McChrystal's 40,000 Troop Hoax
Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, October 13, 2009
It's a time-honored Washington tradition. If you want to bully the government into doing something unpopular and the public into accepting it, manufacture a false emergency. Iraq war? If you don't approve it, mushroom cloud. Banker or IMF bailout? If you don't approve it, financial collapse. Social security privatization? If you don't approve it, the system will go "bankrupt."Our brand is crisis, as James Carville might say.
General McChrystal says that if President Obama does not approve 40,000 more U.S. troops for Afghanistan, and approve them right away, "our mission" - whatever that is - will likely "fail" - whatever that is.
But even if President Obama were to approve General McChrystal's request, the 40,000 troops wouldn't arrive in time to significantly affect the 12-month window McChrystal says will be decisive. So McChrystal's request isn't about what's happening in Afghanistan right now. It's about how many troops the U.S. will have in Afghanistan a year from now and beyond.
There is no emergency requiring a quick decision by President Obama. The current situation in Afghanistan is being used as a bloody shirt to try to lock America into to an endless war, and, as Andrew Bacevich argues in the Boston Globe, lock the Obama Administration into the continuation of military force as the main instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
In his 66-page assessment of the war, McChrystal warns that the next 12 months will probably determine whether U.S. and international forces can regain the initiative from the Taliban.
a recent study by the Institute for the Study of War - a Washington, D.C., think tank headed by Kimberly Kagan, a military analyst who worked on Gen. McChrystal's assessment team - suggested it would be difficult to move enough troops from other posts to deploy anywhere close to 40,000 troops before next summer at the earliest.
The military agrees with the institute's overall findings, although [it] has identified different units it could deploy over the course of the next year.
Let's plot these two facts on the same graph.
Let's say that "12 months" equals 12 months. So, McChrystal's window is between now and next October.
Let's say that "next summer at the earliest" equals June.
We're in October now, so June is eight months away.
That means that for 2/3 of McChrystal's window that will "probably determine" whether we "win" or "lose" in Afghanistan, the 40,000 troops that Obama is being pressured to approve will be mostly irrelevant.
There is no crisis demanding a quick decision on McChrystal's troop request, and plenty of time to explore alternatives, including dramatically reducing our list of enemies, and dramatically increasing the role of diplomacy, negotiations, and deal-making, in Afghanistan and in the region.
In particular, if it's true that 70% of the insurgency consists of "$10-a-day Taliban," as a Senate report estimates, that suggests that we could make deals with (at least) 70% of the insurgency. Suppose that these deals cost us $20 per day, per fighter, and that there are 15,000 Taliban fighters overall. Then a deal with 70% of the insurgency would cost $210,000 per day. The war, on the other hand, costs $165 million per day.
If you assume that fighting this 70% of the insurgency has average cost, then fighting these 70% of Taliban fighters costs $115.5 million per day. So, if we made a deal with them, instead of fighting them, we'd save $115.3 million dollars, every day, for an annual savings of $42 billion dollars. By comparison, if the 10 year cost of health reform is a trillion dollars, then the annual cost is $100 billion. So making a deal with 70% of the Afghan insurgency would pay for roughly half of the cost of health care reform.
In addition, at the current rate about 23 American soldiers are being killed in Afghanistan every month. Assuming, again, average costs, that means that making deals with instead of fighting with 70% of the insurgency will save 16 American lives a month, or 194 American lives a year.
In what is surely an undercount, in the first six months of 2009, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan recorded 1013 civilian deaths. If we use this figure and assume average costs, removing 70% of the insurgency would save 118 Afghan civilians every month, or 1418 per year.
And this analysis doesn't even consider the benefit of avoiding the wounding of American soldiers and Afghan civilians, nor the many other benefits of less fighting, including less trauma for American soldiers in Afghanistan - many of whom are depressed and deeply disillusioned, military chaplains tell the Times of London.
Nor does this analysis consider the benefits of less fighting in terms of less trauma to Afghan civilians and the economic benefits of less fighting for Afghan civilians.
In other words, there is at least one alternative to military escalation that would save more than a thousand lives and tens of billions of dollars every year, among many other benefits over military escalation.
Now, tell me again that there is an emergency requiring President Obama to approve sending 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan.
By How Many Days Can We Shorten This War?
Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy , August 20, 2009
Recently I watched the 2007 Lebanese film "Under the Bombs." The movie tells the story of the U.S.-supported Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, wrapping the historical events inside a fictional narrative. Watching the movie reminded me of Just Foreign Policy's efforts with Jewish Voice for Peace and others to stop that war.
At the time, it seemed clear that the war could not go on indefinitely; the international community would not allow it. But how long would it be allowed to go on? If we could shorten it by one day, innocent civilians would live and not die. The 34-day conflict resulted in 1,191 deaths, the UN Human Rights Council reported. Using this figure, on average, each day of the war killed 35 more people; each day we shortened it saved 35 lives.
Today Afghanistan is holding the first round of its presidential election. Regardless of the outcome, one thing is clear from the campaign: the majority of Afghans are sick and tired of war. "There is broad agreement the war must end," reports Carlotta Gall in the New York Times. There is broad support in Afghanistan for negotiations with insurgents to end the war. The debate inside Afghanistan is on what process negotiations should follow, and whether the Afghan government is really following through on its stated commitment to negotiations.
Americans, too, have apparently had enough. Fifty-four percent - including three-quarters of Democrats - say they oppose the war in Afghanistan, CNNreported this month. AWashington Post-ABC Newspoll now says a majority of Americans see the war in Afghanistan as not worth fighting and just a quarter say more U.S. troops should be sent to the country. Majorities of liberals and Democrats solidly oppose the war and are calling for a reduction in troops. Two-thirds of liberals and six in 10 Democrats are against a troop increase. A majority of women say troop levels should be decreased.
But our leaders in Washington, apparently, are not yet sick and tired of war in Afghanistan. For almost a year, Western officials have been conceding that the war will not end without a political solution that involves negotiations with insurgents. But, these officials say, the West isn't ready yet to make a deal. "Reconciliation is important, but not now," one Western diplomat told the New York Times. "It's not going to happen until the insurgency is weaker and the government is stronger."
So, there's going to be a deal with insurgents; that's a foregone conclusion. The question that remains is how many more people will die before that happens - and whether, from the point of view of the interests of the majority of Afghans and the majority of Americans, the deal we can get 5 or 10 years from now is likely to be so much better than the deal we could get in the next year as to justify the deaths that will be the guaranteed result of postponing meaningful negotiations.
An amendment in June requiring the Pentagon to tell Congress what its strategy was for ending the war failed in the House, 138-278. But in an important milepost for future efforts, it was supported by a majority of House Democrats.
In the Senate, we're much further back: a bill calling for an exit strategy from Afghanistan has not even been introduced. But a path to eventually getting out of Afghanistan has to eventually also go through the Senate.
In our ally Britain, which has far fewer troops there, the question of how long their troops will be in Afghanistan is openly discussed. The head of the British Army said Britain will have to keep thousands on troops on the front line in Afghanistan for up to five more years, theTelegraphreported this week. But this question - how long will our troops be there? - is not even being asked in the U.S. Senate.
The Senate is now in recess; but the recess is a time for Senators to hear from their constituents. Now is the time to urge your Senators to demand an exit strategy from Afghanistan.
Rep. Grijalva Urges U.S. Pressure on Coup Regime in Honduras Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, July 28, 2009
It's been a month since Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was deposed
in a military coup. Negotiations on restoring democracy supported by
the United States broke down when the coup regime refused to accept a
compromise that would allow President Zelaya to return.
The Obama Administration still says
it is working for President Zelaya's return, but so far it has not
responded to the call from Hondurans for increased U.S. pressure on the
coup regime.
Indeed, when President Zelaya tried to increase pressure on the coup
regime by threatening to return to Honduras without an agreement,
Secretary of State Clinton attacked President Zelaya as "reckless," instead of expressing any concern about repression by the coup regime against President Zelaya's supporters.
Now Rep. Raul Grijalva is leading a Congressional effort
to urge the Obama Administration to increase U.S. pressure on the coup
regime by canceling U.S. visas and freezing bank accounts of coup
leaders. Representatives McGovern, Conyers, and Serrano have signed on
to Rep. Grijalva's letter to President Obama.
This isn't just about one man. It's about whether the 60% of
Hondurans who live in poverty have a path to reform and redress of
their grievances. President Zelaya was exiled for seeking reform of
Honduras' constitution - a longstanding demand of social movements in Honduras.
It's also not just about Honduras. Many fear that if the coup in Honduras is allowed to stand it will embolden elite groups in Central and South America who might want to use military force to block political reform movements.
That's why it's so important to reverse this coup. If the Obama
Administration wants to have a pro-majority policy in Latin America, it
can't start off by supporting elite forces in Honduras that refuse to
share power with the 60% of Hondurans who live in poverty.
You can ask your Representative to sign Rep. Grijalva's letter here.
NYT: Taliban Offer Afghan Peace Plan Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, May 26, 2009
With the passage of the war
supplemental by the Senate, President Obama and Congress are "doubling
down" on war in Afghanistan. Are we - and the Afghan people - doomed to
endure many more years of war?
There is no reason that we need be, according to Thursday''s New York Times, which reports
that talks between Taliban leaders and Afghan government
representatives have accelerated since Obama's election, and that
Afghan officials say they have the tacit blessing of Washington for the
talks.
Furthermore, the demands being put forward by the Taliban in the
negotiations appear, on the face of it, to be eminently reasonable.
Daoud Abedi, one of the intermediaries in the talks, told the Times
he had hammered out a common set of demands between the Taliban and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group. The groups agreed to stop fighting if
those conditions were met, Abedi said.
The first demand was an immediate pullback of American and
other foreign forces to their bases, followed by a cease-fire and a
total withdrawal from the country over the next 18 months. Then the
current government would be replaced by a transitional government made
up of a range of Afghan leaders, including those of the Taliban and
other insurgents. Americans and other foreign soldiers would be
replaced with a peacekeeping force drawn from predominantly Muslim
nations, with a guarantee from the insurgent groups that they would not
attack such a force. Nationwide elections would follow after the
Western forces left.
Is there anything here which appears unreasonable on its face?
- Pullback to bases: this was a demand of the Iraqi government, which the US eventually agreed to a version of.
- Cease-fire: a standard element of any peace plan.
- Timetable for US withdrawal - in Iraq, the US agreed to a timetable for withdrawal.
- Transitional government including insurgent leaders: another standard feature of peace agreements.
- Replacement of Western troops by peacekeepers from Muslim nations:
eminently reasonable. Note that many Muslim nations who might be
willing to contribute to such a force have very close relations with
the United States.
- Guarantee from insurgents not to attack such a force: obviously, a
pre-condition of such a force being deployed; Muslim nations wouldn't
deploy their forces unless they believed such guarantees were credible,
and if the Taliban reneged on such a deal, it would hurt them very
badly politically. Moreover, the Taliban have adhered to similar
agreements made in the past, mediated by Pakistan.
- Nationwide elections after departure of Western forces - who could
be against that? A standard principle of UN decolonization is that
elections should not take place under the auspices of occupying powers.
The Taliban also demand the end of US drone attacks in Pakistan. But since even counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen says the drone attacks are doing the US more harm than good,
and since according to Pakistan they are killing more civilians than
militants, it's hard to see why this should be a deal-breaker.
The talks are significant because they suggest how a political settlement may be able to end the eight-year-old war, the Times says.
Of course, all this is one-half of the negotiation: the Taliban
demands. What's missing for an agreement are the US demands. The US is
sure to demand, at the very least, a guarantee from the Taliban about
Afghanistan not being a base for attacks on the US; past statements
from Taliban officials suggest that such a guarantee might not be very
hard to obtain in the context of an agreement. But in any event, the
fact that the Taliban are making reasonable demands ought to focus
attention on the need for the Obama Administration to get serious about
supporting inside-Afghanistan diplomacy.
The signaled position of the Obama Administration has been: we're
not in any hurry for talks, because we want to bloody the Taliban
first, so they'll be more flexible in negotiations. But if the Taliban
are already being flexible, perhaps we could skip over the bloodying
part - given that for every bloodied Taliban, there are going to be
fifty bloodied Afghan civilians - and move straight to meaningful
negotiations.
