Dear Bernard

As an aside.

>
>>Would Plato venerate Parmenides if he were a materialist? Would Plato call
>>Parmenides "Father" if Parmenides was a materialist?
>
>Did Plato "venerate" Parmenides? Was there not some "irony" in this
>supposed veneration, as there was with Protagoras, Prodicus and others?
>Why did Plato stage a "parricide" of Parmenides by the Elean
>stranger?...
>
I recently noted that some commentators think there was no parracide here.
And moreover that it is important that the Elean Stranger is not Socrates.

What say you?

Emile

Dear Ed

This is a nice packaging of the eight hypotheses. Any comment on that stupid
little interlocutor Aristotles?

Regards
Emile

Re: Tekton's of Fri., 15 Jan 1999 21:47:06 EST, another reply.

"You will have no trouble explaining the exact relationship between
the One and the forms, the relationship between the One and the
many, . . . " - Tekton

Let me respond again in a more concise and immediate manner. The
eight hypotheses, 137c - 166c, make Parmenides' (Plato's) case.
Here they are in briefest form. In each case I give the hypothesis
with its protasis and its apodosis, followed in brackets by a brief
explanation. Where the Form is meant, I capitalize the O. Where a
one thing is meant, or either Form or thing, I use the lower case.

1. If there is a One, it doesn't exist. [If it exists it is two,
unity and existence, not one. Does that sound naive to you? That's
the way they saw it in the IV century B.C.],

2. If there is a one, it is other, or many. [Copies, things, There
are alot of them, as we plainly see, and],

3. If there is a one, the others are ones. [Of course, but],

4. If there is a One, the Others have nothing to do with it. [They
are Forms, and Forms are unique.],

5. If there is not a one, it does exist somehow. [After all, we are
speaking and thinking of it. It exists as a Form],

6. If there is not a One, there is no one. [No Form, no copy],

7. If there is not a one, there are others. [as plainly seen],

8. If there is not a One, there is no Other [or other. There is
nothing].

I have tried to put this most concisely, and out of my head as if
in an oral recitation. It is not a "tour de force." It is not as
difficult as you might think, if you carefully observe and learn
the structure of the eight. Orally I may have made a mistake here
or there, and would plead the privilege to fall back upon prior
written studies, if need be. I wanted to try it thus to see how
simply it can all be put. In briefest, this is what Plato's
Parmenides says.

- EFL, 1/20/99

Yes. Dyad < the Greek: hE duas, tEs duados, the number two. I used that
spelling out of association. No special intent. It just came out that
way. - EFL

In a message dated 1/17/99 10:45:17 PM, bfsuzan@... writes:

<<All the efforts of Plato intended to evade the "either..., or..."

alternative imposed upon us by the fight of the Friends of the Earth

against the Friends of Forms (in which were taking part Heraclitus,

Parmenides and their followers), by leading us toward the conclusion

that there was no end in sight so long as we kept denying either the

"material" world or the "intelligible" realm, or tried to reduce the

whole to a single "one"... So, yes, he was taking Parmenides seriously,

but only to a certain extend, and so was he taking seriously

Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus and others, but only so far!.... They

all had to be "overcome", and sure! Parmenides was the harder to

overcome (which the age difference between Socrates and Parmenides in

the Parmenides is intended to "illustrate"...)

>>

Well stated and true.

In a message dated 1/17/99 10:45:17 PM, bfsuzan@... writes:

<<Did Plato "venerate" Parmenides? Was there not some "irony" in this

supposed veneration,>>

In the Theaetetus 183e Socrates states: "A feeling of respect keeps me from
treating in an unworthy spirit Melissus and the others who say the universe is
one and at rest; but there is one being whom I respect above all: Parmenides
himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, a 'reverend and awful' figure. I met him
when I was quite young and he was quite elderly, and I thought there was a
sort of depth in him that was altogether noble."

Now surely, Plato's veneration for Parmenides is real.

In a message dated 1/17/99 9:28:12 PM, czavala@... writes:

<<Parmenides represents a more conceptual way of thinking. But he is not an
idealist. He still keeps thinking in a materialistic way, and that is perhaps
why Plato admires him>>

A  deep affinity exists between Parmenides notion of being and Plato's Forms.
This is one reason for Plato's admiration. Another is Parmenides method. He
was the first philosopher to use pure thought in the form of long deductions
in his attempts to find truth.

