Sonny: The precise nature of choice behavior may be of some interest, I'm not
denying
that. I don't think it affects our basic ideas, after all no one here will
probably deny the
possibility that there might be a degree of randomness in nature. That doesn't
lead us to
free will or freedom of any kind, if anything it decreases our ability to
predict outcomes
and control our actions.

Choice is linked to and is interdependent on all other neural activity, so I
think the analogy
to a subroutine is sound. Something causes us to make a choice, and to choose
what we
choose.

I think we know enough about choice (that it doesn't involve free will) to
comfortably
overturn the prevailing misconceptions of the dominant culture, I don't think
new
neurological research is needed to make our basic, revolutionary point.

Ken





--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Sonny Williams" <sonnyw@m...>
wrote:
> Ken,
>
> Choice behavior is, indeed, a fully-determined cognitive process.  I wouldn't
call it a
"subroutine" because that implies it is somehow linked or even dependent on
another
cognitive routine, and I can't imagine what that might be.
>
> Saying "things couldn't have been otherwise" is a commonly understood way of
describing a fully determined cognitive process, one that is free of
contra-causal control.  I
have no quarrel with synthesized versions of difficult subjects, shortened ones
designed
for popular appeal, but it begs explanation lest it be considered fatalistic and
it requires
the caveat that all determinants, which are innumerable, must be identical, an
impractical,
nay, impossible assertion in a natural environment.
>
> I also remind you that neuroscientists do not yet fully understand choice
behavior; there
are competing theories on how mental deliberations result in a choice
(cost/benefit
analysis, strong versus weak synapses, "dominant neuron," etc).  And, most
importantly to
naturalists, one of the current theories is that some choices are random, "that
stochastic
variation in molecular and biochemical reactions could account for . . .
variation . . .," that
"the stress response system [a specific type of choice behavior] of
Caenorhabditis elegans
is subject to an underlying physiological randomness that affects how it copes
with
environmental insults."  (Source: Nat. Genet. 10.1038/ng 1608, as cited in
Science
magazine, 5 August 2005, Vol 309).
>
> This scientific research into the mechanics of choice behavior must, I
believe, be
incorporated into any naturalistic philosophy.  After all, how can we say we are
informed
by science if we attempt to ignore new scientific findings that might alter one
of our
tenets, that random forces might be at work?  Even if random forces are at work,
they are
still a part of nature, another determinant.  Random events are not supernatural
ones, so
I'm not uncomfortable in saying we don't fully understand choice behavior, and
randomness might be a part of it.
>
> Sonny Williams
>   ----- Original Message -----
>   From: Ken Batts<mailto:ken@k...>
>   To: naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com<mailto:
naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com>
>   Sent: Saturday, September 17, 2005 11:12 AM
>   Subject: [naturalismphilosophyforum] Re: Being a god (little or otherwise)
>
>
>   Gods, Choice
>
>   Steve: You make a good point that we somehow assume that the very idea of a
god
with
>   free will is a coherent concept. I think free will is like a four-sided
triangle, something
>   which can't even be rigorously defined. My guess is that Bob had in mind the
common
>   belief in such a creature (a god with free will), not any vote of confidence
that such a
>   creature does or even could exist.
>
>   Sonny: An example of how we have choice is picking what we want to eat in a
restaurant.
>   There are many items on the menu, we think about it and pick one. If we
chose the
>   lobster, we had to choose it. I personally am glad that we can, in theory,
There's no
other
>   sort of choosing; it's a subroutine, like all other human activities, fully
determined in
it's
>   code and execution.
>
>   Saying things couldn't have been otherwise is one of our best ways of
describing our
lack
>   of free will. Since it's always true (things could not have been otherwise),
and the
common
>   belief is that it's never true, it's important for us to point out.
>
>   Ken
>
>
>
>
>
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Ken,

 

Choice behavior is, indeed, a fully-determined cognitive process.  I wouldn't call it a "subroutine" because that implies it is somehow linked or even dependent on another cognitive routine, and I can't imagine what that might be.

 

Saying "things couldn't have been otherwise" is a commonly understood way of describing a fully determined cognitive process, one that is free of contra-causal control.  I have no quarrel with synthesized versions of difficult subjects, shortened ones designed for popular appeal, but it begs explanation lest it be considered fatalistic and it requires the caveat that all determinants, which are innumerable, must be identical, an impractical, nay, impossible assertion in a natural environment.

 

I also remind you that neuroscientists do not yet fully understand choice behavior; there are competing theories on how mental deliberations result in a choice (cost/benefit analysis, strong versus weak synapses, "dominant neuron," etc).  And, most importantly to naturalists, one of the current theories is that some choices are random, "that stochastic variation in molecular and biochemical reactions could account for . . . variation . . .," that "the stress response system [a specific type of choice behavior] of Caenorhabditis elegans is subject to an underlying physiological randomness that affects how it copes with environmental insults."  (Source: Nat. Genet. 10.1038/ng 1608, as cited in Science magazine, 5 August 2005, Vol 309).

 

This scientific research into the mechanics of choice behavior must, I believe, be incorporated into any naturalistic philosophy.  After all, how can we say we are informed by science if we attempt to ignore new scientific findings that might alter one of our tenets, that random forces might be at work?  Even if random forces are at work, they are still a part of nature, another determinant.  Random events are not supernatural ones, so I'm not uncomfortable in saying we don't fully understand choice behavior, and randomness might be a part of it.

 

Sonny Williams

 

__________________________________________________
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Gods, Choice

Steve: You make a good point that we somehow assume that the very idea of a god
with
free will is a coherent concept. I think free will is like a four-sided
triangle, something
which can't even be rigorously defined. My guess is that Bob had in mind the
common
belief in such a creature (a god with free will), not any vote of confidence
that such a
creature does or even could exist.

Sonny: An example of how we have choice is picking what we want to eat in a
restaurant.
There are many items on the menu, we think about it and pick one. If we chose
the
lobster, we had to choose it. There's no other sort of choosing; it's a
subroutine, like all
other human activities, fully determined in it's code and execution.

