#748

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Date: Thu Apr 8, 2010 7:23 am
Subject: [ReadingRoom] News on Burma - 8/4/10

Burma’s Suu Kyi ‘welcomes party boycott of polls’
NLD Mandalay office closed
Child displacement in Burma documented
Burma Army setting up more barriers against Wa
ASEAN MPs tell leaders to consider expelling Myanmar
US agency accused of sanctions busting
Myanmar party sorry for not bringing democracy
Many won’t vote without NLD
Burmese PM may lead political party
Myanmar to escape censure at ASEAN summit
An election in name only
UK favors sending Myanmar to ICC, China says it’s sovereign, UN’s Ban defers
Elections in Burma
A message to the people of Burma
Food imports to Wa state ‘blocked’
‘The regime is a political rapist’
Ethnic council opposes junta electoral laws
Five reasons why Burma’s elections are bogus
Myanmar tightens formalities with passport application
Inter-Parliamentary Union urges Myanmar to change election laws
Burma’s opposition boycotts
The same old road to nowhere

Burma’s Suu Kyi ‘welcomes party boycott of polls’
Agence France Presse: Wed 7 Apr 2010

Burma’s detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi welcomes her party’s decision to boycott upcoming elections in the military-ruled nation, her lawyer said Wednesday.Senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) agreed last week not to register for the first polls to be held in two decades, after the ruling generals introduced a controversial new election law.

The party would have been forced to oust its iconic leader and recognise the junta’s constitution if it had signed up, but now faces dissolution in less than six weeks for failing to do so under new legislation for the polls.

“Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said she was very glad about the NLD’s decision,” said her lawyer and NLD spokesman Nyan Win after he met with the 64-year-old at her lakeside house. Daw is a term of respect in Burma.

Under election laws dismissed as a sham by international critics, if the party had registered for the polls, due before the end of November, it would have been forced to part with Suu Kyi because she is serving a prison term.

The Nobel peace laureate, who has been locked up for 14 of the last 20 years, had already told the party she was opposed to such a move.

Suu Kyi also supported the party’s apology Tuesday for failing in its struggle for democracy and national reconciliation, Nyan Win said.

In that statement, the NLD blamed the authorities’ crackdown and promised to continue peacefully in its fight for democracy.

“We will firmly stand by our decision. We have our future tasks. But we cannot reveal them at this moment because of our country’s situation,” Nyan Win told reporters, adding that the party would work within the law.

Burma’s election law nullifies the result of the last polls held in 1990 that were won by the NLD by a landslide but never recognised by the junta, which has ruled the country since 1962.

The United States, which has led international criticism of the new election law, blamed the junta for the opposition’s decision to boycott, saying the regime had missed an opportunity.

Amnesty International said Wednesday that Burma’s flawed election plans and “appalling” human rights record should dominate a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) this week in Hanoi.

The London-based group said Burma was violating Asean’s own charter enacted in December 2008 which commits members to ideals of democracy and human rights.

NLD Mandalay office closed – Kyaw Thein Kha
Irrawaddy: Wed 7 Apr 2010

The National League for Democracy (NLD) Mandalay Division office closed on Saturday after local authorities applied pressure on the landlord, a member of the division’s organizing committee said on Wednesday.He told The Irrawaddy that the pressure to close the office began after the March 29 decision by the NLD not to register as a political party, and thereby face dissolution.

“The authorities put pressure on our landlord not to provide her three-story house anymore, and they asked her to comply as soon as possible,” said Myo Naing, a member of the Mandalay organizing committee.

All NLD offices across the country were closed by the authorities after the Depayin massacre in May 2003. The officies were only allowed to reopen on March 10, in preparation for the 2010 election, but only weeks later NLD members voted to not take part in the national election, citing its lack of fairness and inclusiveness, and saying that barring of party leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners from party membership and voting was undemocratic.

Myo Naing said the Mandalay office first opened in 2002 and the contents of the office have been moved to the home of a NLD member, who is also now under pressure from authorities.

On Monday, the NLD executive committee in Rangoon organized a 17-member management committee to handle arrangements for the party’s possessions after it is dissolved, said Tin Oo, the NLD vice-chairman.

According to the new electoral and party registration laws, political parties that fail to register before the 60-day deadline will be dissolved.

Child displacement in Burma documented – Lawi Weng
Democratic Voice of Burma: Wed 7 Apr 2010

In the ongoing military conflict in eastern Burma, children’s lives are scarred by death, destruction, loss and neglect at the hands of Burmese junta troops, according to a joint report by the Free Burma Rangers and Partners released on Wednesday.Based on the Thai-Burmese border, the Free Burma Rangers (FBR) and Partners released its findings in a report titled “Displaced Childhoods,” which chronicles conflict areas in eastern Burma
A displaced family flees from Burmese government forces in Karen State. (Photo: www.partnersworld.org)

According to the report, in 2009 alone there were about 112,000 villages in eastern Burma displaced due to direct or indirect actions by the Burmese regime. Children are particularly at risk in displacement, according to the report.

>From 2002 to the end of 2009, the report said that more than 580,000 civilians including more than 190,000 children have been forcibly displaced from their homes in eastern Burma. An estimated one to three million people live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout Burma. A third of these are children.

The report documents how childhood is disrupted by violence, insecurity and poverty. Children are witnesses of and subject to arbitrary and extrajudicial killings, torture and mistreatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, rape and sexual violence, forced labor and conscription as porters, recruitment as child soldiers and restrictions on basic and fundamental freedoms.

Richard Chilvers, a FBR spokesperson, told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday, “We want to send a strong message that Burma must observe the rights for children because children are venerable in Burma. Particularly, children who are internally displaced.”

He said that the international community must put pressure on the regime and on the United Nations to enforce international standards of human rights inside Burma.

Saw Monkey, a videographer for FBR, said, “There is no peace, freedom and development in Karen State because of oppression.” He said that two children were shot dead and their mother was wounded in March in Ler Doh Township, Nyaunglebin District, in western Karen State.

He said the woman was returning home with her two children when Burmese troops in Light Infantry Battalion 369 shot her 5-year-old daughter at her side and her 5-month-old, who she carried on her back.

“The people live with fear all the time. Their life is always uncertain. Sometimes, when the army comes to a village, they have to run away. For children, they have to abandon their classes.”

The Partners and FBR teams collected information from 200 people affected by displacement in Burma through community-based surveys and border interviews and conducted 82 in-depth interviews along the Thai-Burmese border between June and December 2009.

The interviews included parents and grandparents as well as children from Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Shan states while living in junta-designated relocation sites, in cease-fire areas and in hiding. The FBR team surveyed more than 93 people from ethnic Karen and Shan communities, including 38 women and 46 children between July 2009 and January 2010.

David Eubank, the FBR director, said, “The dictators have committed their lives, fortune and honor to keeping power. If we want to be a part of freedom in Burma by resisting the power of hate with love, we can do no less. We love the people of Burma and stand with them, this is our heart. We believed that oppression is morally wrong, this is our mind.”

IDPs are typically forced to leave their villages, homes, farms and livelihoods with little advanced warning. The people find themselves in precariously unstable circumstances, lacking protection from human rights violations committed by the junta troops and in danger of further displacement with little access to the most basic necessities including adequate and sustainable food sources, clean drinking water, stable shelters, schools and healthcare facilities, according to the report.

The Partners and FBR have called for a formal investigation through a UN Commission of inquiry to evaluate all allegations of international crimes committed against the civilian population in Burma, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The groups said in a statement that according to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, national authorities are responsible to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons. Far from the fulfilling its obligations under international law, the actions of the Burmese regime have led to violent attacks on civilians, irresponsible development projects and widespread human rights abuses which have resulted in new instances of displacement throughout the country, according to the statement.

Burma Army setting up more barriers against Wa – Hseng Khio Fah
Shan Herald Agency for News: Wed 7 Apr 2010

Burma’ ruling military junta has reportedly been erecting barriers more densely than ever against ethnic ceasefire groups, especially in the United Wa State Army (UWSA) as the latest deadline 22 April draws near, according to local sources from the Thai-Burma border.The activities reportedly started on 27 March, Armed Forces Day. Between Tachilek and Monghsat, a distance of 63 miles, there are no less than 20 Burma Army checkpoints, a local source in Monghsat said. “It is to monitor Wa’s movements.”
[Burma Army checkpoint near Tachilek]

At the same time, Tachilek authorities are also vigorously conducting inspection of the people in the town for a week. They have been checking from house to house including hotels and apartments from 22:00 until dawn, said a Tachilek resident.

“They asked many questions. They checked our ID cards and questioned whether our cards are real or not. Some people staying in apartments got thorough inspection including their bedrooms.” she said. “We don’t’ know why they are so serious.”

In addition, rumor is around that Naypyitaw is deploying three more Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs): Kalaw based LID #55, Pegu based LID #77 and Pa-an based LID#22 to the areas very soon. Tachilek area commander Colonel Khin Maung Soe himself was reported to have left the town to oversee the preparations.

The situation seems if the Wa is still standing defiant to the Naypyitaw’s Border Guard Force program, a breakout of hostilities after 28 April is possible, a border watcher said.

The UWSA and other ceasefire groups have been given a 22 April deadline to accept the Burma Army’s demand, and to face the consequences of their continued defiance by 28 April, when they would be declared as illegal organizations.

According to a source close to the UWSA southern military region, the ruling military junta should accept the Wa’s latest counter proposal submitted on 1 April.

“In the past, we said there should be no junta officers at the battalion level,” he said. “But now we are allowing it to have one officer to serve either as a commander or deputy commander at the battalion level.”

ASEAN MPs tell leaders to consider expelling Myanmar
Agence France Presse: Wed 7 Apr 2010

Hanoi – More than 100 ASEAN lawmakers on Wednesday urged leaders meeting in Vietnam this week to impose sanctions on Myanmar and consider its expulsion for ignoring calls for free and fair elections.The legislators said leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at their annual summit Thursday and Friday should “urgently discuss” the election due to be held in Myanmar later this year.

In a petition to the leaders, the parliamentarians condemned election laws unveiled by Myanmar’s junta which have been criticised as undermining the credibility of the vote, the first to be held in the country for two decades.

Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Demoracy, has boycotted the poll over the laws, which would have forced it to exclude her from the party if it wanted to take part.

“With the promulgation of these apparently biased laws… the regime has forfeited its best opportunity to show willingness to engage in an inclusive process of national reconciliation,” the petition said.

The petition, endorsed by 105 members of parliament from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, was sent to leaders by the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), which lobbies for democratic reforms in the former Burma.

“As Myanmar has thus far ignored ASEAN’s calls to reform… a new and more decisive course of action must be undertaken,” the MPs said.

“ASEAN should immediately enact strict and targetted economic sanctions against Myanmar’s military government.”

Myanmar should also be “immediately suspended from the grouping and its permanent expulsion earnestly considered” because it has failed to adhere to principles enshrined in the new ASEAN Charter, they said.

Myanmar has in the past escaped collective censure by ASEAN because of the group’s policy of non-interference in members’ internal affairs.

However, some ASEAN members have separately criticised Myanmar’s military regime and called for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release.

US agency accused of sanctions busting – Francis Wade
Democratic Voice of Burma :Wed 7 Apr 2010

The US government aid agency USAID has denied charges levelled by a Burma campaign group that it is breaching US sanctions on the military-ruled country.The prominent Washington-based US Campaign for Burma (USCB) said in March that USAID funding of the ASEAN Competitive Enhancement (ACE) project, which looks to promote the tourism and textiles industries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, was “not in line with US-Burma policy”.

Burma is a member of ASEAN, but is subject to strict US trade and financial sanctions. A campaign to boycott tourism in Burma has received strong backing from various campaign groups, although this has not been factored into the US sanctions package.

But USAID’s funding of the ACE remains a “violation” of US policy and should be challenged by Congress, USCB advocacy director Jennifer Quigley has told TTR Weekly travel website.

“The spirit of [US Burma sanctions] was to keep American dollars out of the hands of the Burmese regime,” she said. “The way the Burmese tourism economy is structured, it is not a stretch to assume the regime would benefit financially.”

USAID communications director, Hal Lipper, defended the charges by saying that ASEAN had requested funding to Southeast Asia “as a region”.

One of the main arguments against tourism in Burma is that, with the majority of property and services owned by the ruling regime, tourist money would eventually find its way into government coffers. Moreover, rights groups have said that many tourist resorts and services were built using forced labour.

Detained Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi had previously urged tourists to stay away from the country whilst it remains under military rule, although this stance appears have softened in line with growing international engagement with the junta.

The pro-tourism lobby argues however that interaction with locals, although often highly restricted by the government, can contribute towards pulling the country out of decades of isolation.

Tourism currently only contributes to around 0.7 percent of Burma’s GDP, meaning that the boycott is largely symbolic and would have little tangible effect on the country’s economy. The impact of sanctions has also been lessened by Burma’s growing trade with ASEAN countries, as well as China and India.

Myanmar party sorry for not bringing democracy
Associated Press: Tue 6 Apr 2010

Yangon – The party of detained Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi said Tuesday it was sorry it could not bring democracy to the country because of repression by the military government but it will continue its nonviolent struggle.The National League for Democracy last week decided to boycott the first scheduled elections in two decades. It said the electoral laws imposed by the ruling junta, which would prevent Suu Kyi from taking part, were undemocratic.

In a statement Tuesday, the NLD said its leaders and the party members had sacrificed and worked relentlessly. The party “earnestly apologizes to the people” for its failure to achieve national reconciliation and democracy, due to arrests, repression, harassment and threats by the authorities.

“However, the League will never turn its back to the people or to its struggle for democracy,” the statement said. “We pledge to continue to achieve our goals for democracy through systematic, peaceful and nonviolent means.”

Myanmar, also known as Burma, which has been ruled by its military for 48 years. The government has touted the polls as part of a “roadmap to democracy.” Critics say the elections are a sham designed to cement the power of the military.

The junta says it will hold the elections this year but has not set a date.

The NLD statement said the electoral laws imposed by the junta for the polls are “unjust’ and “unrealistic.”

The party’s refusal to participate is likely to undermine the vote’s credibility in the eyes of foreign governments and the United Nations, which have urged the diplomatically isolated junta to ensure all groups take part.

Suu Kyi’s party won the last elections held in Myanmar in 1990 by a landslide but was barred by the military from taking power.

Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate, has spent 14 of the last 20 years in jail or under house arrest.

Many won’t vote without NLD – Khaing Thwe
Irrawaddy: Tue 6 Apr 2010

Rangoon––In an Irrawaddy survey involving more than 500 people in Rangoon, nearly half said they do not intend to vote in the upcoming election if the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), does not contest it.The Irrawaddy recently asked 520 Rangoon residents, both men and women, between the ages of 20 and 70, if they will vote in the election, even without the participation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. Two hundred and fifty-two persons (48 percent) said they did not want to, while 198 persons (38 percent) said they will vote even if the NLD does not participate. The remaining 70 declined to answer or said they had not yet made up their minds.
In the photo taken last year, pedestrians walk by wooden barricades with barbed wires in Rangoon. (Photo: AP)

“I only support the NLD,” said a 54-year-old construction engineer. “I voted for the NLD in the last election in 1990. If the NLD doesn’t compete in this year’s election, I won’t have any party to vote for. I am not going to cast my ballot.”

A 30-year-old woman said that she will not vote in an election without an NLD presence as she knows Suu Kyi’s party alone. She said that she does not know any other party and is not interested in them.

“The election will be meaningless without the NLD,” said a student from the Government Technical College. “All other parties contesting the election consist of people favorable to the regime. So, I am not going to vote.”

A majority of those who said they will not vote without the NLD participating thought the party had made the right decision in not registering for the election. Some said they had made the decision not to vote as a means of boycott, because they respect the NLD viewpoint and decision.

“I don’t think the election will be successful if many people, like us, do not vote,” said a 28-year-old taxi driver. “People need to join hands and they shouldn’t go to the polling station.”

Those who said they will still cast their ballots in the election, with or without NLD participation, had different reasons for doing so, according to our survey.

“As a civil servant I have no choice but to vote. I won’t be happy if the NLD doesn’t compete in election and I will have to choose another suitable party and vote for it, but not the USDA [Union Solidarity and Development Association],” said a 53-year-old office worker.

He added that the regime will force civil servants and military personnel to vote in the election, and could also arrange to mark their ballots the way it wanted.

“If I don’t go to vote, the authorities will get the chance to use my ballot,” a female trader said. “I can’t let that happen, so I must vote.”

“We should vote because it is our right,” said a teacher in his 60s. “We must express our opinion. Also, [the election] authorities will convert our votes into theirs if we don’t use them. I have thought about this and that’s why I believe we should all vote.”

Most of those in favor of voting despite the NLD absence said they do not favor the opposition party decision not to register. Many said that people should vote in the election because during the 2008 constitutional referendum the election authorities had transformed unused ballot papers and advanced voting ballots into “Yes” votes.

A 40-year-old businessman told The Irrawaddy he has yet to think about whether he will cast his ballot in the coming election, as there will be no NLD candidate. He said that he will make his decision based on the political situation at that time.

“The political situation is changing all the time,” said an elderly man. “It will keep changing, so I can’t say yet if I am going to vote.”

He said he believes the NLD was right not to register for the election, but that he was also concerned that NLD members would be driven out of politics due to the dissolution of the party, which would be a great loss for the people of Burma.

“The NLD is the party that was elected by the people,” said a retired headmistress. “I don’t like the way the NLD members made the decision not to register for the election by themselves. I think they didn’t pay attention to public opinion. People want the NLD to contest the election and they will vote for them. The NLD would surely win again if genuine elections were held.”

Burmese PM may lead political party
Irrawaddy: Tue 6 Apr 2010

Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein may leave his current post to head the new political wing of the government-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), according to sources in Naypyidaw. Although Thein Sein reportedly wants to retire and is having heart problems, inside military sources said Snr Gen Than Shwe asked him to remain and head-up the new political party.
Gen. Thein Sein listens through his earphones as he attends a retreat session at the 15th Asean Summit in Thailand last year. (Photo: Reuters)

Several government sources said Thein Sein has been told to hand over his current house and other state-owned properties to the government. The new election laws forbid political parties and their candidates from using state-owned resources, although there is an exemption for resources officially allotted by the government.

The rumor regarding Thein Sein’s future is spreading fast among government servants, dissident circles and observers inside and outside Burma.

Thein Sein, who is known to be a trusted associate of Than Shwe (considered to be the patron of the USDA), was named prime minister in October 2007 and led the National Convention which resulted in the controversial 2008 Constitution. In 2001 he was appointed adjutant-general of the War Office and three years later was promoted to the Secretary-1 in the regime’s ruling council.

Sources said two other high ranking officers and trusted aides of Than Shwe are expected to take leading roles in the future civilian government: Gen. Thura Shwe Mann, the joint chief of staff in the armed forces who is considered the junta’s No 3 in command, and Maj-Gen Htay Oo, the minister of agriculture and irrigation and secretary-general of the USDA.

The 2008 Constitution grants 25 parliamentary seats to the military. It is not known if Thein Sein, Thura Shwe Mann and Htay Oo will run for the junta-sponsored political party as civilian candidates or be appointed to parliament as military representatives.

Sources say two high level officers close to Than Shwe will not enter the political arena. Lt-Gen Myint Swe, head of the Bureau of Special Operations (5), and Maj-Gen Tin Ngwe, chairman of Mandalay Division, will reportedly remain in the military.

The USDA was formed in 1993, and according to official documents has 24 million members, almost half the population of Burma.

USDA members held 633 seats, or 58 percent, at the National Convention convened in 1993 to prepare guidelines for the new constitution. The guidelines were finally approved in 2007 and the Constitution was enacted in 2008.

Opposition group observers say most USDA members are civil servants who were recruited by harassment and intimidation. It also includes teachers, students, business people and political activists.

Many Burmese view the USDA as principally an instrument of the regime that carries out violent acts against opposition activists and civilians. The group has paramilitary members who perform surveillance and search for dissidents in hiding.

USDA members played a key role in the bloody crackdowns during the 2007 uprising and in a deadly attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade in 2003, in which 100 people were killed.

In November 2005, Htay Oo publicly told USDA members that if necessary the association will be turned into a political party.

Myanmar to escape censure at ASEAN summit: observers
Agence France Presse: Tue 6 Apr 2010

Hanoi – Myanmar’s widely condemned election plans will loom large at this week’s ASEAN summit, but criticism is unlikely from regional nations with their own flawed records on rights and democracy, observers say.The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit is being chaired by communist Vietnam, a one-party state that is accused of overseeing deteriorating human rights.

Laos and Cambodia are other members worried about setting a precedent that would make discussion of human rights more acceptable within the bloc, said Christopher Roberts, from the University of Canberra, Australia.

“I think that’s a central concern,” said Roberts, a lecturer in Asian politics and security.

Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo has said he will urge members at the talks to call for a reversal of Myanmar’s electoral laws, which he said contravene the junta’s promises to embark on a “roadmap to democracy.”

Myanmar’s opposition, the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, said last week it would boycott the ballot — the first in two decades — expected to be held later this year.

Under the new electoral laws, the party would have to expel Suu Kyi if it wanted to participate because she is serving a prison term. The Nobel peace laureate has been detained for 14 of the last 20 years.

Without her, the vote cannot be free and fair, say Japan, Australia and Britain. The United States blamed the ruling junta for the opposition boycott, saying the regime had missed an opportunity to move forward.

Leaders of ASEAN’s 10 members are to hold their talks, a twice-yearly event, on Thursday and Friday.

Myanmar has always escaped formal censure from the grouping in the past and observers see virtually no chance of this meeting producing a joint statement criticising the Myanmar vote.

“They are holding an election. Why are you complaining? This is the mentality of a lot of the ASEAN,” said Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (ISEAS).

Although a big question mark surrounds the legitimacy of Myanmar’s next government, “not every regime in ASEAN is legitimate anyway,” he said.

Thailand’s army-backed government, for example, is under pressure from street protesters demanding snap polls to replace an administration they say is undemocratic after coming to power in a 2008 parliamentary vote.

The ASEAN summit comes just a few days after its host, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, held talks in Myanmar with junta leaders.

An Asian diplomat said he expected Dung would have told the ruling generals that the elections will be under global scrutiny and “need to be credible”.

But Dung would not have pushed the regime to allow Suu Kyi to run in the polls because Myanmar could then ask Vietnam to release its own prominent detainees, said the diplomat, who requested anonymity.

Human rights activists say ASEAN’s longstanding principle of non-interference in members’ internal affairs also restricts its ability to criticise Myanmar.

Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, said Vietnam “has consistently resisted efforts to raise human rights issues within ASEAN.”

The bloc’s diverse membership ranges from Communist Laos, one of Asia’s poorest nations, to the Westernised city-state of Singapore, the absolute monarchy of Brunei and the vibrant democracy of Indonesia.

“I see a growing gap in the values within the ASEAN states”, which are divided between conservatives and those — often led by Indonesia — seeking change, said University of Canberra’s Roberts.

The region is at a crossroads, said Yap Swee Seng, executive director of Forum-Asia, an umbrella for regional rights groups.

Rapid economic development and rising education levels have created a strong middle class that is helping to push many countries — including Vietnam, but not Myanmar — from authoritarian-style rule towards more democratic systems, said Yap.

“The people are demanding more and more participation in the decision-making,” he said, adding the issue is whether regimes will be able to adapt to those demands.

An election in name only – Editorial
Bangkok Post: Tue 6 Apr 2010

Burma’s military regime has thrown aside all appearances of democracy and conciliation. Its new election law bans the opposition from participating in the coming polls. It gives special privileges to the military elite and their supporters.The junta has snuffed out an appeal against the illegal imprisonment of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, and announced airily that she will be locked up for the duration of the election.

For these egregious actions, and for its general violence towards its citizens, Burma’s rulers should be ostracised worldwide, and punished if they step outside their country.

Only a Burmese dictatorship could come up with an illogical plan that bars political detainees from the political process. Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya said Thailand intends to lobby Burmese authorities to make the elections more fair.

Thailand hopes all Burmese can participate, and that the junta will come to its senses regarding the incarceration of Mrs Suu Kyi and other political prisoners.

The abhorrent state of politics in Burma is difficult to overstate. Last month the special United Nations envoy charged with investigating the country, said that charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity should be considered. Envoy Tomas Ojea Quintana issued a signed report that the entire Burmese junta, from Senior General Than Shwe on down, was guilty of “systematic violations of human rights”.

One must never forget that Burma is, in fact, fully capable of conducting a civilised and democratic election. The army, under some of the very men who still hold power today, permitted free polls and a nationwide vote in 1990. Mrs Suu Kyi was locked up in the immediate lead-up and on polling day, but her National League for Democracy (NLD) won an overwhelming victory.

That election proved that democracy is more than just one day at the polls. The NLD was never permitted to take its place in parliament, the army launched a brutal and often violent crackdown to divide and conquer the election winners, and hundreds were jailed as political prisoners. Having lost the election, the junta simply stayed in power.

It is now trying to make its despotism legitimate with another election. The rules, of course, have changed. The army must win so no anti-military candidates can run, no dissidents can campaign, ward chiefs will keep track of just how each citizen votes.

By the sham constitution, the farcical vote results will mandate that the army must always have a deciding voice in the government. To cap it off, any soldier or member of the regime who may break any political rules or laws will receive amnesty automatically.

This is the election law which caught in Mr Kasit’s throat, as it should repel anyone who favours democracy. The election laws forbid participation and bring huge penalties including still more prison time for political dissidents. The regime members, however, are automatically off the hook. This is almost a dictionary definition of tyranny.

The world cannot intervene in the internal affairs of Burma, but every nation and group can display its abhorrence of the Burmese dictatorship. Mrs Suu Kyi, the NLD political party and all non-violent political opponents of the government deserve full support.

Right-thinking people must take sides. They can show support for the opposition and make it clear to the Burmese junta that the election or its result cannot be respected under current circumstances.

UK favors sending Myanmar to ICC, China says it’s sovereign, UN’s Ban defers – Matthew Russell Lee
Inner City Press: Tue 6 Apr 2010

United Nations — Amid calls to refer the military government of Myanmar to the International Criminal Court, like Sudan was referred, UK Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant told the Press on Wednesday that his country would support such a referral. But, he said, the Security Council lacks the unanimity necessary for such a referral. Inner City Press asked China’s new Ambassador to the UN Li Baodong what his country thinks of the Council discussing Myanmar’s election laws. “General elections in a country is a matter of sovereign states,” he replied, “and should be respected.” This principle, he said, applies to Myanmar.

When Lyall Grant emerged to speak about Myanmar, or Burma, Inner City Press asked him about China position. We disagree, he said, noting that Myanmar is on the agenda of the Security Council, that it can instability that is a threat to international peace and security.

But when Secretary General Ban Ki-moon addressed the media, Inner City Press asked him about Aung San Suu Kyi’s call on her National League for Democracy to not register for the upcoming elections, given how flawed the election laws are.

“Let me answer tomorrow afternoon,” Ban Ki-moon told Inner City Press. Video here from Minute 7:34, UN transcript below. There will be a meeting of Ban’s Group of Friends on Myanmar, to be addressed by Ban’s chief of staff Vijay Nambiar. We’ll be there.

Footnotes: On March 23, Inner City Press asked Ban’s spokesman to confirm or deny that Ban proposed a former Indonesian foreign minister to replace Ibrahim Gambari as his envoy to Myanmar, but that Than Shwe vetoed it. Nesirky said, “that’s the first I hear of it,” despite the report being included in an article Nesirky said was the only story alleging that Nambiar secretly traveled to Myanmar earlier this year.

Inner City Press asked the UK’s Lyall Grant if the UK believe that a permanent replaced for Gambari should be named. His reply noted that Nambiar is only in the position on an “interim” basis. As Inner City Press has previously reported, the U.S. has said it prefers not naming a permanent replacement until after the elections, so that the person is “not stained” by the elections.

From the March 24 UN transcript:

Inner City Press: I wanted to ask in the run-up to this meeting with the Group of Friends of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi has said that her party, the NLD [National League for Democracy], and other opposition parties, shouldn’t even register for the poll, that the election laws are flawed. I’m wondering; you convened the meeting, what’s your thinking of what the UN can do, given that the main opponent now wants to boycott it?

SG Ban: let me answer tomorrow afternoon after I have convened the meeting of the Group of Friends of Myanmar. I need to discuss this matter with the ambassadors participating in that meeting. I will have a clearer answer, if you excuse me.

Elections in Burma – Editorial
Irish Times: Tue 6 Apr 2010

THE DECISION this week by Burma’s National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi, to boycott the country’s forthcoming elections was both inevitable and understandable. To do otherwise would have been to give political credibility to a profoundly flawed election and equally dubious parliament, and to repudiate both its own leader and its many jailed activists. The NLD decisively won the last election in Burma in 1990 – 60 per cent of the vote and 80 per cent of seats – but was prevented by the military from assuming power.Some of the opposition in Burma have until recently leaned towards participating, arguing that doing so would give them a platform, however limited. But the election, the date of which is expected to be announced any day, will be no exercise in accountability. In truth it is only a crude and implausible attempt to legitimise the continued rule of a brutal military regime.

The parameters for the election are set by the 2008 constitution which entrenches military power by reserving 25 per cent of seats for the army, creating a strong new national defence and security council on which the military retains a majority, and vesting extraordinary powers in the commander-in-chief. It grants immunity to all members of the current regime for acts committed in the course of their duties and gives the military a veto on constitutional change. Reinforced by March 9th electoral rules, it also bans candidates who are or were in jail for political offences, requiring parties to exclude them from their ranks or face dissolution.

Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent 15 of the last 21 years in detention, has indicated she “would not dream” of entering the elections. And the respected International Crisis Group reports that “the main reaction of the populace to it and the forthcoming elections is indifference, rooted in a belief that nothing much will change”.

Internationally the campaign to isolate the junta has been strengthened by a report and welcome recommendations by the UN Special Rapporteur Tomas Ojea Quintana, who describes “a pattern of gross and systematic violation of human rights” of civilians. The abuses, including killings, rape, torture, ethnic cleansing and forced labour, were the result of long-standing state policy, he said. He has rightly urged the UN to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma and to bring charges against members of the regime.

A message to the people of Burma (unofficial translation)
National League for Democracy: Tue 6 Apr 2010

1. The National League for Democracy (NLD) was formed with a commitment to establish democratic system in Burma, which the people of Burma demanded unanimously during the 1988 nationwide pro-democracy uprising.Since its inception, NLD has consistently tried to; (1) Establish a true democratic government in Burma (2) Fully achieve fundamental human rights (3) Firmly lay the foundation of democracy to prevent the re-emergence of a dictatorial regime in the future (4) Perpetuate the Union with equality among all ethnic nationalities (5) Contribute for the peace in the world by improving the lives and development of the people and stability in the country of Burma

To achieve these afore-mentioned aims, the NLD leaders and members have tried to achieve national reconciliation, a necessary and fundamental requirement of democracy, through a great deal of sacrifices. 2. In the 1990 multi-party general election, NLD won 392 seats out of 485 contested seats. This was a mandate given by the people of Burma for the NLD to lead them toward a democratic society. Therefore, the Members of Parliament-elect of the NLD aimed to achieve national reconciliation, convene the Parliament, and solve the problems in Burma peacefully. Hoping to realize meaningful political dialogue with the regime, NLD leaders and its MPs attended the National Convention, held by then State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), now called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). NLD MPs had participated in the National Convention process and tried hard to draft a democratic constitution. However, these attempts were not successful. SPDC refused to convene the Parliament with the elected MPs, and the rightful Parliament was never allowed to emerge.

3. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of NLD, is deeply committed to solving the problems by peaceful means through meaningful dialogue. She has tried hard repeatedly to have a dialogue with the leaders of the military. She continues to call for a dialogue with the military regime while under house arrest. As soon as she was released from house arrest (in 1995 and 2000), she continued to call for dialogue.

Aung San Suu Kyi escaped an assassination attempt in the Depayin massacre in 2003. Even so, she didn’t consider revenge and continued to call for the military regime to establish a political dialogue. In 2009, she was again given a prison sentence when an American citizen, Mr. John Yettaw, arrived at her house unwelcomed. She still continued to call for the regime to meet and discuss for the interest of the country. In her latest letter to Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of SPDC, she wrote that “she requests Senior General to grant a meeting to discuss for the lifting of economic sanctions”. To sum up, numerous attempts by the NLD leaders, members, and MPs-elect to establish a system of democracy in Burma and for national reconciliation were obvious, fully recorded, and have been ignored by the SPDC, rendering their attempts unsuccessful.

4. Now, the SPDC issued a set of electoral laws, including the Election Commission Law, Political Parties Registration Law, Peoples’ Parliament Election Law, National Parliament Election Law, Region (or) State Parliaments Election Law, and by-laws, with the aim of holding elections in 2010. These laws are unjust, undemocratic and not in line with the basic characters of the law. Throughout history, peoples have built their associations and societies based on justice. When we compared these laws with the society of the people of Burma, we found that these laws are obviously not free and fair for our society. They are not in line with principles of democracy, such as distributive justice, natural equality, and political equality. These laws also go against universal ethics. Furthermore, forcing parties to pledge to obey and abide the 2008 Constitution is a violation of democracy and human rights. These laws ignore the demands of an all-party inclusive election made by the UN Secretary-General and the international community.

5. Considering these facts, the Central Committee of the NLD met on March 29, 2010, and decided without objection that the NLD shall not re-register the party at the Election Commission, as the electoral laws issued by the SPDC are unfair and unjust.

6. Standing by the people, the NLD has made persevering efforts for the emergence of democracy and national reconciliation while enduring arrests, punishment, intimidation, disturbances and all sorts of restrictions by the authorities. Nevertheless, all these efforts were to no avail as a result of one-sided suppression and annihilation by the authorities. The NLD would like to sincerely and earnestly apologize to the people of Burma for these vain attempts.

7. However, the NLD will never turn its back on the people of Burma or on its struggle for democracy. We pledge to continue to achieve our goals for democracy through systematic, peaceful and nonviolent means, guided by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who said that “I would like to speak to the people of Burma that I will try as much as I can to continue an effort to achieve democracy in Burma.”

As per decision made by the Central Executive Committee meeting on April 5, 2010
Central Executive Committee National League for Democracy Rangoon
National League for Democracy No 97(B) West Shwegondine Street, Bahan Township, Rangoon

* Translated by US Campaign for Burma

Food imports to Wa state ‘blocked’ – Ko Thet
Democratic Voice of Burma: Mon 5 Apr 2010

Burma’s ruling junta has reportedly blocked the flow of food into the country’s volatile Wa state in a possible sign of looming hostilities against an ethnic army there.Tension has been high recently between the Burmese army and United Wa State Army (UWSA), Burma’s largest ceasefire group. The two are currently in talks over the transformation of the UWSA into a Border Guard Force.

The 30,000-strong Wa army has so far refused to transform, raising concerns about the future of the already tenuous ceasefire it holds with the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The transformation would see it reduce troop numbers and come under direct government control.

UWSA spokesperson Aung Myint said that the army “would accept” the transformation if certain conditions were altered, although did not elaborate on what these are.

The two sides met on 1 April, where the UWSA was asked by Burma’s military security chief, Ye Myint, to submit a proposal regarding the transformation, to be enacted on 28 April.

“It is hard to say whether there will be fighting right after 29 April or just later,” said Aung Myint. “Now the SPDC has blocked imports of food into the Wa state.”

“There is no food shortage yet in the Wa state but it won’t be good for long if the blockade continues.”

China has expressed concern about possible outbreaks of fighting in the Wa region, which is located in Burma’s northeastern Shan state and borders China. Last year, fighting between Burmese troops and a nearby ethnic Kokang army forced some 37,000 refugees across the border into China.

“China is worried about a refugee influx and weapons smuggling problems on their side if fighting breaks out, and has expressed a wish to maintain peace and stability and see development on the China-Burma border,” Aung Myint said.

The Wa army is predominantly made up of ethnic Chinese and is rumoured to receive financial and military support from Beijing. It is one of nearly 20 ethnic armies to have signed a ceasefire with the Burmese junta, although many of these now look increasingly fragile.

The junta has threatened to use force against the UWSA if it finally rejects the offer, and the Wa told DVB recently that it was “preparing for the worst” should it shun the proposal.

‘The regime is a political rapist’: Win Tin
Irrawaddy: Mon 5 Apr 2010

Win Tin, a leading member of Burma’s main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), likened the country’s ruling regime to “a political rapist” intent on destroying the party that has led the pro-democracy movement for the past two decades.“They want to strip us of our 1990 election victory so that we are like a 20-year-old girl, naked and exposed. We cannot allow ourselves to be raped,” he said in an interview with The Irrawaddy, explaining why the party chose not to contest this year’s election.
Win Tin, a senior leader of NLD, attends the party’s central committee meeting at its headquarters in March 29. (Photo: AP)

The outspoken critic of the junta said that the NLD wanted the regime to re-open a dialogue with detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi and review the Constitution. But he added that the chances of this happening were very slim.

He also admitted that he and several other NLD leaders were naive to believe that the regime would introduce election laws that were flexible enough to allow the party to participate in the new polls.

“The election laws made it very clear that the regime doesn’t want Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or the NLD to have any part in the election,” he said.

The NLD decided last Monday that it would not participate in the election because it was required under a new party registration law to expel Suu Kyi and other members serving prison sentences. The party now faces dissolution for refusing to register for the election.

Win Tin said that the NLD leaders will ponder their next move at a meeting next Monday. He also stressed that the party is counting on the international community to send a strong message to the regime that its handling of the election is unacceptable.

“We know that they have limited power [to influence Burma’s political situation], but we want them to react and show that they know what’s really happening here,” he said.

The US and the UN expressed regret last week that the NLD was forced to make a decision that now jeopardizes the party’s continued existence, but blamed the move on the Burmese regime’s draconian election laws.

Meanwhile, Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya said earlier this week that “[the NLD] have every freedom to decide on their own affairs. So I honor and I respect [their] decision.”

On Wednesday, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa visited Burma and told his Burmese counterpart in Naypyidaw that Jakarta expected the regime to “uphold its commitment to have an election that allows all parties to take part.”

Win Tin said that NLD leaders wanted to see more reaction from the region and beyond. “We want China, India and the European nations to speak up,” he said.

Ethnic council opposes junta electoral laws – Hseng Khio Fah
Shan Herald Agency for News: Mon 5 Apr 2010

The Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC-Union of Burma), a coalition of ethnic political organizations, announced yesterday that the council would not accept the Burma’s electoral laws as they were patently one sided laws drawn by the military junta for itself. The announcement was made after its five-day long meeting held from 27 to 31 March at an undisclosed place on the Thai-Burma border. It was attended by 35 representatives from 7 ethnic states: Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Arakan, Chin, Mon and Shan states.

According to the council resolutions, the group will oppose not only the electoral laws, but also the military junta’s 2008 constitution which it says is undemocratic. At the same time, the group expressed its support for the National League for Democracy (NLD) on its decision on 29 March not to re-register as a political party.

On the other hand, the council will not oppose or condemn ethnic organizations and individuals planning to contest in the forthcoming elections, or the people who will vote in the elections even though its position does not support the elections.

The newly elected Chairman Tu Tu Lay urged all state representatives to prevent discord among those who are participating in the elections and those against the elections.

