Hi Jim,

Let us keep to short ones. Yes, the quote at the end was by K.. It is from
the philosophical fragments, so your sense of 'déjà vu' is all the more
relevant since it is written through the same pseudonym, or qua the same
author (in the Eenish dialect).

As regards quantuum physics, you are perfectly consistent in saying that my
paragraph is both no and only quantuum material. Its purpose was barely to
open the field to the idea that an 'understanding' of the word 'quark' was
possible without full 'understanding' of the scientific context -- by this I
did go your understanding way, amending mine and perhaps going further in
the way you had suggested ('for me, the primary things that are understood
are sentences. And usually, but not always, we understand sentences when we
understand the words').

'Holding the quarrelling idea together' within the paradox of existence is
very much like my reading of what S.K. was saying. Holding them quarrelling
is precisely holding them seperated, altogether.

As yourself, I think we are heading for interesting exchanges.

As always,

Paradoxically, still
Yours Sincerely,

Mederic Laplace

PS: Thank you, Warner Bros., for the one canonic version of my quote. I'll
ponder over the various variations and add my very own 'divagations' to
these of Mr Maloyan and to theses of yours that were here published.

Hi Willy,

I've been thinking for a while how best to respond to your two responses to my
"What Is Essential" post.

I'll limit my response to two of your points. In your first response, you wrote:

"Passion and inwardness is something that is personal, that is subjective, where
the meaning you and I give to the terms 'passion' and 'inwardness' gives meaning
to our use of the terms 'personal' and 'subjective.'  See, I am doing it again.
They are 'my' terms. You and I each have our 'my' terms. When you say that the
essential thing is to develop passion and inwardness that is the essential thing
in your meaning of the terms. This makes SK the mirror and our reading of him as
reflecting the face we see in it. We interpret it differently because you see
you and I see me in that mirror. End of blather. Our difficulty begins and ends
with our different interpretations."

I don't see Kierkegaard as a mirror. A mirror has no substance or contribution
of its own. Kierkegaard, in contrast, has a substantial message to get across to
us. You seemed to agree to my summary of Kierkegaard's essential (substantial)
message in my last post.

Given that Kierkegaard has a substantial message, the reader can get
Kierkegaard's message right or wrong - she can appropriate it or misappropriate
it. All interpretations of Kierkegaard are not equally good. Given the genuine
differences of interpretation between you and me, I claim that both of us cannot
have got Kierkegaard right.

In your second response, you wrote:

"Perhaps what is needed here is a communication grid in which we can agree to
what the relation of the speaker to the spoken is prior to the speaking. That SK
is open to so many levels of communication is something that must be addressed.
... I am left with the conclusion that what we need in this group is a
communication grid so that we can always find the other from where we are."

I'm not sure what you mean by a "communication grid". Perhaps you can elaborate
on this idea.

I see myself as advocating a 'simple' or 'naive' understanding of Kierkegaard -
taking his books, chapters, paragraphs, sentences and words at face value. Thus,
for example, when you enquire what I understand by Kierkegaard's words 'passion'
and 'inwardness', I would say that they mean what they ordinarily mean in the
English language. 'Passion' means emotional involvement, intense feeling,
enthusiasm, commitment and resolution, while 'inwardness' means concerning one's
own self - one's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, motivations (one's will),
behaviour and one's relationship to God.

You, on the other hand, seem to advocate a 'higher understanding', where
Kierkegaard's words don't always mean what they ordinarily mean. Kierkegaard
himself is very scathing of those of his contemporaries who claim to have a
"higher understanding" of Christianity. My suspicion is that Kierkegaard would
be equally scathing of anyone who claimed a higher understanding of
Kierkegaard's own works.

Yours,

Jim


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Monsieur Passy d'Meddy, I post this short note as an aside, or
comment, in response to your following statement (I have appended an
SK quote I see as providing a useful form for tracking the
consideration to follow the following); a picture has come to mind
that I want to reduce to words:

<'Holding the quarrelling idea together' within the paradox of
existence is very much like my reading of what S.K. was saying.
Holding them quarrelling is precisely holding them seperated,
altogether.>

There is the notion of something that must be held apart for a certain
condition to be met. Or again, holding the two things apart creates
the condition. The implication of holding two things apart gives rise
to the notion of the two not being held apart and thereby becoming one
in non-separation. The question (yours, I think) remains as to the
validity of that one as the two in one.

I begin with the thought that there is the 'two for the price of one'
thought of the self as opposed to the thought of self; the thought
that contains the thinker of the thought as a place holder. Let's tag
that place holder thought the self-thought. As such, the thought
itself is the container, the universal whose content reserves a place
for the particular. If an identity is made, for whatever the reason,
like maybe the desire to be somebody, wherein the place holder is
reified as the me-thought, then the one who has made the identity, I
am me, has effectively shut itself up within the thought of self.
Could we say that thought and being are one?

We could also say that this allows for the two different position that
we all know so well; we imagine the self in the daydream, being lost
in thought, or we return to our senses and think our thoughts,
including the thought of being who we are. We could also raise the
question of how to break out of that imagined identity if it so
happens that that imagined identity has created any problems other
than the energy it requires to hold it together. It almost seems like
there is a desire to escape that identity, like there is some sort of
despair that it creates that creates the desire to escape its
identity. And could the release of the energy used in holding that
pseudo identity together be high the release engenders; a total
release being bliss? I'm just having fun here playing with SK's
words.

Given all of that, the only answer that makes sense is the ending of
the thought that contains the identity; i.e., the self-thought. The
signal that that particular thought has come to an end will be an
experienced loss of identity, where the experienced loss of identity
signifies the coming to an end of the self-thought. This signifies the
disjunction and gives the Consortium its portfolio.

If the process just delineated is not understood, the reflection upon
that ending posits the next particular thought, which will now enclose
the discontinuity within the self-thought, signifying the shift of the
reified identity from the particular to the universal. We could
describe such a shift as the movement from, say, as esthetic identity
sphere to an ethical identity sphere, from the particular to the
universal. We could say that this new identity is not yet before God
because it is self-held. It is not nothing before God, it is nothing
before itself. By becoming the universal, the self-thought is
completely obscured, but the over-self is held. Still having fun.

Let's say that the question is now how to escape the particular that
now contains the escape, the transcendental particular as the
universal. This escape is to be differentiated from those escapes that
use the same process to move from one particular self to another
particular self, which signifies the esthetic choice being made. To
summarize the situation, the self-thought has been transformed in such
a manner that the place holder now contains the un-identity, or the
identity of the particular as having been negated, the not-self. The
particular has been replaced in the self-thought by a particular that
has transcended itself.

What better place to find the answer to the question of escape than
the place where this new self was born: in the reflection upon the
experience of discontinuity itself? Like returning to the place where
the identity occurs, like maybe the place where those two quarreling
ideas should be held apart, like where the subjective and objective
reflections should not be conflated as representing an identity? And
what if that same conflation were responsible for the first identity?
What if that were the formula for all identity, both high and low?

And so, that reduces the picture I had to words. It was great fun. I
trust you had as much fun reading the words as I had smearing them on
this screen before me.

William Brown, Esq.


"If a person does not first make clear to himself the meaning of
'self,' it is of no use to say of sin that it is selfishness. But
'self' signifies precisely the contradiction of positing the universal
as the particular. Only when the concept of the particular is given
can there be any talk of selfishness; however, although there have
lived countless million of such 'selves,' no science can say what the
self is without again stating it quite generally.*

*This is well worth further consideration, for precisely at this point
it must become apparent to what extent the recent principle that
thought and being are one is adequate, if on one hand a person does
not impair it with untimely and partly foolish misunderstandings, and
if on the other hand he does not wish to have a higher principle that
commits him to thoughtlessness. Only the universal is by the fact that
it is thought and can be thought (not merely in imaginative
constructing, for what cannot be thought!) and is that which can be
thought. The point about the particular is precisely its negative
relation to the universal and its repellant relation to it. But as
soon as a person thinks the particular away it is cancelled, and as
soon as it is thought, it is altered. Therefore, either he does not
think the particular but only imagines that he thinks it, or he thinks
it and merely imagines that it is included in thought."   (CA, Thomte,
pp. 78-79)

Hello James (change of pace), it does seem as though you and I have a
difference. Not only that, but we each see that difference
differently. We look at the same thing and each say it is something
else. Reminds me of that fabled elephant, it does.

You said: <I don't see Kierkegaard as a mirror. A mirror has no
substance or contribution of its own. Kierkegaard, in contrast, has a
substantial message to get across to us. You seemed to agree to my
summary of Kierkegaard's essential (substantial) message in my last
post.

Given that Kierkegaard has a substantial message, the reader can get
Kierkegaard's message right or wrong - she can appropriate it or
misappropriate it. All interpretations of Kierkegaard are not equally
good. Given the genuine differences of interpretation between you and
me, I claim that both of us cannot have got Kierkegaard right.>

Yes, given that Kierkegaard has a substantial message, a given I agree
with, and if that message has substantially to do with one's relation
to oneself, which I think it does, then not to see oneself in that
message could give rise to a similar claim from this side of the
difference; that both of us cannot have got Kierkegaard right.

<^> <<=<>=<>=>> <^>

And you said: < I see myself as advocating a 'simple' or 'naive'
understanding of Kierkegaard - taking his books, chapters, paragraphs,
sentences and words at face value. Thus, for example, when you enquire
what I understand by Kierkegaard's words 'passion' and 'inwardness', I
would say that they mean what they ordinarily mean in the English
language. 'Passion' means emotional involvement, intense feeling,
enthusiasm, commitment and resolution, while 'inwardness' means
concerning one's own self - one's thoughts, feelings, attitudes,
motivations (one's will), behaviour and one's relationship to God.

You, on the other hand, seem to advocate a 'higher understanding',
where Kierkegaard's words don't always mean what they ordinarily mean.
Kierkegaard himself is very scathing of those of his contemporaries
who claim to have a "higher understanding" of Christianity. My
suspicion is that Kierkegaard would be equally scathing of anyone who
claimed a higher understanding of Kierkegaard's own works.>

I chose the following quote for five reasons:

First, it speaks to an inwardness that "is not identical with the
first, but is a new inwardness."

Second, it refers to the first inwardness in much the same terms you
used to describe your only meaning of inwardness.

Third, if the second inwardness is not commensurate with the first
inwardness, the qualification of it being higher does not pertain.

Fourth, since we are dealing with two meanings of inwardness, that
surely means that the message is directed towards one's relation with
oneself, and if that is so, that pesky mirror makes its appearance.

And finally, fifth, I was looking for the way to respond to what you
had said in less words that I usually do.

Willy

"In the ethical way of regarding life it is therefore the task of the
individual to divest himself of the inward determinants and express
them in an outward way. Whenever he shrinks from this, whenever he is
inclined to persist in or to slip back into the inward determinants of
feeling, mood, etc., he sins, he is in temptation. (/Anfechtung/). The
paradox of faith is this, that there is an inwardness which is
incommensurable for the outward, an inwardness, be it observed, which
is not identical with the first, but is a new inwardness. This must
not be overlooked." (F&T, Lowrie, p. 79: Hong, p. 69)

Dear William,

Is it helpful to see Kierkegaard as a mirror? What is the nature of inwardness?

Mirror talk: I agree that we can learn about ourselves by reading Kierkegaard.
But when we read Kierkegaard, we see ourselves in a new light, we see ourselves
in the light of Kierkegaard's insights into the psychological, the ethical and
the religious. I still resist the mirror analogy because mirrors don't change
anything, whilst confronting Kierkegaard's work can result in individuals
changing for the better.

Inwardness: In the quote from Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard is saying that
there are at least two different kinds of inwardness. I don't think my 'naive'
understanding of 'inwardness' denies this. From my reading of Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, I take Kierkegaard to be arguing for a number of
(qualitatively different) kinds of inwardness: the inwardness of the aesthetic
individual, the inwardness of the ethical individual, the inwardness of the
religiousness A individual, and the inwardness of the religiousness B
individual.

My own understanding of the difference between aesthetic inwardness and ethical
inwardness is that the former lacks a self-conscious self-judgemental
reflection. The aesthetic individual has clever thoughts, deep feelings and
strong motivations. However he does not measure these against any absolute
standard. The ethical individual measures his thoughts, feelings and motivations
against the absolute ethical good. Thus there is a qualitative difference
between the inwardness of the aesthetic individual and the inwardness of the
ethical individual. The inwardness of the person of faith is qualitatively
different again, with her conception of herself as a sinner before God who,
nevertheless, has had her sins forgiven. This inwardness has no corresponding
outwardness to go with it.

I intended my account of inwardness in my last post to allow for these kinds of
inwardness, just as a definition of the word 'bird' should allow for different
species (sparrow, finch, blackbird, hawk, etc.) to all be kinds of bird.

There is, of course, a difference between types of bird and types of inwardness,
in that types of birds do not form a hierarchy, whereas the types of inwardness
from the aesthetic up to the level of faith involve quantum jumps in levels of
inwardness, such that from the higher level, the lower level of inwardness is as
nothing.

Yours,

Jim




[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Will,
If I may be so bold as to enter this discussion I have a question about
inwardness. I have been lurking on this forum for some time and must confess
I have had a hard time following most of the discussion so I have been
reluctant to enter in.

You said below that there appears to be two types of inwardness. I am not
sure that SK is saying that there is an original one and a new one but for
discussion I will assume you are correct. What is the difference? James
seemed to have defined toe first one more or less to your satisfaction. You
point out that there is a new one but didn't attempt to define it. Why not?
Does SK define it? If so, where?

In your fourth point below what message are you talking about? I don't
understand why the last part of that statement follows from the first part.

Enough questions for now.

From the wine country,

Don Anderson


-----Original Message-----
From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
[mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
Sent: Sunday, July 03, 2005 8:34 PM
To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [Kierkegaardian] Re: What Is Essential


Hello James (change of pace), it does seem as though you and I have a
difference. Not only that, but we each see that difference
differently. We look at the same thing and each say it is something
else. Reminds me of that fabled elephant, it does.

You said: <I don't see Kierkegaard as a mirror. A mirror has no
substance or contribution of its own. Kierkegaard, in contrast, has a
substantial message to get across to us. You seemed to agree to my
summary of Kierkegaard's essential (substantial) message in my last
post.

Given that Kierkegaard has a substantial message, the reader can get
Kierkegaard's message right or wrong - she can appropriate it or
misappropriate it. All interpretations of Kierkegaard are not equally
good. Given the genuine differences of interpretation between you and
me, I claim that both of us cannot have got Kierkegaard right.>

Yes, given that Kierkegaard has a substantial message, a given I agree
with, and if that message has substantially to do with one's relation
to oneself, which I think it does, then not to see oneself in that
message could give rise to a similar claim from this side of the
difference; that both of us cannot have got Kierkegaard right.

