I was the RWH District Organizer for California at the time PUL's "Two,
Three, Many Parties .. " was published. As you know, some of my comrades in
RWH joined with PUL to form the Freedom Road group. I didn't. Let me
explain why I don't agree with "2, 3, parties" The Maoist RCP, CPML, IWK,
ATM, RWH, and PUL used to dominate the Left in way that would be hard for
younger activists to imagine. Maoism is gone and a blend of
Anarchism/Trotstkyism dominates the Leninist left now. The 1970s were
different. Before the 1977 (Gang of Four) split, the RCP alone had over a
thousand cadres. This may not sound like much, but the quality of the RCP
people was remarkably high. They were genuine mass leaders and they
influenced tens of thousands of students and workers. In terms of
combativeness, dedication and training, they were superior, in quality, to
any of the cadre groups of today. (Actually, I think the tiny Spartacist
League is probably just as disciplined as the old RCP, but the SL doesn't
have the numbers, and its ideological line prevents it from being a force
among the masses.) Anyway, the Maoist groups were all wrecked by the split
in the CCP in which the Leftists allied with Mao were defeated a few weeks
after his death in September 1976. This caused deep confusion among
overseas Maoists. It wrecked the Maoist movement in the USA. The CCP first
declared the "Go4" a "rightist" group. This was so patently false, that it
disoriented us to no end. It was not until "Chairman" Hua Guofeng was
defeated, and Deng Xiaoping won, that the Go4 was correctly identified as a
Left deviation. PUL was first on the scene to describe our former Go4 line
as "ultra-left". The PUL book was given a boost by the change in the CCP
line that identified the Go4 with the Left. The 1977 split in the RCP was
experienced by the rank and file of RWH (the pro-PUL wing of RCP) as a
betrayal of the leadership. The leaders had supposedly failed to recognize
the persistent leftism, and corresponding lack of democracy, in RCP-RWH.
This criticism was totally false and I fought it with all my strength at the
time. But, since I was considered a "leader", and because I was responsible
mainly for discreditied ("leftist") theorectical work rather than
"practical" mass work, I was in a poor position to resist the PUL wave. I
tried to rehabilitate myself by writing for the paper, but that was still
not "practical" work. Every ideological crisis, in every Commuinist split
since 1848, is ALWAYS experienced by the rank and file as a betrayal of
"democratic norms." That doesn't make it true though! What PUL got wrong
is that the basis for the failure of the Maoist movement was the crisis in
Maoist ideology--not an "ultra left" political line. Maoism is riddled with
anti-marxist prejudices. Rather than face this difficult truth, "2, 3 many
Parties .." turns away from the ideological source of the decline and
instead focuses on a supposed "lack of democracy", "ultra-left practice",
leadership abuses, etc. When ANY party is recruiting new members, growing
quickly and winning influence, there is NEVER criticism of a lack of
democracy or of the leadership! When a Party fails--especially for
ideological reasons--something along the lines of the PUL criticism is bound
to emerge from those weaker forces who dare not face the truth. Dave E.

>From: george hegel <ulyanovist@...>
>Reply-To: pof-200@yahoogroups.com
>To: 'pof-200' <pof-200@yahoogroups.com>
>CC: 'theorist' <theorist@yahoogroups.com>, 'pof-300'
><pof-300@yahoogroups.com>
>Subject: [pof-200] Reply to Ben, comments on "Two, Three, Many Parties of a
>New Type?" and a leaflet
>Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2005 20:24:49 -0800 (PST)
>
>
>
>Hello all.
>
>First I want to apologize to the Imperialism study group. I said that I
>would participate and I have not. Like others in the group, I have been
>under pressure from other directions.
>
>Some time ago, Ben asked for comments regarding a leaflet which he
>distributed at a demonstration. I think Ben and I agree that the
>opportunists mis-leaders of the anti-war movement need to be combatted. I
>think we also agree that it is a non-trivial task to work out correct
>tactics for this battle.
