Darwiniana-The Evolution Blog
http://darwiniana.com
The bottom line on the Darwin Debate

Announcing third edition of


World History And The Eonic Effect
Civilization, Darwinism,
  And Theories Of Evolution
Third Edition
http://eonic-effect.net


At a time when theories of evolution are under renewed controversy,
discussion is hampered by the remoteness of the phenomenon of
evolution, and the use of indirect inference to speculate about deep
time. Adherents of Darwinism often defend dogmatic versions of the
theory that have been questioned since the first reviewers of Origin
of Species.


Now Darwinism is under siege from the Intelligent Design movement,
threatening the school system. The attempt to hijack the debate using
long discredited arguments by design tends to make Darwinists close
ranks around their flawed science. The debate is deadlocked by the
rigidity of both parties, evidence of fixed agendas, and metaphysical
presumptions. A new approach is needed. The study of history itself
holds the clue if we can find it.

We live in the first generations with enough historical data to
detect a pattern of Universal History. The discovery of this pattern,
the Eonic Effect, uncovers the evidence for a deep structure
resembling punctuated equilibrium in world history itself. The study
of history and evolution together shows us something we had missed
and allows us to infer the existence of non-random evolution in the
emergence of man. Darwinian theory suffers from low evidence density.
The Eonic Effect is the only data we have at high evidence density of
evolution as a process in real time, and this transforms our views
completely.
   We see the real evolution of man as the Great Transition, the human
passage from evolution to history, in the chronicle of the once and
future Origin of the Species, Man.



From the Preface Announcing the third revised edition of World
History And The Eonic Effect, the classic underground theoretical
self-defense kit in relation to the Darwinian paradigm. The third
edition is almost a new book and the basic text has been extensively
rewritten and streamlined, even as the basic argument has remained
the same. There is much new material and it has been reorganized to
show a more integrated structure, with a few changes in the
terminology of the eonic model. The basic model has remained stable
over three editions, and that leaves the author with increased
confidence in the method and demonstration. An exciting upgrade of
the basics of the eonic effect, and its new model of history...
http://history-and-evolution.com
World History And The Eonic Effect contains a radical demonstration
of a non-random pattern in world history. This pattern we call
the 'eonic effect'. Such a pattern is not supposed to exist, and yet
we can clearly specify its outlines and action over the course of
five thousand years, with a definite suspicion about earlier periods
of man's emergence. This discovery of macro-historical structure has
implications for our views of the meaning of evolution and is a
consequence of the revolutionary discoveries of archaeology and the
vast increase of our knowledge of both world history and the earlier
emergence of man. For the first time we can survey a long enough
interval of history to put the idea of 'universal history' to a test,
and the result is the uncovering of a definite dynamic at work behind
the emergence of civilization. The data asks us to reconsider the
relationship of evolution and history and demands a new kind of
simple model to analyze world history in terms of the different
levels at play. This two-level model elegantly resolves the paradox
of the transition from evolution to history in terms of the idea of
an 'evolution of freedom'. The resulting model gives expression to
the idea of 'macroevolution', and also most unexpectedly gives
meaning to the long conjectured idea of punctuated equilibrium. The
text is comprehensive and outlines everything needed to 'see' the
eonic effect and to harmonize this with issues of historical
interpretation, historical theory, and questions of ideology. The
result can show us the limits of standard types of theory and show
the way to a new kind of theory.
_______________________________
John Landon
nemonemini@...
jcl99@...
Author of
World History
And The Eonic Effect
Civilization, Darwinism
And Theories of Evolution
Third Edition Now Available
On The Web:

http://history-and-evolution.com     http://eonic-effect.net
http://darwiniana.com

A slow reading of Plato's Timaeus is just now getting
started on my plato-timaeus list. If you would like to join
it, you may subscribe by sending email to
plato-timaeus-subscribe@yahoogroups.com, or, if you have a
Yahoo identity, you may go to
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/plato-timaeus/ and subscribe
from there.

Lance Fletcher
List owner

i think SHESTOV is great, but ive only ever been able to find PENULTIMATE
WORDS.



----- Original Message -----
From: "Monica" <instantgrat817@...>
To: <philosophy-history@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 10:08 AM
Subject: [philosophy-history] New --Intro


> Hello
> Thrilled to find this site.  Years ago I studied with Prof Otto
> Pflanze -- a Bismark scholar with a specialty in later years on the
> Philosophy of History.  Best course I ever took.  Influenced all my
> later work on Russian Intellectual History (the path & influence of
> Berdiaev, Shestov Frank from the Russian Orthodox -- a truly
> indigenouu movemnt).
> The syllabi of his course are long buried away but the learning I
> now realize, can be resurrected with your help!!  This particular
> prof I had di have some criticism of Copleston's views -- but not
> many.  I remember Vico a big part of his course -- the
> anhropological angle of it all -- which incidentally is an actual
> concentration at Emory U. in Atlanta.  After this course, I could
> not view history quite the same again.
>
> I now teach History (Civics 7th Grade which I despise) & am
> attempting to teach elsewhere to get into the meat of real History --
>  open eyes to the variety of history out there -- and especially,
> the USE of the historical enterprise valid for today's world --
> perspective.
>
> I realize this a serious site, I anticipate learning a lot.  I am
> new.  This may not belong here -- but have any of you seen or heard
> about the new HBO show Assume the Position?   I am disturbed.  Yes
> it is "accurate" in the reductionist, entertainment history --
> sense, but it does trivialize history to take one discipline --
> History of Popular Culture (NYU influenced the program originators) -
> - and then, to smear it all over the many facets of history just to
> make the learning palatable.  Of course as a Public school History
> teacher I am intrigued, however, since the Social Studies are being
> almost made obsolete (SERIOUSLY they are being phased out; we are
> being trained now as "content reading" value only).
>
> Yes, it is not specific to Philosophy of History, not heady or
> seeking distinct analysis and confirmation of subject matter.....
> welcome to my world.  I need yours to gain depth to mine.   I
> qualify.  I have published works in Russia & academic credentials.
> Someone, comment, especially if you happen upon this audacious
> program.
>
> Thank you, and Greetings
>
> Monica Lombardi
> instantgrat817
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow Reading:  http://freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by
> e-mail, mailto:philosophy-history-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> No virus found in this incoming message.
> Checked by AVG Free Edition.
> Version: 7.1.371 / Virus Database: 268.4.0/305 - Release Date: 4/8/06
>
>

Hello
Thrilled to find this site.  Years ago I studied with Prof Otto
Pflanze -- a Bismark scholar with a specialty in later years on the
Philosophy of History.  Best course I ever took.  Influenced all my
later work on Russian Intellectual History (the path & influence of
Berdiaev, Shestov Frank from the Russian Orthodox -- a truly
indigenouu movemnt).
The syllabi of his course are long buried away but the learning I
now realize, can be resurrected with your help!!  This particular
prof I had di have some criticism of Copleston's views -- but not
many.  I remember Vico a big part of his course -- the
anhropological angle of it all -- which incidentally is an actual
concentration at Emory U. in Atlanta.  After this course, I could
not view history quite the same again.