According to a participant at the meeting, there are people, even though they are against the 2008 constitution, who has decided to contest elections.

One of them is veteran Shan politician Shwe Ohn, who formed a new party; Union Democratic Alliance Organization (UDAO), last year saying if there are no opposition parties, the military junta’s candidates will win by acclamation.

A former member of the defunct Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), who also shared the same view, said, “The military’s door is opening a little bit. We must try to pry it open wide with a few seats that we can win.”

A former resistance leader said that ethnic people have been fighting against the junta for more than half a century, but they have yet to win, it is because they are fighting from the exterior lines. “It is high time we fought them in the interior lines.”

The ENC was established in August 2001 as Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee (ENSCC). In 2004 it became ENC, a state based organization. Another ethnic alliance is the National Democratic Front (NDF), formed in 1976, by armed ethnic movements.

Five reasons why Burma’s elections are bogus – Mac McClelland
Mother Jones: Fri 2 Apr 2010

This week, Burma’s National League for Democracy, the party of detained Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, announced that it wouldn’t participate in the country’s first elections in two decades, which are to be held sometime later this year. Than Shwe, the general who heads the Burmese junta, insists that the contest will be “free and fair,” and despite mountains of evidence to the contrary, some outside observers appear to be buying the hype: ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan said that the elections are “a new beginning,” and the New York Times ran a bizarrely rosy story about the country’s future. But the NLD boycott reflects what everybody in Burma already knows—that the elections are a farce.Let’s take a look at the aforementioned mountains of evidence:

1. The government is already cheating. The military’s proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, has spent millions currying favor with the populace by paving roads, opening free health clinics, and giving away high school tuition. This started before the junta announced the rules for participating in the election (or even a date; October is the rumor), effectively crippling other parties’ ability to start campaigning. When the government finally did reveal the campaign rules, they were so stacked against the opposition—for example, barring Aung San Suu Kyi from participating—that the NLD sued to have them revised. The case was rejected.

2. Even if the generals don’t win, they could still “win.” In 2008, 92 percent of Burmese voters allegedly said yea to a constitution drafted by the junta. Never mind that the new constitution basically legalized forced labor or that the vote was held in the chaos following a cyclone that killed 140,000 people. Also, the last time the government held multiparty elections, in 1990, and lost to the NLD by a landslide, it simply declared the results void and kept Aung San Suu Kyi incarcerated.

3. Even if the generals admit that they don’t win, they still can’t actually lose. According to the constitution, 25 percent of the seats in parliament are reserved for the military, and the current government picks the candidates for president. And in the event that parliamentarians do start exercising too much power, the military machine could always just reassert control of the state, as it did in the coups of 1962 and 1988. Than Shwe reminded the populace of this possibility last weekend when he made the wholly unveiled threat that the army can step into politics “whenever the need arises.”

4. Bad guys will continue to hold the purse strings. The Times has cited the government’s decision to sell “a raft of state-run factories and assets to cronies in the private sector” as a sign of progress. But the reason the military is hastily selling off hundreds of state-owned properties—buildings, land, oil and hydro projects, ports, an airline—to its leaders and crooked friends is to guarantee that the country’s economy will remain in their grasp no matter what the election outcome.

5. There’s the matter of rampant discrimination and war crimes. Don’t discount, as most Western media does, the millions of ethnic minorities inside Burma’s borders, many of whom will not participate in the elections (the rules of which were published only in Burmese and English) and some of which have armed insurgent groups threatening to come out of retirement in the face of election-related turmoil. Also rarely discussed is the full-on, horribly bloody war in the east of the country. These minorities’ continuing disenfranchisement and targeting for annihilation is hardly a move toward peace and democracy. A UN official and more than 50 US congresspeople have called for an investigation into the regime’s crimes against humanity, but a clause in the wildly popular constitution stipulates that the perpetrators cannot be brought to justice.

ASEAN’s Pitsuwan may have cause for saying that the Burmese government’s decision to hold elections is a “step forward”—after all, that’s not saying much about a government known for its total disregard for political and human rights. But such falsely hopeful messages diminish the gaping distance between Burma’s current state and true democracy. Did the National League for Democracy have any choice but to sacrifice their chance to play along with the charade?

Myanmar tightens formalities with passport application
Xinhua: Thu 1 Apr 2010

Yangon – The Myanmar authorities have tightened formalities for its citizens in applying for a passport by adding more complicated procedures for the applicants to go through, the local weekly Popular News reported Thursday.Quoting Yangon division’s Internal Finance and Revenue Department, the report said a passport applicant is re-set to obtain tax clearance verification not only for himself which was previously required but now also for all other household members with whom he is living together, thus adding burden to the applicant.

The authorities’ move is said to prevent anyone of a household member from tax evasion.

Tax clearance is one of the procedures which requires a passport applicant to go through.

Myanmar has been taking some measures since 2006 to tighten levying of taxes in a bid to raise state revenue, while seeking ways also to expose those evading paying tax.

These measures include denying the biennial renewal of private business licenses on failure to fully settle their outstanding tax payment annually.

There are five categories of tax collected by the government, namely commercial and service tax, income tax, profit tax, tax for sale of state lottery and stamps.

Meanwhile, Myanmar on Thursday started introducing passports of international bar-code OCRB system for its citizens to replace handwritten ones in line with the demand of International Aviation Organization which called for stopping the use of the hand-written passports, according to the passport issuing authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Such OCRB passport-readable machines are installed at the Yangon International Airport for the move as well as to facilitate the OCRB passport holders from the international.

Over the period when the new measure is taken, matters related to Myanmar passport extension and renewal in foreign countries, where Myanmar embassies are located, are being suspended for one month from April 1 to 30, according to the ministry.

Inter-Parliamentary Union urges Myanmar to change election laws
Deutsche Presse-Agentur: Thu 1 Apr 2010

Bangkok – The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on Thursday called on Myanmar’s junta to amend its recently promulgated election laws to ensure polls planned this year are “inclusive, free and fair.”“With the elections drawing to a close, time is running short,” said Philippine Senator Aquilino Pimentel, president of the IPU’s human rights committee.

The IPU, an organization which brings together the national parliaments of 143 countries, wound up its 122nd assembly in Bangkok on Thursday.

Myanmar’s military junta last month passed a series of election-related legislation that appeared designed to force the main opposition party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) – to boycott the polls.

The Party Registration Law, for instance, prohibits people currently serving prison terms from being party members. This would force the NLD to expel party leader Aung San Suu Kyi from their ranks before it is allowed to contest this year’s election, a date for which has not yet been set. Suu Kyi is currently serving an 18-month house arrest sentence.

On Monday, the NLD announced the party would not contest the polls.

The NLD won Myanmar’s last general election in 1990, but has been blocked from power for the past two decades. The party remains the strongest political opponent to the military institution that has ruled Myanmar, also called Burma, since 1962.

The IPU human rights committee also examined the individual situations of 293 parliamentarians in 32 countries including Myanmar, Afghanistan and Malaysia.

Senator Pimentel said that the parliamentary delegation from Afghanistan had agreed to close a case against Afghan member of parliament Malalai Joya for a statement she had made, and would allow her to run in the elections in Afghanistan later this year.

He said he hoped that “in the few months between now and the elections, the Afghan Parliament will reinstate Ms Joya.”

On the controversial case of Malaysian member of parliament and de facto opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, who faces sodomy charges, Pimentel said, “The investigation and the proceedings seem to suffer from the same flaws as in the previous sodomy case.”

Malaysia’s Federal Court overturned the conviction in his earlier sodomy case and he was released from prison in 2004.

Burma’s opposition boycotts – George Packer
New Yorker: Thu 1 Apr 2010

The Burmese military regime knows how to do one thing well: survive. Twenty years ago, it nullified an election that was massively won by the party of the opposition, the National League for Democracy. It placed the party’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, under a house arrest that, with a few brief respites, continues to this day. For two decades, the regime has consolidated its power, created an economic oligarchy, ended most of the ethnic insurgencies or fought them to a draw, crushed any democratic tremors among the civilian population, bought off its neighbors, and successfully defied American and world condemnation. Two years ago, in the immediate aftermath of a cyclone that killed one hundred thirty-five thousand people, the government forced Burmese to approve a constitution drafted by the regime itself to perpetuate its hold on power. Elections were scheduled for this year, with the military guaranteed a percentage of seats in parliament and other undemocratic entitlements. The opposition was faced with an excruciating dilemma: whether to join an election that would be its first chance in twenty years to have a share of power, and thereby legitimize the regime’s illegitimate rule, or boycott on principle and accept more years of essentially impotent resistance. For the past two years, this question has preoccupied Burma’s brave, beleaguered political dissidents inside the country, and their supporters on the outside. It was the age-old conundrum of compromise and its limits.

On March 11th, the regime published its election laws. Chapter 2, Section 4(e) of the political party registration law bars any party that participates in the elections from including as members prisoners currently serving sentences. Last year, Aung San Suu Kyi was convicted of violating the terms of her house arrest after a mentally unstable American swam to her house and took refuge there. So under the new law, for the N.L.D. to compete in the elections, Suu Kyi would have to be expelled from the party she has led for twenty years.

On March 29th, the N.L.D. announced that it will boycott the elections. This means that, as of May 6th, Burma’s most important opposition party will be dissolved. The decision by the central committee’s one hundred thirteen members was officially unanimous, but there had been intense debate and division over the question. Apparently, a six-point message released by Aung San Suu Kyi decided matters. And now the opposition’s future is more uncertain than ever.

With its draconian election law, the regime, incompetent in all other matters, shrewdly put the N.L.D. in the position of having to assent to its own destruction. The world will protest, as it always does when the junta shows its barbaric character, but the regime will ignore the protests, secure in the knowledge that it will not have to compete against a party led by the one person it most fears (though the N.L.D. could be reborn under other names). Suu Kyi is almost universally loved and admired in Burma, but her courage is not always distinguishable from inflexibility. Her party is run by elderly men—many of them former political prisoners—who will never defy her. Like many opposition movements under authoritarian rule, it is more democratic in principle than practice. Some respected Burmese voices, such as The Irrawaddy magazine, based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, have not greeted its decision with unalloyed enthusiasm.

It’s almost impossible to know what younger Burmese inside the country think. When I made two visits there in 2008, some of them, who revered Suu Kyi, nonetheless wanted to participate in elections and regarded the N.L.D. as unresponsive to their desires. Others were searching for non-political ways to carve out a margin of freedom. The N.L.D. seemed to be more and more trapped in its own past. The most vibrant parts of Burmese society were not its aging political opposition but its young artists, journalists, humanitarian workers. What will they do now that the main vehicle of political expression is on the verge of dissolving?

As always, the regime has advanced its own short-term interest at the expense of the country it rules. The elections presented a chance for Burma to thaw its frozen relationship with most of the world, and to begin to resolve its own immense conflicts. However flawed, they offered some movement, some way out of a suffocating deadlock. The Obama Administration has been looking for alternatives to the sanctions and isolation that have been American policy toward Burma since 1990, and that have manifestly failed, seeking instead what it calls “pragmatic engagement.” This week, Asia Society released a report (I was a member of the task force) that analyzes the current political and economic landscape in Burma, and proposes how the U.S. might coördinate its policy with Burma’s neighbors in a way that could quickly take advantage of any openings from within the regime. Without giving the junta something for nothing, the report outlines a nuanced strategy over several stages that would mix pressures and incentives in a more flexible and pragmatic fashion than past American policy has allowed.

The launch of the report (including an event in New York on the morning of April 7th) has been overshadowed by the N.L.D.’s dramatic announcement. Once again, Burma and the world are moving in opposite directions. The U.S. might be ready to seek a compromise with the regime, but the regime is still doing what it does best: by its own brutal rigidity, forcing the opposition into a rigid and, perhaps, a self-defeating response.

The same old road to nowhere – Naw May Oo
Irrawaddy: Thu 1 Apr 2010

The 2008 Constitution and the upcoming election guarantee a continuation of Burma’s longest civil war, and the only hope for a peaceful Burma is to constitutionally accommodate ethnic diversity.Beginning with independence, Burma has a history of ignoring critical issues and interests. In 1947, Aung San and his Anti Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) tried to aggressively secure Burma’s national independence from the British by securing the ethnic minorities’ agreement to join a proposed Union of Burma.

As a result, the Panglong Agreement was signed designed to reward Burma with independence. The 1947 Constitution was drafted for an independent Burma and ratified in 1948. In theory, a federal union (Pyidaungsu) and a democratic government was established.

The newly independent Burma, however, was understandably fragile. First, the young country was not prepared to implement democratic principles. Second, the promised democratic union never came to be, and the ethnic groups who agreed to join the non-existent union rebelled.

A decade of constitutionalism and electoralism gave way to the first military coup d’état in 1958 and then to the more permanent military takeover in 1962.

A careful look into the handling of the ethnic discontent would indicate that the government deliberately avoided constitutional discussion which might have helped to reach a peaceful resolution. Instead, the fledgling parliamentary democracy regime turned to the army (Tatmadaw) for help in quelling perceived threats from ethnic groups.

A second Constitution (1974) was ratified to affirm the first military coup of 1962, through which the military government transformed itself to civilian rule by adopting the “Burmese Way of Socialism.” The Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) ruled until the demise of the party in 1988. Now, the third Constitution (2008) paves the way to affirm the second military rule, planning to transform itself to a civilian government through upcoming elections.

What will be the outcome of the 2008 Constitution and attempts to transform the ruling military leadership into a civilian government? While we cannot say for certain, we can point to distinctions between this constitution and prior constitutional efforts. We also can identify key issues, which may present challenges and obstacles for the future based on Burma’s past.

There are substantive differences between the 1947 Constitution and the 2008 Constitution. But, there are also striking similarities between the two documents.

The 1947 and 1974 Constitutions

An inadequate basis for federalism in a multi-ethnic society is one of the factors contributing to the failure of democracy. The government’s consistent refusal to address the question of ethnic diversity constitutionally is the fundamental root-cause of the ongoing civil war in the country.

Generally speaking, ethnic discontent began with the broken promises following the drafting of new constitution in 1947. Minorities joined or agreed to join Pyidaungsu (the Union) based upon the premise that all members of the Union would adhere to the federal principles and thus enjoy full-membership in the Union. Although the word “federal” never appeared in either of the Constitutions, both documents mentioned repeatedly the equivalent Burmese word “Pyidaungsu.”

Some said that the 1947 Constitution established a federal framework by establishing a bicameral national legislature and provisions that spelled out minority rights. The territories of four ethnic groups, the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Kachin, were recognized and each was designated a separate state in the Constitution but with unequal status. For example, while Shan State and Karenni State were constitutionally granted the right to secession, while the other states were not. Moreover, spelling out the right to secession in the Constitution is operationally meaningless.

The 1974 Constitution continued to term Burma as Pyidaungsu or the Union. Some analysts say it also provided a federal theory. For example, ministerial Burma was divided into seven states and seven divisions with little real power and autonomy. But, the same Constitution provided for a unicameral legislature and centralized all powers even further and entrenched the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as the only legal political party in the country.

The same constitution continued to recognize the Burmese language the only official language, and prohibited the teaching, publishing and printing of any other ethnic languages by law.

The 2008 Constitution

It is normal to expect that the constitution would address the problems of democratization and the recognition of Burma’s ethnic and linguistic plurality, principally by engaging these stakeholders in a dialogue regarding reconciliation. The general understanding is that most civil, armed or unarmed, disputes are about 1) the structure of the state, 2) control over natural resources, and 3) the question of groups’ right to self-determination, or some combination thereof.

These issues are most commonly matters necessarily dealt with in a constitution and constitutional laws governing a country. It is then natural to expect that the coming into effect of a new constitution can mean the end of civil (often armed) conflict. And, a constitution producing this sort of result ought to be comprised of the negotiations and debates between the stakeholders.

However, such a dialogue and collaborative process were largely forsaken by the current regime. The constitutional drafters failed to actively involve the participation of the people governed, throughout the process of deciding and drafting the Constitution. on the contrary, the upcoming 2010 election appears only to affirm two things: first, the hegemony of Burma’s Armed Forces and second, the guaranteed continuation of the current civil war.

The 2008 Constitution acknowledges the multi-ethnic character of Burma. The constitution gives token significance to the separation of power between the branches of government, spheres of government and the military but practically provides little to no mechanism in which this division can occur.

Constitutional law experts observe that the sub-national governments at states and local levels have very little effective powers and almost no self-government as they are subordinated to the Pyidaungsu legislature and especially to the executive. In effect, regardless of the repetitious use of the term Pyidaungsu or the Union, Burma is by no means a federal state under 2008 Constitution.

What should bother all citizens most, regardless of their ethnicity, is the way in which the 2008 Constitution addresses civil rights. The way rights are formulated and the limitations placed upon them are even more problematic. The people of Burma will, if at all, enjoy their most fundamental human rights at the pity of the regime.

The Upcoming Election

Will this attempt at legalizing elections and forsaking the question of minorities succeed? Or will Burma continue to repeat the well-established patterns of its past? The Burmese military regime is moving forward with a plan to legitimize and solidify military rule.

The recent election law released by the Burmese regime is shocking to many, given the regime’s persistent rejection of concerns of the people of Burma and the global community.

As for Burmese expatriates, experience tells us that the military has repeatedly used elections and the constitution as a platform to shepherd in new military leadership under the guise of reform.

As for ethnic minorities, we sense the impact of an unfolding political fiasco. We are haunted by the ghost of our country’s history. Twenty years after staging the coup, the Burmese military once again launched another reform effort through the 2008 Constitution. Bold public proclamations declare the government will now transform itself to a civilian government via an election in 2010. Once again will this be a shuffling of rank, responsibility and fiefdoms?

Burma is at a crossroads, the country could advance, or fall back into the well established pattern of military rule and human rights abuses. How the United States and the United Nations respond to the upcoming election and the Burmese regime could probably impact the course of the election, the Burmese Constitution, and set a precedent for the rest of the world.

The actions taken by the Burmese regime are simply a repeat and repackaging of old tactics and without a new approach, the country could easily fall back into its historic conflict patterns and civil war.

* Naw May Oo is a doctoral student writing her dissertation on constitutional design and federalism for post conflict states with a concentration on Burma at Indiana University Maurer School of Law and a fellow at the Center for Constitutional Democracy.

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From: raihana.diani@...
Date: Thu Apr 8, 2010 7:32 am
Subject: Re: [ReadingRoom] News on Burma - 8/4/10

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FYI
The earthquake 7,2 SR happened again in Aceh yesterday..

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Date: Thu, 08 Apr 2010 14:23:57
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Subject: [justpeaceinasia] [ReadingRoom] News on Burma - 8/4/10

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From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Date: Fri Apr 23, 2010 10:02 am
Subject: [ReadingRoom] News on Burma - 23/4/10

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Burma’s hip-hop resistance spreads message of freedom
NLD Youth rolls out human rights aims
Khin Maung Swe may run solo after May 6
Wa hosts allies for security talks
Saboi Jum brothers want KIO to accept BGF
India eyes $5.6bn Burma hydropower deal
Sanctions will force Burmese junta to negotiate
Succession strategy
Final days at NLD Party headquarters
NHPC May Build Power Projects in Myanmar
Junta raking candidate backgrounds
KIO holds militia courses ahead of army deadline
Refugees in Burma, Malaysia and Thailand: Rescue for Rohingya
Burma’s ‘forgotten’ Chin people suffer abuse
Leading parties stay away from election
Ethnic group in Myanmar gears up for war, peace
BGF impasse explained to people by Kachin leaders
Elections without rights
Burmese music: Sound of the underground
The UN singles out big oil in Burma, with good reason
Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis in Bangladesh
Weekly business roundup

Burma’s hip-hop resistance spreads message of freedom – Jack Davies
Guardian (UK): Thu 22 Apr 2010

Thxa Soe’s music gives country’s youth a focus for dissatisfaction with the junta despite strict censorship
Taunggyi, Shan state – Burmese hip-hop artist performs in Yangon. ‘Some people in government like me, some people hate me.’

Burmese hip-hop artist performs in Yangon. ‘Some people in government like me, some people hate me.’ Photograph: New York Times/Redux/eyevine

They know every word. Boys, bare-chested and sweating in the April heat. Girls clutching digital cameras, their faces streaked with paste to protect them from the sun. They answer the call-and-response lines with increasing excitement. By the time Thxa Soe reaches the chorus, the crowd have taken over. With fists pumping the air, they roar his words back at him.

This is a summer music festival, soaked in alcohol and drenched in sweat, the same as anywhere. But this is Burma, and nothing is the same here.

The barricades keeping the audience from the stage are ordinarily used to control rioters. They are ringed with razor wire. At the very front of the crowd, two novice monks, wrapped in the maroon robes that have come to symbolise defiance in Burma, dance and play air guitar. And everywhere, the Tatmadaw – Burmese military officers – armed and helmeted, watch over all.

Everything is watched in Burma, everything is scrutinised, and everything is controlled. Books cannot be published without government approval, song lyrics are vetted by a censorship board for anti-government sentiment before they can be recorded. Anything even vaguely critical of the ruling military junta is swiftly outlawed, any attempt to circumvent the regime brutally repressed.

But an imported art form – hip-hop – is providing a subterranean vehicle for quiet, yet significant, dissent among Burmese youth.

Burma has a history of revolutionary music. Traditional protest songs, known as thangyat, were once used to air grievances, both small, against neighbours, and large, against authority. Following the 1988 student uprising, however, the music was banned outright by the ruling military junta.

But hip-hop’s fluid lyrics wrapped in rhymes and youthful argot make it a perfect modern format for subtly spreading an anti-authoritarian message.

Thxa Soe is one of Burma’s leading hip-hop stars, and one of its most outspoken. He first heard hip-hop as a student at the SAE Institute in London, instantly admiring the quicksilver rhymes and daring lyrics of Dr Dre and Snoop Dogg.

But he also had an interest in the traditional music of his homeland, and began researching the hundreds of documents held in the UK. “In the British Library, I discovered these traditional songs, [with] original Burmese-language lyrics, that nobody had performed for hundreds of years. They were taken from Burma in the 1780s. Many songs that people had never heard.”

He began combining the two art forms, meshing the ancient melodies with computer-generated beats, and near-forgotten Burmese-language words with his own modern lyrics.

“I like, and people like, the freedom of hip-hop. There is not much freedom in rock, but in hip-hop you have freedom to express, express your ideas. And this is our hip-hop, for Burmese.

“I have too many words, not only me, too many teenagers have too much to say. Because our country is a very closed country, and the older people have a closed mind, a concentrated mind.”

The Burmese people have been promised elections this year, the first in two decades. No one at this concert has ever cast a ballot. But even before a date has been set, the poll has been written off by the international community as a sham. The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy, which won 80% of seats in the last election in 1990 but was never allowed to take office, will not contest it.

It opposes new election rules laid down by the junta which forbid the participation of its leader, the Nobel peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, because she is serving a prison term. Aung San Suu Kyi has spent 15 of the past 21 years under house arrest, put there by the same military generals now legislating to keep her from taking part.

There will be no campaign in Burma this year, no discussion of policies, opposition and government, and no international oversight to ensure the polls are “free and fair”.

More than 2,000 political prisoners remain in Burmese jails, and rebel armies in several eastern provinces, including in this state, the Shan, run a fierce resistance against the military’s brutal rule.

“The election will not bring democracy,” the Guardian hears more than once in Taunggyi. But through music, there is opportunity for expression.

Meeting foreign journalists is dangerous, so Thxa Soe speaks to the Guardian several days after the concert at a house 500km south, in Burma’s capital, Rangoon.

The 29-year-old flew under the junta’s radar with his first album, but he is now a victim of its success. Its popularity has meant he is closely watched by the government censors.

Outright criticism of the government is forbidden, but he skates close to the edge of what is acceptable in the junta’s eyes, and his songs are regularly banned.

On a recent album, fully three-quarters of the tracks were forbidden, fearful of reprisals from the junta, fled Burma.

“[I said to him:] ‘Hey man, you can’t be paranoid, but you don’t want to face [this] kind of problems, you need to get out from this country.’ So he decided he want to get out, so I helped him go to America.”

But even the seemingly anodyne can land musicians in trouble in Burma. One of Thxa’s songs recently banned had as its only lyrics: “Hey hey, how are you?”

Famously paranoid, tThe Burmese government is undoubtedly aware its young people are pushing the boundaries of what it will tolerate.

The regime’s mouthpiece, state-run newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar, regularly rails against foreign art forms and entertainment.

Police regularly seize from street vendors bootleg copies of albums and live performances they have banned, but, cheap and quick to reproduce, they are never off the streets long.

Thxa Soe says he has chosen to stay in Burma, despite the risks, because he sees his voice as important in his homeland. “It is very difficult being a musician in Myanmar. You are not free. You are always being watched, for what you say, and you are being told what you can say and what you cannot. [But] I believe music can change a country, not only our country, but the whole world.”

And there are others in Burma finding an outlet for dissent in music. A group known as Generation Wave, its exact membership unknown, secretly records and distributes anti-government albums across the country, dropping them at the tea shops that are the social hubs for Burma’s underground political network.

They write songs such as Wake Up, a call for young people to join the pro-democracy movement, and Khwin Pyu Dot May (Please Excuse Me), the story of a young man asking his mother’s permission to join the struggle.

Most of its members keep their identities a secret, after high-profile member Zayar Thaw was jailed for six years for forming an illegal organisation.

But the threat of prison has not stopped Burma’s young flocking to the group, as fans and as members.

“We welcome young people to participate in our movement against the regime,” a performer known only as YG says. “Our songs honour mothers and revolutionists. We want young people to be active and interested in politics. Every youngster can be an activist.”

As the grinning teenagers leave the Taunggyi concert, steam rising from their sweat-soaked bodies in the now cool midnight mountain air, a young man yells out to the Guardian Thxa Soe’s banned song lyric: “Hey, hey, how are you?”

Innocent enough, but in Burma, everything has meaning.
Censored by the state

Thxa Soe’s record with Burma’s notorious censorship board, run by the ruling military junta, is patchy. On his most recent album, nine of 12 songs were banned.

One song titled Hey, We Have No Money was allowed but another, Water, Electricity, Please Come Back, an obvious comment on Rangoon’s inconsistent power supply, was forbidden.

The titles of Thxa Soe’s albums – Blend Of Music, Mix Or Don’t Mix If You Want To – reflect his musical style, which combines traditional Burmese songs and lyrics with hip hop-style beats and words.

He has been criticised by the censorship board for “ruining” traditional Myanmar music, and the Myanmar Theatre Association has forbidden musicians in traditional orchestras from using their instruments to play contemporary music.

NLD Youth rolls out human rights aims – Khai Suu
Mizzima News: Thu 22 Apr 2010

New Delhi – Human rights issues will be the focus of National League for Democracy (Youth) activities once the party ceases to exist as a legal entity, a party spokesman said yesterday.
Electoral law provisions published last month by the military regime were causing the party to expire, – Rangoon Division Hlaing Tharyar Township National League for Democracy (NLD) Youth information department joint chief Khai Soe said.

“After the NLD took the decision not to stand for election, our party programmes and activities will be more clearly directed on human rights issues and activities … Because we think, under the 2008 constitution, the human rights situation will worsen before and after the election”, Khai Soe told Mizzima.

“I have experience in this issue as I am the former political prisoner. I fully comprehend the dangers that lie ahead … But we cannot be afraid …” he said. “We must face this situation and do what we should. We will work on these activities for the development of rights in Burma and to put our work back on a democratic track.”

The policy will be put to work within the legal framework by starting in Pegu, Irrawaddy and Magwe divisions, he said. Among the activities, the group will expose oppression by local authorities, land-grabbing, extrajudicial killings, forced recruitment of child soldiers and forced voting in the forthcoming elections.

“We will support the families of political prisoners by visiting their homes for counselling. And we will encourage them and discuss with them their right to choose whether or not to vote and that no force should be exerted. We will tell them to inform us when they experience these kinds of oppression and we will convey these violations to the people who deserved to be informed”, Khai Soe said.

He also said that he will start this activity alone but that he has many supporters. He has to fill the vacuum left by rights activist Suu Suu New, who is serving a prison sentence for her work.

Khai Soe was sentenced to a seven-year jail term in 1998 by the Insein Special Tribunal after being charged under sections 5(j) of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act and 17(1) of the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act.

(Section 5(j): to affect the morality or conduct of the public or a group of people in a way that would undermine the security of the Union or the restoration of law and order; Section 17(1): Whoever is member of an unlawful association, or takes part in meetings of any such association, or contributes or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of any such association, or in any way assists the operations of any such association, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term [which shall not be less two years and more than three years and shall also be liable to fine].)

After his release from prison, he has engaged in social work and became an NLD member in 2007. “I gave vocational training to children in abject poverty and school dropouts by finding donors. And also I provided training in hairdressing to young prostitutes who had been pushed into the flesh trade because of economic hardship and poverty. I organised them to get back on track,” he said.

Khin Maung Swe may run solo after May 6
Mizzima News: Thu 22 Apr 2010

New Delhi – Fissures in the National League for Democracy have deepened over the re-registration issue, with party Central Executive Committee member Khin Maung Swe leaning towards going it alone after the May 6 deadline for registration, when the group will cease to exist as a political entity.
Khin Maung Swe has however let it be known he would continue to be loyal to National League for Democracy (NLD) founder Aung San Suu Kyi and the party until the deadline. He is among the few leaders likely to form a party or contest as independents, yet they are averse to being branded disloyal to the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, analysts believe.

The main opposition party had unanimously chosen against re-registration with the Election Commission after deciding against contesting the polls. It had said its decision was based on its view that the electoral laws were “unjust and unfair”. Khin Maung Swe was among the few who disagreed with the party on the issue.

“I shall do nothing until the last date for registration, which is May 6 in keeping with my loyalty to both NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” he said.

May 6 is the last date for registration with the Election Commission in accordance with this year’s Political Parties Registration Law. Soon after Khin Maung Swe was publicly critical of the NLD over its decision not to run, a rumour spread that he would join the race anyway. He denied the claim, citing his indecision on the matter.

“It’s not true that I will contest the elections. I have not yet decided to contest as an individual. It is just speculation by some people. I have no intention to do anything for the time being for I am in a wait-and-see mode,” the NLD Information Department member and Central Executive Committee (CEC) member told Mizzima.

If political parties, which won in the 1990 general elections like the NLD, do not re-register with the commission, their legal status will automatically be void.

Fellow CEC member Dr. Than Nyein, Rangoon Division Vice-Chairman, who nurses a similar opinion on re-registration, also said he would continue to be loyal to the NLD until the cut-off date.

“We are members of NLD as long as NLD exists until May 6. We have not yet taken any decision on electoral issues,” he said.

But both declined to say what they would do after the May 6 deadline.

Wa hosts allies for security talks – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Thu 22 Apr 2010

As the junta’s deadline for the Border Guard Force (BGF) plan passes on Thursday, the largest of Burma’s armed ethnic groups, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has upward of 20,000 troops, met this week with its allies to discuss the potential threats they face in the near future, sources close to the groups told The Irrawaddy.
“The ethnic groups have learned a lesson from the failure of their Kokang allies, and are preparing a united front against any threats to the development and stability of their territories,” said a source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Since Naypyidaw first proposed transforming the various ethnic cease-fire groups into BGFs one year ago, groups such as the UWSA, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the Kokang army (officially called the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army), the Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army and the Shan State Army-North, have formed alliances with each other.

Following the Burmese army’s seizure of the Kokang headquarters in Laogai, near the Chinese border, in August last year, the cease-fire groups have reportedly pledged to stand alongside one another if one group is attacked.

The Burmese army knows that with the UWSA involved, any conflict with the ethnic groups could potentially involve a lengthy and bloody campaign. A couple of days before the deadline, the UWSA sent a letter to the junta saying it rejects the BGF proposal.

According to sources, the Wa leadership reportedly said in the letter that their stance had not changed since their previous letter to Naypyidaw on April 3. It also said that the Burmese regime, or any other party, is welcome in the Wa region if they want to help create development and stability. However, anyone who “seeks to destroy” the region’s peace and development would be considered an enemy, they said.

Contrary to Naypyidaw’s demands, the Wa leaders insisted that any BGF unit stationed in Wa territory must be headed by Wa commanders with Burmese army officers assigned to deputy commander positions. Furthermore, the UWSA proposed that general staff officers could be assigned from the Burmese army, but that all deputy staff officers must come from the UWSA. The Wa said it would allow six lower-ranking Burmese officers in each battalion, whereas the junta demanded 27 rank and file military personnel.

The junta rejected the Wa’s terms on April 9 during a meeting between Wa leaders and a government delegation led by Lt. Col. Than Htut Thein, who is a general staff officer in the Triangle Regional Military Command, according to The Shan Herald Agency for News, which monitors affairs in Shan State.

Saengjuen Sarawin of The Shan Herald Agency for News said that both the Wa and the Burmese army are preparing for conflict. He said the Burmese have reinforced troops and military facilities in northern and southern Shan State, while the UWSA has done similarly in their own territory.

Another major ethnic cease-fire group, the KIO, based in northernmost Burma, was due to hold BGF negotiations with government officials on Thursday in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State. Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein and the chief of the Military Affairs Security, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, who is the chief negotiator with the cease-fire groups, are scheduled to attend the meeting.

The KIO is yet to announce its acceptance or rejection of the BGF proposal. The group proposed that Kachin troops join a “Union Defense Forces,” in the “spirit of Panglong,” referring to a 1947 agreement that granted the Kachin and other ethnic groups full autonomy and internal administration of frontier areas.

Kachin sources said KIO associates in Myitkyina could face retaliatory measures after the deadline passes, noting that a Kachin official was recently arrested in Myitkyina because he traveled to his family home without travel documents.

Analysts have said the BGF issue is posing a dilemma for the Burmese army as the generals’ proposal has failed to bear fruit.

Meanwhile, Chinese premier Wen Jaibao postponed his trip to Burma, Brunei and Indonesia, from April 22 to 25, due to the deathly earthquake in northwestern Qinghai Province, according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site.

As the Chinese are traditionally and geographically close to the Wa, Beijing has repeatedly called for peaceful solutions on ethnic issues in Burma.

Saboi Jum brothers want KIO to accept BGF
Kachin News Group: Thu 22 Apr 2010

In what might lead to fresh fissures in the Kachin community, prominent peace mediators Rev. Dr. Saboi Jum and his younger brother Hkun Myat are seriously suggesting that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) accepts the Border Guard Force proposed by junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe.
The Saboi Jum brothers have told the KIO, the last remaining Kachin armed group refusing to accept the BGF that “It (BGF) is the key and the door can be opened by only a key”. It means the relation between the junta and the KIO will end if the latter rejects the BGF, said a KIO official in Laiza headquarters.

Saboi Jum and Hkun Myat attended the latest KIO’s public meeting explaining its stance and the “lack of positive result on BGF negotiations with the junta after 15 times”, in Laiza headquarters in east Kachin State on April 16. But the two brothers had to go back home in Myitkyina without getting a chance to talk to KIO leaders, said participants.

Earlier this month, three other Kachin leaders who sided with the junta were— Dr. Tu Ja, former Vice-president No. 2 of KIO, Zahkung Ting Ying leader of New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) transformed to BGF and Col. Lasang Awng Wa leader of KIO split Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group transformed to a militia group. They also suggested that the KIO accept BGF —or else it will have trouble in terms of existence.

Saboi Jum is the former general secretary of Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) and founder and director of Shalom Foundation (also called Nyein Foundation), one of the largest national NGOs in Burma. His brother Hkun Myat is a businessman.

The two brothers, a pastor and a businessman mediated in a big way and successfully helped sign a ceasefire agreement between the junta and the KIO on 24 February, 1994.

The 16 year-old ceasefire has not helped usher in democracy and ethnic Kachin rights, so criticism by Kachin people of the two brothers has only mounted. The criticism revolves around the duo creating personal wealth through business, given their proximity to the ruling junta. They are not for the Kachin people.

Saboi Jum was general secretary of KBC during 1993 to 2000 and Kachin Baptist followers expected him to be a saviour of the Kachin people. However he did not fulfill the Kachin people’s aspirations.

In 2007, Saboi Jum was pressured to join the signature campaign in an appeal letter to junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe to halt the Irrawaddy Myitsone dam project by the Kachin Nationals Consultative Assembly. But he refused to sign.

In December, last year, Saboi Jum visited Washington D.C and suggested to U.S. officials to withdraw the economic sanctions on Burma and support the junta’s general elections in 2010.

KIO delegates led by Chairman Lanyaw Zawng Hra will meet the junta’s Northern Regional Commander Maj-Gen Soe Win today in Myitkyina but the KIO will refrain from providing the junta-demanded answer— on whether it will accept the BGF, said KIO officials.

India eyes $5.6bn Burma hydropower deal – Joseph Allchin
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 22 Apr 2010

India’s state-owned National Hydro Power Company Limited (NHPC) will increase its investment in Burma to the tune of an extra $US5.6 billion as Burma aggressively expands its energy sector.
The head of the NHPC, S K Garg, told the Wall Street Journal the company was “inching towards Myanmar [Burma]. We have already sent our team to Myanmar for further survey and investigation for two projects.”

Little is known of the location of the projects, but the Wall Street Journal suggests that they could be two new 510-megawatt and 520-megawatt dams.

The NHPC already has a major presence in the country, primarily at the Tamanthi dam on the Chindwin river in Burma’s northern Sagaing division. The project has a capability of providing 1200 megawatts of electricity, 80 percent of which it is believed will go straight to India.

As of 2007, according to research by the Burma Rivers Network (BRN), over 380 families had been displaced by the Tamanthi dam and none had reportedly received compensation. It is estimated that the dam will eventually displace some 30,000 people in 35 different Kuki ethnic villages.

Sai Sai from BRN said that these people have absolutely no input or “right to participate” in the decision-making process for the dam, a fact that is clearly against the first recommendation of the World Commission on Dams: “Development needs and objectives should be clearly formulated through an open and participatory process, before various project options are identified,” it says.

Added to this, the Chindwin river is the only known habitat of the Burmese Roofed Turtle, a species that will be lost forever by the construction of the dam.

The Wall Street Journal further notes that within India “progress on hydroelectric power capacity addition has been slow due to environmental concerns and issues related to resettlement of people displaced because of the construction of dams”.

This would suggest a strong incentive for India investing in Burma’s hydropower sector, given BRN’s concerns about a lack of accountability in the process.

The Tamanthi dam is being constructed by the NHPC in collaboration with Swiss company Colenco Power Engineering Ltd. According to Garg, quoted in the Indian press, the NHPC is also involved in the 642-megawatt Shwezaye dam.

BRN believes that construction of the Tamanthi dam had been suspended after it began in 2007, suggesting that renewed investment of the sort mentioned by Garg may be needed to finish it, although at present details are not available.

It is believed however that consultants had been engaged by NHPC, but their findings had not yet been put to the government in Naypyidaw.

China is without doubt the leading investor in Burma’s hydropower sector, with numerous projects on rivers across the country, many of which have attracted international controversy and condemnation.

The drying of the Mekong river is partly blamed on Chinese dam construction, whilst Kachin organisations and individuals have strongly petitioned against forthcoming dam projects on the Irrawaddy river, including the Myitsone dam.