>
>I had made a suggestion regarding these tactics with the comments:
>
> > I would urge that the leaflet expressly advocate that demonstrators
>begin advocating
> > the hot-cargoing military goods and/or protests by GIs in Iraq against
>the war.
> > I would also urge that the leaflet attempt to point out that the failure
>of the
> > reformists to seriously promote these, when they have the ear of entire
>demonstrations,
> > holds back the potential of demonstrations.
>
>Ben responded to these comments, and rather belatedly, I'd like to share my
>thoughts about his resonse.
>
> > I thought that many of Ulyanovist's comments were very thoughtful
> > but I disagree with his comments above because they appear
> > somewhat detached from the living thoughts of most of the
> > activists who received copies of the leaflet.
>
>I must confess that I cringed when I read this. I have often heard the
>story from reformists that such and such a slogan is a great idea, but it
>is too advanced for where the masses are today, so we should shelve that
>slogan and say something more modest instead. My usual response is
>something like this. The masses are demanding something, say an end to the
>Iraq occupation, but the tactics they are employing for fighting for their
>demands are woefully inadequate. It is our job to tell them, "look what you
>want is a tall order. I know it sounds radical, but think for a
>minute--wouldn't the fight for your demands be so much more powerful if you
>adopted such-and-such an approach?" In other words, we tell them the truth
>about their struggles, but try to do so in a way that is understandable and
>convincing.
>
>Given that is how I think, as I said, I cringed when I read the passage
>about the ideas being "detached from the living thoughts of most of the
>[recipients]."
>
>The AL Collective distributed a leaflet at the Million Worker March, which
>was heavily working class and heavily minority. (I've appended it at the
>end). This leaflet raised the issue of hot-cargoing military goods. Quite a
>few people commented on the leaflet, and all of it, as far as I know, was
>positive. I say this not to brag, but because I'm not convinced that the
>ideas are all that difficult for activists to understand or accept. I'm
>curious why our different perceptions.
>
> > I don't even know what it means to "hot-cargo" military goods
>
>Wow, I'm surprised.
>
> > (I can guess that it means steal).
>
>To hot-cargo something, means for unionists to treat that thing as
>something that shouldn't be touched, moved, worked on etc. British rail
>workers, for example, refused to move military goods at one point during
>the preparations for the invasion of Iraq.
>
><http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,11816,870974,00.html>
>
> > More to the point, the majority of activists probably
>
> > do not have many contacts within the
> > military -- so would not be able to advocate such a course of
> > action to these non-existent contacts.
>
>I'm not really convinced. It may be that only a minority at a mass
>demonstration has good contacts with the military. But the effect that an
>activist has upon a military contact depends not only on what that activist
>writes or says, but also upon the slogans that are supported at mass
>rallies. If an activist explains to a military contact the importance of
>demonstrations *by GIs*, these arguments may appear "logically flawless",
>but leave gnawing doubts in the GI. If this is the right thing to do, why
>is it that only *you* bring this up to me. Perhaps your viewes are not
>really representative, even among anti-war activists. This is where a the
>adoption of slogans favoring GI demonstrations, by a majority of
>demonstrators would be of great value. If a demonstration of 200,000 in NYC
>found its echo in a demonstration of only 100 GIs in Iraq, I personally
>think it would be worth taking that route.
>
>
> > I agree that it is necessary to criticize the reformist attempts
> > to hijack or liquidate the antiwar movement. But figuring out
> > how to do so is a non-trivial matter. The reformists,
> > unfortunately, have a lot of credibility with most activists
> > (because they often are the people who are in a position to
> > organize the large mass actions and inexperienced activists will
> > not understand how someone can organize an action and still be
> > harmful to the movement).
>
>
> > If we attack the reformists in a clumsy way (as opposed to an
> > intelligent, well-considered way) -- it will not hurt the
> > reformists -- but will only make it appear that the trends which
> > attack the reformists are detached from reality. It is very
> > important that leaflets make a strong connection with readers.