Saying things couldn't have been otherwise is one of our best ways of describing
our lack
of free will. Since it's always true (things could not have been otherwise), and
the common
belief is that it's never true, it's important for us to point out.

Ken

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Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com

----- Original Message -----

From: Phil Knight

To: naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Friday, September 16, 2005 11:52 AM

Subject: [naturalismphilosophyforum] Being a god (little or otherwise)

Tom,

 

You know I am moved to ask what I am about to ask. When you wrote, "Another good reason to be thankful we aren't little gods", just what did you mean?

"Even if there is a God, He would not have free will either." - srs

Steve

 

 

TWClark <twc@...> wrote:

Yes, the dialog didn't get to everything Gabriel asked about, including the question of how we

justify ought statements (that is, values) if we don't have contra-causal free will.   But the meaning of "you ought to do this" is straightforward under determinism.  We have basic needs and values that constitute us as sentient creatures - we can't take them less seriously simply because we discover we're determined to have them.  And as part of having our values we will be led to argue for them, ending up in such statements as "Given the situation, and what we agree is right, you ought to do x."  The arguments function as determinants of behavior, and so are essential for implementing ethics.  If we had the sort of "authentic choice" Gabriel implies is necessary for justifying ought statements, those very statements couldn't have the same determining power they actually have over us, and morality would be impossible.  We could just choose to ignore social norms and the arguments people addressed to us.  Another good reason to be thankful we aren't little gods. 

 

Tom

 

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----- Original Message -----

From: Clarence Williams

To: naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Friday, September 16, 2005 9:54 AM

Subject: [naturalismphilosophyforum] Commitments - Choice Behavior

Tom's "The Commitments of Naturalism - A Dialog" is interesting, but
I noted something in Gabriel Mihalache's opening questions that was
not addressed by Carrier or Macarthur.  Mihalache asked, "What does
it mean that 'we ought to do this and that' considering that there's
no authentic choice?"

Ah, but Gabriel, choice behavior does exist!  Naturalism has
deterministic foundations and rejects contra-causal free will (or
libertarian free will), but we accept scientific evidence regarding
choice behavior.  Everything the mind does, including making
choices, is dependent on antecedent determinants; nothing the mind
does is made of "whole cloth."  See the Naturalism.org web site,
specifically the sections titled, "Naturalism and Choice," and "A
Naturalistic Lexicon of Responsibility" for more discussion of
choice.

There are some within the deterministic family of philosophers who
make statements like this: If conditions are identical, then the
exact same outcome will result.  That's well and good, but identical
conditions simply don't exist in nature.  Sure, we'd all behave
exactly the same way... if conditions were the same, say, tomorrow,
next week, or a year later.  But that's an impossible occurence in
nature, so why even discuss it?  In fact, man's very nature, our
evolutionary leap forward, so to speak, is a mind with enormous
learning capacity.  We were born to learn and change, so in the case
of man, this capacity for learning is sufficient to make it
impossible for the exact conditions to recur in nature.

Naturalists celebrate choice behavior because understanding all the
antecedant determinants that caused a particular behavioral choice
is at the heart of naturalism.

Tom's "The Commitments of Naturalism - A Dialog" is interesting, but
I noted something in Gabriel Mihalache's opening questions that was
not addressed by Carrier or Macarthur.  Mihalache asked, "What does
it mean that 'we ought to do this and that' considering that there's
no authentic choice?"

Ah, but Gabriel, choice behavior does exist!  Naturalism has
deterministic foundations and rejects contra-causal free will (or
libertarian free will), but we accept scientific evidence regarding
choice behavior.  Everything the mind does, including making
choices, is dependent on antecedent determinants; nothing the mind
does is made of "whole cloth."  See the Naturalism.org web site,
specifically the sections titled, "Naturalism and Choice," and "A
Naturalistic Lexicon of Responsibility" for more discussion of
choice.

There are some within the deterministic family of philosophers who
make statements like this: If conditions are identical, then the
exact same outcome will result.  That's well and good, but identical
conditions simply don't exist in nature.  Sure, we'd all behave
exactly the same way... if conditions were the same, say, tomorrow,
next week, or a year later.  But that's an impossible occurence in
nature, so why even discuss it?  In fact, man's very nature, our
evolutionary leap forward, so to speak, is a mind with enormous
learning capacity.  We were born to learn and change, so in the case
of man, this capacity for learning is sufficient to make it
impossible for the exact conditions to recur in nature.

Naturalists celebrate choice behavior because understanding all the
antecedant determinants that caused a particular behavioral choice
is at the heart of naturalism.

OK, let's get philosophical everybody.  Just up at Nat.Org, a dialog
on the philosophical commitments and implications of scientific
naturalism, with two philosophers who have books just published.  I
put in my 1 1/2 cents in the intro, but otherwise it's the pros
dukeing it out in friendly fashion.

See http://www.naturalism.org/commitments.htm

Ponder and enjoy!

Tom

Ken,

Thanks for your encouraging reply.

Of course, you're right: when a person has a certain perspective on
the world that seems so natural, so intimate; angst surely must be a
required response to the idea that they are not what they seem; in
fact, "they" are not really there in any ontological sense.

Given my own background in theism, who I was was always central to my
relationship with God. I was created by God for his good purpose. In
that context, the "I" was an invisible entity that entailed the real
me. When I left the metaphysics of faith I conceptually left dualism
and embraced the thesis that the mind/brain are really the same
thing; however, looking back on it I now realize that functionally
nothing changed. After leaving faith I felt freer to pursue life more
vigorously, the guilt was gone; but I essentially felt the same as
before: I felt like a unify 'I' who made decisions and pursued life
with a different paradigm just without God. With my recent study of
Naturalism (thanks especially to Naturalism.org and Tom Clark) and
books by Susan Blackmore, Daniel Dennett, (now) Thomas Metzinger,
etc., I'm seeing that things are far more 'mind' blowing (literally!)
than ever. It's exciting and scary as hell.

Thanks again, Ken, for your feedback and encouragement.