Sanctions will force Burmese junta to negotiate – Eva Sundari
Sydney Morning Herald: Thu 22 Apr 2010

The past 20 years has seen massive foreign investments in Burma and a policy of unconditional engagement pursued by neighbouring countries, including my own, Indonesia. This practice of unprincipled engagement, which ASEAN has been guilty of, has failed to bring positive change to my Burmese neighbours who show so much courage and hope.
The benefits of foreign investment and trade have not reached the ordinary people of Burma. Instead poverty has increased and health spending has fallen, while the human rights crisis has peaked and so has sexual violence, torture and murder of women by military forces armed with newer weapons. Burma’s humanitarian crisis continues to worsen with tragic consequences. One in 10 children die before their fifth birthday, a figure that doubles in eastern Burma where the military is attacking civilians. Children are still being forcibly recruited into the armed forces despite the regime’s pledges to stop. The cost of unconditional engagement has also implicated Indonesia and ASEAN in the tragedy of the Rohingya boatpeople. There has not been one single political democratic reform, and it is unlikely that Burma’s scheduled 2010 election will bring about any significant change.

Income from foreign investment projects enables the military dictatorship to continue abusing human rights. These abuses, including slavery, torture, extrajudicial executions, rape, forced displacement have been well documented across Burma. The International Labour Organisations and International Tribunal into Crimes against Women in Burma have both named Burma’s oil and gas industry as being linked to human rights violations.

Foreign trade and investment channels money to the military, who continue their brutal repression, and to individual generals to shore up their own financial situations and security. This leaves no reason to engage with anyone who advocates for political change; foreign investment in Burma brings no one to the negotiating table.

Last year we saw Aung San Suu Kyi successfully use existing sanctions as leverage to enter into talks with Burma’s junta for the first time in nearly two years and to meet diplomats from the US, UK and Australia for the first time in six years.

Despite what has been reported in the media, Suu Kyi has not indicated any drastic change to her position on sanctions nor has she called for the lifting of existing sanctions. Not unless, of course one would think, if the regime themselves show concessions in the lifting of its arbitrary control over laws, land and citizens.

New targeted trade and investment sanctions, especially if they include Burma’s oil and gas industry, will strengthen Suu Kyi’s and Burma’s democracy movements bargaining position.

In addition to providing Suu Kyi with more leverage, new targeted trade and investment sanctions will play a role in:

Protecting national resources, such as oil and gas reserves, from being exploited by the military junta for their sole benefit.
Preventing human rights violations from occurring along project sites and by denying the military regime billions in revenues; and
Ensuring foreign companies are not complicit in or linked to the violation of human rights abuses in Burma.

A multilateral approach to sanctions against Burma already exists. The US, EU and Canada have adopted trade and investment sanctions and private companies and individuals have voluntarily enacted sanctions. The introduction of targeted trade and investments sanctions by individual countries would strengthen this multilateral approach. This is especially important given the direct channel of oil and gas profits into the military’s pockets, an industry that Australia’s Twinza Oil is beginning to invest in.

ASEAN has had to accept our responsibility for Burma’s crisis, because we continue to contribute to the military junta’s political and economic strength. By not using all available tools to bring about change in Burma, such as imposing targeted trade and investment sanctions, other nations are doing the same, and thus must join ASEAN in assuming blame for the situation in Burma.

Australia has a strong reputation as a defender of democracy and regional security. This reputation may be in jeopardy, should the necessary steps to stop Australian companies funding human rights abuses in Burma not be taken. This year is going to be a defining one for Burma. Let us work together to send a clear message to the military junta, ASEAN governments, the international community and to our brave neighbours, in the form of Burma’s multi-ethnic community who are united in calls for democracy, that Australia is committed to pinpointing pressure in order to bring key players to the negotiating table.

* Eva Sundari is a Member of Parliament in Indonesia and a member of Indonesia Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP). She is ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus regional vice-president and Indonesia’s National Burma Caucus chairwoman.

Succession strategy – Ashley South
The World Today (UK): Thu 22 Apr 2010

The Burmese people are probably about to get their first chance to vote in twenty years. Things did not go well last time; the military prevented the winners taking power. Now, new groups are emerging to try to take advantage of the limited opportunities on offer.
The Burmese military government issued five laws on March 8, providing a framework for elections which are likely to be held later this year. While a number of opposition activists and politicians will boycott the polls, others are preparing to participate in the first opportunity to vote since 1990.

The elections are the brainchild of junta supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, and represent his ‘succession strategy’ – a way of easing himself out of the day-to-day running of the country, while ensuring that no single person can consolidate power, and represent a threat to his continued pre-eminence behind-the-scenes. The polls could still be cancelled, if Than Shwe and his inner grouping feel they are losing control of the process. In this scenario, the most likely pretext would be to fabricate some kind of national emergency, perhaps by provoking a resumption of conflict with armed ethnic groups, most of which have agreed ceasefires with the military government over the past twenty years.

Assuming that they do go ahead, the elections are likely to result in a consolidation and legitimisation of continued military control in Burma/Myanmar. For this reason, many opposition activists are opposed to the process. These include Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy (NLD), won the last elections in 1990, only to be denied the opportunity of forming a government by the military. The NLD has recently announced it will not register to contest the elections.

However, some non-military-controlled actors, including groups which are outright opposed to the government, are nevertheless preparing to participate. These include representatives of Burma’s ethnic nationality – or minority – communities, which make up about a third of the population.

ANY CHANGE WILL HELP

Why are independent candidates interested in contesting the polls? Not because of any great enthusiasmfor the process, which will be tightly controlled by themilitary regime, but rather
because they see little alternative but to go along with the government’s plans, and in some cases, even glimpse a few potential opportunities. The elections are likely to result in the creation of more political space; a relative concept in such a repressive country. Certainly, they will introduce opportunities for a broader range of economic actors to make their interests felt, including many closely associated with the military.

To many activists and observers, any change is better than the status quo; constitutional
rule-of-law, however problematic, being preferable to continued rule by military fiat. Indeed, to the extent that the elections are Than Shwe’s ‘exit strategy’, many proponents of change in Burma argue that the process should be encouraged.

Most observers of the Burmese political scene are familiar with two main branches of the opposition: the urban-based, pro-democracy movement, led by Suu Kyi, who has spent most of the last two decades under house arrest; and a loose alliance of ethnicnationalist insurgents, who once operated across large swathes of the country, but in recent years have been restricted to a few jungle enclaves along the Thai border. The Burma Army continues its brutal counter-insurgency campaigns in these border areas, which have displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians.

THIRD FORCES

There are however, other important sectors of the political scene. These include armed ethnic ceasefire groups which have ended outright hostilities with the central government, and political elites who have not taken up arms, but rather seek to work for change from within military-controlledMyanmar. Among the former, probably the best prepared are Kachin nationalists, including a number of senior officials recently retired from the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) – which agreed a ceasefire in 1994 – who are preparing to compete in the polls through a new vehicle, the Kachin State Progressive Party.

This group is likely to appeal to large numbers of the Kachin population in northern Burma. However, it may yet be denied the chance, if the military government insists on trying to bring the armed wings of the KIO and other ceasefire groups under the direct control of the Burmese army, before the election. Such a development might be designed to provide a resumption of armed conflict – not just in Kachin State, but in other restive border areas.

Another interesting set of alliances is emerging in the Karen ethnic community. Two Karen parties are likely to participate in the elections, one in Karen State, adjoining Thailand, and another in the old capital of Rangoon, and further to the west, in the Irrawaddy Delta, including areas affected by
Cyclone Nargis two years ago. The latter party will attempt to appeal beyond a purely Karen constituency, to members of other ethnic groups, including Burmans, whose villages are often interspersed with those of the Karen. An important set of emergent players is associated with the ‘third force’ in Burmese politics, which is seeking to mobilise support primarily among the Burman majority.

This mostly civilian network is positioning itself as an alternative to military-backed parties, which is nevertheless independent of the NLD and its ‘politics of dissent’. After sixty years of armed ethnic conflict, the elections are a rare opportunity for ethnic nationalist and other elite groupings to outline their political objectives, and compete on the national political stage. Having said this, most ethnic parties are focusing on winning seats in provincial legislatures, rather than the two national-level assemblies. They are hoping to gain enough seats to leverage at least some concessions on the issues which have structured ethnic and state-society conflict for over half a century.

In particular, ethnic nationalist politicians hope to begin using minority languages in schools and local government departments, in areas where their populations live, and to have some say over the proceeds of natural resource extraction, and the use of government funds.

They also hope to promote the creation of greater political ‘space’, within which civil society-based approaches to community development can flourish, and provide a vehicle for long-term, bottom-up democratisation. The main risk of participation in the elections is that this will legitimise the process, and support the consolidation of militarised rule.

Those taking part may also undermine their own standing in disgruntled ethnic communities. Their attempts to promote incremental change in this way are therefore quite principled, and in many cases decidedly brave.

INTERNATIONAL AGEMDAS

Regarding the international aspect of the elections, the China angle is of considerable importance. Burma’s giant neighbour to the north is its main geo-strategic patron.
It offers cover for the generals’ misrule and human rights abuses – for example
in the United Nations Security Council – in exchange for access to the country’s natural
resources. Less influential, but still of some note, are the various Association
of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries which border Burma to the south
and east, and are looking for stability and investment opportunities.

Despite – or perhaps, even because of – the lofty rhetoric of western actors, European and North American countries have very little influence on the political situation. Regardless of whether the British or United States governments – or the European Union – like it or not, the elections
will take place, and if they do not, this will not be because of western pressure. To think otherwise is to misunderstand the nature of Burmese politics, in an era of declining western influence globally.

Those inside the country seeking to participate in the elections, are hoping to make the best of a poor set of options. They are surely better placed than exiled politicians and their sympathisers to judge the opportunities and constraints locally.

* Ashley South is an independent writer and consultant, specializing in politics and humanitarian issues in Burma/Myanmar and Southeast Asia.

Final days at NLD Party headquarters – Kyi Wai
Irrawaddy: Wed 21 Apr 2010

RANGOON—The red and white sign in front of Burma’s main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), headquarters in Rangoon will disappear in the next 15 days.As a political party, the NLD gained the support of many people from different walks of life for more than 20 years. However, the party will be dissolved in May because of its decision on March 29 not to register as a political party and compete in the election this year.

For now, the ground floor of the headquarters is as lively and busy as before. Tables are occupied by members. Some have come to the office regularly for 20 years, working without a salary. Some of the workers have been imprisoned by the regime only to return upon their release.

A skinny young man and woman said they were waiting for Phyu Phyu Thin, an NLD member who works with HIV/AIDs and TB patients, providing medicine and shelter.

An man from Arakan State who has provided money to help support political prisoners is working at one of the tables. He said the wife of a political prisoner recently asked him if the NLD would continue to provide assistance to political prisoners.

“I had to tell her that I still didn’t know, since we haven’t said anything about it yet,” said the man.

The party has contributed 5,000 to 8,000 kyat (about US $5-8) to each political prisoner every month for 10 years. Currently, there are more than 2,100 political prisoners in prisons throughout the country.

Other current party activities include cleaning water wells damaged by Cyclone Nargis in areas where people still have difficulty finding access to drinkable water. Such projects will be harder to undertake in the future, he said.

“But despite the dissolution of our party, we will continue in our struggle for democracy and there will be political activities,” he said.

In the office, members also work on such issues as how to keep office equipment, records and other assets belonging to the party. In the future, said one member, it will be difficult for a group of former members to meet together.

“Even if the NLD existed as a legal political party, we could be arrested. So, if there’s no NLD and we meet somewhere even for social purposes, do you think we can avoid being harassed? How are we going to meet?” said a member from Mandalay Division.

A MP-elect from Pegu Division in the 1990 election said military intelligence officers constantly pressured him and others to resign from the NLD, saying that they would be paid as much as 10 million kyat (about $10,000).

He said that MP-elects in Pegu Division refused the offer, saying “We won’t leave the NLD, you can jail us,” and many ended up in prison or what the regime called “government guesthouses.”

He said many MP-elects were able to focus on politics only because of the support from their family.

“My wife has taken care of my family throughout my time in politics,” he said. “She is not in favor of the NLD’s dissolution.”

MP-elect Sein Hla Oo said during the NLD meeting on March 29 that if the party was dissolved, he would feel as if half of his heart was taken away.

“I am not happy with the fact that our decision will lead to the end of our organization,” said Tin Oo, the NLD vice chairman. “On the other hand, I am proud of others and myself for making such a dignified decision.”

Quoting Aung San Suu Kyi, who said the NLD would not be destroyed even if it was dissolved, he said it would continue its activities and struggle for democracy.

Veteran NLD leader Win Tin also said that the party has a future.

“Some say the NLD may become an underground organization if it doesn’t re-register,” he said. “We will continue our activities in peaceful and non-violent ways.”

In a letter to the public, the party affirmed that under the leadership of Suu Kyi it would continue its aims and objectives.

It’s clear the party’s social work will go on.

“We have decided to offer food to monks in front of our office until May 4,” said Dr. May Win Myint, a leader of the NLD women’s wing. “We will continue to do so after that, but it may not be here.”

“We also think about the continuation of our prayer every Tuesday for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners,” she said.

NHPC May Build Power Projects in Myanmar – Eric Yep
Wall Street Journal: Wed 21 Apr 2010

Mumbai — India’s state-run NHPC Ltd. is considering building two hydroelectric power projects in Myanmar at an investment of 250 billion rupees ($5.6 billion) as it seeks to expand, its chairman said Wednesday.“We are inching towards Myanmar. We have already sent our team to Myanmar for further survey and investigation for two projects,” S.K. Garg told reporters on the sidelines of an industry conference.

NHPC has been looking at neighboring countries for expansion partly because of slow progress in projects in India. The company, which raised 40 billion rupees ($899 million) through its initial public offering last year, is also planning to set up power projects in Bhutan.

The hydroelectric power producer has an installed generation capacity of 5,175 megawatts, accounting for a little more than 3% of India’s total generation capacity from all fuel sources. India has an estimated hydroelectric potential of 148,701 MW, junior Power Minister Bharatsinh Solanki told Parliament in December.

However, progress on hydroelectric power capacity addition has been slow due to environmental concerns and issues related to resettlement of people displaced because of the construction of dams. Mr. Solanki said in December that 15 hydroelectric projects that could add more than 12,000 megawatt capacity were awaiting environment and forest-related approvals.

Mr. Garg said also that NHPC is looking to build a 510 MW plant and another project with a capacity of 520 MW in Myanmar. NHPC is yet to decide on whether it will tie up with any other company for the projects, he said.

The company aims to produce 18 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in the financial year that started April 1. It produced 17 billion KWh in the previous year, lower than the targeted 17.2 billion KWh, Mr. Garg said.

Junta raking candidate backgrounds – Ahunt Phone Myat
Democratic Voice of Burma: Tue 20 Apr 2010

Burmese authorities are reportedly collecting information on the backgrounds of candidates looking to contest elections this year, the head of a registered party has said.The 19 parties that have so far registered for Burma’s first elections in 20 years, rumoured to be in October, are yet to receive an approval.

But, according to Aye Lwin, chairperson of the Union of Myanmar Federation of National Politics (UMFNP), one of the more prominent parties looking to run this year, the group learnt recently that checks were being carried out on the histories of party members.

“[The authorities] are officially collecting background information on about 27 or 28 [Central Executive Committee candidates],” he said. Fifteen of those belong to the UMFNP, while the rest are members of the closely-allied 88 Generation Students (Union of Myanmar), a party led by his younger brother, Ye Htun.

Aye Lwin, known to have close ties with the ruling junta, was a student activist in the 1988 uprising against military rule before switching sides and campaigning against international sanctions on Burma.

The deadline for parties to register expires in the second week of May. Ohn Lwin, communications officer for the National Political Alliances, speculated that the approvals would be given by the Election Commission (EC) once the deadline is up.

“It is likely that the [EC] is waiting until they get [applications] from everyone,” he said. “We are waiting to be informed and will not yet start our [campaign] activities, such as releasing statements; we are worried that we will be seen as crossing boundaries if we start now.”

Out of the 19 parties registered, 16 have been formed in the past few months. The majority of these are either outwardly pro-junta or part of the so-called ‘third force’ in Burmese politics that are allied to neither incumbent nor opposition.

It is unclear what role these parties will play in a post-election Burma: observers have said that the polls are little more than a show of legitimacy for the ruling junta, which will continue its hold on power under the guise of a civilian government.

One of the registered parties, the Kachin State Progressive Party, is comprised of members of three Kachin ceasefire groups, including the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO).

The KIO is now at loggerheads with the ruling junta following its refusal to transform into a Border Guard Force (BFG), and military analysts have warned that fighting may break out.

The BGF issue is seen as a means for the junta to shore up support and bolster its army size in the run-up to elections, with border units ostensibly coming under the command of Naypyidaw.

KIO holds militia courses ahead of army deadline – Phanida
Mizzima News: Tue 20 Apr 2010

Chiang Mai– Kachin Independence Organisation troops are providing military training to people from the ethnic minority after the group refused to join the Burma Army’s Border Guard Force, local residents and group officers said.This compulsory training will start today and will last 18 days. It will be attended by former Kachin Independence Army (KIA) soldiers from the KIO Third Brigade based in Mai Jayan and nearby villages, along with the persons who had already attended similar military trainings in the past.

A Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) officer said the training includes courses on self-defence, basic military tactics and small arms. “We train them how to shoot a gun, how to take cover and how to avoid being shot”, he said.

A local resident from Mai Jayan said more than 100 people were attending the courses and trainees’ were aged in their 40s to more than 50. “The training started today at the school in Mai Jayan”, he said.

Training will also be held at Inn Bapa village, where the KIA First Battalion under the command of the Third Brigade is based, 32 kilometres east of Mai Jayan. A witness said one person from each household was being collected as a trainee.

Similar short-term courses military training have been conducted in villages in Sadone Village tract, Wai Maw Township, east of Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State.

KIO departmental staff had attended such training in Laiza in August last year.

Junta Military Affairs Security Chief Lieutenant General Ye Myint gave tomorrow as the deadline for the KIO to reply on whether it would bring its troops into line with the Border Guard Force.

According to a KIO Central Committee member, its nine-member delegation led by chairman Zau Hara will leave Laiza this evening to meet the junta’s Northern Command chief Soe Win on Thursday in Myitkyina.

The KIO’s vice-chief of staff, Major General Guan Mau, and General Secretary Dr. Laja held a debriefing on April 16 this month at Manau ground in Laiza, with 2,500 participants comprising Kachin people and staff of grass-roots groups. The group’s leaders explained its stance on the ceasefire period and the border force issue.

They said the group would reject the junta’s offer to join the force and that the group would like to join the Federal Army as Kachin Battalions, another KIO central committee member, who asked not to be named, said.

In a meeting held on April 4 at Northern Command headquarters in Myitkyina, the KIO had presented that position, but Lieutenant General Ye Myint refused the offer.

A day after the debriefing session, a series of bombs exploded at Myitsone hydropower dam project site. KIO has denied involvement.

Refugees in Burma, Malaysia and Thailand: Rescue for Rohingya – Brad Blitz
The World Today (UK): Tue 20 Apr 2010

For months monitors have reported on the crackdown against stateless Rohingya refugees in south eastern Bangladesh and allegations that the Thai Navy is pushing back boatloads of them in the Andaman Sea. As Burma, Bangladesh and Thailand all gear up for elections, these practices seem more common. One fear is that anticipated changes in Burma following polling there will send more unwanted Muslim migrants to seek refuge in neighbouring states.In March, physicians for human rights documented the effects of overcrowding, denial of access to food, health, and work among Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The Thai newspaper Phuketwan reported the disappearance of boats filled with Rohingya following naval activity near Phuket and suggested they had been intercepted and set adrift by the Thai Navy. Then, CNN and other media published claims that 92 Rohingya boatpeople had been chased out of Thai waters, only to wash up in Malaysia where they were detained.

Approximately 725,000 Rohingya are concentrated in North Arakan, also known as Rakhine state, a region of Burma that borders Bangladesh. No country will accept them as citizens, and they have suffered rape, forced labour and killings. Several hundred thousand have fled to Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, and elsewhere in South Asia where they have received only very limited protection from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Hundreds of thousands were expelled in the 1960s by the military-socialist regime of General Ne Win during the Burmese Way to Socialism nationalisation programme. Subsequent expulsions include the murderous ethnic cleansing campaign Operation Dragon King (Naga Min), which drove more than two hundred thousand Rohingya into Bangladesh in 1978, where an estimated ten thousand died from starvation and disease.

The source of the latest tragedy lies in the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya in Burma by a 1982 Citizenship Law which legalised their exclusion. Denied citizenship inside Burma, further discriminatory policies and an increasingly brutal regime, precipitated a series of refugee crises.

In 1991, the Burmese army expelled more than 250,000 Rohingya, destroying villages and buildings on its way, and forcing them into towns in southern Bangladesh, primarily around Teknaf and Cox’s Bazar. Three decades later, the Bangladeshi response has hardened with the government accused of withholding food aid, frustrating NGO access to camps, and with the exception of a small minority of Rohingya, generally refusing to recognise their rights as refugees.

THREAT OF REMOVAL

As documented by Physicians for Human Rights, thousands of Rohingya refugees are now crammed in squalid settlements and only two, Kutupalong and Nayapara in Cox’s Bazar district, have been designated by the government as official UNHCR assisted refugee camps where there is food, healthcare and education for the children. Just 29,000 of the estimated two hundred to four hundred thousand Rohingya in Bangladesh have been given refugee status. And this number of displaced people is growing as new refugee movements continue, fuelled by systematic repression in Burma.

Arriving migrants face a challenging reception in Bangladesh. Denied access to UNHCR supported refugee camps because the authorities describe them as economic migrants, new arrivals are immediately faced with the threat of removal. The government of Bangladesh has stepped up efforts to return large numbers of Rohingya to Burma after new conflicts erupted over the two countries’ 320 kilometres maritime border.

One of these conflicts was exacerbated following an agreement between the government of Burma and South Korea’s Daewoo International Corporation, which was granted oil and gas exploration rights in contested waters. Since then, increasing numbers of Rohingya living in the border area have been expelled by Bangladeshi forces.

Tensions worsened throughout 2008 and in March last year Rohingya labourers in Burma were forced to start construction of a two hundred-kilometre fence to prevent future ‘push backs’ of Rohingya into Burma.

One consequence of the tensions between Burma and Bangladesh has been the increased presence of Bangladeshi troops in the border region. Fearing arrest and abuse, thousands of Rohingya have flooded into makeshift camps, putting a strain on resources and the local community and threatening thousands with starvation.

UNWELCOME VOTERS

In addition, developments in Burma have thrown up a new wildcard: the promise of elections. In a contradictory move, Burmese authorities have permitted Rohingya non-citizens to vote in the planned elections and started issuing temporary identity cards. The prospect of thousands of Rohingya voters in Arakan is not welcome to xenophobic and parochial interests, giving rise to fears of further destablisation. Bangladesh has responded to the anticipated tensions by continuing the forced removals of Rohingya before Burmese authorities complete the fence that is intended to seal off the area.

The Thai authorities have been equally inhospitable to the arrivals of refugees from Burma and Bangladesh. In 2008, the then Prime Minster Samak Sundaravej was reported as saying that Thailand would relocate Rohingya refugees to a deserted island.

Phuketwan journalists and the Arakan Project, a Bangkok based monitoring organisation, later raised the alarm about Thai security forces’ alleged practice of detaining Rohingya refugees on the remote Ko Sai Deang, before towing them out to shark-infested waters and abandoning them. Though challenged by the Thai government, recent press reports suggest that some of these practices have continued.

While Burma remains isolated, western and donor governments should call on the governments of Bangladesh and Thailand to stop the push backs on land and at sea. All receiving states in the region should ask the UNHCR to help determine the status of migrants from Burma and ensure that their human rights are respected, including access to aid and assistance. It is time for a regional plan for the Rohingya which addresses both the geo-political and domestic sources of their persecution.

* Brad Blitz, Professor of Political Geography at Kingston University London, Director of the International Observatory on Statelessness. www.nationalityforall.org

Burma’s ‘forgotten’ Chin people suffer abuse – Sam Bagnall
BBC News: Mon 19 Apr 2010

With elections being held in Burma later this year the country’s “forgotten people” are appealing to the rest of the world for help.The Chin people, who number roughly 1.5m and live mainly in the hilly west of the country near the Indian border, are one of the most persecuted minority groups in Burma.

Yet their plight is little known in the rest of the world.

Filming for the series Tropic of Cancer, presenter Simon Reeve and a two-man BBC crew managed to visit the area.

Risking capture and arrest at the hands of the Burmese army, who have around 50 bases in Chin State, they trekked through the jungle to a remote village.

“It was an extraordinary journey,” said Reeve. “The villagers I met gave me horrifying accounts of the abuses they suffer at the hands of Burmese troops.”

These stories appear to confirm recent research by US organisation Human Rights Watch.

After interviewing Chin refugees in neighbouring India their report concluded that the Chin are subjected to forced labour, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and extra-judicial killings as part of a Burmese government policy to suppress the Chin people and their ethnic identity.

The BBC team was taken into Burma by Chin human rights activist Cheery Zahau.

Despite being on a Burmese army wanted list, Ms Zahau was prepared to run the risk of working with the BBC, which, like other western media organisations, is banned from entering Burma.

“If we don’t speak up, if we don’t tell the stories of the people under this repressive military regime, then no-one will know what’s happening, and if they don’t know they will not do anything,” she said.

Christian persecution

The Chin are mainly Christians, having converted to the faith when the British ruled the area before independence after World War II.

The persecution of the Chin dates back to the military takeover of Burma in the 1960s.

According to the US State Department, Burmese troops and officials have tried to forcibly convert the Chin from Christianity to Buddhism.

They have also destroyed churches, and arrested and even killed Christian Chin clergy, who now often work undercover.

The Chin also suffer from acute food shortages.

The United Nation’s World Food Programme believes that food consumption in Chin State is the lowest in Burma. In recent years food shortages have been further exacerbated by a plague of rats, which have devastated Chin crops.

There is little in the way of medical facilities in Chin State. The villagers said that they had not seen a doctor for 10 years.

The Christian NGO Free Burma Rangers is one of the few sources of medical aid.

They give training to local volunteers who take basic drugs and medical equipment to the remote villages. The danger of running into a Burmese army patrol is ever present.

“If they catch us they will kill us,” one volunteer inside Burma said.

In the neighbouring Indian state of Mizoram, Chin refugees receive little help from the Indian authorities or aid agencies.

Instead they face discrimination and hostility, and are often forcibly repatriated to Burma.

“The Chin are unsafe in Burma and unprotected in India, but just because these abuses happen far from Delhi and Rangoon does not mean the Chin should remain ‘forgotten people’,” said Human Rights Watch in its report.

Burmese refugees from other persecuted ethnic groups who can flee from the south and east of the country into neighbouring Thailand receive international help and assistance.

Human Rights Watch has called for better treatment for the Chin and for Chin refugees who arrive in India.
Map

Burma’s military rulers intend to hold an election later this year, but most opposition leaders are banned from taking part.

The most famous is Aun Sang Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in the elections of 1990.

Burma’s military leaders refused to accept the results and she has spent most of the last two decades in detention. The NLD says it will boycott these elections.

Amnesty International has warned that ethnic groups, like the Chin, face increased repression at the hands of the Burmese military.

The Burmese regime has previously denied repressing ethnic groups.

Leading parties stay away from election – Ko Htwe
Irrawaddy: Mon 19 Apr 2010

Nineteen political parties to date have submitted applications to the Union Election Commission to take part in the Burmese general election later this year. However, most of the leading parties from the previous election, in 1990, have said they will not compete.Of the 19 political parties that have registered, 16 are new parties, while only three are existing parties—the Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organization (MKNSO); the National Unity Party (NUP); and the Union Karen League (UKL).
Members of the National League for Democracy wave in the direction of the home of Aung San Suu Kyi on the banks of Inya Lake in Rangoon on April 17. According to tradition, on the first day of Burmese New Year, activists of NLD release fish into the lake and pray for the freedom of Suu Kyi who has been in detention without trial for more than 15 of the past 21 years. (Photo: Reuters)

The seven other existing parties—including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD)— have either not registered to date or have announced that they will not compete in the election due to the recent election law and the 2008 Constitution, both of which are regarded by observers as serving only to entrench military rule in Burma.

The notable exception is the NUP, formerly known as the Burma Socialist Programme Party, led by late dictator Gen Ne Win. In the 1990 election, the NUP came fourth with 10 seats and to date is the only major party to register.

In 1990, the MKNSO won one seat; the UKL won none.

The leading parties ahead of the NUP in 1990 were the NLD with a landslide 392 seats, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) with 23 seats, and the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), which won 11 seats. None are expected to register before the deadline on May 6.

Speaking to The Irrawaddy on Monday, Aye Thar Aung, the secretary of the ALD, said, “Most of the existing parties have not registered because they cannot accept the 2008 Constitution. The election will go ahead, I’m sure, but I don’t think it will be free, fair and inclusive.”

Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political commentator living in exile, said that the existing political parties did not register with the Election Commission because most are allied with the NLD. Some parties, such as the SNLD, have had their leader arrested and so will not compete. Others believe the election will not be free and fair, he said.

“The parties that have registered to date are not allied with the NLD,” he added.

Of the 16 newly formed parties that have applied for registration, seven are ethnic minority-based parties: the Kachin State Progressive Party, led by Dr. Tu Ja; the Kayin People’s Party, which is headed by well-known Rangoon physician Dr. Simon Tha; the Shan Nationals Democratic Party, led by Sai Ai Pao Eik Paung; the Pa-O National Organization, led by Aung Kham Hti, a former monk and a politician who had a close relationship with former premier Gen Khin Nyunt; the Chin National Party; the Wa Democratic Party; and the Taaung (Palaung) National Party.

Rangoon-based parties to register include: the Union of Myanmar Federation of National Politics, headed by Aye Lwin, a former university student leader who took part in the 1988 uprising; and the 88 Generation Students Union of Myanmar (GSUM)?, led by Ye Htun, the brother of Aye Lwin.

The GSUM is distinct from the original 88 Students Generation group, led by prominent former students—including Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi—who are now in prison.

Aye Lwin, a 46-year-old former political prisoner, started his own political group in 2005. His close contacts with regime officials (he had a meeting with Rangoon’s mayor, Maj-Gen Aung Thein Lin, five months ago) have made him unpopular with young activists, who accuse him of accepting substantial financial support from them.

The remaining registered parties include the Democratic Party, which is led by Thu Wai, a former political prisoner. After the 1990 election, the Democratic Party was abolished.

Also registered are: the Union Democratic Party, headed by Shan leader Shwe Ohn; the Difference and Peace Party, led by Nyo Min Lwin; the New Era People Party, which is led by Tun Aung Kyaw; the National Political Alliance Party, led by Ohn Lwin; the Wunthanu NLD (the Union of Myanmar) party; and the Myanmar New Society Democratic Party.

Ethnic group in Myanmar gears up for war, peace – Tini Tran
Associated Press: Mon 19 Apr 2010

Laiza, Myanmar – Crawling on their bellies, the recruits inch through a field, dragging wooden rifles. A whistle blows, and they scramble to their knees, pulling the pins from imaginary grenades before lobbing them. Dropping flat, they yell “Boom!”At a camp alongside a river, the next generation of soldiers in the Kachin Independence Army, one of Myanmar’s largest armed ethnic groups, is training with a new urgency. A cease-fire is in peril, and the Kachin do not want to patrol the border for the ruling junta.

“I don’t want to kill anyone but being a soldier is the best way to change the conditions in Burma,” said 23-year-old cadet La Ran, who joined four months ago. “I am ready to fight if I have to.”

The possibility of armed conflict in Myanmar, also known as Burma, is rising because a series of cease-fire agreements between the military government and more than a dozen armed ethnic groups are dissolving as the regime seeks to press those groups into becoming a border militia under government control.

The government has set a deadline of April 28 for the armed groups to merge or disarm as the junta tightens its grip on the country ahead of this year’s nationwide elections the first in two decades. Their demands have largely been met with resistance during negotiations over the past year with the country’s largest armed ethnic groups, including the 8,000-member Kachin army.

Myanmar’s government, run by ethnic Burmese who make up the majority, is well known for repressing its own people. Considered among the world’s most brutal, the regime brooks no dissent and has been accused of large-scale violations of human rights, including the yearslong detention of Nobel Peace laureate and democracy icon, Aung San Suu Kyi.

In the country’s hinterlands home to a variety of ethnic minority groups the junta has also faced bitter opposition from the Wa, the Shan, the Karen and the Kachin, who are united in their resentment against historical domination by the Burmese. The Karen and the Shan, who have refused to sign truces, are engaged in intense fighting with government troops.

These groups control large territories along the northern and eastern borders along with the valuable trade in logging, jade, gems, gold, and, in some cases, illegal drugs, that have helped finance their insurgencies.

The Kachin, predominantly Christian hill tribes in the northernmost part of Myanmar, have been engaged in a decades-long struggle against the government for autonomy.

Since a cease-fire was signed in 1994, they have enjoyed de-facto self-rule: In the rebel-controlled area, the Kachin army powers the electric grid and runs hospitals while soldiers in green uniforms adorned with the Kachin flag monitor both the border with China and the frontier with government-controlled Myanmar.

But Kachin leaders are still hoping for a permanent solution. In the interim, they have rebuilt their army and their strength.

Over the weekend, the Kachin army and its political arm, the Kachin Independence Organization, adamantly rejected the government’s border guard proposal at a mass public meeting held in the small town of Laiza, a rebel stronghold near the Chinese border.

“From the very beginning, the public didn’t want the KIA to join the (border guard force),” said Gen. S. Gun Maw, vice chief of staff for the rebels, citing letters from thousands of people opposing the idea. “If they (the government) take the military way, it will be a big mistake for them.”

Pulling up in trucks, motorbikes, buses and cars, more than 1,000 Kachin many dressed in traditional headscarves and sarong-like longyi packed into a large assembly hall. An overflow crowd watched intently on television monitors set up in a second room.

>From the start, the rebel leaders were careful to say their stand reflects the views of the majority of Kachin people, estimated at 1 million in Myanmar. Many in the audience nodded in agreement as their leaders outlined the political stalemate after more than a dozen talks with government leaders over the past 12 months.

“We’ve had the cease-fire for more than 10 years now. It’s a friendly peaceful society now, and I want to keep this. But (the government) violates our rights and takes our land,” said Zing Hang Khawn Hpang, 45, a local trader who attended the weekend meeting.

The gathering was also intended to make a rare appeal for international attention and a small group of foreign journalists, including The Associated Press, were invited to attend. The remote and mountainous Kachin region has largely been off-limits to foreigners for years.

“Not many outsiders know very well what’s happening in Burma and our region … We hope that if they know, if they understand the situation in our region, they may be able to find a way to help us,” Gun Maw said.

In Laiza, a border town of 10,000 nestled in a valley between green hills, the standard of living is better than in other impoverished areas of Myanmar.

Control over two small hydroelectric dams, built with Chinese help, provide the area with 24-hour electricity by comparison, residents in the largest Burmese city, Yangon, only get a few hours of power every third day. Chinese telecommunications towers just over the border ensure steady cell phone service, while brisk commercial trade means a steady supply of Chinese goods, clothing and motorbikes displayed in storefronts on the main boulevard.

On the streets, people talk openly about politics another marked difference from the tightly controlled regions of government-run Myanmar.

The stability has allowed Christianity, brought by missionaries in the 1800s, to flourish a rare display in an otherwise heavily Buddhist nation.

Standing outside the doors of the white-tiled Laiza Kachin Baptist Church, resident Dau Lum, 36, expressed faith that a political compromise can be reached before fighting erupts.

“I try not to worry too much because the world is watching Burma so the Burmese government doesn’t want to start the fight. Even if conflict happens, it will not be like those in the past. I believe that God will guide us to a good future,” he said.

Though Kachin leaders are still pushing for a political solution that includes protection of ethnic rights and government-recognized self-rule, their commanders are preparing for the worst. From the Kachin army’s headquarters, perched high up on the mountainside overlooking the town, they have launched a new push for training and recruitment.

More ominously, the Burmese side has also stepped up its military activities. Kachin residents report army convoys rumbling through the northern countryside in recent weeks near the regional capital of Myitkyina, which is under government control.

But any fighting in northern Myanmar would surely provoke China, the junta’s biggest political ally, which has warned the Burmese government to guard against instability on its borders. Last summer, heavy fighting between troops and the Kokang ethnic group sent some 30,000 refugees across the border into China, prompting a rare reprimand from Beijing.

The Chinese leadership is in a bind, caught between its dislike of border instability and its access to the oil, natural gas, and timber that the junta provides. That makes it hard to divine how deeply Beijing will involve itself.

“We know the Chinese government has influence over the (Burmese government). We want them to use this to make change in Burma, but we’re not sure whether the Chinese government will,” said the Kachin army’s Gun Maw.

Lamai Tang Gun, 59, a Baptist pastor from Myitkyina, notes the Kachin have lived with an uneasy peace for decades: “They (the junta) are always threatening us. We can’t tell if there’s a possibility of fighting. We can only pray to God.”

BGF impasse explained to people by Kachin leaders
Kachin News Group: Fri 16 Apr 2010

Ethnic Kachin leaders in northern Burma today took pains to explain to the people the impasse on the Border Guard Force (BGF) issue with the country’s ruling junta. The public meeting comes before the crucial junta-set deadline of April 22 for transforming the Kachin armed forces.
The public meeting was organized in Laiza, the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in east Kachin State, near the China border. Over 2400 KIO members and members of the public from two states—Kachin and Shan were the audience. Two senior KIO officers took on the onerous task of explaining to the people, said participants.

Dr. Lahkyen La Ja, KIO general secretary detailed all the discussions with the junta on transforming the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the armed-wing of the KIO to the junta-proposed BGF.

According to Dr. La Ja, the two sides met 15 times on the contentious BGF issue in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State since April 28, last year. The issue could not be negotiated because the junta kept pressing the KIA to transform to BGF.

He quoted Burmese military officials as saying that the BGF proposal was the brainchild of junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe and is a goodwill gesture by the military leader.

Brig-Gen Sumlut Gun Maw, Vice Chief of Staff of KIA said that the KIO was told to come up with a clear response on the BGF regarding acceptance by Lt-Gen Ye Myint, Chief of the junta’s Military Affairs Security (MAS) when the KIO delegates met him in Myitkyina on April 4.

In the last meeting, Lt-Gen Ye Myint made it abundantly clear that the KIO has to provide a clear answer on the BGF issue on April 22. Following, which the armed-wing must be transformed within two weeks from April 28, said Brig-Gen Gun Maw.

Lt-Gen Ye Myint also cautioned about the cancellation of the ceasefire agreement saying “If the KIO does not abide by the latest instructions, the relations will revert to the period before the 1994 ceasefire agreement,” the KIA’s Vice Chief of Staff added.

Meanwhile, the latest KIO proposal was sent to Snr-Gen Than Shwe yesterday.

The proposal states that the KIO would like to resolve the BGF issue by peaceful alternative means, not militarily. It wants to convert the KIA to the Union Defence Force under the Burmese Army, maintaining its current status, said Dr. La Ja.

The KIO reiterated to the junta that it would like to convert the KIA after the political imbroglio is resolved through dialogue.