Will Speaker Pelosi Stand Up to the IMF? Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, May 20, 2009
It would be an exaggeration to say that Congress has a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity this week to reform the policies of the
International Monetary Fund. If the future is like the past, if
Congress misses this opportunity, another one will come along - in
about 10 years or so.
This week, House and Senate leaders are meeting in a conference
committee to work out the differences between the House and Senate
versions of the supplemental appropriations bill. The Senate version of
the bill is likely to include $100 billion and new authorities for the
IMF, but the House version of the supplemental bill did not include
funds for the IMF. The Senate is debating amendments now as I write.
The conference committee will almost surely meet soon after Senate
passage; the stated goal is to pass the supplemental before the
Memorial Day recess.
Concrete, observable reforms of the IMF's policies in poor countries
should be part of any agreement: there should be no "blank check" for
the IMF. The IMF is imposing policies in developing countries we
wouldn't accept in the U.S. - when we have a recession, our government
spends money to help the economy recover, as we did in President
Obama's stimulus package. When developing countries have a recession,
the IMF demands budget cuts. With Democrats in charge in Washington,
the IMF - in which the United States has overwhelming influence -
should not be imposing Republican economic policies. In particular, the
IMF should not be imposing Republican economic policies in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, since that fundamentally undermines the quest for
political stability in these countries. It's the height of
self-defeating absurdity to appropriate US tax dollars for
reconstruction and development in these countries while with the other
hand - the IMF hand - we tell them that their governments can't
stimulate their economies.
What happens in the conference process is largely controlled by key
leaders on particular issues. Regarding the IMF, what House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi, Senator Chris Dodd, and Congresswoman Nita Lowey do will
greatly determine whether the IMF will get a blank check or will have
to implement meaningful reforms. In the past, Pelosi, Dodd, and Lowey
have been leaders on issues of World Bank and IMF reform, international
debt relief, HIV/AIDS, and global health.
If you care about these things, now would be a good time to pick up
the phone. If you live in Connecticut, call Senator Dodd: (202)
224-2823. If you're a constituent of Rep. Lowey in New York, call her
office: 202-225-6506. Otherwise, call Speaker Pelosi's office: (202)
225-0100.
When you speak to the receptionist, you could say something like the following:
"My name is ___________ and I'm calling from
_______________[city/state]. In the conference committee on the
supplemental, [Speaker Pelosi /Senator Dodd/ Congresswoman Lowey] has
the power to be a champion for reform of the IMF's policies which have
limited access to health care and education in poor nations and poor
country debt relief. I urge [Speaker Pelosi/Senator Dodd/Congresswoman
Lowey] to include language in the conference report that ensures IMF
agreements do not impose contractionary, recession-worsening policies
as they currently are doing, which is resulting in rising unemployment
and the closure of hospitals and schools. Thank you."
Stopping Pakistan Drone Strikes Suddenly Plausible Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, May 5, 2009
Until this week, it seemed like
the conventional wisdom in Washington was that stopping U.S drone
strikes in Pakistan was outside the bounds of respectable discussion.
That just changed. Or it should have.
Writing in the Los Angeles Times,
Doyle McManus notes that counterinsurgency guru David Kilcullen has
told Congress that U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan are backfiring and
should be stopped. Until now Congress has been reluctant to challenge
the drone strikes, as they are reluctant in general to challenge
"military strategy," even when it appears to be causing terrible harm.
But as McManus notes, Kilcullen has unimpeachable Pentagon credentials.
He served as a top advisor in Iraq to General Petraeus on
counterinsurgency, and is credited as having helped design the Iraq
"surge." Now, anyone in Washington who wants to challenge the drone
strikes has all the political cover they could reasonably expect.
And what Kilcullen said leaves very little room for creative misinterpretation:
"Since 2006, we've killed 14 senior Al Qaeda leaders using
drone strikes; in the same time period, we've killed 700 Pakistani
civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular.
They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they've given rise
to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the
extremists and leads to spikes of extremism. ... The current path that
we are on is leading us to loss of Pakistani government control over
its own population."
Presumably, causing the Pakistani government to lose "control of its
own population" is not an objective of United States foreign policy.
McManus says there's no sign that the Obama Administration is
taking Kilcullen's advice and Obama administration is unlikely to
abandon "one of the few strategies that has produced results." But a Washington Post report suggests otherwise:
Although the missile attacks are privately approved by the
Pakistani government, despite its public denunciations, they are highly
unpopular among the public. As Zardari's domestic problems have grown,
the Obama administration last month cut the frequency of the attacks.
Some senior U.S. officials think they have reached the point of
diminishing returns and the administration is debating the rate at
which they should continue.
Since it is manifestly apparent that 1) the drone strikes are
causing civilian casualties 2) they are turning Pakistani public
opinion against their government and against the U.S. 3) they are
recruiting more support for insurgents and 4) even military experts
think the strikes are doing more harm than good, even from the point of
view of U.S. officials, why shouldn't they stop? Why not at least a
time-out?
Why shouldn't Members of Congress ask for some justification for the
continuation of these strikes? The Pentagon is asking for more money.
It's time for Congress to ask some questions.
On Israeli Settlement Freeze, Public Has Obama's Back by Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, May 2, 2009
There have been hints in the
press that the Obama Administration has been considering conditioning
U.S. aid to Israel on a real freeze of Israeli settlement expansion in
the West Bank. There's a conventional wisdom that suggests that doing
this would touch a "third rail of politics." But the conventional
wisdom might not have been accurate; if it once was accurate, it might
not be accurate any more.
WorldPublicOpinion.org has just released a poll
showing that three-quarters of Americans oppose Israeli settlement
expansion in the West Bank. This number is up 23 points from 2002.
Even among respondents who say they sympathize with Israel more than
the Palestinians, 64% say Israel should not build settlements in the
West Bank.
Opposition to settlements is found among majorities of Democrats,
Republicans, and independents. Those who followed the issue closely
oppose settlement expansion by the same margin as those who don't.
Some may say: public opinion doesn't matter. What matters, they may
say, is that the so-called "Israel Lobby" will effectively punish any
politician who tries to shift U.S. policy towards Israel and the
Palestinians.
But the Obama Administration has already proved that this isn't necessarily so.
The administration has asked Congress for minor changes in
U.S. law that would permit aid to continue flowing to Palestinians in
the event Hamas-backed officials become part of a unified Palestinian
government.
Secretary of State Clinton defended the administration's position before Congress. She noted that
the United States supports and funds the Lebanese
government, even though it includes members of Hezbollah, another
militant group on the U.S. terrorist list.
Reps. Nita Lowey and Mark Kirk objected. But as the Jewish Telegraphic Agencynotes,
Significantly, however, Rep. Debbie Wasserman Shultz
(D-Fla.), a pro-Israel stalwart, defended Clinton in a call organized
by the National Jewish Democratic Council to mark the first 100 days of
the Obama administration.
"The unity government itself will have embraced those principles,"
she said. "The most important priority for members of Congress is to
support Israel and to move the peace process forward."
If the Obama Administration can shift U.S. policy towards engaging
in some form with Hamas, then surely it can shift policy towards moving
the U.S. from ineffective to effective implementation of its stated
policy of opposition to Israeli settlement expansion, as it is
virtually universally recognized that stopping Israeli settlement
expansion is an absolutely necessary element of achieving a two-state
solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict - just as it is virtually
universally recognized that some form of engagement with Hamas will be
necessary to achieve a two-state solution in the long run, and to get
effective aid into Gaza in the short run.
Moreover, if the U.S. would get serious about stopping Israeli
settlement expansion, it could help fundamentally alter the political
dynamics in Israel. Israel's right-wing has grown accustomed to the
notion that Israel can indefinitely go through the motions of a "peace
process," while steadily expanding settlements in the West Bank in the
hopes of making a Palestinian state impossible. If the U.S. puts an end
to this game, it will empower the political forces in Israel who
genuinely want a two-state solution - who, on this question, represent
the majority of the Israeli population.
Foreign Army Shoots US Peace Activist; US Does Nothing Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, March 25, 2009
Here's a news awareness question you might not hear on NPR's "Wait, Wait, Don't Tell Me." (A search on the NPR website yielded no results.)
On March 13, a US citizen attending a peace demonstration was shot
in the head by a soldier of a foreign army. Eyewitnesses report that
the American and his companions weren't doing anything and hadn't done
anything that would justify the use of force, let alone shooting him in
the head.
Here's your news awareness question: name the country.
The American remains hospitalized in critical condition, reportedThe Independent
Tuesday, describing him as "fighting for life" following three brain
surgeries. He suffered a multiple fracture to his skull, severe injury
to the frontal lobe of his brain, and a collapsed eye socket. Part of
his right frontal lobe had to be removed.
His parents have called for a full investigation. But so far,
judging from press reports, the United States government hasn't had
anything to say about it. Why not?
I freely concede that I take this quite personally. I was an
international peace volunteer once. When you are a US peace volunteer
in an international conflict situation, you like to think that your
blue passport gives you some measure of protection; foreign soldiers,
you hope, are going to think twice before shooting an American, because
the US government would have to make a fuss. And if the foreign army in
question belongs to a government that has very friendly relations with
Washington, and is highly dependent on substantial US military,
economic, diplomatic and political aid from the United States, then you
might think that foreign army would really go out of its way not to
shoot Americans.
But, in this case, you might be wrong.
When I open my blue passport, I find a very nice letter from the
Secretary of State asking everyone to gave me safe passage. It would be
nice to think that text means something.
But in this case, it doesn't seem to.
Perhaps there is a Member of Congress who is willing to ask why Tristan Anderson was shot?
Election Dirty Tricks Again in Washington and El Salvador Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, Thursday, March 13, 2009
Last week, more than 30 Members of Congress joined Rep. Raul
Grijalva in asking President Obama to affirm U.S. neutrality in El
Salvador's Presidential election on Sunday March 15, to stop the
recycling in El Salvador of US threats when Salvadorans voted in 2004.
But there has been no high-level response from the Obama
Administration, Rep. Grijalva told Democracy Now! yesterday.
But right-wing Republicans in Congress have not been quiet. Upside Down Newsreports:
On Tuesday El Salvador's largest circulating daily, the Diario de Hoy,
published news of a letter signed by over 40 Republicans in Congress,
denouncing the FMLN and warning of their links to Venezuela and Cuba.
The letter expresses "grave concern that a victory by the FMLN could
make links between El Salvador and the regimes of Venezuela, Iran and
Cuba, and other states that promote terrorism, and also with other
non-democratic regimes and terrorist organizations."
Yesterday, two Republicans gave speeches on the floor of
the House of Representatives threatening that Salvadorans living in the
U.S. will lose their immigration status and be outlawed from sending
money home to their families if voters in El Salvador exercise their
right to elect the opposition FMLN party's candidate on Sunday.
Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ) said, "Should the pro-terrorist FMLN party
replace the current government in El Salvador, the United States, in
the interests of national security, would be required to reevaluate our
policy toward El Salvador, including cash remittance and immigration
policies to compensate for the fact there will no longer be a reliable
counterpart in the Salvadoran government."
Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) stated, "Those monies that are coming from
here to there I am confident will be cut, and I hope the people of El
Salvador are aware of that because it will have a tremendous impact on
individuals and their economy." Indeed, these threats carry
considerable weight for Salvadoran voters, as 25% of the Salvadoran
population lives in the U.S., and 20% of the nation's economy consists
of remittances from those family members."
Why did they do this yesterday? Krista Lee, a US solidarity activist in El Salvador as an election observer, writes:
They made this statement yesterday so that it would come
out on the front page of the Salvadoran papers today, just a few hours
after the campaign officially closed, so the FMLN's ability to respond
is severely limited.
Of course, the official US position is that the US is indeed neutral. A State Department spokesman toldInter Press Service today:
"The U.S. government reiterates its official position that
it does not support either candidate in the upcoming presidential
election in El Salvador on March 15th. Through our embassy in El
Salvador, we have stated this position publicly and repeatedly since
November of 2007.
"With regard to the letters that have been sent [by members of
Congress], the separation of powers and freedom in the U.S.allow for a
debate in which members of the U.S. legislature have expressed their
opinions. This does not reflect the official position of the United
States."
But, being low-profile, this statement will not have the same effect
as the Republicans' statements, trumpeted in El Salvador's private
media, which like the media in Venezuela, are tremendously biased - in
this case, in favor of the right-wing government.
That's why Rep. Grijalva asked for a high-level statement from the Obama Administration. Why has it not yet come?