<^> <<=<>=<>=>> <^>

And you said: < I see myself as advocating a 'simple' or 'naive'
understanding of Kierkegaard - taking his books, chapters, paragraphs,
sentences and words at face value. Thus, for example, when you enquire
what I understand by Kierkegaard's words 'passion' and 'inwardness', I
would say that they mean what they ordinarily mean in the English
language. 'Passion' means emotional involvement, intense feeling,
enthusiasm, commitment and resolution, while 'inwardness' means
concerning one's own self - one's thoughts, feelings, attitudes,
motivations (one's will), behaviour and one's relationship to God.

You, on the other hand, seem to advocate a 'higher understanding',
where Kierkegaard's words don't always mean what they ordinarily mean.
Kierkegaard himself is very scathing of those of his contemporaries
who claim to have a "higher understanding" of Christianity. My
suspicion is that Kierkegaard would be equally scathing of anyone who
claimed a higher understanding of Kierkegaard's own works.>

I chose the following quote for five reasons:

First, it speaks to an inwardness that "is not identical with the
first, but is a new inwardness."

Second, it refers to the first inwardness in much the same terms you
used to describe your only meaning of inwardness.

Third, if the second inwardness is not commensurate with the first
inwardness, the qualification of it being higher does not pertain.

Fourth, since we are dealing with two meanings of inwardness, that
surely means that the message is directed towards one's relation with
oneself, and if that is so, that pesky mirror makes its appearance.

And finally, fifth, I was looking for the way to respond to what you
had said in less words that I usually do.

Willy

"In the ethical way of regarding life it is therefore the task of the
individual to divest himself of the inward determinants and express
them in an outward way. Whenever he shrinks from this, whenever he is
inclined to persist in or to slip back into the inward determinants of
feeling, mood, etc., he sins, he is in temptation. (/Anfechtung/). The
paradox of faith is this, that there is an inwardness which is
incommensurable for the outward, an inwardness, be it observed, which
is not identical with the first, but is a new inwardness. This must
not be overlooked." (F&T, Lowrie, p. 79: Hong, p. 69)





Yahoo! Groups Links

Dear Brown of the Will,

What am I to say? When or since you have included me in your emptying
movement, it seems that all you are left to discuss with is: no-one.

Understand me well, public audience, this is no criticism. I am flattered to
have been included in the emptying process (via the Consortium®).

My writing these very few lines is only to stress, to underline the
following new paradox:

Nothing is currently writing. How is this possible?

Sympathetically, None

a PS:

Willy, I have experienced some fun at reading your lines, yet it was mixed
with a real concern: that they should represent a fracturing scandal to
others who would not have the same inclination for, say, absurdities or, to
use my very french 'apple': 'divagations'. Indeed, think a minute of an
honest rational man trying to understand what is essentially at stake in the
disjunctive pattern portrayed best, in my taste, in /Either... Or.../, who
should seriously though seriously wrong read your conclusion of it all that
You, I and so He is nothing, or, more precisely, an empty thing. 'Absurd!'
should be his natural expostulation. But would it not be un-right for you to
be responsible for his dismissing the whole thing at the same time? Well, of
course he has the original material to exert his rational abilities...

Hi Don, I have visited your site several times. If you want to use any
quotes from my pile, feel free to so do. Thanks for the questions and
welcome to the word-fest. I'll take advantage of your arrival to
characterize the shtick, really a premise, that I use to beat others
with around here with. You'll see that it shouldn't leave any marks
even if applied full force.

<You said below that there appears to be two types of inwardness. I am
not sure that SK is saying that there is an original one and a new one
but for discussion I will assume you are correct. What is the
difference? James seemed to have defined the first one more or less to
your satisfaction. You point out that there is a new one but didn't
attempt to define it. Why not? Does SK define it? If so, where?

Well, on the two varieties of inwardness my only exhibit in that post
was the quote I offered. SK did say that "the paradox of faith is
this, that there is an inwardness which is incommensurable for the
outward, an inwardness, be it observed, which is not identical with
the first, but is a new inwardness. This must not be overlooked."

My whole shtick/premise rises or falls on that one point and one point
only; the separation between two categories being controlled by the
necessity of those two different inwardnesses being incommensurable. I
place all of my Kierkegaardian eggs in that single basket. He did say
that this relation must not be overlooked. It goes sans saying that I
see the point as literal and not rhetorical or polemical. If it were
not to be taken literally, why then, my premise represents a delusion.
I will offer here the following two quotes as backing up my shtick,
although the entire 606 quotes in my collection were collected because
I saw them as backing up that singular point.

"The matter is quite simple. In order to have faith, there must first
be existence, an existential qualification. This is what I am able to
emphasize – that to have faith, before there can be any question
of
having faith, there must be the /situation/. And this situation must
be brought about by an existential step on the part of the individual
(JP II 20)

The existential step would be the movement, or transition, from one
inwardness to the other, or from one subjectivity to another. As that
movement would need to pass through the discontinuity that is the
incommensurability between them, the leap would be a leap of a
different color; not just a leap to something, but a leap in which the
leaper winked out of being and returned in another guise, as it were.
Magic, I say

"Here as everywhere the different spheres must be kept clearly
distinct, and the qualitative dialectic, with its decisive mutation
that changes everything so that what was highest in one sphere is
rendered in another sphere absolutely inadmissible, must be respected.
As for the religious, it is an essential requirement that it should
have passed through the ethical." (CUP, Lowrie, p. 347)

The absolute separation is maintained between the spheres. The
distinction that derives from an incommensurable gap pervades his
words; or so my premise would have it. If the question were to be
asked as to why I 'believe' in the premise, or why do I have 'faith'
in it's being correct, I would probably respond that it corresponds to
my experience of myself. This open me up to the charge that I am
reading something into SK that is not there. Guilty as charged, which
is why I must say that I believe that what I see is what is there; a
faith of sorts from a secular sort of guy. This is why it is not my
intent to insist upon my reading as anything other than my reading.
This is also why my fallback position is always that we read
Kierkegaard as we read ourselves.

Ok, on to my 4th point.

<Fourth, since we are dealing with two meanings of inwardness, that
surely means that the message is directed towards one's relation with
oneself, and if that is so, that pesky mirror makes its appearance.>

Maybe I should have said 'if' instead of 'since.' The mirror, as I
define it, relates to what I see as the inevitability of a shift in
inwardness ending up being related to one's relation to oneself, and,
if that is so, any talk of it then has the capability of being taken
in self-referential terms by the reader; hence the reference to
mirror. Jim had earlier said that he did not see the mirror aspect in
the reading and I was referring to that statement by him.

If anything, I hope that I have taken all of the mystery out of my
position. It is based upon that premise I have just laid out. If you
see it as I see it, we talk about the difference we have seen, and if
you do not see it as I see it, we talk about our differences. Also
forgive the length of my reply; I do tend to be verbose.

Will Brown


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
wrote:
> Will,
> If I may be so bold as to enter this discussion I have a question
about
> inwardness. I have been lurking on this forum for some time and must
confess
> I have had a hard time following most of the discussion so I have
been
> reluctant to enter in.
>
> You said below that there appears to be two types of inwardness. I
am not
> sure that SK is saying that there is an original one and a new one
but for
> discussion I will assume you are correct. What is the difference?
James
> seemed to have defined toe first one more or less to your
satisfaction. You
> point out that there is a new one but didn't attempt to define it.
Why not?
> Does SK define it? If so, where?
>
> In your fourth point below what message are you talking about? I
don't
> understand why the last part of that statement follows from the
first part.
>
> Enough questions for now.
>
> From the wine country,
>
> Don Anderson
>
>

Will,
Thanks for visiting my site. It has been good to see you there and to get
some good feedback from you. Thanks for the offer to use anything from your
pile.

You talk of a premise (or as you call it a shtick) but I don't understand
what that premise is even after your explanation. Perhaps you can tell me in
plainer words.

There are many questions and responses to what you have written. Let me
address a couple of them in this post and save others for later. I am still
bracketing the idea that there are more than one kind of inwardness, but I
want to discuss my understanding of the quote from F&T namely, "...there is
an inwardness that is incommensurable for the outward..." This would seem to
say, on the face of it, that the incommensurability is not between two kinds
of inwardness but between inwardness and outwardness.

But that would be to oversimplify it. SK’s “shtick,” as I guess you would
call it, is in opposition to the notions of Hegel. Hegel’s idea was that of
a certain dialectic or as many have called it a synthesis with its thesis
and antithesis. Although Hegel never used these terms and although they
oversimplify the matter I will use them here as I find them helpful.

Hegel, to be brief, thought that outwardness was higher than inwardness. In
other words outwardness was the thesis and inwardness was the antithesis. In
the course of history, on Hegel’s analysis these would be brought together
into a “new outwardness” (please note the use of “new” here in contrast to
SK’s use of this word in “new inwardness”). This is the jist of Hegel’s
dialectic argument on this point.

SK is arguing quite the opposite. First he is saying that inwardness is
higher than outwardness. Second, he asserts that inwardness and outwardness
are so different (incommensurable) that they can never be brought together –
they are separated because they are incommensurate. Finally he is saying
that there is not now and never will be anything higher than inwardness.

So I would argue that SK’s “new inwardness” is in contrast to the hope for a
“new outwardness.” It is not “new” in contrast to another kind of inwardness
but it is new or rather different from the mistaken notion that tries to
bring outwardness and inwardness together while privileging outwardness. For
SK the highest is faith. It is inward and cannot be expressed outwardly in
any significant way. Thus the knight of faith is on his/her own when
responding to the highest, the absolute. This takes extraordinary courage,
as was the case with Abraham.

Finally as to your point about the “pesky mirror.” I agree with this
analogy. One must bring oneself to the project and expect to be changed. But
I’m not sure I understand your point entirely. Jim also has a good point in
saying that it is more than a mirror because the project changes one. There
is a quote from Sartre that applies here I think. I don’t have it in front
of me so I will paraphrase it. The more you seek to confront and understand
SK the more surely you are brought to confront and understand yourself. This
has been my experience.

I await your reply.

As ever,
Don Anderson

-----Original Message-----
From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
[mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
Sent: Monday, July 04, 2005 10:37 PM
To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [Kierkegaardian] Re: What Is Essential


Hi Don, I have visited your site several times. If you want to use any
quotes from my pile, feel free to so do. Thanks for the questions and
welcome to the word-fest. I'll take advantage of your arrival to
characterize the shtick, really a premise, that I use to beat others
with around here with. You'll see that it shouldn't leave any marks
even if applied full force.

<You said below that there appears to be two types of inwardness. I am
not sure that SK is saying that there is an original one and a new one
but for discussion I will assume you are correct. What is the
difference? James seemed to have defined the first one more or less to
your satisfaction. You point out that there is a new one but didn't
attempt to define it. Why not? Does SK define it? If so, where?

Well, on the two varieties of inwardness my only exhibit in that post
was the quote I offered. SK did say that "the paradox of faith is
this, that there is an inwardness which is incommensurable for the
outward, an inwardness, be it observed, which is not identical with
the first, but is a new inwardness. This must not be overlooked."

My whole shtick/premise rises or falls on that one point and one point
only; the separation between two categories being controlled by the
necessity of those two different inwardnesses being incommensurable. I
place all of my Kierkegaardian eggs in that single basket. He did say
that this relation must not be overlooked. It goes sans saying that I
see the point as literal and not rhetorical or polemical. If it were
not to be taken literally, why then, my premise represents a delusion.
I will offer here the following two quotes as backing up my shtick,
although the entire 606 quotes in my collection were collected because
I saw them as backing up that singular point.

"The matter is quite simple. In order to have faith, there must first
be existence, an existential qualification. This is what I am able to
emphasize – that to have faith, before there can be any question
of
having faith, there must be the /situation/. And this situation must
be brought about by an existential step on the part of the individual
(JP II 20)

The existential step would be the movement, or transition, from one
inwardness to the other, or from one subjectivity to another. As that
movement would need to pass through the discontinuity that is the
incommensurability between them, the leap would be a leap of a
different color; not just a leap to something, but a leap in which the
leaper winked out of being and returned in another guise, as it were.
Magic, I say

"Here as everywhere the different spheres must be kept clearly
distinct, and the qualitative dialectic, with its decisive mutation
that changes everything so that what was highest in one sphere is
rendered in another sphere absolutely inadmissible, must be respected.
As for the religious, it is an essential requirement that it should
have passed through the ethical." (CUP, Lowrie, p. 347)

The absolute separation is maintained between the spheres. The
distinction that derives from an incommensurable gap pervades his
words; or so my premise would have it. If the question were to be
asked as to why I 'believe' in the premise, or why do I have 'faith'
in it's being correct, I would probably respond that it corresponds to
my experience of myself. This open me up to the charge that I am
reading something into SK that is not there. Guilty as charged, which
is why I must say that I believe that what I see is what is there; a
faith of sorts from a secular sort of guy. This is why it is not my
intent to insist upon my reading as anything other than my reading.
This is also why my fallback position is always that we read
Kierkegaard as we read ourselves.

Ok, on to my 4th point.

<Fourth, since we are dealing with two meanings of inwardness, that
surely means that the message is directed towards one's relation with
oneself, and if that is so, that pesky mirror makes its appearance.>

Maybe I should have said 'if' instead of 'since.' The mirror, as I
define it, relates to what I see as the inevitability of a shift in
inwardness ending up being related to one's relation to oneself, and,
if that is so, any talk of it then has the capability of being taken
in self-referential terms by the reader; hence the reference to
mirror. Jim had earlier said that he did not see the mirror aspect in
the reading and I was referring to that statement by him.

If anything, I hope that I have taken all of the mystery out of my
position. It is based upon that premise I have just laid out. If you
see it as I see it, we talk about the difference we have seen, and if
you do not see it as I see it, we talk about our differences. Also
forgive the length of my reply; I do tend to be verbose.

Will Brown


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
wrote:
> Will,
> If I may be so bold as to enter this discussion I have a question
about
> inwardness. I have been lurking on this forum for some time and must
confess
> I have had a hard time following most of the discussion so I have
been
> reluctant to enter in.
>
> You said below that there appears to be two types of inwardness. I
am not
> sure that SK is saying that there is an original one and a new one
but for
> discussion I will assume you are correct. What is the difference?
James
> seemed to have defined toe first one more or less to your
satisfaction. You
> point out that there is a new one but didn't attempt to define it.
Why not?
> Does SK define it? If so, where?
>
> In your fourth point below what message are you talking about? I
don't
> understand why the last part of that statement follows from the
first part.
>
> Enough questions for now.
>
> From the wine country,
>
> Don Anderson
>
>






Yahoo! Groups Links

Dear Jim,

I am coming back to your original message concerning sin. Your challenge
echoed in my ears some discussion I had with some old friends of mine who
also were facing an impossibility to believe, to have faith in Jesus,
precisely because of the miracles and other irrational events (or supposed
so by believers).