I now teach History (Civics 7th Grade which I despise) & am
attempting to teach elsewhere to get into the meat of real History --
  open eyes to the variety of history out there -- and especially,
the USE of the historical enterprise valid for today's world --
perspective.

I realize this a serious site, I anticipate learning a lot.  I am
new.  This may not belong here -- but have any of you seen or heard
about the new HBO show Assume the Position?   I am disturbed.  Yes
it is "accurate" in the reductionist, entertainment history --
sense, but it does trivialize history to take one discipline --
History of Popular Culture (NYU influenced the program originators) -
- and then, to smear it all over the many facets of history just to
make the learning palatable.  Of course as a Public school History
teacher I am intrigued, however, since the Social Studies are being
almost made obsolete (SERIOUSLY they are being phased out; we are
being trained now as "content reading" value only).

Yes, it is not specific to Philosophy of History, not heady or
seeking distinct analysis and confirmation of subject matter.....
welcome to my world.  I need yours to gain depth to mine.   I
qualify.  I have published works in Russia & academic credentials.
Someone, comment, especially if you happen upon this audacious
program.

Thank you, and Greetings

Monica Lombardi
instantgrat817

Thanks Richard -- I'll look for  copy of the book. I was just kidding
about the haiku and cartoon but I guess I was asking for a summary of the
major ideas of the book but I'll get the book and see for myself.

Marx, Darwin, Wagner Haiku

Das Capital, descent of man, superman,
Where is spirit, mind, soul, God?

Brent

>
> In a message dated 2/15/2006 12:04:18 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
> brent@... writes:
>
> Would  you might presenting a summary of Barzun's book about Marx, Darwin,
> Wagner  in the form of a haiku or perhaps a cartoon that wouldn't  incite
> riots?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Brent
>
>
> I suggest that you simply read the book. I purchased it many years ago but
> have not read it lately. As for a haiku or cartoon to capture the book's
> essence, that is well beyond my skill.
>
> Richard
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow Reading:  http://freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by
> e-mail, mailto:philosophy-history-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

In a message dated 2/15/2006 12:04:18 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
brent@... writes:

Would  you might presenting a summary of Barzun's book about Marx, Darwin,
Wagner  in the form of a haiku or perhaps a cartoon that wouldn't  incite
riots?

Thanks,

Brent


I suggest that you simply read the book. I purchased it many years ago but
have not read it lately. As for a haiku or cartoon to capture the book's
essence, that is well beyond my skill.

Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

In a message dated 2/15/2006 1:04:02 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
nemonemini@... writes:

The  attempt to hijack the debate  using long discredited
arguments by  design tends to make Darwinists close ranks  around their
flawed
science.


I am interested as to why you believe the science is "flawed," and what, if
any, counter theories you support.

Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

In a message dated 2/15/2006 1:21:25 PM Central Standard Time,
Saicho@... writes:

Yes, and  in addition, Barzun's From Dawn to Decadence,  there is a succinct
piece on Butler and several sections dealing with Darwin.  Barzun is  one my
heroes....




I will check out the reference

John Landon
nemonemini@...
jcl99@...

Site for
World History
And The  Eonic Effect
Second Edition_  http://history-and-evolution.com_
(http://history-and-evolution.com/)
Darwiniana: An Evolution Blog_  http://darwiniana.com_
(http://darwiniana.com/)

_______________

At a time when theories  of evolution are under renewed controversy,
discussion is hampered by the  remoteness of the phenomenon of evolution, and
the use
of indirect inference to  speculate about deep time. Adherents of Darwinism
often defend dogmatic versions  of the theory that have been questioned since
the first reviewers of Origin  of Species.


Now Darwinism is under siege from the Intelligent  Design movement,
threatening the school system. The attempt to hijack the debate  using long
discredited
arguments by design tends to make Darwinists close ranks  around their flawed
science. The debate is deadlocked by the rigidity of both  parties, evidence
of fixed agendas, and metaphysical presumptions. A new  approach is needed.
The study of history itself holds the clue if we can find  it.

We live in the first generations with enough historical data to  detect a
pattern of Universal History. The discovery of this pattern, the Eonic  Effect,
uncovers the evidence for a deep structure resembling punctuated  equilibrium
in world history itself. The study of history and evolution together  shows us
something we had missed and allows us to infer the existence of  non-random
evolution in the emergence of man. Darwinian theory suffers from low  evidence
density. The Eonic Effect is the only data we have at high evidence  density of
evolution as a process in real time, and this transforms our views
completely.

We see the real evolution of man as the Great Transition, the  human passage
from evolution to history, in the chronicle of the once and future  Origin of
the Species, Man.



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Richard --

Would you might presenting a summary of Barzun's book about Marx, Darwin,
Wagner in the form of a haiku or perhaps a cartoon that wouldn't incite
riots?

Thanks,

Brent

>
> In a message dated 2/14/2006 6:22:58 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
> nemonemini@... writes:
>
> One of  the finest critiques of Darwin is Jacques Barzun’s Darwin, Marx,
> Wagner (Doubleday, 1942 [sic!]). His work has a clarity that has been
> lost
> in the
> intimidated world of academia now, and shows how  thinking normally about
> evolution was still possible before the  onset of the ‘Synthesis’,
> whose
> gestation is, and remains, highly  suspicious
>
>
> Yes, and in addition, Barzun's From Dawn to Decadence,  there is a
> succinct
> piece on Butler and several sections dealing with Darwin.  Barzun is one
> my
> heroes....
>
> Richard
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow Reading:  http://freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by
> e-mail, mailto:philosophy-history-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

In a message dated 2/14/2006 6:22:58 P.M. Pacific Standard Time,
nemonemini@... writes:

One of  the finest critiques of Darwin is Jacques Barzun’s Darwin, Marx,
Wagner (Doubleday, 1942 [sic!]). His work has a clarity that has been  lost
in the
intimidated world of academia now, and shows how  thinking normally about
evolution was still possible before the  onset of the ‘Synthesis’, whose
gestation is, and remains, highly  suspicious


Yes, and in addition, Barzun's From Dawn to Decadence,  there is a succinct
piece on Butler and several sections dealing with Darwin.  Barzun is one my
heroes....

Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

One of the finest critiques of Darwin is Jacques Barzun’s Darwin, Marx,
Wagner (Doubleday, 1942 [sic!]). His work has a clarity that has been lost  in
the
intimidated world of academia now, and shows how thinking normally about
evolution was still possible before the onset of the ‘Synthesis’, whose
gestation is, and remains, highly suspicious. How did it happen that simple
expression of opinion has been lost to humanists in the university system? 
Barzun’s
work shows that a committed non-specialist can in some ways be a  superior
judge of the work of scientists who are too partisan to see clearly.
Here is a passage about Samuel Butler, another ‘induced amnesia’ case. With
the publication of Plausibility of Life with its almost exact  restatement of
Butler’s chief objection to Darwin it would be appropriate to  consider
Butler vindicated, and this made public. A nice hope!
Samuel Butler, the most brilliant and by far the most interesting of  Darwin’
s opponents. . . whose works are at length emerging from  oblivion.
BATESON, 1909
England meanwhile had produced one man of genius  whose opposition to
Darwinism began shortly after the appearance of the Origin  of Species and
continued
unabated on all planes of thought-biological, social,  metaphysical, and
religious-until his death in 1902. This was Samuel Butler,  the grandson of
Darwin’
s old headmaster at Shrews- bury. When the Origin of  Species appeared, Butler
was on his way to New Zealand to earn a competence  raising sheep. He read
the book there in the solitude of his ranch and at once  became a convert to the
idea of evolution. The hypothesis even spurred him to  write for a local
journal a sketch called Darwin Among the Machines, the  leading idea of
which-that
of machinery evolving by itself and ultimately  conquering man-has since
acquired the taste of an unpleasant truth. This idea  of course also contained
the
germ of the satire Erewhon, which Butler  published after he returned to
England, in 1872.
Further reflection and  several rereadings of the Origin of Species made
Butler dissatisfied with the  Darwinian theory of Natural Selection. Perhaps his
own fancy about the  machines gave him the clue to the weakness of
Darwinism-what he ultimately  came to call “the Deadlock in Darwinism.” The
deadlock was
simply that  machines, having no purposes of their own, could not evolve; and
since,  animals and plants were treated by Darwin as if they were machines,
Darwinian  evolution was impossible. Natural
Selection might conceivably aid us to  understand which forms survived, but
it could never tell us how these  forms
had come to be. Natural Selection was an undoubted fact; it could  never be a
theory or a cause. As Butler put it, “To me it seems that the  ‘Origin of
Variations,’ whatever it is, is the only true ‘Origin of Species.’  ”
In examining Darwin’s text, Butler found that small ran- dom variations  were
taken for granted or occasionally ascribed to a metaphysical agent called
Variation, so as to provide Natural Selection with something to work on. But
Butler also found Darwin relying now and again upon use and disuse, and he
traced the origin of this hypothesis to Lamarck, whose name and work Darwin
openly discredited. This led Butler to Buffon, Goethe, and Erasmus Darwin, 
making
him the first careful historian of the evolutionary movement. After  comparing
Darwin’s theory in all its vacillating forms with the theories of  the
earlier trio, Butler came to the conclusion that the grandfather, and not  the
grandson, had met most nearly the difficulties involved in any  evolutionary
hypothesis. The grandson had of course marshaled many more facts  indicative of
evolution than the grandfather; he had, as Butler proclaimed,  taught people
about
evolution; but he had not made out a convincing case for  the way in which
species changed. He had at most emphasized in Natural  Selection a fact
previously noted by zoologists that “those who can survive do  survive.” The
secret
of the Origin of Species still lay hidden in the Origin  of Variation.


John Landon
nemonemini@...
jcl99@...

Site for
World History
And The  Eonic Effect
Second Edition_  http://history-and-evolution.com_
(http://history-and-evolution.com/)
Darwiniana: An Evolution Blog_  http://darwiniana.com_
(http://darwiniana.com/)

_______________

At a time when theories  of evolution are under renewed controversy,
discussion is hampered by the  remoteness of the phenomenon of evolution, and
the use
of indirect inference to  speculate about deep time. Adherents of Darwinism
often defend dogmatic versions  of the theory that have been questioned since
the first reviewers of Origin  of Species.


Now Darwinism is under siege from the Intelligent  Design movement,
threatening the school system. The attempt to hijack the debate  using long
discredited
arguments by design tends to make Darwinists close ranks  around their flawed
science. The debate is deadlocked by the rigidity of both  parties, evidence
of fixed agendas, and metaphysical presumptions. A new  approach is needed.
The study of history itself holds the clue if we can find  it.

We live in the first generations with enough historical data to  detect a
pattern of Universal History. The discovery of this pattern, the Eonic  Effect,
uncovers the evidence for a deep structure resembling punctuated  equilibrium
in world history itself. The study of history and evolution together  shows us
something we had missed and allows us to infer the existence of  non-random
evolution in the emergence of man. Darwinian theory suffers from low  evidence
density. The Eonic Effect is the only data we have at high evidence  density of
evolution as a process in real time, and this transforms our views
completely.

We see the real evolution of man as the Great Transition, the  human passage
from evolution to history, in the chronicle of the once and future  Origin of
the Species, Man.


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Richard,

Maybe  I need to nuance this differently. By "why" I mean reflexive
or theoretical.  If philosophy were merely descriptive it would
ultimately be no different  from any other empirical discipline. I
know that in the past century  American and British practitioners
have tended to go in that direction,  claiming that philosophy is
simply clarification of things we already know.  Wittgenstein is a
good example of a great thinker who saw himself rescuing  language
from metaphysics, but even his position is theoretical, i.e., it
goes from observed communication and attempts to give a contextual
theory of language.
Richard:
While I agree that  philosophy, to be worth its name, must try hard to be
more than descriptive, for  the most part I do not see that philosophy does very
much in the way of I  elucidating things beyond adroit descriptions and
explanations – i.e.if in the  hands of very smart thinkers.  I  still maintain
that “
whys” are beyond the reach of rational thought, whereas  “hows” are not. 
I
agree with you  about Wittgenstein trying to rescue language from metaphysics,
but in fact, he  failed.  We remain the grips of  Platonism and metaphysics
in most walks of life.  He was in fact, bent on showing that  there are no “
philosophical problems,” but only language problems.
In the face of the two  most 20th century seminal events in science and math
[quantum physics and  Gödel’s proof] philosophy has been peculiarly quiet
except for some.  And these days, philosophy can only  follow science and delve
into how science plays into how we think about the  world and ourselves.  A rare
  exception is Gerald Edelman who is a scientist and a philosopher – a fresh
and  welcomed combination these days.


And if I might  add a little of my own "philosophy" to this
discussion, I think human  existence is far more than merely
descriptive. I'm not inclined to believe  that centuries of great
literature and art were exercises in mere fantasy. I  suppose from a
scientific perspective the whole body of human culture could  be
reduced to such. But if I may borrow a Carl Sagan (or Moore-esque)
kind of question, "Which is easier to believe?"