Rod Abbott

--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Ken Batts"
<ken@k...> wrote:
> If you didn't have an occasional moment of angst around this topic
I'd be more worried
> about you! Think of all the societal taboos our ideas break.
Iconoclasts always pay some
> price, hopefully not too high, in anxiety, ostracism, self-doubt,
etc., but the fact that
> you've been able to seriously embrace these ideas in the face of
pressure (either external
> or internalized)  is testimony to your mental fitness.
>
> Ken

If you didn't have an occasional moment of angst around this topic I'd be more
worried
about you! Think of all the societal taboos our ideas break. Iconoclasts always
pay some
price, hopefully not too high, in anxiety, ostracism, self-doubt, etc., but the
fact that
you've been able to seriously embrace these ideas in the face of pressure
(either external
or internalized)  is testimony to your mental fitness.

Ken



--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "RC Abbott" <rc.abbott@s...>
wrote:
> Tom,
>
> Thanks for your reply.
>
> I'm a bit embarrassed by my moment of existential angst; yet,
> it seems
> this very angst is partially fueling the debate over what
> consciousness is
> and if the explanatory gap can bridged. After having left
> fundamentalist Christianity, I accepted a crude but logical
> Naturalism and figured the "mind"; however you define it, is
> functionally the same as the brain (or brain states). I was surprised
> to learn that many thinkers don't accept this. It is hard to
> accept given our experience.
> We seem like a unified self with a personal history and personal
> responsibility; an actor and an observer who is the author of our
> destiny.
>
> I've ordered Metzinger's book. I've
> been
> reading many of the fine articles linked to Naturalism.org especially
> your "Kill the Observer," "Function and
> Phenomenology", and "Mind the
> Gap" by David Papineau. I think your methodology is right on and
> I
> look forward to Metzinger's book and reading more of your fine
> articles. Thanks for the focus.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Rod Abbott
> <http://rcabbott.blogspot.com/>

Tom,

Thanks for your reply.

I'm a bit embarrassed by my moment of existential angst; yet,
it seems
this very angst is partially fueling the debate over what
consciousness is
and if the explanatory gap can bridged. After having left
fundamentalist Christianity, I accepted a crude but logical
Naturalism and figured the "mind"; however you define it, is
functionally the same as the brain (or brain states). I was surprised
to learn that many thinkers don't accept this. It is hard to
accept given our experience.
We seem like a unified self with a personal history and personal
responsibility; an actor and an observer who is the author of our
destiny.

I've ordered Metzinger's book. I've
been
reading many of the fine articles linked to Naturalism.org especially
your "Kill the Observer," "Function and
Phenomenology", and "Mind the
Gap" by David Papineau. I think your methodology is right on and
I
look forward to Metzinger's book and reading more of your fine
articles. Thanks for the focus.

Cheers,

Rod Abbott
<http://rcabbott.blogspot.com/>

Rod,

Thanks for your post on just about my favorite topic.  The mind-body
problem - the relation of subjective phenomenal experience to the
physical world - is the ultimate toughie.  I happen to think
Metzinger is among the best theorists around, deeply grounded in the
actual science, and there's a symposium on his book at
http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/ .  The me
behind "what's mine", according to Metzinger, is a representation
constructed by the brain that functions to manage our interactions
with the world.  It makes us functionally egoistic - a necessary
element in our survival kit.  This representation can be compromised
or abrogated altogether in certain pathological and non-pathological
states.  On the other hand, positing a mental essence apart from the
brain and its functions explains nothing, and is a positive
hindrance to understanding consciousness.  Which is why I suggest
we "kill the observer" in a paper in the Journal of Consciousness
Studies, at www.naturalism.org/kto.htm.

Contemplating consciousness is indeed dizzying, but I recommend that
we pay close attention to that which we're trying to explain.  What
*are* the characteristics of consciousness that seem so elusive and
that seem to transcend physicalism and third-person science?  Most
folks, seems to me, charge off in their theories of consciousness
without paying careful attention to what they're trying to explain.
This is my humble advice about how to focus the issue.

The mind-body has significance for us naturalists since standard
intuitions about the relationship between mind and matter are of
course dualistic.  Being able to show that such things as the
feeling of selfhood and phenomenal experience don't require anything
categorically mental will help cement an entirely naturalistic
understanding of ourselves.

Good hunting, and good luck with Metzinger, who I'm happy to report
just joined the advisory board for the Center for Naturalism.

best,

Tom
CFN



--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "RC Abbott"
<rc.abbott@s...> wrote:
> I read a review of Thomas Metzinger's book "Being No One" (MIT,
2002)
> by Kenneth Einar Himma (http://www.amhc.org/poc/view_doc.php?
> id=1720&type=book&cn=90)[A book I will start reading soon]. I know
> little about Prof Himma except that he teaches at Seattle Pacific
> University. Although he likes Prof Metzinger's book he raises the
> essentialist objection about how objective third-person science
leads
> to subjective first-person experience. Rightly explain the neural
> correlates and offer various concpetual models all you want but it
> still begs the question of how that explains ME. Not just
subjective
> experience in general, but MY subjective experience. He
writes: "What
> the dualist argues is that the postulation of a mental substance
is
> needed to explain why those conscious states are mine: they are
mine
> because I am the mental substance that is the subject of those
> conscious states." Whether he holds this view or merely posing an
> possible objection to Metzinger's thesis is a bit unclear.
>
> Susan Blackmore also states that many theories of consciouness
fail
> to explain the "gap" between object/subjective experience.
>
> Long before I started reading about the nature of consciousness I
> thought "Why me now?" An odd why to put it but that's the way it
came
> to me. I could accept naturalist explaination about the universe,
but
> when I focused on ME and my history, the creeping question of "why
me
> now" sat in the background.
>
> I am firmly rooted in naturalism but must confess all my readings
of
> consciousness and the various approaches is dizzying.
>
> Ultimately the point of this post is to ask for help focusing the
> issue(s) and helping me to stay out of semantic traps.
>
> Thanks One and All,
>
> Rod

I read a review of Thomas Metzinger's book "Being No One" (MIT, 2002)
by Kenneth Einar Himma (http://www.amhc.org/poc/view_doc.php?
id=1720&type=book&cn=90)[A book I will start reading soon]. I know
little about Prof Himma except that he teaches at Seattle Pacific
University. Although he likes Prof Metzinger's book he raises the
essentialist objection about how objective third-person science leads
to subjective first-person experience. Rightly explain the neural
correlates and offer various concpetual models all you want but it
still begs the question of how that explains ME. Not just subjective
experience in general, but MY subjective experience. He writes: "What
the dualist argues is that the postulation of a mental substance is
needed to explain why those conscious states are mine: they are mine
because I am the mental substance that is the subject of those
conscious states." Whether he holds this view or merely posing an
possible objection to Metzinger's thesis is a bit unclear.