The KIO delegates will meet Burmese military officials again on April 22 and it is expected to explain its latest proposal instead of coming up with a clear response on the BGF issue as sought by the junta, said KIO officials in Laiza.

Till now, there is no sign of impending civil war between the KIO and the ruling junta, said local military observers.

Elections without rights
Asian Human Rights Commission: Thu 15 Apr 2010

The government of Burma has set down conditions for the forming of political parties that would have people associate in order to participate in anticipated elections, but nowhere is the right to associate guaranteed. While parties are required to have at least a thousand members to enlist for the national election–500 for regional assemblies–a host of extant security laws circumscribe how, when and in what numbers persons can associate. The allowance of association without the right to associate is manifest in the Political Parties Registration Law 2010, which contains references to some preexisting laws that prohibit free association. According to section 12, as translated by the Asian Human Rights Commission,

“A party that infringes any of the following will cease to have authorization to be a political party: … (3) Direct or indirect communication with, or support for, armed insurgent organisations and individuals opposing the state; or organisations and individuals that the state has designated as having committed terrorist acts; or associations that have been declared unlawful; or these organisations’ members.”

As in present-day Burma–or Myanmar as it is now officially known–anybody can be found guilty of having supported insurgents, of having been involved in terrorist acts, and above all, of having contacted unlawful associations, the law effectively allows the authorities to de-register any political party at any time.

The case of U Myint Aye is indicative. For founding a local group of human rights defenders and speaking on overseas radio broadcasts about what he saw after Cyclone Nargis, Myint Aye was arrested and accused of a fabricated bombing plot. The military tried and convicted him and two other accused in a press conference during September 2008; in November a court followed suit, handing down a sentence of life imprisonment (AHRC-UAU-018-2009).

More recently, the AHRC has issued appeals on evidence-free cases in which people have been tried and convicted to long terms of imprisonment for having allegedly had contact with unlawful groups outside the country. These include the case of Dr. Wint Thu and eight others in Mandalay (AHRC-UAC-011-2010), and the case of Myint Myint San and two others in Rangoon who were convicted for allegedly receiving money from abroad that was for the welfare of families with imprisoned relatives (AHRC-UAC-137-2009).

The new party registration law is hostile to democratic government because it envisages the arbitrary use of draconian provisions to prevent people from associating freely. It is a law to ensure that only persons and parties palatable to the military regime will be able to run for and obtain office.

But it also points to a far deeper problem. The very concept of a right, in terms of international standards, is neither recognized nor understood by the government of Burma. That the right to associate does not exist is not merely a consequence of a law designed to deny it. It is a consequence of a political and legal regime that does not contain rights within its conceptual framework at all.

This was not always the case. In 1950s Burma, rights were a central part of how national leaders sought to shape government and society. The courts also strongly supported citizens’ rights against the state through a robust constitutional framework. But after the military took full power in a second coup, during 1962, rights became “socialist”.

According to this notion of rights, the interests of the people and the state were aligned against the capitalists. Under “socialist rights” the very idea that a citizen might have a right to claim against the state was absurd. Individual agents of the state could violate citizens’ rights, but the state itself could never do wrong. The right to associate in this time was therefore always a “right” to associate with and through the organs of the state, not apart from them.

After 1988 the socialist concept of rights also ceased to exist, but it was not replaced with anything else. The new state in Burma was right-less, constitution-less, and also law-less in the sense that all laws in the last two decades have been issued as executive decrees rather than through any legislative process. Anything described as a right in this time has in the official view been no more than an entitlement bestowed upon all or part of the population, even if it may be described otherwise.

The 2008 Constitution has confirmed the absence of rights from the normative frame of the new state. At every point it negates and qualifies so-called statements of rights, including the right to associate. Under section 354, citizens have a “right” to form associations that do not contravene statutory law on national security and public morality: which as shown above can be construed to mean literally anything.

The military regime in Burma evidently expects the new constitution and new elections together to be taken as indicators of social and political change. But the passing of a constitution does not signify that rights exist, and nor does the holding of elections signify democratic renewal.

After 52 years of almost unbroken army rule, Burma is today not only without a judiciary, but also without the conceptual frame of rights that are requisite for a fair electoral process. Lacking these, what remains can only be characterized as the politics of despair.

Burmese music: Sound of the underground
The Independent (UK): Wed 14 Apr 2010

When the junta banned traditional protest songs, its leading exponents chose a life of exile rather than fall silent. Andrew Buncombe meets them in Delhi.First comes the sound of hand drums, followed by a voice that is steady and persistent. As Ngwe Toe leans back and angles his words towards the microphone, his lines are met by a chanting group which takes up his theme and sings back at him, as a call and response.

“The religion in our country,” sings Toe, as the group answers for him, “is Theravada Buddhism”. The activist continues: “The colour saffron is growing everywhere.”

The group responds: “The monks are very graceful, but now their power has been drained. They are hiding in the remote areas.”

As the drums continue in a dreamy loop, Toe implores: “Tell me why.” The chanters tell him: “The military devil is rising up.”

This is a traditional Burmese protest song with a modern twist. For generations, the people of Burma marked their new year by performing Thangyat – songs and skits that gave voice to local grievances.

In 1988, the year in which the military authorities violently crushed a series of democracy demonstrations with the death of at least 3,000 people, the junta decided it had endured enough protest and banned the tradition, threatening jail for anyone who dared to disobey.

But the generals could not stop Thangyat, merely drive it overseas. Now, communities of exiled Burmese around the world put together their own collections of protest songs, which are sold on CDs and even broadcast back into Burma where residents listen secretly on their radios.

One of the most famous and popular groups, of which Ngwe Toe is a member, is based in the west of Delhi. Ahead of the traditional four-day new year celebrations, or water festival, which begins today, the activists recorded and released a new collection of songs, music and poetry entitled Gaining Victory for Us and Defeat for Them.

“During the festival, it is a tradition that if there is something the people do not like, it will be criticised – be it politics, social affairs or food,” said Zin Naing, who escaped to India from Burma after the 1988 uprising and who helped produce the recording.

“Now, inside Burma, Thangyat is not allowed, so ours has become one of the only ones that people can get. We produce it on CD as well as cassettes, which are smuggled into Burma.”

There are an estimated 6,000 Burmese exiles in Delhi, most of them from Chin state, on India’s north-eastern border. Many of them took part in the 1988 uprisings and came to India, which at the time was critical of the military authorities and welcomed the refugees. Most have never dared to even visit their home country since.

Ngwe Toe, the 40-year-old lead singer, fled when he was just 19, leaving behind all his relatives. His father died in 2003, but he dreams of returning to the country with his wife and young son, and of being able to show his child to his mother.

In the meantime, he takes some measure of comfort from imagining his family furtively listening to the songs of protest that he and his friends have recorded. “It’s like a rap,” he said. “I say the first line and then the others respond with the second. It’s a call and response, and when I am singing, I am shouting these slogans with emotion. I am very focused on the song. I would be happy if my mother hears it, and would then be able to give the message that her son is involved in the politics.”

The lyrics for the song performed by Ngwe Toe were written by a Buddhist monk, forced to escape to India after taking part in the so-called Saffron Revolution of September 2007, when tens of thousands of monks and citizens took to the streets of Rangoon and other major cities, demanding democratic reforms.

The monk, U Dhamma, a smiling, round-faced 23-year-old, fled after he and several other monks from his monastery joined the demonstrations in the northern city of Mandalay. “I took part in the marches. I thought there would be a revolution. I believed in democratic rule for Burma,” said the monk, who crossed into north-eastern India in January 2008 and now lives in the same dusty Delhi neighbourhood as many other exiles. “After the marches, I stayed at the monastery for some months, but then a minister came to give food. We were very angry and refused to accept this. The minister put pressure on the abbot to expel us, and the next day our names were put in the newspaper, saying that we were to be expelled. We had no chance to stay in Burma.”

Those who wrote the collection of protest songs have had no shortage of material to inspire them over the past 12 months. Last year, the junta extended the house arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi for 18 months, after she was convicted of breaching the terms of her detention when an uninvited US tourist swam to her lakeside home.

Then, last month, the regime announced new rules governing the controversial election due to be held later this year. The rules effectively bar Ms Suu Kyi from standing and say that her party, the National League for Democracy, (NLD), would have to oust her if it wished to field candidates. The NLD has announced it is boycotting the election.

It is not just the junta that comes in for criticism in the Thangyat. While the songs indeed condemn the regime’s alleged nuclear ambitions, the election and the country’s poverty, the NLD and even politicians in exile are also subjects of satire.

Such humour has long been a tradition of subtle dissent in Burma. One of the country’s best-known comics, Zarganar, spent many years making barbed puns about the regime. Eventually, in 2008, the junta ran out of patience with him and seized on an interview he had given to the BBC criticising the authorities’ response of the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. He was jailed for 59 years, a sentence reduced to 35 on appeal.

Likewise, in Mandalay, members of a famous comic troupe known as the Moustache Brothers have been in and out of jail as a result of their performances making fun of the junta.

The Burmese exiles who put together the protest album remain confident that change can come. The song performed by Ngwe Toe says the monks will lead the transformation.

Its last lines, sung as call-and-response, conclude: “If the monks unite – the military becomes afraid. If the monks unite – the religion will be glowing. If the monks take to the front lines – we will escape from poverty. If the monks speak the truth – they will speak to the whole world.”

The UN singles out big oil in Burma, with good reason – Matthew Smith
Huffington Post (US): Tue 13 Apr 2010

In a surprising report last month to the UN Human Rights Council, UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on human rights Tomás Quintana recommended an official “commission of inquiry” into possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in military-ruled Burma (Myanmar).Although the call for such a commission was widely covered in media and policy circles, a critical section of the report went completely overlooked and unreported: Quintana actually became the first UNSR to take specific aim at the ruling State Peace and Development Council’s corporate partners, singling out problematic foreign oil companies operating in the country.

Coming after a 5-day mission to Burma, the report pulls no punches. It notes “rampant forced labor” connected to the country’s four main natural gas projects, including the transnational Yadana gas pipeline to Thailand and the Shwe gas pipeline to China.

Confirming what’s long been documented, the report notes the Yadana and Shwe companies “rely on the Myanmar military to provide security for their projects.”

Mentioning by name only South Korea’s Daewoo International and Thailand’s PTTEP, Quintana in effect implicated a who’s who of Big Oil: The Yadana project, meaning “treasure,” is operated by Total (France), Chevron (US), and PTTEP; and Shwe, meaning “gold,” is operated by Daewoo International, state-owned companies from India and South Korea, and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).

While this is the UNSR’s first mention of the human rights impacts of foreign-led energy projects in Burma, at EarthRights International (ERI), we’ve documented for years how overland gas pipelines and other billion-dollar installations in the country are physically secured by the Tatmadaw — the Burmese Army — resulting in forced labor, killings in cold blood, rape, torture, and other abuses against local residents.

The Tatmadaw is a decentralized, complicated organization of hundreds of thousands of poor, uneducated, predominantly ethnic Burman soldiers. It’s the most powerful political actor in the ethnically diverse country, and the most brutal. It also happens to include thousands of impressionable children, forced from their families, trained to be soldiers, and taught in the way of indiscriminate violence.

In 2009, one former child soldier explained to ERI how he was taken by the Tatmadaw from his family at age 15, and how his craven superiors ruthlessly burned the feet of children who tried to escape their clutches. This particular soldier “graduated” to provide security for Total and Chevron’s pipeline, where he in turn conscripted local villagers for forced labor.

For years, Total and Chevron’s pipeline has resulted in abuses like this: forced labor, killings, rape, torture. In recent weeks we documented two extrajudicial killings and numerous instances of forced labor committed by battalion #282, known locally as “Total’s battalion,” a notorious regiment that’s been securing the project since the 1990s.

This is a grave problem. The burgeoning and controversial corporate social responsibility agenda hasn’t effectively addressed it, regardless of what some companies and analysts claim, and victims of corporate human rights abuses still lack access to justice, despite lawsuits brought by Burmese villagers against Total and Unocal (now Chevron) in the companies’ home states.

What’s more, there’s another batch of problems with Burma’s gas sector. These involve cold hard cash, and were also noted by Quintana: For years, lucrative gas exports have lined the camouflaged pockets of the ruling military regime while the ailing country has sunk deeper into poverty. That’s inherently problematic. In 2009, ERI calculated how Total and Chevron’s pipeline generated over US$7.5 billion dollars from 2000-2008, the lion’s share going to the ruling junta.

This cash influx has only complicated the already deep military-politico complex in the country, not least of all by contributing to high-level corruption. Last September, we exposed how gas revenues from Total and Chevron’s pipeline were being siphoned by the Burmese elite into offshore bank accounts in Singapore, rather than to the national economy or development.

Now, the same junta managing this cash is orchestrating the country’s first elections in 20 years, controversially excluding over 2,100 political prisoners (by virtue of keeping them behind bars), including Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy party just recently decided to boycott the elections.

In this context, the decision was made by the junta and its partners to simultaneously move forward with the construction of yet another pipeline: the Shwe gas pipeline to China, operated by Daewoo and CNPC. Costing nearly US$2 billion to construct, it’ll be almost 20 times longer than Yadana, moving gas valued at a whopping US$30 billion, according to the Shwe Gas Movement.

The pipeline comes amidst a palpable threat of civil war between the Tatmadaw and non-state ethnic armies near the northern end of the project, in Shan State, where there’s a danger of thousands of refugee out-flows to China.

Villagers in some areas of the project aren’t thinking about elections as much as the risk they’ll lose their land and have to do forced labor. Where construction has already begun, so too have land confiscations and persecutions against the pipeline’s dissenters.

In a politically unstable “election year,” when the world’s attention will focus on Burma, one would think that risky transnational mega-development projects would be approached with caution, by both the junta and its corporate partners.

Apparently, that’s not the case.

Rather than move full speed ahead, Daewoo International, its partners, and CNPC should instead listen to the Shwe Gas Movement and EarthRights International: the companies should postpone the Shwe pipeline and any work on offshore installations until there’s no risk the project will contribute to human rights violations — that would be good business. In the meantime, the companies should promote public participation in development decisions; conduct transparent, inclusive third-party environmental and human rights impact assessments according to international standards; and practice complete revenue transparency, including publishing taxes, fees, royalties, bonuses, and social benefits paid to the Burmese authorities.

For companies who’ve ignored the risks and already made the mistake of being involved in a fully operational oil and gas project in Burma — like Total, Chevron, and PTTEP — they ought to take immediate steps to mitigate their harmful impacts. At a bare minimum, they should:

Practice complete revenue transparency.
Facilitate complaints of forced labor to the International Labour Organization.
Acknowledge an accurate sphere-of-responsibility, determined by actual social and political impacts, and take steps to mitigate the local harms caused by Tatmadaw forces securing the project.
Commission ongoing human rights and environmental impact assessments according to international standards, including the safe participation of local communities.

Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis in Bangladesh – Dr. Habib Siddiqui and Dr. Nora Rowley
Kaladan Press: Tue 13 Apr 2010

When a widely circulated newspaper like the New York Times picks up the matter of ill-treatment of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, it is no small matter. It is a matter of grievous concern and shame to tens of thousands of Bangladeshi-Americans who live in and around the Big Apple state. In its February 20 publication the headline read, “Burmese Refugees Persecuted in Bangladesh.” It said, “Stateless refugees from Myanmar are suffering beatings and deportation in Bangladesh, according to aid workers and rights groups who say thousands are crowding into a squalid camp where they face starvation and disease.” It described the situation as a humanitarian crisis.The NY Times report should come as no surprise to many of us who have been following the inhuman condition of the Rohingyas around the world for a number of years. In its Special Report, dated February 18, “Bangladesh: Violent Crackdown Fuels Humanitarian Crisis for Unrecognized Rohingya Refugees,” the Doctors Without Borders (MSF) criticized the Bangladesh government for violent crackdown against the stateless Rohingyas in Bangladesh. It was a chastising report in which the MSF called for an immediate end to the violence, along with urgent measures by the Government of Bangladesh and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to increase protection to Rohingya refugees seeking asylum in the country.

Last month the Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) issued an emergency report, “Stateless and Starving: Persecuted Rohingya Flee Burma and Starve in Bangladesh”. This report reveals a PHR emergency assessment of 18.3% acute malnutrition in children. This level of child malnutrition is “considered “critical” by the World Health Organization (WHO), which recommends in such crises that adequate food aid be delivered to the entire population to avoid high numbers of preventable deaths.” The extreme food insecurity causing this critical level of malnutrition is the direct consequence of Bangladesh government authorities’ restricting movement and, therefore, income generation of the Rohingya, and actively obstructing the amount of international humanitarian aid to this population.

Last week, the American Muslim Taskforce (AMT), an umbrella organization that includes the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), amongst other Muslim organizations in the USA, hosted a press conference in the National Press Club, Washington D.C. to discuss human rights abuses in Bangladesh. In his inaugural statement, Mr. Wright Mahdi Bray of the AMT brought up the squalid living conditions of the Rohingya refugees inside Bangladesh. In the last few years we have raised the Rohingya issue a few times with Bangladesh government, but have failed to improve the deplorable condition.

Denied citizenship rights and subjected to repeated abuse and forced slave labor in their ancestral homes in the Arakan/Rakhine state of Burma by a xenophobic Buddhist government, where they cannot travel, marry or practice their religion freely, and betrayed and battered by their Magh Rakhine co-residents, many Rohingya Muslims have hardly any option left for them to survive with dignity other than seeking refuge outside. The neighboring Bangladesh to the north-west with her huge Muslim population and historical ties with Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar, dating back centuries earlier during the Arakanese rule of those districts (1538-1666), provides a natural setting for seeking shelter. Thus, when the Burmese genocidal campaigns – Naga Min ( King Dragon) Operation (1978-79) and Pyi Thaya Operation (1991-92) – forced eviction of some 300,000 and 268,000 Rohingya refugees, respectively, to seek shelter outside it was Bangladesh where they ended up.

With the assistance of the UNHCR, Bangladesh repatriated most of those refugees back to Arakan. Still, however, tens of thousands of Rohingyas never returned, especially from the second batch of major exodus in 1991-92. The on-going Nasaka operation and targeted violence by the Rakhine Maghs inside the Rakhine state have also forced many Rohingyas to leave their ancestral land and return again to Bangladesh. Many of those refugees have often used Bangladesh as a transit point to seek better shelters elsewhere. Many of the Rohingyas have ended up in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and also in Pakistan.

As noted recently by Syed Neaz Ahmad in a New Age article, the late King Faisal’s kind gesture to offer the fleeing Rohingyas a permanent abode in Saudi Arabia is no longer respected by the new rulers who have restricted their employment and movement within the Kingdom. According to him some three thousand Rohingya families are in Makkah and Jeddah prisons awaiting their deportation. It is good to hear that the Pakistan government has agreed to take these unwanted refugees. (Islamabad can also do a noble job, albeit a delayed one for the past four decades, in taking some 300,000 stranded Pakistanis – living a miserable life in camps in Bangladesh.)

There are some 13,600 Rohingyas registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Malaysia, an estimated 3,000 in Thailand, and unknown numbers in India. Small number of Rohingya refugees also lives in Japan, Australia and the USA. The total number of Rohingya refugees living inside Bangladesh today is not known. The UNHCR stopped documenting the Rohingyas after 1991 as they shifted their focus to Africa and Eastern Europe. From my contacts within the Rohingya leadership, the estimate is around 400,000. Of these refugees, only 28,000 are recognized as prima facie refugees by the Government of Bangladesh and live in official camps under the supervision of the UNHCR. The official camp has everything: primary schools, a computer learning centre funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, health care centers, adult literacy centers, supplementary food centers for children and pregnant women.

Except a handful of wealthy Rohingyas who have been able to settle comfortably within the big cities, the rest of the refugees struggle to survive unrecognized and largely unassisted and unprotected, living in dire humanitarian condition with food insecurity, poor water and appalling sanitation. They live mostly in and around Cox’s Bazar and the Hilly districts of Chittagong. Some of the unfortunate refugees have also ended up living in slums of big cities like Dhaka and Chittagong. As reported by the MSF and the Amnesty International, these Rohingya refugees are treated as unwanted folks and have faced repeated beatings and harassment, including forcible repatriation to Myanmar. Many refugees, who had been repatriated to their country in the past, had entered Bangladesh again as they did not find any development and change in the attitude of the Myanmar authorities.

Some Rohingya refugees live at a makeshift camp in Kutupalong, south of Cox’s Bazar. Last June and July the local authorities destroyed 259 homes in that makeshift camp to clear space around the perimeter of the official UNHCR camp at Kutupalong. There was a crackdown in October in Bandarban District, east of Cox’s Bazar, forcing many Rohigyas to take shelter in the makeshift camp in Kutupalong. In January 2010, another crackdown followed the refugees living in Cox’s Bazar District. To add to the brutality of the authorities, the Rohingyas also suffer at the hands of the local population, whose anti-Rohingya sentiment is fuelled by local leaders and the media.

This was not the first time that this kind of problem emerged for the fleeing Rohingyas. In 2002 during the police action “Operation Clean Heart” many Rohingyas were violently forced from their homes, which led to the establishment of the original Tal makeshift camp on a swamp-like patch of ground. This camp relocated, and in the spring of 2006 MSF started a medical program at the new site, where at the time around 5,700 unregistered Rohingya lived in awful, unsanitary conditions on a small strip of flood land in Teknaf in the Cox’s Bazar District. After two years of providing humanitarian assistance, and following strong advocacy by MSF, which ultimately gained the support of UNHCR and the international community, the Government of Bangladesh allocated new land in Leda Bazar for around 10,000 people in mid-2008. Less than one year later, nearly 13,000 people were living in Leda Bazar Camp, their fundamental living conditions having changed little. According to the MSF, these people continue to struggle to survive without recognition and opportunities to provide for themselves inside an increasingly hostile environment.

With a total population of over 28,400, the unregistered Rohingya at Kutupalong makeshift camp now outnumber the total registered refugee population supported by the UNHCR in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government has repeatedly stopped registration of those unfortunate refugees living outside the official camps. Without official recognition these people are forced to live in overcrowded squalor, unprotected and largely unassisted. Prevented from supporting themselves, they also do not qualify for the UNHCR-supported food relief. And sadly, the UNHCR, which is mandated to protect refugees worldwide, makes little or no visible protest at the injustice of this situation.

According to the MSF, the UNHCR is guilty of not taking the return of the Rohingyas as a priority issue. The Office of the UNHCR must take greater steps to protect the unregistered Rohingya seeking asylum in Bangladesh. The UNHCR must not allow the terms of its agreement with the government to undermine its role as international protector of the Rohingyas who have lost the protection of their own state – Myanmar, and have no state to turn to. Any failure to protect the Rohingyas inside and outside Myanmar is simply not acceptable.

We are told that as a poor country, Bangladesh faces a dilemma about the Rohingya refugees. If she shows too much flexibility a huge influx may occur, while being harsh creates concern among international community. Nevertheless, Bangladesh government’s forced repatriation of the refugees against their wishes is simply inhuman and violates international humanitarian laws. It must be immediately stopped, failing which its international image may suffer terribly. It must also stop all harassment against the Rohingyas. Temporary residency permits should be provided to the refugees so that they can earn their livelihood like any other Bangladeshi. There is nothing worse than a forced poverty which leads to crime and other serious problems. Should the refugees choose to leave Bangladesh for a third country the government should not hinder that process either. It must also make all diplomatic efforts to find shelters for these stranded refugees in sparsely populated and prosperous countries of Europe and North America, and the Gulf states.

The Rohingya refugees remain trapped in a desperate situation with no future in Bangladesh. These unfortunate people are caught between a crocodile and a snake: neither the xenophobic SPDC regime wants them back in Myanmar, nor does the Bangladesh government want them to stay because they are largely perceived as a burden on already scant resources. Outside China, none of the neighboring countries of Burma has ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. This must change by ratifying those conventions.

As the Thai boat crisis of 2009 made clear, regional comprehensive solutions are needed to the situation of the stateless Rohingya. The international community must support the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR to adopt measures to guarantee the unregistered Rohingya’s lasting dignity and well-being in Bangladesh.

[About the authors: Dr. Siddiqui is a human rights activist who has written and co-edited three books on the Rohingyas of Burma. Dr. Rowley is a medical doctor who as part of MSF worked with the Rohingya people inside Arakan. She is currently affiliated with the US Campaign for Burma.]

Weekly business roundup – William Boot
Irrawaddy: Mon 12 Apr 2010

Belarus Bids to Bypass Arms Boycott with Burma Sales

The East European country of Belarus is bidding to develop military weapons sales to Burma following a week-long visit by a high-ranking delegation.

A team from the Belarusian state military and technical committee met Burmese army representatives to discuss military and technical cooperation, a European report said this week.

It was the second meeting between the two countries. A Burmese delegation went to Belarus last June.

Although foreign currency revenues from contracts with this state [Burma] remain insignificant, there are certain prospects for the development of cooperation in the military and technical sphere, delegation official Uladzimir Lawranyuk told the Belarus news agency Belapan on April 7.

Belarus is on a United States™ government restricted list because of its arms sales to unstable countries, such as North Korea and Sudan.

The US report lists Belarus as the 11th largest arms exporter in the world, with sales of at least US $1 billion between 1999 and 2006.

Western countries have called for a total weapons embargo on Burma, which buys military equipment from a number of countries, including China, India, Russia, Ukraine and Serbia.

Vietnam: Much Remains To Be Done on Asean Economic Union

Asean is a harmonious organization which has made enormous progress in becoming a œclosely-integrated political and economic entity, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung claimed on April 8.

His welcoming speech to the 16th summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) made no mention of conflicts in Burma, the military confrontations in a border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, or the severe political crisis within Thailand which has forced the Thai prime minister to cancel his participation in the summit.

The Hanoi meeting, in the rotating chairmanship of Asean held by Vietnam, is aimed at solidifying ambitions for the 10-country association to become a European Union-like organization by 2015—seen by most observers as an impossible target.

In a sign that Asean leaders might now be recognizing this, Nguyen Tan Dung warned that œmuch remains to be done to actually imitate the European Union.

It is now imperative to make stronger efforts to really bring the Asean Charter into life, accelerate Asean economic integration and work out a suitable model for sustainable economic development, he said.

Thais Fund Road to South Burma for Bangkok Link

Thailand is spending US $11 million to expand trade and port links into southern Burma.

The Thai government, via the commerce ministry, will use the funding to build a road linking the Thai town of Kanchanaburi with the Burma port of Tavoy, and to create a new permanent border crossing for trade further south near Prachuap Khiri Khan.

The Thai ministry said the developments were agreed at trade talks in the Thai resort town of Hua Hin, on the sidelines of the Mekong Rivers Commission conference.

The aim of the two links is to cut the cost and time of transporting farm and sea produce from Burma into Thailand.

Bangkok is about 300 kilometers from Tavoy in a direct line via Kanchanaburi.

The developments are forecast to be completed some time in 2013, said the Thai commerce ministry.

Australian Trade with Burma Grows Despite Sanctions

Trade between Australia and Burma has grown 160 percent over the last year despite sanctions imposed by the Australian government since 2007, a human rights campaign group has alleged.

The increased trade is mainly in textiles such as women’s clothes, communications and technical equipment, and fish, but does not include investment in Burma’s state-controlled oil and gas industry, said the Burma Campaign Australia (BCA) this week.

Trade between Australia and Burma has grown significantly over the past five years. In the last year alone, it increased 160 per cent, said BCA spokeswoman Zetty Brake.

No detailed breakdown of the increase has been disclosed.

Blanket sanctions are not imposed by Australia against Burma, but the government has been enforcing so-called targeted sanctions on Burmese financial institutions and regime leaders since October 2007.

The BCA said it seeks an extension of government-imposed targeted sanctions and government support for a total trade ban until there is regime change.

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#751

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Date: Tue Apr 27, 2010 8:29 am
Subject: The real enemy

piapi

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The real enemy

To solve external conflicts, we must start at their root cause, in our hearts

The violence that occurred on April 10 on Ratchadamnoen Klang Avenue was a great loss for all parties involved — be they the government, the UDD — and all Thais. Every one of us lost. If the destruction on that day was called a victory, then it was a victory for anger and hatred.

After the violence, everyone is pointing fingers at the other side, overlooking the crux of the problem. It is the anger and hatred which pushes us into being vindictive enemies. The more we feel angry and hateful, the more vigorous our finger-pointing gets, and the louder our condemnation becomes. So much so we have forgotten it is the anger and hatred in our hearts that has driven us to be part of the violence, directly and indirectly.

Anger and hatred does not hurt others only, it also hurts us. Whenever we let anger and hatred dominate us, it affects our mind, our disposition, our behaviour.

It is hate and anger which has turned people who used to have goodwill towards one another into enemies, ready to jump at each other’s throats, to beat up, even to kill with cold blood. In other words, it has turned us into devils without our realising it.

It might be true that a person we hate is vicious and inhumanely cruel. But treating him in such a fashion will make us similarly inhumane. We view him as sub-human, but our action reduces us to his level, or even lower. We do not see him as human because of our hate and anger, which has driven us to destroy our own humanity.

Just because he or she has a different political ideology or wears a shirt of different colour, we view it as enough to brand him or her evil. This results from our presumption that people of that ideology, of this and that shirt colour, are all bad, unpatriotic, fascists. We may not know them at all, but because they belong to the group or the institution that we despise, it is enough for us to label them as bad.

Rationally, we may understand that a view one holds does not make them a bad person. But emotionally, the fact that he or she subscribes to the ideology which we detest, or belongs to the group that we hate, is enough to make us hate them. It is easy to see the other side as bad people. For when we believe we are on the side of righteousness, the people on the other side must be the evil ones.

But it does not stop there. When we believe they are evil, we feel it is legitimate to deal with them as we deem appropriate. The reasoning is that we should not let such bad people live and create more problems. We are ready to condemn them with the crudest language we could find. We are ready to make accusations, lie, or inflict pain on them. But the more we do that with people we label ‘‘evil’’, the more evil we ourselves become.

When the ‘‘angels’’ are ready to use any means to get rid of the ‘‘devils’’, they become devils themselves.

There is indeed a fine line between ‘‘angels’’ and ‘‘devils’’. Whenever we let hatred and anger dominate our hearts and minds, the angels easily become devils. Take note:

When we fight with the devil, be cautious not to become the devil ourselves. When hate and anger arise, it will push others away from us, particularly the people who are the target of our anger. Strangely, however, the more we grow apart, the more similar we become in dispositions, views and behaviours, which only mirror each other. We similarly believe they are right and the other side is wrong. We are alike in cursing the other side with rude, angry words. Our behaviours, such as making false accusations, are the same.

Isn’t it strange that the more we hate someone, the more we behave like them, although we label them evil? The more we want to hurt others, the more we hurt ourselves because we allow hate and anger to dominate our minds. It does not only put us on fire, it also destroys our image, reduces our humanity, and leads to many actions that we must repay. We plunge ourselves in the deep pit of vengefulness and suffering, which is so difficult to climb out of.

Everyone is human. They love, hate, are happy, and sad — like us. They have dreams and fears — also like us. But we are fixated with the labels we attach to them. For example prai (the oppressed), amataya (the elites), PAD, UDD, police, troops, or any organisations they belong to. So much so that we cannot see their humanity. We are so fixated with the colour of the shirts they wear that we cannot see them as a person. When we hate, we see them as the evil we must eliminate. We condemn and demonise them. The more we see them as less than human, the more righteous and more legitimate we feel to hurt them.

The age of catastrophe, which we call migasanyee, is a time when people can cruelly kill one another because we see the other side as just flesh, or miga, instead of people. We do not have to wait several hundreds of years to enter such an age. We are in the middle of it right now. People no longer see the humanity in others. We will pass this era when we start to see people beyond the labels, ideologies, shirt colours; to see the humanity of one another.

What is important is not to reclaim the street space from the protestors. We must return humanity to the yellow shirts, the red shirts, the police, the soldiers. Only then we can live together in peace.

We can only see others’ humanity when we interact with one another as humans, when we open our hearts to listen to them instead of just acting our roles or insisting on listening selectively to what confirms our prejudices.

One important dharma in time of conflicts is sajja nurak, which is not to be stubbornly attached to the belief that only one’s view is correct. One should constantly remind oneself that the view of the other side may also be correct, so we are more open to other people’s views.

In conflicts, all sides tend to insist they are right and the other side is wrong. Thus, they are not willing to listen to the other side. This applies not only to the conflicts between the government and the protesters, but also to people who love each other, such as husband and wife, father and children. During an argument, is there anyone willing to listen? This is because we are confident that we are right. Because we don’t know how to listen, the quarrel is getting more serious.

Even when it involves people who love each other, listening is difficult. It is then all the more difficult for people we hate. Because we close our heart, we are more convinced that ‘‘we are right and you are wrong’’. But how can we be sure that we are 100 percent right or good, and the other side is 100 percent bad?

How can we know if our information is 100 percent accurate? How can we be certain that what they are demanding is wholly out of selfishness? How can we be sure when we have never opened our hearts to listen to their points of view, for we have concluded right from the start that they are wrong and evil?

The Buddha’s teachings in the Kalamasutra are very important in this time of conflicts. It reminds us not to believe something just because ‘‘we hear it from others, because it is logical, because it agrees with our ideas, because it is plausible, or because the speaker is our teacher [or credible]’’. If it is the case, don’t conclude that what you have heard or what you have been informed, including the opinions based on those information, are wholly correct.

It is difficult to have compassion for the other side, although it is good for our own mind. But at least we should see them the way they really are. When we all desire justice, we should give justice to others and ourselves by viewing them the way they are. But how can we do that when we are full of prejudices? It is only when we can transcend these prejudices and open our hearts to listen to the other side, when we do not believe so easily, that we can see other people accurately as they are.

It is only then that we will realise other people are not our enemy. Our hatred and anger is.

Edited translation from an article in Thai by Phra Paisal Visalo printed in the ‘Matichon’ newspaper on April 18, 2010.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/leisure/leisurescoop/175963/the-real-enemy

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#752

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Date: Wed May 12, 2010 7:08 am
Subject: [ReadingRoom] News on Burma - 12/5/10

piapi

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Indian team to visit Myanmar for expediting power projects
U.S. Diplomat Meets With Myanmar Opposition Leader
US envoy warns Myanmar over NKorea arms
Path of engagement with Burma
Union Election Commission issues Notification No. 41/2010
Faction of Myanmar’s opposition forms new party
NDF Party to ally with pro-democracy, ethnic groups
Military rule in civilian clothing?
Parties aplenty, but can any challenge Myanmar’s junta?
Burma’s imperfect polls offer the best hope for change
Game over? No, not yet
Political parties slam ‘rule-breaking’ PM
No more ‘military government’
Tensions rising between Myanmar’s military junta and the Kachin Independence Army
Call to open Myanmar’s books
Quintana says conditions not present for credible elections
We must deny the military regime in Burma the legitimacy it craves
Tight censorship on reporting USDP
DKBA unlikely to reunite with KNLA
Shan party allowed to register for elections
Myanmar introduces visas on arrival for tourists
Myanmar border trade hits 1.3 bln USD in 2009-10
Than Shwe a predator, says media watchdog
Myanmar junta members go civilian
Japanese companies sign hydropower deal with Myanmar
Breaking Burma’s isolation
Burma’s ‘elections’ should not be recognized

Indian team to visit Myanmar for expediting power projects – Utpal Bhaskar
LiveMint.com: Mon 10 May 2010

Govt plans to revive the 1,200MW Tamanthi hydroelectric power plant and 642MW Shwezaye project
New Delhi – As part of India’s economic diplomacy initiative to engage Myanmar and counter China’s growing influence in that country, an Indian team will be leaving for the eastern neighbour on Tuesday to discuss building power plants and transmitting some of the electricity to India.

India plans to revive the stalled 1,200MW Tamanthi hydroelectric power plant and 642MW Shwezaye project on the Chindwin river, the largest tributary of the Irrawaddy river, Myanmar’s key commercial waterway. The memorandum of association for these projects are expected to be signed by December.

The delegation will comprise officials from state-owned firms NHPC Ltd and Power Grid Corp. of India Ltd (PGCIL), said a government official who did not want to be identified.

The visit is part of the Indian government’s exercise to improve diplomatic and economic ties with a neighbour that has rich deposits of natural gas. Myanmar has natural gas reserves of 89.722 trillion cu. ft (tcf), of which 18.012 tcf are proven recoverable reserves, or gas that can be easily extracted and tapped.

Sudhir Kumar, joint secretary, hydropower, in India’s ministry of power, who is part of this delegation, declined comment. S.K. Garg, chairman and managing director, NHPC, confirmed the impending visit and said: “Survey and investigation work are yet to be completed. No modalities have been worked out so far.”

“A transmission link for the evacuation of power is expected to be set up. We had submitted a report on the transmission of power around one-and-a-half years back,” a PGCIL executive said on condition of anonymity.

Tamanthi is in north Myanmar. Once completed, the project would help control floods and provide water for irrigation in the region. India would receive the bulk of the power generated. Myanmar has hydroelectric power potential of 39,720MW and an installed capacity of 747MW.

A power transmission link with Myanmar would also help towards a power inter-link of countries of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc), which groups India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and the Maldives. The Saarc grid envisaged meeting electricity demands and boosting economic and political ties in the region.

The embassy of Myanmar in New Delhi could not be contacted. Questions emailed to it bounced back.

The projects are integral to India for its engagement with Myanmar. India’s ministry of external affairs, or MEA, will underwrite as much as Rs40 crore in expenses to be incurred by NHPC on hydrological studies needed to develop the two power plants in that country. The ministry has funded the cost for additional investigations and the preparation of updated detailed reports for both the projects.

NHPC had earlier submitted reviews of feasibility reports for the Tamanthi and Shwezaye projects to MEA and the power ministry. Subsequently, the reports were accepted by the department of hydropower implementation of the Myanmar government. The feasibility reports of Tamanthi and Shwezaye were prepared by Switzerland’s Colenco Power Engineering Ltd and Japan’s Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc., respectively.

Analysts say that since inter-country deals are complex, they are best handled between governments rather than by commercial entities.

“We have similar plans with Nepal and Bhutan. However, in the case of Myanmar, the challenges are many, especially from the evacuation point of view,” said K. Ramanathan, distinguished fellow at The Energy and Resources Institute. “There are also geopolitical and technical challenges.”

U.S. Diplomat Meets With Myanmar Opposition Leader – Mark McDonald
New York Times: Mon 10 May 2010

Hong Kong — A senior United States diplomat met with the leader of Myanmar’s principal opposition party on Monday, three days after it was disbanded after refusing to register for an election it considered to be undemocratic.
The envoy, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt M. Campbell, spoke with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi early Monday afternoon, a Western diplomat said. The meeting took place at a government guesthouse near her home in Yangon, Myanmar’s principal city and the former capital.

Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, has been detained for most of the past 20 years, mostly under house arrest at her lakeside home. She turns 65 next month.

In a statement Monday night, Mr. Campbell applauded Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s “compassion and tolerance for her captors in the face of repeated indignities.”

“It is simply tragic,” he said, “that Burma’s generals have rebuffed her countless appeals to work together to find a peaceable solution for a more prosperous future.”

Mr. Campbell also conferred Monday with some of the senior leaders of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party — the “uncles” — including its former deputy chairman, U Tin Oo.