Here are some actions concerned Americans can take:
1. Call the State Department
to ask for a US Embassy press conference in San Salvador to publicly
state US neutrality in the Salvadoran presidential elections: (202)
647-4087/ (202) 647-6575 (message.)
NYT Publishes Roadmap for Taliban Talks Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, March 11, 2009
If you're interested in a "way forward" in Afghanistan that's not
built around killing a bunch of innocent people for no reason, then I
strongly encourage you to read and absorb every word of Carlotta Gall's report in Wednesday's New York Times, "As U.S. Weighs Taliban Negotiations, Afghans Are Already Talking."
Some key points, based on conversations with Afghan officials and Western diplomats in Kabul:
- Far from being "pie in the sky," discussions with the Taliban
leadership are already underway and could be developed into more formal
talks with the support of the US. The ongoing talks were actually
initiated by an overture from the Taliban: the Taliban leadership
council first approached the government about peace talks last year.
- Officials with contacts within the Taliban said the current discussions had been productive.
- The peace process might have made greater progress already if the Afghan government and the US had pushed it more forcefully.
- Afghan parliamentarians involved in the talks said they were
waiting for President Karzai to secure guarantees of support for the
process from foreign governments, in particular the United States, before they could go further.
- Negotiations should be expanded to a broad spectrum of Taliban
leaders; a policy of talking only to "moderates" is doomed to failure;
negotiations have to be conducted with broad consultation among the
Taliban leadership and through Pashtun tribal leaders and elders.
- As part of the ongoing negotiations, the Taliban are demanding an
end to house searches and arrests, and the release of Taliban detainees
from Afghan jails and the US detention centers at Guantánamo and
Bagram. [Those seem like negotiable demands, don't you think? It's not
as if they're insisting that "The official language of Afghanistan will
now be Swedish" or "Everyone has to change their underwear three times
a day, and they have to wear them on the outside, so we can check."]
...
The point that the U.S. needs to go beyond endorsing negotiations with
"moderate Taliban" was made forcefully by Afghan businesswoman Rangina
Hamidi, interviewed Tuesday on Democracy Now!:
"extremists" also have to be engaged. She noted that "almost every
group that has been involved in the destruction of Afghanistan since
the past thirty years" was represented in the US-organized political
process for Afghanistan after 2001 - except the Taliban.
Last weekend President Obama "signaled that reconciliation could
emerge as an important initiative" as part of his review of US policy
in Afghanistan, the New York Timesreported.
This is potentially a very hopeful sign. But it is absolutely critical
that the "reconciliation" in the new strategy potentially includes
Taliban leaders who can actually help deliver peace, not just be a
rehash of the existing "reconciliation" policy that has failed:
The problem with the reconciliation process, officials say,
is that it demanded that the Taliban lay down their arms in return for
security guarantees, which they did not trust either the government to
enforce or the Americans to honor.
"We make reconciliation sound like surrender; where has that ever
worked?" said one Western official with long experience in Afghanistan,
who did not want to be identified because of the political nature of
his comments. "What is required is structured engagement with all
Afghan communities, including the Pashtun and therefore representatives
of the Taliban, around a new political project."
A recent ABC poll
found that 64% of Afghans support negotiations with the Taliban. The Afghan government - whatever its faults, a government selected by a U.S. - endorsed political process - supports negotiations. Since
we are all about "promoting democracy," shouldn't that count for
something?
Can Congress Save Obama from Afghan Quagmire? Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, March 9, 2009
A progressive Presidency is a terrible thing to waste. It only comes
around once every so often. Wouldn't it be a shame if Americans' hopes
for the Obama Administration were squandered in Afghanistan?
Members of Congress who want the Obama Administration to succeed
won't do it any favors by keeping silent about the proposed military
escalation in Afghanistan. The actions of the Obama Administration so
far clearly indicate that they can move in response to pressure: both
good pressure and bad pressure. If there is only bad pressure, it's
more than likely that policy will move in a bad direction. In
announcing an increase in U.S. troops before his Afghanistan review was
complete, Obama partially acceded to pressure from the military. If we
don't want the military to have carte blanche, there needs to be
counterpressure.
Some Members of Congress are starting to speak up. Rep. Murtha
recently said he's uncomfortable with Obama's decision to increase the
number of troops in the country by 17,000 before a goal was clearly
defined, APreports.
Sen. Nelson is calling for clear benchmarks to measure progress in
Afghanistan, and said he may try to add benchmarks to the upcoming war
supplemental bill this spring, CQ Todayreports.
But these individual expressions of discomfort will likely not be
enough to stop the slide towards greater and greater military
escalation.
Eight Members of Congress (Walter Jones, Neil Abercrombie, Roscoe
Bartlett, Steve Kagen, Dennis Kucinich, Ron Paul, Ed Whitfield, and
Lynn Woolsey) have initiated a letter to President Obama urging him to
reconsider his support for military escalation. The letter argues that
military escalation may well be counterproductive towards the goal of
creating a stable government that can control Afghanistan, noting that
a recent Carnegie Endowment study concluded that "the only meaningful
way to halt the insurgency's momentum is to start withdrawing troops.
The presence of foreign troops is the most important element driving
the resurgence of the Taliban." [You can find the letter - and ask your
Representative to sign it - here.]
There is political space for challenging the logic of escalation.
Forty-two percent of Americans think troops in Afghanistan should be increased, up from 34 percent in January, CBS Newsreports,
no doubt reflecting the largely uncritical press treatment that the
proposal for military escalation has received. But the same CBS
News/New York Times poll still found that more people thought that U.S.
troop levels in Afghanistan should be decreased (24%) or kept the same
(23%) - i.e. 47% thought troop levels should be decreased or stay the
same, rather than increased.
If we want the US government to seriously pursue diplomacy, there
must be serious counterpressure against sending more troops without
end. If you want recycling, you have to discourage the establishment of
new landfills. If you want economic development and human rights to be
at the center of trade policy, you have to jam up corporate trade
deals. If you want diplomacy, there has to be a significant political
pushback to military escalation.
President
Obama wants, quite reasonably, to "reset" relations with Russia. He
also said, quite reasonably, he would "go through the federal budget
line by line, programs that don't work, we cut."
Our relations with Colombia also need to be reset. "Plan Colombia,"
which was supposedly going to cut the flow of Colombian cocaine into
the U.S., doesn't work, neither to reduce the flow of illegal drugs,
nor to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Colombia.
Since Plan Colombia doesn't work, it should be cut.
An October report from the Government Accountability Office
found that coca-leaf production in Colombia had increased by 15% and
cocaine production had increased by 4% between 2000 and 2006, and
recommended cutting funding. Plan Colombia has cost U.S. taxpayers over
$6 billion.
Plan Colombia has also failed to promote human rights. Broadly
speaking, the practical political meaning of Plan Colombia in the
Colombian political context has been: "Washington supports the
Colombian government, and therefore the Colombian government can do
whatever it wants without restraint." The human consequences of this
political blank check have been disastrous.
A recent report by Human Rights First found human rights defenders
in Colombia are frequently accused by the government and its supporters
of belonging to leftwing guerrillas, and are secretly investigated for
months or years before being "illegally detained," Inter Press Servicereports.
"The steadfast investigation of spurious criminal complaints against
defenders stands in stark contrast to the failure to investigate
attacks, threats, and other forms of intimidation perpetrated against
them or against civilians more generally," HRF said.
In Colombia, the government accusation of "supporting the
guerrillas" can be a death sentence, since it's understood as a "seal
of approval" for paramilitary violence. On February 20, Senators Brown
and Murray wrote the Colombian Ambassador expressing concern at attacks made by President Uribe against human rights advocates
who had testified before the House Committee on Education and Labor.
Brown and Murray expressed concern for "the effect [these] comments may
have on the safety of those who voluntarily testified." Uribe has
publicly smeared human rights critics as members of the guerrillas'
"international bloc."
Last week, the Fellowship of Reconciliation and dozens of human rights organizations and religious institutions released a letter to President Obama
calling for major changes in U.S. policy toward Colombia. The groups
urged the President to end the failed drug policy and to invest in drug
treatment for U.S. citizens and aid for the millions of Colombians
displaced by war. "Rather than ending the drug trade, the problem has
increased - with more coca plants grown in Colombia, and cocaine as
easily available in the United States," said Mark Johnson of FOR.
"There is no better time than now to end Plan Colombia."
The letter urged the Obama Administration to end military aid to
Colombia - currently the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the
Western Hemisphere - and called for renewed diplomatic efforts to
support a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict in Colombia.
Many are looking to the Obama Administration for changed policies in Latin America. Senator Lugar has called for scrapping the Cuba embargo. Reps. Grijalva and Kaptur are asking
the Obama Administration to affirm that the U.S. won't interfere in El
Salvador's March 15 Presidential election and will respect the result.
These are all worthy efforts that should be supported. But our
failed Colombia policy deserves special attention: it's literally a
matter of life and death. Our carte blanche support for the Colombian
government has fostered a climate of impunity for violence against
civilians. And all it would take to begin to make change is cutting an
expensive government program that doesn't work.
Could Obama Say a Few Words for Democracy in El Salvador? Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, March 2, 2009
We all know that President Obama has a lot on his plate. On the other
hand, as candidate Obama reminded us, "words matter," especially the
words spoken by the President of the United States, and with El
Salvador facing a watershed Presidential election on March 15,
President Obama could do a lot for the people of El Salvador and the
future of U.S. relations with Latin America simply by saying something
along the following lines between now and March 15:
"The United States government will remain neutral in El Salvador's
March 15 presidential race, will respect the election results, and will
work toward a positive relationship with whichever party is elected."
If you haven't been following the recent history of U.S. relations
with Central America in general and El Salvador in particular, that
might seem like a pretty banal statement. But in the context of the
actual history of massive U.S. interference in the region's political
processes, such a statement would be revolutionary.
Before El Salvador's 2004 presidential election, Bush Administration
officials attempted to influence the vote by suggesting that if the
opposition party won, the status of Salvadoran immigrants in the U.S.
would be threatened and remittances sent to El Salvador by Salvadorans
working in the U.S. could be ended. These remittances have been
estimated to comprise 10-20% of El Salvador's GDP, likely surpassing
official development assistance, foreign direct investment, and tourism
as a source of foreign exchange for El Salvador. These threats were
widely reported in the Salvadoran press and have contributed to a
lingering belief that the U.S. will not permit the opposition to win
the election - a belief currently being stoked by right-wing campaign
ads in the country, which are recycling the threats from 2004.
If the U.S. makes no statement that it will remain neutral and
respect the results, the practical effect will be to preserve the
enduring legacy of past interference, and thereby to effectively
intervene against the opposition. An official statement is needed to
clarify for Salvadoran public opinion that the U.S. will remain
scrupulously neutral.
U.S. immigration policy should not be made into a political
instrument used to influence foreign elections. Similarly, we reject
the suggestion that the US government would seek to financially punish
Salvadorans, in this country or in El Salvador , for exercising their
right to elect a government of their choosing. As members of Congress,
we will not support any such measure.
Could Obama say a few words for democracy in El Salvador? It would
take him 30 seconds to do so. But it would be a big step towards
repairing the damage of the last 30 years of U.S. policy.
Guadeloupe Strikes: A Warning to Obama? Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, February 22, 2009
On February 12, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told
Congress that the global economic crisis was the most serious security
challenge facing the United States and that it could topple governments
and trigger waves of refugees, the Los Angeles Timesreported.
A week later, the French government was sending police
reinforcements to the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe after a month of
strikes and protests over low pay and high prices followed by clashes
between police and protesters. Strikers have been demanding a raise of
$250 a month for low-wage workers who now make about $1,130 a month.
"Underlying much of the unrest in Guadeloupe and Martinique is anger
within the local Afro-Caribbean community...that the vast majority of
wealth and land remain in the hands of colonist descendants," notedAl Jazeera.
Across much of the world, and much of Latin America in particular,
the global economic crisis is going to play out against a legacy of
extreme inequality and poverty. The unrest in Guadeloupe may be a
preview of what's coming worldwide if there isn't a change in
Washington's priorities.
If the global economic crisis is the most serious security
challenge, how come there is so little discussion of devoting more
resources to addressing this challenge directly? Quite the contrary:
with the purported goal of reducing the U.S. budget deficit, the Obama
Administration is planning to "scale back" its promise to double
foreign aid, the New York Times reports.