I understand very well the concern of reason you so clearly express
regarding these events. It is, for me as, I suppose for many others, a point
of perplexity, whereas it is also an about-turn: to believe or not beyond
the rational...

Still, there is also something else which can be believed, listened and
understood by us and which may change everything in our life. I would
propose the following to you and to your reason with the very reserve that
you do not consider me as a 'cult leader' attempting to 'dupe' my
'followers'. I wish no follower. I am just the man next door...

I borrow the words of Jesus as Mark* reports them:

Mark 11-25: && And whenever you stand praying, if you have anything against
anyone, forgive him, that your Father in heaven may forgive you your
trespasses. &&

Mark 12-[28- to-31]: && Then one of the scribes came, and having heard them
reasoning together, perceiving that He had answered them well, asked him,
"Which is the first commandment of all?"
Jesus answered him, "The first of all the commandment is: 'Hear, O Israel,
the LORD our God, the LORD is one.
And you shall love the LORD your God with all your heart, with all your
soul, with all your mind and with all your strength.' This /is/ the first
commandment."
"And the second, like /it/, /is/ this, 'You shall love your neighbor as
yourself.' There is no other commandments greater than these." &&

----- ---- --- -- - -- --- ---- -----

In the first passage, I read that Jesus invites us to consider that our
non-forgiveness is an offense, just as the one we would refuse to forgive.
We have the ability to forgive.

In the second passage, I read that your quest for understanding is
applicable even in the context of searching the LORD. "You shall love the
LORD [...] with all your mind", not against your mind. What I further read
is that perhaps the mind alone is not enough. Heart, soul, mind and
strength, altogether. Nothing less, nothing more.

I further read that what highest rests is the set of these two legacies:
Love the LORD and love your neighbour as yourself. The remainder is the
remainder, but here is, it is said in Mark, what has nothing above itself.

----- ---- --- -- - -- --- ---- -----

What can you read in them? And why is that so?

----- ---- --- -- - -- --- ---- -----

A personal: I find that Mark is an eligible reading even for the one who
hardly suffers moral lecturing. There is something dry about his narration
which allows, I find, to come closer to Jesus' goodness than in any of the
other three Gospels. They all have something to tell us, how-ever.

----- ---- --- -- - -- --- ---- -----

Well, I hope this /was/ sufferable otherwise may you just forgive my
boldness in proffering it.

More Sincerely than ever,
Médéric Laitier

* The words were found in the new King James version as edited by Thomas
Nelson Publishers, Nashville, 1984

Don, I think I can work my way through our differences sufficiently to
expose them to discourse. I'll give it a try and toss it your way.
I'll begin with your following statement and the quote you quoted
from:

<There are many questions and responses to what you have written. Let
me address a couple of them in this post and save others for later. I
am still bracketing the idea that there are more than one kind of
inwardness, but I want to discuss my understanding of the quote from
F&T namely, "...there is an inwardness that is incommensurable for the
outward..." This would seem to say, on the face of it, that the
incommensurability is not between two kinds of inwardness but between
inwardness and outwardness.>

"The paradox of faith is this, that there is an inwardness which is
incommensurable for the outward, an inwardness, be it observed, which
is not identical with the first, but is a new inwardness. This must
not be overlooked."

You mentioned Hegel and his dialectical dance of thesis and antithesis
becoming a synthesis, and how SK was saying that such a dance is
really a tangling of the feet. I see the quote as saying that there is
an inwardness and an outwardness that pair dialectically, and that the
new inwardness is not a synthesis of the two but an inwardness that
has no outwardness which means that it is not the inwardness of the
dialectical pair. Yes, I have simplified this, but I can immediately
add the complexity back into it by pegging the inwardness that pairs
with the outwardness as representing the esthetic sphere, and the new
inwardness as representing the subjectivity that represents the
ethical sphere, the 'passageway' to the religious sphere.

The final complexity I add, which makes this what I call my shtick, is
that I see SK talking about that shift, or transition, from the first
inwardness to the second inwardness as if it were a change in one's
sense of self; there being a discontinuity between the two. This
brings two different readings of what he is saying into play. That
difference is to be found in the answer to the question of what the
nature of that change from one sphere to another is? I read it as
taking place in the self-relation, where the discontinuity, as
expressed in the quote as an incommensurability between the two, as
representing an absolute change in that self to self relation. Others
read it differently by allowing for a continuity in the transition.

Let me change the question to one of where the change takes place, and
add a twist to the complexity. I see it taking place at the place
where one grasps oneself as oneself, while another could see it as a
change of mind, or heart, or some such that makes the same self new.
The question becomes one of is it the same self new or is it a new
self. If the latter, the paradox is brought into play by the asking
the question, and if that question is asked because the change
experienced allows it to be raised, then the self asking the question
becomes the paradox.

It occurs to me that what I have done here is to expose the place in
SK's thoughts where the difference between a literal reading of the
change as expressed in his words and a figurative reading of that
expressed change makes the two readings incommensurate one with the
other. The question remains as to whether I read something into the
words that is not there, an artifact of the subject itself, or his
message really speaks to what I know of myself. I cannot answer that
question other than say that this is what I believe, or, if I am to
say that it does, take it as a matter of faith. Perhaps in saying
that, I have come upon my meaning of those two terms, belief and
faith. They require an either/or that is undeterminable, one has to be
held as belonging to the holder for the terms to apply. Is this then
the definition of passion, or am I just messing around with words? I
don't know, and I don't know.

I sure hope I haven't confused the issue beyond rescue. If I have
become unintelligible, it was not my intent.     Willy


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
wrote:
> Will,
> Thanks for visiting my site. It has been good to see you there and
to get
> some good feedback from you. Thanks for the offer to use anything
from your
> pile.
>
> You talk of a premise (or as you call it a shtick) but I don't
understand
> what that premise is even after your explanation. Perhaps you can
tell me in
> plainer words.
>
> There are many questions and responses to what you have written.
Let me
> address a couple of them in this post and save others for later. I
am still
> bracketing the idea that there are more than one kind of inwardness,
but I
> want to discuss my understanding of the quote from F&T namely,
"...there is
> an inwardness that is incommensurable for the outward..." This would
seem to
> say, on the face of it, that the incommensurability is not between
two kinds
> of inwardness but between inwardness and outwardness.
>
> But that would be to oversimplify it. SK's "shtick," as
I guess you
would
> call it, is in opposition to the notions of Hegel. Hegel's idea
was
that of
> a certain dialectic or as many have called it a synthesis with its
thesis
> and antithesis. Although Hegel never used these terms and although
they
> oversimplify the matter I will use them here as I find them helpful.
>
> Hegel, to be brief, thought that outwardness was higher than
inwardness. In
> other words outwardness was the thesis and inwardness was the
antithesis. In
> the course of history, on Hegel's analysis these would be
brought
together
> into a "new outwardness" (please note the use of
"new" here in
contrast to
> SK's use of this word in "new inwardness"). This is the
jist of Hegel's
> dialectic argument on this point.
>
> SK is arguing quite the opposite. First he is saying that
inwardness is
> higher than outwardness. Second, he asserts that inwardness and
outwardness
> are so different (incommensurable) that they can never be brought
together –
> they are separated because they are incommensurate. Finally he is
saying
> that there is not now and never will be anything higher than
inwardness.
>
> So I would argue that SK's "new inwardness" is in
contrast to the
hope for a
> "new outwardness." It is not "new" in contrast to
another kind of
inwardness
> but it is new or rather different from the mistaken notion that
tries to
> bring outwardness and inwardness together while privileging
outwardness. For
> SK the highest is faith. It is inward and cannot be expressed
outwardly in
> any significant way. Thus the knight of faith is on his/her own when
> responding to the highest, the absolute. This takes extraordinary
courage,
> as was the case with Abraham.
>
> Finally as to your point about the "pesky mirror." I agree
with this
> analogy. One must bring oneself to the project and expect to be
changed. But
> I'm not sure I understand your point entirely. Jim also has a
good
point in
> saying that it is more than a mirror because the project changes
one. There
> is a quote from Sartre that applies here I think. I don't have
it in
front
> of me so I will paraphrase it. The more you seek to confront and
understand
> SK the more surely you are brought to confront and understand
yourself. This
> has been my experience.
>
> I await your reply.
>
> As ever,
> Don Anderson

Would Soren have identified himself immanently (genius) or
transcendently (apostle)?  Wuth what authority did Soren carry out his
prolific wriintgs?

I have just finished a selection in Kaufmann of Kierkegaard's On
Authority and Revelation.

I have found this selection very intersting and am curious as to what
other perceptions on this may exist.

Subjectively Yours,

Nolan

Dear Mederic,

Thank you for another clearly-written and subjectively-challenging posting. I am
always pleased to receive such posts.

Like you, Mark is my favourite gospel - it has a rawness and lack of spin (in
comparison to the other gospels), and I feel closer to Jesus, the actual man,
when reading Mark than I do when reading the other gospels. I appreciate the
other gospels as well - but for different reasons.

I take it that your main reason for choosing the quotes from Mark was to make
the point that for Jesus, love of God involves the participation of our minds,
and hence such belief and love is compatible with our rationality, our reason.

You invite me to respond directly to the words of Jesus (as reported by Mark).
In a moment I am going to steer things back in the direction of Kierkegaard, as
this is a Kierkegaardian forum, but first a direct response to the words of
Jesus.

The command to make up with those I am at odds with (to 'forgive' them) before I
communicate with God, and the command to love my neighbour as one like myself,
are ethical commands which I accept as having full authority over me. Questions
of faith and reason don't arise here.

The command to 'love God with all your heart, soul, mind and strength' is more
problematic, as it is not transparent to me what the command involves. My
inclination is to 'demythologise' it by interpreting it as a command to love the
(ethical) good. Loving the good is a command I can respect and accept on Jesus'
authority. With the demythologising interpretation in place, again questions of
reason and faith don't arise.

To widen the focus from Mark's Jesus to the New Testament as a whole, there is a
call to the reader to believe in the gospel of Jesus Christ. Unlike Kierkegaard,
the New Testament writers generally claim that faith involves a step BEYOND
reason (beyond the limits of reason), but not a step AGAINST reason. Kierkegaard
radicalises the New Testament message by claiming that faith involves a step
against reason. Thus Kierkegaard represents more of an affront to a rationalist
like myself than do the New Testament authors.

I agree that reason has its limits - it can only take us so far. For example,
the existence of the universe is a mystery which cannot be explained by sciences
nor by reason. I agree that some things are 'beyond explanation' - I can accept
sin as a reality that is beyond explanation. However Kierkegaard seems to want
to go further than this and claim that certain aspects of reality are not just
beyond explanation, but are 'beyond our understanding' or even positively
'against our understanding'.

Kierkegaard seems to go out of his way to offend the rational person. He finds
paradoxes everywhere - not just within the confines of Christianity. Truth
itself is paradoxical according to Kierkegaard.

Now to some extent the emphasis on the paradoxical might just be a strategy
Kierkegaard deliberately employs to wake up (out of their dogmatic slumbers) the
complacent and shallow Danes of his own time. Further, I agree with a number of
his criticisms of the Hegelian system, particularly that it took reason too far
into domains where it should not have been taken. Perhaps in a 'less rational'
age, or in a country where Christianity was not a matter of course, Kierkegaard
would have been less radical in his attack on reason. (Recall he does also
attack the "subjective madness" of those who believe in miracles and
superstition without any justification.)

Ronald Green makes my point in his excellent essay "'Developing' in Fear and
Trembling" in the Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard:

"Read as an ethical treatise, Fear and Trembling leaves us strangely disturbed.
Once we put aside the compulsion to ethicalize Abraham's conduct in the ways
that violate the clear sense of the text, we are left with a book whose exemplar
borders on the psychopathic. Of course, this may be part of Kierkegaard's
purpose in troubling his contemporaries' religious complacency. In that case,
without really intending to offer Abraham in Genesis 22 as a model of behaviour,
Kierkegaard/Johannes would deliberately use this provocative and troubling
episode to reinforce the book's call to personal religious engagement and
commitment." (CCTK, p. 268)

Certainly Kierkegaard's discussion of Abraham in Fear and Trembling is a prime
example of Kierkegaard at his most offensive to the sensitive and reasonable
person. In this book, Johannes de silentio describes Abraham as a man who comes
within a whisker of murdering his young son, at the same time portraying him as
a paragon of faith. Why would Kierkegaard make such an offensive suggestion? I
don't think that it is just a desire to shock his contemporaries out of their
complacency. It is also because of the way Kierkegaard thinks a person's level
of passion is connected to the person's consciousness of the paradoxical nature
of reality. I repeat a quote I used a while back:

"Subjectivity culminates in passion, Christianity is paradox; paradox and
passion fit each other perfectly, and paradox perfectly fits a person situated
in the extremity of existence. Indeed in the whole world there are not to be
found two lovers who fit each other as do paradox and passion ... the existing
person has been situated in the extremity of existence by the paradox itself."
(CUP, Hong, p. 230)

Kierkegaard seems to think that unless we see the world as paradoxical, we will
not develop maximum passion and inwardness.

Many questions come flooding in at this point, the most urgent ones being:
1. Is Kierkegaard right to claim that truth and reality are paradoxical?
2. Is Kierkaard right to claim that an individual can only have maximum passion
if she conceives truth and reality as paradoxical?
3. Is Kierkegaard as wedded to the idea of the paradoxical as I suggest here?

These are not questions I don't feel confident to answer at present - but they
remain at the forefront of my mind as I continue my reading of Kierkegaard.

Yours,

Jim

P.S. Throughout I use the word 'paradox' to mean 'a feature of reality that
appears to be self-contradictory or an impossibility'. Paradoxes are things
which are beyond our understanding.

P.P.S. Although this post is addressed to Mederic, as a direct response to what
he wrote, I welcome responses to what I have written from any other member of
the forum.




[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Will
Thanks for your response to my attempt to explain the unexplainable. I think
you have clarified some things that you are saying and not others. It seems
to me  we are not very far apart.

I don’t see that there is inwardness and outwardness that pair
dialectically. Hegel and his ilk thought this but I don’t see where SK is
buying it. He thinks that never the twain shall meet or if they do meet it
is very superficial.

I also don’t think that the “new inwardness” doesn’t come in at the ethical
level but at the religious level.

You say that the inwardness that pairs with the outwardness represents the
esthetic sphere. I think SK says that one who is solely (or mostly) in the
esthetic sphere has very little inwarndness. It is a going along with the
crowd, the herd, a mindless and existential collective behavior. It is all
outwardness and very finite and universal at a very low level. Nothing comes
from within.