The party, the National League for Democracy, formally shut down last Friday rather than comply with onerous registration requirements and other election protocols set up by the junta. A senior N.L.D. official, Khin Maung Swe, said he has since formed a new party, according to a report in an online news portal, The Irrawaddy.

The government has said it will hold parliamentary elections this year but has not announced the date. The N.L.D. won the last elections, in 1990, but the results were ignored by the military, which has continued to rule ever since.

Mr. Campbell said Monday night that “what we have seen to date leads us to believe that these elections will lack international legitimacy.”

Mr. Campbell landed on Sunday in Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, where he told a news conference that the United States administration was “troubled” by the recent political developments in Myanmar that had led to the dissolution of the N.L.D.

Later on Sunday he proceeded to Naypyidaw, the capital of Myanmar, where he reportedly met with Foreign Minister Nyan Win; Information Minister Kyaw San; and U Thaung, a former ambassador to the United States who now directs Myanmar’s nuclear energy program as minister of science and technology.

Senator Judd Gregg, Republican of New Hampshire, sponsored a resolution that passed the Senate last week that denounced the junta and called for the release of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners in Myanmar.

“I regret that the military regime in Burma continues to display a complete and total disinterest in positive relations with the United States, and credible and fair elections for the people of Burma,” Mr. Gregg said.

He added that the United States “expects the military regime to dramatically expand political participation and create an environment free from fear and intimidation before we will consider elections in Burma as anything but a farce.”

The United States and other Western nations have established a broad range of sanctions against Myanmar and the ruling generals.

US envoy warns Myanmar over NKorea arms
Associated Press: Mon 10 May 2010

Yangon – A top U.S. official visiting Myanmar warned Monday that its military regime should abide by U.N. sanctions that prohibit buying arms from North Korea, and also said the junta’s election plans lack legitimacy.
Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asia, read a statement to the press as he prepared to leave Myanmar after holding nearly two hours of closed-door talks with detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party was disbanded last week as a result of its refusal to register for the polls, slated for sometime this year.

He did not reveal details of their talks, but praised her nonviolent struggle for democracy.

“She has demonstrated compassion and tolerance for her captors in the face of repeated indignities,” he said. “It is simply tragic that Burma’s generals have rebuffed her countless appeals to work together to find a peaceable solution for a more prosperous future.” Burma is another name for Myanmar.

Campbell earlier held talks with several Cabinet ministers.

The U.S. envoy issued what appeared to be Washington’s strongest warning to date concerning Myanmar’s arms purchases from North Korea, which some analysts suspect includes nuclear technology.

A U.N. Security Council resolution bans all North Korean arms exports, authorizes member states to inspect North Korean sea, air and land cargo and requires them to seize and destroy any goods transported in violation of the sanctions.

Campbell said that Myanmar leadership had agree to abide by the U.N. resolution, but that “recent developments” called into question its commitment. He said he sought the junta’s agreement to “a transparent process to assure the international community that Burma is abiding by its international commitments.”

“Without such a process, the United States maintains the right to take independent action within the relevant frameworks established by the international community,” said Campbell.

He did not explain what the new developments were or what action the U.S. might take, though it has in the past threatened to stop and search ships carrying suspicious cargo from Pyongyang.

Campbell said that in talks with senior officials, the U.S. side had also outlined a proposal “for a credible dialogue” for all concerned parties to agree on how to conduct upcoming polls, the first since 1990. But the junta had instead moved forward unilaterally without consulting opposition and independent voices.

“As a direct result, what we have seen to date leads us to believe that these elections will lack international legitimacy,” he said. “We urge the regime to take immediate steps to open the process in the time remaining before the elections.” The exact date for the polls has not yet been set.

Campbell’s visit, his second in six months, came just days after the dissolution of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party, or NLD, which won the 1990 election but was never allowed to take power.

The party considers newly enacted election laws unfair and undemocratic as Suu Kyi and other political prisoners would be barred from taking part in the vote and so declined to reregister as required, which meant it was automatically disbanded last week.

Suu Kyi was driven from her home in a three-car police motorcade to the nearby government guesthouse for the talks with Campbell. The Nobel Peace Prize laureate has been detained, mostly under house arrest, for 14 of the past 20 years. Her freedom has been a long-standing demand of the United States and much of the world community, including the United Nations.

Campbell also voiced concern about the increasing tensions between the government and ethnic minorities that have long been striving for greater autonomy, but face sometime severe repression.

“Burma cannot move forward while the government itself persists in launching attacks against its own people to force compliance with a proposal its ethnic groups cannot accept,” he said. “The very stability the regime seeks will continue to be elusive until a peaceable solution can be found through dialogue.”

Campbell arrived Sunday and met with senior junta officials in the remote administrative capital of Naypyitaw before flying Monday to Yangon, the biggest city. Among the officials he met were Foreign Minister Nyan Win, Information Minister Kyaw San and Science and Technology Minister U Thaung Myanmar’s former envoy in Washington who is the point person for the U.S.-Myanmar engagement.

Relations between Myanmar, also known as Burma, and the U.S. have been strained since its military crushed pro-democracy protests in 1988, killing hundreds, possibly thousands, of demonstrators. Since then, Washington has been Myanmar’s strongest critic, applying political and economic sanctions against the junta for its poor human rights record and failure to hand over power to a democratically elected government.

Campbell, however, said he would continue a dialogue with all sides in Myanmar as part of a new Washington policy of engagement rather than isolation of the ruling generals.

Last year President Barack Obama reversed the Bush administration’s isolation of Myanmar in favor of dialogue with the junta.

Path of engagement with Burma – Wesley K. Clark, Henrietta H. Fore, Suzanne DiMaggio
Japan Times: Mon 10 May 2010

New York — The Obama administration’s decision to seek a new way forward in U.S.-Burma relations recognizes that decades of trying to isolate Burma (aka Myanmar) in order to change the behavior of its government have achieved little. As Burma’s ruling generals prepare to hold elections later this year — for the first time since 1990 — it is time to try something different.
Attempting to engage one of the world’s most authoritarian governments will not be easy. There is no evidence to indicate that Burma’s leaders will respond positively to the Obama administration’s central message, which calls for releasing the estimated 2,100 political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi), engaging in genuine dialogue with the opposition, and allowing fair and inclusive elections.

In fact, the recently enacted electoral laws, which have been met with international condemnation, already point to a process that lacks credibility.

This past fall we convened a task force under the auspices of the Asia Society to consider how the United States can best pursue a path of engagement with Burma. We concluded that the U.S. must ensure that its policies do not inadvertently support or encourage authoritarian and corrupt elements in Burmese society.

At the same time, if the U.S. sets the bar too high at the outset, it will deny itself an effective role in helping to move Burma away from authoritarian rule and into the world community.

During this period of uncertainty, we recommend framing U.S. policy toward Burma on the basis of changes taking place in the country, using both engagement and sanctions to encourage reform. The Obama administration’s decision to maintain trade and investment sanctions on Burma in the absence of meaningful change, particularly with regard to the Burmese government’s intolerance of political opposition, is correct.

Yet there are other measures that should be pursued now. The U.S. should engage not only with Burma’s leaders, but also with a wide range of groups inside the country to encourage the dialogue necessary to bring about national reconciliation of the military, democracy groups, and non-Burmese nationalities.

Removal of some noneconomic sanctions that restrict official bilateral interaction is welcome, and an even greater relaxation in communications, through both official and unofficial channels, should be implemented. Expanding such channels, especially during a period of potential political change, will strengthen U.S. leverage.

To reach the Burmese people directly, the U.S. should continue to develop and scale up assistance programs, while preserving cross-border assistance. Assistance to nongovernmental organizations should be expanded, and U.S. assistance also should be targeted toward small farmers and small- and medium-size businesses.

Educational exchanges under the Fulbright and Humphrey Scholar programs and cultural outreach activities should be increased. These programs produce powerful agents for community development in Burma, and can significantly improve the prospects for better governance.

U.S. policy should shift to a more robust phase if Burmese leaders begin to relax political restrictions, institute economic reforms and advance human rights. If there is no movement on these fronts, there will likely be pressure in the U.S. for tightening sanctions.

If there is no recourse but to pursue stronger sanctions, the U.S. should coordinate with others, including the European Union and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, to impose targeted financial and banking measures to ensure that military leaders and their associates cannot evade the impact of what otherwise would be less-effective unilateral sanctions.

If a different scenario emerges, it should open the way for a much more active U.S. role in assisting with capacity building, governance training and international efforts to encourage economic reforms.

One priority should be to develop an appropriate mechanism for ensuring that revenues from the sale of natural gas are properly accounted for, repatriated and allocated to meet urgent national needs.

In adjusting its policy toward Burma, the U.S. must face reality with a clear vision of what its foreign policy can achieve. U.S. influence in Burma is unlikely to outweigh that of increasingly powerful Asian neighbors. Therefore, the U.S. should make collaboration with other key stakeholders, particularly ASEAN, the United Nations and Burma’s neighbors — including China, India and Japan — the centerpiece of its policy.

In every respect, conditions in Burma are among the direst of any country in the world, and it will take decades, if not generations, to reverse current downward trends and create a foundation for a sustainable and viable democratic government and a prosperous society.

The U.S. needs to position itself to respond effectively and flexibly to the twists and turns that a potential transition in Burma may take over time, with an eye toward pressing the Burmese leadership to move in positive directions.

* Wesley K. Clark, a former NATO supreme commander, is a senior fellow at UCLA’s Burkle Center for International Relations. Henrietta H. Fore is a former administrator of USAID. Both are cochairs of the Asia Society-sponsored Task Force on U.S. Policy toward Burma/Myanmar. Suzanne DiMaggio, director of Policy Studies at the Asia Society, is project director. © 2010 Project Syndicate

Union Election Commission issues Notification No. 41/2010
The New Light of Myanmar: Mon 10 May 2010

Nay Pyi Taw, May 7 – The Union Election Commission issued Notification No. 41/2010 today. The translation of the notification is as follows:-
The Union of Myanmar Union
Election Commission Nay Pyi Taw
Notification No. 41/2010
10th Waning of Kason, 1372 ME
7 May 2010

Permission granted to Kokang Democracy and Unity Party to register as political party

The Union Election Commission granted permission to the Kokang Democracy and Unity Party with its headquarters at No. B/6/137 on Dawna Street in Region 6 of Ward 2, Lashio, Shan State to register in accord with the Article 9 of the Political Parties Registration Law as of 7 May 2010.

The registration number of the Kokang Democracy and Unity Party is (4).

By Order,

Sd/Win Ko
Secretary
Union Election Commission

Faction of Myanmar’s opposition forms new party
Associated Press: Fri 7 May 2010

Yangon, Myanmar — A faction of Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition declared Friday it will form its own political party to contest Myanmar’s first elections in two decades, a day after the democracy icon’s party disbanded to boycott the vote it says will be flawed.
Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, which won Myanmar’s last election in 1990 but which the army never allowed to take power, declined to reregister for elections planned for this year, as stipulated by a new election law. The League says the laws are undemocratic and unfair, and its non-registration is tantamount to a boycott.

However, a group of League members who had disagreed with the boycott said they would form their own party called the National Democratic Force.

“We will form a new political party to continue our struggle for democracy and human rights,” said Khin Maung Swe, a former senior member of Suu Kyi’s party and a former political prisoner.

Whether Suu Kyi would play any role in the new party was not immediately clear but unlikely. She had previously called the junta’s election laws “undemocratic” and said she would “not even think” of registering her party for the polls.

Swe said he had earlier suggested the idea of forming what he called a “lifeboat party” to enable the League to circumvent the dissolution. “The idea was not accepted,” he said, but the faction decided to form one anyway.

Swe said the new party would register with the Election Commission this month. While existing parties had to reregister by May 6, new parties are given more time.

Roughly 80 percent of the new party’s membership would be from Suu Kyi’s former party, he said.

“We are going to continue our unending democratic struggle within the legal framework,” said Than Nyein, expected to serve as the new party’s chairman.

On Thursday, officials at the National League for Democracy tidied their desks and locked political files at their main office in Yangon, a quiet end to a party founded more than 20 years ago to challenge military rule.

Leaders and several members were seen Friday inside the headquarters. They are barred from holding political meetings there but have said they will continue working as a social movement.

Suu Kyi, who has been under house arrest for 14 of the past 20 years, was convicted last year of illegally harboring a visitor, an eccentric American who swam uninvited to her lakeside home. The conviction bars her from running or even voting in the election.

The government has not yet announced a date for the upcoming elections, saying only they will be held this year. The vote has been widely criticized as a sham designed to cement military rule.

NDF Party to ally with pro-democracy, ethnic groups – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Fri 7 May 2010

A former leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) who plans to form a new political party to contest in the coming election said the party will ally with other pro-democracy and ethnic parties to shape the pro-democracy movement.
“Our unfinished duty is to bring peace, democracy and development to the people of Burma,” said Than Nyein, a former NLD executive member and a leader of the new party. “For the cause, we will work together with other political parties including ethnic parties after we form the National Democratic Force (NDF) party.”

Than Nyein said the NDF would not rush to ally with other political groups until it had studied the nature of the campaign and the political parties.

“Our party would also avoid to contest in ethnic areas in favor of the rights of ethnic political parties to manage their affairs,” Than Nyein told The Irrawaddy on Friday. “Like the democracy issue, ethnic issues are also important for us.”

He said ethnic political issues should be resolved alongside democracy and human rights issues.

People should approach politics pragmatically, he said: “Sometimes when the things that we want can not happen, we need to think about other ways to achieve our main goal—how to contribute to society in a better way.”

Than Nyein and his former NLD colleagues will formally apply to register the new party within one month. The NLD was dissolved as a political party on Thursday after it decided not to re-register, saying the electoral laws are not fair. The laws banned NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other political detainees from running in the election.

As for Suu Kyi’s future political role, Than Nyein said she is still their party’s leader.

“At any time Daw Aung San Suu Kyi can come to lead us,” he said. “We always respect her.”

He said detained activists of the 88 Generation Students group who are now in their forties and thirties, such as Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi, are also welcome. “They are a new generation,” Than Nyein said.

After the election commission approves the NDF’s application, he said that many former NLD members are likely to join the NDF party, and the party expects to rely heavily on former NLD activists across the country.

Meanwhile, some former NLD leaders expressed caution about the role of the NDF.

Win Tin, a former colleague of Than Nyein who pposed NLD re-gistration, said that Than Nyein and other former NLD members within the new political party must be loyal to the people of Burma and respect Suu Kyi.

Some activist said they were concerned that the NDF could split dissident groups, which could affect the overall pro-democracy movement.

“We could see a big split among the opposition,” said Chan Tun, a veteran Rangoon politician. “I want to suggest that they seek unity and understanding. If you have the same goals, then it’s all right to use different tactics and approaches. I hope all the pro-democracy groups can avoid disunity, which would be the biggest blow for the movement.”

Than Nyein was a former student leader in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the 1988 uprising, he was a physician in southern Shan State, where he led a pro-democracy movement. After the military coup, he was briefly detained.

In the early 1990s, Than Nyein and other NLD leaders close to Suu Kyi were sideline from the party because of the junta’s pressure. He said a number of his friends have died in prison. He was arrested several times during the past 20 years. His last detention was in 1996 for aiding Suu Kyi. He was released in September 2008 along with other NLD leaders such as Win Tin and Khin Maung Swe.

Military rule in civilian clothing? – Editorial
Voice of America: Fri 7 May 2010

Burma’s top military leaders recently resigned their posts and organized a new political party, a move possibly intended to run candidates in national elections later this year.
Prime Minister of Burma Thein Sein.Burma’s top military leaders recently resigned their posts and organized a new political party, a move possibly intended to run candidates in national elections later this year, the first since 1990.

The international community has been calling consistently for a return to representative, civilian rule in Burma. This action by some of Burma’s top generals, though, follows enactment of a restrictive election law that bars many political activists from running for office. The decision by General Thein Sein and some 20 other members of his cabinet to shed their uniforms raises more questions than it answers about Burma’s future.

Under a controversial new constitution drafted by the military government, a popular vote some time later this year will, Burmese authorities say, restore civilian rule for the first time since 1962. The generals see the election as a way to enhance their credibility at home and deflect criticism on their policies from the international community.

To accomplish this, Burma’s leaders would have to open up the political process. Instead, they restricted it with the new Political Parties Registration law and the constitution, which guarantees 25 percent of the seats in Parliament to the military even before the voting. Now, by leaving their military posts and forming the new Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP, Thein Sein and his “former” military colleagues could supplement the military’s 25% quota on parliamentary seats, enabling the military to retain control of the country under the guise of an open election.

The USDP has yet to announce its plans, and it is hoped that its intentions will soon be clear. To be credible, an open, free and fair election is essential, along with a chance to conduct a broad and serious dialogue with leading activists and various ethnic groups who deserve a say in Burma’s future.

Parties aplenty, but can any challenge Myanmar’s junta? – Martin Petty
Reuters: Fri 7 May 2010

Bangkok – Although dismissed by many as a sham to entrench five decades of military rule, Myanmar’s upcoming election is being taken seriously at home, with dozens of political parties queuing up to take part.
But what remains to be seen is whether any real force will emerge to challenge the iron-fisted rule of a military that seems determined to cling on to power.

The party seen as Myanmar’s only real hope for a democratic future was effectively disbanded as of Friday when Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) opted not to register for what it said were “unjust” polls — a move that angered many of its supporters.

A breakaway NLD faction announced just hours after the deadline that it would enter the election under a new political entity called the National Democratic Force (NDF) — assuming the army-appointed Election Commission agrees to allow it.

But if the NDF or any other pro-democracy parties emerge, their leaders will have big shoes to fill now the charismatic, long-detained Suu Kyi, the icon of Myanmar’s democracy struggle, has clearly stated her opposition to the long-awaited polls.

The NLD won the last election, in 1990, by a landslide but was denied the chance to rule by a junta that used unexplained constitutional technicalities to keep the NLD out of office.

Many experts and people on the ground believe the window of opportunity for an opposing force to win the support of Myanmar’s people and replicate the NLD’s 1990 feat is fast closing.

Opposing opposition?

The break-up of the NLD could lead to a fractious and divisive opposition, with those intending to challenge the military and its proxies more likely to face off with each other.

“We’ll have to wait and see how well the real, genuine pro-democracy parties can work together,” said Aung Naing Oo, a Harvard-educated Burmese academic based in Thailand.

“The problem is the NLD wasn’t strategically deconstructed. The hardliners and moderates who have been through thick and thin might undermine each other. Some may go underground and that’s a recipe for confrontation.”

The prospect of a clumsily-formed and bickering opposition plays right into the hands of the generals, who unlike 1990, appear to have hatched a clever plan to retain control of the country at all levels.

The armed forces drafted a constitution in 2008 and ensured it passed a referendum, granting its commander-in-chief more power than an elected president and allocating control of key ministries, like justice, defence and interior, to the military.

And it looks as if it will get its hands on the “civilian” side of the new democratic Myanmar too.

At least 20 ministers from the junta, including Prime Minister Thein Sein, resigned from the military last week to become civilian politicians, although as is typical with Myanmar, their parties remain a mystery.

A party known as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) has attracted wide attention on state-controlled television, prompting accusations the junta has hijacked a social development organisation to use as its vehicle for parliamentary politics.

The USDA appears to be modelled on Indonesia’s powerful Golkar Party and claims to have 24 million members — about half of Myanmar’s population.

Parliamentary sideshow

A total of 30 groups have applied to become political parties and more may join before the June 6 deadline for new parties to register for the election, a date for which has yet to be set.

Only four of 10 existing parties have applied to run, three, including the National Unity Party (NUP) — the runner-up to the NLD in 1990 — comprise former members of the Socialist Programme Party, the political arm of the military junta that seized power in a 1962 coup before its dissolution in 1998.

Regardless of who wins, most analysts believe parliamentary politics will be a sideshow given the military’s ministerial and budgetary powers and its allocation of 25 percent of the national assembly and a third of senate seats to serving generals.

“The generals don’t want a repeat of the 1990 election and its clear they won’t share power with anyone,” said Aung Zaw, editor of the Thailand-based Irrawaddy magazine.

“Any idea that this election can change the political landscape is wishful thinking. Members of parliament won’t have the power or numbers to go against these military dinosaurs.”

(Additional reporting by Aung Hla Tun in Naypyitaw; Editing by Alex Richardson)

Burma’s imperfect polls offer the best hope for change – Roger Huang
Jakarta Post: Fri 7 May 2010

Burma is at an important juncture this year as its first election in 20 years approaches.
Well known for its charismatic opposition leader, Aung Sang Suu Kyi, and the ruling, military-dominated State Peace and Development Council, it comes as no real surprise that a series of recently announced electoral laws would effectively prevent Suu Kyi and other political dissidents from participating in the upcoming election.

Irrespective of the wave of criticism the electoral laws attracted from pro-democracy forces and foreign governments, it seems clear that the multiparty election will take place with or without the participation of non-junta-supported parties. This includes the main democratic opposition, the Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy, providing a serious challenge to the NLD and other political stakeholders.

Regardless of the mockery that the 2010 Burma election may make of the democratic process, it would be an even bigger blow for the country if no genuine opposition participates. Under the new laws, NLD will face dissolution as a legal entity if it continues with its current plan to boycott the election.

Despite the undemocratic clauses of the 2008 Constitution on which the 2010 election is based, it will essentially allow a pseudo-civilian government to be formed after the election. This will include the reintroduction of a parliamentary system in Burma, albeit with 25 percent of the seats guaranteed for the military. Despite the unfair practices and challenges any opposition may face, the election also provides an opportunity for opposition groups to challenge the SPDC, by competing for seats against junta-backed proxy parties.

Hundreds of genuine democratic enthusiasts not affiliated with the NLD will still be eager to run in the election. Some may succeed in the polls even in the face of open intimidation and junta manipulation.

By participating in the election, even without Suu Kyi’s approval or the NLD’s involvement, opposition groups may garner enough support to become viable players in the Burmese political landscape. Additionally, from within the SPDC-ascribed framework, opposition politicians will finally have a “legitimate” platform to push for gradual political liberalization, and perhaps even more important, address key pragmatic social and economic concerns of the state when the parliament finally convenes after a hiatus of several decades.

For the last two decades, the NLD and the international community have continued to condemn and dismiss the SPDC. However, continued isolation, Western sanctions and moral condemnation of the generals have done little to sway the junta’s position. Such policies have in fact only strengthened the junta’s resolve to develop the Burmese state at their own pace and on their own terms.

Irrespective of what Suu Kyi stands for, and the noble sacrifices she and others have made in their demand for a democratic Burma, the reality is that Western support and continued focus on Suu Kyi and the NLD, along with their sanctions, have failed to influence the ruling junta.

Participating in the election within the constraints set by the junta may seem like kowtowing to the military regime and falls far short of the international norms in upholding a credible democratic process. However, for a nation that has been plagued by civil war, ethnic tensions, factional politics and bureaucratic inefficiency ever since its independence, participation in the election is perhaps the only viable option at present for any constructive development.

Suu Kyi will remain an important figure for the future of Burma, whether as a living martyr or as a figure for peace and reconciliation in a more politically relaxed Burma. However, the political realities of today’s Burma suggest that pragmatism must prevail over abstract notions of democracy and simplistic moral positions. For the betterment of the Burmese populace, gradual, incremental political changes will be more constructive than continued absolutist positions that insist on vague and unrealistic goals aimed at immediate “democracy” in the Burma state.

As former Burmese UN Secretary-General U Thant reportedly once said, “Governments, systems, ideologies come and go, but it is humanity which remains.” Similarly, in order for Burma to move beyond its current political impasse, strict dogmatism must be abandoned by the NLD and other oppositional stakeholders. As long as the democratic forces survive the 2010 electoral games, hope will remain for Burma.

East Asia Forum

* Roger Huang is research development officer at the Center for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

Game over? No, not yet – Aung Zaw
Irrawaddy: Fri 7 May 2010

Like it or not, Burma’s politics will remain black and white, with no prospect of becoming “multi-colored,” as in neighboring Thailand.
The decision by Burma’s main opposition party and outright winner of the 1990 election, the National League for Democracy (NLD), not to reregister signaled that political divisions remain deep.
Aung Zaw is founder and editor of the Irrawaddy magazine. He can be reached at aungzaw@....

As the NLD held a final gathering this week at its Rangoon headquarters before its forced dissolution, Burmese people and the dissident community inside and outside the country hotly debated the future of the party, the democracy movement as a whole and, of course, the roles of Aung San Suu Kyi and other party leaders.

Many pragmatists, revolutionary activists and even members of the “pro-election” camp have sympathy for the NLD and Suu Kyi and want them to continue the fight. Some of the criticism of the NLD is based on sympathy because the critics want to see the party adopt a better political strategy and tactics and to become savvy.

Since its foundation in 1988, the NLD has never been able to function as a political party, operating rather like a quasi semi-underground social movement. Many of its leaders, including Suu Kyi, have been detained for long terms of imprisonment or house arrest.

Although the NLD emerged the winner of the 1990 election, the result was not recognized by the regime, which then decapitated the party and imprisoned many of its members.

The regime ruthlessly and brutally played a black and white game, and with the dissolution now of the party the junta may feel it has achieved its objective. But I am not so sure.

Suu Kyi and party leaders have repeatedly said that they would never turn their backs on the people or renounce the struggle for democracy. They have vowed to keep the visible signs of the party—its banners and placards—on view, perhaps provoking a crackdown.

Political and social instability will undoubtedly increase before we see a better Burma.

Suu Kyi will continue to be an influential leader regardless of whether or not she remains under house arrest or heads a political movement. She and other prominent activists now in prison should be released and resume their involvement in the opposition movement.

The new government (a “wolf in sheep’s clothing?”) will have no choice but to continue to face the fundamental challenges presented by a still formidable Suu Kyi and her calls for political dialogue, the embattled democracy movement, radical activists, unpredictable political strife, thorny ethnic issues and the restless, armed ethnic rebels.

International support for Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement, while not expected to increase dramatically, will remain strong. The struggle is not over. With or without the NLD, the desire for change in Burma will remain the same.

The upcoming election (apparently more like a selection than an election) is unlikely to change the dynamics of the current civil-military relationship because the regime wields a unilateral and coercive policy instrument. We may see a less evil and more sophisticated government take power but fundamentally meaningful changes are unlikely to come to Burma.

The issues of ethnic minorities, human rights violations, political prisoners, forced labor, internally displaced persons, refugees and the millions of migrants stranded in neighboring countries won’t be solved.

The ethnic issue will continue to confront the new government because the Burman-dominated military regime doesn’t understand the aspirations of the ethnic minorities and why they took up arms in the first place.

Snr-Gen Than Shwe once famously declared at a cabinet meeting: “Let them [the ethnic minority groups] smoke as many 555 cigarettes as possible. Let them drink as many Black Label [whiskies] as possible. As long we have peace it is fine.”

Ethnic leaders aren’t fighting for 555 cigarettes and Black Label whiskey, however. Without a solution of ethnic issues, there can be no political transition in Burma.

Internationally, the military’s absolute control of key areas in the future government indicates that Naypyidaw will remain a pariah, lacking credibility and legitimacy. Burma will continue to be a problem child in the region and beyond.

Sanctions will remain in place, although the West, particularly the US, will find more creative ways to penetrate Burma and the new regime. The clandestine military relationship between Burma and North Korea will continue to draw the attention of the West and neighboring governments.

Of course, there is no lack of wishful thinkers and spin-doctors, saying things they don’t believe in for the sake of maintaining the status quo for their donors or just to undermine Suu Kyi and the democracy movement.

Indeed, some naively believe there will be a new landscape after the election. Any new landscape, however, will be just a facade—even Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s change from military uniform to civilian suit won’t disguise his true clown’s costume.

Than Shwe and his team should not be underestimated, however. They have a raft of “Plan Bs” in order to hold on to power at all cost. They don’t care how many more activists die in prison or in ethnic conflicts. They are unmoved by the plight of refugees and internally displaced people.

Than Shwe and his road map may deceive sections of the foreign community and some regional leaders suffering from “Burma fatigue.” But the people of Burma are not deceived—they’ve had enough of the hell that is Burma today and they want change.

Political parties slam ‘rule-breaking’ PM – Aye Nai
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 6 May 2010

A number of parties competing in Burma’s elections this year have said the formation of a new political party by prime minister Thein Sein violates Burma’s own domestic laws.
According to the Political Party Registration Law, unveiled in March, government employees are barred from setting up their own political parties. Thein Sein, who last week stood down from his military post but remains prime minister, has announced that he will head the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which recently registered for the polls.

The USDP sounds eerily similar to the government-proxy social organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), although no concrete link has yet been verified.

If there is a link, then the party would be guilty of political corruption because the USDA is financed by the government.

“During the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League era [1945 to 1962], the law prohibited government workers from setting up political parties and standing for the elections,” said Thu Wei, head of the Democracy Party. “However, the prime minister’s position back then was not recognised as a government employee, so we are not yet clear what the law now is.

He added however that it was “completely inappropriate” to use the USDA’s name. “We dislike and do not accept this,” he said. “This is unfair and cunning, and is meant to confuse people during the elections. If such a party becomes the government, lies and wrongdoings will continue.”

Ye Htun, brother of the prominent Burmese politician Aye Lwin and head of Union of Myanmar 88 Generation Student Youths party, said that Burma was dealing in “messy politics”.

“Today’s election laws were written by the current military government who are like the referee on the pitch,” he said. “Now the referee is bringing his own ball into the game, play the game himself, and he will shoot it into the goalpost that he himself positioned. This is quite pointless in politics.”

Khin Maung Swe, spokesperson for the National League for Democracy (NLD), which today marks its termination as a political after refusing to run in the elections, said that if Thein Sein was still receiving a government salary, then his new role as USDP head would be illegal.

Much of the international community has condemned the election laws, which effectively block the NLD from participating and appear to be a ploy aimed at keeping the military government in power. More than 25 parties have so far registered for the elections.

No more ‘military government’ – Nayee Lin Let
Irrawaddy: Thu 6 May 2010

Naypyidaw: The War Office in Napyidaw has issued a directive for state-controlled media not to describe the Burmese government as a “Tatmadaw government,” according to military sources. Tatmadaw, in Burmese, means “military.”
A high ranking officer said that on April 26, state-owned media such as newspapers, radio, television run by the Defense Ministry and Information Ministry were given instructions not to use the term.
Burmese soldiers sit alert in a car escorting Snr-Gen Than Shwe from a military parade marking the country’s 65th Armed Forces Day at a parade ground in Naypyidaw on March 27. (Photo: Getty Images)

“This instruction is aimed at the government led by PM Thein Sein,” said the officer. “Many high-ranking army officer have already resigned from their army positions in order to set up a political party and to become candidates in the upcoming election. In that case, if you continue to use the term ‘Tatmadaw government,’ it won’t be relevant. So, the media must use the term ‘government of the union of Burma.’”

The instruction was issued after the resignation of selected army officers who will join a state-backed political party to stand as candidates for seats in parliament, said the officer.

The term “Tatmadaw government” has been widely used in regime-controlled media after the military coup since 1988.

According to an army veteran, after April 26, there are no army officers in the structure of the current government and the military government has been transformed into a civilian government.

“If you use the term tatmadaw government, it won’t be relevant with the current government. So you are not allowed to use the term,” he said.

Under the current government, there are 38 ministries. In the cabinet, there are 39 ministers and 39 deputy ministers.

It was reported last week that Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein and other key members of the ruling junta have registered a political party to contest the upcoming general election.

Thein Sein and 26 other leaders had registered the party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), at the Union Election Commission in April. The 26 other party leaders were not identified but are known to be current ministers and deputy ministers.

A list of army officers who resigned:

Ministers:

Gen Htay Oo, agriculture and irrigation minister
Lt-Gen Soe Thein, Industrial (2) minister
Gen Thein Swe, transportation minister

Brig-Gen Lun Thi, energy minister
Gen Aung Min, railway minister
Brig-Gen Tin Naing Thein, economy and trading minister

Gen Soe Naing, hotel and tourism minister
Gen Hla Htun, finance and taxation minister
Brig-Gen Thein Zaw, communication minister

Brig General Thuya Myint Maung, minister for religion
Gen Khin Aung Myint, minister for culture
Gen Tin Htut, minister for cooperative

Col Thein Nyunt, minister for border areas development
Col Zaw Min, minister for electricity (1)
Gen Khin Maung Myint, minister for construction and electricity (2)

Brig-GenThuya Aye Myint, sports minister
Brig-GenKyaw San, information minister
Brig-GenThein Aung, forestry minister

Gen Maung Oo, home and immigration minister
Brig Ohn Myint, minister for mining
Gen Maung Maung Swe, social affairs minister

Brig-Gen Maung Maung Thein, husbandry and fishery minister
Gen Lin Maung, auditor-general
Brig-Gen Aung Thein Lin, mayor of rangoon
Brig Phone Zaw Han, mayor of mandalay

Deputy Ministers:

Lt-Col Khin Maung Kyaw, industrial (2)
Gen Kyaw Swar Khine, industrial (2)
Col Thuyein Zaw, national planning

Col Nyan Htun Aung, transportation
Brig Tin Htun Aung, labor
Brig Aung Myo Min, education

Brig Than Htay, energy
Brig Aung Htun, economy and trading
Brig Aye Myint Kyu, hotel and tourism

Col Hla Thein Swe, finance and taxation
Gen Thein Htun, communication
Brig Thuya Aung Ko, religion

Brig Myint Thein, construction
Brig Win Sein, immigration
Col Tin Ngwe, border area development
Brig Win Myint, electricity (2)
Brig Bhone Swe, interior
Brig Kyaw Myint, social affairs

Col Maung Par, deputy mayor of Rangoon

Tensions rising between Myanmar’s military junta and the Kachin Independence Army
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly: Thu 6 May 2010

Tensions are rising between Myanmar’s military junta and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), as the latter continues to reject transformation into a border guard force.
Not all anniversaries are to be celebrated; 28 April marked a year since Myanmar’s government proposed to integrate some 20 ethnic insurgent ceasefire groups into the Tatmadaw (armed forces). Despite a year of negotiations, agreement on the proposal seems no closer.

The border guard force (BGF) initiative coincides with the military government’s (State Peace and Development Council: SPDC) efforts to secure the participation of these groups’ political wings in elections designed to formalise the military’s control over the government.

Weaker ceasefire groups have had little choice but to comply with the Tatmadaw’s demands. However, stronger groups have reacted obstinately to the initiative. One of these is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which remains a formidable military group. A spokesman for the KIA’s political wing, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), told Jane’s it boasts 25,000 personnel, including between 7,000 and 8,000 ground troops. These figures may be exaggerated, but the group can also draw on its 7,000-strong militarised youth wing.

Irreconcilable differences
Visiting the KIA’s headquarters in Laiza on 16 April, Jane’s was told why the BGF initiative is seen as unworkable. According to the proposal, each BGF unit would be commanded by three majors, including a commander and vice-commander drawn from the ethnic armies and an intelligence-cum-administrative officer from the government’s army, significantly restricting the group’s autonomy. The KIA’s independence would be further compromised by the integration of 29 other officers and non-commissioned officers from the army into each of the 326-strong units. Subordinated to the Tatmadaw’s directorate of militias and border guard forces, the BGF units would be inferior to infantry battalions.

As an incentive, the Tatmadaw promised the KIA salaries, provisions and armaments. However, the proposal would retire soldiers over the age of 50 and sideline senior KIA commanders. The proposal also omits any mention of the KIO, which governs the Kachin State Special Region 2.

In an attempt to resolve the ongoing dispute, 16 meetings between the SPDC and KIO have taken place, but these have achieved little. The KIO’s initial counter-proposal to the BGF was to rename the KIA as the Kachin Regional Guard Force and jointly govern Kachin state with the new government. The SPDC rejected this on the basis that the BGF was modelled on international practices, and that the creation of autonomous ethnic forces would restore a system of administration that had failed under the previous U Nu government.

In later meetings, the KIO invoked the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which gave ethnic areas on the periphery of the state internal administrative autonomy. In response, the northern commander Major General Soe Win declared: “The age of Panglong has been cancelled and it is gone now.”

Following the last meeting in April, the KIO proposed informally that the entire BGF issue be set aside for resolution under the new government, and that it neither participate nor interfere in the elections. The SPDC spurned the offer.

Finally, on 15 April, the KIA dispatched a letter to Naypyidaw acknowledging that it would accept a role within the Tatmadaw, but only on the basis of equality as part of a union army. On 23 April, the two sides agreed to continue their dialogue.

Growing tensions
Against this background of uncertainty, a series of recent bomb explosions have highlighted increased military tension. On 15 April, three bombs exploded in downtown Yangon. According to the state-run newspaper New Light of Myanmar, the incident killed 10 people and injured 170. On the same day, a bomb blast also occurred in the town of Muse at the main border trade gate with China. Although no one has claimed responsibility for either blast, several of the ceasefire groups have indicated that if fighting resumes they will wage urban warfare.

Two days later, 27 bombs exploded at a controversial hydropower project north of Myitkyina. The project has been a source of tension as it will displace 60 Kachin villages. Government officials are publicly linking the BGF issue and these bombs. On the morning of the explosions, the SPDC-supported Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) reported that unexploded ordnance at the site resembled KIA-manufactured bombs.

The KIA vehemently denied any involvement in the bombings when speaking to Jane’s. However, several weeks before, the USDA revealed that authorities had arrested a man in possession of 32 remote-controlled bombs. According to their account, the man confessed he had attended a two-day training course in explosives organised by the KIA, which had dispatched him and 49 other underground operatives with small stipends and dozens of explosives.

Forecast
Amid growing tensions, the two sides appear to be at loggerheads. The SPDC remains resolute, while the KIA position requires either constitutional redrafting or their exclusion from the process, neither of which the SPDC wants to accept. A resumption of hostilities is possible, but undesirable for all parties. The SPDC is likely to forge ahead with elections and resolve the status of the ceasefire groups later. However, without a settlement the country’s deep-rooted ethnic problems will only fester.

Call to open Myanmar’s books – Brian McCartan
The Asia Times: Thu 6 May 2010

Bangkok – A new international campaign aims to encourage oil and gas giants Total and Chevron to reveal the extent of payments they have made to the Myanmar government over the past 18 years. New oil and gas pipelines are slated to come online in the next few years and rights groups allege Myanmar’s oil and gas industry serves to prop up the rights-abusing military regime.
EarthRights International (ERI), a Washington DC-based human-rights and environmental organization, announced the campaign at a press conference in Bangkok on April 27. A statement for the campaign was signed by more than 160 labor unions, investmentfirms, academics, non-government organizations and policy makers, including former Irish president and head of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Mary Robinson, as well as former Norwegian prime minister Kjell Magne Bondevik.

The statement calls for France-based Total, Chevron of the United States, and Thai state oil company Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration and Production (PTTEP), to reveal the amounts paid to the junta in fees, taxes, royalties and benefits since the start of the Yadana Gas project in 1992. EarthRights says transparency of these payments would set a good example for other oil and gas companies now working in Myanmar.

Total, in response to a report by ERI in September 2009, disclosed in October 2009 that its portion of the Yadana gas project had generated US$254 million for the junta in 2008. Economists say this data will be important for the policies, including taxation, interest rates and exchange rate management, of the government that comes into power after the elections that are expected to be held this year.