In a message dated 1/17/99 9:28:12 PM, czavala@... writes:

<<The Gods,  who hold Forms as the really real,  are held in esteem.  Forms,
non-mental, truly existing metaphysical entities, must be. The Giants,
materialists, make war against heaven, and are "without law." (Book Ten of the
Laws, 889 ff.)
I can't find where Plato says this in Laws 889 ff.
>>

Nomoi X, 889 ff., describes materialism and we know this leads to lawlessness
because Plato says so in the Sophist, 246d.

The Stranger tells Theatetus he knows how to deal with materialists. Theatetus
asks how. The Stranger says if they cannot be changed, we are to imagine them
reformed, "...and assume them willing to moderate their present lawlessness in
answering our questions."

On Sun, 17 Jan 1999 08:58:52 EST, Tekton@... wrote:

>Would Plato venerate Parmenides if he were a materialist? Would Plato call
>Parmenides "Father" if Parmenides was a materialist?

Did Plato "venerate" Parmenides? Was there not some "irony" in this
supposed veneration, as there was with Protagoras, Prodicus and others?
Why did Plato stage a "parricide" of Parmenides by the Elean
stranger?...

>Is  Parmenides' One Being material? Is it an object of sense?

When there is only a single "being" that is everything, does it make
much difference that you call it "ideal" or "material" if you are a
part of it?... Does calling it sense perception or thought makes much
difference when you are left with only one way of "perceiving"?...

All the efforts of Plato intended to evade the "either..., or..."
alternative imposed upon us by the fight of the Friends of the Earth
against the Friends of Forms (in which were taking part Heraclitus,
Parmenides and their followers), by leading us toward the conclusion
that there was no end in sight so long as we kept denying either the
"material" world or the "intelligible" realm, or tried to reduce the
whole to a single "one"... So, yes, he was taking Parmenides seriously,
but only to a certain extend, and so was he taking seriously
Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus and others, but only so far!.... They
all had to be "overcome", and sure! Parmenides was the harder to
overcome (which the age difference between Socrates and Parmenides in
the Parmenides is intended to "illustrate"...)

Yours,
Bernard

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bernard F. SUZANNE (bfsuzan@...)
Plato and his dialogues : http://phd.evansville.edu/plato.htm
See also intro to Plato at: http://eawc.evansville.edu/essays/suzanne.htm

Judy Wubnig wrote:

> >From: Carmen Zavala <czavala@...>
> >
> >The problem consists in that Parmenides (being a "materialist") . . .
>
> Why do you say that Parmenides is a materialist?  He gives arguments which
> assume materialism, but he is not himself a materialist.

I put the word "materialist" between " ", because I didn't want to start a
mayor discussion about that. I meant that he was materialist in some larger
sense. As you said: "He gives arguments that assume materialism."
That makes him a materialist in some sense to me.
Of course in opposition to Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (and this has already been
discussed befor on this list), who was a materialist in a strong sense,
Parmenides represents a more conceptual way of thinking. But he is not an
idealist. He still keeps thinking in a materialistic way, and that is perhaps
why Plato admires him. Because he hasn't missed the point: the problem of the
relation between the material and the conceptual one.
Nevertheless Plato didn't think that Parmenides had been able to explain
successfully his philosophy  (Theaitetus184a) and that is why he proposes to
continue using  maieutike to discuss wih Theaitetus, instead of starting a
conceptual exercise as in the "Parmenides".

From: Tekton@...

The Gods,  who hold Forms as the really real,  are held in esteem.  Forms,
non-mental, truly existing metaphysical entities, must be. The Giants,
materialists, make war against heaven, and are "without law." (Book Ten of the
Laws, 889 ff.)
I can't find where Plato says this in Laws 889 ff.

Carmen Zavala
czavala@...
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5132

In a message dated 1/17/99 2:29:50 PM, elittle@... writes:

<<As to "Tau Mega Kai Micron," I presume you mean "To mega kai
mikron," the famous Indefinite Duad,>>

What is a duad? Is it like a dyad?

tekton@...