I don’t see that the ethical sphere is where any “new inwardness” comes in
either. It there is such a thing as “new inwardness” it will come in only at
the religious level. The ethical is outward and still finite. Its finiteness
is the problem. It is at a higher level than what little inwardness there is
at the esthetic level is. One who is at this level has incorporated
(appropriated) the outward but it does come from without. Yet it is a step
higher and has a qualitative difference. It takes a leap but a small one so
to speak. Nevertheless this inwardness is still of a finite nature and is
not the highest as Hegel argued.

If there is such a thing as a “new inwardness” it is at the religious level
and this level only. This is the level of “the absolute relation to the
absolute.” This is the level that requires the “big leap” because it is a
leap from the finite to the infinite. It comes about, on Sk’s reading, when
the ethical level fails the individual. One discovers that it has its
limits, it is flawed and not complete – there is more to come as future
event, something altogether new. Yet what is to come is beyond
understanding, beyond the finite, beyond the universal. It is inexplicable.
It is a trial. At this point one becomes, if courage does not fail, a
“knight of resignation.” Realizing that the outward no longer serves. Then
all one has is what we are referring to here as the “new inwardness” which I
am suggesting is the only authentic inwardness on SK’s thinking. It is
faith. The “knight of faith” marches to an inward drum and there is no
outwardness to rely upon and there is no outward expression. It is the
absolute relation to the absolute – it is inexplicable.

So is the “new inwardness” new or is it a “new more complete recognition” of
the inwardness we all possess?

You said:
<Let me change the question to one of where the change takes place, and
add a twist to the complexity. I see it taking place at the place
where one grasps oneself as oneself, while another could see it as a
change of mind, or heart, or some such that makes the same self new.
The question becomes one of is it the same self new or is it a new
self. If the latter, the paradox is brought into play by the asking
the question, and if that question is asked because the change
experienced allows it to be raised, then the self asking the question
becomes the paradox.>

In the above paragraph there are two statements I need to have clarified.
What is meant by “the place where one grasps oneself as oneself?” Also what
is the difference between “the same self new” and “a new self?” Is
“inwardness the same as self?” Also what does the last sentence mean?

Later!

Don Anderson
http://road.nancyanddon.com



-----Original Message-----
From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
[mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
Sent: Thursday, July 07, 2005 1:03 PM
To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [Kierkegaardian] Re: What Is Essential


Don, I think I can work my way through our differences sufficiently to
expose them to discourse. I'll give it a try and toss it your way.
I'll begin with your following statement and the quote you quoted
from:

<There are many questions and responses to what you have written. Let
me address a couple of them in this post and save others for later. I
am still bracketing the idea that there are more than one kind of
inwardness, but I want to discuss my understanding of the quote from
F&T namely, "...there is an inwardness that is incommensurable for the
outward..." This would seem to say, on the face of it, that the
incommensurability is not between two kinds of inwardness but between
inwardness and outwardness.>

"The paradox of faith is this, that there is an inwardness which is
incommensurable for the outward, an inwardness, be it observed, which
is not identical with the first, but is a new inwardness. This must
not be overlooked."

You mentioned Hegel and his dialectical dance of thesis and antithesis
becoming a synthesis, and how SK was saying that such a dance is
really a tangling of the feet. I see the quote as saying that there is
an inwardness and an outwardness that pair dialectically, and that the
new inwardness is not a synthesis of the two but an inwardness that
has no outwardness which means that it is not the inwardness of the
dialectical pair. Yes, I have simplified this, but I can immediately
add the complexity back into it by pegging the inwardness that pairs
with the outwardness as representing the esthetic sphere, and the new
inwardness as representing the subjectivity that represents the
ethical sphere, the 'passageway' to the religious sphere.

The final complexity I add, which makes this what I call my shtick, is
that I see SK talking about that shift, or transition, from the first
inwardness to the second inwardness as if it were a change in one's
sense of self; there being a discontinuity between the two. This
brings two different readings of what he is saying into play. That
difference is to be found in the answer to the question of what the
nature of that change from one sphere to another is? I read it as
taking place in the self-relation, where the discontinuity, as
expressed in the quote as an incommensurability between the two, as
representing an absolute change in that self to self relation. Others
read it differently by allowing for a continuity in the transition.

Let me change the question to one of where the change takes place, and
add a twist to the complexity. I see it taking place at the place
where one grasps oneself as oneself, while another could see it as a
change of mind, or heart, or some such that makes the same self new.
The question becomes one of is it the same self new or is it a new
self. If the latter, the paradox is brought into play by the asking
the question, and if that question is asked because the change
experienced allows it to be raised, then the self asking the question
becomes the paradox.

It occurs to me that what I have done here is to expose the place in
SK's thoughts where the difference between a literal reading of the
change as expressed in his words and a figurative reading of that
expressed change makes the two readings incommensurate one with the
other. The question remains as to whether I read something into the
words that is not there, an artifact of the subject itself, or his
message really speaks to what I know of myself. I cannot answer that
question other than say that this is what I believe, or, if I am to
say that it does, take it as a matter of faith. Perhaps in saying
that, I have come upon my meaning of those two terms, belief and
faith. They require an either/or that is undeterminable, one has to be
held as belonging to the holder for the terms to apply. Is this then
the definition of passion, or am I just messing around with words? I
don't know, and I don't know.

I sure hope I haven't confused the issue beyond rescue. If I have
become unintelligible, it was not my intent.     Willy

Don, this subject gets messy quickly. I had written a lengthy reply in
an attempt to answer your questions and I can see that it covers too
much ground at once, inviting a ton more of questions. In essence,
what I wanted to do was set aside all considerations other than the
structure of what we may call the leap, or transition, as he calls it
elsewhere. This morning I think I have just found the way around the
long mess. You asked the following question:

<So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
complete
recognition" of the inwardness we all possess?>

I would translate that question to asking if the new is absolute or
relative, and come down on the side of the absolute. The following two
quotes from his /Fragments/ expresses that absolute quality of the
transition. Could not the quote from F&T about the 'old' and 'new'
inwardness, with that difference between them of being incommensurable
one with the other be seen as saying the same thing? Are we to take
what he says literally or figuratively? In other words, is this
transition something one can come upon and then reflect upon to find
the words to describe? Do we have a premise-author or an essential
author?

"In so far as the learner was in Error, and now receives the Truth and
with it the condition for understanding it, a change takes place
within him like the change from non-being to being. But this
transition from non-being to being is the transition we call birth.
Now one who exists cannot be born; nevertheless the disciple is born.
Let us call this transition the /New Birth/, in consequence of which
the disciple enters the world quite as at the first birth, an
individual human being knowing nothing as yet about the world into
which he has been born, whether there are other human beings in it
besides himself; for while it is possible to be baptized /en masse/,
it is not possible to be born anew /en masse/. (PF, Swenson/Hong, pp.
23-24)

"But is the hypothesis here expounded thinkable? Let us not be in
haste to reply; for not only one whose deliberation is unduly
prolonged may fail to produce an answer, but also one who while he
exhibits a marvelous promptitude in replying, does not show the
desirable degree of slowness in considering the difficulty before
explaining it. Before we reply, let us ask ourselves from whom we may
expect an answer to our question. The being born, is this fact
thinkable? Certainly, why not. But for whom is it thinkable, for the
one who is born, or for the one who is not born? This latter
supposition is an absurdity which could never have entered anyone's
head; for one who is born could scarcely have conceived the notion.
When one who has experienced birth thinks of himself as born, he
conceives this transition from non-being to being. The same principle
must hold in the case of the new birth. Or is the difficulty increased
by the fact that the non-being which preceded the new birth contains
more being than the non-being that preceded the first birth? But who
then may be expected to think the new birth? Surely the man who has
himself been born anew, since it would of course be absurd to imagine
that one not so born should think it. Would it not be the height of
the ridiculous for such an individual to entertain this notion?"
(Ibid., pp. 24-25)

The second quote, as I read it, says that there is something that
cannot be known until it is known, and that that something is the
transition he calls the leap. That does not say we cannot entertain
such a proposition and read such an absolute change into his words
wherever he suggests it. The quote from F&T fits the bill in my book.
I have said nothing about experience or the conditions necessary for
the transition, or the religious significance of such a transition. I
see his /Purity of Heart/ as his guide book to that transition.
Willy


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
wrote:
> Will
> Thanks for your response to my attempt to explain the unexplainable.
I think
> you have clarified some things that you are saying and not others.
It seems
> to me  we are not very far apart.
>
> I don't see that there is inwardness and outwardness that pair
> dialectically. Hegel and his ilk thought this but I don't see
where
SK is
> buying it. He thinks that never the twain shall meet or if they do
meet it
> is very superficial.
>
> I also don't think that the "new inwardness"
doesn't come in at the
ethical
> level but at the religious level.
>
> You say that the inwardness that pairs with the outwardness
represents the
> esthetic sphere. I think SK says that one who is solely (or mostly)
in the
> esthetic sphere has very little inwarndness. It is a going along
with the
> crowd, the herd, a mindless and existential collective behavior. It
is all
> outwardness and very finite and universal at a very low level.
Nothing comes
> from within.
>
> I don't see that the ethical sphere is where any "new
inwardness"
comes in
> either. It there is such a thing as "new inwardness" it
will come in
only at
> the religious level. The ethical is outward and still finite. Its
finiteness
> is the problem. It is at a higher level than what little inwardness
there is
> at the esthetic level is. One who is at this level has incorporated
> (appropriated) the outward but it does come from without. Yet it is
a step
> higher and has a qualitative difference. It takes a leap but a small
one so
> to speak. Nevertheless this inwardness is still of a finite nature
and is
> not the highest as Hegel argued.
>
> If there is such a thing as a "new inwardness" it is at the
religious level
> and this level only. This is the level of "the absolute
relation to the
> absolute." This is the level that requires the "big
leap" because it
is a
> leap from the finite to the infinite. It comes about, on Sk's
reading, when
> the ethical level fails the individual. One discovers that it has
its
> limits, it is flawed and not complete – there is more to come
as future
> event, something altogether new. Yet what is to come is beyond
> understanding, beyond the finite, beyond the universal. It is
inexplicable.
> It is a trial. At this point one becomes, if courage does not fail,
a
> "knight of resignation." Realizing that the outward no
longer
serves. Then
> all one has is what we are referring to here as the "new
inwardness"
which I
> am suggesting is the only authentic inwardness on SK's
thinking. It is
> faith. The "knight of faith" marches to an inward drum and
there is no
> outwardness to rely upon and there is no outward expression. It is
the
> absolute relation to the absolute – it is inexplicable.
>
> So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
complete
recognition" of
> the inwardness we all possess?
>
> You said:
> <Let me change the question to one of where the change takes place,
and
> add a twist to the complexity. I see it taking place at the place
> where one grasps oneself as oneself, while another could see it as a
> change of mind, or heart, or some such that makes the same self new.
> The question becomes one of is it the same self new or is it a new
> self. If the latter, the paradox is brought into play by the asking
> the question, and if that question is asked because the change
> experienced allows it to be raised, then the self asking the
question
> becomes the paradox.>
>
> In the above paragraph there are two statements I need to have
clarified.
> What is meant by "the place where one grasps oneself as
oneself?"
Also what
> is the difference between "the same self new" and "a
new self?" Is
> "inwardness the same as self?" Also what does the last
sentence mean?
>
> Later!
>
> Don Anderson
> http://road.nancyanddon.com
>
>

Hello again Nolan. That collection of essays is SK's Book on Adler. I
have 16 quotes from the book in my quote bin (see site reference in
profile) that I feel captures the gist of the book. Perhaps the answer
to your two questions might be found in the following quote:

"In so far as an essential author may be said to feel a need to
communicate himself, this need is purely immanent, an enjoyment of his
understanding raised to the second power, or else it would be for him
an ethical task consciously assumed. The premise-author feels no need
to communicate himself, for essentially he has nothing to
communicate." (BA, Lowrie, p.117-18)

Those essays, concentrating on the genius/apostle difference as they
do, reveal that divide from many angles and provide what I see as a
clarification of how that divide is situated. I must add some more
quotes from it. As to SK's authority, he used the term 'Governance.'
His /Point of View/ has an entire chapter devoted to the matter. When
one has appropriated a subject, it is that appropriation that speaks.
All one needs do is push the button, get out of the way, and the
subject turns to words to express itself.

Kaufman? Haven't read him in years, but if my memory serves me
correctly, his Kierkegaard and my Kierkegaard had only the name in
common; not that that means anything.       willy


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, nolanhatley <no_reply@y...>
wrote:
>
> Would Soren have identified himself immanently (genius) or
> transcendently (apostle)?  Wuth what authority did Soren carry out
his
> prolific wriintgs?
>
> I have just finished a selection in Kaufmann of Kierkegaard's On
> Authority and Revelation.
>
> I have found this selection very intersting and am curious as to
what
> other perceptions on this may exist.
>
> Subjectively Yours,
>
> Nolan

James, can I not but comment? There seems to be a certain humour in
the air and I want to see if I can capture it in my reply. If I do,
forgive me in advance for it's capture.

< Kierkegaard seems to think that unless we see the world as
paradoxical, we will not develop maximum passion and inwardness.>

What if, at the maximum passion and inwardness, it is not the world
that is the paradox, but the self-relation? The quote you used as
supporting your statement (I added the bracketed parts for context) is
below. It seems to me to be saying that the paradox fits that self
situated at the extremity of existence like a glove; in other words,
where passion and the paradox are two ways of saying the same thing,
this subjectivity is the truth. I cannot imagine where you see
anything in the quote that indicates the world is paradoxical, but let
me see if I can imagine it. Here is your lead in to the quote:

< Certainly Kierkegaard's discussion of Abraham in Fear and Trembling
is a prime example of Kierkegaard at his most offensive to the
sensitive and reasonable person. In this book, Johannes de silentio
describes Abraham as a man who comes within a whisker of murdering his
young son, at the same time portraying him as a paragon of faith. Why
would Kierkegaard make such an offensive suggestion? I don't think
that it is just a desire to shock his contemporaries out of their
complacency. It is also because of the way Kierkegaard thinks a
person's level of passion is connected to the person's consciousness
of the paradoxical nature of reality. I repeat a quote I used a while
back:>

"[If, however, subjectivity is truth, and subjectivity is the existing
subjectivity, then, if I may put it this way, Christianity is a
perfect fit.]     Subjectivity culminates in passion, Christianity is
paradox; paradox and passion fit each other perfectly, and paradox
perfectly fits a person situated in the extremity of existence. Indeed
in the whole world there are not to be found two lovers who fit each
other as do paradox and passion, [and their quarrel is only like a
lover's quarrel when the quarrel is about whether it was he who
awakened her passion or it was she who awakened his—and similarly
here,] the existing person has been situated in the extremity of
existence by the paradox itself." (CUP, Hong, p. 230)

You surely are not speaking for all with your 'prime example' remark.
If so, those of us who find rationality in what SK says are the
irrational lot. What if the whole of F&T were for the purpose of
making a point, like, say this: Faith as trumping the universal, the
ethical, by the obeying of God in real time in a manner that negates
the ethical, that suspends the ethical? My God, what a way to express
the paradox of God sticking Her infinite nose into the finite! Talk
about the camel and the tent! And here it is in the Bible, the Word of
God! On a less humorous note, here is SK saying much the same thing,
and, at the same time referring to the psychological bent of the book:

"A COMMENT ON SOMETHING IN FEAR AND TREMBLING
Johannes de silentio rightly says that to show the various
psychological points of view requires passionate concentration.
Similarly with the decision whether or not to assume that this and
that is humanly speaking impossible for me. I am not thinking here of
the higher clashes where what is expected is in total conflict with
the order of nature (e.g. that Sarah gets a child though far beyond
natural child-bearing age). Which is why Johannes de silentio
reiterates that he cannot understand Abraham, since here the clash is
at such a height that the ethical itself is a spiritual trial.