Total, Chevron and PTTEP are part of a consortium, together with Myanmar state gas firm Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), in the Yadana gas field in the Andaman sea as well as a gas pipeline that feeds two power plants that provide electricity to Bangkok. Total signed an initial profit-sharing contract with MOGE in 1992 and remains the primary shareholder. Chevron became involved when it bought UNOCAL in 2005. Sales of gas from the pipeline to PTT Public Company Ltd, Thailand’s state-owned oil and gas company, began in 2000.

The project came in for criticism over well-documented human-rights abuses in the area directly related to construction of the pipeline between 1996-1999 and ongoing security measures maintained along its route. A lawsuit brought against UNOCAL in the United States by villagers from the pipeline area was settled for an undisclosed sum in 2005.

Despite this, Total and Chevron – which inherited UNOCAL’s liabilities in the merger – deny responsibility for the negative impacts of the project, including human-rights abuses. They have even made claims that rights abuses have been eradicated in the project area, statements that ERI and other human-rights groups contest.

The Yadana field is the military regime’s single-largest revenue earner. ERI estimates the field earned $1.7 billion in 2008, of which an estimated $1.02 billion went directly to the regime. The group believes that from 2000, when gas sales began, through 2008, the junta earned a total of $7.58 billion in revenues.

Fast cash flows
Another field in the Andaman Sea, the Yetagun, is run by Malaysia’s Petronas, Thai Nippon Steel, PTTEP and MOGE. Petronas took over the stake of a British energy company that pulled out of the project under pressure in 2002 and is now its largest shareholder. A natural gaspipeline from the field joins with the Yadana pipeline at the Thai border. According to ERI’s research, the amount of revenue earned from the Yetagun project is only slightly less than that generated by the Yadana project.

Another much more ambitious oil and gas pipeline project in western Myanmar is projected to at least double these annual earnings. The Shwe Gas project encompasses natural gas extraction from a field off the coast of Arakan Division and a 2,806-kilometer pipeline that will run the length of Myanmar to Kunming in southwestern China and onto Nanning, the capital of Guangxi province.

The consortium involves Daewoo International and Korean Gas of South Korea, Oil and Gas Corporation (ONCG-Videsh) and Gas Authority of India Ltd (GAIL) and MOGE. Hyundai Heavy Industries of South Korea was contracted by Daewoo in February to construct related offshore and onshore gas production facilities.
China’s state-run China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) secured its place as the sole buyer of the Shwe natural gas reserves in 2008. In June 2009, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping and Myanmar deputy leader Vice Senior General Maung Aye signed a memorandum of understanding for the development, operation and management of the pipeline, which will have a capacity to transport 12 billion cubic meters of natural gasannually.

Conservative estimates indicate that Myanmar’s government will earn $1 billion per year from the pipeline over the next 30 years, with the first gas transfers expected to begin in 2013. This is in addition to the $2.5 billion to $3 billion already paid to the regime for bonuses and contract exploration rights related to the project.

Supplementing the project is the construction of a deep-sea port and crude oil storage facilities on Maday Island, near the town of Kyaukpyu, on the Arakan coast. The port will allow Chinese oil tankers to unload at the facility and pump the oil through a 771-kilometer pipeline being built alongside the natural gas pipeline to Kunming.

The oil pipeline will have the capacity to transport 22 million tonnes of crude oil annually. The port and pipeline will also allow China to avoid sending oil, by some estimates over 80% of its fuel shipments, from the Middle East and Africa through the pirate-infested and easily blocked Malacca Strait. While the port and storage facilities are scheduled to be completed this year, the pipeline is not expected to be up and running until 2013.

Blacklisted bosses
Contracts for the construction of the port facilities and some of the pipeline infrastructure have been given to Asia World and IGE. Asia World is owned by Steven Law, also known as Tun Myint Hlaing, the son of alleged drug trafficker Lo Hsing Han. Both Law and his father have been on a US visa blacklist since 1996 for suspected drug trafficking and their company is on the US Treasury Department’s sanctions list for their financial connections to the regime.

IGE, which is registered in Singapore, is owned by the sons of Myanmar Minister of Industry-1, Aung Thaung. The company is on a European Union sanctions list against junta members and their associated businesses. Aung Thaung and his sons are barred from entering the European Union and Australia under the sanctions.

The dual pipeline project has come under criticism from rights groups. They claim the deal has contributed to increased militarization along the pipeline route, land confiscation and forced labor. A Myanmar army offensive against the Kokang ethnic group along the border with China last year may have also been connected to the pipeline project. Both the military government in the Myanmar capital in Naypyidaw and officials in Beijing are keen to make sure that continued tensions between the junta and ethnic groups along the border do not cause security problems for the pipeline.

Although India will not receive any of the Shwe Gas field’s output, it is still interested in Myanmar’s offshore oil and gas potential. In February, the Indian government authorized ONCG Videsh and GAIL to move forward with their stakes in the gas pipeline to China. It also authorized a reported $1 billion investment by the companies in continued development of offshore gas fields operated by Daewoo.

Rights groups claim the profits earned by the junta from the Yadana and Yetagun gas projects already provide the means for the regime to ignore international criticism and purchase more weapons and equipment for its military. They claim the $3 billion earned annually from oil and gas projects would be better spent to improve the country’s abysmally underfunded health and education sectors.

The generals have been criticized for under-reporting their earnings from the gas projects, which are believed to make up over 60% of national income. Instead of accurately including gas revenues in its national budget, the cash received is recorded at the 30-year-old fixed exchange rate of six kyat to the dollar; the current black market rate is over 1,000 kyat to the greenback.

In a September 2009 report entitled “Total Impact”, ERI claimed that the funds not recorded went into offshore accounts at two banks in Singapore – the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) and the DBS Group. Both banks have officially denied the accusation.

Although oil and gas revenues fell last year due to a decline in global prices, the revenues were still significant. A MOGE representative told the ASEAN Council on Petroleum at a trade fair in November that Myanmar expected to double its output of natural gas in the next 10 years, largely from the Shwe project.

Economist Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate for economics and former World Bank head, suggested to Myanmar’s leaders in a rare seminar with a foreign expert in December 2009 that oil and gas revenues could, if used wisely, open up a new era for the impoverished country. Sean Turnell, an Australian expert on Myanmar’s economy, has suggested that oil and gas revenues could be used to shore up other parts of the economy, including initiatives that establish credit systems for farmers. So far this foreign advice has fallen on deaf ears.

Oil and gas prices and revenues are a contentious issue in Myanmar. Rapidly rising fuel prices were one of the chief factors that sparked the anti-government street demonstrations in 2007 that later became known around the world as the Buddhist monk-led “Saffron” revolution. As part of a recent move to privatize many of the junta’s business holdings, tycoon and junta favorite Tay Za has moved to secure contracts for state-run gas stations, a move that has apparently provoked anger in some Yangon business circles.

The government announced in February it would sell 256 gas stations to private companies. Tay Za, who is the chairman of the recently formed Fuel Oil Importers and Distributors Association (FOIDA) and already has the contract to operate state-run stations in northern Myanmar, is well placed to buy the stations. The vice chairman of the FOIDA is Aung Thet Mann, son of junta number three and armed forces joint chief of staff General Thura Shwe Mann.

It is unlikely however that the privatizations will extend to the state-owned MOGE and it remains unclear how the oil and gas operations will be operated under the new government that will take over after elections late this year. Analysts believe it is unlikely that the generals would allow a new minister to drastically alter the current revenue arrangements. This will be a problem for any new regime as it bids to manage more effectively – and hopefully transparently – the economy.

* Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist.

Quintana says conditions not present for credible elections
Irrawaddy: Thu 6 May 2010

The United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Tomás Ojea Quintana, said on Wednesday that the Burmese military government has not established the conditions necessary for a credible election and urged the junta to release all political prisoners in advance of the election.
“The Government of Myanmar [Burma] has not yet responded to pleas from inside and outside the country for conditions that allow credible elections,” Quintana said in a UN press release.
Tomas Ojea Quintana from Argentina, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Burma. (Photo: AP)

“These elections are important for the people of Myanmar [Burma] and provide an opportunity for real improvement in the human rights situation. However, the government needs to ensure that these elections are credible—they must be open to full participation, they must be transparent, and they must be conducted in a manner that allows for free and fair choice by the people of Myanmar [Burma],” he said.

One of the main obstacles to a free and fair election with full participation is the fact that more than 2,000 political prisoners—including Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of Burma’s main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and members of the 88 Generation Students—are held in prisons across Burma, and the election laws forbid all of them from taking part in the election.

Quintana said that the release of prisoners of conscience would allow political parties that have decided against participation to reconsider, and would facilitate the active participation of all citizens in Burma’s first election since 1990.

After his last visit to Burma earlier this year, however, Quintana reported to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that political prisoners in Burma are not expected to be released ahead of the polls.

Bo Kyi, the joint-secretary of Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma, agreed that prisoners should be released but is not optimistic.

“All the political prisoners should be released so that they can take part in the political process,” Bo Kyi said. “I don’t anticipate general amnesty for the prisoners before the elections. But perhaps only a small number of prisoners who have almost served their terms would be freed just for show.”

Quintana said in the UN press release that the election laws do include some provisions for fair elections, such as the counting of votes in each polling station in the presence of the candidates, or their nominated agents, and members of the public.

But election commission decisions regarding political party activity are unchallengeable in any court of law, and Quintana expressed concern that the absolute powers granted to the election commission could impede the activities of political parties unless the Government guaranteed it would allow full freedom of expression and assembly.

The UN press release came the day before the Burmese election registration deadline, after which any political party that does not register will be dissolved. The NLD has already decided to face party dissolution rather than accept the Burmese regime’s controversial election laws and 2008 Constitution.

We must deny the military regime in Burma the legitimacy it craves – Mitch Mcconnell
Irrawaddy: Thu 6 May 2010

Today I rise to introduce a bill that would renew sanctions against the Burmese junta. As in years past, I am joined in this effort by my good friend, Senator Feinstein. Senators McCain, Durbin, Gregg and Lieberman are original cosponsors of this bipartisan legislation and continue to be leaders on the issue.
Renewing sanctions against the military regime in Burma is as timely and important as ever. Over the past year, the regime has not only made clear that it has no intention of reforming; it is also trying to stand up a new sham constitution and to legitimize itself in the eyes of the world through a sham election. In my view, the US must deny the regime that legitimacy.

By way of background, a little history is in order. For nearly half a century, Burma has been under some kind of military rule and every popular effort to reverse that situation has failed. In 1988, military authorities violently put down a popular uprising. Two years later, the Burmese people went to the polls and handed an overwhelming victory to the pro-democracy opposition, and the junta ignored the results. It never seated these popularly elected candidates. It jailed pro-democracy leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi. And it has maintained its brutal rule ever since.

In response to these events, the United States established on a bipartisan basis various sanctions against the Burmese regime. These include a 1997 executive order; the annual import ban which has been renewed annually since 2003; and restrictions on Burmese jade, which were enacted in 2008.

On a number of occasions since 1990 the U.S. and the UN have attempted to engage Burma diplomatically.

These include, during the Clinton Administration, a delegation led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard; various efforts by former U.S. ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright; and two trips to Burma by then Congressman Bill Richardson in the mid-1990s.

Other diplomatic efforts included Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill’s “road map” in 2006; and overtures made by the US through China in 2007. And in 2008, Admiral Timothy Keating met with Burmese officials as part of US efforts to provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.

The UN, for its part, has dispatched a human rights envoy to Burma 15 times and special envoys 26 times over the past two decades. And UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has visited Burma on two occasions.

None of these efforts has yielded anything in the way of reform. Indeed, when Burmese citizens, led by Buddhist monks, took to the streets in peaceful protest against the government and its policies in the fall of 2007, these pro-democracy protestors, much like their predecessors, were brutally suppressed.

Nonetheless, the regime has sought at various times to save face internationally. In response to this last major challenge to its authority in the fall of 2007, for example, the regime unveiled a proposed constitution.

But a quick look at the document shows that it could scarcely have been less democratic. It precluded Suu Kyi from participating in the electoral process and ensured that the charter may not be amended without the military’s blessing. The noted constitutional law professor, David Williams, of Indiana University, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year it was one of the worst constitutions [he has] ever seen.

What’s more, the vote to adopt this constitution took place two years ago in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the worst natural disaster in modern Burmese history, and international election observers were not permitted access to the country during the vote. If the regime was really interested in legitimacy, holding a vote like this in the middle of a natural disaster without election observers is not the way to do it.

So the results of this vote were roundly condemned, and for good reason. Still, despite widespread condemnation of this constitution and the circumstances surrounding its adoption, some held out hope that a subsequent election law might lead to democratic reform. But those hopes were dashed earlier this year when the regime actually issued the long-awaited election law. Among other things, the law would force the Democratic opposition, the National League for Democracy, to expel Suu Kyi if the party chose to enter any of its candidates in the upcoming national election and it forbids political prisoners and Buddhist monks from political participation.

The deadline for registering candidates and political parties under the new law is later this week, and parties that fail to register before then will be deemed illegal. In other words, the law’s practical effect would be to sideline Burma’s most prominent Democratic reformer and force its leading opposition party out of business.

We also get periodic press reports of ties between Burma and North Korea, including a particularly alarming report in recent days about an alleged weapons transfer from Pyongyang.

Now, last year, the Obama Administration initiated a review of US policy with respect to Burma. As a result of that review, the administration decided it was time for the US to take another run at engaging the regime. That’s why last summer, Secretary Clinton reportedly proposed to her Burmese counterpart at an international conference in Southeast Asia that the U.S. remove its investment ban on Burma in exchange for the unconditional release of Suu Kyi. Whatever the merits of this overture, this was a serious offer from a high-ranking US official aimed at improving bilateral relations.

Yet not only was Secretary Clinton’s offer ignored and Suu Kyi not freed, the regime actually extended Suu Kyi’s detention for another year and a half. And several months later the junta denied her appeal. It was shortly after that that the regime released the anti-democratic election law I just referred to. So however well intentioned, the administration’s policy of engagement has unfortunately met with the same fate as earlier engagement efforts, notwithstanding the fig leaves the regime occasionally holds out as supposed proof of its willingness to reform.

Clearly, the regime craves legitimization of its rule. Why else would it suddenly move to finalize the constitution it had been working on intermittently for 14 years after its rule was challenged by the nonviolent Saffron Revolution in the fall of 2007? They did it for the same reason they trotted out a transparently flawed election law earlier this year: they wanted to provide the appearance of reform where there was none. But they can’t have it both ways. If the regime wants legitimization, it must show real progress.

Secretary Clinton’s policy review toward Burma concluded that engagement along with sanctions might produce results where sanctions alone had failed. Although we have yet to see any positive results from engagement, the administration itself concedes that sanctions should remain in place. But the administration, to its credit, has been quite candid about the lack of tangible progress by the regime.

Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell acknowledged as much after the release of the Burmese election law. The US approach, he said, was to try to encourage domestic dialogue between the key stakeholders and the recent promulgation of the election criteria doesn’t leave much room for such a dialogue. It should be noted parenthetically the absence of any tangible result from engagement has nothing to do with work of American diplomats. It has everything to do with the type of regime we’re dealing with in Burma. But again, the fact remains that no progress has been made.

Legitimacy is the one thing the regime cannot impose by force. But if legitimacy is what it wants, a first step would be credible elections. And at this point there is no reason to believe that that’s even possible under the current constitution, under the current election law, and in the current political climate in Burma.

So renewing sanctions is important because it denies the junta the legitimacy it so craves. A sanctions regime says to the junta and the world in no uncertain terms that the United States does not view this government as having the support of its citizenry. It says that the United States will not be a party to recognizing the junta’s attempt to overturn the democratic elections of 1990, the last true expression of the Burmese voters. Sanctions should remain in place against the junta for the same reason the term Burma is used by friends of democracy instead of the junta’s chosen name of Myanmar because Myanmar is the name of a government that has not been chosen by its people.

In short, sanctions should remain in place because lifting sanctions would give the regime precisely what it wants; namely, legitimacy.

I strongly urge my colleagues to support sanctions renewal against the Burmese regime. And I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the Record.

Tight censorship on reporting USDP – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Wed 5 May 2010

Burma’s censorship board is keeping a tight control on reporting about the junta’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) led by Prime Minister Thein Sein in private journals.
Journalists in Rangoon said the censorship board, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division under the Ministry of Information, does not allow any questioning on the controversial formation of Thein Sein’s USDP, which was formed directly from the state mass organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).

Prime Minister Thein Sein with two other USDP leaders who are government officials inspecting a cement plant near Mandalay
(Photo: AP)
“Any critical questions on the formation of the USDP in journals have been removed by the censorship board,” said an editor with a Rangoon journal who requested anonymity, “But all positive writing is allowed.”

“Indirect mention or quotes in journals that contrast the formation of the USDP under Prime Minster Thein Sein with the election law have been taken out,” he said, adding that journals had published news related to the USDP on both front and inside pages this week.

However, journalists in Rangoon said reporting that the USDP is the prime minister’s party was not allowed in front page reporting. The censorship board also removed any comments about the 2008 Constitution clause that bans government officials’ involvement in political parties.

Thein Sein’s formation of a political party is controversial because analysts say he broke the junta’s own Political Party Registration Law’s chapter 4 (D) and chapter 7 (D), which bar government officials from forming political parties and using government property.

Political observers in Rangoon said the junta could practice double standards regardless, and some government sources argue that Thein Sein and other ministers are no longer government officials because they have resigned their military commissions and only play a political role.

Three days before the USDP applied to the Union Election Commission under Thein Sein’s leadership on April 29, the war office announced his retirement and that of 22 other military officials.

Despite the controversy over the junta’s USDP, the election commission approved its application along with nine other parties on Tuesday, according to an announcement in state-run-newspapers on Wednesday.

“Among the groups that submitted applications to set up political parties, the UEC [Union Election Commission] passed the following parties to set up political parties today as they are found to be in accord with Political Parties Registration Law and Rules,” reported The New Light of Myanmar.

The USDP is expected to contest all constituencies amounting to 75 percent of the total 1,158 seats of the union parliament as well as parliaments of states and divisions in Burma in the coming election later this year.

A quarter of Burma’s parliaments will be reserved for military officials appointed by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Thursday is the deadline for the main opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) and other remaining parties in the 1990 elections to prolong their existence by registering their parties with the current election commission.

The international community and Burmese are waiting to see whether the junta will crackdown on the opposition following the deadline for the NLD led by Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, which decided to avoid party registration in late March.

Officials from the Ministry of Information have called local journalists to a press conference in Naypyidaw on Thursday, which could mainly focus on recent bombings in Burma including the New Year festival blast in Rangoon.

The USDP party issue, the fate of the NLD and the junta’s other steps toward the election may also be on the press conference agenda.

DKBA unlikely to reunite with KNLA – Alex Ellgee
Irrawaddy: Wed 5 May 2010

Mae Sot, Thailand—Despite earlier reports that the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) might reject the Burmese junta’s border guard force (BGF) proposal and reunite with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), rejection of the BGF proposal is uncertain and reunification with the KNLA appears unlikely.

The DKBA is a Buddhist militia group that broke away from the Karen National Union (KNU), which is mostly Christian, and its KNLA military wing in 1995.

The DKBA is viewed as a proxy army for the Burmese military junta and now controls most of the Thai-Burmese border area that was previously KNU territory. It claims to have 6,000 troops, with a planned increase to 9,000, making it Burma’s second-largest armed ethnic militia.

The Burmese junta has demanded that all armed ethnic militias join the BGF, and there are divisions within the DKBA, both at the leadership and lower levels, about whether to do so.

Col Chit Thu, the commander of DKBA Battalion 999 and the DKBA’s most powerful military commander, is reportedly in favor of joining the BGF. Saw Lar Pwe, the commander of Battalion 907, is reportedly against joining.

Also opposed to joining the BGF is U Thuzana, the DKBA’s spiritual leader and the influential abbot of Myaing Gyi Ngu monastery, who has reportedly persuaded many others to join him in opposition.

The direction the DKBA is leaning seems to change with each passing day.

According to a KNLA source in southern Karen state, the DKBA and KNLA struck a peace deal last week, implying that the DKBA would reject the BGF proposal, but since then nothing has changed.

“It appears the DKBA have gone back to their old ways,” the source said. “It’s very difficult to trust them one-hundred percent when they are still working for the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council], but we can see a part of them wants to leave the DKBA.”

Col Ner Dar, son of the late Karen leader Gen Bo Mya, told The Irrawaddy that there had been a quarrel between the DKBA and the Burmese military, but he had received reports that the dispute was already settled.

Ner Dar did not believe the DKBA would reunite with the KNLA, “because they don’t want to, and even if they did it would be difficult.”

An observer, who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons, said: “While we may see new groups forming within the DKBA, it’s unlikely there will be a reunification with the KNLA. Low level deserters can be expected, but the business interests of the DKBA leaders will keep them on the junta’s path.”

A DKBA official also told The Irrawaddy that the rumors of fighting between Burmese troops and DKBA are not true.

“We are always preparing in case of conflict, but currently nothing has happened. We don’t see fighting against Burmese army is the answer. It will not help Karen people,” he said.

On April 28, a meeting was held by senior DKBA officers, who according to initial reports decided that the DKBA should join the BGF.

But the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports receiving conflicting information from sources within the DKBA, KNLA, Royal Thai Army and villagers in Pa’an District about what the senior DKBA officers based on the Thai-Burma border had agreed to, or rejected, in the meeting.

A recent report by the KHRG said that internal DKBA disagreements over the BGF could increase desertions. Some soldiers and low-ranking officers told the KHRG they oppose the plan, “while others said they will desert if the DKBA refuses [to join the BGF] because such a refusal might mean renewed conflict with the Burmese military.”

But even low-level desertions, for whatever reason, may be problematic for DKBA soldiers. Deserters face extreme retribution both from the junta and the DKBA.

According to a KNLA source in southern Karen State, half the DKBA in one brigade were close to deserting over the BGF proposal, but the junta reportedly threatened to kill the families of those who.

This was confirmed by a DKBA source, which told The Irrawaddy that DKBA soldiers have little choice but to continue under the DKBA, even if it joins the BGF. “Our families are left in SPDC controlled areas. If we choose to fight against the Burmese government, our wives and children will be slaughtered,” he said.

A recent report by the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) said that DKBA soldiers from Chit Thu’s Battalion 999 crossed into Thailand and burned three huts in a Thai village in Tha Song Yang District, Tak Province. The DKBA reportedly believed the villagers were in contact with the KNLA and were withholding information about four DKBA soldiers who recently deserted.

The KHRG report gives examples of soldiers being executed following suspicions of desertion, indicating the difficulties faced by DKBA deserters.

A former DKBA soldier, called Pah G, who was forcibly recruited at age 13, recalled in the report how his commanding officer had explicitly stated that deserters would be executed if recaptured.

“If we couldn’t escape successfully, when they recaptured us we would be killed, because the commander gave an order that if escaping soldiers were recaptured they would be punished with death,” said Pah G.

Shan party allowed to register for elections – Hseng Khio Fah
Shan Herald Agency for News: Wed 5 May 2010

The junta runs media the New Light of Myanmar on 3 May reported that the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) is one of the political parties that were permitted to be set up by the Union Elections Commission to contest in the forthcoming general elections.
There are altogether30 political parties that have registered for the elections, among them 24 have already passed so far. The permission depends on each party’s policy, according to UEC.

Meanwhile the Union Democratic Alliance Organization (UDAO) that was formed by the veteran Shan politician Shwe Ohn has yet to know whether its application is being considered by the UEC or not. It had applied for registration months before most of the other parties were formed. But according to CEU, the party applied only on 8 April.

The SNDP was formed in early April and applied for its registration to the Election Commission on the same day. Its party Chairman is Sai Ai Pao, the well to do salt trader from Namkham who has made his home in Rangoon and its Vice Chairman is Sai Saung Si, former elected representative of Kyaukme constituency No#2 in 1990.

The party’s aim is to pave the way for the people in Shan State to have more choices and to represent them in working for their rights and to protect them. In addition, the party is also to comply with the principles that were written in the 2008 constitution, according to its Chairman.

“We are going to contest peacefully in accordance with the constitution. We don’t oppose any party and organizations because we regard all as friends, not enemy,” Sai Ai Pao told SHAN in April.

The party plans to contest in 40 out of 55 townships in Shan State, and other than these, it is going to contest in other states and divisions: Kachin and Karenni states and Rangoon, Mandalay, Pegu and Sagaing divisions where most Shan residents are living as well. In Burma, Shan has the second biggest population after the Burman.

The party is already known by the local people in Shan State North as Kyar Phyu Party (White Tiger Party).

Apart from the SNDP, another party called Northern Shan State Progressive Party (Northern-SSPP) led by Chan Khaw, is also expected to be contesting in Shan State North. It applied for its registration on 23 April. Its headquarters is based in Lashio, the capital town of the Shan State North. But it is yet to be known whether its application will be approved or not.

At present, the SNDP has reportedly selected two candidates for Muse and one for Namkham townships, northern Shan State to compete in the area. The two from Muse are Sai Mawk Kham Soi (aka) Sai Phoe Aung and Sai Phoe Myat, both former chairmen of Muse Shan Literature and Culture Association (Muse-SLCA). The candidate in Namkham is Sai Ohn Kyaw, a veterinary surgeon, according to local residents in Muse. “They have yet to start their campaigns.”

According to reports from the junta, in Shan State East’s Pongpakhem subtownship of Mongton Township, opposite Chiangmai, alone will have 23 polling booths, according to sources from the Thai-Burma border.

Security service for each polling station will be three tiered: the first by the Elections Commission and Township Peace and Development Council (TPDC), the second by the police, Red Cross and fire brigades and the last by militia units and the Burma Army.

At the same time, local businessmen are also being urged by the junta to become members of its Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP).

It had also in April instructed both regional and divisional level commands to carry out census and compile lists of eligible voters within their respective areas, said a source close to the junta officials on the Thai border.

Myanmar introduces visas on arrival for tourists
Reuters: Tue 4 May 2010

Yangon – Myanmar’s military government will offer visas on arrival to boost the country’s nascent tourism sector, a travel industry official said on Tuesday.

Tourist visas, which are normally arranged days in advance at an embassy abroad, will be now be available at international airports in Mandalay and the biggest city, Yangon, said Tin Tun Aung, secretary of the Myanmar Travel Entrepreneurs Association.

“We heartily welcome it,” Tin Tun Aung told Reuters. “I’m sure it will have a strong impact on tourist arrivals to our country.”

The cost of the visa will be $30 and would be valid for 28 days, he added.

Although Myanmar is rich in jungles, beaches and mountains and is dotted with hundreds of golden Buddhist temples, its tourism industry remains largely undeveloped.

Total tourist arrivals in Myanmar during for the fiscal year 2009-2010 stood at 300,000, compared with 255,288 for the same period a year earlier. Some 315,536 people traveled to Myanmar in the 2005-2006 period, official data showed.

Those figures are dwarfed by neighboring Thailand, which drew 14.1 million tourists last year.

Many potential visitors are deterred by the poor reputation of the country and its hardline military rulers, who are accused of corruption, stifling democratic freedoms and presiding over decades of human rights abuses.

Myanmar’s government plans to hold its first election in two decades some time this year and is on a drive to privatize numerous industries, including shipping and air travel, to attract more foreign investment, which has been restricted by Western sanctions on the regime.

(Reporting by Aung Hla Tun; Writing by Martin Petty; Editing by Alex Richardson)

Myanmar border trade hits 1.3 bln USD in 2009-10
Xinhua: Tue 4 May 2010

Yangon — Myanmar’s border trade hit 1.38 billion U.S. dollars in the previous 2009-10 fiscal year which ended in March, representing the highest annual trade of its kind in the past five years, the local Weekly Eleven reported Monday.
Of the total border trade with four neighboring countries of China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh, Myanmar’s export amounted 660 million dollars whereas its import stood over 710 million dollars.

Myanmar has a total of 14 border trade points with these neighboring countries.

The border trade volume during the past consecutive years were registered as 1.34 billion dollars in 2008-09, 1.32 billion dollars in 2007-08, 1.09 billion dollars in 2006-07 and 716 million dollars in 2005-06.

Myanmar mostly exports agricultural, animal, marine, mineral, forestry products and finished goods, whereas the country imports cement, agricultural machinery and its spare parts, computer and electronic devices, motor cars, motorcycles, mobile phones and their accessories.

Than Shwe a predator, says media watchdog – Ko Htwe
Irrawaddy: Tue 4 May 2010

Burmese military government strongman Snr-Gen Than Shwe has made the Top 40—on an annual list of the world’s “Predators of Press Freedom,” which was released by Reporters Without Borders on Monday to mark World Press Freedom Day.
“The general, who began his military career in psychological warfare, can rely on the army to impose order through fear,” an accompanying statement said. “His henchmen continue to hunt down journalists suspected of sending information and video footage abroad that show the disastrous state of the country.”
A policeman reads a newspaper while on duty at the Supreme Court in Rangoon. (Photo: Reuters)

Noting that Than Shwe has decided to hold a general election this year, Reporters Without Borders said that he is nevertheless “refusing to loosen his grip on the media and Internet.”

In its introduction to the press statement, Reporters Without Borders said, “There are 40 names on this year’s list of ‘Predators of Press Freedom’—40 politicians, government officials, religious leaders, militias and criminal organizations that cannot stand the press, treat it as an enemy and directly attack journalists. They are powerful, dangerous, violent and above the law.”

Than Shwe is listed alongside North Korean despot Kim Jong-il, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, Saudi Arabian Prime Minister Abdallah ibn Abdulaziz Al-Saud and murderous organizations such as ETA from northern Spain, FARC from Colombia and the Israeli Defence Forces.

Meanwhile, in a statement issued on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day, US government included Burma in a group of countries—Belarus, China, Cuba, Eritrea, North Korea, Tunisia, Uzbekistan and Venezuela—where journalists who write articles critical of government leaders and their policies are imprisoned,

Noting that 2009 was a bad year for the freedom of the press worldwide, President Barack Obama said: “While people gained greater access than ever before to information through the Internet, cell phones and other forms of connective technologies, governments like China, Ethiopia, Iran, and Venezuela curtailed freedom of expression by limiting full access to and use of these technologies.”

In Burma, the Press Scrutiny and Registration division (PSRD) routinely inspects and censors books, journals and newspapers. Any media criticism of the military junta is strictly forbidden.

“We are writing under the constant shadow of the government,” a Rangoon-based journalist told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday. “Press freedom is simply not real.”

Recently, the PSRD allowed news journals to publish political sections carrying interviews with newly formed political parties, their leaders and their policies. Rangoon-based The Ray of Light Weekly ran interview with two central executive committee members of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) and published their reasons for not competing in this year’s election.

“The government is interested in party registration and wants to keep tabs on the NLD. That’s why they allowed that interview,” said Maung Wuntha, a well-known journalist in Rangoon.

Several editors in Burma said the military government will only permit articles and commentaries that favor the pro-junta parties.

“I have personal experience that if I write an anti-junta commentary, the government will take it out after it is submitted to the censorship board,” said an editor.

Most editors of news journals in Burma want to publish balanced and unbiased articles pertaining to the election, but some are under the influence of political entities, he added.

Burma’s most prominent journalist, Win Tin, who is also a leading member of the NLD, said that “during the election period, I think there will be no freedom of the press. Sometimes, freedom has to break out, but we will have to struggle all the way.”

Hla Hla Win, a young video reporter for the exiled Democratic Voice of Burma was sentenced to 20 years in prison for sending sensitive images abroad.

Sources said pro-government journals and newspapers, such as The Voice, are allowed more editorial freedom. Its editor, Dr Nay Win Maung, is well-known for his right-wing views and pro-junta stance. He is also publisher of Living Color magazine in Rangoon and the co-founder of Rangoon-based NGO EGRESS, which belongs to the so-called “Third Force” in Burma—a group founded during the International Burma Studies conference in Singapore in mid-2006 that is neither pro-junta nor pro-opposition. They advocate engagement and a business-friendly policy with the junta, and are anti-sanctions.

According to Ohn Kyaing, a former journalist and member of the NLD, press freedom inside Burma is one-sided. “Freedom only exists on one side. I don’t believe freedom is balanced. If they wanted balance in the media, they would dissolve the PSRD,” he said.

* Lalit K Jha from Washington also contributed to this article.

Myanmar junta members go civilian – Seth Mydans
New York Times: Mon 3 May 2010

Bangkok — It is an obvious move when generals in a military junta decide to step aside in favor of civilian rule: shed military ranks and uniforms and transform themselves into civilians.Last week, several cabinet members in Myanmar’s junta did a quick change, resigning from the armed forces, apparently in preparation for parliamentary elections expected later this year.

Under a new Constitution adopted in 2008, the military that has ruled Myanmar, formerly Burma, since 1962 is preparing to replace itself with a civilian government that includes a 440-member House of Representatives.

The new legislature will set aside 25 percent of its seats for serving military officers, a number that could be augmented by former officers in civilian clothes.

Many foreign analysts, as well as Myanmar’s opposition party, the National League for Democracy, have called the elections a false front intended to put a civilian face on the military’s continued grip on power.

According to the official press, the prime minister, Gen. Thein Sein, and 22 cabinet ministers gave up their uniforms on Monday, a move that was not unexpected in advance of the elections. They maintained their cabinet positions, however, perhaps a foretaste of the civilian governments to come.

The addition of those and any other newly resigned officers would ensure an even greater role for the military in the legislature, which in any case is not expected by foreign analysts to be independent of the country’s top leadership. Under the new Constitution, that leadership will also be dominated by serving military officers, with the armed forces chief remaining the country’s most powerful figure.

The Constitution requires a candidate to be a member of a political party, and last week the official press reported that after shedding his uniform, Prime Minister Thein Sein, now a civilian, had applied to form a new party.

On the opposition side, the National League for Democracy, headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has announced that it will not participate in the elections, which it condemned as unfair and undemocratic.

That party won the last elections, in 1990, by a landslide but was prevented from assuming office by the ruling junta, which maintained its grip on power.

Many of the party’s members have been arrested since then, and Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi has spent most of the past 20 years under house arrest. The Constitution bars people with criminal records from running for office.

Analysts say Myanmar’s half-step toward democracy could begin a long, slow process of greater accountability, at least on a local level. In any case, the military so thoroughly permeates the government, bureaucracy and economy of Myanmar that it is likely to retain vast influence in all areas of life, no matter what shape the government takes.

It has been a long-term project for the military junta to seek the legitimacy, at least in form, of an electoral mandate. Its goal is what it calls “discipline flourishing democracy,” which would presumably avoid the undisciplined clash of interests in more open Western-style democracies.

Its neighbors in Southeast Asia present a range of democratic and nondemocratic formulas of government, including the disciplined parliamentary systems of Singapore and Cambodia, with their virtual one-party rule.

But since the overthrow of President Suharto in Indonesia in 1998, none of them have been governed by the military, which analysts say is still likely to be the case in Myanmar despite its civilian format.

Japanese companies sign hydropower deal with Myanmar
Xinhua: Mon 3 May 2010

Two Japanese companies have reached respective contract agreements with Myanmar’s power authorities to provide related services to a hydropower project in the country, an official daily reported yesterday. One agreement on consulting services of in-house engineering services was signed between the NEWJEC Inc of Japan and Myanmar’s Ministry of Electric Power-1, while the other on concrete work of the Upper Yeywa hydropower project was between the High Tech Concrete Technology Co Ltd of Japan and the Myanmar ministry in Nay Pyi Taw on Friday, said the New Light of Myanmar.

The Upper Yeywa hydropower project is a follow-up one of the Yeywa project, which is nearly-completed.

The 790-megawatt (mw) Yeywa hydropower plant is said to mainly distribute electricity to the commercial city of Yangon.

One of its four turbines with 180 mw started its test-run in February to generate power and the full run is expected by this month.

The Yeywa hydropower plant, which lies on the Myitnge River, 50 kilometers southeast of Mandalay, is being implemented by the Ministry of Electric Power-1.

The hydropower plant, which costs 600 million U.S. dollars, will produce 3.55 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh) annually on total completion and its generating capacity represents 70 per cent of about 5 billion kwh being generated by 15 power plants.

Breaking Burma’s isolation – Wesley K. Clark, Henrietta H. Fore and Suzanne DiMaggio
Project Syndicate: Mon 3 May 2010

NEW YORK – The Obama administration’s decision to seek a new way forward in United States-Burma relations recognizes that decades of trying to isolate Burma (Myanmar) in order to change the behavior of its government have achieved little. With Burma’s ruling generals preparing to hold elections later this year – for the first time since 1990 – it is time to try something different.Attempting to engage one of the world’s most authoritarian governments will not be easy. There is no evidence to indicate that Burma’s leaders will respond positively to the Obama administration’s central message, which calls for releasing the estimated 2,100 political prisoners (including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi), engaging in genuine dialogue with the opposition, and allowing fair and inclusive elections. In fact, the recently enacted electoral laws, which have been met with international condemnation, already point to a process that lacks credibility.

This past fall, we convened a task force under the auspices of the Asia Society to consider how the US can best pursue a path of engagement with Burma. We concluded that the US must ensure that its policies do not inadvertently support or encourage authoritarian and corrupt elements in Burmese society. At the same time, if the US sets the bar too high at the outset, it will deny itself an effective role in helping to move Burma away from authoritarian rule and into the world community.

During this period of uncertainty, we recommend framing US policy toward Burma on the basis of changes taking place in the country, using both engagement and sanctions to encourage reform. The Obama administration’s decision to maintain trade and investment sanctions on Burma in the absence of meaningful change, particularly with regard to the Burmese government’s intolerance of political opposition, is correct.

Yet there are other measures that should be pursued now. The US should engage not only with Burma’s leaders, but also with a wide range of groups inside the country to encourage the dialogue necessary to bring about national reconciliation of the military, democracy groups, and non-Burmese nationalities. The removal by the US of some noneconomic sanctions designed to restrict official bilateral interaction is welcome, and an even greater relaxation in communications, through both official and unofficial channels, should be implemented. Expanding such channels, especially during a period of potential political change, will strengthen US leverage.

To reach the Burmese people directly, the US should continue to develop and scale up assistance programs, while preserving cross-border assistance. Assistance to non-governmental organizations should be expanded, and US assistance also should be targeted toward small farmers and small- and medium-sized businesses. Educational exchanges under the Fulbright and Humphrey Scholar programs and cultural outreach activities should be increased. These programs produce powerful agents for community development in Burma, and can significantly improve the prospects for better governance.

US policy should shift to a more robust phase if Burmese leaders begin to relax political restrictions, institute economic reforms, and advance human rights. If there is no movement on these fronts, there will likely be pressure in the US for tightening sanctions. If there is no recourse but to pursue stronger sanctions, the US should coordinate with others, including the European Union and ASEAN, to impose targeted financial and banking measures to ensure that military leaders and their associates cannot evade the impact of what otherwise would be less-effective unilateral sanctions.

If a different scenario emerges, it should open the way for a much more active US role in assisting with capacity building, governance training, and international efforts to encourage economic reforms. One priority should be the development of an appropriate mechanism for ensuring that revenues from the sale of natural gas are properly accounted for, repatriated, and allocated to meet urgent national needs.

In adjusting its policy toward Burma, the US must face reality with a clear vision of what its foreign policy can achieve. US influence in Burma is unlikely to outweigh that of increasingly powerful Asian neighbors. Therefore, the US should make collaboration with other key stakeholders, particularly ASEAN, the United Nations, and Burma’s neighbors – including China, India and Japan – the centerpiece of its policy.