Tekton@... wrote:

   <<<<Since Plato would never refuse an argument by actually trying to
explain and teach the correct way to understand something in a straight
discursive manner, he doesn't answer directly to Parmenides in 132 c-d,
but tries to explain his (Parmenides') confusion dialectically in the
discussion in the second part of the dialogue.>>>>

   <<Exactly where, in part two of the Parmenides, does Plato say what
you think he says? Please provide the hypotheses and the sentence or
sentences. The second part of the Parmenides goes to the absolute limit
of human thought. Therefore agreement between Platonists is difficult.
However, this much is clear: Plato held idealism and psychological
idealism to be false.>>


The first hypothesis talks about what is true if the One is:
that it would :
have no parts nor be a whole
have no beginning nor an end
have no one dimensional nor a two dimensional (137e-138a) form
(skematos)
not  be in any place
not change it's place nor become something else.
not be similar or unsimilar to itself or something else
not be commensurable in size to something else.
not be in any time
not be, since it hasn't got any existence in time
not be possible to mention it, nor explain, think, perceive or imagine
it (142a)

The problem raised here is that if we consider One as an ideal "thing" (
with material existence), or in other words, if we consider that One is
an idea, with material existence, then we will have to deal with the
contradiction that it would not even be possible to speak about it. But
the fact that you have to accept the existence of an idea because of the
evidence that a discussion is actually taking place, had already been
pointed out in (135c).. that is why the exercise continues  with case 2:
If one EXISTS.
And it will be showed that if we take "one" as the units with material
existence, then we will be able to assign to the "one" the opposite of
what we did in the first example (137c-142a). And it will be possible to
mention, explain, etc. The "one" (the material one).
The problem then is that the material existing "one" can be
comprehended, but the mentally grasped "one" (the "idea" of "one") can
not. At least if we want to attribute to it a material existence. That
is why problem 2a (155e-157b) about the kind of existence of both "ones"
and about the evidence of change is raised.
The problem of the evidently existing mental grasped "one" and the
evidently material existing "one" (units in nature) is tried to be
solved with the postulation of  the "instant".
>From the "instant" both "ones" can be comprehended and explained.

So, when I said that I don't consider that Parmenides' answers given to
Socrates' argument (of the ideas being mental realities in the psyche)
are consistent arguments against
Socrates' suggestion, I meant that in the above mentioned parts it is
showed that the idea of one (that participates of the material existing
"ones") logically has to have an existence too, but this would be in a
"placeless" instant. (otherwise there would be the contradictions of
arguments 1 and 2 of the second part and also all the problems of
objectivation of the "one" discussed in the first part of the dialog).
This placeless instant could be the psyche in Socrates opinion, since
psyche has no space-existence. The second part of the dialog gives us an
internal logical justification of what was already stated and tried to
be proved in the first part of the dialog.

>>However, this much is clear: Plato held idealism and psychological idealism to
be false.<<

I agree. Idealism is clearly refuted in the "Parmenides", since it
supposes some kind of eternal existence of the idea, which would lead to
the "third man argument" refuted in 132e-133a) and Cratilus (432d). But
of point 2a  and 132b we could conclude that our comprehension of the
idea as eternal existing and all what was pointed out in the 1 st
example (137c-142a) has an instantly existence in our psyche. This
existence is not subjective ( it is not each man who measures things-
Theaitetus), but it appears in each psyche as the same eternal existing
idea for each one of us.
And since we are mentioning the Theaitetus, I don't know if  Theaitetus
184a has been discussed, where Socrates criticises in some way
Parmenides' way of arguing (probably the second part of the dialog is
meant), for considering it somehow confusing/abstract(but not
incorrect)? There he suggests , that the discussion in the Parmenides
(as well as in the Theaitetus itself) is about cognition (epistemes peri
ti pot' estin). This too, would speak in favour of  that Plato is taking
up the problem of mental cognition and the ideas, as existing in the
psyche in the instant of cognition. There in the psyche-instant the
ideas "participate" in the in-space-and-time-existing "things" because
they refer to them.

Carmen
czavala@...
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5132

Re: Tekton's of Fri 15 Jan 1999 21:47:06 EST

"Since the logoi are `exceedingly clear' you will have no trouble
explaining the exact relationship between the One and the forms,
the relationship between the One and the many, and the relationship
between the forms and Tau Mega Kai Micron [sic]. Am I correct?"

