. There are plenty of these friends of ours in the Arab
world who understand the risks that you're discussing.
So I think we're a long way away from, you know, the kind of
cataclysm that you're asking about, precisely because I think a lot
of mature folks out there understand why it's necessary to avoid
that. So let me just try to steer away in the opposite direction and
say, you know, people are conscious of it, and for that reason I'm
confident that wiser heads, cooler heads, can prevail and not let
things slide further down the road to that kind of a conflict.
Barbara Starr -- Rodman:( if you read the whole article Rodman
deliberately and openly wont discuss anything having to do with Iraq).
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2001/t08222001_t0821asd.html
other headline on
Iraq
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2001/n08212001_200108212.html
By Bill Gertz Published July 19, 2003
The FBI is investigating the origin of forged documents indicating that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger, and one candidate for the forgeries is an Iraqi opposition group, U.S. officials said. The documents, obtained first by Italy's intelligence service, ended up fooling the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies into believing Baghdad was trying to buy uranium ore from the African nation, U.S. officials say. The documents ended up "tainting" other reliable intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs and undermining the credibility of U.S. intelligence reports, said officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity. One official said that the documents were provided first to the Italians and then to journalists before they ended up in the hands of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which dismissed them as fakes. FBI spokesman Bill Carter said in an interview that a preliminary inquiry into the documents was undertaken after recent meetings between senior FBI officials and Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia Democrat and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Carter declined to comment further, citing a policy of not discussing FBI investigative matters. Other officials said the FBI has sent agents to Italy and other nations to find out the origin of the documents, and the bureau's counterintelligence agents also are questioning officials at the CIA and State Department. The probe was first reported by Newsweek magazine. Other intelligence obtained by Britain is considered reliable and indicates Niger had tried to sell uranium ore to Saddam Hussein's government, said officials familiar with U.S. intelligence reports. President Bush chastised senior advisers, including National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and outgoing press spokesman Ari Fleischer, about the uranium intelligence flap and the White House's handling of it several times during the recent trip to Africa. Spokesmen at the time initially said the White House was provided with bad intelligence from the CIA, only to reverse course a day later and claim the intelligence may still be valid although it should not have been included in a presidential speech. "The president wanted the matter settled," one official said of Mr. Bush's harsh words for his advisers. Although it received intelligence from the documents earlier, the CIA did not obtain copies of the forged documents until February 2003 — months after the Italians first obtained them and after the president's State of the Union address. A U.S. official said the Italians initially only described the documents to the CIA. Then the State Department obtained a set from a journalist and that led to an investigative trip to Niger by former U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson. Mr. Wilson said Niger's government told him that the country would not sell uranium to Iraq, but also informed him that Iraqis were in the country discussing unspecified commercial transactions, which could have included uranium-ore purchases, the U.S. official said. CIA Director George J. Tenet testified before a closed hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee on Wednesday to explain how the tainted intelligence ended up in a major U.S. intelligence-community report and the president's State of the Union speech. An official said the documents included a letter about the purchase of some 500 tons of uranium ore, supposedly signed by Niger's president, Mamadou Tandja. The signature was found to have been faked. Another document was described as an October 2000 Niger military document signed by a former foreign minister of Niger. Besides Iraqi opposition, investigators also say the documents could have been produced by criminals, con men, or a foreign intelligence service. The six main anti-Saddam groups before the war were the Iraqi National Congress, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Iraqi National Accord and the Constitutional Monarchy Movement. In London on Wednesday, British Prime Minister Tony Blair defended British intelligence on the Niger-Iraq uranium deal before the Parliament. "The intelligence on which we based this was not the so-called 'forged documents' that have been put to the IAEA, and the IAEA have accepted that they got no such forged documents from British intelligence," Mr. Blair said. "We had independent intelligence to the effect," the prime minister added. U.S. intelligence officials suspect the bogus documents were created to exaggerate Iraq's nuclear-arms program as part of an effort to garner international opposition to Baghdad. The forged documents undermined one element of a National Intelligence Estimate, a major interagency report, that became the basis for part of the president's January speech to Congress. Officials familiar with the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction said it included one passage about efforts by Baghdad to buy yellowcake uranium ore from Niger. However, the passage in the highly classified report did not have a "footnote" or objection attached to it, indicating it represented a consensus view of all intelligence agencies, including the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Only later in another section of the 90-page classified report did the State Department intelligence office indicate that it doubted the attempted Niger uranium purchases. "There was no opposition to the main reference to Niger," said one official who has seen the estimate. According to U.S. officials, the State Department's opposition to the intelligence on Niger uranium in the report was related to the department's doubts about Iraq's purchase of special alloy tubes that were believed to be for building gas centrifuges.
Weapons expert Dr David Kelly reportedly told of "many dark actors playing games" in an email to a journalist hours before his suicide.
The words appeared to refer to officials at the Ministry of Defence and UK intelligence agencies with whom he had sparred over interpretations of weapons reports, according to the New York Times.
The message gave no indication that he was depressed and said he was waiting "until the end of the week" before judging how his appearance before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee had gone.
The newspaper did not name the recipient of the email.
It said another associate had received a "combative" message from Dr Kelly shortly before he left his Oxfordshire home for the last time on Thursday.
The scientist said in the email that he was determined to overcome the scandal surrounding him and was enthusiastic about the possibility of returning to Iraq.
Dr Kelly was grilled by MPs last week over his comments to reporters about the use of intelligence in the run-up to the war in Iraq. He had denied being the main source for a BBC story about claims that a dossier on Iraq had been "sexed up" to boost public support for military action.
Dr Kelly's wife Janice told the New York Times her husband had worked on Thursday morning on a report he said he owed the Foreign Office and had sent some emails to friends.
She said: "After lunch, he went out for a walk to stretch his legs as he usually does."
Mrs Kelly said she had no indication that her husband was contemplating suicide.
"But he had been under enormous stress, as we all had been."
Mama Mia, What a Con! How the Italians — perhaps with U.S. neocon help — suckered the Brits into believing and promoting the African-uranium fable
By: Dennis Hans - 07/19/03
Did neonconservative elements in U.S. intelligence, perhaps at the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP), use the Italian military intelligence agency, known as SISMI, to con British intelligence into believing what most U.S. experts considered far-fetched at best — that Iraq sought uranium from Africa for use in a nuclear weapons program? Is that the “back story” behind this discredited assertion — “there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa” — in the Brits’ ballyhooed September 2002 dossier, which Bush cited in his 2003 State of the Union address?
At this point, there is substantial circumstantial evidence against Italy’s SISMI, less so for a U.S. role in the plot — if a plot is what it is. It strains credulity that SISMI would, on its own, con the Brits into believing and hyping the uranium allegations. But one thing this strange, complex story has revealed time and again is that credulity-straining things happen all the time.
So with that caveat out of the way, we turn to our attempt at a coherent narrative of this convoluted tale.
The Brits Received “Summaries,” Not Forgeries
British officials vehemently deny that they knew anything about the forged Iraq-Niger correspondence and “memorandum of agreement” for the sale of 500 tons of uranium oxide when they published their September dossier. They insist that their assertion was based on other evidence that their government had obtained from at least two western (but non-U.S.) intelligence services.
I believe the Brits. Their position is supported by an important story in the March 22 Washington Post (http://commondreams.org/headlines03/0322-04.htm).Paraphrasing an official of the U.N. shortly after that body’s International Atomic Energy Agency exposed the forgeries, the Post reported that “a Niger diplomat turned the letters over to Italian intelligence, which provided summaries of the information to Washington and London.”
The key word is “summaries.”
On July 9, a Reuters dispatch (http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/24by7panews/page.cfm?objectid=13157652&method=full&siteid=50143) made the same basic point:: “Italy's intelligence service circulated reports about the Niger documents — not the documents themselves — to other Western intelligence services in early 2002, and that was apparently how the British and U.S. intelligence services learned of them, U.S. government sources said.”
“The news reported by various information organizations, national and foreign, concerning Italy's claimed transmission to other intelligence organizations of documents of Niger or Iraqi origin, conveying evidence relative to uranium transactions between Niger and Iraq are without any foundation.”
The key phrase in the non-denial denial is “documents of Niger or Iraqi origin.” What SISMI transmitted were of ITALIAN origin — they were SISMI “summaries” based (how loosely we don’t know) on the info in the actual documents.
Why the Brits Believed
The Brits found the allegations in the “summaries” credible BECAUSE they never received the actual documents. If the efforts of the Iraqis to acquire uranium in Africa are described in a report provided by a trusted ally that was not at all eager to attack Iraq, and if the reader of that report is unaware the allegations are based on obvious forgeries, he might well be inclined to believe the allegations. He would not have his guard up while reading the summaries/report, and unless someone provided a darn good reason for skepticism, he would likely consider the Iraqis guilty until proven innocent. He would not be inclined to search for evidence that would clear the Iraqis.
SISMI went out of its way to lend credibility to the summaries/report by flattering the Brits and playing up what we might call Italy’s own “special relationship” with Britain: They were two European allies who, unlike the Bush administration cowboys chomping at the bit, did not believe in early 2002 that war was the only solution to Iraq. SISMI also boxed the Brits by insisting they not compare intelligence notes with the Yanks. British officials concede as much, without specific reference to SISMI, in an important article by Richard Norton-Taylor in the July 14 Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,997704,00.html):
“British intelligence sources said yesterday that MI6 had separate information [distinct from the forgeries] to back the claim. MI6 was provided the information by a third party which insisted that neither the source nor the intelligence could be passed on. . . . Whitehall officials suggested yesterday that the claims came from a ‘close ally’ but one which did not want Britain to give it to the US as a further pretext for war.”
That sound you hear is SISMI playing MI6 like a violin. But who composed the tune? SISMI? Berlusconi? An ally in the western hemisphere? Who wanted the Brits to believe in a uranium crock?
Is Italian “Intelligence” Idiotic or Insidious?
The actual forged documents have now appeared in the Italian and U.S. media (view them via this link: http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/US/uranium030716flaweddocs.html). As ABC’s Brian Ross reported July 16, “Among the many glaring errors evident in the documents . . . are the use of obsolete letterheads, incompatible dates and poorly forged signatures.”
So what are the chances SISMI’s forensic investigators were fooled by this rubbish? Slim. It strains credulity to think SISMI could not figure out they were dealing with obvious forgeries (assuming SISMI didn’t create them itself), but it’s certainly possible.
If SISMI considered them geniune, why didn’t they include photocopies along with the summaries/report it passed on to the Brits and others? Wouldn’t that help a recipient agency conduct their own investigation to confirm or refute the allegations in the “summaries”?
If SISMI was cynically trying to persuade the Brits of an African Connection that SISMI knew or highly suspected was bogus, the smart thing for SISMI to have done is lock up those laughable letters and distribute instead neatly typed “summaries” that wouldn’t have those “glaring errors.” Had SISMI given MI6 the actual documents, it probably would have taken the Brits the same two hours it took the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conclude they were forgeries.
Is SISMI a mostly rightwing hotbed in a rightwing government? A source within SISMI told the Italian newspaper La Repubblica (as paraphrased July 16 by the Associated Press) that “the Italian Foreign Ministry had raised strong objections about the information provided by Italian intelligence.” (http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-2916088,00.html)
Sounds just like the infighting among the Bush administration, where the cool, competent and powerless folks in the State Department’s intelligence bureau, whose judgments look darn good in hindsight, have been repeatedly stunned by the incredible nonsense passed off as truth by the superhawk neoconservatives at the Pentagon’s OSP.
Even if turns out that the SISMI leadership is both hawkish and sneaky, and indeed passed on to the Brits allegations it new were groundless, it’s hard to believe that SISMI would do this on its own initiative.
The Brits’ and Yanks’ Mysterious “Other” Sources
So far, our focus has been on one British source, SISMI. Rest assured, SISMI was the Brits’ primary source. But we know from numerous comments by named an unnamed Brit officials that they had at least one other foreign intelligence source. It could be an agency from another country (some recent speculation centers on France), or it may simply be a different branch of Italian intelligence. Whatever the case, this other source or sources seems to have provided the merest of scraps — “fragmentary” stuff similar or identical to some odds and ends the sane branches of U.S. intelligence place little stock in.
In the weeks and months after the Niger Connection fell apart on March 7, 2003, various U.S. officials aluded to untainted evidence in our possession implicating Iraq in efforts to buy uranium from an African nation other than Niger. Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) asked the Bush administration what this evidence was, and an official State Department response acknowledged that our source was a “second Western European government” (i.e., other than the British) that had “based its assessment on the evidence already available to the U.S. that was subsequently discredited” (http://alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=16155). According to a “senior intelligence official” quoted in the July 8 Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A23777-2003Jul7?language=printer),
“We both [the U.S. and Brits] had one source reporting through some liaison service which said, ‘Look what we found.’ There were other [intelligence] reporting streams, but it may be that all streams are traced to the same source.”