In every respect, conditions in Burma are among the direst of any country in the world, and it will take decades, if not generations, to reverse current downward trends and create a foundation for a sustainable and viable democratic government and a prosperous society. The US needs to position itself to respond effectively and flexibly to the twists and turns that a potential transition in Burma may take over time, with an eye toward pressing the Burmese leadership to move in positive directions.

Burma’s ‘elections’ should not be recognized – Nehginpao Kipgen
Sydney Morning Herald: Mon 3 May 2010

In an annual routine policy review, the European Union extended economic sanctions against the military-ruled Burma for another year on April 26, 2010. With the continued political imbroglio in this South-East Asian nation, the decision was not something unexpected.The sanctions, which include a travel ban and a freeze of assets of enterprises owned by members of the ruling junta and people associated with them, is aimed at bringing the military leadership to the path of dialogue that would eventually lead Burma to democracy.

The European Union wants to see the establishment of a democratically elected civilian government that engages in socio-economic development, and respects human rights while rebuilding relations with the international community.

The European Union renewed its call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the opposition and general secretary of the National League for Democracy, and also offered to hold dialogue with the junta if it makes a tangible democratic progress.

Given its history of recalcitrance, the military junta is unlikely to give in to the calls of the European Union. Nevertheless, the junta in its own way is seeking recognition, if not endorsement, from the international community.

With years of criticisms and pressures from the international community, the military leaders plan to legitimise their rule by holding a general election. The goal is to transform the dictatorial-type of regime to a civilian form of government, where the ultimate power rests in the hands of military.

There are two important reasons, among others, that concern the military leadership in terms of losing its power to a civilian government – safety and control.

After decades of brutality on its own people, the military leadership is concerned about their own safety under a democratically elected government. The trial and execution of former military leaders in Iraq is something that probably worries the Burmese military leaders.

With the different ethnic nationalities demanding political autonomy, the junta is wary of any decentralisation of the Burmese society. Under the present system, the military controls all branches of the government – legislative, executive and judiciary.

It is symbolically significant, at this juncture, to the Burmese opposition that the European Union has extended sanctions for another year. The move can be construed as support for the democratic movement. However, this initiative will remain unyielding as long as there is economic engagement by countries such as China, India, and members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

It is not the European Union that is solely responsible for Burma’s policy failure. It is the conflicting approaches of engagement and sanctions that make the international community’s strategy ineffective.

Beyond economic sanctions, what the European Union can possibly do is to lobby and convince its international partners, at least the Western countries, not to recognise the result of the election if held under the existing restrictive laws.

It could also strive to formulate a co-ordinated international strategy to effectively deal with the military junta.

If the European Union, together with its international partners, decides not to recognise the election result, the Burmese military junta will lack the global legitimacy it pursues.

Regardless of the outcome of general election, Burma’s decades-old conflicts will continue as long as suppression of ethnic minorities is unabated, and their fundamental rights are denied.

* Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004) and general secretary of the U.S.-based Kuki International Forum (www.kukiforum.com). He is a regular contributor to The National Times.

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#753

From: Noor Samad <norsam.bcjp@...>
Date: Mon May 17, 2010 9:15 am
Subject: Check out my photos on Facebook

rodinsam16

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facebook

Noor Samad has:
268 friends
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Check out my photos on Facebook

Hi,

I set up a Facebook profile where I can post my pictures, videos and events and I want to add you as a friend so you can see it. First, you need to join Facebook! Once you join, you can also create your own profile.

Thanks,
Noor

To sign up for Facebook, follow the link below:

http://www.facebook.com/p.php?i=1144480430&k=Z5AX4VW6V5TF6BD1PBVTVPVQTRIB4Z2D3RGPK&r

Other people you may know on Facebook:

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#754

From: Max Ediger <ediger.max@...>
Date: Tue Jun 1, 2010 7:06 am
Subject: peace in Palestine and Israel

maxediger

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Friends:� Most of you have surely heard of the attack by Israel on boats brings emergency supplies to Gaza.� The information is still not compltet so we do not know the whole story, but what we do know is that the people in Gaza have been suffering for a very long time already and now their suffering is even greater.

�

A week-long movement for peace in Palestine and Israel started yesterday (Monday) and although it was started by a Christian movement, all people of all faiths are urged to participate.� You can see information about this movement at http://www.oikoumene.org/en/programmes/public-witness-addressing-power-affirming-peace/churches-in-the-middle-east/pief/pief-home.html.�

�

Peace......max

--
Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. Persons who have given up both victory and defeat, the contented, they are happy. (Buddhist wisdom)
"Education is the ability to listen to almost anything without losing your temper or your self-confidence."
�-- �Robert Frost

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#755

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Date: Wed Jun 2, 2010 7:24 am
Subject: [FaithPeace] Faith and Peace Newsletter - 31/5/10

piapi

Send Email

May 2010

Doctrine Divides, Action Unites

۩ Home Page

۩ School of Peace

۩ Faith and Peace Archives

۩ Photos and events

۩ Who are we

Contents

► Identity, Resistance and Liberation
Samden Ghale

In this article, a Nepalese participant at the 14-week School of Peace (SOP) conducted by Interfaith Cooperation Forum (ICF) in Bangalore, India, reflects on what she has discovered from the theme of the first module of the 2010 SOP, “Self, the Other and Community.” [Read more]

► An Internal Struggle over Caste-Based Discrimination
Kathleen Cecille Martin

A SOP participant from the Philippines courageously confronts the feelings within herself in her reflection on the second SOP module, “Conflict, Violence and War.” [Read more]

► Islamic Principles vs. Islamic State in Indonesia
Blake Respini and Herdi Sahrasad

The role of Islam in the ongoing political development of Indonesia and its role in forming the national identity of the country are some of the central topics discussed by the authors in this article. [Read more]

► Freedom of Religion in Indonesia: Multiple Choices Not Short Answer

In this article published in Caveat by the Community Legal Aid Institute, or LBH Masyarakat, in Jakarta, the level of religious tolerance in the country is discussed in depth. Of particular concern is the persecution of the Ahmadiyya community and the constitutionality of the 1965 blasphemy law that is currently being reviewed by the Constitutional Court.
http://lbhmasyarakat.org/admin/dataupload/CAVEAT%20-%20Vol%2009%20-%20II%20-%202010.pdf

► Indonesia’s Multicultural Islam in Action
Agung Yudhawiranata

Highlighted in this article is the Sekaten Festival on the island of Java that celebrates the birthday of the prophet Muhammad, a festival that weaves together both Islam and the local Javanese culture. [Read more]

► Post-presidential Election Realities
A Ray of Hope for Detainees on Security Charges in the Far South?
Pratchaya Toe-e-tae

People in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand—Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala—have lived with violence nearly every day since 2004. The author of this article describes why the people of these provinces also feel that they also must deal with a discriminatory justice system as well. [Read more]

► There’s Hope for Peace through Faith
Sanitsuda Ekachai

Respecting the moral responsibility inherent in Islam would lead to a different form of governance in Thailand to resolve both local and national problems in the country, according to this article. [Read more]

► Celebrating Extraordinary Muslim Women
Salma Hasan Ali

The author describes the life and work of three Muslim women in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Pakistan as a way not only to recognize their achievements but to also counter the stereotypes often associated with Muslim women. [Read more]

► Iranian Women Rally against Polygamy
Sahar Sepehri

Women’s organizations in Iran are fighting against enactment of a law currently being considered by Iran’s Parliament that will expand the ability of Iranian men to marry a second wife. [Read more]

► Interfaith Human Rights Workshop Exposed to Moro Struggle
Bruce Van Voorhis

ICF held a workshop in August 2009 in the Philippines to discuss an issue that many ICF activists confront every day—human rights violations. In addition to learning about ways to respond to the ongoing denial of people’s rights in their communities, the setting of the workshop in Mindanao provided the participants with an opportunity to learn more about the decades of struggle of the Moro people—the Muslim community of the country—and to meet some of those whose lives have been impacted by the conflict between the government and the Moros. [Read more]

e-mail : forumicf@...

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#756

From: shreeram chaudhary <chaudhary_srmail@...>
Date: Wed Jun 2, 2010 8:03 am
Subject: Re: [FaithPeace] Faith and Peace Newsletter - 31/5/10

chaudhary_srmail@...

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Dear Sir

Namaste,

Thank you for sending news letter.

Regards

Shreeram
Nepal
--- On Wed, 2/6/10, CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...> wrote:

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Subject: [justpeaceinasia] [FaithPeace] Faith and Peace Newsletter - 31/5/10
To: faithpeace@...
Date: Wednesday, 2 June, 2010, 8:24 AM

May 2010

Doctrine Divides, Action Unites

۩ Home Page

۩ School of Peace

۩ Faith and Peace Archives

۩ Photos and events

۩ Who are we

Contents

► Identity, Resistance and Liberation
Samden Ghale

In this article, a Nepalese participant at the 14-week School of Peace (SOP) conducted by Interfaith Cooperation Forum (ICF) in Bangalore, India, reflects on what she has discovered from the theme of the first module of the 2010 SOP, “Self, the Other and Community.” [Read more]

► An Internal Struggle over Caste-Based Discrimination
Kathleen Cecille Martin

A SOP participant from the Philippines courageously confronts the feelings within herself in her reflection on the second SOP module, “Conflict, Violence and War.” [Read more]

► Islamic Principles vs. Islamic State in Indonesia
Blake Respini and Herdi Sahrasad

The role of Islam in the ongoing political development of Indonesia and its role in forming the national identity of the country are some of the central topics discussed by the authors in this article. [Read more]

► Freedom of Religion in Indonesia: Multiple Choices Not Short Answer

In this article published in Caveat by the Community Legal Aid Institute, or LBH Masyarakat, in Jakarta, the level of religious tolerance in the country is discussed in depth. Of particular concern is the persecution of the Ahmadiyya community and the constitutionality of the 1965 blasphemy law that is currently being reviewed by the Constitutional Court.
http://lbhmasyarakat.org/admin/dataupload/CAVEAT%20-%20Vol%2009%20-%20II%20-%202010.pdf

► Indonesia’s Multicultural Islam in Action
Agung Yudhawiranata

Highlighted in this article is the Sekaten Festival on the island of Java that celebrates the birthday of the prophet Muhammad, a festival that weaves together both Islam and the local Javanese culture. [Read more]

► Post-presidential Election Realities
A Ray of Hope for Detainees on Security Charges in the Far South?
Pratchaya Toe-e-tae

People in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand—Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala—have lived with violence nearly every day since 2004. The author of this article describes why the people of these provinces also feel that they also must deal with a discriminatory justice system as well. [Read more]

► There’s Hope for Peace through Faith
Sanitsuda Ekachai

Respecting the moral responsibility inherent in Islam would lead to a different form of governance in Thailand to resolve both local and national problems in the country, according to this article. [Read more]

► Celebrating Extraordinary Muslim Women
Salma Hasan Ali

The author describes the life and work of three Muslim women in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Pakistan as a way not only to recognize their achievements but to also counter the stereotypes often associated with Muslim women. [Read more]

► Iranian Women Rally against Polygamy
Sahar Sepehri

Women’s organizations in Iran are fighting against enactment of a law currently being considered by Iran’s Parliament that will expand the ability of Iranian men to marry a second wife. [Read more]

► Interfaith Human Rights Workshop Exposed to Moro Struggle
Bruce Van Voorhis

ICF held a workshop in August 2009 in the Philippines to discuss an issue that many ICF activists confront every day—human rights violations. In addition to learning about ways to respond to the ongoing denial of people’s rights in their communities, the setting of the workshop in Mindanao provided the participants with an opportunity to learn more about the decades of struggle of the Moro people—the Muslim community of the country—and to meet some of those whose lives have been impacted by the conflict between the government and the Moros. [Read more]

e-mail : forumicf@...

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#757

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Date: Thu Jun 10, 2010 9:59 am
Subject: [Readingroom] Re-sending: News on Burma - 5/6/10

piapi

Send Email

Burma’s military budget to increase significantly
National Library goes in regime’s latest property sale
Desperate plight of Burma’s Rohingya people
Most trafficking victims in Thailand ‘are Burmese’
Burma tops ‘worst of the worst’ list of human rights violators
Report says Burma is taking steps toward nuclear weapons program
Myanmar’s nuclear bombshell
Expert says Burma ‘planning nuclear bomb’
Ethnic leaders dividing community
EU neighbours sign up to Myanmar sanctions
Caught between a vote and a hard place
Myanmar’s military ambitions
The international community’s naive beliefs on Burma
Sanctioning disaster
Depayin masterminds wield power in USDP
Insein court tacks 10 years on to youth’s term
Burma intelligence probes political inmates
Five facts about China-Myanmar relations
The ghost of elections past
Than Shwe’s electronic dream
Transocean drilled in Burmese waters linked to drug lord
North Korea exporting nuke technology to Burma: UN experts

Burma’s military budget to increase significantly
Irrawaddy: Fri 4 Jun 2010

At the four-monthly meeting of Burma’s top generals held in Naypyidaw during the last week of May, the junta significantly increased its military budget from last year, according to sources close to the Burmese military. A military source told The Irrawaddy on Thursday that although the amount budgeted to the military is unavailable, it is known to be much larger than last year’s military budget.

“The money allocated to the military was budgeted under the heading ‘Defense Budget’, but there was no specific line items for separate expenses,” he said.

The military source added, however, that it is generally believed that large military equipment purchases will be made within the next six months.

In 2009, Burma signed a contract with Russia for the purchase of 20 MiG-29 jet fighters at a cost of nearly US $570 million.

Analysts believe that many of Burma’s future military purchases may come from North Korea.

According to a report by UN experts obtained by The Associated Press last month, North Korea is exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology and using multiple intermediaries, shell companies and overseas criminal networks to circumvent UN sanctions.

The UN’s seven-member panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicates that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Burma.

In November 2008, Gen Thura Shwe Mann, the regime’s No 3 ranking general, made a secret visit to North Korea and signed a memorandum of understanding, officially formalizing military cooperation between Burma and North Korea with his North Korean counterpart, Gen Kim Kyok-sik.

During his trip to Pyongyang, Shwe Mann also visited sites of secret tunnel complexes built into the sides of mountains to store and shield jet aircraft, missiles, tanks and nuclear and chemical weapons.

In addition, according to Burmese Maj Sai Thein Win, a former deputy commander of a top-secret military factory who defected and brought with him top secret documents and photographs about Burma’s nuclear projects, secret underground bunkers and tunnels have been built at many locations in Burma.

Sai Thein Win, who was trained in Burma as a defense engineer and later in Russia as a missile expert, said that about 10,000 Burmese officials have been sent to Russia thus far to study military technology, including nuclear technology.

Sai Thein Win also said in a report that Burma is trying to build medium-range missiles such as SCUDs under a memorandum of understanding with North Korea. “Burma wants to have rockets and nuclear warheads. Burma wants to be a nuclear power,” Sai Thein Win said.

One reason the regime is able to increase its military budget and import expensive military equipment and technology may be its expected increase in energy revenues.

A study by the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace said that Burma’s export earnings from the country’s growing energy sector will double in the next five years, due mainly to oil and gas transit pipelines now being built from Burma to China. The Institute said the calculation is based on energy exports—mostly gas—accounting for at least 45 percent of the $6.6 billion earnings declared by Burmese interests in 2008.

Burma’s military regime is infamous for spending a large percentage of its national budget on the military, rather than on education, health and other public services. According to Burma military experts, 40 to 60 percent of the national budget is allocated to the military.

In contrast, 0.4 percent of the national budget is spent on healthcare, while 0.5 percent is spent for education, according to a report released in 2007 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank based in London.

In other news regarding the four-monthly meeting, according to military sources there was no major military reshuffle in Naypyidaw.

National Library goes in regime’s latest property sale – Nayee Lin Latt
Irrawaddy: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Burma’s National Library and a TV studio complex are among five state-owned buildings sold to private investors, according to informed sources in Rangoon.Apart from the National Library, the regime has shed itself of the MRTV 3 news and studio complex, the People’s Department Store, the Yadanapon Theater and a six-story office building, said sources close to the regime’s Privatization Commission.

The buildings were among more than 20 administered by the regime’s Department of Human Settlement and Housing Department. The buildings that are still unsold belong to the Ministry of Industry No. 1, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Ministry of Health, Rangoon Division Department of Health, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Co-operatives.

A Privatization Commission official said that since late 2009 a total of 147 state-owned buildings, including factories and government ministry offices, had been sold off.

A Rangoon Municipal Committee engineer said the sale was aimed at offering “economic opportunities” not only to business investors but also to the “general public.”

One of the customers in the latest sell out, however, was the Shwe Taung Development Co., Ltd., which enjoys a close relationship with the regime. It paid 130 billion kyat (about US $13 million) for the MRTV 3 complex.

The National Library went for only about 100 million kyat ($100,000), while the Yadanapon Theater, which belonged to the Myanma Motion Picture Enterprise of the Ministry of Information, fetched more than 920 million kyat (nearly $1 million).

One businessman with close contacts to regime officials suggested that state-run property was being sold off to raise funds for the development of the government quarter in Naypyidaw and help finance the upcoming election.

A retired professor from Rangoon’s University of Economics expressed sorrow at the sale of the National Library, saying it contradicted an official statement assuring support for Burmese literature.

Desperate plight of Burma’s Rohingya people
BBC News: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Nasima, 22, is from the Rohingya ethnic group, a Muslim minority that lives in western Burma. Rights groups say it is one of the most persecuted communities in the world – they were made stateless in 1982, and deemed to be illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.Several hundred thousand have since crossed into Bangladesh, where people speak a similar language. This year Dhaka has been accused of arresting hundreds of Rohingya and forcing them over the border – claims the government denies. It says it is too poor to help them. The BBC’s Mark Dummett spoke to Nasima in the Kutupalong makeshift camp, which is now home to more than 30,000 Rohingyas.

“In Burma my people face persecution, so that’s why we come to Bangladesh,” Nasima said.

“In my family’s case, we came under pressure from the government because we had some property.

“One day, the army accused my father of sheltering someone who had just returned from Bangladesh. Anyone who comes back to Burma is sent to jail, so it is illegal to look after them. But that accusation was false.

“They took my father to a military camp and beat him up. After seven days they sent us his blood-stained clothes and said they would kill him.

“So we sold all our cattle and chickens at the market. We sent that money to the camp and they then released him.

“Later, my brother was attacked by some Buddhist people. He was badly injured and after lots of suffering he eventually died.

“As I grew up, my father decided that I wasn’t safe in Burma. The government doesn’t let us marry so he told me to leave for Bangladesh.

“We had a relative who was handicapped and a beggar, and she agreed to look after me.

“We took a boat over the river and it was very dangerous. On the other side we were stopped by the Bangladesh Rifles [BDR].

“They demanded bribes of 100 taka each [$1.50] to let us through, but we only had 100 taka between us.

“‘You must leave the girl with us then,’ the BDR men said. But my relative refused and argued that she could not move without me helping her. So finally they let us through.”

Police raid

Nasima said: “I already had one sister in Bangladesh but I didn’t know where she was living. So we went to Cox’s Bazar and lived as beggars.

“Sometimes people would give us a little rice or a bit of money to survive.

“Finally I met a man who knew my sister. She was living in Alikadam, and her husband came and got me.

“I lived there for two years, working as a farm labourer. Life was fine, and I was able to marry and have a child.

“But five days after the baby was born the police arrived. They came without warning when we were having dinner.

“They rounded up all the Burmese men including my husband and my sister’s husband and put them in a police truck.

“I told the police that I had a newborn and that we could not survive without my husband.

“I begged them to let him stay, but they said that the Rohingya should expect no mercy. So I told them to take me too.

“They put me into the lorry and drove us to the river.

“They found a fishing boat and threatened to beat up the captain if he didn’t take us to the other side – to Burma.

“Once we got there, he told us that he had seen some other Rohingyas being shot by the Nasaka [the Burmese border guards], and he told us how to follow the river upstream and then sneak back into Bangladesh.

“We walked the whole night and then finally in the morning we got back to this side.

“That’s when I noticed there was something wrong with my baby. He had died during the journey and I hadn’t even realised it. We dug a small hole with our bare hands and buried him there.

“We came to a road and waved to a passing jeep. We begged the driver to save our lives and take us away from there. All I had to pay him with was my scarf.

“He had heard about the Kutupalong camp and said that the Rohingya were safe there.

“One week after arriving at the camp my husband said he had to go and find work. He left and I have no idea where he is now.

“I survive by going into the jungle and collecting firewood to sell. If I collect some, I can then eat a little.

“This week I have only had three meals. But I am living alone. It is much worse for some of the families with 10 or 11 mouths to feed.

“Death would be better than this life.”

Most trafficking victims in Thailand ‘are Burmese’ – Usa Pichai
Mizzima News: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – Burmese workers rank the highest in numbers of human-trafficking victims in Thailand, while a labour shortage in the kingdom’s expanding fisheries industry is set to exacerbate the problem, rights groups say.Sompong Sakaew, director of the Labour Rights Promotion Network, told Mizzima today that human trafficking in Thailand was ranked by the United States as “worrisome” and that the situation had worsened in recent years. The NGO is based in the fish-farming and salt-producing province of Samut Sakhon, on the Gulf of Thailand south of Bangkok.

“The biggest problem is in the fishery industries, where Burmese workers are deceived and forced to work the hardest and longest,” he said.

A recent estimate of the number of migrant workers in Thailand was set at more than three million, but the registered number is 700,000 workers, and they are mainly from Burma.

Sompong said business owners in Thailand still lacked the conscience to employ workers legally. Many wanted cheap labour and ignored the realities of the illicit trade that was supplying and exploiting these workers.

“Thailand is at risk of an international boycott of its seafood products if the human trafficking in this industry remains unresolved,” he warned.

According to the Mirror Foundation anti-human-trafficking centre in Bangkok, up to 138 cases were reported to the foundation last year – three times than in the previous year. The report was released at a press conference yesterday in Bangkok prior to National Anti-human Trafficking Day tomorrow.

Conditions in northern Thailand have also declined. Burmese boys from Mae Sot were deceived and forced to sell roti in Chiang Mai. Traffickers have also persuaded children from Burmese families to work in Thailand, and later forced them to sell flowers in the northern city, according to Duan Wongsa, manager of the Anti-Trafficking Co-ordination Unit Northern Thailand, in Chiang Mai.

“Recently… traffickers brought children from refugee camps along the border in Tak Province to inner provinces of Thailand,” she added. “Children would be brought and forced to work as domestic helpers for pitiful wages.”

Ekkalak Lumchomkae, head of the Mirror Foundation centre, told Mizzima the situation was in crisis, particularly in the fisheries sector.

GreenFacts.org ranked Thailand third in the world in 2006 among its top 10 exporters and importers of fish and fishery products, but the country faces a severe labour shortage, with an estimated deficit of more than 10,000 workers. The shortage provides impetus for the traffickers to tries harder to search workers to serve businesses.

“From our fieldwork in some areas, there are politicians and officials behind the traffickers,” Ekkalak said. “Legal measures to control the fisheries sector are ineffective or local officials are negligent in applying the law.”

The situation in other sectors, such as prostitution, begging and flower-selling remained unchanged in 2008 and last year, the centre’s report said.

Ekkalak said the rate Burmese workers have to pay to middlemen to work in Thailand had increased, from the recent figure of around 20,000 baht (US$606), to 25,000 baht, nearly twice the amount demanded in the previous year. It takes most of them at least a year to repay the brokers.

He added that police have only been able to arrest minor Burmese traffickers after raids on suspected factories, failing to net the masterminds. “Local police were not brave enough to charge them [trafficking kingpins] under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 2008, but tend to lay charges for lesser offences.”

The centre blacklisted four seaside provinces with severe trafficking problems: Songkhla, Chonburi, Samut Sakhon and Samut Prakan.

A 14-year-old Muslim girl in Mae Sot, lured into working as a flower-seller in Bangkok, said she went unpaid during two years work for her employers.

“They told me that the money would be paid to my mother but she also never saw it,” the teen said. “They also hit me in the head when I could not bring in enough money.”

She later escaped from her taskmasters with the help of her neighbours and returned to Mae Sot – which along with the fishing town of Ranong on the southwest coast of Thailand near a marine border with Burma, and Chiang Rai in the far north – is a hotspot of activity for human traffickers.

Thai Minister of Social Development and Human Security Issara Somchai said at the opening of anti-human trafficking campaign in Bangkok that recent trafficking has become a more complex process.

Transnational networks put children and young people at high risk because their desire for better livelihoods leaves them open to exploitation, according to a report on Thailand’s Public Relations Department website on Friday.

Thailand’s first anti-trafficking legislation took effect in June, 2008, and was aimed at tackling the ever-increasing problem. The content specified provisions banning trafficking that involves the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by threats or use of force for the purpose of exploitation.

Exploitation is defined as seeking benefit from prostitution, or production or distribution of pornographic materials. The law also bans other forms of sexual exploitation, slavery, forced begging, other forced labour or provision of services, coerced removal of organs for the purpose of trade, or any other similar practices resulting from forced or harmful work with extortion as the result, regardless of a person’s consent.

However, activists said the problem was not in the law, but in its application. Local police are reluctant to charge traffickers, who are often violent or armed, or employers in their jurisdictions, who usually have considerable social power. Police therefore seek far lesser penalties than the legislation prescribes, rights activists have said.

Burma tops ‘worst of the worst’ list of human rights violators – Howard LaFranchi
Christian Science Monitor: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Washington — The hit parade of the world’s worst human rights violators is out, and it reads like a rap sheet of the usual suspects.The “worst of the worst,” as Washington-based human rights watchdog Freedom House calls them, is comprised of nine countries and one territory: Burma, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tibet (under Chinese jurisdiction).

What Freedom House calls “shameful” is that one of those “worst” – Libya – was just elected to the United Nations’ premier human rights organization, the Human Rights Council. Moreover, three countries on the organization’s expanded list of countries with only slightly better human-rights records – China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia – are already members.

“It’s a badge of shame that these countries sit on the council, but the shame really goes to the [UN] General Assembly countries that elected these egregious violators of rights in the first place,” says Paula Schriefer, Freedom House’s director of advocacy. She notes that Saudi Arabia, for example, was elected to the council with more than 150 votes out of the 192 General Assembly members.

In all, 20 countries and territories have such appalling human rights records as to be considered the world’s worst. Rounding out the list Freedom House issued Thursday are: Belarus, Chad, Guinea, Laos, Syria, and two territories: South Ossetia and Western Sahara.

The “worst of the worst” list is just one piece of evidence that Freedom House offers to support its conclusion that freedom globally is on the decline, after several decades of general expansion.

“By absolute standards, the world is still freer than it was 30 years ago,” Freedom House Executive Director Jennifer Windsor says in the report’s overview. The less-good news: “The last four years have seen a global decline in freedom,” she adds, including in such specific areas the organization measures globally as multiparty elections, freedom of association, freedom of speech, rights of minorities, and the rule of law.

The report finds that the countries on the “worst” list represent a “narrow range” of political systems with such familiar names as dictatorship, military junta, and one-party rule. Another common factor in many of the countries on the list is corruption.
The Human Rights Council, which sits in Geneva, is dismissed by some rights advocates because of the participation of some “worst” rights violators. The council was snubbed by the Bush administration for that reason, but the Obama administration reversed course and decided to try to reform the body from within.

Ms. Schriefer, who was reached by phone in Geneva where she is representing Freedom House with the council, calls the presence of “egregious” rights violators on the council an “embarrassment,” but adds, “There’s no reason the majority can’t get down to business on the work of promoting and supporting human rights in all corners of the world.”

She notes on the bright side that the council has managed to appoint an independent expert on Sudan, and is about to consider renewing the expert’s mandate. “You can tell issues like this matter to countries [that become the object of rights probes] by the energy and resources they put into avoiding it,” she says.

The council has also registered a number of setbacks. A group of rights-promoting countries attempted to pass a resolution in May 2009 condemning Sri Lanka for repressive actions against its own citizens. But the effort backfired when supporters of the Sri Lankan regime on the council amended the resolution so it ended up praising the government’s steps.

“Now Sri Lanka uses the resolution as part of its propaganda trumpeting the support it has garnered internationally,” Schriefer says. “That was not a positive step for human rights.”

Report says Burma is taking steps toward nuclear weapons program – Joby Warrick
Washington Post: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Burma has begun secretly acquiring key components for a nuclear weapons program, including specialized equipment used to make uranium metal for nuclear bombs, according to a report that cites documents and photos from a Burmese army officer who recently fled the country.The smuggled evidence shows Burma’s military rulers taking concrete steps toward obtaining atomic weapons, according to an analysis co-written by an independent nuclear expert. But it also points to enormous gaps in Burmese technical know-how and suggests that the country is many years from developing an actual bomb.

The analysis, commissioned by the dissident group Democratic Voice of Burma, concludes with “high confidence” that Burma is seeking nuclear technology, and adds: “This technology is only for nuclear weapons and not for civilian use or nuclear power.”

“The intent is clear, and that is a very disturbing matter for international agreements,” said the report, co-authored by Robert E. Kelley, a retired senior U.N. nuclear inspector. Officials for the dissident group provided copies of the analysis to the broadcaster al-Jazeera, The Washington Post and a few other news outlets.

Hours before the report’s release, Sen. James Webb (D-Va.) announced that he was canceling a trip to Burma, also known as Myanmar, to await the details. “It is unclear whether these allegations have substantive merit,” Webb, who chairs a Senate Foreign Relations panel on East Asia, said in a statement released by his office. “[But] until there is further clarification on these matters, I believe it would be unwise and potentially counterproductive for me to visit Burma.”

There have been numerous allegations in the past about secret nuclear activity by Burma’s military rulers, accounts based largely on ambiguous satellite images and uncorroborated stories by defectors. But the new analysis is based on documents and hundreds of photos smuggled out of the country by Sai Thein Win, a Burmese major who says he visited key installations and attended meetings at which the new technology was demonstrated.

The trove of insider material was reviewed by Kelley, a U.S. citizen who served at two of the Energy Department’s nuclear laboratories before becoming a senior inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency. Kelley co-wrote the opposition group’s report with Democratic Voice of Burma researcher Ali Fowle.

Among the images provided by the major are technical drawings of a device known as a bomb-reduction vessel, which is chiefly used in the making of uranium metal for fuel rods and nuclear-weapons components. The defector also released a document purporting to show a Burmese government official ordering production of the device, as well as photos of the finished vessel.

Other photographs show Burmese military officials and civilians posing beside a device known as a vacuum glove box, which also is used in the production of uranium metal. The defector describes ongoing efforts on various phases of a nuclear-weapons program, from uranium mining to work on advanced lasers used in uranium enrichment. Some of the machinery used in the Burmese program appears to have been of Western origin.

The report notes that the Burmese scientists appear to be struggling to master the technology and that some processes, such as laser enrichment, likely far exceed the capabilities of the impoverished, isolated country.

“Photographs could be faked,” it says, “but there are so many and they are so consistent with other information and within themselves that they lead to a high degree of confidence that Burma is pursuing nuclear technology.”

A Washington-based nuclear weapons analyst who reviewed the report said the conclusions about Burma’s nuclear intentions appeared credible and alarming. “It’s just too easy to hide a program like this,” said Joshua H. Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government.

Myanmar’s nuclear bombshell – Bertil Lintner
Asia Times: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Bangkok – Myanmar’s ruling generals have started a secret program to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them in a high-stakes bid to deter perceived hostile foreign powers, according to an investigative report by the Democratic Voice of Burma that will be aired later on Friday by television news network al-Jazeera.Asia Times Online contributor Bertil Lintner was involved in reviewing materials during extensive authentication processes conducted by international arms experts and others during the report’s five-year production. In the strategic footsteps of North Korea, Myanmar’s leaders are also building a complex network of tunnels, bunkers and other underground installations where they and their military hardware would be hidden against any external aerial attack, including presumably from the United States.
Based on testimonies and photographs supplied by high-ranking military defectors, the documentary will show for the first time how Myanmar has developed the capacity and is now using laser isotope separation, a technique for developing nuclear weapons. It will also show how machinery and equipment has been acquired to develop ballistic missiles.

That Myanmar is now trying to develop nuclear weapons and has become engaged in a military partnership with North Korea will dramatically change the region’s security dynamic. Myanmar is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a 10-nation grouping whose members jointly signed the 1995 Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Bangkok Treaty.

The nuclear bid will also put the already diplomatically isolated country on a collision course with the US. US Senator Jim Webb, who has earlier led a diplomatic drive to ”engage” the junta, abruptly canceled his scheduled June 4 trip to Myanmar when he learned about the upcoming documentary. The explosive revelations about Myanmar’s nuclear initiative are expected to freeze Washington’s recent warming towards the generals.

It is possible that the junta’s grandiose schemes could amount to little more than a monumental waste of state resources. According to one international arms expert familiar with the materials on Myanmar’s program, the laser isotope separation method now being employed by Myanmar’s insufficiently trained scientists ”is probably one of the worst that is yet to be invented. The major countries of the world have spent billions of dollars trying to make the process work without success.”

There is thus a risk that the generals will further undermine the country’s already wobbly economic fundamentals on ill-conceived weapons projects, ones that may yield little more than lots of radioactive holes in the ground and some crude Scud-type missiles.

Western military experts assert that any sophisticated bunker-buster bomb could easily penetrate the newly built network of tunnels and other underground facilities, constructed near the new capital of Naypyidaw. In light of the country’s lack of technical know-how, Myanmar’s desired nuclear bomb may also turn out to be a huge white elephant. It is not even certain that its homegrown missiles will fly. At least that is the conclusion of weapons’ experts who have closely examined the materials that will be presented in al-Jazeera’s investigative report.

The program was produced over five-years by the Democratic Voice of Burma, or DVB, a Norway-based radio and TV station run by Myanmar exiles. They have made their case based on leaked photographs, documents and testimonies from key military defectors. The documentary was directed by London-based Australian journalist Evan Williams.

Nuclear turncoat

The report’s main source, Sai Thein Win, is a former Myanmar army major who recently defected to the West, bringing with him a trove of information never seen before outside of the country. His documentation has been scrutinized by, among others, Robert Kelley, a former US weapons scientist at the Los Alamos facility where work is conducted towards the design of nuclear weapons.

>From 1992 to 1993 and 2001 to 2005, Kelley also served as one of the directors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “Sai Thein Win reminds us to some degree of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli technician at the Dimona nuclear site in the Negev desert … Sai is providing similar information,” said Kelley.

Vanunu blew the whistle on Israel’s nuclear program, and, according to Kelley, Sai Thein Win has “provided photographs of items that would appear to be very useful in a nuclear program as they are specific to nuclear issues. They could be seen as for other things, but they look like they were designed for a nuclear program.”

Geoff Forden, another international arms expert, says Myanmar appears to be “pursuing at least two different paths towards acquiring a missile production capability. One is a more or less indigenous path. The less indigenous comes from the fact that they have sent a number of Myanmar military officers to Moscow for training in engineering related to missile design and production.”

Sai Thein Win was among the Myanmar army officers sent to Russia and he has produced photographs of himself taken during his training there. He also has pictures of a top secret nuclear facility located 11 kilometers from Thabeikkyin, a small town near the Irrawaddy River in northern Myanmar.

He claims this is the headquarters of the army’s nuclear battalion and that it is there the regime is trying to build a nuclear reactor and enrich uranium for weapons. Missile development, he says, is carried out at another facility near Myaing, southwest of Mandalay, in central Myanmar.

Machinery for the Myaing plant has been supplied by two German firms, which also sent engineers to install the equipment. The Germans, Sai Thein Win says, were told that “the factories were educational institutions … those poor German engineers don’t know, didn’t know that we were aiming to use those machines in producing rocket parts or some parts for military use.”

How useful those machines will be for missile development is questionable. Despite their training in Russia, the Myanmar engineers handling them have little or no knowledge of producing sophisticated weapons, according to experts who say the generals’ apparent dream of having a nuclear reactor may also be just that: a pipedream.

Another high-ranking Myanmar military official also provided DVB’s researchers with classified information related to the country’s nuclear and missile program. He, however, fell out of view while in Singapore some time last year and his current whereabouts is now unknown.

Myanmar was one of the first countries in the region to launch a nuclear research program. In 1956, the country’s then-democratic government set up the Union of Burma Atomic Energy Center in the former capital Yangon. Unrelated to the country’s defense industries, it came to a halt when the military seized power in 1962. The new military power-holders, led by General Ne Win, did not trust the old technocrats and saw little use in having a nuclear program designed for peaceful purposes.

In 2001, Myanmar’s present ruling junta aimed to revitalize the country’s nuclear ambitions. An agreement was signed with Russia ’s Atomic Energy Ministry, which announced plans to build a 10-megawatt nuclear research reactor in central Myanmar. That same year, Myanmar established a Department of Atomic Energy, believed to be the brainchild of the Minister for Science and technology, U Thaung, a graduate of the Defense Services Academy and former ambassador to the US. At the time, US-trained nuclear scientist Thein Po Saw was identified as a leading advocate for nuclear technology in Myanmar.

Reports since then have been murky, including speculation that the deal was shelved due to Myanmar’s lack of finances. The Russian reactor was never delivered, but in May 2007 Russia ’s atomic energy agency, Rosatom, again announced it would build Myanmar ’s nuclear-research reactor. Under the initial 2001 agreement, Myanmar nationals, most military personnel, were sent to Russia for training. Nearly 10 years later, Russia has yet to deliver the reactor because Myanmar “refused to allow inspection by the IAEA”, according to DVB.

North Korean ally

Myanmar thus appears to have embarked on its own indigenous program to build a nuclear research reactor. Unconfirmed reports circulated on the Internet claim that North Korea is assisting the Myanmar authorities in the endeavor. Diplomatic relations between North Korea and Myanmar, which were severed in 1983 when North Korean agents detonated a bomb in Yangon, were officially restored in April 2007.

Only days later, a North Korean freighter, the Kang Nam I, docked at Thilawa port near the old capital. Heavy crates were unloaded under strict secrecy and tight security. A journalist working for a Japanese news agency was detained and interrogated for attempting to photograph the unloading.

Last year, the Kang Nam I was back in the news when, destined for Myanmar, it was turned back by US naval warships. At the time, it was thought to be carrying material banned under UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing North Korea from exporting material related to the production and development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

North Korea’s role in Myanmar ’s nascent nuclear program is still a matter of conjecture. But in May this year, a seven-member UN panel monitoring implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicated that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Myanmar.

The experts in the documentary said they were looking into “suspicious activity in Myanmar”, including the presence of Namchongang Trading, one of the North Korean companies sanctioned by the UN. North Korean tunneling experts are also known to have provided crucial assistance to the construction of Myanmar’s underground facilities.

According to an unnamed Myanmar army engineer, who was also interviewed for the DVB documentary, “a batch of eight North Koreans came each time and [were] sent back, [then] another eight came and were sent back. At the Defense Industry factories, there are at least eight to 16 of them … they act as technical advisers.”

In November 2008, Gen Shwe Mann, the third-highest ranking official in Myanmar’s military hierarchy, paid a secret visit to Pyongyang. Traveling with an entourage of military officers, he visited a radar base and a factory making Scud missiles, and signed a memorandum of understanding with the North Koreans to enhance military cooperation between the two countries.