Susan Blackmore also states that many theories of consciouness fail
to explain the "gap" between object/subjective experience.

Long before I started reading about the nature of consciousness I
thought "Why me now?" An odd why to put it but that's the way it came
to me. I could accept naturalist explaination about the universe, but
when I focused on ME and my history, the creeping question of "why me
now" sat in the background.

I am firmly rooted in naturalism but must confess all my readings of
consciousness and the various approaches is dizzying.

Ultimately the point of this post is to ask for help focusing the
issue(s) and helping me to stay out of semantic traps.

Thanks One and All,

Rod

Will: I agree, and the payback is the satisfaction of the helpful act itself. By
working for the
world you want, you'd be fulfilling a desire: approaching your ideal view of
yourself; a
thoughtful, kind, generous, etc. person. And potentially reaping the benefits:
gratitude,
admiration, love, etc.

Ken





--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <will_g_davidson@y...>
wrote:
> Logically, I ought to act in such a way as to help create the kind of
> world I want to live in.
>
>
> --- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Ken Batts"
> <ken@k...> wrote:
> > Steve:  I agree with your post. "Ought" is about desires, needs, and
> > not about anything
> > "ultimate". We don't need to claim "oughts" are anything but
> > pragmatic rules that we
> > believe are useful and meet our ideals.
> >
> > We need (desire) to agree on certain "oughts", and make them law.
> > Codifying the Monolaw
> > for example is something we "ought" to do, in other words something
> > we desire to do, and
> > believe that this particular desire is worth implementing. Laws
> > should ( I desire for them to
> > be) keep people from dangerously or destructively breaking the
> > monolaw.
> >
> > Ken
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > , "Is", is... that would seem to be pretty self evident.
> >
> > Ought (on the other hand) is a lever one man uses to push against
> > another. Declare
> > something "ought be" and then convince enough people with enough
> > power and I guess
> > you can get what you say ought to be.
> >
> > Those that say you can't get "ought" from "is", or on the other side
> > of the chasm,  those
> > that say that "is" gives us all the "oughts", well they are working
> > their own agendas. (This
> > is not to imply in anyway that those agendas are self authored: for
> > we know they are not.)
> >
> > What is hard for humans is for every individual to own up to wanting
> > what they want. They
> > must say "I desire __________". If what they desire does not do to
> > another that which they
> > would not want done to themselves, then they should pursue it
> without
> > apologies. Instead
> > of saying "This is desirable, or this is undesirable", man employs
> > the double speak of "This
> > is good, or this is bad", as a means of getting what they DESIRE
> > (ironically enough).

Logically, I ought to act in such a way as to help create the kind of
world I want to live in.


--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Ken Batts"
<ken@k...> wrote:
> Steve:  I agree with your post. "Ought" is about desires, needs, and
> not about anything
> "ultimate". We don't need to claim "oughts" are anything but
> pragmatic rules that we
> believe are useful and meet our ideals.
>
> We need (desire) to agree on certain "oughts", and make them law.
> Codifying the Monolaw
> for example is something we "ought" to do, in other words something
> we desire to do, and
> believe that this particular desire is worth implementing. Laws
> should ( I desire for them to
> be) keep people from dangerously or destructively breaking the
> monolaw.
>
> Ken
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> , "Is", is... that would seem to be pretty self evident.
>
> Ought (on the other hand) is a lever one man uses to push against
> another. Declare
> something "ought be" and then convince enough people with enough
> power and I guess
> you can get what you say ought to be.
>
> Those that say you can't get "ought" from "is", or on the other side
> of the chasm,  those
> that say that "is" gives us all the "oughts", well they are working
> their own agendas. (This
> is not to imply in anyway that those agendas are self authored: for
> we know they are not.)
>
> What is hard for humans is for every individual to own up to wanting
> what they want. They
> must say "I desire __________". If what they desire does not do to
> another that which they
> would not want done to themselves, then they should pursue it
without
> apologies. Instead
> of saying "This is desirable, or this is undesirable", man employs
> the double speak of "This
> is good, or this is bad", as a means of getting what they DESIRE
> (ironically enough).

Steve:  I agree with your post. "Ought" is about desires, needs, and
not about anything
"ultimate". We don't need to claim "oughts" are anything but
pragmatic rules that we
believe are useful and meet our ideals.

We need (desire) to agree on certain "oughts", and make them law.
Codifying the Monolaw
for example is something we "ought" to do, in other words something
we desire to do, and
believe that this particular desire is worth implementing. Laws
should ( I desire for them to
be) keep people from dangerously or destructively breaking the
monolaw.

Ken









, "Is", is... that would seem to be pretty self evident.

Ought (on the other hand) is a lever one man uses to push against
another. Declare
something "ought be" and then convince enough people with enough
power and I guess
you can get what you say ought to be.

Those that say you can't get "ought" from "is", or on the other side
of the chasm,  those
that say that "is" gives us all the "oughts", well they are working
their own agendas. (This
is not to imply in anyway that those agendas are self authored: for
we know they are not.)

What is hard for humans is for every individual to own up to wanting
what they want. They
must say "I desire __________". If what they desire does not do to
another that which they
would not want done to themselves, then they should pursue it without
apologies. Instead
of saying "This is desirable, or this is undesirable", man employs
the double speak of "This
is good, or this is bad", as a means of getting what they DESIRE
(ironically enough).