So the Brits left it in, believing erroneously that they had secret evidence not privy to the Yanks! What the Brits didn’t know is that their trusty friends in SISMI provided summaries/reports to the Yanks, too. Nor did the Brits know that the U.S. had long ago conducted three separate investigations into the allegations that flowed from the forged documents, and each concluded that, for a variety of reasons, there was virtually no chance they were true. But because the CIA did not tell the Brits in early September what it new and what it had investigated and discounted, the Brits didn’t get a chance for a lightbulb moment. You know, the light switches on and the MI6 agent says, “That sounds amazingly like the allegations that we’ve been thinking are true, but unlike you Yanks, we didn’t check them out. We basically just took the word of our secret source. Please, CIA friend, tell me more.”
This “failure to communicate” is all the more astounding when one considers that a CIA officer sits on the Brits’ Joint Intelligence Committee. He or she doesn’t have full privileges, but there really is a “special relationship” between Brit and Yank spooks. Why the CIA official or officials chose not to explain to the Brits WHY they should delete the uranium reference is a matter for Congress to investigate.
And what to make of CIA director George Tenet? It’s not good to have at the top someone who’s (1) a coward and (2) easily cajoled by his smooth-talking, back-slapping pal, George W. Bush. From a professional standpoint, that’s two strikes against Tenet. Sticking strictly to uranium, his agency did ask the Brits — however ineffectively and non-specifically — to not mention it in the dossier. And a few weeks later he got a similar line stricken from Bush’s October 7 address in Cincinnati. But he also breathed life into the allegations by mentioning it, albeit with caveats, in the classified National Intelligence Estimate of October — a document put out mainly to placate Democrats who wanted more to go on than administration pronouncements.
Those passages were not read in a vacuum. They were read by members of Congress who shortly before had first learned about the Uranium Connection from a trusted ally asserting in a white paper that “there is intelligence” of such a Connection. That nuclear double-shot helped to persuade fence-sitters to give Bush a green light to wage war.
The net effect of Tenet’s conflicting actions on the Uranium Connection was to give some legitimacy to allegations that deserved almost none. A less cowardly director would have driven a stake into the Connection, but such a director would never have been hired by Bush.
Questions that Require Answers
Determining the who, when, how and why of the preparation of these summaries — and whether “summaries” is a good description of what SISMI distributed — will go a long way toward determining if the Brits believed these materials or merely pretended to.
Consider “who?” The summaries presumably were prepared by SISMI agents. Did they prepare them on their own? Did any non-Italians collaborate? If so, who? What was the nature of the collaboration?
Consider “why?” Was the purpose of the summaries to accurately reflect the contents of the documents or to hype and distort them? At any point in their preparation phase did the preparers learn or suspect that the allegations were false and the documents fake?
Consider “when?” The actual documents were acquired by Italian intelligence in the late in 2001. Not till months later did the Italians distribute the summaries. After Wilson revealed in the New York Times that he conducted his Niger investigation in “late February 2002,” the British Foreign Office said that it was some time after that that the Brits received information on Iraq’s pursuit of African uranium from their sources. (http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=422729). If that British info is correct, why the delay? Why not get the documents or summaries into British, U.S. or, God forbid, IAEA hands IMMEDIATELY?
It’s not clear when the U.S. received its copy of SISMI’s “summaries.”
As soon as we did, did we alert our Italian ally that it was spreading bad information so that SISMI could alert the other recipients?
Apparently not. Of course, there wouldn’t be any need to do so if spreading lies was the intent and we were in on the scheme.
Bob Woodward reported in the March 23, 2003 Washington Post that, in very early 2002, Bush “signed a secret intelligence order authorizing the CIA to undertake a comprehensive program to remove Hussein” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12215-2003Mar22?language=printer). If that covert campaign was anything like past ones to topple a foreign government, a significant component would be disinformation. Did Bush authorize the intelligence community to launch an overseas disinformation campaign? Was the writing and distribution of the “summaries” part of that effort? Is this why there was such little concern, aside from career professionals at the CIA, about duping the Brits?
Did the summarizers broaden Iraq’s potential list of suppliers to include all four uranium-producing nations in Africa — perhaps to give the allegations a longer life by making them more difficult to speedily refute?
The U.S. Congress needs to put the right officials under oath and pose tough questions to determine if the Bush team used the Brits to deceive America about the nuclear threat from Iraq. The British Parliament needs to determine if British intelligence were witting or unwitting participants. The Italian Parliament needs to determine if their intelligence agents produced credible “summaries” or hyped and distorted ones; and if the latter is the case, did they do so on their own or in cahoots with elements of U.S. intelligence?
For intelligence officials in three countries, it could be a long, hot summer.
Dennis Hans is a single white male who has taught courses in mass communications and American foreign policy at the University of South Florida-St. Petersburg. He enjoys dancing, romantic walks on moonlit beaches, and exposing Bush administration deceit. If you’re a lovely non-smoking lady with a delightful sense of humor and some dirt on Powell or Cheney, Dashing Den would love to hear from you at HANS_D@...
One week after the attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the press corps, "This isn't Pearl Harbor." No, it was worse. Sixty years ago, the United States did not have a director of central intelligence or thirteen intelligence agencies or a combined intelligence budget of more than $30 billion to provide early warning of enemy attack.
There is another significant and telling difference between Pearl Harbor and September 11. Less than two weeks after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed a high-level military and civilian commission to determine the causes of the intelligence failure. Following the September attacks, however, President Bush, CIA director George Tenet, and the chairmen of the Senate and House intelligence committees were adamantly opposed to any investigation or postmortem. The president's failure to appoint a statutory inspector general at the CIA from January 2001 to April 2002deprived the agency of the one individual who could have started an investigation regardless of the director's opposition. Overall, the unwillingness to begin a congressional inquiry for nearly eight months increased the suspicion that indicators of an attack had gone unheeded.
The eventual Senate and House intelligence committee investigation of the September 11 failure, which began in June 2002, was mishandled from the beginning. The original staff director for the investigation, former CIA inspector general Britt Snider, had the stature and experience for the job, but he was soon pushed out by former Senate intelligence committee chairman Richard Shelby (R-GA), a staunch critic of CIA Director Tenet but never an advocate for reform of the intelligence community. The staff itself is too small and inexperienced to do the job seriously. The August 2002 decision of the chairmen of the Senate and House intelligence committees to order an aggressive FBI investigation of the joint committee, ostensibly to uncover leaks of classified information, marked a blatant violation of the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. The move was designed to placate the Bush administration, which has consistently established
roadblocks to an independent investigation of the intelligence community.
Nevertheless, the preliminary report of the joint intelligence committee has done an excellent job of ferreting out evidence documenting the failures at the CIA and the FBI. The report describes a director of central intelligence who declared a war on terrorism in 1998 but allocated no additional funding or personnel to the task force on terrorism; an intelligence community that never catalogued information on the use of airplanes as weapons; and a CIA that refused to acknowledge the possibility of weaponizing commercial aircraft for terrorism until two months after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Two days after the report was published, the Bush administration reversed itself and endorsed the creation of a separate, independent investigation to study the intelligence failure.....
Bush's troubles won't help Democrats By Llewellyn King KNIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE
Engineers call them hairline fractures: minute cracks that do not affect the load-bearing ability of a structure but that bear watching, in case they should propagate.
Last week Washington began to notice hairline cracks in the Bush White House - nothing so severe that the president is threatened by the Democrats. But, by any measure, it has been a terrible time for the White House. And the pollsters are beginning to pick up the public's doubts.
The immediate impact has been a toning down in the truculence of the president's keenest supporters. Talk of a new imperialism has evaporated and the doctrine of pre-emption has been put back on the shelf.
The immediate cause of the White House discomfort is the faulty intelligence on Saddam Hussein's alleged attempts to buy uranium in Niger, and Bush's referencing this fiction in his State of the Union address.
The White House blames the CIA and a nasty spat has broken out between CIA Director George Tenet and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. It seems unlikely that both of them can remain in the administration.
Then there is the situation on the ground in Iraq, which does not look to be improving soon, and the continued U.S. fatalities, running at about one a day.
The neo-conservatives, who were the most vociferous and articulate in advocating war, are on the defensive. Their Bible, The Weekly Standard, has gone from lavish enthusiasm about the war to claiming that things are going better on the ground than we are being told.
In light of these difficulties, the administration has been forced to tread lightly around such thorny issues as Syria, Iran and North Korea. Even the most bellicose of conservatives are not suggesting that the doctrine of pre-emption be given another outing while Iraq remains an open sore. Mercifully for the administration, the public and the politicians are overlooking Afghanistan, where our allies - now seen as warlords - have upped the production of heroin.
On the domestic front, things are not going any better. Such economic recovery as there is has not produced new jobs. And no less an oracle than Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan twice has warned about the dampening effects of an anticipated natural gas shortage this fall and winter.
Heavy users of natural gas, such as the chemical industry and the wood products industry, already are severely impacted by gas prices, which are high by traditional summer standards.
The chemical industry is losing production and moving offshore. If Greenspan is right, we will face a winter of discontent. And the benefits of Bush's tax cut will be negated by the cost of people heating their homes. What is worse, there is no quick fix, and the White House has to hope for the mildest of winters.
There are other issues that affect individuals and families besides the cost of home heating, and the White House appears to have been slow to grasp them. They include Medicare, welfare and transportation. Unlike foreign policy, which is an abstraction to most people, these are voter issues.
Joyous Democrats tell me that we may be at the beginning of real trouble for the president. Maybe, but the Democrats look weak and disorganized without resounding alternatives. Democrats have no more idea of what to do in Iraq than anyone else, and they consistently have underestimated Bush both as a politician and as someone who can communicate with the population.
To think that the president's current troubles signal an end to Republican dominance in Washington is naive. What the White House's troubles may signal is a closer election than appeared possible before the invasion of Iraq.
Of the nine declared Democratic presidential candidates, none inspires confidence.
The party is still hoping for a savior from outside. They bandy about retired Gen. Wes Clark's name. And Delaware Sen. Joe Biden is hovering. Clark is a political amateur and Biden has tried his luck before and failed.
The Democrats' biggest difficulty is that Bush has monopolized patriotism. It is patriotism that Bush has been most skillful at exploiting. He has ridden high from 9/11 to the present day not on tax cuts and the rest of his domestic agenda, but on the war on terrorism, which to date has included the invasion of Iraq.
Bush is not in trouble, but he is not as strong as he was. It will take a further deterioration for any of the tiny cracks in Bush's governance to open wide enough for his opponents to insert a crowbar.
Llewellyn King is chairman and CEO of the King Publishing Co. (www.kingpublishing.com), publisher of White House Weekly and Energy Daily. Readers may write to him at King Publishing, 1325 G St. NW, Suite 1003,Washington, D.C. 20005.
Bush’s Brain: How Karl Rove Made George W. Bush Presidential by James Moore and Wayne Slater; Boy Genius: Karl Rove, the Brains Behind the Remarkable Political Triumph of George W. Bush by Lou Dubose, Jan Reid and Carl M. Cannon
Karl Rove, chief political advisor to George W Bush, is the subject of two recently published books by veteran journalists.
Bush’s BrainHow Karl Rove Made George W. Bush Presidential was authored by television correspondentJamesMoore and Wayne Slater, Austin, Texas, bureau chief of the Dallas Morning News.
BoyGenius:Karl Rove, the Brains Behind the Remarkable Political Triumph of George W. Bush was penned by Lou Dubose, Jan Reid and Carl M. Cannon. Dubose, formerly an editor forthe Texas Observer and The Austin Chronicle, co-authored Shrub: The Short But Happy Political Life of George W. Bush. Reid is a novelist andmagazine journalist, and Cannon is the White House correspondent for the National Journal.
Considering the subservient role the media has played in relation to the Bush administration, it is no surprise that neither volume deals with the real social and political significance of figures like Rove, one of the most dismal representatives of the political underworld.
Bush’s Brain and Boy Genius provide glimpses into Rove’s machinations, but manage to stay within definite boundaries and leave the political status quo essentially unquestioned. They gloss over, for example, critical events relating to the ascension of Bush to the presidency. Neither work seriously treats the 2000 presidential election result as a political hijacking, organized by a right-wing cabal that included Rove.
Although much of the two books’ material overlaps, Boy Genius: Karl Rove,the Brains Behind the Remarkable Political Triumph of George W. Bush, as the title suggests, adopts a less critical attitude and in general is a less substantive work.