>
>I absolutely agree that we need to attack the opportunists in a way that is
>successful. Since we cannot mobilize anywhere near the support they can
>mobilize, we need to devote a great deal of thought toward how to make the
>agitation convincing. But at the same time, if we deal the reformists no
>blows at all, they will not be hurt in any way. Further, it is inevitable,
>to some extent, that mistakes will be made. When I proposed to you to urge
>soldier demonstrations and/or hot-cargoing military goods, I implicitly
>assumed you would do your best to present that agitation in an intelligent
>and understandable way. As I've mentioned, I've attached a leaflet that was
>distributed at the Million Worker March which received very positive
>feedback. The leaflet could have undoubtedly been written better. But I'd
>very much like to know whether you think it discredits anti-opportunists by
>appearing out of touch. The same goes for "The road away from war" leaflet
>that appears on my live journal."
> That leaflet also seemed to get a positive reception, and to make a
>strong connection with readers. Some readers offered to distribute copies
>themselves. But my perception on this could be skewed, so I welcome any
>other data points.
>
>
> > When I worked with the MLP (before it dissolved in 1993) I worked
> > in a factory and our leaflets to the workers there were based on
> > many conversations we had with workers in which we learned what
> > kinds of ideas and arguments had meaning to them and were
> > comprehensible.
>
>Yes, it is absolutely important to get feedback about what is convincing,
>and what seems to have holes in it.
>
>
> > I would like to see Ulyanovist in our study group on Lenin's
> > "Imperialism" (if he has the time).
>I apologize for my lack of participation there. One comment, somewhat
>off-topic, that I would make is this. I noticed a number of
>anarchist-leaning posts. I know that you had a debate on Marxism vs
>Anarchism on the question of the state. I think that's great. But the
>differences between Marxism and Anarchism go much further than the
>differences over the state. In "Left Wing Communism an Infantile Disorder"
>Lenin describes petit-bourgeois revolutionism as "smacking of anarchism or
>borrowing something from the latter". I think it would be real useful to
>criticise anarchism, not only for its position on the state, but also for
>its ultra-leftism. Otherwise, there is a danger that anarchists might shed
>their views on the state, without shedding their essentially ultra-left
>style of politics.
>
> > I would also like to know more about Ulyanovist's political
> > experience and background and priorities and the same for
> > whatever group he is working with.
>
>Can you hold that thought a bit? Thanks.
>
>
> > It appears likely that Ulyanovist is a trotskyist of some sort.
> > I am not a trotskyist by any stretch of the imagination. But
> > what is important to me is that Ulyanovist understands that the
> > reformists undermine the antiwar movement and other oppositional
> > movements. Everything else is minor.
>
>********
>
>One of the things that I appreciate about Ben is his concern for theory. It
>is a concern that I share. Naturally, I imagine that the literature that
>has influenced me is likely to be of general importance. Much of that
>literature is already on-line at the Marxist Internet Archive. However,
>there is one book, of a theoretical nature, that I think is definitely
>worth serious study, which is not online, and that I sorely wish was
>available to otheres. The book is "Two, Three, Many Parties of a New Type?
>Against the Ultra-Left Line". The book was published by the Proletarian
>Unity League in 1977, and dealt with some of the problems that were facing
>what was called the New Communist Movement. The PUL joined the Freedom Road
>Socialist Organization, which itself split into two organizations each
>retaining the name Freedom Road. Their web-sites are at
>
>http://www.freedomroad.org/
>
>http://www.frso.org/
>
>I have never been affiliated with either organization, and my main interest
>is in the book that I've mentioned. One of the FRSO sites has, for several
>years, had a notice that "We plan to publish this and other related PUL
>works on this web site." http://www.freedomroad.org/content/view/231/64/
>Unfortunately, they have not followed through. I wrote to them six or so
>months ago with an offer to scan the book for them, but without a reply.
>
>The book, as I mentioned, deals with some of the problems facing the a
>section of the left in the mid 70's. In particular, it deals with
>theoretical confusion, and the ill-effects of that confusion upon the
>movement. However, the issues that are raised are relevant, I believe, to
>todays circumstances and to communists regardless of whether they consider
>themselves part of the "New Communist Movement", or adhere to some other
>trend. The authors present their views in a very cogent, worked out manner.