The notion that scaling back Obama's commitment to double foreign
aid would be a reasonable way to reduce the nation's fiscal deficit can
only be taken seriously as long as people aren't aware of or don't
consider the relative magnitude of the numbers involved and the likely
consequences of different kinds of spending.
The Times article doesn't report how much the deficit might
be decreased by the threatened "scaling back." But the campaign promise
was to double foreign aid to $50 billion by 2012. If instead of
"scaling back" the promised increase, foreign aid weren't increased at
all, that would suggest a maximum saving of about $25 billion a year.
Representative Barney Frank recently wrote in The Nation:
"I would be very happy if there was some way to make it a
misdemeanor for people to talk about reducing the budget deficit
without including a recommendation that we substantially cut military
spending ... Current plans call for us not only to spend hundreds of
billions more in Iraq but to continue to spend even more over the next
few years producing new weapons that might have been useful against the
Soviet Union. Many of these weapons are technological marvels, but they
have a central flaw: no conceivable enemy ... In some cases we are
developing weapons -- in part because of nothing more than momentum --
that lack not only a current military need but even a plausible use in
any foreseeable future ... If, beginning one year from now, we were to
cut military spending by 25 percent from its projected levels, we would
still be immeasurably stronger than any combination of nations with
whom we might be engaged."
Frank's proposal would save about $160 billion a year - more than six
times the savings from not increasing foreign aid at all. Or, put
another way, if instead of Frank's proposal, we only cut military
spending by 4%, that would pay for the entire increase in foreign aid
that President Obama promised during the campaign.
And surely it's the case, that if Representative Frank wants to cut
the military budget by 25% in part because so much of the military
budget has no relevance to "security" (except perhaps to the "security"
of executives at military contractors in their desire to continue to
live extravagantly on the public dole) then we can find 4% of cuts in
the military budget that have nothing to do with "security," as most
Americans would understand it. And if that 4% were reallocated to
keeping Obama's promise to double foreign aid, then instead of spending
it on corporate welfare for military contractors we'd be using it to
address what Director of National Intelligence Blair told Congress was
the most serious security challenge facing the United States.
"I know development assistance is not the most popular of
programs, but as president, I will make the case to the American people
that it can be our best investment in increasing the common security of
the entire world and increasing our own security," he said. "That's why
I will double our foreign assistance to $50 billion by 2012 and use it
to support a stable future in failing states and sustainable growth in
Africa, to halve global poverty and to roll back disease."
We eagerly await you, President Obama. Use your bully pulpit. Make the case.
Conditioning Part of U.S. Aid to Israel on Implementation of U.S. Policy Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, February 16, 2009
It
is well-known outside the United States that a key obstacle, if not the
key obstacle, to Israeli/Palestinian peace is the relationship between
Israel and the United States. To say that the U.S. "supports Israel"
severely misstates the problem: the key problem is the perception and
the reality that the U.S. almost unfailingly protects the Israeli
government from the negative consequences of anti-Palestinian policies,
such as the recent military assault on Gaza, so that while rhetorically
the U.S. is committed to peace, in practice the incentives that have
been created and maintained by U.S. policy have had the effect of
constantly pushing the Israeli government towards more confrontation
with the Palestinians, rather than towards accommodation. Just as a
Wall Street banker who expects a U.S. government bailout will take
dangerous risks since he is protected from the potential negative
consequences of those risks, so Israeli government leaders, faced with
choices between "risks for peace" and "risks for war" will tend to
choose "risks for war" since the U.S. government is perceived to
provide a blanket insurance policy against "risks for war" while no
such insurance is perceived to exist for "risks for peace."
The key immediate question then for people in the United States
concerned about Israeli-Palestinian peace is altering the character of
the insurance policy. Just as Washington must demand policy changes in
exchange for insuring Wall Street banks, so Washington must demand
policy changes in exchange for insuring Israeli government policies. In
either case, the failure to demand policy changes spreads systemic
risk, since the insurance effectively makes the failed policies into
policies of the U.S. government.
Could public opinion in the United States have an impact? While
Americans are in general significantly misinformed about the
Israel-Palestinian conflict due to the fact that most reporting of the
conflict in the United States takes place through the prism of U.S.
government policy, it is still the case that there is a significant gap
between public opinion and U.S. government policy, whether because the
media reporting is not nearly as unbalanced as the U.S. government
policy, or because more reasonable instincts among the public tend to
counteract somewhat the bias of the media, or both.
On December 31, Rasmussen reported
that Americans were "closely divided" over whether the Israel should be
taking military action in Gaza. 44% said Israel should have taken
military action, while 41% said it should have tried to find a
diplomatic solution. Among Democrats, only 31% backed military action,
while 55% said Israel should have tried to find a diplomatic solution.
Among Republicans, 62% backed military action, while 27% said Israel
should have tried to find a diplomatic solution.
These views were not effectively represented in Congress. When, week
after the Rasmussen poll, a resolution effectively endorsing the
Israeli assault - that's how it was, quite predictably, reported in the
press, and therefore that was the effective result - was considered by
the Senate, it was passed by voice vote. When it was considered by the
House, it passed 390-5,
with four Democrats and one Republican voting no and 22 Democrats
voting "present" - in effect, a politically cautious no vote (many
Members who voted "present" had publicly criticized the Israeli
assault.) So, being charitable and counting the "present" votes as
"no," the vote was 390-27, or 94% to 6%, in favor of Israel's military
action, in contrast to the 44% to 41% (or 52% to 48%, excluding those
who didn't answer) that might have been predicted if Congress were
reflecting public opinion. Among Democrats, it was 90% to 10% voting in
favor of military action in the House, as opposed to 55% to 31% against
military action among Democrats generally (64% to 36% excluding
non-answerers); among Republicans in the House, the vote was 99% to 1%
in favor of military action, as opposed to 62% to 37% among Republicans
generally (70% to 30%, excluding non-answerers.)
In July 2008, a poll
published by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the
University of Maryland asked: "In the Israel-Palestinian conflict, do
you think [the US] should take Israel's side, take the Palestinians'
side, or not take either side?" 71% of Americans surveyed answered:
"Not take either's side."
Of course, this is not the only issue where Congress diverges
sharply from public opinion. It is well-known that a well-financed,
disciplined, and focused lobby can outweigh broad public opinion.
However, in addition to this dynamic, it is also true in this
particular case that lobbying on the other side is handicapped by a gap
in infrastructure.
In particular, there is a voice missing: an organized effort acting
in DC, and supported by grassroots action outside of DC, to begin to
move the parameters of the insurance policy. On the one hand, there are
inside-DC groups that have been working diligently to try to change the
debate. But these groups have been unable politically to raise the
all-important question of US pressure on the Israeli government. On the
other hand you have groups outside of DC that are quite happy to raise
the question of pressure, but have been so far unable politically to
push for anything strategic. "Stop aid to Israel" may be an emotionally
satisfying demand in the context of a demonstration, but it is a
totally irrelevant demand in the context of Washington. If one had a
meeting with a Member of Congress about "stopping US aid to Israel,"
the effective response would likely be: come back when you are ready to
stop wasting my time.
If one considers precedents of how progress has been made on similar
issues in Congress in the past, the logical thing to do at this stage
would be to push for an amendment that would condition a part of US aid
to Israel on compliance with an important aspect of stated US policy.
In this year's funding cycle, for example, US military aid to Israel is
expected to increase. The increase, or even part of the increase, could
have real conditions attached.
The principal determinant of what real conditions would be attached
in a meaningful effort would be the opinions of Members of Congress who
were willing to do so. But there are some obvious candidates.
An obvious example would be to condition part of US military
assistance on certification by the President that all Israeli
settlement expansion in the West Bank has ceased. This condition is
obvious because 1) it is widely considered a key precondition of any
meaningful "peace process" 2) it is already stated US policy 3) it is
verifiable 4) it is already a condition of the "road map" 5) Senator
Mitchell, in his 2001 report on the causes of the second intifada,
identified Israeli settlement expansion as a key cause of violence and
predicted that violence would resume if settlement expansion were not
stopped - as it wasn't. So, such a condition would actually implement
existing US policy and would actually strengthen Mitchell's hand as a
negotiator.
It is important to note that such a campaign - like Rocky's first
fight - should be judged a significant success if it takes place at
all. In other words, if in 2009 even a handful of Members of Congress
were willing to publicly support an amendment that would condition even
a small part of US aid to Israel on verified implementation of US
policy on an issue important to peace - such as cessation of settlement
expansion in the West Bank - and if there were a significant public
mobilization on behalf of such an amendment, it would significantly
change the dynamics of the US-Israel relationship, and lay the ground
for expanded efforts to do so in the future. There are about 50-60
Members of Congress who have indicated by past actions that they might
at least be willing to consider such a step. If a third of them
actually did so, it would be noticed. But first they have to be asked
in a way that would make them consider it to be a live proposition, and
that is the piece that has been so far missing.
Mitchell needs more support, because at the moment it's far from
obvious whether Washington will let Mitchell be Mitchell. He's been
praised for his work in the Northern Ireland peace process, but for all
the difficulties Mitchell faced in Northern Ireland, there was one
thing he could count on: no-one prevented him from talking to one of
the key parties in the conflict. Mitchell talked to Gerry Adams and
Martin McGuinness, leaders of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the
Irish Republican Army, considered at the time [with obvious
justification] by the British, the U.S. and the Protestant leadership
in Northern Ireland to be a terrorist group. Today, Sinn Fein is part
of the Northern Ireland government. But at the moment, Mitchell's not
allowed to talk to Ismail Haniyeh or other members of the political
leadership of Hamas, even though they won the 2006 Palestinian
legislative elections and constitute the de facto government of Gaza.
Why should U.S. diplomacy engage Hamas? The answer is very simple.
It is very likely that if the U.S. were to engage Hamas diplomatically,
it would be much easier to achieve a peaceful political resolution of
the Israel/Palestine conflict. On the other hand, if the U.S. were to
continue the Bush Administration's policy of trying to isolate Hamas,
the supporters of Hamas, and the people living under Hamas
jurisdiction, it is very likely that achieving a peaceful political
resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict would be much more
difficult.
Therefore, if the true and primary goal of U.S. policy is to promote
a peaceful political resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict, then
the correct U.S. policy is to diplomatically engage Hamas.
It may well be that U.S. policy, or major actors that shape U.S.
policy, have other, even contradictory goals. If so, those goals should
be stated and defended. But let us assume for the sake of discussion
that achieving a peaceful political resolution of the Israel/Palestine
conflict really is the goal of U.S. policy, and examine how engaging
Hamas could contribute to that goal, and failing to engage Hamas could
thwart it.
First: a political resolution of the conflict that involves Fatah
and Hamas would be, in Palestinian terms, politically legitimate.
Suppose that there is a political agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians attempting to achieve a political resolution of the
conflict, and that on the Palestinian side, both Fatah and Hamas signed
off on this agreement. Taken together, Fatah and Hamas represent the
overwhelming majority of Palestinian public opinion. If you have an
agreement with Fatah and Hamas, you essentially have an agreement with
Palestinians as a whole. No major actor would question the legitimacy
of such an agreement.
Second: obviously any meaningful agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians purporting to resolve the conflict is going to include,
along with whatever else it concludes, a commitment from the
Palestinian side to forswear violence against Israel. Obviously, the
Israeli side - and third parties supporting the agreement - are going
to expect that this commitment be meaningful. For such a commitment to
be meaningful requires two things: it requires that the agreement be
perceived as politically legitimate among Palestinians and related
actors - see above - and it requires that the Palestinian side have the
capacity to substantially impose the provisions of the agreement on any
recalcitrant dissidents. Fatah and Hamas together have that capacity.
Indeed, Hamas alone has demonstrated that it has that capacity in Gaza,
when it substantially enforced its ceasefire agreement with Israel on
more radical groups, even though Israel did not lift or significantly
ease the blockade on Gaza, as it had been expected to do.
On the other hand, it is clear that Hamas retains the power to
"disrupt" any peace process. After Israel's invasion of Gaza, no-one is
even bothering to say the word "Annapolis."