Yes, you are correct. I have presented an explanation long ere now.
In order not to encumber the screens of the whole list, many of
whom have already been through this altogether, I will mail you an
example privately to your address, a free-standing essay on "The
Structure of Plato's Parmenides." I can also send you, if you wish,
a transcript of most of the original Plato-Parmenides list
discussion, which covers the same ground and a bit more. Any one
else wishing any of these may apply to me likewise at either of my
addresses, or find them somewhere here on the Onelist.com (I am not
very good at finding these archives) or at www.morec.com/plato.htm

As to "Tau Mega Kai Micron," I presume you mean "To mega kai
mikron," the famous Indefinite Duad, hE duas aoristos, of Plato's
lecture On the Good, etc., reported by Aristotle, et al. (This is
a very hazy side of Plato's doctrine (cf. Konrad Gaiser, Platons
Ungeschriebene Lehre, etc.), subject to much argument and
conjecture, but it would seem that there would be some
correspondence between this mega kai mikron, and the talla of the
Parmenides or ta polla of other sources (to hen kai talla :: to hen
kai to m. kai  m.), athough I know of none immediately off hand
that is explicit (don't ask for a reference).

- EFL, 1/17/99

The Gods,  who hold Forms as the really real,  are held in esteem.  Forms,
non-mental, truly existing metaphysical entities, must be. The Giants,
materialists, make war against heaven, and are "without law." (Book Ten of the
Laws, 889 ff.)

Would Plato venerate Parmenides if he were a materialist? Would Plato call
Parmenides "Father" if Parmenides was a materialist?

Is  Parmenides' One Being material? Is it an object of sense? The answer to
these questions is no.

tekton@...

Calling Plato an 'Idealist,' in any sense, is  nonsense. Who won the Battle of
the Gods and Giants? (Sophist 246a and following.)

tekton@...

In a message dated 1/15/99 3:51:39 PM, elittle@... writes:

<<The
eight hypotheses of the "main part" of the dialogue are exceedingly
clear and amenable to exegesis.>>

Hi Ed -

Since the logoi are "exceedingly clear" you will have no trouble explaining
the exact relationship between the One and the forms, the relationship between
the One and the many,  and the relationship between the forms and Tau Mega Kai
Micron.

Am I correct?

tekton@...

Re: Parmenides 132 b-d, and comments by Tekton and C. Zavala:
(Carmen Zavala's msg came across my screen as dated 19 Jan 1997,
which appears to be an error somewhere. I think it was transmitted
14 January 1999).

"I don't consider that Parmenides' answers given to Socrates'
argument (of the ideas being mental realities in the psyche) are
consistent arguments against Socrates' suggestion." - Zavala

I not only agree with Carmen's comment, but think this is an
exceedingly important point.

First, let us look at the text (132b3, ed. Jaeger; my translation):

Alla, phanai, hO ParmenidE, ton SOkratE, mE tOn eidOn hekastOn E
toutOn noEma, kai oudamou autOi prosEkEi eggignesthai allothi E en
psuchais, but Parmenides, said Socrates, is not each of these Forms
a thought, and it belongs to it to arise nowhere but in [our]
minds; houtO gar an hen ge hekaston eiE kai ouk an eti paschoi ha
nundE elegeto, so each is one, and doesn't undergo what was just
proposed (i.e. regress).

Ti oun; phanai, hen hekaston esti tOn noEmatOn, noEma de oudenos;
How so? [Parmenides] said, each is one of the thoughts [or: each
one is a thought], but a thought of nothing?

All' adunaton, eipein, but that is impossible, said [Socrates].

Alla tinos; then of something?

Nai, yes.

Ontos E ouk ontos; of [something that] is, or [that] isn't?

Ontos, [something that] is.

Ouk henos tinos, ho epi pasin ekeino to noEma epon noei, mian tina
ousan idean; not of one thing, that which intends to address many,
being some one idea?

Nai, right.

Eita ouk eidos estai touto to nooumenon hen einai, aei on to auto
epi pasin; then this Form will not be the one thought [or: a Form
will not be what is thought to be one; or: this thought Form will
not be one], always being one of many things? [confusing the
thoughts and the things].