>More than that, the authors enumerate, document and address in detail a
>wide range of the positions that they oppose. That in itself makes study of
>the book worthwhile. Even if the authors' views are mistaken, pregnant
>mistakes are often more valuable to study than sterile truths.
>
>Having a Trotskyist background, the language of the book was somewhat
>off-putting to me at first. Stalin, Mao and Hoxa are quoted in support of
>various points. However, getting to the gist of the arguments is, in my
>opinion, worth the effort, even if one finds the views of Stalin, Mao and
>Hoxa dubious from a revolutionary point of view. There are other criticism
>that I would make of the book -- but you need to read it first!
>
>I don't know if Ben, or anyone else in this group has read the book, or has
>an opinion on it. I also don't know if the group has space on its site for
>such a work (it's 250 pages), or whether it would be considered
>appropriate. I do however believe that study of this work can be very
>useful for clarifying a host of theoretical issues, and in my opinion,
>would be completely appropriate for the group's web site. It may be a bit
>advanced for some of the less well-read folks. I don't recommend it as
>introductory reading. However, I do see it as in-line with the long term
>goals of the group. If having this book on-line on the group's web site
>seems reasonable, I would be more than happy to scan it. (As an aside, the
>Marxist Internet Archive, at least according to the policy that I've read,
>generally does not accept the works of living authors).
>
>*****
>
>Leaflet distributed at Million Worker March.
>
>Please give feedback.
>
>For Hot Cargoing Military Goods
>
>Lately, there have been increasing calls to pull US troops out of Iraq.
>However, to paraphrase Clarence Thomas of ILWU local 10, one of the
>initiators of the Million Worker March, concessions aren’t won by asking
>for them, they are won by fighting for them. That idea applies as much to
>concessions wrung from the government as it applies to concessions wrung
>from employers. To get the US troops out of Iraq, and to keep them from
>being sent on other military adventures, we need to move from resolutions
>against the war to resolute struggle against the war.
>
>
>
>Hot-cargoing military goods, that is refusing to handle them, is one of the
>means available to struggle against the occupation of Iraq. It is a means
>of struggle that is naturally posed by the situation, because it is a means
>that could actually bring success. At the same time, it is a means of
>struggle that brings with it a risk of personal hardship to individual
>union brothers and sisters.
>
>
>
>In the final analysis, the decision to hot-cargo military goods rests with
>individual union locals. No-one can make that decision for them. But for
>that very reason, no-one should be accused of irresponsibility merely for
>raising the issue, or for arguing the case for hot-cargoing.
>
>
>
>Hot cargoing could lead to success in the struggle against the occupation
>of Iraq. However, this success would, in all likelihood, not come from
>shutting down tight the supply chain of the occupation forces. In order for
>military supplies to be blocked on a large scale, hot-cargoing would have
>to include all major ports as well as trucking and rail. No president in
>the midst of war would permit such a thing if they can help it. On one
>hand, there are purely military channels of transport that would be used.
>On the other hand, the tactic of placing transport under military control
>is available to the government. But especially the tactic of militarizing
>transport poses a serious risk to the government. Do they really want to
>open a second front and use the military in attempts to break American
>unions at the same time that they are fighting a war in Iraq that they
>can’t seem to win? (And if the American unions are under attack, might not
>dock-workers in other countries hot-cargo US
> ships in solidarity?) It is precisely this option of opening a second
>front that the government may find unappealing, and which may provide the
>incentive for a withdrawl from Iraq.
>
>
>
>One of the first arguments which is brought against hot-cargoing military
>goods is that such actions would be stabbing US soldiers in the back.
>Hot-cargoing would, according to this argument, aggrevate the shortage of
>supplies such as body armor. This argument, we believe misunderstands the
>real effects of hot-cargoing. Any shortage of supplies felt by the armed
>forces is a shortage due to the decisions of the government and the brass,
>and exists for no other reason. When the military "does without" it is
>because it is cheaper. Hot-cargoing, except under very unusual situations,
>would not, and could not, prevent the military from supplying itself. The
>pressure on the government from hot-cargoing results from the potential for
>"another front", and not from an absolute shortage of supplies.