--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Sonny Williams" <
sonnyw@m...> wrote:
> From a philosophical standpoint, I avow there is no free will.  I further
avow that under identical circumstances he could not have done
otherwise.  I join you, Ken, in also avowing that such beliefs are
exciting, and positively contribute to the naturalist essences of
connection, compassion and control.
>
> From a practical or applied standpoint, my avowals beg lengthy
explanation.


This is the kind of situation we need to avoid, and why I argue for a
more explicitly "progressive" (though that is certainly difficult to
define) stance. What I mean by"progressive" is that our philosophy has
huge implications for change, in a kinder, more thoughtful direction
never tried, to a better friendlier, more compassionate world.  I don't
think we're doomed by  genes to stay right about where we are in terms
of retribution, cheating, punishment, etc. . If "philosophical" means
something very complex and far removed from "practice", I'd say we
will never make our beliefs known.

My error, looking back, was to imply that "Dems good, Republicans
bad". Both groups believe in free will, one possibly less than the other,
but we don't need to overidentify with one or the other. What we should
do IMO is to be more overtly for the idea that this idea really changes
things, not always in ways we can predict, but it won't be
"conservative", in any sense I understand that word. It won't
necessarily be "big gov't. democrat", either, but once we stop blaming
each other for all kinds of stuff that we're not to blame for, things will
be kinder and gentler.

I think it's a sign of our lack of clarity that someone, a conservative,
but a smart thoughtful one like Sonny tried to figure out for a long time
whether as a social conservative he had a place here, that wasn't really
his fault. Not to say he wasn't welcome, but that no one here (I think?)
thinks that non-free will "begs a lengthy explanation". At least some of
it is crystal clear and immediate, and doesn't need a lengthy
explanation.

Ken







>   ----- Original Message -----
>   From: Ken Batts<mailto:ken@k...>
>   To: naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com<
mailto:naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com>
>   Sent: Saturday, May 21, 2005 10:06 PM
>   Subject: [naturalismphilosophyforum] Good Dogma
>
>
>   Sonny: If there's a homunculus, it's fully caused like everything else,
so
>   it doesn't change a thing, there's still no free will.
>
>   The recent debate has strengthened my belief that we need to
admit
>   and embrace our dogma (in the good sense of that word,  that
which
>   we accept and build our ideas on). I think our dogma, the one I share
>   with Marv and Steve and Tom and Owen Flanagan and many others,
>   consists of this:
>
>   1) there's no free will
>   2) that's a really good thing, because it leads to connection,
>   compassion and control
>
>   We're not an academic philosophy department, where all ideas get
>   equal hearing and consideration (as they should, that's the rules
there).
>   We've come here because we believe a couple of things, which we
think
>   are very important. If someone demonstrates to me that there is,
>   beyond a shadow of a doubt, free will, I will quit the group and start
>   blaming everyone for their faults, and glorifying theme for their
virtues.
>
>   Dogma is just that, it's not some declaration that one knows the
>   absolute truth, rather a declaration that one believes soomething
>   strongly enough to use it as a premise for their ideas about life and
love
>   and happiness, etc. Since this is a philosophy forum I suggest we
>   happily affirm that ours is a dogmatic philosophy, one based on
certain
>   premises, and go on from there.
>
>   Ken
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>   Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>     a.. To visit your group on the web, go to:
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unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>
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Service<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>.

Sonny: If there's a homunculus, it's fully caused like everything else, so
it doesn't change a thing, there's still no free will.

The recent debate has strengthened my belief that we need to admit
and embrace our dogma (in the good sense of that word,  that which
we accept and build our ideas on). I think our dogma, the one I share
with Marv and Steve and Tom and Owen Flanagan and many others,
consists of this:

1) there's no free will
2) that's a really good thing, because it leads to connection,
compassion and control

We're not an academic philosophy department, where all ideas get
equal hearing and consideration (as they should, that's the rules there).
We've come here because we believe a couple of things, which we think
are very important. If someone demonstrates to me that there is,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, free will, I will quit the group and start
blaming everyone for their faults, and glorifying theme for their virtues.

Dogma is just that, it's not some declaration that one knows the
absolute truth, rather a declaration that one believes soomething
strongly enough to use it as a premise for their ideas about life and love
and happiness, etc. Since this is a philosophy forum I suggest we
happily affirm that ours is a dogmatic philosophy, one based on certain
premises, and go on from there.

Ken

Tom:  Thanks for the explanation of how the different beliefs divide up.
If our task is to enter the academic fray, then I can see a value of this
level of clarification.

At the more popular level, I'd like to stick to the term "Free Will" and
"Non-free will". What people have always meant by that, in worldview
terms, is the ability to act without being caused. Sure, there's another
sense, not being coerced, but the context always clears up any possible
misunderstanding, that's why the same words have been able to refer
to two different things without confusion. The average person
understands the difference. So I think we should state simply and
clearly we believe that, as progressive naturalists, we think that
humans don't have free will, that we don't need free will in order to
achieve happiness, in fact we think that the belief in free will is one of
the things making achieving a good world difficult.