Richard:
Are we talking about  philosophy or about human existence?  Of course human
existence is more than merely descriptive – in fact it is  profoundly much
more!  Philosophy is  on the far periphery of human existence and
accomplishments
in the arts and  sciences.  If we are talking about  most endeavors by us
humans, I must say that human expressiveness is the sine  qua non of our
existence
– and that expressiveness comes in many colors – some  scientific, and some
artistic.  I,  for one, consider science to be an art form.  Truth seekers,
whatever one thinks of  the meaning of *truth,* come in all shapes and sizes,
and that is a good  thing.
Regards,
Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

--- In philosophy-history@yahoogroups.com, Saicho@a... wrote:
>
>
> In a message dated 12/20/2005 8:50:13 A.M. Pacific Standard Time,
> scuiry@y... writes:
>
> Richard,
>
> It's not (or I'm not, nor are philosophers) taking  common sense
out
> of philosophy. It's the reduction of philosophy to mere  common
sense
> that is derided. Philosophy is not merely descriptive; it
asks "Why?"
>
> Daniel
>
>
>
>
>
> Daniel,
> I do not believe that philosophy asks *why?* but IMO a better
single word
> description would be *how.* There are no *whys* in the philosophy
of the mind,
> or language or science, but there are concerns and questions about
how the
> mind  works in conjunction with how the cosmos and the world
works. For me, *why*
> is a  metaphysical question the proceeds to endless regression. As
for
> reducing  philosophy to ONLY common sense, my feeling is that at
the base of all
> pursuits,  scientific or philosophic, there is a set of axiomatic
[for lack of a
> better  term] or basic concepts that form the substrate of our
mental process.
>   They are not Kant's synthetic a prioris, but close, and I could
go on and
> on  about this, but I will stop here and await your response if
you choose to
> make  one.
>
> Regards,
> Richard.
>

Richard,

Maybe I need to nuance this differently. By "why" I mean reflexive
or theoretical. If philosophy were merely descriptive it would
ultimately be no different from any other empirical discipline. I
know that in the past century American and British practitioners
have tended to go in that direction, claiming that philosophy is
simply clarification of things we already know. Wittgenstein is a
good example of a great thinker who saw himself rescuing language
from metaphysics, but even his position is theoretical, i.e., it
goes from observed communication and attempts to give a contextual
theory of language.

And if I might add a little of my own "philosophy" to this
discussion, I think human existence is far more than merely
descriptive. I'm not inclined to believe that centuries of great
literature and art were exercises in mere fantasy. I suppose from a
scientific perspective the whole body of human culture could be
reduced to such. But if I may borrow a Carl Sagan (or Moore-esque)
kind of question, "Which is easier to believe?"

Daniel

In a message dated 12/20/2005 8:50:13 A.M. Pacific Standard Time,
scuiry@... writes:

Richard,

It's not (or I'm not, nor are philosophers) taking  common sense out
of philosophy. It's the reduction of philosophy to mere  common sense
that is derided. Philosophy is not merely descriptive; it  asks "Why?"

Daniel





Daniel,
I do not believe that philosophy asks *why?* but IMO a better single word
description would be *how.* There are no *whys* in the philosophy of the mind,
or language or science, but there are concerns and questions about how the
mind  works in conjunction with how the cosmos and the world works. For me,
*why*
is a  metaphysical question the proceeds to endless regression. As for
reducing  philosophy to ONLY common sense, my feeling is that at the base of all
pursuits,  scientific or philosophic, there is a set of axiomatic [for lack of a
better  term] or basic concepts that form the substrate of our mental process.
   They are not Kant's synthetic a prioris, but close, and I could go on and
on  about this, but I will stop here and await your response if you choose to
make  one.

Regards,
Richard.


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

--- In philosophy-history@yahoogroups.com, Saicho@a... wrote:
>
>
> In a message dated 12/15/2005 11:25:12 A.M. Pacific Standard
Time,
> scuiry@y... writes:
>
> Determinism: I'm willing to grant the determinist his or her
thesis
> with this proviso. I think freedom in this model makes sense in
the
> way that Spinoza proposed - we are free to the extent we are able
to
> act without external  constraint.
>
> Daniel
>
>
>
>
> I agree with this -- but there are also internal constraints as
well.
>
> Richard
>

Sure, but aren't there degrees of this?

I'm not saying this fully answers all objections. I think it is a
step toward making sense out of freedom given certain
assumptions/understandings about causality.

Daniel

--- In philosophy-history@yahoogroups.com, Saicho@a... wrote:
>
>
> In a message dated 12/16/2005 6:21:58 A.M. Pacific Standard Time,
> ziobro@w... writes:
>
> >  Common sense seems to demand a lot of things. G.E. Moore
thought he
> >  solved the sceptical dilemma by simply holding up his hands - a
kind
> >  of common sense solution that never gained philosophical favor.
I
> > can  understand how scientifically we have to operate under
certain
> >  assumptions. I don't know if that is true philosophically.
Doesn't
> > the  common sense solution of causal connections beg the
> > question, "How do  we know or on what basis do we conclude there
is a
> > necessary,  contingent or any connection between cause and
effect?
>
> Daniel,
>
> I  may be misreadig you here, but your question here pertains not
to
> common  sense, but to questions for understandig on a theoretical
level.
> In the  sphere of common sense one is concerned with getting thigs
done,
> knowing  how to act in various situations, and the like.
Questions  for
> understanding on the level of theory are concered with why
something  is
> what it is, what its place is in relation to other things,  etc.
>
>
>
>
>
> Regarding common sense and  philosophy, I suppose one could say
that common
> sense [CS] deals with why one  should not run a red light, for
example, while
> philosophy deals with knowledge  and/or reality.[i.e. epistemology
and/or
> ontology].  But I find it hard to believe that one  can do
philosophy by
> intentionally putting aside CS.  I wonder why Moore is derided for
his holding up his
> hand to make a CS point?  I believe  the answer is, [professional]
philosophers
> prefer complexity, and while they may  occasionally quote Ockham,
they seldom
> follow his nominalistic dictum.   For me, taking CS out of
philosophy would
> be like removing verbs from our  language.
> Regards,
> Richard
>

Richard,

It's not (or I'm not, nor are philosophers) taking common sense out
of philosophy. It's the reduction of philosophy to mere common sense
that is derided. Philosophy is not merely descriptive; it asks "Why?"

Daniel

In a message dated 12/15/2005 11:25:12 A.M. Pacific Standard Time,
scuiry@... writes:

Determinism: I'm willing to grant the determinist his or her thesis
with this proviso. I think freedom in this model makes sense in the
way that Spinoza proposed - we are free to the extent we are able to
act without external  constraint.

Daniel




I agree with this -- but there are also internal constraints as well.

Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

In a message dated 12/16/2005 6:21:58 A.M. Pacific Standard Time,
ziobro@... writes:

>  Common sense seems to demand a lot of things. G.E. Moore thought he
>  solved the sceptical dilemma by simply holding up his hands - a kind
>  of common sense solution that never gained philosophical favor. I
> can  understand how scientifically we have to operate under certain
>  assumptions. I don't know if that is true philosophically. Doesn't
> the  common sense solution of causal connections beg the
> question, "How do  we know or on what basis do we conclude there is a
> necessary,  contingent or any connection between cause and effect?

Daniel,

I  may be misreadig you here, but your question here pertains not to
common  sense, but to questions for understandig on a theoretical level.
In the  sphere of common sense one is concerned with getting thigs done,
knowing  how to act in various situations, and the like.  Questions  for
understanding on the level of theory are concered with why something  is
what it is, what its place is in relation to other things,  etc.





Regarding common sense and  philosophy, I suppose one could say that common
sense [CS] deals with why one  should not run a red light, for example, while
philosophy deals with knowledge  and/or reality.[i.e. epistemology and/or
ontology].  But I find it hard to believe that one  can do philosophy by
intentionally putting aside CS.  I wonder why Moore is derided for his holding
up his
hand to make a CS point?  I believe  the answer is, [professional] philosophers
prefer complexity, and while they may  occasionally quote Ockham, they seldom
follow his nominalistic dictum.   For me, taking CS out of  philosophy would
be like removing verbs from our  language.
Regards,
Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

At 06:21 AM 12/16/2005, you wrote:

>On Thu, 15 Dec 2005, Daniel Scuiry wrote:
>
> > Common sense seems to demand a lot of things. G.E. Moore thought he
> > solved the sceptical dilemma by simply holding up his hands - a kind
> > of common sense solution that never gained philosophical favor. I
> > can understand how scientifically we have to operate under certain
> > assumptions. I don't know if that is true philosophically. Doesn't
> > the common sense solution of causal connections beg the
> > question, "How do we know or on what basis do we conclude there is a
> > necessary, contingent or any connection between cause and effect?
>
>Daniel,
>
>I may be misreadig you here, but your question here pertains not to
>common sense, but to questions for understandig on a theoretical level.
>In the sphere of common sense one is concerned with getting thigs done,
>knowing how to act in various situations, and the like.  Questions for
>understanding on the level of theory are concered with why something is
>what it is, what its place is in relation to other things, etc.
>
>Regards,
>
>Stan Ziobro

This is precisely my point. Is all philosophy reduced to common sense? I
thought the project of philosophy was reflexive. This is exactly why
Moore's cute hand gestures were laughed at. If philosophy is sheer
pragmatism and common sense, then it is essentially no different from any
quantifiable, empirical discipline. Proper and meaningful thinking is also
reflexive. But if not, if all proper and meaningful thinking is reduced to
the common sense rule, then philosophy is nothing more than a footnote on
aberrant human thought.

Daniel

On Thu, 15 Dec 2005, Daniel Scuiry wrote:

> Common sense seems to demand a lot of things. G.E. Moore thought he
> solved the sceptical dilemma by simply holding up his hands - a kind
> of common sense solution that never gained philosophical favor. I
> can understand how scientifically we have to operate under certain
> assumptions. I don't know if that is true philosophically. Doesn't
> the common sense solution of causal connections beg the
> question, "How do we know or on what basis do we conclude there is a
> necessary, contingent or any connection between cause and effect?

Daniel,

I may be misreadig you here, but your question here pertains not to
common sense, but to questions for understandig on a theoretical level.
In the sphere of common sense one is concerned with getting thigs done,
knowing how to act in various situations, and the like.  Questions for
understanding on the level of theory are concered with why something is
what it is, what its place is in relation to other things, etc.

Regards,

Stan Ziobro

Richard,

Two things I'd like to note:

Common sense seems to demand a lot of things. G.E. Moore thought he
solved the sceptical dilemma by simply holding up his hands - a kind
of common sense solution that never gained philosophical favor. I
can understand how scientifically we have to operate under certain
assumptions. I don't know if that is true philosophically. Doesn't
the common sense solution of causal connections beg the
question, "How do we know or on what basis do we conclude there is a
necessary, contingent or any connection between cause and effect?

Determinism: I'm willing to grant the determinist his or her thesis
with this proviso. I think freedom in this model makes sense in the
way that Spinoza proposed - we are free to the extent we are able to
act without external constraint.

Daniel





--- In philosophy-history@yahoogroups.com, Saicho@a... wrote:
>
>
> Daniel
> Thank you for these  thoughtful insights. In defense of Hume, I do
not think
> he was denying  causality. He was denying the rationalist attempt
to
> assimilate causal  connection to logical connection. Logical
entailments are
> "necessary".  Causal connections cannot be empirically
established. We can
> certainly  gather statistics and determine probabilities based on
observed
> phenomena  even on an empiricist model. But there is no way to
garner
> logical or  metaphysical connections between phenomena,
> Richard:
> I believe that this is  turning into [or always has been] an
epistemological
> discussion, which is fine  with me.  It revolves around how we
define such
> concepts as truth, and meaning, etc.  When you say that  * Causal
connections
> cannot be  empirically established* this begs the question as to
what
> *empirical* means,  and I happen to believe that causal
connections can be established
> ONLY through  empirical observation. Our language [something that
Wittgenstein
> claims we are  enslaved by] can be used to either render things
simple or
> complex,  understandable or confusing.  If one  wishes to believe
that everything
> that occurs has a probability attached to it,  that is OK as long
as one
> understands that probability is an invented concept  that has no
more dominion over
> what is and what might be some other concept we  may invent.
Normally
> probability  attaches to an event when there is empirical evidence
that it may NOT
> occur.  If this has never been  observed over a long period of
time, common
> sense suggests that until such an  observation is made, no
probability can be
> attached.
> As for gathering  statistics to determine probabilities, yes, we
can do that �"
>  and we do it by  impressing a formulaic construction of our
making on what
> we experience.  Such a construction is no path to truth  [whatever
that is] but
> rather a path to a, perhaps, justifiable conjecture we  often mold
into a
> law.  I, for one,  do not believe in such laws as anything more
than
> conjectures.
> Daniel:
> Lacking any necessary entailment between  one event and any other
we are left
> with
> probabilities. I, for one, would  bet my life on most of them. We
couldn't
> build bridges, buildings or  anything safely if we had no reliable
laws from
> engineering and physics with  which to work. So, if you want to be
a
> pragmatist and say that  macro-determinism is like everything else
in
> science on which we've come to  rely, then sure, I'll buy that.
But then we
> are back to the same old  criticism, that if determinism is true,
it is
> trivially true, for it is so  all-encompassing in its scope as to
have no
> practical  meaning.
> Richard:
> I agree with you.  It has no practical meaning, except to  engage
one in
> speculations about *free will.*  J  And yes, I am a  pragmatist.
> Regards,
> Richard
>