You don't have to believe the story that was largely propagated in
the U.S. media about the recent Israeli invasion of Gaza - that Hamas
bore all or most of the responsibility for Israel's actions - to
appreciate and acknowledge that Hamas played a significant role. Hamas
took a deliberate choice to let the ceasefire expire and renew rocket
fire in response to the Israeli government's continued economic
strangulation and military attacks, knowing that this could provide a
pretext for an Israeli invasion. It was taking a risk, and it was
largely Palestinian civilians in Gaza that paid the price for that
gamble. There were other choices. It could be argued, given the track
record of effective international indifference to the suffering of
Palestinian civilians, that other choices would not have been effective
at lifting the blockade - but neither has the decision to facilitate
the escalation of violence been effective, and now Gazans are worse off
than before, with, among other things, 1300 dead. Obviously the
overwhelming responsibility for the Israeli bombardment and invasion of
Gaza lies with those who executed and paid for and supported the
killing, but the responsibility of those who took actions which helped
provide excuses for the killing is not zero.
So it should be clear that engagement with Hamas, if successful,
could be very helpful, and continuing a policy of isolation could be
very harmful.
But is there any reason to believe that a policy of engagement could be productive?
First: since a policy of engagement costs essentially nothing of
concrete value, the rational threshold for engagement is low. If there
is any significant probability that engagement might be useful, it
should be pursued. If it fails, we have lost nothing; and indeed, if
the effort is sincere, it proves to the world that the U.S. is serious,
so it gains something, even if it fails. If it fails because another
actor is recalcitrant, then the recalcitrant actor is exposed to
criticism and pressure - including, in the case of Hamas, pressure from
Palestinian and Arab public opinion.
Second: Hamas leaders have stated publicly and repeatedly that they
are ready to accept a political resolution to the conflict, essentially
along the lines of the international consensus and the Arab peace plan:
Israel and a Palestinian state side by side, on the 1967 borders.
Senior officials in the Islamic group Hamas are indicating
a willingness to negotiate a long-term truce with Israel as long as the
borders of Gaza are opened to the rest of the world. "We want to be
part of the international community," Hamas leader Ghazi Hamad told The
Associated Press at the Gaza-Egypt border, where he was coordinating
Arab aid shipments. "I think Hamas has no interest now to increase the
number of crises in Gaza or to challenge the world."
...
Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas prime minister in Gaza, said in comments
aired Thursday that the Palestinians must heal their internal rifts and
he welcomed aid for Gaza from any source. He also seemed to leave a
door open for better relations with the U.S. "I think it is not in
America's interest to stay in conflict with the Arab and Muslim world,
considering its interests in the region," Haniyeh, who remains in
hiding after Israel's onslaught, said on Al-Jazeera television. "We
hope that the new American President revises all the policies of his
predecessor."
...
[The] three Hamas leaders interviewed said they would accept statehood
in just the West Bank and Gaza and would give up their "resistance"
against Israel if that were achieved. "We accept a state in the '67
borders," said Hamad. "We are not talking about the destruction of
Israel."
Carter said his most recent talks [with Hamas] came after
the group's win in January 2006 elections. At that time, he said Hamas
expressed willingness to declare a ceasefire in Gaza and the West Bank
and allow Abbas to negotiate on behalf of all Palestinians. "I intend
to find out if these are their prevailing thoughts now," he said.
What did Carter find out? On April 22, the Washington Postreported:
The armed Islamist movement Hamas is prepared to accept
Israel as a neighbor if the Palestinian people approve the terms for
peace, former president Jimmy Carter and the group's exiled leadership
said Monday following a visit to the region that included seven hours
of negotiations.
...
Carter said the group's "ultimate goal is to see Israel living in their
allocated borders, the 1967 borders, and a contiguous, vital
Palestinian state alongside." Carter was referring to the borders that
Israel had before the 1967 Middle East war, when it captured Gaza, the
West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. In 1982, Israel
completed a pull-out from the Sinai Peninsula, another conquest of that
war.
...
Carter said that in his negotiations, Hamas leaders referred to the
[Hamas] charter dismissively as "an ancient document" and that they
agreed to abide by any peace deal forged by Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas if the Palestinian people approve it. That
could be accomplished either through a referendum or by a vote of the
legislative council.
...
The talks resulted in a written agreement. An English version that
Carter released reads in part: "If President Abbas succeeds in
negotiating a final status agreement with Israel, Hamas will accept the
decision made by the Palestinian people and their will in a referendum
monitored by international observers . . . even if Hamas is opposed to
the agreement."
Of course, people can claim, if they wish, that these statements are
not meaningful. But there is really only one worthy way to prove
whether they are meaningful or not: put them to the test of serious
negotiations. As Mitchell has written about Northern Ireland: if you
want peace, you have to talk to the people who are involved in the war.
If you agree, tell Obama.
Would It Kill Us to Apologize to Iran for the Coup? Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, February 4, 2009
When President Obama told al-Arabiya,"if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us," the most widely reported Iranian response was President Ahmedinijad's suggestion that if the U.S. truly wants good relations with Iran, it should begin by apologizing for U.S. "crimes" against Iran, including U.S. support for the coup that overthrew Iranian democracy in 1953.
Not surprisingly, there hasn't exactly been a groundswell of popular support in the United States for President Ahmadinejad's suggestion. Just 11% of U.S. voters think America should apologize for "crimes"against Iran, according to a poll from Rasmussen.
Of course, if you know anything about the United States, you wouldn't leap to the conclusion that Americans, as a country, are a bunch of jerks who can't admit when they've done anything wrong. Occam's Razor suggests a simpler explanation: most Americans have little knowledge about the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. As far as they know, the U.S. hasn't done anything wrong. So why should we apologize?
Unfortunately for us, outside our borders U.S. foreign policy isn't judged according to what we know, but according to what our government does and has done. And it is well known in Iran and throughout the Middle East that the U.S. (at the urging of and with the assistance of the UK) organized a coup against the democratically-elected Iranian government of Mohammed Mossaedgh in 1953, in retaliation for Mossaedgh's stubborn insistence that Iran's oil belonged to Iranians. And for the next twenty-five years, the U.S. kept in power a dictatorship in Iran, actions justified in no small measure by the alleged need to protect "our oil" that God had misplaced "under their sand."
[To brush up on your history, read Stephen Kinzer's excellent account, a tour de force of accessible writing, or watch the 6 minute version here.]
If you know this history, the proposal that the U.S. apologize for overthrowing Iranian democracy seems a lot more reasonable. Imagine that the shoe were on the other foot. Suppose that in 1953, when someone who is now 65 was 10 years old, Iran, together with the British(something we have in common with Iran is the experience of Britain as a colonial power), organized a coup that overthrew the democratic government of the United States and replaced it with a dictatorship that lasted until 1979, when someone who is 39 today was ten years old.And now comes Iran talking about improved relations. Do you think that no-one in the United States would suggest that Iran acknowledge its role in the coup as a step to improving relations?
But if it is reasonable for Iranians to propose that the U.S.apologize for its role in overthrowing Iranian democracy and installing a dictatorship, would it be feasible for the U.S. to do so? I maintain that it would not only be feasible, but useful.
While 1953 is recent enough that there are people alive who remember it, it is long enough ago that those directly responsible for the coup are long gone. In this way it differs from admitting, for example, that Bush Administration officials authorized torture in violation of U.S.and international law - that admission could have immediate legal consequences for the responsible officials.
In contrast, acknowledging the U.S. role in the 1953 coup would not put anyone at risk of prosecution, and would not harm us in any way.
On the contrary, it could be a game-changer in U.S. relations with the Muslim world - indicating that there really is a new guy at the helm.
Is there a precedent? There sure is: a close one. In 1999, President Bill Clinton gave a "near-apology" for the U.S. role in Guatemala's civil war.
Guatemala City, March 10 - President Clinton expressed regret today for the U.S. role in Guatemala's 36-year civil war, saying that Washington "was wrong" to have supported Guatemalan security forces in a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that slaughtered thousands of civilians.
Clinton's statements marked the first substantive comment from the administration since an independent commission concluded last month that U.S.-backed security forces committed the vast majority of human rights abuses during the war, including torture, kidnapping and the murder of thousands of rural Mayans.
"It is important that I state clearly that support for military forces or intelligence units which engaged in violent and widespread repression of the kind described in the report was wrong," Clinton said, reading carefully from handwritten notes. "And the United States must not repeat that mistake. We must, and we will, instead continue to support the peace and reconciliation process in Guatemala." ... Clinton's aides said the president had thought for some time about how to word his near-apology. The Guatemalan military received training and other help from the U.S. military in an era when the United States supported several Latin American rightist governments fighting leftist insurgents.
The "original sin" of the U.S. role in Guatemala's civil war was the U.S.-organized overthrow of the democratic government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 - the year after it overthrew democracy in Iran.
If President Clinton could "near-apologize" for the U.S. role in Guatemala, is it beyond the realm of imagination that President Obama could "near-apologize" for the U.S. overthrow of democracy and support of dictatorship in Iran?
If President Obama did so, mightn't it be a "game-changer" in U.S. relations with Iran? What would it cost us to merely state the truth? And doesn't the righteous man admit fault when he has the opportunity to do so?
Many Americans would be justifiably proud of President Obama if he would apologize to Iran for the 1953 overthrow of Iranian democracy on behalf of the United States. Patch Adams told me this morning: "when you write about this, please say that I support it."
Kucinich to Introduce Gaza Ceasefire Resolution - Who Will Co-sponsor? by Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, January 14, 2009
The
war in Gaza continues, largely because the Bush Administration has
continued to oppose, in practice, an immediate ceasefire. With each day
that passes without a ceasefire, more innocents are killed.
Representative Dennis Kucinich plans to introduce a resolution in
the House soon calling for an immediate ceasefire. There are a number
of whereases in the draft, recounting the human toll of the war and the
blockade, but the punchline is very simple:
Resolved, That the House of Representatives calls on the
Government of Israel and representatives of Hamas to implement an
immediate and unconditional ceasefire and to allow unrestricted
humanitarian access in Gaza.
"A resolution has co-sponsors," a Kucinich staffer once said. It's
great that Dennis is on the floor of the House telling the truth. But
it's terrible for the prospects of changing disastrous U.S. policies
towards the Palestinians for Dennis to be standing alone. Who will
co-sponsor the Kucinich ceasefire resolution?
So far the original cosponsors include John Conyers, Keith Ellison,
Maurice Hinchey, Marcy Kaptur, Jim McDermott, Nick Rahall, Diane
Watson, and Lynn Woolsey.
When the House voted on AIPAC's resolution endorsing the war, five
people voted no: Dennis Kucinich, Gwen Moore, Ron Paul, Nick Rahall,
and Maxine Waters. Twenty-two Democrats voted "present," including many
who had spoken strongly against the resolution and/or against the war:
Neil Abercrombie, Earl Blumenauer, Peter DeFazio, John Dingell, Donna
Edwards, Keith Ellison, Sam Farr, Raul Grijalva, Maurice Hinchey, Hank
Johnson, Carolyn Kilpatrick, Barbara Lee, Betty McCollum, Jim
McDermott, George Miller, Jim Moran, John Olver, Donald Payne, Loretta
Sanchez, Pete Stark, Diane Watson, and Lynn Woolsey.
On July 19, 2006, Kucinich introduced a resolution calling for an
immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. That resolution was co-sponsored by:
Neil Abercrombie, Tammy Baldwin, Wm. Lacy Clay, Emanuel Cleaver, John
Conyers, Danny Davis, Peter DeFazio, Lloyd Doggett, Bob Filner, Raul
Grijalva, Maurice Hinchey, Michael Honda, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Marcy
Kaptur, Carolyn Kilpatrick, Barbara Lee, Betty McCollum, Jim McDermott,
Cynthia McKinney, Gregory Meeks, George Miller, Gwen Moore, James
Moran, John Olver, Major Owens, Nick Rahall, Charles Rangel, Bobby
Rush, Louise Slaughter, Hilda Solis, Pete Stark, Nydia Velazquez,
Maxine Waters, and Lynn Woolsey.
On July 25, 2006, Sheila Jackson-Lee introduced a bill calling for
an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. That received 18 co-sponsors: John
Conyers, Elijah Cummings, Danny Davis, Lloyd Doggett, Al Green, Raul
Grijalva, Maurice Hinchey, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Marcy Kaptur, Dale
Kildee, Carolyn Kilpatrick, Dennis Kucinich, Jim McDermott, Gwen Moore,
John Olver, Nick Rahall, Diane Watson, and Lynn Woolsey.