AnagkE au phainetai, so it must seem.

Ti de dE; and this? eipein ton ParmenidEn, said Parmenides, ouk
anagkE hE talla phEs tOn eidOn metechein, isn't it necessary
inasmuch as you say others participate in the Forms, E dokei soi ek
noEmatOn hekaston einai kai panta noein, E noEmata onta anoEta
einai, [that] either it seems to you [that] each is of thoughts and
all things think, or thoughts are thoughtless things? [For a more
graceful translation you can try Cornford, but my aim here has been
exactitude, and indication of ambiguities.]

One is not compelled to read this as a "put-down" or refutation of
Socrates (even though that is always an option). It is equally
readable as a question. Carmen is right to say (1) that Plato is
not didactic, but ever provocative, and (2) that it wouldn't suit
the context of the whole. Often when meaning is doubtful, context
gives us the right key, indeed better than isolated sentences. The
eight hypotheses of the "main part" of the dialogue are exceedingly
clear and amenable to exegesis. We have done all that three years
ago.

I would only question Carmen's depiction of Parmenides as a
materialist. It is still too soon for all such distinctions to be
clear and firm. Rather it seems to me that all this was new to him.
He was puzzled perhaps, and even Plato was asking questions. They
are struggling with it. We still are.

Implied here is the perennial question: are thoughts things? Tines;
Nai. Ontas? . . . noEmata onta anoEta. It has been argued down the
ages. We call it the mind-brain problem. Read Dean Woodridge, "The
Machinery of the Brain," or Gilbert Ryle, "The Concept of Mind." It
is being contested here and now.

EFL, 1/15/99

On Thu, 14 Jan 1999 23:15:05 EST, Tekton@... wrote:

> I am astonished to hear
>Parmenides was a "materialist." Surely, this cannot be.

I concur with Carmen on the fact that, as presented in the dialogue,
Parmenides is a "materialist idealist", that is, he tries to hold an
idealist position but doesn't realize he does it in a very
"materialistic" way: All his objections in the first part of the
dialogue show a "materialistic" view of what ideas might be. Then,
because he is in an "either..., or..." approach, that is, holding that
ONLY his "ideas" (of the one, many, being, and so forth) exist, without
reference to the world of "becoming", the "material" world (in fact, he
holds that they all equate to one single "idea"), he his reasoning "in
a vacuum" and can say everything and his contrary! He shows what
"dialectic" gone awry looks like. Be equating being, thinking and
talking, he takes words for "the real thing" and doesn't care what's
behind, which is another form of "materialism", "logical
materialism"...

Yours,
Bernard

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bernard F. SUZANNE (bfsuzan@...)
Plato and his dialogues : http://phd.evansville.edu/plato.htm
See also intro to Plato at: http://eawc.evansville.edu/essays/suzanne.htm

Judy Wubnig wrote:

> >The problem consists in that Parmenides (being a "materialist") . . .
>
> Why do you say that Parmenides is a materialist?  He gives arguments which
> assume materialism, but he is not himself a materialist.

I meant the historical Parmenides, which Plato is referring to.
I put the word "materialist" between " ", because I didn't want to start a
mayor discussion about that. I meant that he was materialist in a larger
sense. As you said: He gives arguments that assume materialism. That makes him
a materialist to me.

In a message dated 1/14/99 12:45:17 AM, czavala@... writes:

<<Since Plato would never refuse an argument by actually trying to explain and
teach the correct way to understand something in a straight discursive
manner, he doesn't answer directly to Parmenides in 132 c-d, but tries to
explain his (Parmenides') confusion dialectically in the discussion in the
second part of the dialogue.>>

Hi Carmen -

Exactly where, in part two of the Parmenides, does Plato say what you think he
says? Please provide  the hypotheses and the sentence or sentences. The second
part of the Parmenides goes to the absolute limit of human thought. Therefore
agreement between Platonists is difficult. However, this much is clear: Plato
held idealism and psychological idealism to be false.

In addition, please answer Judy's question, because I am astonished to hear
Parmenides was a "materialist." Surely, this cannot be.

tekton@...