Both volumes are muckraking accounts of Rove’s career, but despite their varying levels of criticism, the journalist/authors cannot help but express admiration for him. At various moments, it becomes clear that the authors measure Rove by the standards of contemporary American culture: Rove is a success, a “winner” and not a “loser,” no matter how unattractive he is as a personality and political type.
Bush’s Brain begins by claiming that Rove is “something grander” than a presidential advisor. “His influence marks a transcendent moment in American politics: the rise of an unelected consultant to a position of unprecedented power,” which may “raise” constitutional questions. The book’s authors describe Rove as the “co-president of the United States.” This is a remarkable assertion, but even more remarkable is the failure of the authors to grasp that the rise of an unelected consultant takes place as the consequence of the rise of an unelected president! Rove’s prominence is one expression of the quasi-Bonapartist character of the Bush administration.
“Cabinet appointments were vetted through him [Rove], judicial nominations crossed his desk, as did the details of a proposed energy bill, administration policy on stem-cell research, steel tariffs, and health care policy. Nearly every speech was shown to Rove before it was delivered,” asserts BoyGenius.
Dirty tricks
This wide portfolio is all the more significant because Rove seems to have little interest in the substance of policy, outside of its impact on maintaining political office. He rose through the ranks of the Republican Party as a career political operative, concerned mainly with the process of manipulating public opinion to produce a desired electoral result.
While a hard-core right-winger, Rove is not a product of the Christian fundamentalists, the neo-conservatives, the Southern racists or other factions of the contemporary far right. He comes from a slightly earlier, but equally foul, political tradition—the McCarthyite red-baiter.
Born in Denver in 1950, Rove grew up in Colorado, Utah and Nevada. Beginning his political career as a die-hard Nixonite (from age 9), Rove “escaped the Vietnam draft, but loathed everything those anti-war protesters on TV stood for,” according to Boy Genius. “I came from a relatively conservative state, Utah, and it was hard to sympathize with all those Commies,” proclaimed Rove.
After dropping out of college, Rove’s first foray into dirty tricks campaigning was in Illinois in 1970. Gaining entry into the office of Alan Dixon, a Democrat running for state treasurer, Rove stole campaign stationery and printed false invitations to Dixon’s campaign headquarters, promising “free beer, free food, girls, and a good time.” They were distributed in places such as homeless shelters. In 1973, while chairman of the College Republicans, Rove first hooked up with George Bush the elder, who was then the chairman of the Republican National Committee, beginning his role as a Bush family retainer.
Rove went to Texas in 1977 to work for a Bush Political Action Committee (PAC) run by JamesBaker. At the time of Rove’s arrival, U.S. senator John Tower was the only Republican holding statewide office. When Rove left in 2001 to serve as a senior adviser to President Bush, all 29 statewide elected offices were held by Republicans, and both U.S. Senate seats were occupied by Rove clients, what Bush’s Brain calls “a shiny roster of winners.” Both books present this phenomenon as the product of Rove’s ingenious handiwork. It would be more accurate to say that when Rove arrived in Texas, only one statewide Republican politician was unscrupulous enough to hire him—by the time he left, they all were.
Authors Moore and Slater of Bush’s Brain state that “the Texas political landscape was spotted with the blood of those who had been taken down by Karl Rove.” Despite this awestruck attitude, however, Rove’s track record is hardly one of unbroken success: he helped run Bush the elder’s abortive 1980 presidential campaign as well as Phil Gramm’s presidential campaign debacle in 1996.
What neither Boy Genius nor Bush’s Brain choose to recognize is that Rove was a consequence, not the cause, of a process that saw a wholesale movement throughout the South of conservative white Democratic Party politicians into the Republican Party. A pivotal moment of this shift, part of the movement to the right by the entire political establishment, came in 1983 when Gramm, then a Democrat, quit Congress to run again for his seat as a Republican. He then became one of Rove’s major clients.
To help his clients win office, Rove conducted “whisper wars”—a genteel way of saying slander campaigns—against political opponents. Whispers of homosexuality in the Texas state government purportedly undermined the gubernatorial campaign of incumbent Ann Richards in her unsuccessful 1994 fight against Rove’s client George W Bush. The same tactic was used in the 2000 GOP primary against John McCain. Rumors were circulated that McCain, a former Vietnam prisoner of war, had become mentally unhinged as a result of his imprisonment.
Although Bush was Rove’s premier asset—“the keys to the kingdom”—the latter maintained a list of private business clients who paid for his political advice. Among them was tobacco giant Philip Morris, which hired Rove to provide “political intelligence.” Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and Angolan anti-communist guerrilla leader and mass murderer Jonas Savimbi also paid Rove to lobby for them.
Philip Morris supported tort reform, the campaign by big business to curb liability from lawsuits involving injury, illness or death.Texas was one of the first states to sue the tobacco companies for recovery of Medicaid costs for treatment of tobacco-related illnesses. At the time, Rove shamelessly claimed: “My job advising Philip Morris has nothing to do with my working for the governor.”
By 1997, Bush was in the early stages of emerging as a potential presidential candidate. In Texas, he appointed a committee to conduct statewide hearings, dubbed “the tax road show.” According to Bush’s Brain, Bush’s tax plan was copied directly from Ronald Reagan’s sweeping tax proposals in the 1980s. His tax committee included Enron CEO Kenneth Lay. “These were Karl Rove’s guys, the big-money guys, and the financial foundation of the national GOP.... [O]nce Bush decided to move forward on a plan to cut taxes, the voices shaping it sounded remarkably as if they all belonged to Rove,” argue the authors of Bush’s Brain.
The 2000 election
The 2000 presidential election campaign is what supposedly established Rove’s standing as a political genius. The two books fail to mention or gloss over the fact that only days before the November balloting Rove predicted a landslide victory for Bush, with the Republican candidate capturing 320 votes in the Electoral College, indicating that the master strategist completely misread the actual shifts in public opinion. In fact, Gore won the popular vote by a margin of more than 540,000, and the Electoral College vote was the closest in more than a century.
Bush’s eventual victory was only due to the machinations of the Republican Party on election night and in Florida in the subsequent weeks, a conspiracy in which Rove was centrally involved, culminating in the anti-democratic ruling by the US Supreme Court that shut down vote-counting.
The events of election night are worth recalling briefly. Around 8 p.m., the major television networks, based on information provided by the generally reliable Voter News Service, projected Vice President Al Gore the victor in Florida. Such an outcome spelled likely defeat for Bush. As Boy Genius reports, the projection “stunned and horrified” Rove. In an unprecedented move, he “rushed to get himself on the air” (national television) where he admonished the networks for “prematurely” calling Florida. In another unprecedented action, Bush held an unscheduled press conference in which he repeated this message. The purpose of these desperate efforts was not primarily to appeal to last-minute voters, as Boy Genius suggests, but to put pressure on the television networks to rescind their projection, which they all subsequently did.
At around 2 a.m., Fox News, whose decision desk was headed by Bush’s first cousin John Ellis, unilaterally declared Florida and thus the national election for the Texas governor, a call then taken up by the rest of the networks. This projection turned out to be false, and the networks were eventually obliged to term the Florida race “too close to call,” but the psychological edge provided by their having declared Bush the victor in the presidential election had an undoubted and enduring impact on public opinion.
The authors of Bush’s Brain produce material that underscores the fact that for the first time in modern history a president attained office through outright criminality. Documents released by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) some 19 months after the election reveal that the Bush team flew an estimated 250 operatives to Florida to disrupt the vote recount. Dubbed the “Brooks Brothers Riots” (after the upscale clothing worn by the disrupters), a successful effort was organized to stop the recount in Miami-Dade county of the estimated 10,000 “undervotes”—ballots for which no presidential choice had been registered by the original machine count.
The well-heeled “rioters” banged and kicked on the doors and windows of the office where the canvassing board was counting the ballots and physically assaulted or threatened a number of Democratic Party representatives on the scene. A fleet of corporate jets, including planes owned by Enron chairman Lay, a key Bush supporter, and Halliburton, the energy services firm where Vice President Dick Cheney had served as CEO, transported the hooligans.
“Karl Rove, working with James A. Baker III, put it all together,” state the authors of Bush’s Brain, adding, “Rove always worked best while hiding behind the curtain.”
The authors of both Bush’s Brain and Boy Genius express a certain admiration for what they consider to be Rove’s skills in making Bush “presidential”—covering up his obvious intellectual inadequacy and his inability to express himself without a script. Bush’s Brain describes Bush as “remarkably apolitical.” It mentions a meeting at the White House with Bush, media chief Mark McKinnon and Rove. Bush pushes a button and four attendants in white jackets appear. “Yes sir, Mr. President. Is there something we can get you?” Bush dispatches the attendants for a glass of water and says to Rove: “Now that’s power!”
Boy Genius ends with a brief reference to the 2002 midterm elections.
“One can say Rove was a superb talent scout and recruiter of candidates,” proclaim the authors. “George W. Bush did not come north from Texas to be thought of as a loser. Neither did his personal ‘boy genius.’ And as soon as the votes were counted in November 2002, the planning began anew for 2004 and the contest that will truly determine the Bush-Rove legacy,” write the authors in the epilogue, revealing themselves to be more admirers than critics of Rove’s methods.
The authors of Bush’s Brain also end their work by waxing ecstatic about Bush’s standing after the midterm elections and during the build-up for war against Iraq: “The president was confident. The public believed [in the case for war against Iraq]. And the Democrats cowered... Bush was almost mythological, descending from the sky in the world’s command center called Air Force One, possessed of a relentless level of approval from the people who were enduring hard times caused, in part, by his leadership. In the closing days [of the midterm elections], it was obvious voters were deciding to give the president what he wanted: congressional support for Republicans and a mandate to clear out Saddam.”
The notion that Bush is unchallengeable, a quasi-mythical being, is patently absurd and, more than anything, demonstrates the political outlook of these supposed critics. The temporary success of the Bush-Rove team has less to do with their innate strength than with the historic collapse of liberalism and the prostration of the Democratic Party. The current crisis arising from the exposure of Bush administration lies about Iraqi “weapons of mass destruction,” whatever its immediate outcome, demonstrates the fundamentally narrow social base of the present regime and its inherent political weakness.
The authors of Bush’s Brain contend that “Rove represents a new species of advisor,” a “product of the permanent campaign, the co-president, whose relationship with Bush, and his faithful guidance, have put him at the heart of power in a manner unknown to previous political consultants and U.S. electoral history.” But Rove must be placed within the appropriate political context—the takeover of the Republican Party by semi-fascist elements from the Christian right. He represents the rise of political gangsterism in the Republican Party, and his current political “success” is the product of the alliance of these forces with the Christian fundamentalists, for which he has been a leading facilitator.
In general, the authors elevate Rove’s role at the expense of other members of the Bush administration, such as Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Both books tend to exaggerate his significance in order to avoid a more probing analysis of the present government and the political and social crisis in America.
Nonetheless, the ascent of this right-wing mediocrity, whose only apparent skill is manipulation and deceit, to the highest levels of power is telling. It is one expression of the decay of bourgeois democracy in the US and the degeneration of the ruling elite as a whole. In the final analysis, semi-criminal elements like Rove come out of the woodwork to attempt to rescue, by any means necessary, a fatally diseased American capitalism.
From: cosmicdot <no_reply@yahoogroups.com>
Subject: [corporatesleuth] Enron, Iraq, Cheney and the California Energy
Swindle
To: corporatesleuth@yahoogroups.com
Enron, Iraq, Cheney and the California Energy Swindle
"In April of 2001, Ken Lay handed Dick Cheney a two-page memorandum
recommending national energy policy changes. The memo contained
Enron's positions on specific, rather technical issues, which were
presented as a "fix" for the California crisis. (Enron brazenly
advised the administration not to place price caps on energy, which
would be precisely the request California officials made to the
President, and which the President and the Vice President would just
as brazenly deny until public pressure forced them to capitulate.)
According to a special report prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman, over
seventeen energy policies recommended by Enron made their way into
the official White House National Energy Policy report.
Congress awoke from its somnambulism, having become alarmed at
Enron's close association with the Bush administration. Congressional
committees asked Dick Cheney for the names of those who advised him
and the reports he relied upon in drafting the nation's energy
policy. Cheney bluntly and adamantly refused to reveal those facts.
After months of standoff, the General Accounting Office (GAO) filed a
suit against the Vice President in an effort to obtain the requested
information. The White House then developed a fascinating legal
strategy that helped them triumph over the legislative branch."
http://www.yuricareport.com/PoliticalAnalysis/FraudinWhiteHouse.htm
Post-Saddam U.S. Leaders Garner, Bremer and Chalabi All Have Neocon Ties
By Robert Younes, M.D. and Janet McMahon
Once U.S. and British forces had rolled over the Iraqi army and taken control of Baghdad, it was time to put back together what Iraq’s “liberators” had destroyed. In March the Department of Defense appointed Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s choice, retired Army Gen. Jay Garner, to be director of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for post-war Iraq, reporting—until recently—to the Pentagon.