Ken

--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "twclark2002" <
twc@n...> wrote:
> Ken,
>
> My apologies for the misattribution - false memory implantation
> syndrome, obviously.
>
> I once suggested at another forum we could call contra-causal
> freedom Type 1 freedom, and the freedom of voluntary action Type
2
> freedom.  In addition, we could call those who think there should be
> revisions to our responsibility practices progressives, and those
> who think things should stay the same conservatives.  So we can
> classify people as for instance Type 1 conservatives, like
> philosopher Robert Kane, who believe in Type 1 freedom and see no
> need for changes in our practices.  Then there are Type 2
> conservatives, such as law professor Michael Moore, who believe only
> in the freedom of voluntary action but think our practices needn't
> change. And there are folks like us who are Type 2 progressives, who
> believe in Type 2 freedom and think that changes to our
> responsibility practices are in order.  I don't know if there are
> any Type 1 progressives running around.
>
> Of course we see Type 1 freedom as supernatural, Type 2 as natural.
> So we have supernaturalist conservatives, naturalist conservatives,
> and naturalist progressives, and maybe no supernaturalist
> progressives.  I'm not sure that this is terminological progress,
> but it's at least slightly descriptive of the actual situation.
> (Btw, the virtue of using "Type 1" and "Type 2" instead
> of "supernaturalist" and "naturalist" is that some philosophers such
> as Kane and Australian supreme court justice David Hodgson don't
> think their Type 1 contra-causal freedom is supernatural.  Somehow
> they think natural human agents manage to have contra-causal
> freedom, don't ask me how. Re Hodgson, see "Hodgson's Black Box"
at
> http://www.naturalism.org/hodgson.htm.)
>
> Tom
>
> --- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Ken Batts"
> <ken@k...> wrote:
> > > So what do we call our position?  Ken has recommended (as have
I
> > from time to time) that we call it neo-compatibilism, following
> Owen
> > Flanagan who used that term in The Problem of the Soul, e.g., see
> p.
> > 150 re CNHDO and responsibility, and see the index for "neo-
> > compatibilism".
> >
> > Actually, for the record, I've opposed the term neo-compatibilism
> > (though if you find an old post from me contradicting this I won't
> be
> > completely surprised!)
> >
> > My reasoning is that the position Flanagan (and I think Tom) call
> neo-
> > compatibilism, which is identical to my position, is different
> enough
> > from "paleo-compatibilism" (plain old-fashioned compatibilism)
> that
> > calling it neo-compatibilism is misleading. It could actually as
> easily be
> > called neo-incompatibilism, I think it shares more with that
> philosophy.
> > This is of course my opinion, and it's admittedly subjective. I
> agree with
> > Flanagan's suggestion: toss the compatibilist/incompatibilist
> argument,
> > since determinism/indeterminism hasn't been demonstrated, and
work
> > to define critical terms like responsibility without resorting to
> the myth
> > of free will.
> >
> > Ken

> So what do we call our position?  Ken has recommended (as have I
from time to time) that we call it neo-compatibilism, following Owen
Flanagan who used that term in The Problem of the Soul, e.g., see p.
150 re CNHDO and responsibility, and see the index for "neo-
compatibilism".

Actually, for the record, I've opposed the term neo-compatibilism
(though if you find an old post from me contradicting this I won't be
completely surprised!)

My reasoning is that the position Flanagan (and I think Tom) call neo-
compatibilism, which is identical to my position, is different enough
from "paleo-compatibilism" (plain old-fashioned compatibilism) that
calling it neo-compatibilism is misleading. It could actually as easily be
called neo-incompatibilism, I think it shares more with that philosophy.
This is of course my opinion, and it's admittedly subjective. I agree with
Flanagan's suggestion: toss the compatibilist/incompatibilist argument,
since determinism/indeterminism hasn't been demonstrated, and work
to define critical terms like responsibility without resorting to the myth
of free will.

Ken

Ken,

My apologies for the misattribution - false memory implantation
syndrome, obviously.

I once suggested at another forum we could call contra-causal
freedom Type 1 freedom, and the freedom of voluntary action Type 2
freedom.  In addition, we could call those who think there should be
revisions to our responsibility practices progressives, and those
who think things should stay the same conservatives.  So we can
classify people as for instance Type 1 conservatives, like
philosopher Robert Kane, who believe in Type 1 freedom and see no
need for changes in our practices.  Then there are Type 2
conservatives, such as law professor Michael Moore, who believe only
in the freedom of voluntary action but think our practices needn't
change. And there are folks like us who are Type 2 progressives, who
believe in Type 2 freedom and think that changes to our
responsibility practices are in order.  I don't know if there are
any Type 1 progressives running around.

Of course we see Type 1 freedom as supernatural, Type 2 as natural.
So we have supernaturalist conservatives, naturalist conservatives,
and naturalist progressives, and maybe no supernaturalist
progressives.  I'm not sure that this is terminological progress,
but it's at least slightly descriptive of the actual situation.
(Btw, the virtue of using "Type 1" and "Type 2" instead
of "supernaturalist" and "naturalist" is that some philosophers such
as Kane and Australian supreme court justice David Hodgson don't
think their Type 1 contra-causal freedom is supernatural.  Somehow
they think natural human agents manage to have contra-causal
freedom, don't ask me how. Re Hodgson, see "Hodgson's Black Box" at
http://www.naturalism.org/hodgson.htm.)

Tom

--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "Ken Batts"
<ken@k...> wrote:
> > So what do we call our position?  Ken has recommended (as have I
> from time to time) that we call it neo-compatibilism, following
Owen
> Flanagan who used that term in The Problem of the Soul, e.g., see
p.
> 150 re CNHDO and responsibility, and see the index for "neo-
> compatibilism".
>
> Actually, for the record, I've opposed the term neo-compatibilism
> (though if you find an old post from me contradicting this I won't
be
> completely surprised!)
>
> My reasoning is that the position Flanagan (and I think Tom) call
neo-
> compatibilism, which is identical to my position, is different
enough
> from "paleo-compatibilism" (plain old-fashioned compatibilism)
that
> calling it neo-compatibilism is misleading. It could actually as
easily be
> called neo-incompatibilism, I think it shares more with that
philosophy.
> This is of course my opinion, and it's admittedly subjective. I
agree with
> Flanagan's suggestion: toss the compatibilist/incompatibilist
argument,
> since determinism/indeterminism hasn't been demonstrated, and work
> to define critical terms like responsibility without resorting to
the myth
> of free will.
>
> Ken

> So what do we call our position?  Ken has recommended (as have I
from time to time) that we call it neo-compatibilism, following Owen
Flanagan who used that term in The Problem of the Soul, e.g., see p.
150 re CNHDO and responsibility, and see the index for "neo-
compatibilism".

Actually, for the record, I've opposed the term neo-compatibilism
(though if you find an old post from me contradicting this I won't be
completely surprised!)

My reasoning is that the position Flanagan (and I think Tom) call neo-
compatibilism, which is identical to my position, is different enough
from "paleo-compatibilism" (plain old-fashioned compatibilism) that
calling it neo-compatibilism is misleading. It could actually as easily be
called neo-incompatibilism, I think it shares more with that philosophy.
This is of course my opinion, and it's admittedly subjective. I agree with
Flanagan's suggestion: toss the compatibilist/incompatibilist argument,
since determinism/indeterminism hasn't been demonstrated, and work
to define critical terms like responsibility without resorting to the myth
of free will.