If everyone listed above who is currently a Member of Congress
co-sponsored the Kucinich resolution, the resolution would have about
fifty sponsors. And that would be a good start. It would give a very
different message to the world than five people voting no on the AIPAC
resolution. And it would encourage other Members of Congress to take a
first step away from the disastrous policies that Congress has been
supporting.
Of course every Member of Congress should be hearing from their constituents.
But, if your Member of Congress is on the above list, you have a
special responsibility to act now to ask your Representative to
co-sponsor the Kucinich resolution. You can use the link here for calling and the link here for writing.
Amnesty vs. AIPAC: Senate to Consider AIPAC Resolution Endorsing War in Gaza Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, January 8, 2009
The
Senate could consider as early as today a resolution promoted by AIPAC
intended to effectively endorse the continuation of the Israeli
military assault in Gaza. (You can find the text of the draft
resolution on AIPAC's web page.)
In particular, the resolution does not call for an "immediate
ceasefire," but for a "durable and sustainable ceasefire," which is the
Bush Administration's code for continuing the war - the excuse the
Administration has given for why the war must go on. Nor does the
resolution call for ending the blockade on Gaza, even though the
blockade is also an act of war.
Call your Senators now.
Urge them to insist that any resolution passed by the Senate call for
an immediate ceasefire and for lifting the blockade on Gaza.
Last Friday, Amnesty International USA sent an "urgent" letter
to Secretary of State Rice, calling on her to end the Bush
Administration's "lopsided response" to the ongoing Israeli military
attacks on Gaza that have reportedly killed
more than 600 Palestinians, including some 200 children. "Amnesty
International USA is particularly dismayed at the lopsided response by
the U.S. government to the recent violence and its lackadaisical
efforts to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza," the letter
said. Amnesty urged the Bush Administration to "go beyond rhetoric and
exert concrete pressure on both parties to immediately cease unlawful
attacks."
Unfortunately, the U.S. Senate, at the urging of AIPAC, is poised to
embrace the Bush Administration's "lopsided" and "lackadaisical"
response.
Call your Senators now,
and urge them to insist that any resolution passed by the Senate call
for an immediate ceasefire and lifting the blockade on Gaza. If you
don't want to call, you can also write.
Can Congress Speak Out Against Gaza Violence? Yes, They Can! Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, January 7, 2009
If you're a Member of Congress, and your name doesn't happen to be Dennis J. Kucinich, can you still speak out in opposition to the carnage that President Bush and Secretary of State Rice are actively promoting in Gaza?
Yes, you can!
There are two key issues. Should the U.S. support an immediate ceasefire (international opinion) or should the U.S. insist that the violence continue (Bush Administration position.) Should the blockade on Gaza end (international opinion) or should it continue (Bush Administration position.) Of course, the blockade is also an act of war.
Congresswoman Donna F. Edwards (Jan. 2): "the United States must work actively for an immediate ceasefire that ends the violence, stops the rockets, and removes the blockade of Gaza."
Congressman Joe Sestak (Jan. 2): "...beginning with bringing a swift end to this ongoing conflict..."
Congresswoman Lois Capps (Dec. 29): "...the current military operation in Gaza represents a vastly disproportionate response that will further destabilize the region... The numbers of dead and injured in Gaza, and the televised images of the humanitarian crisis now unfolding are truly shocking... I believe an immediate ceasefire is necessary."
Congressman Earl Blumenauer (Dec. 30): "I was particularly discouraged that the U.S. did not try to broker an extension of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas or improve the humanitarian situation on the ground... I strongly urge all parties to usher in the New Year with a renewed ceasefire agreement."
Congresswoman Betty McCollum (Dec. 31):"The time has come for both sides to end the rockets, end the bombings, and end the restrictions on food, medicine and fuel - all of which inflict intolerable harm on innocent civilians on both sides."
Congressman Keith Ellison (Dec. 31): "I believe the following actions must be taken at once... restore the ceasefire... The Israeli and Egyptian borders must be opened at once to allow the innocent civilians caught in this violence to seek refuge, and for the flow of food, water and medical supplies into Gaza.... I agree with those who demand strict observance of international humanitarian law, which must be observed immediately and without exception."
"The attacks on civilians represent collective punishment, which is a violation of Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention... Israel is leveling Gaza to strike at Hamas, just as they pulverized south Lebanon to strike at Hezbollah. Yet in both cases civilian populations were attacked, countless innocents killed or injured, infrastructure targeted and destroyed, and civil law enforcement negated. All this was, and is, disproportionate, indiscriminate mass violence in violation of international law... The attack aggravated a humanitarian crisis wrought by the Israeli-imposed blockade of food, fuel, and medical supplies."
Can Congress speak out against the Gaza violence? Yes, it can! But Brit Tzedek v'Shalom reports that AIPAC is preparing a Congressional resolution that would endorse the continuation of the Israeli assault. Don't whine that Congress is "Israeli-occupied territory" if you haven't exerted the minimal effort to ask Congress to behave differently. You can do so in 5 seconds here.
UPDATE 1: Some more Congressional voices, as reported by Churches for Middle East Peace:
Congressman Sam Farr: "A ceasefire is in the best interest of the United States and both parties involved and must be the immediate goal of the global community."
Congressman John W. Olver, December 31, 2008: "I call upon the United States, the United Nations Security Council, and the broader international community to secure an immediate and lengthy cease-fire and encourage both sides to begin serious negotiations to avoid repetition of this latest round of violence."
UPDATE 2: J Street, Churches for Middle East Peace, and Just Foreign Policy are urging Americans to call Congress in support of an immediate ceasefire and lifting the blockade. You can find contact info, talking points, and report results here.
The Gaza War is Completely Stoppable Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, December 29, 2008
We
have seen this movie before. In the summer of 2006, Israel invaded
Lebanon. Replace "Hizbullah" with "Hamas" and "Lebanon" with "Gaza,"
and much we have seen in the last few days is depressingly familiar.
Once again, the Israeli military assault is justified on the basis of
the need to stop rocket attacks on Israel, even though it is widely
conceded that this will not be the result. Once again, establishment
voices in Washington give carte blanche to the military action, even
though few believe it will accomplish its stated objectives, and
everyone understands that it will impose a huge political cost for the
United States around the world, especially in the Arab and Muslim world.
But, although one can only be sick at the repeated, completely
unnecessary loss of life, there is a silver lining to the Lebanon
precedent: international outrage in 2006 effectively forced the United
States government into a corner, in which it finally could no longer
resist a ceasefire. And there is no reason to believe that what
happened in 2006 can not and will not happen again now.
The question is then how long it will take international outrage to
build to the level necessary to force the US government to stop backing
the Israeli military action, and therefore how many Palestinians and
Israelis will needlessly die in the meantime.
In some ways we have a head start over 2006. No-one can now
plausibly claim that there is something intrinsically wrong with a
ceasefire, or that there is something intrinsically wrong with
negotiating with Hamas to achieve a new ceasefire. After all, just over
six months ago, Israel and Hamas negotiated a ceasefire, brokered by
Egypt, with the active encouragement of the United States. There was
never any daylight between Israel and Hamas on whether a ceasefire was
desirable; what was in dispute, and remained in dispute, was what the
parameters of the ceasefire would be. Israel wanted the ceasefire
limited to military calm-for-calm across the Israel-Gaza border. Hamas
wanted the ceasefire to include significant easing of the economic
blockade on Gaza and also to extend to the West Bank. These differences
were finessed in the ceasefire agreement at the time, leading many to
conclude that the disagreements would eventually explode the ceasefire
agreement, as they now have.
But if you know this history, then you know that the statement
"Israel had to act to protect its citizens from rocket attacks" is
sorely lacking. Of course Hamas rocket attacks generated political
pressure in Israel for a response. But was this the only possible
response? If it was not the only possible response, was it the most
effective response towards the stated goal? Among possible responses,
was it moral and just?
After all, there is every reason to believe that the ceasefire could
have continued and even been strengthened if Israel - and the United
States - had been willing to ease the economic blockade of Gaza and
extend the ceasefire to the West Bank. Since it was at least as likely
- probably much more likely - that this would have done more to reduce
and perhaps eliminate rocket attacks, it is reasonable to suggest that
a key goal of the military assault is to maintain the economic blockade
and maintain the status quo in the West Bank.
And, when you consider that former President Carter and other
luminaries have denounced the economic blockade as an "abomination,"
and that even Israeli Prime Minister Olmert has conceded that Israel
must give up almost all of the West Bank in any political settlement,
then it is extremely hard to justify the military campaign on the basis
that it is necessary to defend the economic blockade, or the status quo
in the West Bank.
And therefore it is likely that pressure can build more quickly now
than it did in 2006, and fewer people will have to die. Already,
"mainstream pro-Israel peace groups" in the US have spoken out in favor
of an immediate ceasefire. Notably, J Street called not only for a
ceasefire, but for lifting the blockade.
There are many ways to take action; you can write to President-elect Obama here and to President Bush and Congress here.
Take Concrete Steps to Engage Iran Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, December 23, 2008
President-elect Obama pledged he would engage with Iran without pre-conditions. As a recent "experts' statement"
chaired by Ambassadors Pickering and Dobbins has argued, talking with
Iran would lower tensions in the region; help stabilize Iraq;
facilitate Iran's cooperation in helping to stabilize Afghanistan; and
facilitate peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians and between
Israel and Syria. The experts say direct, unconditional and
comprehensive negotiations are most likely to succeed, and that we
should adopt policies to facilitate contacts between scholars,
professionals, religious leaders, lawmakers and ordinary citizens.
The Obama Administration can take concrete steps immediately to
facilitate these contacts. We can open a "U.S. interests section" -
low-level diplomatic representation - in Tehran. For the first time in
many years, the U.S. would have diplomatic representation in Iran. Even
the outgoing Bush Administration indicated that it wanted to do this.
The U.S. has an "interests section" in Cuba; Iran has an "interests
section" in Washington. There is broad agreement in Washington that
there should be more interaction between Iranians and Americans. If
there were a "U.S. interests section" in Tehran, Iranian students would
no longer have to travel outside Iran to apply for visas to study in
the United States, making it easier for Iranians to study here. We can
also allow direct passenger airline flights between Tehran and New
York.
These steps would bring immediate benefits in making it easier for
Iranian citizens to travel to the United States; they would also be
first steps towards greater diplomatic engagement between Iran and the
United States.
There are some troubling signs on the horizon. Reports
that Dennis Ross is apparently being considered for a new position to
coordinate outreach to Iran suggests that there is some magical
thinking going on among some of the advisers to Obama - a belief that
pursuing the failed policies of the past will produce different results.
Momentum needs to be generated for a true break, a clear indication
that the U.S. is going to put real diplomacy first. Not simply a
re-packaging of existing demands, but a real willingness to negotiate.
Taking simple, concrete moves to thaw relations is an important first
step.
Change.org is soliciting suggestions that they will present to the
new Administration. You can vote for "Take Concrete Steps to Engage
Iran" here.
Kinzer: Surge Diplomacy, Not Troops, in Afghanistan Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, December 8, 2008 USA Today reports that Gen. McKiernan - top U.S. commander in Afghanistan - "has asked the Pentagon for more than 20,000 soldiers, Marines and airmen" to augment U.S. forces. McKiernan says U.S. troop levels of 55,000 to 60,000 in Afghanistan will be needed for "at least three or four more years." He added: "If we put these additional forces in here, it's going to be for the next few years. It's not a temporary increase of combat strength."
We should have a vigorous national debate before embarking on this course. Contrary to what one might think from a quick scan of the newspapers, there are knowledgeable voices questioning whether increasing the deployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan is in our interest, or is in the interest of the Afghan people.
Bestselling author and former longtime New York Times foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer argues the opposite in this five minute video:
Kinzer argues that sending more U.S. troops is likely to be counterproductive. It's likely to produce more anger in Afghanistan, and more anger is likely to produce more recruits for the Taliban. A better alternative would surge diplomacy instead, reaching out to people who are now supporting the Taliban.
Al Qaeda and the Taliban are very different forces, argues Kinzer. The Taliban has deep roots in Afghan society. Many of the warlords allied with the Taliban are not fanatic ideologues.
Afghanistan is a place of fluid loyalties, Kinzer notes. A warlord allied with the Taliban may not be anti-American, or if he is today, he need not be tomorrow. We should take advantage of these fluid loyalties, and try to follow the diplomatic solution that Afghans and Afghan leaders are advocating.