Garner, who cooled his heels in Kuwait until the fighting essentially was over, was touted as a highly competent administrator and logistician. In 1991, he had led Operation Provide Comfort, which delivered food and shelter to Kurds in northern Iraq after the first Gulf war, when thousands of Iraqi Kurds fled the wrath of Saddam Hussain.
This time around, Garner’s responsibilities included managing Iraq’s 23 ministries, each—with the exception of the Health Ministry, to be headed by an Iraqi—directed by an American administrator, aided by an Iraqi adviser. Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine was named Garner’s regional coordinator for central Iraq, including Baghdad; W. Bruce Moore is the country’s Northern Group coordinator, and F.J. “Buck” Walters “coordinates” the southern region.
As the weeks went by, though, increasingly impatient Iraqis continued to wait for water and food supplies and the restoration of electrical power. According to London’s Financial Times of May 2, “Some Western officials in Baghdad have described the U.S.-led reconstruction effort as chaotic, contrasting it with the early efforts in Afghanistan under the leadership of the United Nations.” Even the neocons’ Iraqi wunderkind, Ahmad Chalabi, acknowledged that the “situation is critical because people are complaining and you may get acts of violence.” He should know—Chalabi’s protégé, fellow former exile and self-proclaimed “mayor of Baghdad” Mohammed Mohsen al-Zubaidi, was arrested April 27 by U.S. forces “for his inability to support the coalition military authority and for exercising authority which was not his.”
Garner, however, denied the country faced severe problems. “There is no humanitarian crisis,” he told reporters in late April. Instead, he said, ”We ought to be beating our chests every day. We ought to look in a mirror and get proud and stick out our chests and suck in our bellies and say: ‘Damn, we’re Americans!’”
General Garner himself has strong ties to Israel and its American supporters. In 1998, he visited Israel under the aegis of the pro-Israel Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). Two years later, he and 42 other retired military officers signed a letter stating that “A strong Israel is an asset that American military planners and political leaders can rely on,” and praising Israel’s “restraint” in its brutal response to the al-Aqsa intifada.
Just before the onset of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Garner, a personal friend of Ariel Sharon as well as of Donald Rumsfeld, was in charge of placing Patriot missiles in Israel. From 1994 to 1996 he was the commanding general of the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command. Garner currently is on leave from defense contractor SY Technology, of which he assumed the presidency after retiring in 1997 as a three-star general. The firm, which specializes in missile defense systems, was involved in the development of Israel’s Arrow missile program. This year it received a $1.5 billion contract to provide logistical services to U.S. special operations forces.
Whether or not the general was spending too much time looking in the mirror, on May 5 President Bush named former Reagan “counter-terrorism ambassador” L. Paul Bremer head of reconstruction efforts in Iraq, with Garner now reporting to him. While Bremer’s ascendancy was described as a victory for the State Department over Pentagon control of Iraq’s post-war government—and may indeed have been perceived as such by the affected individuals—a closer look reveals that, while the coin may have been flipped, the currency remains the same.
As part of their ongoing competition for the president’s ear, Colin Powell’s State Department and Rumsfeld’s Pentagon, the secretary of defense—or, perhaps, his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz—reportedly rejected a list of eight State Department nominees to help administer Iraq. Far from being a State Department “victory,” then, Bremer’s appointment was calculated to be acceptable to the neocon cabal ensconced in the Pentagon.
And what might make Bremer so qualified—apart from being “a telegenic diplomat who favors expensive suits,” as Singapore’s Straits Times decribed him? First off, he has the right connections. According to the May 3 Boston Globe, Bremer, a former U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands, “is considered an ally to neoconservatives in Washington. He worked as an aide in government to Henry A. Kissinger, and later became managing director of Kissinger Associates from 1989 to 2000.”
Earlier this year, he and former CIA Director James Woolsey, another cabalist, participated in a UCLA teach-in organized by student Republicans and a group called “Americans for Victory Over Terrorism.” Woolsey’s description of the ongoing war on terrorism as the “fourth world war” raised eyebrows at home and, undoubtedly, hackles abroad.
Most importantly, however, Bremer can identify the right enemies—of Israel, at least. In a 1996 opinion piece he drafted for the Wall Street Journal entitled “Terrorists’ Friends Must Pay a Price,” Bremer called on the Clinton administration to deliver ultimatums to, and then pre-emptively attack, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Sudan. Nor is he all talk and no action: it was in 1986, while Bremer was “counter-terrorism ambassador,” that the U.S. bombed Libya. (He also named Nelson Mandela’s opposition African National Congress as a “terrorist” organization, implicitly legitimizing South Africa’s apartheid regime.)
Bremer does have his limitations, however—the most relevant one being that “he doesn’t have any background for Middle Eastern affairs,” according to Philip C. Wilcox Jr., another former State Department counterterrorism head. “I assume he was chosen because of his impeccable conservative views and his management skills,” Wilcox told The Boston Globe.
Meyrav Wurmser, Middle East analyst at the Hudson Institue and co-founder and former director of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), views Bremer more charitably, if not less ideologically. According to the Globe, she described Bremer as “‘not like one of those ideological State people who works against the president, so people are basically happy’ in the administration’s conservative circles.”
(No faint praise that, coming from the prescient neocon whose “acute knowledge of the Palestinian Authority’s tactics led her to realize that the Oslo process was doomed to failure from the outset,” according to her biography.)
Before the U.S. whisked him back to Baghdad—which he last saw when he was 13—Ahmad Chalabi, Bremer’s sartorial soulmate, was head of the London-based Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella exile group formed in 1992 with CIA assistance. Chalabi envisions himself as Iraq’s post-war interim prime minister, and enjoys the endorsement of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, Richard Perle of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, and Hudson Institute co-founder and trustee Max Singer. Others singing his praises include the AIPAC-spinoff Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the aforementioned JINSA.
Born in 1945, Chalabi is the scion of a wealthy Iraqi Shi’i family with close ties to the Hashemite monarchy installed in Iraq after World War I by T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, and British imperial authorities. Chalabi’s grandfather served in nine Iraqi cabinet positions, his father was a cabinet officer and president of Iraq’s figurehead senate, and his mother ran political salons that catered to the Iraqi elite. In 1958, a coalition of army officers and the Iraqi Communist Party lead a revolution that toppled King Faisal II. The Chalabi family went into exile, starting banks in Geneva, Beirut and Amman—all of which failed.
Chalabi attended MIT, then earned a doctorate in mathematics at the University of Chicago, where he was a protégé of the late neo-conservative professor Albert Wohlstetter. It was Wohlstetter who introduced Chalabi to Richard Perle. In 1977, Chalabi was invited by Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan to establish the Petra Bank, which soon became the country’s second largest commercial bank. The bank collapsed under Chalabi’s chairmanship, bringing ruin to many of its depositors. Chalabi is believed to have swindled up to $100 million in the form of loans to family members and businesses. He allegedly also was using the bank to transfer money to Iraqi opposition groups and engage in arms transfers to Saddam Hussain. Playing both sides of the fence, Chalabi also is rumored to have been a CIA informant regarding Iraq’s trade deals. In April 1992, a Jordanian military court sentenced Chalabi in absentia to 22 years of hard labor on 31 charges of embezzlement, theft, misuse of depositor funds and speculation with the Jordanian dinar.
In the 1980s, Chalabi, by then a “leader” of London-based Iraqi exiles, advocated a “rollback” of the Hussain regime by using a guerrilla force of 1,000 fighters operating out of Iraq’s northern and southern no-fly zones. In the early 1990s the CIA spent $100 million, funnelled through the Iraqi National Congress and its Kurdish allies in northern Iraq, to implement Chalabi’s plan. In 1996 a force of fighters from the northern no-fly zone tried to topple the Baghdad regime, but the insurrection was crushed. All CIA money to the Iraqi National Congress ceased, along with Washington’s commitment to the Chalabi plan.
The State Department and the CIA now reportedly regard Chalabi with deep suspicion, and many in Washington consider him unfit for a leading role in post-war Iraq. Apart from his brief period organizing Kurdish resistance in the north in the 1990s, Chalabi has not been in Iraq since 1956, and it was becoming apparent soon after his latest return in early April that he had little credibility among Iraqis for his reputed role as an adviser to the post-war Ministry of Finance. Even as the Pentagon was airlifting Chalabi and his army of 700 fighters to Iraq in four C-17 transports, in fact, the CIA pronounced Chalabi unfit to be a leader in post-war Iraq
Robert Younes, M.D. is the former media and public relations director, and Janet McMahon of the managing editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.
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More Missing Intelligence
by ROBERT DREYFUSS
[from the July 7, 2003 issue]
As the Pentagon scours Iraq for weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi links to Al Qaeda, it's increasingly obvious that the Bush Administration either distorted or deliberately exaggerated the intelligence used to justify the war against Iraq. But an even bigger intelligence scandal is waiting in the wings: the fact that members of the Administration failed to produce an intelligence evaluation of what Iraq might look like after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Instead, they ignored fears expressed by analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department who predicted that postwar Iraq would be chaotic, violent and ungovernable, and that Iraqis would greet the occupying armies with firearms, not flowers.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, it turns out that the same people are responsible for both. According to current and former US intelligence analysts and government officials, the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans funneled information, unchallenged, from Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC) to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who in turn passed it on to the White House, suggesting that Iraqis would welcome the American invaders. The Office of Special Plans is led by Abram Shulsky, a hawkish neoconservative ideologue who got his start in politics working alongside Elliott Abrams in Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson's office in the 1970s. It was set up in fall 2001 as a two-man shop, but it burgeoned into an eighteen-member nerve center of the Pentagon's effort to distort intelligence about Iraq's WMDs and terrorist connections. A great deal of the bad information produced by Shulsky's office, which found its way into speeches by Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and George W. Bush, came from Chalabi's INC. Since the INC itself was sustained by its neocon allies in Washington, including the shadow "Central Command" at the American Enterprise Institute, it stands as perhaps the ultimate example of circular reasoning.
"The same unit [the Office of Special Plans] that fed Chalabi's intelligence on WMD to Rumsfeld was also feeding him Chalabi's stuff on the prospects for postwar Iraq," said a leading US government expert on the Middle East. Says a former US ambassador with strong links to the CIA: "There was certainly information coming from the Iraqi exile community, including Chalabi--who was detested by the CIA and by the State Department--saying, 'They will welcome you with open arms.'" Rumsfeld's willingness to accept that view led him to contradict the Chief of Staff of the US Army, who predicted that it would take hundreds of thousands of troops to control Iraq after the fall of Baghdad, a view that seems prescient today.
According to the former official, also feeding information to the Office of Special Plans was a secret, rump unit established last year in the office of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel. This unit, which paralleled Shulsky's--and which has not previously been reported--prepared intelligence reports on Iraq in English (not Hebrew) and forwarded them to the Office of Special Plans. It was created in Sharon's office, not inside Israel's Mossad intelligence service, because the Mossad--which prides itself on extreme professionalism--had views closer to the CIA's, not the Pentagon's, on Iraq. This secretive unit, and not the Mossad, may well have been the source of the forged documents purporting to show that Iraq tried to purchase yellowcake uranium for weapons from Niger in West Africa, according to the former official.
The catastrophic result of the belief that it would be easy to pacify postwar Iraq and to create a quisling government in Baghdad, a view that was codified as dogma by the White House, is unfolding daily in Iraq. The country is engulfed in economic and political chaos, armed resistance is growing among the Sunni Muslims in central Iraq, and the powerful and largely hostile Shiite clergy in the south has barely begun to flex its muscles. Not only that, but Iraq watchers report that former Baath Party members are coalescing into nascent political formations, leading armed resistance to the occupation, and that they could emerge as either a strong political party or an underground terrorist group.
Astonishingly, the Bush Administration did not even bother to prepare and internally publish an intelligence estimate about postwar Iraq. (An "estimate," in intelligence jargon, is a formal evaluation produced after sifting, sorting and analyzing various bits and pieces of raw intelligence. So-called National Intelligence Estimates are produced by a unit that reports immediately to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet.) "Back in the old days, there would have been an estimate," says Raymond McGovern, the twenty-seven-year CIA warrior who formed Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity this past January. "In their arrogance, they didn't worry about it."
Other sources concur. "There was no intelligence estimate done, and there weren't a lot of questions being asked," says Melvin Goodman, a former CIA analyst with the Center for International Policy. "And I know for a fact that at CIA and NESA [the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs], none of them thought that postwar Iraq would be governable." Goodman says that CIA and DIA experts on Iraq were not called in by the Pentagon, and no intelligence roundtables were held to evaluate the situation. Most of the intelligence about how easily the INC and its allies could assume power in Iraq was coming from the INC itself, says a former State Department official. "And I know for a fact that when the subject came up, intelligence officers were extraordinarily skeptical of the exiles' information."