No, on a more modest scale, there are many, surely by far the
majority, who are able to live without having consciousness really
penetrate their lives. For them it is surely possible never to come to
a decision in passionate concentration on whether to cling expectantly
to this possibility or give it up. Thus they live on in unclarity.

Not so with those individualities whose nature is consciousness. They
could quite well give up this and that, even if it is their dearest
wish, but they must have clarity about whether they expect it or not.
It is forever impossible to get immediate or half-reflective natures
to grasp this. So they never really get as far as distinguishing
between resignation and faith.

This is precisely what Johannes de silentio has urged again and again.
Everything depends upon passionate concentration. So if someone comes
along and wants to correct him by bringing the matter back into
ordinary intellectual unclarity (which is undeniably the common state
of man) – then, yes, of course he manages to be understood by
many.
That's how it always is when what a real thinker has put a fine point
on is corrected with the help of what 'he rejected even before he
began'." (P&J, Hannay, pp. 483-84) (50 X 2 A 594)

So, he has worked the ethical/universal sphere into it in such a way
that it must be suspended to show the faith that requires its
suspension in the paradox, and in spades. It's not irrational: its
paradoxical; and it uses the entire structure of his spheres to
express it. The paradox that is the separation of the spheres has been
itself reduced to the paradox of faith. It's a great romp, I say. It's
SK at his finest; it includes that proverbial kitchen sink. And nope,
I guess I cannot imagine it.     William

Will,
I don't think I was asking if the "new inwardness" was relative or absolute.
I was thinking about the nature of inwardness in general. I was thinking
more about SK's discussion of self as spirit and relation in Part 1A of SUD
and how it relates to inwardness. Is inwardness the self that SK describes?
How do these relate to one another or not?

I don't have time right now to go into this in more detail.

Don Anderson

-----Original Message-----
From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
[mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
Sent: Monday, July 11, 2005 11:59 AM
To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [Kierkegaardian] Re: What Is Essential


Don, this subject gets messy quickly. I had written a lengthy reply in
an attempt to answer your questions and I can see that it covers too
much ground at once, inviting a ton more of questions. In essence,
what I wanted to do was set aside all considerations other than the
structure of what we may call the leap, or transition, as he calls it
elsewhere. This morning I think I have just found the way around the
long mess. You asked the following question:

<So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
complete
recognition" of the inwardness we all possess?>

I would translate that question to asking if the new is absolute or
relative, and come down on the side of the absolute. The following two
quotes from his /Fragments/ expresses that absolute quality of the
transition. Could not the quote from F&T about the 'old' and 'new'
inwardness, with that difference between them of being incommensurable
one with the other be seen as saying the same thing? Are we to take
what he says literally or figuratively? In other words, is this
transition something one can come upon and then reflect upon to find
the words to describe? Do we have a premise-author or an essential
author?

"In so far as the learner was in Error, and now receives the Truth and
with it the condition for understanding it, a change takes place
within him like the change from non-being to being. But this
transition from non-being to being is the transition we call birth.
Now one who exists cannot be born; nevertheless the disciple is born.
Let us call this transition the /New Birth/, in consequence of which
the disciple enters the world quite as at the first birth, an
individual human being knowing nothing as yet about the world into
which he has been born, whether there are other human beings in it
besides himself; for while it is possible to be baptized /en masse/,
it is not possible to be born anew /en masse/. (PF, Swenson/Hong, pp.
23-24)

"But is the hypothesis here expounded thinkable? Let us not be in
haste to reply; for not only one whose deliberation is unduly
prolonged may fail to produce an answer, but also one who while he
exhibits a marvelous promptitude in replying, does not show the
desirable degree of slowness in considering the difficulty before
explaining it. Before we reply, let us ask ourselves from whom we may
expect an answer to our question. The being born, is this fact
thinkable? Certainly, why not. But for whom is it thinkable, for the
one who is born, or for the one who is not born? This latter
supposition is an absurdity which could never have entered anyone's
head; for one who is born could scarcely have conceived the notion.
When one who has experienced birth thinks of himself as born, he
conceives this transition from non-being to being. The same principle
must hold in the case of the new birth. Or is the difficulty increased
by the fact that the non-being which preceded the new birth contains
more being than the non-being that preceded the first birth? But who
then may be expected to think the new birth? Surely the man who has
himself been born anew, since it would of course be absurd to imagine
that one not so born should think it. Would it not be the height of
the ridiculous for such an individual to entertain this notion?"
(Ibid., pp. 24-25)

The second quote, as I read it, says that there is something that
cannot be known until it is known, and that that something is the
transition he calls the leap. That does not say we cannot entertain
such a proposition and read such an absolute change into his words
wherever he suggests it. The quote from F&T fits the bill in my book.
I have said nothing about experience or the conditions necessary for
the transition, or the religious significance of such a transition. I
see his /Purity of Heart/ as his guide book to that transition.
Willy


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
wrote:
> Will
> Thanks for your response to my attempt to explain the unexplainable.
I think
> you have clarified some things that you are saying and not others.
It seems
> to me  we are not very far apart.
>
> I don't see that there is inwardness and outwardness that pair
> dialectically. Hegel and his ilk thought this but I don't see
where
SK is
> buying it. He thinks that never the twain shall meet or if they do
meet it
> is very superficial.
>
> I also don't think that the "new inwardness"
doesn't come in at the
ethical
> level but at the religious level.
>
> You say that the inwardness that pairs with the outwardness
represents the
> esthetic sphere. I think SK says that one who is solely (or mostly)
in the
> esthetic sphere has very little inwarndness. It is a going along
with the
> crowd, the herd, a mindless and existential collective behavior. It
is all
> outwardness and very finite and universal at a very low level.
Nothing comes
> from within.
>
> I don't see that the ethical sphere is where any "new
inwardness"
comes in
> either. It there is such a thing as "new inwardness" it
will come in
only at
> the religious level. The ethical is outward and still finite. Its
finiteness
> is the problem. It is at a higher level than what little inwardness
there is
> at the esthetic level is. One who is at this level has incorporated
> (appropriated) the outward but it does come from without. Yet it is
a step
> higher and has a qualitative difference. It takes a leap but a small
one so
> to speak. Nevertheless this inwardness is still of a finite nature
and is
> not the highest as Hegel argued.
>
> If there is such a thing as a "new inwardness" it is at the
religious level
> and this level only. This is the level of "the absolute
relation to the
> absolute." This is the level that requires the "big
leap" because it
is a
> leap from the finite to the infinite. It comes about, on Sk's
reading, when
> the ethical level fails the individual. One discovers that it has
its
> limits, it is flawed and not complete – there is more to come
as future
> event, something altogether new. Yet what is to come is beyond
> understanding, beyond the finite, beyond the universal. It is
inexplicable.
> It is a trial. At this point one becomes, if courage does not fail,
a
> "knight of resignation." Realizing that the outward no
longer
serves. Then
> all one has is what we are referring to here as the "new
inwardness"
which I
> am suggesting is the only authentic inwardness on SK's
thinking. It is
> faith. The "knight of faith" marches to an inward drum and
there is no
> outwardness to rely upon and there is no outward expression. It is
the
> absolute relation to the absolute – it is inexplicable.
>
> So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
complete
recognition" of
> the inwardness we all possess?
>
> You said:
> <Let me change the question to one of where the change takes place,
and
> add a twist to the complexity. I see it taking place at the place
> where one grasps oneself as oneself, while another could see it as a
> change of mind, or heart, or some such that makes the same self new.
> The question becomes one of is it the same self new or is it a new
> self. If the latter, the paradox is brought into play by the asking
> the question, and if that question is asked because the change
> experienced allows it to be raised, then the self asking the
question
> becomes the paradox.>
>
> In the above paragraph there are two statements I need to have
clarified.
> What is meant by "the place where one grasps oneself as
oneself?"
Also what
> is the difference between "the same self new" and "a
new self?" Is
> "inwardness the same as self?" Also what does the last
sentence mean?
>
> Later!
>
> Don Anderson
> http://road.nancyanddon.com
>
>





Yahoo! Groups Links

William,

We seem to disagree where Kierkegaard locates the paradox (or the paradoxes, if
there are more than one).

I claim that SK sees the world as paradoxical. You reply:

"I cannot imagine where you see anything in the quote that indicates the world
is paradoxical ... What if, at the maximum passion and inwardness, it is not the
world that is the paradox, but the self-relation? ... The paradox that is the
separation of the spheres has been itself reduced to the paradox of faith."

Well, in the quote we are concentrating on, SK writes: "Christianity is
paradox."

Now you may want to claim that Christianity is wholly within, but I want to
maintain that Christianity, for SK, is at least partly out there in the world.
SK describes the following aspects of Christianity as being paradoxes: sin, the
atonement, the incarnation, as well as Christianity as a whole.

Now for me the atonement and the incarnation were historical events, and, as
such, are part of the world. Thus, for SK, a true description of the world would
include these paradoxical features. If the world includes paradoxical features,
then my statement 'The world is paradoxical' is true.

Let me turn the tables on you: You claim in your post that the "self-relation"
is a paradox, and that "the separation of the spheres" is a paradox. Can you
produce quotes where SK makes these two claims?

As for "Fear and Trembling", the quote from SK's Journals is helpful. It is
particularly illuminating that SK says that "Johannes de silentio reiterates
that he cannot understand Abraham". I suppose that if Johannes cannot understand
Abraham, then there's not much chance of you and me understanding him. Perhaps I
should be less confrontational and more modest and just say "I cannot understand
how a man poised to murder his son can be exhibiting faith."

On "Fear and Trembling", you outline your own view as follows:

"What if the whole of F&T were for the purpose of making a point, like, say
this: Faith as trumping the universal, the ethical, by the obeying of God in
real time in a manner that negates the ethical, that suspends the ethical?"

Two responses to this come to mind. First, I am persuaded by Ronald Green that
SK didn't just communicate one message in F&T, but intended the text to contain
a number of different messages - the text has various layers of meaning. You are
suggesting that SK only had one purpose in writing F&T, but following Green, I
think you are wrong about this.

Second, I can agree, however, that one of SK's purposes in writing F&T was, as
you say, to show "Faith as trumping the universal, the ethical." However this
point alone does not answer my criticism of SK. I can accept that SK wants me to
believe that "faith trumps the universal", but I don't see how portraying a
potential child murderer as a paragon of faith is supposed to convince me of
this. I'm tempted to say that if faith is all about raising a knife to a child's
throat, I'll stick with the ethical, thank you very much.

Yours,

James

P.S. I have been following your exchange with Don Anderson with interest. I
think Don was correct to point out that the incommensurability SK mentions in
the quote is between inwardness and outwardness and not, as you interpret,
between the two kinds of inwardness.

I agree that the quotes from "Philosophical Fragments" you include do support
your "new self" interpretation of SK. However perhaps the PF quotes reveal
inconsistencies in SK's writings. First, the one-transition view expressed in
the quotes conflicts with the three-transition view carefully detailed in
"Concluding Unscientific Postscript". In CUP, SK spends some time describing the
passion for the absolute of the ethical individual, and portrays Socrates as an
ethical individual who has "authentic inwardness". Perhaps SK came to view PF as
a flawed work, which he then attempted to correct in CUP which is, after all, a
"Postscript" to PF.

Second, Johannes Climacus is claiming that only the individual who has made the
transition to faith ("from non-being to being") can understand the nature of the
transition and the nature of the new life after the new birth. However, Johannes
admits that he himself has not made the transition to faith, so how can he know
what the individual of faith can and cannot understand?


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

How do you do, Mr Rovira, how do you do!

We are pleased, We... -- who is we, though I suddenly wonder? It seems I am
developping the common syndrom of inflated ego which appears to manifest
itself, among other things, by expressing ourselves -- here it is, yet
again -- in a plural form.  Unless it is Schizophrenia... Hullo, Nash!--

Well, I am glad to bid you welcome here, in my own name(s).

Abraham. Historical perspective, anachronism. Hmmm... You may be right.

Although, I wonder if you may be \absolutely\ right -- / \ hello willy! \
/ -- Indeed, your consideration over Abraham's historical context raises
before my eyes the following question:

Are the ethical notions of good and evil an emanation of the historical
process, I am even tempted to write, progress?

It is a prospect over the thing, sure enough, and it allows to say that
before a certain period no ethical conflict could be felt. And after all why
not? Man is descended, it is said, from the apes, to which some nasty
dastards, ironicly enough add that the apes descend from the tree (the
passive form of which would biologically be quite controversial, I should
think). I am not sure the pun is applicable to the english language, though,
for descend would have to mean come down...Yo, having checked, it is. Still,
placing the good/evil split-uprise period after Abraham, is in my opinion
quite questionable.

For as presented in the Bible, the sacrifice demanded upon Abraham is a
/proof/. To be so, Abraham has to be in a position where he feels a conflict
between what he shall experience as his moral or ethical duty and the
respect of the LORD's authority.

Should he completely lack the conceptual background as you have possibly
suggested, --if I have not exceedingly distorted you, that is--, his
following the Command to sacrifice his son would not be so much of a proof,
would it? It would only be mecanical, --ack, another anachronism!-- be
natural.

I agree with you that the terms in which Professor Green elaborates his
grandeloquent explanation \are/ anachronistic. I am not even sure that
Kierkegaard had (thoroughly) read Kant. I cannot think of any reference to
him in the books I read. Will, our living memory, can you? Is the
moral/religous conflict read of Abraham's proof an anachronism ? I am not
sure...

Another prospect would be a more platonician approach, The ideals, you
know...

Yet another one would be the Nietzsche's were good and evil do not really
contradict each other, there being merely "a frog vantage".

Yet another one could have been a very long novel by F. Dostoievky, with
possibly passionate love, irrestible attractions for the evil, decaying
higher societies, a fantastic nihilst who just kill himself for nothing,
thus freeing mankind of the thrall of Christianity, early events of a
socialistic revolution to come, and an exhausted hero who sincerely wonders
why everyone is expecting so muchof him, and actually so much more of him
than they do from themselves.