>From: Carmen Zavala <czavala@...>
>
.
>The problem consists in that Parmenides (being a "materialist") . . .

Why do you say that Parmenides is a materialist?  He gives arguments which
assume materialism, but he is not himself a materialist.
			 Judy Wubnig

Tekton@... wrote:

> Plato excludes the possibility of Forms existing as  mental realities in
> Parmenides 132 b-d.

I don't consider that Parmenides' answers given to Socrates' argument (of the
ideas being mental realities in the psyche) are consistent arguments against
Socrates' suggestion.I'm sorry not to have an English version of the text
here to quote.
Parmenides in 132c asks if one should not conclude of Socrates suggestion,
that if the other things participate in the ideas, then
1) each thing would consist of thoughts (noemata) and would think everything,
or
2) that things, even though they are thoughts, don't think.
The problem consists in that Parmenides (being a "materialist") considers
ideas to be "things", with a material existence in space and time. If you
skip considering thoughts to be material "things" (but rather mental events),
then the next argument against Socrates of the idea of an idea, etc, would be
out of place.
I have the impression that Plato intended to show this way the problem of the
"objectivation" of the ideas that leads to an incomprehension of his theory
of ideas. The discussion in the second part of the dialogue would have as one
of its purposes to make clear the distinction between the being of the
concrete (material) and the being the abstract (mental event), as Ed Little
pointed out in his "Structure of Plato's Parmenides".
Since Plato would never refuse an argument by actually trying to explain and
teach the correct way to understand something in a straight discursive
manner, he doesn't answer directly to Parmenides in 132 c-d, but tries to
explain his (Parmenides') confusion dialectically in the discussion in the
second part of the dialogue.

Carmen Zavala
czavala@...
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5132

Re: Parmenides, 132b-d. These are surely difficulties that
Parmenides  (i.e. Plato) sees in Forms. He raises them and leaves
them unresolved, including the suggestion that Forms are thoughts
(indeed the whole dialogue raises difficulties that in the end
are left hanging). Shortly thereafter (135a) he repeats his
perplexity in a general way. Let me use Cornford's translation.

      And yet, Socrates, Parmenides went on, these difficulties
      and many more besides are inevitably involved in the forms,
      if these characters of things really exist and one is going
      to distinguish each form as a thing just by itself. The
      result is that the hearer is perplexed and inclined either
      to question their existence, or to contend that, if they do
      exist, they must certainly be unknowable by our human
      nature. Moreover there seems to be some weight in these
      objections, and, as we were saying, it is extraordinarily
      difficult to convert the objector . . .

      Tauta mentoi, hO SOkratEs, ephE hO ParmenidEs, kai eti alla
      pros toutois panu polla anagkaion echein ta eidei, ei eisin
      hautai hai ideai tOn ontOn kai horieitai tis auto ti
      hekaston eidos. hOste aporein te ton akouonta kai
      amphisbEtein hOs oute esti tauta, ei te hoti malista eiE,
      polla auta einai tEi anthrOpinEi phusei agnOsta, kai tauta
      legonta dokein te ti legein kai, ho arti elegomen,
      thaumastOs hOs dusanapeisantin einai. kai andros panu men
      euphuous tou dunEsomenou mathein hOs esti genos ti hekastou
      kai ousia autE kath' hautEn, eti de thaumastoterou tou
      heurEsontos kai allon dunEsomenou didaxai tauta panta
      hikanOs dieukrinEsamenon.

But then he admits the need for Forms (135b-c).

      But on the other hand, Parmenides continued, if, in view of
      all these difficulties and others like them, a man refuses
      to admit that forms of things exist or to distinguish a
      definite form in every case, he will have nothing on which
      to  fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each
      thing has a character which is always the same, and he will
      completely destroy the significance of all discourse . . .

      Alla mentoi, eipen ho ParmenidEs, ei ge tis dE, hO SOkratEs
      au mE easei eidE tOn ontOn einai, eis panta ta nundE kai
      alla toiauta apoblepsas, mEde ti horietai eidos henos
      hekastou, oude hopoi trepsei tEn dianoian hexei, mE eOn
      idean tOn ontOn hekastou tEn autEn aei einai, kai houtOs tEn
      tou dialegesthai dunamin pantapasi diaphtherei . . .