On the eve of the invasion, there was something akin to panic at the Norfolk,Virginia-based US Joint Forces Command, which was responsible for supporting the Pentagon's Iraq task force, then headed by retired Gen. Jay Garner. "They were scared shitless," says a former US official who was in close contact with the command. "They were making it up as they went along." He adds, "There was a great deal of ignorance. They didn't know the names of the [Iraqi] tribes, much less how they relate to each other. They didn't have the expertise, and they didn't have enough time to assemble the expertise."
Such expertise would have allowed the Army to foresee that once Saddam was eliminated, Iranian-backed Shiite forces in southern Iraq, with great influence over the 60 percent of Iraqis who are Shiite, would instantly emerge as a powerful claimant to power. Instead of leading to the democracy envisioned by Bush, the war in Iraq could result in a Shiite-dominated fundamentalist regime, a prospect that is starting to seem the most likely. Not the kind of victory Bush wants to take to the US electorate in 2004.
At a June forum on Iraq at the American Enterprise Institute, Kenneth Katzman, the Middle East specialist at the Congressional Research Service, made a chilling prediction of how the crisis in Iraq will continue to unfold, to the discomfort of his AEI hosts. The Shiite forces in southern Iraq, he said, are content for now to let the Sunni-led guerrillas harass and weaken US troops. "The Shiites hope that Sunni violence in central Iraq will force the United States out, and then the Shiites will move in and pick up the pieces," he said. Despite discord and infighting among the Shiites, Katzman said, most of the Shiite leadership is tied closely to the Iranian government and its ultraconservative clergy. For the rest of this year, he predicted, the US forces in Iraq will be unable to pacify the country or halt the violence, and by next year, as the election nears, there will be enormous political pressure for the United States to withdraw--or, in Washington-speak, to develop an "exit strategy." The question for Bush, according to Katzman, is, Does the United States have the political staying power to continue to sustain one or two casualties a day in October 2004?
That's a question that ought to disturb Karl Rove's sleep. And it might be a question that Democratic would-be opponents of the President ought to ponder. A massive failure of US intelligence has led to an emerging disaster in postwar Iraq. It's a true crisis, and one that could determine the fate of Bush's presidency. In Watergate, the refrain was: "What did the President know, and when did he know it?" Let me suggest a question for Bush, the know-nothing GOP standard-bearer in 2004: "What didn't the President know, and when didn't he know it?"
Cheney Was Bush’s Triggerman in Escalating Intelligence Catfight
Vice President Dick Cheney was the true triggerman behind waging the imperialist war on Iraq.
Exclusive To American Free Press
By Gordon Thomas
Vice President Dick Cheney was the trigger which exploded the long-simmering war between the White House and the CIA’s embattled director, George Tenet.
He ordered Tenet last January to insert the now notorious 16 words that there was “credible” British intelligence that Saddam had tried in 2001 to buy uranium ore (yellowcake) from Niger, the impoverished West African nation.
Three months before, in October 2002, Tenet had personally intervened to stop President Bush from making such a claim in a speech asserting that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Tenet told Bush he could not support the claim. When Cheney told him last January about the “credible” British intelligence, Tenet repeated his warning that the CIA could not endorse it. In what one account says was a “tense meeting,” Cheney bluntly overruled Tenet.
The vice president’s action cast a shadow over British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s visit to Washington.
Bush feels Britain’s intelligence services, MI6 and MI5, have not kept the CIA properly informed. Blair insists his spy agencies could not pass on more information on the Niger yellowcake because, according to a London Foreign Office officer, “under the rules governing cooperation they have with foreign intelligence services, our service could not share intelligence from those sources without the originator’s permission.”
This impasse has created a deep anger between the CIA, MI6 and MI5. A British official at its embassy in Washington told AFP that “the CIA has been dumping on everybody and everybody is dumping on the CIA”.
A Bush administration official described Blair’s visit as “fallout time. Not finding WMD was always going to make his visit a time for plain speaking. To echo the president’s liking for a Texan example, this could be shootout time at the White House corral.”
More certain is that the intelligence fallout from the Iraq war is now the most serious rift in transatlantic secret relations since the post-World War II scandal of the British atom spies who stole U.S. nuclear secrets for the Soviet Union.
“We don’t believe for a moment that Tenet just fell on his own sword. What happened has all the hallmarks of Dick Cheney,” said an MI6 source close to the agency’s director-general, Sir Richard Dearlove.
The reverberations have led to calls in London for Blair to resign—and efforts by former White House spokesman Ari Fleischer to bring closure to the row on the eve of his own departure from the administration.
Clare Short, who resigned from Blair’s cabinet over Britain going to war “on a false pretense,” said Blair “should now resign before matters get nastier for him. Trust in him and Bush is going down by the day.”
How all this happened is one of the most shocking stories to emerge in the post-Iraq war inquest.
ORIGINS OF NIGER SCANDAL
The complex story has simple roots. In November 2001, Italian secret service agents were approached by a West African diplomat. He said he had details of a plot by the Iraqis to buy “hundreds of tons” of uranium ore from Niger. He produced supporting documents.
On the surface, the claim sounded credible. Iraq had already purchased 200 tons of yellowcake from Niger in 1986, the Italians told the CIA station in Rome. The station chief sent a detailed report to Langley, including the documents the African diplomat had provided.
The material was sent to the State Department. The U.S. ambassador to Niger at the time, Barbro Owens-Kirk Patrick, was asked to assess all the material.
But while she was doing so, Cheney intervened. He told a senior diplomat, Joseph Wilson—who had first-hand knowledge of Niger—that he wanted him to go there and investigate the claims.
By the time he arrived, Owens-Kirkpatrick had dismissed the documents as “crude forgeries”—and the African diplomat’s claims to the Italians as “pure fantasy.”
Wilson concurred. His own investigation showed that Niger’s security on yellowcake—introduced after Saddam’s previous purchase—was too rigorous for any Iraqi attempt to purchase uranium ore to have gone undetected.
In March 2002, Wilson briefed Tenet. He passed on Wilson’s findings to his British counterpart, Sir Richard Dearlove of MI6. He informed the head of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, and John Scarlett, the former spy who now chairs Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee. His job is to know anything that can be known about Saddam and his WMD.
On Sept. 24, 2002, Blair published his government’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. It included the claim “Iraq has sought the supply of significant amounts of uranium from Africa.”
It did not say when—let alone whether—this had been in the 1980s. Neither was Niger mentioned. But to Wilson it was “obvious this was the same story as in the discredited documents.”
There the matter may have died as far as the White House went if Bush had not wanted to include the details in his October speech of last year.
Having headed him off, Tenet believed the bogus Niger connection was over. But then Cheney made his fateful visit to Langley last January to demand that Tenet should allow the Niger story to form part of Bush’s State of the Union speech.
Tenet, say credible sources, was horrified. He reminded Cheney that both Owens-Kirkpatrick and Wilson had refuted any Niger connection.
Cheney was insistent. He said there was credible evidence from British intelligence. He cited the Blair report. He reminded Tenet of Saddam’s previous acquisition of yellowcake in the 1980s.
Tenet had explained Niger had no capability to enrich uranium ore—the basic prerequisite to producing a nuclear bomb. He added that, after the first gulf war ended, UN inspectors had destroyed Saddam’s essential equipment that could turn the ore into fissionable material.
The CIA was certain that Iraq had not been able to repair the equipment. Tenet also reminded Cheney he had personally intervened to stop Bush including the “Niger story” in his speech three months before, in October 2002.
Cheney, according to one CIA source, “came close to critical mass.”
He told Tenet that National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had now received “good intelligence” from London that Saddam had tried to buy uranium ore from Niger in 2001. Therefore that would go into the State of the Union speech—and Tenet must accept the British intelligence.
“The clear implication from Cheney was that the Brits knew more than we did,” said the CIA source.
Bush, traveling back from his African trip, told reporters that Tenet had “cleared” the reference to Niger.
Rice went further: “If the CIA director had said take this out, it would have gone, without question.”
Tenet did say that. Cheney overruled him—once more citing the British “credible sources.” So who were they?
Intelligence sources believe there are two. The French secret service (DGSE) and Mossad.
Both have a strong presence in West Africa.
Niger is a former French colony.
Israel receives a substantial portion of its oil from adjoining Nigeria.
Niger’s uranium mines are run by a French company which is supervised by the French Atomic Energy Commission.
In London, MI6 insists the evidence from these sources remains “credible.”
British intel sources say that “a further factor in the refusal to share its information about Niger with the CIA is concern that the White House would publish it—and lead to our sources being uncovered,” said a London source.
On his trip to London to meet Blair, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was accompanied by Meir Dagan, head of Mossad. He met Sir Richard Dearlove and Eliza Manningham-Buller.
High on their list was the Niger uranium claim. No one still knows if the French-Mossad intelligence is credible.
Did Mossad provide it as part of Israel’s own strategy to ramp-up the war against Iraq?
Did French intelligence refuse to allow the CIA to see its own intelligence because the Paris government was strongly opposed to the coming war with Iraq—and would not wish to provide Washington with any support for military action?
At a recent meeting, Bush confronted Blair with these questions.
But there is little optimism that there will be resolution to a growing crisis which has already blighted the leadership of both men.
I predicted many months ago in cia-drugs that the political and media establishment would turn on Bush, just as they turned on his father, once he began to deviate even one iota from Likud's strategic plans.
VMANN: yeah but its not the neocons who are attacking him is it? not the zionists.
That's a possible scenario. One major faction is trying to remove the Cheney/Rumsfeld group from the playing field; another major faction is trying to remove Bush. One feels the beginning rumblings of an all-out political war between the two factions. Over a year ago I predicted that the ham-fisted Iran-Contra alumni in the administration would manage to trigger a major scandal before long. One senses that all hell is about to break loose, especially if the Iraq situation continues to deteriorate, as it almost inevitably will.
VMANN: what is the evidence for these two factions? also, arent there also factions which seek to keep these neocons in place?
I believe that tying Neo-Con history to Trotsky and Rockefeller and Fabian
Socialism has helped a lot.
To see NeoCons as Disguised Commies may have been dismissed as "conspiracy
theory" a few months ago, but now it is given serious attention, causing
much embarrasment to both left and right.
You may consider it "tilting at windmills" to believe these traitors can be
embarrassed out of their positions of power, but from where I sit it looks
strikingly effective.
> Sean McBride wrote:
>
> On the subject of achievable and realistic political goals: this is a
> perfect example. Some progress has been made on taking down the neocons a
> notch or two, although they are still riding fairly high in the saddle.
> They are still well-ensconced in the offices of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick
> Cheney, but maybe for not much longer.
>
> The efforts to expose their real agenda by a handful of determined
> writers, like Jim Lobe, Justin Raimondo, Seymour Hersh and Jude
> Wanniski, is having a major practical impact on the world. They haven't
> been tilting at windmills. They are fully engaged with reality, and are
> having a significant impact on it.
>
> This is why I prefer well-grounded conspiracy research to poorly grounded
> conspiracy theorizing.
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: The Webfairy
> To: political-research
> Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 9:38 PM
> Subject: [political-research] Where is Iraq War Instigator,
> Richard Perle?
>
>
>
> http://www.mediamonitors.net/williamhughes56.html
> Where is Iraq War Instigator, Richard Perle?
> by William Hughes, Media Monitors Network, 07/15/03
>
>
>
> Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
> ADVERTISEMENT
> [click here]
>
>
> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
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Please don't take it amiss if you notice a delay in your posts showing up. To get things off on the right foot here, I am going to tightly moderate the group for a brief time, and will, of course, often be away from my computer. Once things settle in, I'll turn off most of the moderation.
On the subject of achievable and realistic political goals: this is a perfect example. Some progress has been made on taking down the neocons a notch or two, although they are still riding fairly high in the saddle. They are still well-ensconced in the offices of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, but maybe for not much longer.
The efforts to expose their real agenda by a handful of determined writers, like Jim Lobe, Justin Raimondo, Seymour Hersh and Jude Wanniski, is having a major practical impact on the world. They haven't been tilting at windmills. They are fully engaged with reality, and are having a significant impact on it.
This is why I prefer well-grounded conspiracy research to poorly grounded conspiracy theorizing.
Friday, July 18, 2003 Tamuz 18, 5763 Israel Time: 04:35 (GMT+3) Ha'aretz
Last Update: 17/07/2003 16:11
Report: French neo-Nazis, Jews unite in Web hate
By Reuters
PARIS - French neo-Nazis formed an alliance with extremist Jewish groups on the Internet to publish a torrent of hate messages directed against Arabs and Muslims, according to a report by a leading anti-racist group.