Ken

Retribution, that is blaming the person and not the behavior seems to
me to be related to social hierarchy. When we take a retributivist
attitude toward a person we are in essence attempting to exert our
dominance over them in an effort to get them to submit. The person
who submits, stops performing the unacceptable behavior not because
they have been shown the error of their ways; not because the
underlying mechanisms that caused the behavior have been changed, but
rather because they have accepted a lower hierarchical status and
will now follow the leader.
The dominant individual hasn't had to "figure out" the offender he
has merely had to exert his will. It is an easy system for a social
group to employ that does not require the use of any higher cognitive
abilities.
I think this instinct for dominance and submission is very powerful.
It may be an easy strategy to employ, but I think we can agree that
it is ultimately destructive in society.
Ideally, we shouldn't opt for the quick and easy fix of retribution
but should rather strive to modify the underlying mental architecture
that lead to the offensive behavior.

--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "TWClark"
<twc@n...> wrote:
> Sonny,
>
> I understand and regret your frustration in this regard.  To
clarify, compatibilism is generally understood in the philosophical
community to be the position that 1) the freedom we have is the
freedom of voluntary action and 2) that the full complement of
retributive attitudes and responsibility practices based on
retributive desert are justified by this sort of freedom.
>
> Now, clearly you and I and most of the folks associated with the
CFN are not compatibilists according to this definition.  Although we
believe in the first part (since the freedom of acting voluntarily,
without being coerced, etc. is compatible with NFW), we don't accept
the second part.   How so-called compatibilists can hold onto
retributive justifications for punishment, for instance, is beyond
me, and that issue is the concern of much of the stuff at the
Criminal Justice page, and most recently the first two sections of
Maximizing Liberty.   I've challenged compatibilists to justify their
support for retributivism, and so far haven't heard anything in the
least convincing.
>
> So what do we call our position?  Ken has recommended (as have I
from time to time) that we call it neo-compatibilism, following Owen
Flanagan who used that term in The Problem of the Soul, e.g., see p.
150 re CNHDO and responsibility, and see the index for "neo-
compatibilism".  Keep in mind that Flanagan is absolutely with us in
categorically denying contra-causal free will.  Here's a quote:
>
> "What the neo-compatibilist means when she says that a person is
responsible for some act is, first, that the act was routed through
the conscious deliberation/habit module; second, that that module is
adjustable from the inside, by the agent, and from the outside, by
way of feedback from the moral community; and third, that by virtue
of being routed through a modifiable cognitive module, the person can
learn to respond differently the next time."
>
> Whatever we call our position on free will and responsibility, we
believe that there should be changes in our attitudes and practices
to reflect the fact that we don't have contra-causal free will.
>
> Tom
>   ----- Original Message -----
>   From: Sonny Williams
>   To: appliednaturalism@yahoogroups.com
>   Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 5:50 PM
>   Subject: Re: [appliednaturalism] Re: Irredeemable Terms
>
>
>   Ken,
>
>   Whatever!
>
>   You know, Ken, this is pretty frustrating.  I quote the CFN and
I'm challenged as one who seems to believe in free will.  When Steve
researches the CFN, he lambastes the Naturalist Lexicon.  After you
say that compatibilism is contrary to naturalism (that's a
revelation, since the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy presents
many compatibilist's views and they are identical to what the CFN
says).  So, I quote Tom saying he's a "soft" compatibilist and I'm
criticized for that as well.  Now, he's a "neo-compatibilist," which
is apparently some sort of philosophical animal that is incompatible
with compatibilism.  So now "soft" and "neo-" carry two different
meanings.
>
>   I believe if you look back at my earliest posts you'll find that
I never wanted to use philosophical labeling in the first place.  I
wanted specifics!  I wanted to concentrate on policy issues as the
way to... really understand how we intend to apply the concept of NFW
and CNHDO.  I'm a pretty bright guy, Ken, and I don't have the
foggiest idea what you really mean by NFW and CNHDO.  I'm through
listening to philosophical, hypothetical bullshit.  Saying, "there is
no free will," is as worthless as tits on a boar.  I want answers.
That's what I found at the CFN, but now I'm told that I can't believe
everything that's written there; naturalism is different.  What
exactly do you intend to do with those cute, little philosophical
phrases, just spout 'em out until you're blue in the face and hope
people come crawling to your philosophy?  It ain't gonna happen, Ken.
>
>   Whatever!  I'll just bow out of contributing anything to the
discussion until you guys decide who the hell you really are.
>
>   ----- Original Message -----
>     From: Ken Batts
>     To: appliednaturalism@yahoogroups.com
>     Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 8:11 AM
>     Subject: [appliednaturalism] Re: Irredeemable Terms
>
>
>     Sonny:  Neo-compatibilism (Tom's term for his beliefs) and
>     Compatibilism are incompatible. I suggest we go with Flanagan's
idea of
>     dropping the compatibilist/incompatibilist argument and go
straight to
>     building a philosophy not based on free will.
>
>     Ken
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
>   Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>     a.. To visit your group on the web, go to:
>     http://groups.yahoo.com/group/appliednaturalism/
>
>     b.. To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
>     appliednaturalism-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
>     c.. Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service.

----- Original Message -----

From: Sonny Williams

To: appliednaturalism@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 5:50 PM

Subject: Re: [appliednaturalism] Re: Irredeemable Terms

Ken,

 

Whatever!

 

You know, Ken, this is pretty frustrating.  I quote the CFN and I'm challenged as one who seems to believe in free will.  When Steve researches the CFN, he lambastes the Naturalist Lexicon.  After you say that compatibilism is contrary to naturalism (that's a revelation, since the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy presents many compatibilist's views and they are identical to what the CFN says).  So, I quote Tom saying he's a "soft" compatibilist and I'm criticized for that as well.  Now, he's a "neo-compatibilist," which is apparently some sort of philosophical animal that is incompatible with compatibilism.  So now "soft" and "neo-" carry two different meanings.