However, if you continue to insist that Plato was not an
"idealist," far be it from me to object. It merely illustrates my
contention that there are two ways of looking at all such things.

- EFL, 12/27/98

In a message dated 12/26/98 4:37:37 PM, elittle@... writes:

(In reply to my question, which was why call Plato an "Idealist," elittle
states:)

>With respect to Plato, I used the
>term to denominate Plato's investigation of ideai, eidE.

Plato excludes the possibility of Forms existing as  mental realities in
Parmenides 132 b-d. The arguments  therein refute philosophical and
psychological idealism. Should the term, then, still be used?

tekton@...

Aristotle could have said it for us: the name , "idealism,"
means many things ("pollachOs legetai"). Likewise "realism," as
was pointed out here a few weeks ago. For each of these terms one
could write a little dictionary, after the manner of Aristotle in
Delta, Metaphysics. May I leave you to do it? Often the context
makes the chosen meaning clear. With respect to Plato, I used the
term to denominate Plato's investigation of ideai, eidE. In the
context of modern metaphysics I used it to denominate the
Cartesian-Kantian tradition. Tekton, 24 Dec 1998 21:04:07, comes
across as a realist (modern sense). "Triangles are not mental,
neither are forms. Space, too, is a thing. What sense, then does
it make to say of Plato that he is an idealist?" But this is
precisely the metaphysical dichotomy. 

In a message dated 12/24/98 6:18:21 PM, elittle@... writes:

> helped to
>illuminate my understanding of Plato's Idealism,

Triangles are not mental, and neither are forms. Space, too, is a thing. What
sense, then, does it make to say of Plato that he is an idealist?

tekton@...

Where did Plato go?

Modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes, and continuing with
Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Schopenhauer, not to mention others,
has found its most acute problem the relation of what goes on in
our heads to what goes on outside. The answers to this problem have
sometimes become polarized in two opposite views called idealism
and realism. The extreme idealist holds only the reality of what is
in our minds. The extreme realist holds only the reality of what is
outside. Because we are argumentative and antagonistic creatures,
these exaggerated positions often come to characterize the two
views, and to be held exclusively in denial of each other. William
James, for example, does not speak kindly of Kant; Schopenhauer, it
seems, of most anyone. Philosophers sometimes are not given to
compromise.

Ancient philosophy also wrestled with this problem. Not quite in
the same terms as we use today, but Plato's doctrine of Ideas was
subject to similar opposite interpretations of extreme and
realistic character. The rivalry between the Academy (post-Plato)
and Aristotle may exhibit this, but in any case we have been left
with heavenly and earthly kinds of Forms in the Phaedo and in
Aristotle respectively. Not to mention other possible kinds between
these extremes.

To look at these two widely separated endeavors together, side by
side, as I have ventured to do here, may shed light upon both in
turn. We originally gathered here to read Plato's Parmenides
together, and we did. We remained to discuss all sorts of residual
and detailed questions. Good. One reader brought up the name of
Schopenhauer, to throw light upon her particular understanding of
Plato. Never mind that she went a bit overboard in her enthusiasm.
We all are prone to do that from time to time. The reference opened
a new horizon, and supplied me with an analogy that helped to
illuminate my understanding of Plato's Idealism, of its reception,
and of the positions of Parmenides, Aristotle et al., as well as my
understanding of modern philosophical discussion.

This is where Plato and Parmenides are: they are very much with us.
More so, I hope, if we can see these connections, and see how alive
the issues of ancient metaphysics still are.

My own position on this metaphysical dichotomy is to embrace a
dualism: rather than choose body or mind, I embrace both, two
separate and related parts of human nature. Mankind is twofold, not
just sexually but existentially and logically. It is why I prefer
the Parmenidean logic to the Aristotelian (Gamma Metaph.) for any
discussion of matters in any way anthropological.

EFL. 12/24/98





Thanks, Emile. Plato is still very much with us. I thought my last msg
might explain the connection as I saw it. If not, I will probably come
back to it in due course. Meanwhile, a Merry Christmas and a Happy New
Year to all. - Ed

Dear Ed

Just a small question. In this dualistic world you are building of rads vs
mods: where oh where did Plato go?