Members of extreme-right groups were prepared to set aside their anti-Semitic feelings to share Web space and know-how with extremist pro-Israeli campaigners, amid a rise in violence in the Middle East, the study found.
"This is a new phenomenon," Mouloud Aounit, head of the MRAP group which published the 170-page report, said on Thursday.
"We wanted to ring an alarm bell over the worrying development of this form of racism which is not only virtual, but has also spread to everyday life," he said.
The report said 26 Web sites, traced to right-wing and Jewish extremists groups in France, operated from the same server in the United States between 1999 and March this year.
Members of the groups also shared advice on how to send messages without leaving electronic trails.
Investigators believed the sites were taken down because of disagreement between the groups over the U.S.-led war in Iraq, with Jewish extremists supporting the action but some French far-rightwingers against it.
French police had no immediate reaction to the report and France's main Jewish organization, CRIF, was not immediately available for comment.
Aounit said the unlikely alliance could resurface soon.
The report said that between 2001 and 2003, the groups sent 1,000 messages a day, including incitements to attack mosques in the hope of triggering civil war between Arabs and other French people.
They also included messages calling for the assassination of President Jacques Chirac, referred to ironically as Ben Shirak, whom extremists accused of handing power to Muslim interests.
A year ago, a member of the anti-foreigner National Republican Movement )MNR( tried to gun down Chirac at the annual Bastille Day parade, days after posting a message on a British neo-Nazi Web site boasting that he would soon be famous.
Chirac has called for a crackdown on racism following anti-Semitic attacks and signs that the war in Iraq had increased tension between France's Jews and Muslims.
However, Aounit said the government remained indifferent to the flood of hate messages pouring out over the Internet.
"There is obviously the question of legislation, which must be addressed at the European level, but if there is the political will, if you give cyber-cops the means to investigate, you could very rapidly arrest, identify the authors," he said.
Perhaps we should take a
break on looking for SaddamHussein,
Osama bin Laden, William "Slots" Bennett, oreven
James J. "Whitey" Bulger. For me, the key questiontoday
is: Where is Richard Perle? Before the launching of
Iraq War No. 2, in March
20, 2003, Perle, America's Iago,regularly
appeared on TV and cable TV programs, on radio,and
in the print media, too. He repeated, ad infinitum, adnauseam,
why it was so absolutely critical for the U.S. toimmediately
invade Iraq. America was "at risk," he said,with
that ubiquitous smirk on his mug. There wasn't amoment
to lose.
"Saddam has WMD," he told
us, and he also "hates America"and
poses a dire "threat to our security?" The shifty Perle, theMother
of all Neo-cons, also predicted, like former DefenseDepartment
official, Ken Adelman, that a U.S. invasion ofIraq
would be a "cakewalk!" It will be "easy," he boasted.We
would also be "exporting democracy" to the Iraqi people,who
will "welcome us" with open arms "as liberators," heclaimed
over and over again in similar words. Cakewalk! Easy!Exporting
Democracy! Liberators! Sure!
Now, Perle is among the missing!
The man with the sinister-looking
scowl hasn't showed up on the Talking Head circuitssince
about the time the U.S. occupation of Iraq began goingsour.
Could he be hiding out in his beloved Israel, in a safehouse
provided by Benjamin Netanyahu, a/k/a "Bend-the-TruthYahoo"?
Or, are the War Hawks, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA)and
Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), telling him to keep a lowprofile
by working temporarily as an extra on a Hollywoodmovie?
Who knows?
It's a certainty that the
idea of "regime change" for Baghdadwas
first hustled in Zionist Israel. A 1996 paper concoctedby
Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser, entitled, "AClean
Break: A New Strategy for Security the Realm," calledfor,
inter alia, "the removal of Saddam Hussein and the
installation of a Hashemite
monarchy in Baghdad."
The "realm" Perle, Feith
and Wurmser were seeking to secure,however,
wasn't America's, but Israel's! The study was intendedas
a blueprint for the then-upcoming Likud-dominated govern-ment
of Netanyahu. Feith now works for "our" DefenseDepartment,
in a high policy post, while Wurmser is planted inthe
State Department as a "special assistant." ("Examining the
Role of Israel-and its American
Friends-in Promoting War onIraq,"
Allan C. Brownfeld, WRMEA, May, 2003).
For a while, Perle was a
chief honcho of the Defense PolicyBoard,
which advised Donald Rumsfeld and reported directlyto
another shadowy figure, Deputy Defense Secretary, PaulWolfowitz.
Perle was recently forced to resign from the toppost,
but still remains on the Board.
Perle is a notorious Israeli
Firster. He is a member of theJewish
Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA). He isalso
a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,a
hard line, right wing "think tank," that has slated Iran asAmerica's
next war target. Perle advocates a so-called"Pax
Americana," a new American Empire, which promotesAmerica's
world domination. Gee, I wonder if Israel willbenefit
from that scheme, too?
Perle serves, also, on the
Board of Advisors of the Foundationfor
Defense of Democracy (FDD)-another right wing group,which
is, of course, fanatically pro-Israel. He hangs out withSuper-Hawks,
such as: Charles Krauthammer, William Kristoland
Gary Bauer.
In fact, Perle is a master
deceiver! American soldiers are nowdying
in Iraq, 30 since President George W. Bush declared"mission
accomplished" on board the USS Lincoln, on May 1,2003.
As the body bags of our fallen heroes return to Dover,Delaware's
Air Force base, loved ones have every right to blamePerle,
and his ilk, for their losses.
The Iraq invasion was not
a "cakewalk." Iraq doesn't haveWMD,
nor did it have any ties to terrorists, as Perle tooted.And,
the Iraqi people bitterly resent the U.S./British invasionand
occupation of their country.
The unnecessary and immoral
destruction by Coalition Forcesof
Iraq's gas, water and electrical works, the bombing of theircities,
pollution of their lands and rivers by toxic chemicals,leaking
raw sewage and tons of depleted uranium, the deathand
injuries to countless thousands of innocent civilians,and
the mostly total collapse of its social, health, culturaland
monetary systems, too, has been a human catastropheof
the first magnitude. A country of 25.5 million souls hasbecome
a living hell for no darn good reason. Opponents ofthe
war have nothing to regret.
Democracy, Perle's rotten
lies to the contrary, is not, likeCoke
Cola, an exportable product. Americans troops nowface
death around every corner in Iraq, as the situation onthe
ground begins to resemble the guerrilla warfare conditionsof
the British-occupied north of Ireland during the late 70s.The
Iraqi war will only be over when the Iraqi people say so.The
cost to U.S. taxpayers could hit $1.6 trillion. And, thistotally
uncalled for conflict has created even more enemiesfor
America around the globe.
A final question: Will the
slippery Perle, America's Iago,ever
be forced to answer to the people for his incalculablewrongdoing?
William Hughes is a Baltimore
attorney and the author of"Andrew
Jackson vs. New World Order" (Authors Choice Press),which
is available online. He contributed above article to MediaMonitors
Network (MMN) from Maryland, USA
That's a possible scenario. One major faction is trying to remove the Cheney/Rumsfeld group from the playing field; another major faction is trying to remove Bush. One feels the beginning rumblings of an all-out political war between the two factions. Over a year ago I predicted that the ham-fisted Iran-Contra alumni in the administration would manage to trigger a major scandal before long. One senses that all hell is about to break loose, especially if the Iraq situation continues to deteriorate, as it almost inevitably will.
Hey, don't be shy: join up in political-research and share your always stimulating and well-formulated musings:
Don't worry about any loyalty issues -- you can keep contributing to cia-drugs as usual. Political-research is making a point of avoiding any feuds, and I am going to go out of my way not to get into any pissing contests with Kris and Phoenix between lists. We can both proceed on our merry ways without interrupting one another.
Subject: Re: [cia-drugs] Re: Fwd: BLOOD IN THE WATER--Watergate II---Mike Ruppert
Sean,
I think there is some merit to the idea that Cheney, Rice and Rumsfeld may fall on their swords long before the mentally challenged princeling is forced to abdicate.
I'm posting this as an example of the cynical use of every
form of propaganda and brainwashing technique known to man
in manipulating the United States into a war in the Middle
East against all reason. Obviously Daniel Pipes does not
believe in Christian fundamentalist ideology. He holds it
in complete contempt. But he is delighted to use it as yet
another "weapon" in his armory.
Tim Howells
=============================================
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1148
[Christian Zionism:] Israel's Best Weapon?
by Daniel Pipes
New York Post
July 15, 2003
Middle Easterners were widely puzzled in early 1994 when some
leading American politicians, including Sen. Jesse Helms
(R-N.C.) and Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), forwarded more
assertive, tougher positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians than
did the government of Israel. They were, for example, more
reluctant than Jerusalem to let U.S. funds go to the PLO and
they displayed more eagerness to move the U.S. embassy from
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
One Arabic newspaper, Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, captured the general
bafflement when it observed that Likud, Israel's more
nationalist party, had "lost in Israel but it still rules
supreme in Washington."
The same pattern is again visible these days, as Christian
leaders such as Gary Bauer, Jerry Falwell and Richard Land
more vocally oppose the "road map" for Palestinian-Israeli
diplomacy than nearly all their Jewish counterparts. But this
bold Christian solidarity with Israel should not be surprising,
as it manifests a Christian form of Zionism that is nearly two
centuries old.
Christian support for the creation of a Jewish state originated
in England, becoming a significant movement in the Victorian
period. In 1840, the British foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston,
"strongly" recommended that the Ottoman government then ruling
Palestine "hold out every just encouragement to the Jews of
Europe to return to Palestine." Lord Shaftesbury in 1853 coined
the phrase "A land without a people for a people without a land."
George Eliot put these ideas in novel form with Daniel Deronda in
1876. In 1891, Sir George Adam Smith wrote in his authoritative
Historical Geography of the Holy Land that the Ottomans had to be
pushed out of Palestine and replaced by the Jews, "who have given
to Palestine everything it has ever had of value to the world."
That same year, 1891, saw perhaps the greatest early Christian
support in the United States for a Jewish state - the "Blackstone
Memorial," a petition that carried the signatures of 413 prominent
Americans, including the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the
speaker of the House, the greatest industrialists of the age
(Rockefeller, Morgan, McCormick), famous clergymen, writers and
journalists.
Addressed to the president of the United States, Benjamin
Harrison, and the secretary of state, James G. Blaine, the
memorial asked them to "use their good offices and influence
. . . to secure the holding at an early date of an international
conference to consider the condition of the Israelites and their
claims to Palestine as their ancient home." According to one
historian, Paul Charles Merkley, the Blackstone Memorial had the
effect of "firmly planting in many minds" the "notion of
American sponsorship of a Jewish return to Palestine."
The Balfour Declaration of November 1917, whereby the British
government announced that it favored "the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," was perhaps
the single most important act premised in Christian Zionism.
Harry S. Truman's recognition of Israel, against the nearly total
opposition of his administration, was probably second. His
biographer, Michael T. Benson, finds that Truman's pro-Israel
outlook "was based primarily on humanitarian, moral, and
sentimental grounds, many of which were an outgrowth of the
president's religious upbringing and his familiarity with the
Bible." (Truman's just-discovered diary, with its petulant
remarks about Jews, makes his Zionist stance the more
noteworthy.)
The media has recently focused on Christian Zionism as though
it were something new ("How Israel Became a Favorite Cause of
the Conservative Christian Right" runs a typical title, this
one a front-page article in The Wall Street Journal). The real
story is how Christian Zionists are increasingly the bedrock of
Israel's support in the United States, more solidly pro-Israel
and more robustly Zionist than many in the Jewish community.
To those who wonder why Washington follows policies so different
from the European states, a large part of the answer these days
has to do with the clout of Christian Zionists, who are
especially powerful when a conservative Republican like George W.
Bush is president. (In contrast, Christian Zionism has nearly
died out in Great Britain.)One anti-Israel writer, Grace Halsell,
recognizes this fact and deems Christian Zionists a "more
dangerous" influence in Washington than are the Jewish Zionists.
Put positively: other than the Israel Defense Forces, America's
Christian Zionists may be the Jewish state's ultimate strategic
asset.
The Nation "A White House Smear" claims Bushco treason over Wilson's wife!
In this article, The Nation's David Corn suggests that senior administration officials committed treason by revealing a deep-cover CIA operative to the public through Bob Novak, columnist. And not just any deep-cover CIA operative... one who was responsible for doing delicate undercover WMD investigations... Joseph Wilson's wife Valerie Plame. Yes, the same Wilson involved in the Niger yellowcake investigation.