Richard –  previously:
Ø       What is your opinion  as to what *the truth about humanity* means?
Is  this a
>  different kind of *truth* from scientific *truth?* Also, why *dangerously

> so?*

Whit:
Kinds  of truth? Curious concept. Are there reasons I should consider
subscribing to  it? I'm tempted to say "Truth is truth, although there are
different kinds of  verification." I take it as a plain truth that we have
significant free will.  However, those who seek their verification only in
scientifically "reputable"  theory and experiment, and who demand of
hypotheses beyond current experiment  that they be on their face coherent
with the better-verified facts regarding,  e.g., causal systems would deny my
modes of verification regarding free will  are reputable.
Ø
Ø     Richard”
Ø     You say that *kinds of  truth* is a curious concept, but you mentioned
*the truth about humanity* as  something particular, and it seemed to me that
it was a very broad and all  encompassing kind of truth – or was it something
more precise than that?  I am merely asking what exactly you mean  by the
expression since, as it stands, it could have many  interpretations.
Ø     As for *truth is  truth,* since I do now know you, and your way of
conversing, I do not know if  this was a jest.  Tautologies do not  inform.  If
you take it as a *plain  truth* that we have significant free will, is not
*plain truth* a circumscribed  kind of truth – i.e. as opposed to *embellished
truth,* or *tortured  truth,* or just *truth?*  I am not  sanguine about truth
being so obvious and demonstrable.  There are scientific truths,  mathematical
truths, psychological [personal] truths, historical truths, and so  on.  While
these may all appear to  share the *=* sign, they are surely not all cut from
the same epistemological  cloth, at least in my opinion.  The  millions of
words devoted to exploring and arguing over what *truth* means  attests to the
fact that *truth* is a problematic concept we have invented.  The dimensions of
the issue of  *truth* include at least: epistemological, ethical, semantical
and logical. [See  Tarski, Schlick, Dummet, Putnam, Popper, and many others]

Ø
Whit:
Ø     As for the danger,  having some portion of our scientifically literate,
and
thus presumably more  intelligent and capable population convinced that free
will is but a common  illusion (perhaps, some of them allow, performing some
socially useful  function as such, however incoherent a suggestion that may
be), will assure  that they are not working on the issues of how to best
enable and tune  freedom. You can hardly expect someone devoted to science to
work on enabling  what they see as an illusion.
Ø
Ø     Richard:
Ø     I admit to being  somewhat lost in the above.  I do  not consider the
*scientifically literate* to be necessarily *more intelligent,*  but often
simply more educated.  As  to that group, if it is indeed a cohesive
intellectual
force [which I doubt] not  working towards on the issues related to enabling
and tuning freedom – is that  their mission?  What has science, in  its
various
disciplines, to do with the matter of freedom and even free  will?   There
are some who are  devoted to understanding how the brain works, but I seriously
doubt that they  have any agenda that aims to thwart or support a
philosophical position;  real scientists are after the answers to questions as
to how
things work  the way they do.  They usually have  little time for the niceties
of
philosophy and metaphysics.  As to any of them being devoted to work  * on
enabling what they see as an illusion* I imagine that there are many, such  as
Damasio, who are quite interested in issues surrounding such things as
illusions and delusions – whether or not they have any important play in all 
this.
Ø
Ø     Whit:
So on the one  hand you have Marxist-influenced sorts who similarly claim
that freedom is  just an "ideology" used to divert the masses; at one foot
you have a current  pope whose early intellectual work was (I'm informed)
against free will; and  on the other hand you have people who take themselves
to be hard-headed  science types who also are walking away from freedom.

Now, if humanity  has real and substantial freedom, but as yet has hardly
learned to use it  well (presuming that using it well isn't following
Augustine in surrendering  it to God), then any scientists whose fields
overlap with human cognition and  behavior should, if science is to do us
good in this area, be working towards  better understanding of our freedom,
which, accepting it is real, is an  extraordinary thing worthy of study,
after all. But mostly they're turning  their backs, mumbling about illusions,
and dissuading their students,  too.
Ø
Ø     Richard:
Ø     When you say things  like * better understanding of our freedom,
which, accepting it is real, is  an extraordinary thing worthy of study,
after all* I must ask what you mean  by *freedom,* since I consider it to be
another invented abstraction that  attracts a great deal of attention.  There
are many synonyms for *freedom* among which there are  epistemological
differences that are not trivial.  Could you explain what you mean  by it?
Ø
Whit:
That's  dangerous, if we allow that free will is real, is it not? Considering
our  current crises in government, religion, economy and environment I'd  even
venture it's criminal negligence on the part of science. That's  supposing
that a better scientific understanding here would, as in other  areas, lead
to significant pragmatic advances in the use of the thing,  advances which,
considering how central free will is, be broadly  transformative of human
societies.

Richard:
Ø     Why do you give  science such a prominent role in this matter?  Few
scientists are concerned with  exploring these kinds of abstractions – they
want
to know how things work in the  world, the mind and the cosmos.  To  me, it is
like asking them to investigate the basis and meaning of *faith.*  I am sure
there are some out there who  might be interested, but I imagine they are in
the minority.
When you state that * advances which, considering how central free will  is,
be broadly  transformative of  human societies.*  I am curious as  to how
human societies would be transformed ?
As for working towards a *better understanding of our freedom,* in my
opinion, if one           believes they have freedom of will, of thought and
even of
action, then  they do – by         definition.  I would imagine  that most of
us believe we have freedom of thought, but that            our physical
freedom is or can be thwarted by cultural and governmental  proscriptions. Much
freedom of action is  curtailed by the knowledge of its possible consequences.
Regards,
Richard
PS I have no idea what  happened to the above formatting!


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

On Sat, Dec 03, 2005 at 05:27:14PM -0000, philosophy-history@yahoogroups.com
wrote:

> As  someone who has no sympathy for creationists, I find myself in  other
> contexts, when discussing that, having to allow, despite being a  thorough
> fan of evolution, that our science still is quite immature, with  the ongoing
> determinist concensus, and where that leaves the human  conscience if taken
> seriously, showing that while current science may be an  obvious improvement
> on some varieties of religion, it's a far, far way from  the truth about
> humanity -- dangerously  so.
>
> Whit,
>
> What is your opinion as to what *the truth about humanity* means?  Is  this a
> different kind of *truth* from scientific *truth?* Also, why *dangerously
> so?*
>
> Regards,
> Richard

Richard,

Kinds of truth? Curious concept. Are there reasons I should consider
subscribing to it? I'm tempted to say "Truth is truth, although there are
different kinds of verification." I take it as a plain truth that we have
significant free will. However, those who seek their verification only in
scientifically "reputable" theory and experiment, and who demand of
hypotheses beyond current experiment that they be on their face coherent
with the better-verified facts regarding, e.g., causal systems would deny my
modes of verification regarding free will are reputable.