But, hey, I was not present at Abraham's time -- not that I remember,at
least -- so who knows... You may be right. It's a possibility. It is as it
is. Logically, enough.

Well, hope you won't take my post as biting. In fact, it's full of things
which are directed elseward ) O yes, yet another new word in the
frog-english language!(. A serious man should not do this. Right. It's not
serious. Right. Why, I am not serious. Right. So that may be serious not to
be serious for a non-serious man. Right. What is serious? Right. No wait, I
was expecting an answer here. Right. For Christ sake, the machine's gone
waco! Right. Will you shut up? Right. You bloody damn piece of crap, you
will... Right! ... Right! Right! Prrrrrrrr! Ri..gh...t. Final explosion.

Cheers, Jeers, Spears... Britney

Blugah, Hopp, Mieleimohom, Taggla.
Meddy, the lunatic is back

PS: Hullo Will! I was wondering, is there a disjunctional relationship
between the sign / \ and the token \ / ? I should think so for, if you
return one, I suppose you should return the other one as well, or it would
not be fair-play. Obliquity... Consider how much more simple it would be in
an upright world... Look: |  | & |  |, identical ! No bloody paradox in
that. The other James is right.

Hello all,

and sorry. In my previous message the word "prospect" is logically
inadequate. It is to be replaced, if one should be interested in what was
intended by the phrase "point of view".

A special notice: Yes, Rick, you are logically right here, once more, my
faulty "prospect" is a deviance from my french 'perspective' or vantage.
It's a resisting one, this one!

Mr. Rovira,

"I think the substance of your reply is in the two paragraphs quoted below,
and you make good points, so I will respond to them"

&&For as presented in the Bible, the sacrifice demanded upon Abraham is
a  /proof/. To be so, Abraham has to be in a position where he feels a
conflict between what he shall experience as his moral or ethical duty and
the respect of the LORD's authority.

  Should he completely lack the conceptual background as you have possibly
suggested, --if I have not exceedingly distorted you, that is--, his
following the Command to sacrifice his son would not be so much of a
proof, would it? It would only be mecanical, --ack, another anachronism!--
be natural.&&

No, the substance of my reply was not here.

In a nutshell, it was that your approach, interesting as it might be, was
resting upon an historical approach of ethics. I saw you and still see you
as advocating for a conception of mankind where ethical values appeared
somehow at a given time.

I do not share this approach. I have the prejudice to think, to believe that
even animals experience death and especially killing as something regretful.
I see it as an eternal determinant of Life's behaviours, something that both
tends to maintain us alive (a notion close to Schopenhauer's 'want to live')
and gives us the experience of remorse or guilt when we kill.

To me denying this principle is leads upon a very dangerous slope:
relativisation of ethical values: they appeared in time, they may as well
disappear in time. No absolute involved, we may just kill each other free of
remorse. Let us bomb our enemy!

I do not share this point of view. I shall never. Jesus Christ did not
invent forgiveness. He experienced the feeling and applyed it to an
extraordinary extent. His legacy is that we all have the ability, we should
only remember it, and be strong enough to apply it in our turn.

Abraham's sacrifice was a sacrifice because he had to abandon what he
experienced as /the good/ under the command of his LORD. And for no other
reason.

Now the eventual modality through which he received this Command from the
LORD is precisely the element which is not explicited in the Bible and it is
a point which is bearing a tremendous question mark beside itself not only
for rationalists as James Stuart, but also for more 'mysties' as I  happen
to consider myself. HOW ??? did he exactly receive the command? Was it a
phone call, an e-mail, a fax, an earth-quake which articulated the message,
a bolt of lightning which drew the message in the sky, a vision? Not said.

If we are to make any sense of it we are to suppose he did, to believe he
did. Now, a detail yet worth being remembered: Isaac was NOT sacrificed.
What was proved was Abraham's determination to follow the LORD's ways.
Abraham passed the proof and his hand was held back at the ultimate moment.

You wanted a god who at the time did not expect a human sacrifice. Well,
here is one. All he demands is commitment to what he says.

That will do,
Mederic

Hi JR, as opposed to JS, your mention of considering Abraham as a
pagan gets my mind to moving again on what might be called
Kierkegaard's Socrates problem. Let me burble on a bit about it, which
is to say, let my thoughts fall where they may. My intent is to move
us in the direction of what we think the intent of SK's message is. If
you and I find a common inquiry in this, more's the pleasure.

I take a pluralistic stance in regards to what I would call SK's
dilemma, a self-knowing that exposes a false sense of self. If there
were such an exposure, a revelation, and I think history is replete
with evidence of such, then a meaning of personal must come into being
that would require an absolute separation from any prior meaning of
the term. The dilemma appears because this occurrence defines
inwardness and an inward God-relation that requires shifting that
personal back into the world.

If God is posited as a personal God, then this 'personal place' is
where God is met; the God-relation. The difficulty arises when the
Christian dogma comes into play; the God-man as not only bringing that
infinite meeting back into the finite, but at a specific time in
history. SK's dilemma is then one of placing the pluralistic answer
into a Christian bottle. If the false sense of self released is
grounded in a temporal sense of self, SK's task is seen to be one of
describing how that temporal sense of self arises*, how it is
released, and how to breath life back into it at in a second temporal
sense; the Christian sense. That he allows the pagan a religious
sphere shows he was clearly cognizant of the Socrates problem.

Anyway, that's a scattered view of my thoughts on this matter. I tried
to squeeze in the kitchen sink.    Willy

*This is where I see his /Concept of Anxiety/ entering the picture;
the self grounded in time as losing its timeless quality, which then
sets up the problem his Christian answer answers. What role do you see
this book playing in his message?

P.S. As I closed the file, the message asked if I wanted to save
Abraham. Moi?

Hi Don, I should have made my intent more transparent. It did seem to
me that you were thinking about the nature of inwardness in general
and what I wanted to do was apply a particular twist to the term;
mine. Rather than reply in depth to your two premise paragraphs, I was
trying to take a shortcut. That was my error. I had written a long
reply in which I had set out our differences, then scrubbed that in
favor of trying to collect our differences under a single roof. I saw
such a roof in your question following your premise paragraphs in
which you asked an 'in sum' sort of question: "So is the "new
inwardness" new or is it a "new more complete
recognition" of the
inwardness we all possess?"

It is not necessary for you to go into more detail as I see your two
premise paragraphs expressing your view in this matter very clearly.
Again, it was my error in leaping over your words instead of
addressing those words directly. At this point, I see our differences
as possibly residing in the meaning of the term 'religious.'

As an example, you had said that if there were such a thing as a new
inwardness it would be at the religious level only. If the new
inwardness were to define the religious level, and I am saying this in
a pluralistic sense, where this also defines the meaning of spirit,
then your Christian view and my pluralistic view might find some
compatibility; I could place that shift to the spiritual in the
ethical and you could place it in Religiousness B.

What this difference does, however, is create a wide gap between our
respective reading of what SK is specifically saying. As an example, I
see you having relegated SK's ethical sphere to the outward and the
finite, that being because the "big" leap is reserved for the
religious sphere, whereas I read SK as placing the ethical to the
inward and infinite. So, what I was doing was trying to find a way
around our differences. That my roof has collapsed most likely means
that it was not well constructed. Should I lose my contractors
license? Oh well!    Willy


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
wrote:
> Will,
> I don't think I was asking if the "new inwardness" was relative or
absolute.
> I was thinking about the nature of inwardness in general. I was
thinking
> more about SK's discussion of self as spirit and relation in Part 1A
of SUD
> and how it relates to inwardness. Is inwardness the self that SK
describes?
> How do these relate to one another or not?
>
> I don't have time right now to go into this in more detail.
>
> Don Anderson
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
> [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
> Sent: Monday, July 11, 2005 11:59 AM
> To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [Kierkegaardian] Re: What Is Essential
>
>
> Don, this subject gets messy quickly. I had written a lengthy reply
in
> an attempt to answer your questions and I can see that it covers too
> much ground at once, inviting a ton more of questions. In essence,
> what I wanted to do was set aside all considerations other than the
> structure of what we may call the leap, or transition, as he calls
it
> elsewhere. This morning I think I have just found the way around the
> long mess. You asked the following question:
>
> <So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
> complete
> recognition" of the inwardness we all possess?>
>
> I would translate that question to asking if the new is absolute or
> relative, and come down on the side of the absolute. The following
two
> quotes from his /Fragments/ expresses that absolute quality of the
> transition. Could not the quote from F&T about the 'old' and 'new'
> inwardness, with that difference between them of being
incommensurable
> one with the other be seen as saying the same thing? Are we to take
> what he says literally or figuratively? In other words, is this
> transition something one can come upon and then reflect upon to find
> the words to describe? Do we have a premise-author or an essential
> author?
>
> "In so far as the learner was in Error, and now receives the Truth
and
> with it the condition for understanding it, a change takes place
> within him like the change from non-being to being. But this
> transition from non-being to being is the transition we call birth.
> Now one who exists cannot be born; nevertheless the disciple is
born.
> Let us call this transition the /New Birth/, in consequence of which
> the disciple enters the world quite as at the first birth, an
> individual human being knowing nothing as yet about the world into
> which he has been born, whether there are other human beings in it
> besides himself; for while it is possible to be baptized /en masse/,
> it is not possible to be born anew /en masse/. (PF, Swenson/Hong,
pp.
> 23-24)
>
> "But is the hypothesis here expounded thinkable? Let us not be in
> haste to reply; for not only one whose deliberation is unduly
> prolonged may fail to produce an answer, but also one who while he
> exhibits a marvelous promptitude in replying, does not show the
> desirable degree of slowness in considering the difficulty before
> explaining it. Before we reply, let us ask ourselves from whom we
may
> expect an answer to our question. The being born, is this fact
> thinkable? Certainly, why not. But for whom is it thinkable, for the
> one who is born, or for the one who is not born? This latter
> supposition is an absurdity which could never have entered anyone's
> head; for one who is born could scarcely have conceived the notion.
> When one who has experienced birth thinks of himself as born, he
> conceives this transition from non-being to being. The same
principle
> must hold in the case of the new birth. Or is the difficulty
increased
> by the fact that the non-being which preceded the new birth contains
> more being than the non-being that preceded the first birth? But who
> then may be expected to think the new birth? Surely the man who has
> himself been born anew, since it would of course be absurd to
imagine
> that one not so born should think it. Would it not be the height of
> the ridiculous for such an individual to entertain this notion?"
> (Ibid., pp. 24-25)
>
> The second quote, as I read it, says that there is something that
> cannot be known until it is known, and that that something is the
> transition he calls the leap. That does not say we cannot entertain
> such a proposition and read such an absolute change into his words
> wherever he suggests it. The quote from F&T fits the bill in my
book.
> I have said nothing about experience or the conditions necessary for
> the transition, or the religious significance of such a transition.
I
> see his /Purity of Heart/ as his guide book to that transition.
> Willy
>
>
> --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
> wrote:
> > Will
> > Thanks for your response to my attempt to explain the
unexplainable.
> I think
> > you have clarified some things that you are saying and not others.
> It seems
> > to me  we are not very far apart.
> >
> > I don't see that there is inwardness and outwardness that pair
> > dialectically. Hegel and his ilk thought this but I don't see
> where
> SK is
> > buying it. He thinks that never the twain shall meet or if they do
> meet it
> > is very superficial.
> >
> > I also don't think that the "new inwardness"
> doesn't come in at the
> ethical
> > level but at the religious level.
> >
> > You say that the inwardness that pairs with the outwardness
> represents the
> > esthetic sphere. I think SK says that one who is solely (or
mostly)
> in the
> > esthetic sphere has very little inwarndness. It is a going along
> with the
> > crowd, the herd, a mindless and existential collective behavior.
It
> is all
> > outwardness and very finite and universal at a very low level.
> Nothing comes
> > from within.
> >
> > I don't see that the ethical sphere is where any "new
> inwardness"
> comes in
> > either. It there is such a thing as "new inwardness" it
> will come in
> only at
> > the religious level. The ethical is outward and still finite. Its
> finiteness
> > is the problem. It is at a higher level than what little
inwardness
> there is
> > at the esthetic level is. One who is at this level has
incorporated
> > (appropriated) the outward but it does come from without. Yet it
is
> a step
> > higher and has a qualitative difference. It takes a leap but a
small
> one so
> > to speak. Nevertheless this inwardness is still of a finite nature
> and is
> > not the highest as Hegel argued.
> >
> > If there is such a thing as a "new inwardness" it is at the
> religious level
> > and this level only. This is the level of "the absolute
> relation to the
> > absolute." This is the level that requires the "big
> leap" because it
> is a
> > leap from the finite to the infinite. It comes about, on Sk's
> reading, when
> > the ethical level fails the individual. One discovers that it has
> its
> > limits, it is flawed and not complete – there is more to come
> as future
> > event, something altogether new. Yet what is to come is beyond
> > understanding, beyond the finite, beyond the universal. It is
> inexplicable.
> > It is a trial. At this point one becomes, if courage does not
fail,
> a
> > "knight of resignation." Realizing that the outward no
> longer
> serves. Then
> > all one has is what we are referring to here as the "new
> inwardness"
> which I
> > am suggesting is the only authentic inwardness on SK's
> thinking. It is
> > faith. The "knight of faith" marches to an inward drum and
> there is no
> > outwardness to rely upon and there is no outward expression. It is
> the
> > absolute relation to the absolute – it is inexplicable.
> >
> > So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
> complete
> recognition" of
> > the inwardness we all possess?
> >
> > You said:
> > <Let me change the question to one of where the change takes
place,
> and
> > add a twist to the complexity. I see it taking place at the place
> > where one grasps oneself as oneself, while another could see it
as a
> > change of mind, or heart, or some such that makes the same self
new.
> > The question becomes one of is it the same self new or is it a new
> > self. If the latter, the paradox is brought into play by the
asking
> > the question, and if that question is asked because the change
> > experienced allows it to be raised, then the self asking the
> question
> > becomes the paradox.>
> >
> > In the above paragraph there are two statements I need to have
> clarified.
> > What is meant by "the place where one grasps oneself as
> oneself?"
> Also what
> > is the difference between "the same self new" and "a
> new self?" Is
> > "inwardness the same as self?" Also what does the last
> sentence mean?
> >
> > Later!
> >
> > Don Anderson
> > http://road.nancyanddon.com
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links

Dear Jim and Mederic,

I hope you don't mind an outsider contributing to your conversation on Abraham.
My remarks concern the relationship between the historical and the theological.

I think it is important to distinguish between the historical person Abraham and
the 'man of faith' Abraham, as filtered through centuries of Jewish and
Christian theology.

The historical Abraham was probably a religious innovator who, throughout his
life, was questioning the old ways of his traditional religion, and way 'going
his own way' to some extent, following his conscience when it conflicted with
the dictates of his inherited religion.