>
>
>
>Undoubtedly, the brass would try to drive a wedge between workers and
>soldiers by trying to bring about the appearence that labor actions was
>causing soldiers to die. They might intentionally ship things like body
>armor through hot-cargoing ports in order to make a propaganda point. They
>would try to make the argument that labor action was the cause of soldiers’
>deaths. But while shipments of body armor was lying idly, the military,
>through one means or another (such as military transport) would be getting
>the supplies that the brass thought actually needed for prosecuting the war
>aims. It is the tricks the government will use that will cause GIs to be
>killed, not labor action.
>
>
>
>But the real question is not what tricks the military brass will use to
>gain a propaganda advantage, but how to actually mount a struggle which has
>the potential to bring an end to the horror which is the occupation of
>Iraq. The sooner a struggle is mounted that forces Bush or Kerry to
>withdraw from Iraq, the fewer American casualties there will be and the
>fewer Iraqi casualties there will be from American aggression.
>
>
>
>It has been argued that if workers in a given union local decide to
>hot-cargo military goods, the union tops will leave them to hang in the
>wind. This is undoubtedly a possibility. But the number of resolutions
>against the US occupation of Iraq that have been approved by the union tops
>shows that the official leaders are under increasing pressure to oppose the
>occupation, and that the union rank and file are increasingly in favor of
>an end to the occupation. Can the labor bureaucrats stab unionists who
>hot-cargo military goods in the back? Absolutely. Can the labor movement
>demonstrate solidarity, and defend one another despite the union
>bureaucracy? We think that is possible too. How things turn out will depend
>on the course of the struggle.
>
>
>
>One step toward organizing the hot-cargoing of military goods is building
>support for the workers who would be on the front lines of such actions.
>Every person at the Million Worker March, whether or not they belong to a
>union, and whether or not military goods are handled at their work site,
>can contribute to building such an action. All workers, and not just those
>in organized unions, can pledge material support to such to a hot-cargo
>movement. Those who belong to unions, can urge their union to pledge to
>defend all workers who might be victimized in the course of such a
>struggle.
>
>
>
>Defend the 343rd
>
>As this leaflet is being printed, the US military brass is considering
>charges against 19 reservists in Iraq for refusing to obey orders. The
>targeted GIs are members of the Army’s 343rd Quartermaster Company who
>refused orders on Wednesday to haul fuel to the Iraqi town of Taji, north
>of Baghdad.
>
>
>
>Charges have not yet been filed against the soldiers, who were read their
>rights and have been removed from military barracks and detained in tents.
>If charged with wilful disobedience, the soldiers could face up to five
>years imprisonment, loss of pay and dishonorable discharge.
>
>
>
>The big news agencies are portraying the soldiers as simply cowards,
>fearful of undertaking a dangerous mission. We don’t have the full details
>yet, but the details we do have, as well as our knowledge of how the brass
>conducted the war in Vietnam suggest that much more is at play. During the
>war in Vietnam, the brass sent GIs into the jungle as bait, to lure
>attacks, so gunships could mow down the attackers. As the GIs in Vietnam
>increasingly understood that their sacrifices on the battlefield had
>nothing to do with anything virtuous, they increasingly disliked playing
>the role of bait, and in increasing numbers refused such missions. It is
>possible that the "fuel delivery" mission of the 343rd was also meant to
>lure attacks. According to early reports, the same fuel had been
>"delivered" on a previous mission. However, the party to which it was
>delivered refused it, reportedly because the fuel was contaminated with
>water.
>
>
>
>Rather than being cowards, the soldiers of the 343rd have demonstrated a
>fair amount of bravery by standing up to the brass. They deserve to be
>defended by the entire working class. They should not be victimized.
>
>
>
>al_collective@...
>
>(labor donated)
>
>
>
>
>
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