As for the danger, having some portion of our scientifically literate, and
thus presumably more intelligent and capable population convinced that free
will is but a common illusion (perhaps, some of them allow, performing some
socially useful function as such, however incoherent a suggestion that may
be), will assure that they are not working on the issues of how to best
enable and tune freedom. You can hardly expect someone devoted to science to
work on enabling what they see as an illusion.

So on the one hand you have Marxist-influenced sorts who similarly claim
that freedom is just an "ideology" used to divert the masses; at one foot
you have a current pope whose early intellectual work was (I'm informed)
against free will; and on the other hand you have people who take themselves
to be hard-headed science types who also are walking away from freedom.

Now, if humanity has real and substantial freedom, but as yet has hardly
learned to use it well (presuming that using it well isn't following
Augustine in surrendering it to God), then any scientists whose fields
overlap with human cognition and behavior should, if science is to do us
good in this area, be working towards better understanding of our freedom,
which, accepting it is real, is an extraordinary thing worthy of study,
after all. But mostly they're turning their backs, mumbling about illusions,
and dissuading their students, too.

That's dangerous, if we allow that free will is real, is it not? Considering
our current crises in government, religion, economy and environment I'd even
venture it's criminal negligence on the part of science. That's supposing
that a better scientific understanding here would, as in other areas, lead
to significant pragmatic advances in the use of the thing, advances which,
considering how central free will is, be broadly transformative of human
societies.

Best,
Whit

Daniel
Thank you for these  thoughtful insights. In defense of Hume, I do not think
he was denying  causality. He was denying the rationalist attempt to
assimilate causal  connection to logical connection. Logical entailments are
"necessary".  Causal connections cannot be empirically established. We can
certainly  gather statistics and determine probabilities based on observed
phenomena  even on an empiricist model. But there is no way to garner
logical or  metaphysical connections between phenomena,
Richard:
I believe that this is  turning into [or always has been] an epistemological
discussion, which is fine  with me.  It revolves around how we  define such
concepts as truth, and meaning, etc.  When you say that  * Causal connections
cannot be  empirically established* this begs the question as to what
*empirical* means,  and I happen to believe that causal connections can be
established
ONLY through  empirical observation. Our language [something that Wittgenstein
claims we are  enslaved by] can be used to either render things simple or
complex,  understandable or confusing.  If one  wishes to believe that
everything
that occurs has a probability attached to it,  that is OK as long as one
understands that probability is an invented concept  that has no more dominion
over
what is and what might be some other concept we  may invent.  Normally
probability  attaches to an event when there is empirical evidence that it may
NOT
occur.  If this has never been  observed over a long period of time, common
sense suggests that until such an  observation is made, no probability can be
attached.
As for gathering  statistics to determine probabilities, yes, we can do that –
  and we do it by  impressing a formulaic construction of our making on what
we experience.  Such a construction is no path to truth  [whatever that is] but
rather a path to a, perhaps, justifiable conjecture we  often mold into a
law.  I, for one,  do not believe in such laws as anything more than
conjectures.
Daniel:
Lacking any necessary entailment between  one event and any other we are left
with
probabilities. I, for one, would  bet my life on most of them. We couldn't
build bridges, buildings or  anything safely if we had no reliable laws from
engineering and physics with  which to work. So, if you want to be a
pragmatist and say that  macro-determinism is like everything else in
science on which we've come to  rely, then sure, I'll buy that. But then we
are back to the same old  criticism, that if determinism is true, it is
trivially true, for it is so  all-encompassing in its scope as to have no
practical  meaning.
Richard:
I agree with you.  It has no practical meaning, except to  engage one in
speculations about *free will.*  J  And yes, I am a  pragmatist.
Regards,
Richard





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

In a message dated 12/1/2005 9:25:30 A.M. Pacific Standard Time,  whit@transp
ect.com writes:

As  someone who has no sympathy for creationists, I find myself in  other
contexts, when discussing that, having to allow, despite being a  thorough
fan of evolution, that our science still is quite immature, with  the ongoing
determinist concensus, and where that leaves the human  conscience if taken
seriously, showing that while current science may be an  obvious improvement
on some varieties of religion, it's a far, far way from  the truth about
humanity -- dangerously  so.

Whit



Whit,

What is your opinion as to what *the truth about humanity* means?  Is  this a
different kind of *truth* from scientific *truth?* Also, why *dangerously
so?*

Regards,
Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

At 09:10 PM 12/1/2005, you wrote:
>Richard:
>This is a rich area  for discussion, and, I believe, a rather old one.
>Personally, I do not accept determinism  as a cosmic fact, but probably
>not for the
>same reasons Daniel presents.  Since I accept causality as the sine qua  non
>of science, [regardless of the theories of quantum physics] I believe
>that  at
>the macro level, causality is irrefutable.  At the micro level,. i.e. that of
>  subatomic particles, we have experiments and theories that only refute
>predictability � not causality.  If we deny that one event causes another
>event
>[agreeing with Hume’s  philosophical word play] then we remove from
>science, and
>virtually 100% of our  daily observed realities, the mechanism of change and
>its roots.  Determinism, in my opinion, should not  be equated to causality.
>The  enormously complicated processes involved in just about any natural
>phenomenon,  such as hurricanes and tornados, or the hormonal reactions of
>the
>body, cannot  be successfully reductively analyzed because there are two
>factors
>that impeded  such an analysis: 1) the uncertainly of the ingredients of the
>originating  event, and 2) the very large number of parameters
>involved.  Even
>if we could nail down the full  complement of physical factors that
>accompanied
>the originating event, [the  initial state]  we could not, with  any real
>certainty predict the next event that might result.  It does not require
>quantum
>physics �  more to the point, it requires exactitude of every variable
>involved � and that  is simply impossible.  But this does  not deny the
>existence of
>causality.  The study of chaos theory shows that the  predictability of
>complex systems is thwarted by the existence of uncertainty in  the
>initial state �
>but more to the point � uncertainty in the presence and  effects of all
>intervening conditions.  For all the theories that followed Heisenberg and
>the
>quantum physics, no  scientist would ever deny the utility of causality as a
>critical factor in  understanding the way things are and behave.  The
>cloud chamber,
>in which subatomic  particles are observed to impact other particles and
>spiral off in paths  dictated by the magnetic field that is applied  To
>doubt the
>effects of a magnetic field  on the charged particles is to doubt a sub
>stantial ingredient in the process and  what is known up to that point.
>Remember, just because  something, some process, is indeterminable, does not
>mean that there was no  determining factor[s] involved�.
>Regards,
>Richard

Richard,

Thank you for these thoughtful insights. In defense of Hume, I do not think
he was denying causality. He was denying the rationalist attempt to
assimilate causal connection to logical connection. Logical entailments are
"necessary". Causal connections cannot be empirically established. We can
certainly gather statistics and determine probabilities based on observed
phenomena even on an empiricist model. But there is no way to garner
logical or metaphysical connections between phenomena, Lacking any
necessary entailment between one event and any other we are left with
probabilities. I, for one, would bet my life on most of them. We couldn't
build bridges, buildings or anything safely if we had no reliable laws from
engineering and physics with which to work. So, if you want to be a
pragmatist and say that macro-determinism is like everything else in
science on which we've come to rely, then sure, I'll buy that. But then we
are back to the same old criticism, that if determinism is true, it is
trivially true, for it is so all-encompassing in its scope as to have no
practical meaning.