 

I believe if you look back at my earliest posts you'll find that I never wanted to use philosophical labeling in the first place.  I wanted specifics!  I wanted to concentrate on policy issues as the way to... really understand how we intend to apply the concept of NFW and CNHDO.  I'm a pretty bright guy, Ken, and I don't have the foggiest idea what you really mean by NFW and CNHDO.  I'm through listening to philosophical, hypothetical bullshit.  Saying, "there is no free will," is as worthless as tits on a boar.  I want answers.  That's what I found at the CFN, but now I'm told that I can't believe everything that's written there; naturalism is different.  What exactly do you intend to do with those cute, little philosophical phrases, just spout 'em out until you're blue in the face and hope people come crawling to your philosophy?  It ain't gonna happen, Ken.

 

Whatever!  I'll just bow out of contributing anything to the discussion until you guys decide who the hell you really are.

 

----- Original Message -----

From: Ken Batts

To: appliednaturalism@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 8:11 AM

Subject: [appliednaturalism] Re: Irredeemable Terms

Sonny:  Neo-compatibilism (Tom's term for his beliefs) and
Compatibilism are incompatible. I suggest we go with Flanagan's idea of
dropping the compatibilist/incompatibilist argument and go straight to
building a philosophy not based on free will.

Ken

If you experience reality through a FW perspective, then NFW feels
mechanistic because it as if Self (FW) is being controlled by
something external to Self. These external things are ones own
emotions, unconscious, etc.
These people do not experience self as and integrated whole of
emotions, unconscious, AND self monitoring. The self monitoring
function takes on the characteristics of a unitary and autonomous
self. A center from which everything else is referenced.
It is perfectly possible to reject FW intellectually and yet to still
experience Self as this unitary center.

Control - so control is having a mental architecture in place that
allows you to act effectively in the world.


--- In naturalismphilosophyforum@yahoogroups.com, "twclark2002"
<twc@n...> wrote:
> Steve,
>
> To my way of thinking, someone has control over things if they can
> act in such a way as to bring about what they want.  I'm in control
> of my fate insofar as its my desires, not someone eles's, that I
act
> on.  Yes, I'm fully caused to desire what I want, but the
> distinction between acting on these desires rather than at the
> behest of someone else's desires still holds.  The way we express
> this is to say that normally I'm in control of my life, not someone
> else.
>
> This sort of control can't ground the ultimate responsibility free
> willists want, so we don't have to worry that admiting such control
> will result in punitive practices based in contra-causal freedom.
> Nor is such control metaphysically incoherent the way libertarian
> free will is.  It simply states the fact that human agents are
often
> in a position of acting to fulfill their desires, and therefore are
> controlling outcomes to their liking.
>
> This is one example of how certain ordinary language distinctions
> still hold within a NFW, CNHDO view of things.
>
> Tom
>
>
> Steve wrote over at the Applied Naturalism group, May 15, 2005, msg
> 1730:
>
> <Sonny,
>
> <I am having a hard time understanding what part of "for every act
> done the actor could not have done otherwise", you are NOT grasping
> as the truth, the absolute, no doubts about it, truth.
>
> <If people get the notion through NFW enlightenment that they have
no
> control over their future, its for a very good reason, they don't
> have any control over their future. They never did before they were
> confronted with the realities of NFWism and of course they don't
> afterwards... and there is no way for them to get control over their
> life. To the extent that you have been misled to believe that
control
> exists for the individual over their life, I am sorry.
>
> <It is true that new learning can alter a person, but to accept new
> learning, or to expose oneself to new learning, and the effect that
> new learning has on the individual is totally out of the control of
> the individual, so in reality new learning, like everything else
that
> really controls what an individual does is outside any kind of real
> control of the individual.
>
> <CNHDO does not distract from NFWism, CNHDO is a logical conclusion
> from NFWism. And as Kan and I have been saying it is one of the
> fruits of the tree of NFWism. We want very badly for people to come
> to understand that CNHDO is true, and to adopt new attitudes
> accordingly. There is almost no sense sharing the secret of NFWism
if
> we're going to hide CNHDO or allow others to pretend CNHDO is not
> true.
>
> Steve>

Steve,

To my way of thinking, someone has control over things if they can
act in such a way as to bring about what they want.  I'm in control
of my fate insofar as its my desires, not someone eles's, that I act
on.  Yes, I'm fully caused to desire what I want, but the
distinction between acting on these desires rather than at the
behest of someone else's desires still holds.  The way we express
this is to say that normally I'm in control of my life, not someone
else.

This sort of control can't ground the ultimate responsibility free
willists want, so we don't have to worry that admiting such control
will result in punitive practices based in contra-causal freedom.
Nor is such control metaphysically incoherent the way libertarian
free will is.  It simply states the fact that human agents are often
in a position of acting to fulfill their desires, and therefore are
controlling outcomes to their liking.

This is one example of how certain ordinary language distinctions
still hold within a NFW, CNHDO view of things.

Tom


Steve wrote over at the Applied Naturalism group, May 15, 2005, msg
1730:

<Sonny,

<I am having a hard time understanding what part of "for every act
done the actor could not have done otherwise", you are NOT grasping
as the truth, the absolute, no doubts about it, truth.

<If people get the notion through NFW enlightenment that they have no
control over their future, its for a very good reason, they don't
have any control over their future. They never did before they were
confronted with the realities of NFWism and of course they don't
afterwards... and there is no way for them to get control over their
life. To the extent that you have been misled to believe that control
exists for the individual over their life, I am sorry.

<It is true that new learning can alter a person, but to accept new
learning, or to expose oneself to new learning, and the effect that
new learning has on the individual is totally out of the control of
the individual, so in reality new learning, like everything else that
really controls what an individual does is outside any kind of real
control of the individual.

<CNHDO does not distract from NFWism, CNHDO is a logical conclusion
from NFWism. And as Kan and I have been saying it is one of the
fruits of the tree of NFWism. We want very badly for people to come
to understand that CNHDO is true, and to adopt new attitudes
accordingly. There is almost no sense sharing the secret of NFWism if
we're going to hide CNHDO or allow others to pretend CNHDO is not
true.

Steve>