Emile

Rad or Mod Idealism (cont.)

We have been talking here about radical and moderate idealism as
pertinent to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer and others, Kant
of course and Berkeley et al. The issue is not without relevance to
our discussions of Plato and his dialogues, including the
Parmenides.

In ancient times moderate and radical idealism showed themselves in
a somewhat different manner than in modern.

For us moderns a paramount issue has been the status of what we
call the objective world, the world "out there," outside our skins,
beyond our nerve ends. Does it exist? What is it? (1) Radical
idealism questions its very existence. (2) Moderate idealism
questions its nature only, not the fact that it is there. This has
been the issue since the time of Descartes. It is a modern issue.

The ancients had not gotten so far yet. The first of the ancient
philosophers of the Greek world to separate a world of Idea from
the world of palpable things were perhaps Parmenides with his One
Being (I say assuredly he did, but others of you may not be
prepared to go that far yet), and surely Plato with his Ideas.
Plato uses the words, Idea and Form, and explicitly contrasts such
Ideas with their copies, imitations, participants, what we call
things. There is the idea of a chair, and an actual chair; the idea
of beauty, and an actual beautiful thing.

Here is where a choice of two ways of understanding Plato arises.

(1) Some view Plato's doctrine as a Theory of Forms, in the sense
of a firm proposal of the dual nature of things. They even continue
and flesh out this proposal further with evidence from Plato's
dialogues, especially the Phaedo, explaining where the Ideas come
from. We remember them somehow from a prior existence in another
world (ekei), that is until our immersion in this world down here
(entautha) brings about forgetfulness of them.

(2) There is just as good evidence from Plato's dialogues that he
was not so sure about this as appears above, that he was not making
a firm (much less a dogmatic) proposal, but that he was asking
questions, and stating a hypothesis he was not at all certain
about. The most striking evidence is the Parmenides, especially in
that passage (135) near the end of the preliminary conversation in
which Parmenides says to Socrates

      And yet, Socrates, these difficulties and many more besides
      are inevitably involved in the forms, if these characters of
      things really exist . . .

      But on the other hand, if, in view of all these difficulties
      and others like them, a man refuses to admit that forms of
      things exist or to distinguish a definite form in every case,
      he will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as
      he will not allow that each thing has a character which is
      always the same, and in so doing he will completely destroy
      the significance of all discourse. . . .

In this dramatic way, Plato is hedging his bet, and leaving us with
a dilemma rather than settling the question. The main part of the
dialogue, which follows, does implicitly the same thing: it gives
us a series of dilemmas, all based upon ambiguities (ambivalences)
which are themselves based upon the underlying ambiguity of Idea
and thing (copy), which was brought up in the first place.

So here is where the radicals and the moderates parted company in
ancient times. (1) The radicals accepted Plato's Ideas as a theory,
presented by Plato in a dogmatic spirit. Recollection a la Phaedo
was a part of it for the far out radicals. There it is: Ipse dixit.
(2) Moderates accepted it all as a great question, a hypothesis at
best, indeed a whole bunch of hypotheses as in the Parmenides. They
repudiated heavenly Ideas as a sure thing.

There seem to have been more rads than mods. For one thing it is
the easier position. It is definite. It is clear cut. It has an air
of certainty. The position of the mods was more subtle. It left us
with questions rather that with certainties. It is much more
uncomfortable.

Aristotle was a mod. It was the rads (doubtless in the Academy
after Plato's death) that he objected to. Shall I repeat his famous
men-and-horses passage? I don't think I need to. As a moderate,
Aristotle didn't throw out Plato's suggestion. He modified it. His
hylomorphism, matter and form, are a re-presentation of Plato's
suggestions in a more worldly, more acceptable form. So he was not
the antagonist of Plato, but rather his fulfiller. He corrected the
radical interpretation.

But there was argument about all this among those who followed. The
rads seemed to get the best of it. Yet the possibility of moderate
Platonism and moderate idealism has always survived.

Moderns divide likewise into radical and modulated Idealism, except
instead of debating the issue of the relation of Platonic Ideas to
the world of things, they debate the relation of our ideas (mental
activity) to the outside world. The similarity of the debates
should be clear, and stimulating.

EFL, 12/18/98