The sources for Novak's assertion about Wilson's wife appear to be "two senior administration officials." If so, a pair of top Bush officials told a reporter the name of a CIA operative who apparently has worked under what's known as "nonofficial cover" and who has had the dicey and difficult mission of tracking parties trying to buy or sell weapons of mass destruction or WMD material. If Wilson's wife is such a person--and the CIA is unlikely to have many employees like her--her career has been destroyed by the Bush administration. (Assuming she did not tell friends and family about her real job, these Bush officials have also damaged her personal life.) Without acknowledging whether she is a deep-cover CIA employee, Wilson says, "Naming her this way would have compromised every operation, every relationship, every network with which she had been associated in her entire career. This is the stuff of Kim Philby and Aldrich Ames." If she is not a CIA employee and Novak is reporting accurately, then the White House has wrongly branded a woman known to friends as an energy analyst for a private firm as a CIA officer. That would not likely do her much good.
This is not only a possible breach of national security; it is a potential violation of law. Under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, it is a crime for anyone who has access to classified information to disclose intentionally information identifying a covert agent. The punishment for such an offense is a fine of up to $50,000 and/or up to ten years in prison. Journalists are protected from prosecution, unless they engage in a "pattern of activities" to name agents in order to impair US intelligence activities. So Novak need not worry.
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Cheney deputies Lewis "Scooter" Libby and Eric Edelman relay neoconservative views to Rice at the National Security Council. At the NSC, they have a sympathetic audience in Elliott Abrams, Robert Joseph, Wayne Downing and Zalmay Khalilzad.
News and Analysis - 14 May 2002 "Who's Pulling the Foreign Policy Strings?" Dana Milbank. The Washington Post, 14 May 2002.
[excerpt] On one side is Brent Scowcroft, who had been national security adviser for former president George Bush and is now the embodiment of the Republican establishment's view of foreign policy. On the other side is Richard Perle, a Reagan administration Pentagon official called the "Prince of Darkness" by foes, and now intellectual guru of the hard-line neoconservative movement in foreign policy. Scowcroft and Perle have relatively minor, advisory posts in the current Bush administration. Yet each man has profound influence over Bush policies and officials in the competition for the hearts of the president and his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Scowcroft represents the moderate, realpolitik strain in Republican foreign policy, promoting internationalist policies and the interests of American industry. Perle's allies favor a more hawkish foreign policy and an inclination for the United States to go it alone. Perle's lineup of like-minded thinkers is impressive, starting with Vice President Cheney. The vice president sometimes stays neutral, but his sympathies undoubtedly are with the Perle crowd. Cheney deputies Lewis "Scooter" Libby and Eric Edelman relay neoconservative views to Rice at the National Security Council. At the NSC, they have a sympathetic audience in Elliott Abrams, Robert Joseph, Wayne Downing and Zalmay Khalilzad. At the Pentagon, Perle's allies are not just Rumsfeld but also deputy Paul D. Wolfowitz, an academic and a neoconservative purist, and Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith. Perle also has a man at Powell's State Department: Undersecretary John Bolton, late of the American Enterprise Institute. Bolton, who often irks European allies, was the official who announced the U.S. rejection of the International Criminal Court.
Blame shifts back to White House over uranium claim BY JONATHAN S. LANDAY AND WARREN P. STROBEL Knight Ridder Newspapers
WASHINGTON - (KRT) - A senior White House adviser emerged Thursday as a key player in the mention of disputed intelligence on Iraq in President Bush's State of the Union speech, prompting a partisan tug-of-war over Bush's responsibility for the misleading claim.
The revelation moves the spotlight back to the White House and away from the CIA, where President Bush and CIA Director George S. Tenet had placed it last Friday.
Senior CIA officials told a closed Senate Intelligence Committee hearing Wednesday that, before Bush gave the speech, they discussed the reliability of intelligence about Iraq's alleged attempts to buy uranium in Africa with National Security Council aide Robert Joseph, according to two senior U.S. officials. Joseph, a top aide to Bush national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, coordinates policies to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The two U.S. officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because the hearing was classified.
Sen. Richard Durbin, an Illinois Democrat and an Intelligence Committee member, said Thursday on ABC News that Tenet told the committee that a White House official - whom Durbin didn't identify - was "insistent" that the uranium reference be in Bush's address. Later, two U.S. officials confirmed to Knight Ridder that Joseph was the White House aide Durbin described.
That alleged push from Joseph puts a different light on the controversial allegation, distinct from Bush's emphasis last Friday, when the president stressed that the CIA had approved the wording of his speech. Tenet later issued a statement saying he had done so, though in retrospect he shouldn't have, because the intelligence underpinning the allegation was suspect.
Many Democrats reject Tenet's taking responsibility for Bush's allegation, saying the blame lies with the president and some of his aides, who they suggest were so intent on making the case for war against Iraq that they distorted intelligence findings to boost their argument.
Bush was asked Thursday at a news conference whether he took responsibility for the uranium statement. He ducked the question, saying he took responsibility for waging war against Saddam Hussein.
The White House acknowledged July 7 that the president's uranium statement shouldn't have been in the State of the Union address because it was based on British intelligence that the CIA was unable to confirm. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said at a White House news conference Thursday that his government still stood behind its intelligence finding that Iraq had sought uranium in Africa.
White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan said Thursday that the uranium claim wasn't central to Bush's case against Saddam, which he said "was based on solid and compelling evidence."
"There are some in Congress that are seeking to rewrite history," McClellan said.
Knight Ridder first reported last month that it was Joseph, working with Vice President Dick Cheney's office, who led an effort by pro-invasion administration officials to include the uranium allegation in Bush's address.
The two U.S. officials disputed Durbin's account of Wednesday's hearing, saying it wasn't Tenet, but CIA analyst Alan Foley, who described the White House-CIA discussions on the uranium issue. Foley heads an agency unit, known by the acronym WINPAC, that analyzes intelligence about weapons proliferation.
One of the U.S. officials said Foley, recalling his telephone conversations with Joseph, "didn't say `he (Joseph) insisted, he jammed it down my throat,' or anything like that."
Foley, the official continued, "doesn't remember the exact conversation" with Joseph because no one anticipated the inclusion of the material would ignite such controversy.
When questioned later, Durbin stood by his account.
"There were clearly negotiations between the White House and the CIA about the wording of this," he said, noting they took place three months after the CIA persuaded the White House to remove a similar uranium reference from a Bush speech in Cincinnati.
"It raised the question in my mind about why we're not focusing on those individuals in the White House who were so hell-bent on including this questionable conclusion on the president's most important speech of the year," Durbin said.
---
Knight Ridder correspondent James Kuhnhenn contributed to this report.
A Pentagon committee led by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, advised President Bush to include a reference in his January State of the Union address about Iraq trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger to bolster the case for war in Iraq, despite the fact that the CIA warned Wolfowitz's committee that the information was unreliable, according to a CIA intelligence official and four members of the Senate's intelligence committee who have been investigating the issue.
The Senators and the CIA official said they could be forced out of government and brought up on criminal charges for leaking the information to this reporter and as a result requested anonymity. The Senators said they plan to question CIA Director George Tenet Wednesday morning in a closed-door hearing to find out whether Wolfowitz and members of a committee he headed misled Bush and if the President knew about the erroneous information prior to his State of the Union address.
Spokespeople for Wolfowitz and Tenet vehemently denied the accusations. Dan Bartlett, the White House communications director, would not return repeated calls for comment.
The revelations by the CIA official and the senators, if true, would prove that Tenet, who last week said he erred by allowing the uranium reference to be included in the State of the Union address, took the blame for an intelligence failure that he was not responsible for. The lawmakers said it could also lead to a widespread probe of prewar intelligence.
At issue is a secret committee set up in 2001 by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called the Office of Special Plans, which was headed by Wolfowitz, Abram Shulsky and Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to probe allegations links between Iraq and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and whether the country was stockpiling a cache of weapons of mass destruction. The Special Plans committee disbanded in March after the start of the war in Iraq.
The committee's job, according to published reports, was to gather intelligence information on the Iraqi threat that the CIA and FBI could not uncover and present it to the White House to build a case for war in Iraq. The committee relied heavily on information provided by Iraqi defector Ahmad Chalabi, who has provided the White House with reams of intelligence on Saddam Hussein's weapons programs that has been disputed. Chalabi heads the Iraqi National Congress, a group of Iraqi exiles who have pushed for regime change in Iraq.
The Office of Special Plans, according to the CIA official and the senators, routinely provided Bush, Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice with questionable intelligence information on the Iraqi threat, much of which was included in various speeches by Bush and Cheney and some of which was called into question by the CIA.
In the months leading up to the war in Iraq, Rumsfeld became increasingly frustrated that the CIA could not find any evidence of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons program, evidence that would have helped the White House build a solid case for war in Iraq.
In an article in the New York Times last October, the paper reported that Rumsfeld had ordered the Office of Special Plans to "to search for information on Iraq's hostile intentions or links to terrorists" that might have been overlooked by the CIA.
The CIA official and the senators said that's when Wolfowitz and his committee instructed the White House to have Bush use the now disputed line about Iraq's attempts to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger in a speech the President was set to give in Cincinnati. But Tenet quickly intervened and informed Stephen Hadley, an aide to National Security Adviser Rice, that the information was unreliable.
Patrick Lang, a former director of Middle East analysis at the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in an interview with the New Yorker magazine in May that the Office of Special Plans "started picking out things that supported their thesis and stringing them into arguments that they could use with the President. It's not intelligence. It's political propaganda."
Lang said the CIA and Office of Special Plans often clashed on the accuracy of intelligence information provided to the White House by Wolfowitz.
Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, the author of a May New Yorker story on the Office of Special Plans, reported, "former CIA officers and analysts described the agency as increasingly demoralized. George knows he's being beaten up," one former officer said of George Tenet, the CIA director. "And his analysts are terrified. George used to protect his people, but he's been forced to do things their way." Because the CIA's analysts are now on the defensive, "they write reports justifying their intelligence rather than saying what's going on. The Defense Department and the Office of the Vice-President write their own pieces, based on their own ideology. We collect so much stuff that you can find anything you want."
"They see themselves as outsiders," a former CIA. expert who spent the past decade immersed in Iraqi-exile affairs said of the Special Plans people, told Hersh. He added, "There's a high degree of paranoia. They've convinced themselves that they're on the side of angels, and everybody else in the government is a fool."
By last fall, the White House had virtually dismissed all of the intelligence on Iraq provided by the CIA, which failed to find any evidence of Iraq's weapons programs, in favor of the more critical information provided to the Bush administration by the Office of Special Plans
Hersh reported that the Special Plans Office "developed a close working relationship with the (Iraqi National Congress), and this strengthened its position in disputes with the CIA and gave the Pentagon's pro-war leadership added leverage in its constant disputes with the State Department. Special Plans also became a conduit for intelligence reports from the INC to officials in the White House."
In a rare Pentagon briefing recently, Office of Special Plans co-director Douglas Feith, said the committee was not an "intelligence project," but rather an group of 18 people that looked at intelligence information from a different point of view.
Feith said when the group had new "thoughts" on intelligence information it was given; they shared it with CIA director Tenet.
"It was a matter of digesting other people's intelligence," Feith said of the main duties of his group. "Its job was to review this intelligence to help digest it for me and other policy makers, to help us develop Defense Department strategy for the war on terrorism."
Jason Leopold, formerly the bureau chief of Dow Jones Newswires, is a freelance journalist based in California. He is currently finishing a book on the California energy crisis. He can be contacted at jasonleopold@....
I predicted many months ago in cia-drugs that the political and media establishment would turn on Bush, just as they turned on his father, once he began to deviate even one iota from Likud's strategic plans.
Bush has failed to move forward in attacking Syria, Iran and other of Israel's enemies, and he is trying to impose a peace settlement on the Mideast (the Road Map plan) which has angered the Greater Israel cultists in Israel and the U.S.
That the rug is presently being pulled out from underneath Bush Jr. comes as no surprise. Some of his attackers may be calculating that Dick Cheney will pursue a much harder pro-Israel line than Bush.
We can pursue this in political-research if you want:
Subject: [cia-drugs] Re: Fwd: BLOOD IN THE WATER--Watergate II---Mike Ruppert
I seem to recall that after this year's Bilderberger meeting Brian Quig posted here that his (unnamed) contact who was there had said that there had been a consensus to get rid of GW Bush.
http://www.counterpunch.org/leopold07172003.html
Wolfowitz's Fingerprints on Niger Claim
Pentagon Committee Told White House to Hype Dubious Uranium Claims
By JASON LEOPOLD
WASHINGTON, D.C
A Pentagon committee led by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, advised President Bush to include a reference in his January
State of the Union address about Iraq trying to purchase 500 tons of
uranium from Niger to bolster the case for war in Iraq, despite the
fact
that the CIA warned Wolfowitz's committee that the information was
unreliable, according to a CIA intelligence official and four members
of
the Senate's intelligence committee who have been investigating the
issue.