Daniel

There are different uses of "determinism." The way the debate sometimes goes
about the sort of determinism that's vs "free will," that sort of
determinism isn't necessarily the sort where everything in the universe is
tied up in "deterministic causal chains" such that the exact facts of the
future are already a sure thing. It's quite compatible with there being
either enough randomness or enough complexity -- or both -- that we can't
just apply formulas and determine what the facts will be at some arbitrary
future point.

But neither randomness nor unpredictability is what we want to believe we
have in terms of freedom. We want to determine what we will do from the
inside. If it's random, we don't determine it; and if it's determined by
outside factors, we don't determine it, not from inside, not in that sense
of the idea of determining what we do.

There's an article by Henry Stapp in the just-out Journal of Consciousness
studies where he's promising to put in layman's terms a QM-based picture of
a sort of dualism that he claims gets some traction on this problem. Haven't
read it yet. I'll report back.

Whit

Daniel:
I thought  determinism came out of Newtonian view of the universe. Am I
mistaken? There  is only probability in quantum physics. As long as there is
probability  there can be no certainty and therefore no necessity.
Therefore, determinism  is false.
Richard:
This is a rich area  for discussion, and, I believe, a rather old one.
Personally, I do not accept determinism  as a cosmic fact, but probably not for
the
same reasons Daniel presents.  Since I accept causality as the sine qua  non
of science, [regardless of the theories of quantum physics] I believe that  at
the macro level, causality is irrefutable.  At the micro level,. i.e. that of
  subatomic particles, we have experiments and theories that only refute
predictability – not causality.  If we deny that one event causes another
event
[agreeing with Hume’s  philosophical word play] then we remove from science,
and
virtually 100% of our  daily observed realities, the mechanism of change and
its roots.  Determinism, in my opinion, should not  be equated to causality.
The  enormously complicated processes involved in just about any natural
phenomenon,  such as hurricanes and tornados, or the hormonal reactions of the
body, cannot  be successfully reductively analyzed because there are two factors
that impeded  such an analysis: 1) the uncertainly of the ingredients of the
originating  event, and 2) the very large number of parameters involved.  Even
if we could nail down the full  complement of physical factors that accompanied
the originating event, [the  initial state]  we could not, with  any real
certainty predict the next event that might result.  It does not require quantum
physics –  more to the point, it requires exactitude of every variable
involved – and that  is simply impossible.  But this does  not deny the
existence of
causality.  The study of chaos theory shows that the  predictability of
complex systems is thwarted by the existence of uncertainty in  the initial
state –
but more to the point – uncertainty in the presence and  effects of all
intervening conditions.  For all the theories that followed Heisenberg and the
quantum physics, no  scientist would ever deny the utility of causality as a
critical factor in  understanding the way things are and behave.  The cloud
chamber,
in which subatomic  particles are observed to impact other particles and
spiral off in paths  dictated by the magnetic field that is applied  To doubt
the
effects of a magnetic field  on the charged particles is to doubt a sub
stantial ingredient in the process and  what is known up to that point.
Remember, just because  something, some process, is indeterminable, does not
mean that there was no  determining factor[s] involved….
Regards,
Richard


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

At 09:24 AM 12/1/2005, you wrote:

>Daniel,
>
>Some people say so. Others argue that QM only applies at a microscopic
>scale, and in no way changes the claims that on the "classical" scale --
>where we live -- things are still deterministic -- or perhaps deterministic
>mixed with random, where there's still no room for the non-deterministic,
>non-random role for consciousness that free will claims.
>
>I know a lot of the people trying to develop a "science of consciousness."
>Most of them, even, are determinists. Only a small minority think that QM
>solves the problem of free will for science (or even opens the door to a
>possible solution). And this is people who are looking seriously at
>consciousness. In others areas of science, where "consciousness" is still a
>suspect term, the support for determinism is even stronger.
>
>As someone who has no sympathy for creationists, I find myself in other
>contexts, when discussing that, having to allow, despite being a thorough
>fan of evolution, that our science still is quite immature, with the ongoing
>determinist concensus, and where that leaves the human conscience if taken
>seriously, showing that while current science may be an obvious improvement
>on some varieties of religion, it's a far, far way from the truth about
>humanity -- dangerously so.
>
>Whit

Whit,

I thought a credible case had been made that human neurological systems had
a kind of "irreducible complexity" and thus had varying degrees of
probability in terms of certain input/output activities. Forgive me, I am
not versed in this subject enough to the use proper terms. Basically, the
complexity of certain neurological systems make it in principle impossible
to predict their behavior with absolute certainty.

I know you are saying that a high degree of probability makes it
"macro-deterministic" or at least a workable hypothesis for the most part.
I wonder if that theory is an intellectual sleight of hand. Even advocates
of free-will admit that we act mostly from character and personality. So is
marco-determinism just another version of soft-determinism?

Daniel

At 08:58 AM 12/1/2005, you wrote:
>In a message dated 12/1/2005 8:37:30 A.M. Pacific Standard Time,
>scuiry@... writes:
>
>I  thought determinism was old hat these days, i.e., because of quantum
>mechanics.
>
>Daniel
>
>
>
>Has quantum physics *determined* that determinism does not work?
>
>Richard

I thought determinism came out of Newtonian view of the universe. Am I
mistaken? There is only probability in quantum physics. As long as there is
probability there can be no certainty and therefore no necessity.
Therefore, determinism is false.

The other criticism I remember is Humean: There is no necessary connection
between cause and effect; there is simply concomitance and constant
conjunction. That hardly hardly supports determinism in any meaningful sense.

Without any demonstrable necessity determinism cannot be proven.

Now what that says about "free will" is another matter. I think I have
indicated before that freedom is an abstract concept. Only to the extent
that one can make sense of abstract concepts does it have any meaning.
Beyond that there is only behavior.

Daniel