In all probability, part of his inherited religious tradition involved the
sacrifice of the first-born male son. Thus when Isaac finally arrived on the
scene, the onus was on Abraham to sacrifice him. Abraham, being a genuine and
devout man of faith felt a strong obligation to fulfil the demands of his
religion and sacrifice Isaac. But Abraham the loving husband and parent felt the
tug of humanity, conscience and love pulling him in the opposite direction - to
refrain from sacrificing Isaac. Abraham suffered the agony of an
ethical/religious dilemma where both courses of action seemed both obligatory
and also abhorrent. In the end Abraham did not sacrifice Isaac, and he went on
to found the first 'grown-up' religion - Judaism.

So much for my speculation concerning the real dilemma of the historical
Abraham. This speculative reconstruction at least makes Abraham understandable,
and we can feel his agonising conflict as he struggled to reach the right
decision. I have no doubt that many real human beings in ancient times did
struggle with their consciences over the question of first-born sacrifices.

Now the 'theological' Abraham of Genesis 22 is significantly different from the
historical Abraham of my reconstruction. This is because Genesis 22 contains no
reference to the pre-Judaism practice of first-born human sacrifice, and the
only reason offered for Abraham's belief that he is command to kill Isaac is
that God is testing Abraham. Thus the theological Abraham hears God commanding
him to sacrifice Isaac despite God's previous promise to Abraham that he would
have many descendants. Of course the story of Genesis 22 has been reflected on
by many Christians down the centuries, notably by Saint Paul, Kant and
Kierkegaard. My problem with SK's portrayal of Abraham is that he doesn't make
Abraham a positive role model for us; he portrays Abraham as someone who
unaccountably believes he has heard God's voice commanding him to kill his young
son. As I have said in a previous posting, this may have been a deliberate ploy
by SK to shake up the complacent Christians of Denmark, who unthinkingly paid
lip-service to the idea that Abraham was a paragon of faith. It may also have
been part of SK's purpose to emphasize the paradoxical nature of all aspects of
Christianity and faith, which, I suggest, was one of SK's central and dominant
themes in his ethical and religious writings.

Yours,

Jim


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

This message seems to have made a detour.

I am not in the mood for patience so here it is anew.

Perhaps I am now getting mionitored...

I promise, I shall return to more directly Kierkeagaardian issues.

Mederic

----- Original Message -----
From: "Médéric Laitier" <mederic.laitier@...>
To: <kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 9:19 PM
Subject: Re: [Kierkegaardian] Abraham


> Mr. Rovira,
>
> 'At no point does anything I say require ethical relativism. The knowledge
> of any specific part of the human race at any given time of the ethic of
any
> given behavior says nothing about the absolute nature of the ethic. In
other
> words, our ignorance or knowledge of ethics is irrelevant to the absolute
> nature of these ethics.'
>
> Can we ask of someone who ignores ethical values to behave in a moral
> manner?
>
> If so, then are we being moral ourselves by asking someone to act
according
> to a principle he ignores? I don't think so.
>
> If not, then we admit a case (the ignorant) for whom the ethical values
are
> inaplicable.
>
> In both cases we make the ethical values relative.
>
> But that's not the essential. Do you earnestly think that there were ever
a
> man, a single man who killed remorse-free, a man who so ignored good and
> evil?
>
> Well I think here is an essential one.
>
> I believe in the intimate existence of the experience of guilt in every a
> man, regardless culture, time or place.
>
> Whether you mind your moral conscience or not is at your own discretion.
But
> you have it. And here is, in my eyes the innerst of free-will.
>
> ---- --- -- - -- --- ---- ---- --- -- - -- --- ---- ---- --- -- - -- --- -
--
> -
>
> "And yes, the God of Christianity does demand human sacrifice: that of
> Christ.  Paul saw Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac as prefiguring the
sacrifice
> of Christ on the cross, saying even that Abraham received Isaac, in a
manner
> of speaking, back from the dead."
>
> No. Human beings asked for Jesus to be crucified, and human beings did
fail
> at rising up to save him because they were afraid to die, all of them.
Even
> the closest friends, even Peter. But they had the leisure to, they had the
> occasion.
>
> Alleging that it was meant to be is just an easy way for us to alleviate
our
> souls' sufferings. None rose up to save him, and who should if it were to
> take place today?
>
> None had faith enough before the resurrection to believe the words of
Jesus
> that 'by losing their lives serving' him they 'would save' theirs. They
> needed a proof, a demonstration, they needed evidence or what was then so
> experienced.
>
> It was meant to be, it was fatal, yes, because of us, because we are
afraid
> to die.
>
> Well, enough preaching
> ML
>

Dear Willy,
Thanks for your reply to my brief note. Yes I suspect that there are
differeces between u residing in the meaning of the term "religious." I do
not have an understanding about how you see it in SK. I am very unclear how
you understand what is finite and what is infinite. That seems to be a
crucial question to me.

Another question is "the ethical" universal or absolute? I see a difference
between "universal" and "abaolute" in the way SK uses them. Do you and
others see it that way?

It seems to me that some on this forum, possibly you I'm not sure, are
attempting to square what SK is saying with reason or to put it another way
to square faith with reason. I don't think this can be done and stay within
SK's thought. An underlying assumption of SK is that faith and reason are
incommesurate or to put it another way "faith is an absurdity to reason."
Faith is existential while reason is in the mind. Reason seeks and deals
with that which doesn't change, faith seeks and wants change. Reason looks
to the past for its absolutes, faith looks to the future. Reason is mired in
being, faith is always becoming. Reason has everything all worked out
logically in a system, faith has nothing worked out and awaits the fullness
of time.

Well enough for now.  I look forward to a deeper understanding of your ideas
and thought as well as that of others on the forum.

Sincerely,
Don Anderson





-----Original Message-----
From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
[mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 12:05 PM
To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [Kierkegaardian] Re: What Is Essential


Hi Don, I should have made my intent more transparent. It did seem to
me that you were thinking about the nature of inwardness in general
and what I wanted to do was apply a particular twist to the term;
mine. Rather than reply in depth to your two premise paragraphs, I was
trying to take a shortcut. That was my error. I had written a long
reply in which I had set out our differences, then scrubbed that in
favor of trying to collect our differences under a single roof. I saw
such a roof in your question following your premise paragraphs in
which you asked an 'in sum' sort of question: "So is the "new
inwardness" new or is it a "new more complete
recognition" of the
inwardness we all possess?"

It is not necessary for you to go into more detail as I see your two
premise paragraphs expressing your view in this matter very clearly.
Again, it was my error in leaping over your words instead of
addressing those words directly. At this point, I see our differences
as possibly residing in the meaning of the term 'religious.'

As an example, you had said that if there were such a thing as a new
inwardness it would be at the religious level only. If the new
inwardness were to define the religious level, and I am saying this in
a pluralistic sense, where this also defines the meaning of spirit,
then your Christian view and my pluralistic view might find some
compatibility; I could place that shift to the spiritual in the
ethical and you could place it in Religiousness B.

What this difference does, however, is create a wide gap between our
respective reading of what SK is specifically saying. As an example, I
see you having relegated SK's ethical sphere to the outward and the
finite, that being because the "big" leap is reserved for the
religious sphere, whereas I read SK as placing the ethical to the
inward and infinite. So, what I was doing was trying to find a way
around our differences. That my roof has collapsed most likely means
that it was not well constructed. Should I lose my contractors
license? Oh well!    Willy


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
wrote:
> Will,
> I don't think I was asking if the "new inwardness" was relative or
absolute.
> I was thinking about the nature of inwardness in general. I was
thinking
> more about SK's discussion of self as spirit and relation in Part 1A
of SUD
> and how it relates to inwardness. Is inwardness the self that SK
describes?
> How do these relate to one another or not?
>
> I don't have time right now to go into this in more detail.
>
> Don Anderson
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
> [mailto:kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com]On Behalf Of Will Brown
> Sent: Monday, July 11, 2005 11:59 AM
> To: kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [Kierkegaardian] Re: What Is Essential
>
>
> Don, this subject gets messy quickly. I had written a lengthy reply
in
> an attempt to answer your questions and I can see that it covers too
> much ground at once, inviting a ton more of questions. In essence,
> what I wanted to do was set aside all considerations other than the
> structure of what we may call the leap, or transition, as he calls
it
> elsewhere. This morning I think I have just found the way around the
> long mess. You asked the following question:
>
> <So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
> complete
> recognition" of the inwardness we all possess?>
>
> I would translate that question to asking if the new is absolute or
> relative, and come down on the side of the absolute. The following
two
> quotes from his /Fragments/ expresses that absolute quality of the
> transition. Could not the quote from F&T about the 'old' and 'new'
> inwardness, with that difference between them of being
incommensurable
> one with the other be seen as saying the same thing? Are we to take
> what he says literally or figuratively? In other words, is this
> transition something one can come upon and then reflect upon to find
> the words to describe? Do we have a premise-author or an essential
> author?
>
> "In so far as the learner was in Error, and now receives the Truth
and
> with it the condition for understanding it, a change takes place
> within him like the change from non-being to being. But this
> transition from non-being to being is the transition we call birth.
> Now one who exists cannot be born; nevertheless the disciple is
born.
> Let us call this transition the /New Birth/, in consequence of which
> the disciple enters the world quite as at the first birth, an
> individual human being knowing nothing as yet about the world into
> which he has been born, whether there are other human beings in it
> besides himself; for while it is possible to be baptized /en masse/,
> it is not possible to be born anew /en masse/. (PF, Swenson/Hong,
pp.
> 23-24)
>
> "But is the hypothesis here expounded thinkable? Let us not be in
> haste to reply; for not only one whose deliberation is unduly
> prolonged may fail to produce an answer, but also one who while he
> exhibits a marvelous promptitude in replying, does not show the
> desirable degree of slowness in considering the difficulty before
> explaining it. Before we reply, let us ask ourselves from whom we
may
> expect an answer to our question. The being born, is this fact
> thinkable? Certainly, why not. But for whom is it thinkable, for the
> one who is born, or for the one who is not born? This latter
> supposition is an absurdity which could never have entered anyone's
> head; for one who is born could scarcely have conceived the notion.
> When one who has experienced birth thinks of himself as born, he
> conceives this transition from non-being to being. The same
principle
> must hold in the case of the new birth. Or is the difficulty
increased
> by the fact that the non-being which preceded the new birth contains
> more being than the non-being that preceded the first birth? But who
> then may be expected to think the new birth? Surely the man who has
> himself been born anew, since it would of course be absurd to
imagine
> that one not so born should think it. Would it not be the height of
> the ridiculous for such an individual to entertain this notion?"
> (Ibid., pp. 24-25)
>
> The second quote, as I read it, says that there is something that
> cannot be known until it is known, and that that something is the
> transition he calls the leap. That does not say we cannot entertain
> such a proposition and read such an absolute change into his words
> wherever he suggests it. The quote from F&T fits the bill in my
book.
> I have said nothing about experience or the conditions necessary for
> the transition, or the religious significance of such a transition.
I
> see his /Purity of Heart/ as his guide book to that transition.
> Willy
>
>
> --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "don Anderson" <don@n...>
> wrote:
> > Will
> > Thanks for your response to my attempt to explain the
unexplainable.
> I think
> > you have clarified some things that you are saying and not others.
> It seems
> > to me  we are not very far apart.
> >
> > I don't see that there is inwardness and outwardness that pair
> > dialectically. Hegel and his ilk thought this but I don't see
> where
> SK is
> > buying it. He thinks that never the twain shall meet or if they do
> meet it
> > is very superficial.
> >
> > I also don't think that the "new inwardness"
> doesn't come in at the
> ethical
> > level but at the religious level.
> >
> > You say that the inwardness that pairs with the outwardness
> represents the
> > esthetic sphere. I think SK says that one who is solely (or
mostly)
> in the
> > esthetic sphere has very little inwarndness. It is a going along
> with the
> > crowd, the herd, a mindless and existential collective behavior.
It
> is all
> > outwardness and very finite and universal at a very low level.
> Nothing comes
> > from within.
> >
> > I don't see that the ethical sphere is where any "new
> inwardness"
> comes in
> > either. It there is such a thing as "new inwardness" it
> will come in
> only at
> > the religious level. The ethical is outward and still finite. Its
> finiteness
> > is the problem. It is at a higher level than what little
inwardness
> there is
> > at the esthetic level is. One who is at this level has
incorporated
> > (appropriated) the outward but it does come from without. Yet it
is
> a step
> > higher and has a qualitative difference. It takes a leap but a
small
> one so
> > to speak. Nevertheless this inwardness is still of a finite nature
> and is
> > not the highest as Hegel argued.
> >
> > If there is such a thing as a "new inwardness" it is at the
> religious level
> > and this level only. This is the level of "the absolute
> relation to the
> > absolute." This is the level that requires the "big
> leap" because it
> is a
> > leap from the finite to the infinite. It comes about, on Sk's
> reading, when
> > the ethical level fails the individual. One discovers that it has
> its
> > limits, it is flawed and not complete – there is more to come
> as future
> > event, something altogether new. Yet what is to come is beyond
> > understanding, beyond the finite, beyond the universal. It is
> inexplicable.
> > It is a trial. At this point one becomes, if courage does not
fail,
> a
> > "knight of resignation." Realizing that the outward no
> longer
> serves. Then
> > all one has is what we are referring to here as the "new
> inwardness"
> which I
> > am suggesting is the only authentic inwardness on SK's
> thinking. It is
> > faith. The "knight of faith" marches to an inward drum and
> there is no
> > outwardness to rely upon and there is no outward expression. It is
> the
> > absolute relation to the absolute – it is inexplicable.
> >
> > So is the "new inwardness" new or is it a "new more
> complete
> recognition" of
> > the inwardness we all possess?
> >
> > You said:
> > <Let me change the question to one of where the change takes
place,
> and
> > add a twist to the complexity. I see it taking place at the place
> > where one grasps oneself as oneself, while another could see it
as a
> > change of mind, or heart, or some such that makes the same self
new.
> > The question becomes one of is it the same self new or is it a new
> > self. If the latter, the paradox is brought into play by the
asking
> > the question, and if that question is asked because the change
> > experienced allows it to be raised, then the self asking the
> question
> > becomes the paradox.>
> >
> > In the above paragraph there are two statements I need to have
> clarified.
> > What is meant by "the place where one grasps oneself as
> oneself?"
> Also what
> > is the difference between "the same self new" and "a
> new self?" Is
> > "inwardness the same as self?" Also what does the last
> sentence mean?
> >
> > Later!
> >
> > Don Anderson
> > http://road.nancyanddon.com
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links





Yahoo! Groups Links

Mr. Rovira,

'At no point does anything I say require ethical relativism. The knowledge
of any specific part of the human race at any given time of the ethic of any
given behavior says nothing about the absolute nature of the ethic. In other
words, our ignorance or knowledge of ethics is irrelevant to the absolute
nature of these ethics.'