The Senators and the CIA official said they could be forced out of
government and brought up on criminal charges for leaking the
information
to this reporter and as a result requested anonymity. The Senators
said
they plan to question CIA Director George Tenet Wednesday morning in
a
closed-door hearing to find out whether Wolfowitz and members of a
committee he headed misled Bush and if the President knew about the
erroneous information prior to his State of the Union address.
Spokespeople for Wolfowitz and Tenet vehemently denied the
accusations.
Dan Bartlett, the White House communications director, would not
return
repeated calls for comment.
The revelations by the CIA official and the senators, if true, would
prove
that Tenet, who last week said he erred by allowing the uranium
reference
to be included in the State of the Union address, took the blame for
an
intelligence failure that he was not responsible for. The lawmakers
said
it could also lead to a widespread probe of prewar intelligence.
At issue is a secret committee set up in 2001 by Defense Secretary
Donald
Rumsfeld called the Office of Special Plans, which was headed by
Wolfowitz, Abrum Shulsky and Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of
Defense for
Policy, to probe allegations links between Iraq and the terrorist
organization al-Qaeda and whether the country was stockpiling a cache
of
weapons of mass destruction. The Special Plans committee disbanded in
March after the start of the war in Iraq.
The committee's job, according to published reports, was to gather
intelligence information on the Iraqi threat that the CIA and FBI
could
not uncover and present it to the White House to build a case for war
in
Iraq. The committee relied heavily on information provided by Iraqi
defector Ahmad Chalabi, who has provided the White House with reams
of
intelligence on Saddam Hussein's weapons programs that has been
disputed.
Chalabi heads the Iraqi National Congress, a group of Iraqi exiles
who
have pushed for regime change in Iraq.
The Office of Special Plans, according to the CIA official and the
senators, routinely provided Bush, Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick
Cheney
and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice with questionable
intelligence information on the Iraqi threat, much of which was
included
in various speeches by Bush and Cheney and some of which was called
into
question by the CIA.
In the months leading up to the war in Iraq, Rumsfeld became
increasingly
frustrated that the CIA could not find any evidence of Iraq's
chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons program, evidence that would have
helped
the White House build a solid case for war in Iraq.
In an article in the New York Times last October, the paper reported
that
Rumsfeld had ordered the Office of Special Plans to "to search for
information on Iraq's hostile intentions or links to terrorists" that
might have been overlooked by the CIA.
The CIA official and the senators said that's when Wolfowitz and his
committee instructed the White House to have Bush use the now
disputed
line about Iraq's attempts to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger
in a
speech the President was set to give in Cincinnati. But Tenet quickly
intervened and informed Stephen Hadley, an aide to National Security
Adviser Rice, that the information was unreliable.
Patrick Lang, a former director of Middle East analysis at the
Defense
Intelligence Agency, said in an interview with the New Yorker
magazine in
May that the Office of Special Plans "started picking out things that
supported their thesis and stringing them into arguments that they
could
use with the President. It's not intelligence. It's political
propaganda."
Lang said the CIA and Office of Special Plans often clashed on the
accuracy of intelligence information provided to the White House by
Wolfowitz.
Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, the author of a May New Yorker
story
on the Office of Special Plans, reported, "former CIA officers and
analysts described the agency as increasingly demoralized. George
knows
he's being beaten up," one former officer said of George Tenet, the
CIA
director. "And his analysts are terrified. George used to protect his
people, but he's been forced to do things their way." Because the
CIA's
analysts are now on the defensive, "they write reports justifying
their
intelligence rather than saying what's going on. The Defense
Department
and the Office of the Vice-President write their own pieces, based on
their own ideology. We collect so much stuff that you can find
anything
you want."
"They see themselves as outsiders, " a former <C.I.A>. expert who
spent
the past decade immersed in Iraqi-exile affairs said of the Special
Plans
people, told Hersh. He added, "There's a high degree of paranoia.
They've
convinced themselves that they're on the side of angels, and
everybody
else in the government is a fool."
By last fall, the White House had virtually dismissed all of the
intelligence on Iraq provided by the CIA, which failed to find any
evidence of Iraq's weapons programs, in favor of the more critical
information provided to the Bush administration by the Office of
Special
Plans
Hersh reported that the Special Plans Office "developed a close
working
relationship with the (Iraqi National Congress), and this
strengthened its
position in disputes with the <C.I.A>. and gave the Pentagon's pro-
war
leadership added leverage in its constant disputes with the State
Department. Special Plans also became a conduit for intelligence
reports
from the <I.N.C>. to officials in the White House."
In a rare Pentagon briefing recently, Office of Special Plans co-
director
Douglas Feith, said the committee was not an "intelligence project,"
but
rather an group of 18 people that looked at intelligence information
from
a different point of view.
Feith said when the group had new "thoughts" on intelligence
information
it was given; they shared it with CIA director Tenet.
"It was a matter of digesting other people's intelligence," Feith
said of
the main duties of his group. "Its job was to review this
intelligence to
help digest it for me and other policy makers, to help us develop
Defense
Department strategy for the war on terrorism."
Special investigation
The spies who pushed for war
Julian Borger reports on the shadow rightwing intelligence network set up in Washington to second-guess the CIA and deliver a justification for toppling Saddam Hussein by force
Julian Borger Thursday July 17, 2003 The Guardian
As the CIA director, George Tenet, arrived at the Senate yesterday to give secret testimony on the Niger uranium affair, it was becoming increasingly clear in Washington that the scandal was only a small, well-documented symptom of a complete breakdown in US intelligence that helped steer America into war.
It represents the Bush administration's second catastrophic intelligence failure. But the CIA and FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks was largely due to internal institutional weaknesses. This time the implications are far more damaging for the White House, which stands accused of politicising and contaminating its own source of intelligence.
According to former Bush officials, all defence and intelligence sources, senior members of the administration created a shadow agency of Pentagon analysts staffed mainly by ideological amateurs to compete with the CIA and its military counterpart, the Defence Intelligence Agency.
The agency, known as the Office of Special Plans (OSP) was set up by the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to second-guess CIA information and operated under the patronage of hardline conservatives in the top rungs of the administration, the Pentagon and at the White House, including Vice-President Dick Cheney.
The ideologically driven network functioned like a shadow government, much of it off the official payroll and beyond congressional oversight. But it proved powerful enough to prevail in a struggle with the state department and the CIA by establishing a justification for war.
Mr Tenet has officially taken responsibility for the president's unsubstantiated claim in January that Saddam Hussein's regime had been trying to buy uranium in Africa, but he also made it clear his agency was under pressure to justify a war that the administration had already decided on.
How much Mr Tenet reveals of where that pressure was coming from could have lasting political fallout for Mr Bush and his re-election prospects, which only a few weeks ago seemed impregnable. As more Americans die in Iraq and the reasons for the war are stripped bare, his victory in 2004 no longer looks like a foregone conclusion.
The president's most trusted adviser, Mr Cheney, was at the shadow network's sharp end. He made several trips to the CIA in Langley, Virginia, to demand a more "forward-leaning" interpretation of the threat posed by Saddam. When he was not there to make his influence felt, his chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby was. Such hands-on involvement in the processing of intelligence data was unprecedented for a vice-president in recent times, and it put pressure on CIA officials to come up with the appropriate results.
Another frequent visitor was Newt Gingrich, the former Republican party leader who resurfaced after September 11 as a Pentagon "consultant" and a member of its unpaid defence advisory board, with influence far beyond his official title.
An intelligence official confirmed Mr Gingrich made "a couple of visits" but said: "There's nothing at all unusual about people both in and out of government coming here to engage in a dialogue and to exchange views on a range of subjects."
In that guise he visited Langley three times in the run-up to war, and according to accounts, the political veteran sought to browbeat analysts into toughening up their assessments of Saddam's menace.
Mr Gingrich gained access to the CIA headquarters and was listened to because he was seen as a personal emissary of the Pentagon, and in particular, of the OSP.
In the days after September 11, Mr Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, mounted an attempt to include Iraq in the war against terror. When the established agencies came up with nothing concrete to link Iraq and al-Qaida, the OSP was given the task of looking more carefully.
William Luti, a former navy officer and ex-aide to Mr Cheney, runs the day-to-day operations, answering to Douglas Feith, a defence undersecretary and a former Reagan official and Washington lobbyist for Israel and Turkey.
The OSP had access to a huge amount of raw intelligence. It came in part from "report officers" in the CIA's directorate of operations whose job is to sift through reports from agents around the world, filtering out the unsubstantiated and the incredible. Under pressure from the hawks such as Mr Cheney and Mr Gingrich, those officers became reluctant to discard anything, no matter how far-fetched. The OSP also sucked in countless tips from the Iraqi National Congress and other opposition groups, which were viewed with far more scepticism by the CIA and the state department.
There was a mountain of documentation to look through and not much time. The administration wanted to use the momentum gained in Afghanistan to deal with Iraq once and for all. The OSP itself had less than 10 full-time staff, so to help deal with the load, the office hired scores of temporary "consultants". They including like-minded lawyers, congressional staffers, and policy wonks from the numerous rightwing thinktanks in the US capital. Few had experience in intelligence.
"Most of the people they had in that office were off the books, on personal services contracts. At one time, there were over 100 of them," said an intelligence source. The contracts allow a department to hire individuals, without specifying a job description.
As John Pike, a defence analyst at the thinktank GlobalSecurity.org, put it, the contracts "are basically a way they could pack the room with their little friends".
"They surveyed data and picked out what they liked," said Gregory Thielmann, a senior official in the state department's intelligence bureau until his retirement in September. "The whole thing was bizarre. The secretary of defence had this huge defence intelligence agency, and he went around it."
In fact, the OSP's activities were a complete mystery to the DIA and the Pentagon.
"The iceberg analogy is a good one," said a senior officer who left the Pentagon during the planning of the Iraq war. "No one from the military staff heard, saw or discussed anything with them."
The civilian agencies had the same impression of the OSP sleuths. "They were a pretty shadowy presence," Mr Thielmann said. "Normally when you compile an intelligence document, all the agencies get together to discuss it. The OSP was never present at any of the meetings I attended."
Democratic congressman David Obey, who is investigating the OSP, said: "That office was charged with collecting, vetting and disseminating intelligence completely outside of the normal intelligence apparatus.
"In fact, it appears that information collected by this office was in some instances not even shared with established intelligence agencies and in numerous instances was passed on to the national security council and the president without having been vetted with anyone other than political appointees."
The OSP was an open and largely unfiltered conduit to the White House not only for the Iraqi opposition. It also forged close ties to a parallel, ad hoc intelligence operation inside Ariel Sharon's office in Israel specifically to bypass Mossad and provide the Bush administration with more alarmist reports on Saddam's Iraq than Mossad - a highly professional body - was prepared to authorise.
"None of the Israelis who came were cleared into the Pentagon through normal channels," said one source familiar with the visits. Instead, they were waved in on Mr Feith's authority without having to fill in the usual forms.
The exchange of information continued a long-standing relationship Mr Feith and other Washington neo-conservatives had with Israel's Likud party.
In 1996, he and Richard Perle - now an influential Pentagon figure - served as advisers to the then Likud leader, Binyamin Netanyahu. In a policy paper they wrote, entitled A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, the two advisers said that Saddam would have to be destroyed, and Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran would have to be overthrown or destabilised, for Israel to be truly safe.
The Israeli influence was revealed most clearly by a story floated by unnamed senior US officials in the American press, suggesting the reason that no banned weapons had been found in Iraq was that they had been smuggled into Syria. Intelligence sources say that the story came from the office of the Israeli prime minister.
The OSP absorbed this heady brew of raw intelligence, rumour and plain disinformation and made it a "product", a prodigious stream of reports with a guaranteed readership in the White House. The primary customers were Mr Cheney, Mr Libby and their closest ideological ally on the national security council, Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice's deputy.
In turn, they leaked some of the claims to the press, and used others as a stick with which to beat the CIA and the state department analysts, demanding they investigate the OSP leads.
The big question looming over Congress as Mr Tenet walked into his closed-door session yesterday was whether this shadow intelligence operation would survive national scrutiny and who would pay the price for allowing it to help steer the country into war.
A former senior CIA official insisted yesterday that Mr Feith, at least, was "finished" - but that may be wishful thinking by rival organisation.
As he prepares for re-election, Mr Bush may opt to tough it out, rather than acknowledge the severity of the problem by firing loyalists. But in that case, it will inevitably be harder to re-establish confidence in the intelligence on which the White House is basing its decisions, and the world's sole superpower risks stumbling onwards half-blind, unable to distinguish real threats from phantoms.