Almost all the money in Afghanistan fueling the insurgency comes from the Afghan poppy crop, the source of most of the world's heroin, Kinzer notes. We're trying to crush that poppy-growing culture in an impossible way, Kinzer says. Burning and spraying poppy fields will never achieve that goal. All that does is impoverish Afghans and make them more angry at us.
The entire Afghan poppy crop is worth four billion dollars a year. We're now spending $4 billion a month on our war in Afghanistan. Let's take one of those months, and buy the entire poppy crop, suggests Kinzer. That way we're not impoverishing Afghans, we're putting money in their pockets instead of shooting them and burning down their houses. We'd use some of that to make morphine for medical use and we could burn the rest.
If we continue to act as if there's a military solution in Afghanistan, we're just going to get further dragged down into quagmire. There is a way out, Kinzer says. We can follow a much more sophisticated diplomatic and political strategy in a way that will reduce the ability of the Taliban to attract young recruits. What we're doing now is the opposite, fueling the insurgency. Sending fewer troops to Afghanistan, not more, is needed to stabilize Afghanistan.
If you agree with Stephen Kinzer, why not <a href=" http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/involved/askBarack.html">send a note</a> to that effect to President-elect Obama?
For Middle East Peace, Dennis Ross is Not the Change We Seek Robert Naiman, Huffington Post, November 14, 2008
The
advent of the Obama Administration presents new opportunities for talks
with Iran and negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The
policies and personalities that will shape the Obama Administration's
approach to achieving peace in the Middle East are being determined
now. Some reports indicate that former officials like Dennis Ross, who
directed failed policies in the past, are angling for top positions.
Allowing such officials to direct U.S. policy could compromise U.S.
efforts and send a signal to the region that U.S. policy is not really
going to change from the failed policies of the past. A recent report suggests that campaigns by women's groups have helped remove Larry Summers from the short list for Treasury Secretary. A similar campaign
by folks concerned about peace in the Middle East could help remove
Dennis Ross from short lists for top positions supervising our
diplomacy in the Middle East.
Obama has proposed to make an early and sustained push to support
peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and has pledged to talk to
Iran without preconditions. A sustained push by the United States for
Israeli-Palestinian peace would force on to the table fundamental
issues that must be resolved, like Israeli withdrawal from the West
Bank. Even Israeli Prime Minister Olmert said recently
that Israel must withdraw from nearly all the West Bank as well as East
Jerusalem to attain peace with the Palestinians. And an early push for
talks with Iran could help establish security in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But we can't assume that this is the direction that U.S. policy will move.
A November 3rd article in the New York Times
noted that a report from the "Bipartisan Policy Center" explores
blockading Iran's gasoline imports - an act of war - and says that "a
military strike is a feasible option." The article notes that the
report's authors include Dennis Ross, a "top Mideast adviser to Obama."
Ross served in the first Bush Administration as well as the Clinton
Administration, where he played a leading role in U.S. negotiations
with the Israelis and Palestinians.
Daniel Kurtzer, also an Obama adviser, has written that
American and Arab negotiators saw Ross as biased and not "an honest
broker." One Arab negotiator said, "The perception always was that
Dennis [Ross] started from the Israeli bottom line, that he listened to
what Israel wanted and then tried to sell it to the Arabs." Aaron David
Miller, who also served on the U.S. team, has written that
under Clinton U.S. negotiators acted as "Israel's lawyer," rather than
focusing on what would enable both sides to reach agreement.
The Jewish Chroniclereports
that Palestinian leaders are optimistic about Obama, but they are
looking for "new faces" on the U.S. side. Walid Awad, spokesman for the
Fatah Central Media Commission, called on Obama to immediately devote
his attention to Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy when he takes office in
January. "Bush did not deal with the conflict until it was too late and
he did not pressure Israel enough to bring about a solution," Awad
said. He voiced concern about reports Obama may appoint Dennis Ross to
a senior foreign policy position. "He's never been fair with the
Palestinians so bringing him back into the fold would be
counter-productive. Obama has to bring in new faces."
As a former Clinton official told Time, if President-elect
Obama wants U.S. efforts to help achieve peace in the Middle East to
succeed, he must break not only with the policies of President Bush,
but also with the policies of President Clinton. Ask President-elect Obama to turn a new page.
Now is Our Time: Ask Barack for a Just Foreign Policy Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, November 7, 2008
I'm
guessing that a lot of you, like me, received a lot of email from the
Obama campaign over the last many months, urging your support. Many of
you, like me, responded. You gave money, made phone calls, knocked on
doors.
Now it's time to write back. The policy window is open, as the
political scientists say. During his campaign, President-Elect Obama
promised to repair relations between the United States and the rest of
the world. Not only that, but he promised to do specific things, many
of which could be quickly and easily accomplished. Right now policies
are being set and senior officials chosen for the new Administration.
Early input counts more: "it's always too early until it's too late,"
as they say in Washington. Now is the time to ask Barack to fulfill his promises to reform U.S. foreign policy.
Obama promised that he would end the war in Iraq and withdraw U.S.
troops. There is no obstacle to doing so besides the unfulfilled
imperial fantasies of the neoconservatives. The Iraqi government itself
is demanding a firm timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
Obama promised to talk to Iran without pre-conditions. There is no
reasons that diplomatic contacts should not begin immediately. The Bush
Administration itself has proposed to open an "interests section" -
low-level diplomatic representation - in Iran. This would be a good
first step. Obama should publicly encourage the Bush Administration to
move forward with its own good idea.
Obama promised to pay more attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Some of the policies he has proposed - like sending more U.S. troops,
and launching attacks into Pakistan without the agreement of the
Pakistani government - are of dubious merit and are likely to be
harmful. But other things he has proposed, like increasing the pace and
effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, are urgently needed. Obama
has argued, correctly, that the U.S. should talk to everyone. This
policy needs to be applied in Afghanistan and Pakistan, without delay.
The official policy of the Afghan government is to seek reconciliation
with the Taliban. U.S. policy should clearly support this policy of the
Afghan government, not seek to sabotage it.
Obama promised to actively support efforts for Israeli-Palestinian
peace. Early indications that he seriously intends to do so could have
a dramatic effect in the region. He could signal that he intends to
actually implement existing U.S. policy against Israeli settlements in
the West Bank, a policy with which the majority of Israelis would have
no dispute, and would welcome with relief.
Obama promised to improve U.S. relations with Latin America. In a
campaign speech, he invoked the example of FDR, whose "Good Neighbor"
policy swore off U.S. military intervention, and pledged economic and
humanitarian cooperation. Great strides could be easily made in Latin
America through cooperation, extending education and health care to the
poor majority in a region suffering from extreme poverty and
inequality. Obama could start by negotiating the return of ambassadors
with Bolivia and Venezuela, and reversing the Bush Administration's
decision to end Bolivia's preferential access to the U.S. market. He
could fulfill his promise to lift the Bush Administration's
restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, work with the
bipartisan Cuba Caucus in the House to make it easier for U.S.
companies to sell to Cuba, and work towards lifting completely the U.S.
embargo, which the whole world is demanding. He could pledge that the
U.S. will, for once, remain studiously neutral in the upcoming
Salvadoran elections.
Obama promised to cut unnecessary spending. The greatest opportunity
for cuts is in the military budget, which is outrageously large by
world standards, and much of which consists of pork barrel spending for
military contractors. Representative Frank has called for a 25% cut in
U.S. military spending. Let John McCain, who says he know where to cut,
prepare a list of recommendations. Who will dare to say that John
McCain's proposed cuts cannot be made?
It's always to early, until it's too late. Urge Barack now to reform U.S. foreign policy.
On Invasion Anniversary, British Govt Says: Talk to Taliban Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, October 7, 2008
October
7 marks the seventh anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. To
mark the occasion, the British government, our closest allies in
Europe, are sending us a message on all channels: there is no military
solution, there must be a political solution, and there should be talks
with the Taliban. It would be a step forward for U.S. policy if both
Presidential candidates would acknowledge this reality in tonight's
debate.
America is somewhat preoccupied at the moment with the economic
crisis and the Presidential election. But the Brits are trying to get
through to us anyway, perhaps because they fear that some of the
rhetoric of the Presidential campaign risks locking the U.S. into a
path of military escalation, when what is needed is a political
escalation.
Over the weekend, the top British military commander in Afghanistan
made a number of statements that have yet to penetrate US political
discourse. The Guardian reports:
"We're not going to win this war," Brigadier Mark
Carleton-Smith said yesterday. "It's about reducing it to a manageable
level of insurgency that's not a strategic threat and can be managed by
the Afghan army. We may well leave with there still being a low but
steady ebb of rural insurgency."
...
He said the aim should be to change the nature of the
debate in Afghanistan so that disputes were settled by negotiation and
not violence. "If the Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of
the table and talk about a political settlement, then that's precisely
the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this,"
Carleton-Smith said. "That shouldn't make people uncomfortable."
The British government supported the commander's statements, the Financial Timesreports:
A spokesman said the UK's ministry of defense "did not have
a problem" with warning the UK public not to expect a "decisive
military victory" and to prepare instead for a possible deal with the
Taliban.
The top United Nations official in Afghanistan added his voice in support, Reuters reports:
"I've always said to those that talk about the military
surge ... what we need most of all is a political surge, more political
energy," Kai Eide, the U.N. special envoy to Afghanistan, told a news
conference in Kabul. "We all know that we cannot win it militarily. It
has to be won through political means. That means political
engagement."
Eide said success depended on speaking with all sides in the
conflict. "If you want to have relevant results, you must speak to
those who are relevant. If you want to have results that matter, you
must speak to those who matter," he said.
Indeed, talks between Taliban representatives and Afghan government officials took place recently in Saudi Arabia, CNNreports:
In a groundbreaking meeting, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
recently hosted talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban
militant group, according to a source familiar with the talks. The
historic four-day meeting took place during the last week of September
in the Saudi city of Mecca, according to the source, who spoke on the
condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the negotiations.
...
It was the first such meeting aimed at bringing a
negotiated settlement to the Afghan conflict and for the first time,
all parties were able to discuss their positions and objectives openly
and transparently, the source said.
...
While Mullah Omar was not present at the talks in Mecca,
the source said the Taliban leader has made it clear he is no longer
allied with al Qaeda - a position that has never been publicly stated
but emerged at the talks. It confirms what another source with an
intimate knowledge of the Taliban and Mullah Omar has told CNN in the
past.
Even Defense Secretary Gates made somewhat supportive remarks. APreports:
Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday endorsed efforts
to reach out to members of the Taliban or other militants in
Afghanistan who may be considered reconcilable, much like what has
happened in Iraq.
Of course, what is really at issue here is not whether there is a
policy of bringing in low-level Taliban fighters who agree to renounce
violence and support the government. That policy already exists. What
is at issue is initiating a process to bring in people at a higher
level, a process that might involve some political accommodation. Note
that the shift in strategy in Iraq after 2006 that is now called a
success involved precisely this shift - bringing in not just fighters,
but leaders, and making accommodation not just for individuals, but for
groups with political demands, e.g integration into the Iraqi army.
There will be a tendency to want to push off these unwelcome
realities until after the election. But the downside danger is the
candidates locking themselves - and us - into a policy of military
escalation, which without a new political posture, is almost certainly
doomed to fail. Then we'd have another round of increase in needless
American and Afghan deaths before we would accommodate reality. Why not
begin the process of accommodating reality now, and avoid the needless
deaths?
Wall Street Bailout Threatens World's Poor Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, October 2, 2008
On
Monday the House voted down the the Bush Administration's request that
Congress authorize $700 billion for purchasing Wall Street's "toxic
assets" linked to the collapse of the housing bubble, after being
deluged by phone calls and emails in opposition. The Senate approved
basically the same proposal Wednesday, and the House may vote again
Friday, although at this writing the outcome is still very much in
doubt.
Largely missing from debate has been the impact of this plan on U.S.
government spending on human needs in the next Administration. And
there has been almost no mention of the impact on our global
commitments to help reduce illiteracy and address easily preventable
disease.
Last week, world leaders met at the United Nations. UN Secretary
General Ban is asking for the world's wealthy countries to contribute
$72 billion per year to help the world meet the modest UN goal of
reducing extreme poverty. According to the advocacy group Health Gap,
the US share of this would be about 1/3, or $24 billion, based on the
US share of the donor countries' wealth. Over the four years of the
next Administration, that would be about $100 billion. As Inter Press Servicereported,
delegates to the UN meeting expressed concern that donor country
commitments to reducing global poverty would now be even weaker than
before.