Can we ask of someone who ignores ethical values to behave in a moral
manner?

If so, then are we being moral ourselves by asking someone to act according
to a principle he ignores? I don't think so.

If not, then we admit a case (the ignorant) for whom the ethical values are
inaplicable.

In both cases we make the ethical values relative.

But that's not the essential. Do you earnestly think that there were ever a
man, a single man who killed remorse-free, a man who so ignored good and
evil?

Well I think here is an essential one.

I believe in the intimate existence of the experience of guilt in every a
man, regardless culture, time or place.

Whether you mind your moral conscience or not is at your own discretion. But
you have it. And here is, in my eyes the innerst of free-will.

---- --- -- - -- --- ---- ---- --- -- - -- --- ---- ---- --- -- - -- --- ---
-

"And yes, the God of Christianity does demand human sacrifice: that of
Christ.  Paul saw Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac as prefiguring the sacrifice
of Christ on the cross, saying even that Abraham received Isaac, in a manner
of speaking, back from the dead."

No. Human beings asked for Jesus to be crucified, and human beings did fail
at rising up to save him because they were afraid to die, all of them. Even
the closest friends, even Peter. But they had the leisure to, they had the
occasion.

Alleging that it was meant to be is just an easy way for us to alleviate our
souls' sufferings. None rose up to save him, and who should if it were to
take place today?

None had faith enough before the resurrection to believe the words of Jesus
that 'by losing their lives serving' him they 'would save' theirs. They
needed a proof, a demonstration, they needed evidence or what was then so
experienced.

It was meant to be, it was fatal, yes, because of us, because we are afraid
to die.

Well, enough preaching
ML

Willy,

Interesting.  I am curious then as if to discover that SK ever
thought he was on a mission from God at any point in his carreer.
Undoubtedly, he was a genius.  I believe that is clear by his own
defintion and the defintion of several other men, such as Harold
Bloom.  Did he ever transend then to take messages from God?  Now, if
you believe that is possible, and he didn't I would be curious to
hear your thoughts on that.  For that matter, if you think he did,
too.  If you believe that to be impossible, why?  Furthermore, if it
to be impossible, and you still think SK believed himself a
missionary to Christendom, what psychological explanation unearths
most deeply these mysterious perplexities?

Kaufmann obviously prefers Nietzhe to SK in his scholary appraisal.

Grace and Peace,

Nolan

--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Will Brown" <wilbro99@y...>
wrote:
> Hello again Nolan. That collection of essays is SK's Book on Adler.
I
> have 16 quotes from the book in my quote bin (see site reference in
> profile) that I feel captures the gist of the book. Perhaps the
answer
> to your two questions might be found in the following quote:
>
> "In so far as an essential author may be said to feel a need to
> communicate himself, this need is purely immanent, an enjoyment of
his
> understanding raised to the second power, or else it would be for
him
> an ethical task consciously assumed. The premise-author feels no
need
> to communicate himself, for essentially he has nothing to
> communicate." (BA, Lowrie, p.117-18)
>
> Those essays, concentrating on the genius/apostle difference as they
> do, reveal that divide from many angles and provide what I see as a
> clarification of how that divide is situated. I must add some more
> quotes from it. As to SK's authority, he used the term 'Governance.'
> His /Point of View/ has an entire chapter devoted to the matter.
When
> one has appropriated a subject, it is that appropriation that
speaks.
> All one needs do is push the button, get out of the way, and the
> subject turns to words to express itself.
>
> Kaufman? Haven't read him in years, but if my memory serves me
> correctly, his Kierkegaard and my Kierkegaard had only the name in
> common; not that that means anything.       willy
>
>
> --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, nolanhatley <no_reply@y...>
> wrote:
> >
> > Would Soren have identified himself immanently (genius) or
> > transcendently (apostle)?  Wuth what authority did Soren carry out
> his
> > prolific wriintgs?
> >
> > I have just finished a selection in Kaufmann of Kierkegaard's On
> > Authority and Revelation.
> >
> > I have found this selection very intersting and am curious as to
> what
> > other perceptions on this may exist.
> >
> > Subjectively Yours,
> >
> > Nolan

Hi Jim, a 'few' words follow in response to your post:

Your analysis of the 'world is paradoxical' because of the incarnation
and the atonement brought the paradoxical with it leaves me with no
choice but to agree that the distinction I made was solely mine; the
point is taken.

Concerning the self-relation and the applicability of the paradox to
it, I would use your argument as to why the world is paradoxical; if
the paradox is in there with the existing person, this person is the
paradox in the same sense of your argument for the paradox being the
world.

As to the separation of the spheres being a paradox, I don't think he
ever says that explicitly, but what is more paradoxical than a
transition containing a self-discontinuity within it? There is a
Buddhist Koan that plays on the same theme; The Gateless Gate. One
must go through it, but no one ever gets through it. It's a leap,
where the leaper may reflect upon the leap and truthfully say that no
one leaped. It is as if, when the question is asked, "What happened?",
the answer founders because the implied "to me" cannot be applied. The
"me" is seen to be the thought of 'having been' identified as one's
past, giving the self its temporal imprint.

I would make the point that when SK speaks to the selfishness that
indicates the esthetic sphere, it is this identity he is speaking to.
When this identity is negated, is broken, goes South, there a
discontinuity comes into being in the reflection that allows such an
identity to take root. If that reflection is the very reflection
required for self-identity, defining the existential, and I say it is,
then it is the reflection that gives one one's sense of self that
contains the possibility of entertaining a false sense of self, i.e.,
the selfishness that needs to be broken, which is why SK could say the
following:

"If someone were to say to him, 'This is a curious entanglement, a
curious kind of knot, for the whole trouble is really the way your
thinking twists around; otherwise it is even normal, in fact, this is
the course you have to take: you must go through the despair of the
self to the self. You are quite right about the weakness, but that is
not what you are to despair over; the self must be broken in order to
become itself, but quit despairing over that.'—if someone were to
speak to him in that way, he would understand it in a dispassionate
moment, but his passion would soon see mistakenly again, and then once
more he would make a wrong turn—into despair." (SUD, Hong, p.65;
Lowrie, p. 199)

On the F&T business, I have so many differences with your statements
that I may respond in a second post at a later date.   Willy

PS:

<P.S. I have been following your exchange with Don Anderson with
interest. I think Don was correct to point out that the
incommensurability SK mentions in the quote is between inwardness and
outwardness and not, as you interpret, between the two kinds of
inwardness.>

Our difference here harks back to our different view of the existence
spheres. As I read what Don is saying, he is definitely on your side
in this issue. This issue definitely provides a bright line separation
that divides those of us who post here into two separate groups. Is
the self the problem, or is the problem something I must solve. If I
am the problem, how does one wash off blood with blood?

== === == ===

<I agree that the quotes from "Philosophical Fragments" you include do
support your "new self" interpretation of SK. However perhaps the PF
quotes reveal inconsistencies in SK's writings. First, the
one-transition view expressed in the quotes conflicts with the
three-transition view carefully detailed in "Concluding Unscientific
Postscript".>

I hear this: "Well, yes, he said that, but he didn't mean it." Once
you start dismissing SK words that support my position, and keeping
those that support your position, reason surely goes out the window.
Either SK's entire structure holds together or it cannot be used to
say what he was saying, or meaning. In making the argument you make,
you give up all authority of the very subject you are trying to find
the authority in. It does not make sense logically to make that sort
of argument; you inevitably end up pulling the rug out from under your
own feet. If I recollect rightly, you have complained of SK as being
self-contradictory. For myself, I can see him speaking to a singular
theme, one that has facets that seem contradictory if the singular
theme is not seen.

=== == === ==

<In CUP, SK spends some time describing the passion for the absolute
of the ethical individual, and portrays Socrates as an ethical
individual who has "authentic inwardness". Perhaps SK came to view PF
as a flawed work, which he then attempted to correct in CUP which is,
after all, a "Postscript" to PF.>

Yes, perhaps, but is it also possible that the flaws you see are not
in the structure, but in your understanding of the structure? A
singular theme can have many facets, as can an elephant be comprised
of many disparate parts. Besides, are you seriously suggesting that
the PF was a flawed work because that one quote does not support your
position? I do note that in the chapter of CUP dealing with Danish
literature he was still positive about the PF, so he must have changed
his mind later in the book.

= == ==== ======

<Second, Johannes Climacus is claiming that only the individual who
has made the transition to faith ("from non-being to being") can
understand the nature of the transition and the nature of the new life
after the new birth. However, Johannes admits that he himself has not
made the transition to faith, so how can he know what the individual
of faith can and cannot understand?>

"Never have I fought in such a way that I have said: I am a true
Christian; the others are not Christians, or probably even hypocrites
and the like. No, I have fought in this way: /I know what Christianity
is/; I myself acknowledge my defects as a Christian – but I do
know
what Christianity is. And to come to know this thoroughly seems to me
to be in the interest of every human being, whether one is now a
Christian or a non-Christian, whether one's intention is to accept
Christianity or to abandon it. But I have attacked no one, saying that
he is not a Christian; I have passed judgment on no one. Indeed, the
pseudonymous writer Johannes Climacus, who poses the issue of
'becoming a Christian,' does even the opposite, denies being a
Christian and accords this to the others – surely the greatest
possible distance from passing judgment upon others! And I myself have
from the start enjoined and again and again repeated stereotypically:
I am without authority." (PV, Hong, p.15) (On My Work as an Author)

For Professor Ferreira, in her CCKT paper, to seriously suggest that
"any attempt to identify Climacus's leap with Kierkegaard's
understanding must take into account the fact that Climacus confesses
himself not to be a Christian," is a chortle on two accounts; the
above quote, which shows why he had JC say what he said, and the
reification of the pseudonym as having a separate existence, i.e., a
mind of its own, is like looking at the pointing finger instead of the
moon. On the latter, SK has much to say in /Point of View/, a book I
think you would enjoy reading, about his relation to the pseudonymous
authors as pointing fingers; a sample follows:

"But from the total point of view of my whole work as an author, the
esthetic writing is a deception, and herein is the deeper significance
of the /pseudonymity/. But a deception, that is something rather ugly.
To that I would answer: Do not be deceived by the word /deception/.
One can deceive a person out of what is true, and—to recall old
Socrates—one can deceive a person into what is true. Yes, in only
this
way can a deluded person actually be brought into what is true—by
deceiving him. …What, then, does it mean 'to deceive'? It means
that
one does not begin /directly/ with what one wishes to communicate but
begins by taking the other's delusion at face value. Thus one does not
begin (to hold to what is essentially the theme of this book) in this
way: I am a Christian, you are not a Christian—but this way: You
are a
Christian, I am not a Christian. Or one does not begin this way: It is
Christianity that I am proclaiming, and you are living in the purely
esthetic categories. No, one begins this way: let us talk about the
esthetic. The deception consists in one's speaking this way precisely
in order to arrive at the religious. But according to the assumption
the other person is in fact under the delusion that the esthetic is
essentially Christian, since he thinks he is a Christian and yet he is
living in esthetic categories. " (PV, Hong, pp.53-54 )


--- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Jim Stuart" <jimstuart@n...>
wrote:
> William,
>
> We seem to disagree where Kierkegaard locates the paradox (or the
paradoxes, if there are more than one).
>
> I claim that SK sees the world as paradoxical. You reply:
>
> "I cannot imagine where you see anything in the quote that indicates
the world is paradoxical ... What if, at the maximum passion and
inwardness, it is not the world that is the paradox, but the
self-relation? ... The paradox that is the separation of the spheres
has been itself reduced to the paradox of faith."
>
> Well, in the quote we are concentrating on, SK writes: "Christianity
is paradox."
>
> Now you may want to claim that Christianity is wholly within, but I
want to maintain that Christianity, for SK, is at least partly out
there in the world. SK describes the following aspects of Christianity
as being paradoxes: sin, the atonement, the incarnation, as well as
Christianity as a whole.
>
> Now for me the atonement and the incarnation were historical events,
and, as such, are part of the world. Thus, for SK, a true description
of the world would include these paradoxical features. If the world
includes paradoxical features, then my statement 'The world is
paradoxical' is true.
>
> Let me turn the tables on you: You claim in your post that the
"self-relation" is a paradox, and that "the separation of the spheres"
is a paradox. Can you produce quotes where SK makes these two claims?
>
> As for "Fear and Trembling", the quote from SK's Journals is
helpful. It is particularly illuminating that SK says that "Johannes
de silentio reiterates that he cannot understand Abraham". I suppose
that if Johannes cannot understand Abraham, then there's not much
chance of you and me understanding him. Perhaps I should be less
confrontational and more modest and just say "I cannot understand how
a man poised to murder his son can be exhibiting faith."
>
> On "Fear and Trembling", you outline your own view as follows:
>
> "What if the whole of F&T were for the purpose of making a point,
like, say this: Faith as trumping the universal, the ethical, by the
obeying of God in real time in a manner that negates the ethical, that
suspends the ethical?"
>
> Two responses to this come to mind. First, I am persuaded by Ronald
Green that SK didn't just communicate one message in F&T, but intended
the text to contain a number of different messages - the text has
various layers of meaning. You are suggesting that SK only had one
purpose in writing F&T, but following Green, I think you are wrong
about this.
>
> Second, I can agree, however, that one of SK's purposes in writing
F&T was, as you say, to show "Faith as trumping the universal, the
ethical." However this point alone does not answer my criticism of SK.
I can accept that SK wants me to believe that "faith trumps the
universal", but I don't see how portraying a potential child murderer
as a paragon of faith is supposed to convince me of this. I'm tempted
to say that if faith is all about raising a knife to a child's throat,
I'll stick with the ethical, thank you very much.
>
> Yours,
>
> James
>
> P.S. I have been following your exchange with Don Anderson with
interest. I think Don was correct to point out that the
incommensurability SK mentions in the quote is between inwardness and
outwardness and not, as you interpret, between the two kinds of
inwardness.
>
> I agree that the quotes from "Philosophical Fragments" you include
do support your "new self" interpretation of SK. However perhaps the
PF quotes reveal inconsistencies in SK's writings. First, the
one-transition view expressed in the quotes conflicts with the
three-transition view carefully detailed in "Concluding Unscientific
Postscript". In CUP, SK spends some time describing the passion for
the absolute of the ethical individual, and portrays Socrates as an
ethical individual who has "authentic inwardness". Perhaps SK came to
view PF as a flawed work, which he then attempted to correct in CUP
which is, after all, a "Postscript" to PF.
>
> Second, Johannes Climacus is claiming that only the individual who
has made the transition to faith ("from non-being to being") can
understand the nature of the transition and the nature of the new life
after the new birth. However, Johannes admits that he himself has not
made the transition to faith, so how can he know what the individual
of faith can and cannot understand?
>
>