If the Bush Administration's Wall Street bailout is enacted, we will
be told that there is no money for additional spending on human needs,
nationally and globally, in the next Administration - regardless of
whether this is true. Already, in the first Presidential debate,
moderator Jim Lehrer pressed the candidates to say what priorities they
were going to give up, in light of the expected Wall Street bailout.
There are alternatives to the Bush Administration's plan that would
cost the US taxpayers less, have greater chance of addressing problems
in the credit market, and not politically threaten the next
Administration's ability to increase spending on human needs. Congress
should consider these alternatives before approving the Bush
Administration's plan.
Representative Peter DeFazio has introduced a plan which would strengthen regulations to bolster the banking sector, the Nation reports.
The plan is based on a proposal made by William Isaac, head of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation under the Reagan Administration.
Isaac notes that in the 1980s Congress enacted a program which shored
up the capital of banks to give them more time to resolve their
problems, and the FDIC resolved a $100 billion insolvency in savings
banks for a total cost of less than $2 billion.
We should ask Congress
to consider the cost to the world, as well as to the United States, of
enacting the Bush Administration's plan, and to consider alternatives.
What Kissinger Said: "I Do Not Believe That We Can Make Conditions" Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, September 27, 2008
Jim Lehrer missed an opportunity last night to help clarify for people watching the debate what is in dispute between Democrats like Barack Obama and Republicans like John McCain about U.S. policy towards Iran. For the record, this is what McCain adviser and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said about U.S. policy towards Iran, according to the transcript on CNN's website:
"I am in favor of negotiating with Iran.... But I do not believe that we can make conditions for the opening of negotiations."
This was at an event with five former U.S. Secretaries of State,
three Republicans (Kissinger, Powell, and Baker) and two Democrats
(Christopher and Albright.) All five agreed that the U.S. should
negotiate with Iran, without preconditions.
What "without preconditions" means in this context is quite
straightforward and well-known. The current policy of the Bush
Administration has been that the United States will not enter into
substantive talks with Iran unless Iran first agrees to suspend the
enrichment of uranium. The five former U.S. Secretaries of State agreed
that this was a mistake, and that the United States should drop this
precondition for the beginning of talks.
Our former Ambassador to the United Nations Thomas Pickering, who
has spent much of his adult life being paid by the United States
government to be an expert on diplomacy, put it this way in an
interview earlier this year:
"Certainly, there's been a lot of suspicion of Iran, I join
in being concerned about Iran's nuclear program, I don't dismiss that
at all, it's serious. But I think asking for a price to open talks is
not a feasible way to get the conversation going, and it was not the
posture of the United States when it opened talks with North Korea...my
own feeling is that with Iran we should start talks with Iran without
preconditions."
It's John McCain's position - the neoconservative position - that is
the outlier. And besides electioneering, there's only one plausible,
logical explanation for the McCain-neoconservative position: they don't
want an agreement between the United States and Iran. What they fear is
not that talks would be useless, but that they might be productive.
After all, as everybody knows, if the U.S. seriously pursued talks
and the talks failed, it would be a huge propaganda victory for the
United States. "See," the United States could say. "We tried."
What the neoconservatives are afraid of is that there might actually
be an agreement, and that an agreement would acknowledge and accept
Iran's status and interests in the region. Then the neocons would have
to give up their fantasies of "regime change" in Iran and "roll back"
of Iranian influence.
The neoconservatives are married to the precondition of suspension
of enrichment because they believe it is a deal-breaker for the Iranian
side. There is an overwhelming consensus of Iranian public opinion that
Iran has and must exercise the right to its own nuclear energy program.
This consensus includes every political faction with significant
influence in the country's politics. So, if your real goal is to
prevent any agreement between the United States and Iran, insisting
that Iran abandon its nuclear program (which is how Iranians interpret
the U.S. demand) as a precondition for talks is an excellent policy.
There is a proposal on the floor that would meet U.S. concerns about
the future capacity of Iran to use nuclear technology for a weapons
program while satisfying the demand of Iranian public opinion for an
Iranian nuclear energy program. That is Ambassador Pickering's proposal
for multilateral enrichment in Iran, with full transparency and
vigorous inspections. This week in New York Iranian officials restated
Iran's willingness to negotiate on such a proposal.
That is what is in dispute. Do we want four more years - or even
eight more years - of confrontation with Iran in a McCain-Palin
Administration pursuing the neoconservative policies of the early Bush
Administration, or do we want to seriously pursue negotiations that
could lead to an agreement that would help stabilize the whole Middle
East, significantly facilitating U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and
promoting stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Will Lehrer Ask McCain, Obama About Israeli-Palestinian Peace? Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, September 22, 2008
Thefirst 2008 presidential debate between Senator Obama and Senator McCainwill focus on foreign policy and will occur this coming Friday. JimLehrer of PBS will moderate the debate.
As we have seen repeatedly in this election season, what gets askedby debate moderators is as important as what the candidates areprepared to say. If debate moderators decide to ask about nonsense,then the result will likely be a nonsense debate.
When debate moderators are from the corporate media, they tend toreflect the worldview of their employers. And what their employers areinterested in seeing addressed may be - and often is - very differentfrom what the public would like to see addressed.
But as an employee of public broadcasting, Jim Lehrer works for us.
Will Jim Lehrer ask the candidates what they intend to do to helpbring about peace between Israelis and Palestinians? There is just onedebate between the candidates focused on foreign policy, so if thisquestion is not addressed in Friday's debate, it might not be addressedin any debate.
The U.S. government has long acknowledged - including in repeated statements by Secretary of State Rice, as recently as last month- that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are a key stumbling blockto peace. The question is whether this U.S. policy of opposition willbe made a priority.
The New York Times noted last monththat in the last year Israel had nearly doubled its settlementconstruction in the West Bank, in violation of its obligations under aU.S.-backed peace plan, citing Peace Now's authoritative report.
Urge Jim Lehrerto ask the Presidential candidates what they will specifically do topromote Israeli-Palestinian peace and end the policy of Israelisettlement expansion in the occupied Palestinian territories.
McCain Hypes the "Threat" from Iran Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, August 29, 2008
It
may be Russia that recently sent its troops across international
borders in violation of the UN Charter in a "humanitarian intervention"
to protect the South Ossetians (can the Russians get Samantha Power to
do PR for them about the "Responsibility to Protect"?), but Iran,
apparently, remains the bogey of choice for McCain and the neocons, as
indicated by McCain's "tiny" ad.
Apparently the neocons think Iran will work better to "scare the hell
out of the American people," in the phrase attributed to Senator
Vandenberg. Russia has one big demerit as a neocon bogey: it has too
much ability to defend itself. It has nuclear weapons, a veto on the UN
Security Council, huge energy reserves, easy ability to be disruptive
to U.S. plans across a range of fronts. As any bully knows, "pick on
someone your own size" is not advice generally followed by the
successful bully. The most successful bullies will generally choose a
bogey that has no reasonable prospect of significantly hurting them.
And that points towards Iran.
Does Iran represent a "serious threat" to the United States of
America, or even to Israel? It depends, certainly, on what you mean by
"serious" and "threat." It is, of course, in the interests of McCain
and the neocons to conflate two very different kinds of "threats":
military threats and political challenges.
Iran, any honest and knowledgeable person would admit, does not
represent, now or in the foreseeable future, a significant military
threat to the United States or even to Israel. (If it did, Americans
and Israelis should ask why we bother having such huge military
budgets, and in the case of Israel, mandatory military service, if
these things are so irrelevant.) Iran, as far as anyone outside knows,
does not possess nuclear weapons, and is not in the process of
acquiring any. The latter assertion in some sense cannot be proved: if
Bush Administration officials are pushed, they will say that it doesn't
matter if Iran is currently seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in the
normal sense of actually acquiring them, because they are acquiring the
capacity to enrich uranium, and the capacity to enrich uranium is very
useful for building nuclear weapons. If you define "seeking nuclear
weapons" this way - seeking to develop a capacity which would have the
effect of making it easier for you to acquire nuclear weapons in the
future, should you wish to do so - then indeed, Iran is seeking a
nuclear weapon. But according to this standard, Brazil and many other
countries we are not threatening to attack are also "seeking nuclear
weapons," and there is no provision in any international law, treaty or
agreement which would justify unilateral U.S. or Israeli action against
Iran on the basis of this "threat."
Even if Iran were to actually acquire a nuclear weapon - an
extremely distant prospect made more likely by U.S. and Israeli threats
- it's far from obvious that this would make the United States or
Israel less secure in a military sense. It would still be true, for the
foreseeable future after that distant and unlikely prospect, that the
United States and Israel would have an absolutely overwhelming military
advantage against Iran in any military confrontation, and it would also
be true that everyone would know that for Iran to use a nuclear weapon
against Israel would be an act of suicide. And every honest and
knowledgeable person admits that Iranian leaders, like leaders
elsewhere, are overwhelmingly pragmatic and rational in their actions.
They may make misjudgments, they may undertake provocative acts when
they see it as being in their interests to do so, but like most people
everywhere, they do not want to die, and they do not want to lose power.
The primary utility, from the Iranian point of view, of having a
nuclear weapon would be that the United States and Israel would have to
formally abandon the fantasy of attacking Iran. That, from the point of
view of the neocons, is the "threat." They don't want Iran to become
another Russia, a country that you can't easily push around. (Of
course, if the United States would respect international law and the UN
Charter - as it demands of Russia - then the United States would have
to concede this, even if the Iranians only had sticks and stones.)
And the reason they see this as a high priority is that they see
Iran as a political threat. If you see yourself as bully of the
schoolyard, the presence of other bullies who aren't part of your gang
is a latent threat. The next seemingly defenseless person you want to
bully might turn to another bully for protection. And that's a threat
to your power.
But it's far from obvious why the majority of the American people
should see Iran in this way. The neocons were furious that Hizbollah
was able to frustrate their plans to dominate Lebanon, in part because
Hizbollah has patrons in the form of Iran and Syria. But what is the
interest of the majority of Americans in dominating Lebanon? Arguably,
the overwhelming majority of Lebanese, even those who have no love for
Hizbollah, are far better off because the neocon project failed. A new
national accord was reached in Lebanon, with the participation of all
major factions, including Hizbollah and the US-backed coalition, and
the support of all the regional patrons, including the Gulf countries,
Iran, and Syria. An imperfect agreement, no doubt, but a far, far
better outcome from the point of view of the interests of the majority
of Lebanese than civil war.
The neocons are also furious that Iran has helped frustrate their
fantasy to turn Iraq into a U.S. client state. This fantasy would
almost surely have failed eventually, given its fundamental
contradiction with Iraqi nationalism, even if Iran didn't exist. But
there's no question that Iran has helped accelerate the failure of the
neocon project for Iraq. So it's understandable that the neocons are
angry. But should we be angry? Is it in the interests of the majority
of Americans to try to make Iraq into a U.S. client state? It's
certainly not in the interests of the U.S. soldiers who would have to
be stationed there permanently, or their families, or American
taxpayers who would have to foot the bill.
When the United States leaves Iraq, Iraq will not be a U.S. client
state. Neither it be an Iranian client state, for the simple reason
that this would not be in the interests of the majority of Iraqis, even
the majority of Iraqi Shiites. It's in the interests of the majority of
Iraqis to have good relations with Iran, but it's also in the interests
of the majority of Iraqis to have good relations with Turkey and Jordan
and the Gulf countries, and that means they have to balance the need
for good relations with Iran with the need for good relations with
others. And despite the last 30 years of national disaster, and the
many real and deep conflicts that still have to be worked out, they
still have an Iraqi national identity, and a strong desire to be free
and independent actors in the world. No outside power, or coalition of
outside powers, has the resources or stomach over the long-term to
frustrate the desire of the majority of Iraqis to live in an
independent country.
So if you're a neocon, Iran is a significant threat, not in a
military sense, but in a political sense. But from the standpoint of
the interests of the majority of Americans, Iran is not a significant
threat, because the majority of Americans have no stake in the neocon
project of dominating the Middle East. The majority of Americans, and
the majority of Israelis and other peoples in the Middle East, would be
far better served by serious attempts to assist in resolving the
conflicts of the Middle East. The continuation of neocon policies of
military adventurism in the White House, in the form of John McCain,
represents a far greater danger than Iran to Americans and the world.