A photo file and other details of the visit were leaked to Myanmar exiles and were soon available on the Internet, prompting the authorities to carry out a purge within its own ranks. On January 7 this year, one Foreign Ministry official and a retired military officer were sentenced to death for leaking the material.

Military insecurity

Aung Lin Htut, a former intelligence officer attached to the Myanmar Embassy in Washington until he defected in 2004, claims that soon after General Than Shwe came to power in 1992 he “thought that if we followed the North Korean example we would not need to take into account America or even need to care about China. In other words, when they have nuclear energy and weapons other countries … won’t dare touch Myanmar.”

The tunnels and bunkers – some of which are large enough to accommodate hundreds of soldiers – should be seen in the same light, Aung Lin Htut has argued. “It is for their own safety that the government has invested heavily into those tunnel projects,” he said.

The generals may fear not only an outside attack, which is highly unlikely according to security experts, but also another popular uprising. In 1988, millions of people took to the streets to demand an end to military dictatorship. In 2007, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks led marches for national reconciliation and a dialogue between the military government and the pro-democracy movement.

On both occasions, the generals responded with military force and brutally suppressed the popular movements. But the generals were shaken and apparently saw the need to move themselves and vital military facilities underground and away from populated areas, as also seen in the junta’s bizarre and sudden move to the new capital Naypyidaw in November 2005.

For other reasons, North Korea reacted similarly after the war on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is believed to have one of the world’s most extensive complexes of tunnels, storage facilities – and even weapons’ factories – all hidden from the prying eyes of real and imagined enemies.

That is likely why Myanmar’s generals see Pyongyang as a role model and why relations between the two countries have warmed since the 1990s – hardly by coincidence at the same time the US has become one of Myanmar’s fiercest critics. In 2005, then-secretary of state Condoleezza Rice branded Myanmar, along with Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Zimbabwe as “outposts of tyranny”, and the US tightened financial sanctions against the regime and its supporters.

The present US administration of President Barack Obama adopted a more conciliatory approach, sending emissaries to Myanmar to “engage” the generals and nudge them towards democracy. But sources close to the decision-making process in Washington also believe that concern over Myanmar’s WMD programs – and increasingly close ties with North Korea – should be equally important considerations in any new US policy towards Myanmar.

One of the negotiators recently sent to Myanmar, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell, is interviewed in the DVB documentary. When asked about Myanmar’s new security-related polices and initiatives, he replies rather cryptically:

Some of it is sensitive so really can’t be discussed in great detail, but I will say we have seen enough to cause us some anxiety about certain kinds of military and other kinds of relationships between North Korea and Burma [Myanmar]. We have been very clear with the authorities about what our red lines are … we always worry about nuclear proliferation and there are signs that there has been some flirtation around these matters.

According to internal documents presented by the DVB, the total cost of Myanmar’s tunneling projects and WMD programs is astronomical, running into billions of US dollars. This appears to be one reason why several Myanmar military officers have defected to the West – and brought with them the evidence that will be seen by global audiences on Friday.

* Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea Under the Kim Clan. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.

Expert says Burma ‘planning nuclear bomb’ – DVB and Robert Kelley
Democratic Voice of Burma: Fri 4 Jun 2010

A five-year investigation by DVB has uncovered evidence that Burma is embarking on a programme to develop nuclear weaponry. At the centre of the investigation is Sai Thein Win, a former defense engineer and missile expert who worked in factories in Burma where he was tasked to make prototype components for missile and nuclear programs.Sai contacted DVB after learning of its investigation into Burma’s military programmes, and supplied various documents and colour photographs of the equipment built inside the factories. The investigation has also uncovered evidence of North Korean involvement in the development of Burmese missiles, as well as Russia’s training of Burmese nuclear technicians.

In collaboration with DVB, American nuclear scientist and a former director in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Robert Kelley, has spent months examining this material. Here he writes in an exclusive report for DVB that Burma is probably mining uranium and exploring nuclear technology that is only “useful only for weapons”. For the full 30-page report, click here.

A remarkable individual has come out of Burma to describe nuclear-related activities in that secretive country. DVB has interviewed this man at length and is presenting his evidence here for all to see. His name is Sai Thein Win, and until recently he was a major in the Burmese army. He was trained in Burma as a defense engineer, and later in Russia as a missile expert. He returned to Burma to work in special factories, built to house modern European machining tools, to build prototypes for missile and nuclear activities.

Sai brought with him some documents and colour photographs of equipment built in these factories. DVB is publishing these photos and has arranged with experts to analyze what they have discovered. Some will no doubt want to weigh in and add their conclusions – no doubt there will be detractors who do not agree with the analysis and our conclusion that these objects are designed for use in a nuclear weapons development program. We invite their criticism and hope that any additional analysis will eventually reinforce our view that Burma is engaged in activities that are prohibited under international agreements.

DVB has hundreds of other photos taken in Burma inside closed facilities, as well as countless other information sources and documents. Background information is given for the very specific information Sai is providing.

In the last two years certain “laptop documents” have surfaced that purport to show that Iran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear program. The origin of these documents is not clear but they have generated a huge international debate over Iran’s intentions. The Burmese documents and photographs brought by Sai are much closer to the original source materials and the route of their disclosure is perfectly clear. The debate over these documents should be interesting in the non-proliferation community.

Who is Sai Thein Win?

Sai was a major in the Burmese army. He saw a DVB documentary about special factories in Burma that had been built by the regime to make components for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). He worked in two of these factories and felt there was more that needed to be conveyed outside Burma. Sai came out to Thailand to tell the world what he has seen and what he was asked to do. What he has to say adds to the testimony of many other Burmese defectors, but he supplements it with many colour photographs of the buildings and what they are building inside them. In addition he can describe the special demonstrations he attended and can name the people and places associated with the Burmese nuclear program that he visited.

Sai Thein Win reminds us of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli technician at the Dimona nuclear site in the Negev desert. Vanunu took many photographs of activities in Israel that were allegedly related to nuclear fuel cycle and weapons development. These photos were published in the Sunday Times in London in 1986. They purportedly showed nuclear weapons activities in Israel at the time. Israel has never confirmed that the images were taken in their facilities; much less that Israel even has a nuclear weapons program. But Vanunu was abducted, tried in an Israeli court and sentenced to many years in prison for divulging state secrets. Sai is providing similar information.

What is the Program that Sai Describes?

Sai tells us that he was tasked to make prototype components for missile and nuclear programs. He is an experienced mechanical engineer and he is capable of describing machining operations very accurately.

Sai has very accurately described a missile fuel pump impeller he made because he is trained as a missile engineer. His information on nuclear programs is based upon many colour photographs and two visits to the nuclear battalion at Thabeikkyin, north of Mandalay. The Nuclear Battalion is the organization charged with building up a nuclear weapons capability in Burma. The Nuclear Battalion will try to do this by building a nuclear reactor and nuclear enrichment capabilities.

It is DVB consultants’ firm belief that Burma is probably not capable of building the equipment they have been charged to build: to manufacture a nuclear weapon, to build a weapons material supply, and to do it in a professional way. But the information provided by Sai and other reporters from Burma clearly indicates that the regime has the intent to go nuclear and it is trying and expending huge resources along the way.

Factories filled with European equipment

Two companies in Singapore with German connections sold many machine tools to the Burmese government, notably the Department of Technical and Vocational Education (DTVE). DTVE is closely associated with the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) which is subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). A great deal of information is known about people and organizations in this chain. DTVE is probably a front for military purchasing for weapons of mass destruction; that is to say nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them, largely missiles.

The German government did not have derogatory information about DTVE when the tools were sold and allowed the sale. Fortunately, although the machine tools were very expensive and capable, they were sold without all of the accessories to make the very precision parts required for many missile and nuclear applications. These factories are only making prototypes and first models of equipment for other research organizations. They are not making serial copies for a production program and they do not do research themselves

The companies believed the machines were to be used for educational and vocational training, but the German government, suspicious about the end use, sent a diplomat and an expert to examine the machines that were installed in two special factories in Burma. The expert was suspicious that the machines would be used for uses other than training; there were no students and no universities nearby, and there were no women students. The expert noted that none of the male students wore military uniforms. DVB has examined the photos and some of the “students” who wore civilian clothes during the expert visit wear military uniforms when the Europeans are not there.

Sai provided recognizable photos of the equipment installers and the Germans during their site visit. This is one of many indications that he was at the factories and that his story is very credible. It is also fortunate that the German government was diligent and visited these factories to verify the end use. The Burmese were probably not telling the whole truth, but the visits allow serious verification of the facts.

Sai describes equipment the Nuclear Battalion is building

Sai has provided DVB with many photos of material that the Nuclear Battalion at Thabeikkyin is requesting. One of the most obvious ones is requested in an accompanying secret memo from the No (1) Science and Technology Regiment at Thabeikkyin to the Special Factory Number One near Pyin Oo Lwin. It is for a “bomb reactor” for the “special substance production research department” and there are some sketches of what is wanted as well as pictures. A bomb reactor in a nuclear program is a special device for turning uranium compounds into uranium metal for use in nuclear fuel or a nuclear bomb. The pictures and sketches are of such a bomb reactor and one of the pictures has been subjected to high temperature. The paint is burned off and it has been used. It may be a design from a foreign country or a Burmese design. But the need for a bomb reactor in a Burmese Nuclear Battalion is a strong signal that the project is trying to make uranium metal. Whether the uranium metal is used in a plutonium production reactor or a nuclear device, Burma is exploring nuclear technology that is useful only for weapons.

Sai also provided photos of chemical engineering machinery that can be used for making uranium compounds such as uranium hexafluoride gas, used in uranium enrichment. He describes nozzles used in advanced lasers that separate uranium isotopes into materials used for bombs. He provides pictures of a glove box for mixing reactive materials and furnaces for making uranium compounds. All of these things could have other uses, but taken together, in the context of the Nuclear Battalion, they are for a nuclear weapons program.

Sai has been told that the regime is planning to build a nuclear reactor to make plutonium for a nuclear bomb. He has seen a demonstration of a reactor component called a “control rod” that fits this story. He has been told that the regime plans to enrich uranium for a bomb and he has seen a demonstration of a carbon monoxide laser that will be part of this enrichment process. He has named the individuals he met and heard from at Thabeikkyin and they can be correlated through open source information with their jobs for the Burmese Department of Atomic Energy. Many are frequent visitors to IAEA grant training projects. He himself was tasked to make nozzles for the carbon monoxide laser. He actually knows less about the chemical industrial equipment seen in his photos than we can judge, but his overall story is quite interesting. It is also clear that the demonstrations and explanations that he has seen are quite crude. If they are the best Burma can do they have a long way to go.

How does Sai fit into the overall Burma story?

Sai is a mechanical engineer with experience in machining parts on highly specialized and modern machine tools. These machine tools make items that are very precise and can be used in nuclear energy programs or to make missiles. Sai is not a nuclear expert and he has little to say about the things he made, or that his factory made other than what he was told about their uses. He does provide photos of items that would be used in the nuclear industry to process uranium compounds into forms used in the nuclear weapons development process. These photos or his descriptions could be faked, but they are highly consistent with the uses he suggests.

Sai received a degree as a defense engineer in Burma. He then went to Russia to train in missile technology at the prestigious Bauman Institute in Moscow. He can document all of this. His friends went to Russia as well and studied nuclear and chemical technology at the Moscow Institute of Engineering Physics (MIFI) and the Mendeleev Institute of Chemical Technology. MIFI was the main training institute for Soviet nuclear weapons designers for many years. The ones who studied chemistry at Mendeleev are probably the ones who are most important in building the special equipment that Sai knew about.

Stories about a nuclear reactor in Burma

There have many wild stories about a nuclear reactor in Burma. It is clear that Burma and Russia considered building a 10 Megawatt (10 MW) research reactor in Burma in 2000. It is also clear that this deal was not closed and that Russia announced only intent to build a 10 MW reactor around 2008. This reactor has not been built and Russia is highly unlikely to approve such a deal unless Burma signs a new special agreement with the IAEA. This agreement is called an Additional Protocol and Burma is very unlikely to sign it because it would give the IAEA the access it needs to discover a clandestine nuclear program in Burma.

Furthermore, a 10 MW nuclear reactor is a very small concern for proliferation. Such reactors are common in the world and they are simply too small to be of serious proliferation concern. They can be used to teach students how to work in the nuclear area, but they are not appropriate to rapidly make any serious quantities of plutonium for bombs. IAEA has standards for which reactors are especially suitable for plutonium production and this proposed reactor is below that limit. It is appropriate only for nuclear technology training and the production of medical radioisotopes. Local production of medical isotopes is one of the main reasons for reactors in the 10 MW class around the world. Burma could use this reactor for training, but reports that it bought a 10 MW reactor from Russia are clearly untrue, and stories that they want to build one of their own for a bomb program are nonsense.

The idea that Burma is building a larger reactor, like the alleged one Israel destroyed in Syria, is more interesting. This could be a plutonium production reactor, like the 25 MW (thermal) one that North Korea operated in Yongbyon. The fact that North Korea would consider supporting nuclear programs outside its own borders, in client states like Syria, is of serious concern when evaluating Burma. North Korea does have a memorandum of understanding to help Burma build intermediate range ballistic missiles but their role in the nuclear program is only anecdotal.

Is Burma violating its international agreements?

The most important agreement that Burma must satisfy is its agreement with the IAEA. It signed an agreement with the IAEA in 1995 that it would not pursue nuclear weapons under a carefully defined standard international legal agreement. A supplement to this agreement, a so-called Small Quantities Protocol, said that Burma had no nuclear facilities and very small amounts of nuclear materials, which it did not even have to itemise. As a result of this declaration, which was accepted by the IAEA, there are no nuclear safeguards inspections in Burma. There are some IAEA visits to Burma, because Burma is a recipient of IAEA scientific grant money for humanitarian purposes. Some of these grants train Burmese scientists for nuclear activities that could enable them to produce nuclear materials, but these are not the majority of the grants.

Burma has certified that it has no nuclear facilities, has minimal nuclear materials, and has no plans to change this situation. The information brought by Sai suggests that Burma is mining uranium, converting it to uranium compounds for reactors and bombs, and is trying to build a reactor and or an enrichment plant that could only be useful for a bomb. There is no chance that these activities are directed at a reactor to produce electricity in Burma. This is beyond Burma’s engineering capabilities. It is up to Burma to notify the IAEA if these conditions have changed. Clearly, if it is trying to secretly build a bomb and is breaking these rules it will not be voluntarily notifying the IAEA.

Burma has also purchased high quality machine tools from a German machine tool broker in Singapore that can be used for weapons of mass destruction manufacture. These tools could be used to make many things but they are of a size and quality that are not consistent with student training, the declared end use.

The Department of Technical and Vocational training is a front for weapons procurement and is associated with the DAE and MOST. All of these departments, programs, and people associated with them, should be sanctioned and prohibited from buying anything that could contribute to weapons programs.

What is the state of Burma’s nuclear program?

We have examined the photos of the Burmese nuclear program very carefully and looked at Sai’s evidence. The quality of the parts they are machining is poor. The mechanical drawings to produce these parts in a machine shop are unacceptably poor. If someone really plans to build a nuclear weapon, a very complex device made up of precision components, then Burma is not ready. This could be because the information brought by Sai is not complete or because Burma is playing in the field but is not ready to be serious. In any case, nothing we have seen suggests Burma will be successful with the materials and component we have seen.

What is significant is intent. Burma is trying to mine uranium and upgrade uranium compounds through chemical processing. The photos show several steps in this intent. Burma is reported to be planning and building a nuclear reactor to make plutonium and is trying to enrich uranium to make a bomb. These activities are inconsistent with their signed obligations with the IAEA.

Even if Burma is not able to succeed with their illegal program, they have set off alarm bells in the international community devoted to preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation. The IAEA should ask Burma if its stated declarations are true. If these allegations appear real there should be follow-up questions and inspections of alleged activities. This effort will be hampered by Burma’s failure to sign the Additional Protocol. Under the current Small Quantities Protocol Agreement, IAEA has no power to inspect in Burma.

Burma is also trying to build medium-range missiles such as SCUDs under a memorandum of understanding with North Korea. SCUDS are not likely to carry a Burmese nuclear warhead because first generation nuclear warheads are usually too heavy and large for the SCUD missile. But there is little reason to embark on SCUD missiles and nuclear weapons other than to threaten ones near-neighbours. Burma is ruled by a junta that has no real political philosophy other than greed. The junta rules for the purpose of enriching a small cadre with the rich resources of the country: teak, gold, jade, other minerals and the labour of the people. Like their model, North Korea, the junta hopes to remain safe from foreign interference by being too dangerous to invade. Nuclear weapons contribute to that immunity.

Conclusions

DVB has interviewed many sources from inside Burma’s military programs. Many other researchers are interviewing former Burmese military people, for example Dictator Watch and Desmond Ball with Phil Thornton. They have provided anecdotal evidence pointing to a Burmese nuclear weapons program. Sai has clarified these reports and added to them with colour photos and personal descriptions of his visits to the Nuclear Battalion. He trained in Moscow in missile technology along with friends who trained in nuclear technology who later vanished into the Nuclear Battalion of Thabeikkyin. All were trained in some of Russia’s first quality institutes.

The total picture is very compelling. Burma is trying to build pieces of a nuclear program, specifically a nuclear reactor to make plutonium and a uranium enrichment program. Burma has a close partnership with North Korea. North Korea has recently been accused of trying to build a nuclear reactor inside Syria to make plutonium for a nuclear program in Syria or North Korea. The timeframe of North Korean assistance to Syria is roughly the same as Burma so the connection may not be coincidental.

If Burma is trying to develop nuclear weapons the international community needs to react. There needs to be a thorough investigation of well-founded reporting. If these reports prove compelling, then there need to be sanctions of known organizations in Burma and for equipment for any weapons of mass destruction.

* Kelley, 63, a former Los Alamos weapons scientist, was an IAEA director from 1992 to 1993, and again from 2001 to 2005. Based in Vienna, Austria, he conducted weapons inspections in Libya, Iraq, and South Africa, and compliance inspections in Egypt, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, Syria, Tanzania, Pakistan, India, and Congo, among others.

Ethnic leaders dividing community: critics
Irrawaddy: Thu 3 Jun 2010

Seven leading ethnic political leaders inside and outside Burma have been criticized for their election activities by a Rangoon-based group called the Burma Ethnic Politics Watch Network (BEPWN).
“We strongly condemned these seven people and their political movement, which helps the Burmese regime stay in power and delay democratic reform in Burma,” said a statement released by the BEPWN on May 22.

“Their actions could divide unity among the ethnic political movement inside and outside Burma and also mislead understanding in the international community in its support to the democracy movement in Burma,” the statement said. The organization accused the seven leaders of being “self-interest seekers” and ignoring the plight of ethnic people in Burma.

The statement by the Rangoon-based network has been widely circulated through the Internet. The statement received by The Irrawaddy named of seven ethnic leaders and criticized their political background and activities.

They are Harn Yawnghwe (Shan), the executive director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office; Dr. Lian H. Sakhong (Chin) of the Ethnic Nationalities Council; Dr. Saw Simon Tha, a Karen physician-turn-politician; Sai Aik Pao, former secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD); San Tha Aung of the Khami National Solidarity Organization; Dr. Saboi Jum, a peace broker between the Burmese regime and Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and Wa politician Philip Sem, who will contest in the general election.

According to the statement, Harn Yawnghwe of the Euro-Burma Office (EBO) has funded a number of ethnic individuals or organizations in order to form parties or contest in the general election.

The network said Harn has requested funds from the European Commission (EC) to finance ethnic politicians in Burma who plann to contest in the election. The statement said he is misusing the money intended for humaniatrian projects.

In an interview with The Irrawaddy in Dec. 2009, Harn said the EBO would provide financial support to opposition parties or ethnic groups that will contest in the general elections in 2010 if they need support, but it should not be misconstrued as EBO support for the Burmese regime 2008 Constitution and planned 2010 election.

The aim of supporting the groups is to let them strive for democracy and ethnic rights within any political space that might be opened up by the Burmese regime, he said.

When contacted by The Irrawaddy this week, Harn Yawnghwe said the group’s allegations were not accurate, and his organization has not provided money to people to contest in the election.

“We give education to them about the election law,” he said. “But, we don’t provide money to them.”

The Rangoon-based network said that Dr. Saw Simon Tha, a committee member of the newly formed Kayin People’s Party, supported the Burmese regime and ignoring the plight of Karen who have been displaced for decades in the jungle in Karen State due to military government attacks.

Simon Tha and 15 Karen politicians in Rangoon registered the KPP to contest in the general elections in 2010.

He was accused of dividing the Karen community in Karen State and those in other parts of Burma.

In an interview with The Irrawaddy in March, Simon Tha said his party will contest in Irrawaddy, Rangoon and Pegu divisions and Mon State, but not Karen State. He said that his party will represent all Karen people in Burma.

Simon Tha is well-known as a peace negotiator between Karen rebel groups and the Burmese regime. In 2004, he arranged peace talks in Rangoon between the Karen National Union, led by the late Gen Saw Bo Mya, and a government delegation led by former Burmese Premier Gen Khin Nyunt.

The statement said that Chin politician Lian H. Sakhong, the EBO research director, abused democracy and worked for his own interests. Sakhong is active in the United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD-LA), and the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) based in Thailand.

The statement said Shan politician Sai Aik Pao supported the Burmese regime. He is a former secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) which won a majority of seats in the Shan State in 1990 election. The statement said he was a hand-picked ethnic representative of the Burmese junta national convention from 1993-1996. He is leading the Shan Democratic Party that will contest in the election in 2010.

The statement said that Saboi Jum was close to the Burmese authorities and provided them with secret information about the KIO. He is a founder of the Nyein Foundation in Kachin State and a peace broker between the Burmese regime and KIO.

The statement said ethnic Wa politician Saw Philip, also known as U Philip Sam, is a leading member of the Wa Democratic Party which supports the Burmese regime, and supported the junta’s national convention.

The statement said that San Tha Aung, who will contest in the election for the Arakan National Party, was a hand-picked representative of the junta and supported it in the national convention.

EU neighbours sign up to Myanmar sanctions
Earth Times: Thu 3 Jun 2010

Brussels – Countries neighbouring the European Union, from Iceland to Armenia, have signed up to the bloc’s decision to keep trade and visa bans on the Myanmar regime, the EU said Thursday.
The EU first brought in sanctions in 2006 in a bid to push the junta towards democracy. In April, it extended them for a year, arguing a “lack of improvement in the human rights situation and the absence of substantive progress towards an inclusive democratisation process.”

Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Norway “have declared that they share the objectives” of the sanctions regime and “will ensure that their national policies conform” to it, an EU statement said.

The sanctions include measures such as a ban on the import of wood and metals from Myanmar, a ban on arms exports, a ban on financial links with over 1,200 regime-linked companies, and a visa ban on some 400 regime figures and their families.

Caught between a vote and a hard place; Suu Kyi’s democracy party splinters over decision whether to contest coming election under junta’s harsh rules – Mark MacKinnon
The Globe and Mail (Canada): Thu 3 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai, Thailand – After clinging for two decades to their stolen victory in a 1990 election, Myanmar’s main opposition party – led by Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is suddenly fragmenting and may be dissolved altogether, ironically over the prospect of another election.
When the military regime in Myanmar, also known as Burma, announced that it was altering the country’s constitution and would hold its first election since Ms. Suu Kyi and her party won a landslide victory in the 1990 vote, it presented her National League for Democracy with a stark choice. It could take part in elections it had no chance of winning under the military’s rules, or boycott and ignore the first hint of political opening the repressive junta has allowed in 20 years.

Taking part would mean renouncing the 1990 election results, as well as expelling the revered Ms. Suu Kyi – who has been under some form of arrest for most of the past two decades – and other political prisoners from the party, since no one with a conviction on their record is allowed to be a member of any party running in the elections.

Not registering for the elections may now lead to the forced dissolution of the party that has led the struggle for democracy inside the repressive country since it was founded in 1988. The election law specifies that only those parties that take part in the elections will be considered legal. Since the deadline for registration passed, the state-run media has taken to referring to the NLD as a “former political party.”

The decision not to run has split the NLD, with Ms. Suu Kyi and the bulk of the party deciding to stick to their position that the results of the 1990 election must be honoured, while a smaller faction has decided to break away from the main pro-democracy movement and to take part in the election.

The new party, headed by long-time NLD member Than Nyein, has adopted the name National Democratic Front. A reportedly furious Ms. Suu Kyi said through her lawyer that the new party was “undemocratic” – since it ignored a party vote not to take part in the elections – and has asked her supporters to boycott the election or spoil their ballots.

It’s a situation that likely pleases the generals, who have ruled Myanmar since the end of British colonial rule in 1962. “The government has been trying to divide the NLD for the past 20 years. Only now can they see that happening,” said Htet Aung, a reporter at The Irrawaddy magazine, a publication run by Myanmarese exiles that publishes out of Chiang Mai, a Thai city roughly 100 kilometres from the border with Myanmar.

Like many exiles, Mr. Htet was unsure of where he stood on the issue. “I understand the NLD’s position and Aung San Suu Kyi’s position. They are committed to genuine democracy and when they see no hope for genuine democracy, they don’t want to participate in these elections,” he said. “But on the other hand, when you’re under a dictatorship, if you want democracy you must pass through the election process.”

So far, the junta has not set a specific date for the vote, only saying that it will take place by the end of 2010. Few see the election as anything but an attempt by the junta to give its rule a coat of legitimacy that it currently lacks. The election will be conducted under emergency laws that forbid criticisms of the government and gatherings of more than five people.

The newly passed election law sets aside one-quarter of the 440 seats in the lower house for the military, and with the opposition weak and barred from getting its message out, the generals and their allies look sure to sweep to a large majority.

General Thein Sein and 22 members of his cabinet recently resigned their positions in the military to run in the election under the banner of the junta’s Union Solidarity and Development Party. Should, as expected, the regime control parliament after the election, the junta’s senior leader, General Than Shwe will likely be voted into the powerful new post of president.

“The regime has 100 per cent of the power now, and they’ll try and keep 100 per cent, but with the legitimacy of an elected government. They wanted the NLD to take part in the elections and then to allow them to win only 5 per cent of the seats,” said Nyo Ohn Myint, the Thailand-based chair of the NLD foreign affairs committee.

“Political parties [that take part in the election] won’t have the opportunity to do any campaigning, or to criticize, because the election laws do not allow you to attack the government. You can’t talk about the electricity shortages, you can’t talk about the water shortage, you can’t talk about the basic problems of the people, because every problem is related to the state. You can’t criticize, so the election campaign is for what?”

However, Mr. Nyo admitted the decision not to participate had deeply divided the party. He characterized those who broke away to form the National Democratic Front as “moderates” willing to give the junta more benefit of the doubt than Ms. Suu Kyi and her allies were.

The election comes as both the United States and China have stepped up diplomatic efforts to engage with the government in Rangoon. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will visit Myanmar this month, and Mr. Nyo said he feels China, which is worried about ethnic conflicts in the north of Myanmar spilling over its border, may be able to pass messages between the regime and the opposition.

The United States, meanwhile, is increasingly concerned by Myanmar’s growing relationship with North Korea, as well as reports that it recently has been trying to acquire materials that could allow it to follow Pyongyang’s lead by producing nuclear weapons. It’s believed that two nuclear reactors are under construction in Myanmar, which has reportedly received aid from both Russia and North Korea in the effort.

“Burma could become another problem like North Korea,” said Aung Zaw, editor of The Irrawaddy, who met with U.S. assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell before the latter’s recent trip to Myanmar. “That’s why the U.S. engagement is no longer about [promoting] democracy alone. It’s about proliferation, too, now.”

Myanmar’s military ambitions
Al Jazeera: Thu 3 Jun 2010

Myanmar’s ruling generals have started a programme to build nuclear weapons. They are trying to develop long-range missiles.
Elections later this year are aimed at convincing the world they are moving towards democracy. But fearing attack from the US and an uprising by their own people, Myanmar’s generals are instead digging themselves in with a nationwide network of bunkers.

With top-secret material gathered over five years, this film reveals how Myanmar is trying to become the next nuclear-armed North Korea.

Key files and other information has been smuggled out by defecting army Major Sai Thein Win, a former deputy commander of a top-secret military factory at a town called Myaing.

Before leaving, he smuggled out thousands of files detailing a secret programme by Myanmar’s ruling generals to build nuclear weapons.

To check Sai Thein Win’s claims, the Democratic Voice of Burma had him show the files to Bob Kelley, a former intelligence officer at North America’s nuclear facility Los Alamos and an ex-director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Files and photos were also shown to Geoff Forden, a military research scientist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The experts agree Myanmar is a long way from achieving its goals.

But many believe that with its stated intent to one day acquire nuclear weapons, Myanmar’s military ambitions should be taken seriously.

Myanmar’s military ambitions can be seen from Friday, June 4, at the following times GMT: Friday: 0600; Saturday: 1900; Sunday: 0300; Monday: 1400; Tuesday: 0530; Wednesday: 1900; Thursday: 0300.

[http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/general/2010/05/201053110470990951.html ]

The international community’s naive beliefs on Burma – Editorial
Nation (Thailand): Wed 2 Jun 2010

Global think-tanks are ignoring the fact that nothing is free or fair in the junta-ruled country, least of all ballots.Most people are saying “at least it’s better than nothing”, in reference to the upcoming elections in Burma. This is especially true for those who are desperate to see some progress in the junta-ruled country.

The latest briefing from the International Crisis Group gave the impression that the election, despite the international community pointing out all the faults with it, would serve as “the best opportunity in a generation to influence the future direction of the country”.

With such an endorsement, even though a mild one by international standards, the junta leaders in Rangoon will end up having the last laugh. Persistence and complete control is a virtue these days because stability and the status quo are easy to deal with.

Political turmoil in Thailand has added fuel to the international community’s growing anxiety about democratic development in the region. Many scholars tend to view countries with continuous political stability as preferred models of development and investment.

The Thai situation was repeatedly used to demonstrate one salient point – stability is linked to prosperity. If one wants prosperity then one must forget about freedom and democracy. Thailand wants both, so the experiment and healing continues.

What is sad about the the international community and most independent think-tanks is that they are not really serious about the suffering of the Burmese people.

For 20 years, the Burmese people have been living under the military junta, tightly monitored and suppressed. And yet, the international community is slow in taking collective action. Investments from the West, dubious positions and awkward neighbourly policies by China, India, as well as Asean, have only strengthened the regime.

Why should the junta accommodate calls for fairness and justice?

The Burmese generals know full well that international focus is short-lived, as there are a myriad global issues to pay attention to. The current Korean Peninsula crisis will continue to dominate the headlines. It would not be a surprise if the junta suddenly declared the date of polls now that global attention has shifted away to the northeast of Asia.

The ICG’s claim that the voting in Burma could be “relatively fair” is preposterous. Yet, such belief is proliferating. That is exactly what the junta wants to see, and that explains why dictatorial governments around the world no longer succumb to any international pressure.

The ICG has not asked if the voters are free to cast their ballots with free will.

How can voters cast their ballots freely if they are being controlled and watched by plain-clothes police officers and thousands of spies in the neighbourhood? They are scared to hell. Every name and household has been scrutinised and put in the records.

The people know that what they do at the polling stations will come back to haunt them. The atmosphere of fear is rising every day.

It is naïve to think that the 1990 poll victory by the opposition party may take place once again because the Burmese voters will be prepared to reject the junta en masse. Similarly, the junta leaders are prepared to make sure they win the polls, now that they’ve learned from past mistakes.

Indeed, if the ICG continues believing what it does, the regime has already won the election!

Sanctioning disaster – Joel Whitney interviews Morten Pedersen
Guernica (US): Wed 2 Jun 2010

The Burma expert defends aid, diplomacy, and “understanding” Burma’s dictators in order to improve human rights, sway softliners, and save lives.Early last month, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi and offered a battery of human rights demands to her wardens in the military government. The dictators have been gearing up for elections later this year. Yet, unfazed by Campbell’s demands, they yawned and pressed on with elections from which Suu Kyi, who won in 1990, and her opposition party, the National League for Democracy, are banned. International election monitors? Also banned. And don’t expect election-day scoops from a country where a foreign journalist was shot point-blank for covering monks’ protests in 2007. “I think they learned their lesson from 1990 when they actually allowed for a free and fair election and lost in a landslide,” said Jared Genser, Suu Kyi’s international counsel.

Days after his visit, Campbell admitted “profound disappointment” that more had not come from the talks. Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK, noted judiciously: “… Clearly after two visits [by Campbell] since last September, engagement with the regime has produced no results at all.” [Emphasis added] On May 15, the president renewed economic sanctions against the regime. But members of Congress sought to make those sanctions even tougher. “In a further sign of fraying American patience,” the Guardian reported, “a bipartisan coalition in the U.S. House of Representatives called this week for a ‘tougher and more robust application of sanctions on Burma’ and urged the Obama administration to back an international war crimes inquiry.”

President Obama’s policy on Burma has something for everyone. It’s a hodgepodge of baby-step diplomacy, self-righteous threats, and crippling economic sanctions. The sanctions condemn the dictators for rights violations by blocking U.S. investments (except for Chevron, which is somehow allowed to stay), including all non-humanitarian aid. Morten Pedersen, a Burma scholar lurking in the bibliography of a lot of Burma policy books, insists that the sanctions, especially the ban on aid, are undermining the president’s diplomacy. Oh, and starving the Burmese.

During his six-year stay in Burma, where he was able to use his conversant Burmese to interview experts and ordinary people, Pedersen says the most dire rights violation he found was crushing poverty. Alongside political rights, he argues that socioeconomic rights must be seen as part of the array of human rights. But such an approach would seem anathema to a Congress that prioritizes condemnation and punishment of the generals over the well being of the people of Burma.

Advocating an approach he calls principle engagement, Pedersen writes in an op-ed in the Canberra Times, “pressure can be exercised without mindlessly ratcheting up sanctions, which have little practical impact other than limiting our ability to influence broader social, political and economic processes. Quiet, but persistent, pressure and support for incremental gains is likely over time to shape the political behaviour of the military more effectively than public condemnation and sanctions.”

Calling the generals’ outlook Hobbesian, Pedersen argues in Promoting Human Rights in Burma, “We may feel that the military leaders hold socially deviant values, or that their fears regarding political reform are unjustified. Yet, like many leaders who believe they have a higher purpose, they are largely impervious to criticism, and do not expect nonbelievers—foreigners in particular—to understand.” So what’s the point of talking to them? Well, like all regimes, Burma’s has hardliners and softliners. As distasteful as it may sound, can “understanding” the generals, even speaking in their terms, bring about human rights improvements, bolster military softliners, and save lives? And if so, is it politically viable?

Pedersen is a research fellow at the Australian National University’s Centre for International Governance and Justice. Burmese historian Thant Myint-U calls him “one of the foremost students and scholars of Burmese politics anywhere outside the country.” Pedersen previously worked as senior analyst for the International Crisis Group in Burma and consultant on Burmese politics and development affairs with the UN, the World Bank, and the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. I spoke with him at the Algonquin Hotel in New York City in late March, while he was in town for a conference. We sat amidst a throng of tourists who drank high-priced martinis and ate complimentary nuts.

—Joel Whitney for Guernica

Guernica: You lived in Burma for six years. The generals are killing and imprisoning and torturing a lot of their people. Some say they are committing genocide against groups like the Karen. Liberals and conservatives in the U.S. and Europe seem to have converged on this idea that if there is ‘evil’ there, we certainly shouldn’t fund it. It’s not moral for us to deal with them. Do you disagree?

Morten Pedersen: There’s two ways of looking at morality. One would be when you look at the act itself, [asking] is that moral or immoral? Many people would define it as immoral, because it funds a bad regime. To me, morality is better looked at in terms of its consequences. I look at how our acts impact the Burmese people. If there is a net benefit from our acts for the Burmese people, I see it as moral. You often are accused of being immoral when you argue for engagement. I think it’s important to make that point up front that that’s not the issue. We can disagree on things, but it’s not about morality. And of course it all depends on what type of engagement we’re talking about.

People especially in the U.S., are quick to say, “If you’re not sanctioning then you are doing ASEAN-style engagement, which is commercial engagement.” The kind of engagement I’m talking about is what I term “principle engagement,” whose up-front objective is to bring improvements in human rights for the Burmese people. By that I mean the entire range of human rights, not just political and civil rights, but also socioeconomic rights, which, as far as I’m concerned, are of equal value. That’s certainly something that [was clear from] my six years in Burma, that socioeconomic issues are uppermost in people’s minds.

Guernica: So just to define principle engagement…

Morten Pedersen: So if there’s a net benefit flowing from the engagement in human rights terms, then I see it as being the way to go. And that then gets into these rather difficult calculations of what is the relative benefit of one approach versus the other. A lot of the discussion is about aid, because that really is where the door is in Burma. The reality is that there wouldn’t be a lot of trade and investment flowing into Burma even if sanctions were lifted, because of the economic environment. (You would get more of it than now, but not a lot.) So I’ve spent a lot of my time looking at aid as a way of having a dialog or a conversation both with the regime but also with society. Of course [that means] a financial relationship that can improve living conditions of people on the ground.

Guernica: Because right now the U.S., for one, doesn’t give significant amounts of aid?

Morten Pedersen: The U.S., as part of this new diplomatic engagement policy has also for the first time committed to openly giving aid inside the country. For many years, it was all outside. But that has kind of been shifting over the last seven years. They have begun to do little things inside.

Guernica: And the E.U.?

Morten Pedersen: The E.U. made a decisive shift seven or eight years ago where they said we’re going to separate politics and humanitarian issues. My argument is that you’re dealing with a long-term crisis. Humanitarian aid by definition is aid that saves lives in a crisis. Burma is an extended crisis; therefore going in and saving lives of course has value. But it doesn’t make sense to only do that. Because you save a life today but then tomorrow the crisis will come back and threaten it again. There has to be more ambition than that.

Guernica: How?

Morten Pedersen: Principle engagement is changing governance to the extent that you can so that human rights improve. But [you’re] also helping people cope with whatever situation exists. So in the short term, it’s about helping people cope. And in the medium term, I think it is also a strategy for beginning to effect changes that over time can lead to bigger things. But it will be domestically driven change and you [see] at best international aid or engagement, or whatever it is, as possibly being a catalyst for that.

The idea that aid props up the regime is ludicrous. In power terms, it is irrelevant. If you stick to the concept of morality where we shouldn’t be doing anything that benefits a corrupt regime, yes, then you’ve got a problem. But if you look at morality in utilitarian terms, I don’t believe that you do, because there’s not significant power consequences of the aid going in. Or at least you can make sure that there isn’t. Of course, I am assuming here that aid agencies are being principled themselves and that they look after their money and that there is proper monitoring and so forth. There’s been an easy argument out there for years, you know, ‘Aid won’t make a difference, you’re not allowed to do anything that’s meaningful and they will steal all of it.’ But it has been proven by the agencies that have engaged that this is not the case.

Guernica: So in its limited way, aid works?

Morten Pedersen: Aid works to the extent that aid works in any country. Usually it doesn’t change a country, right? But it can do things at the individual level.

Guernica: Your book strongly argues for more understanding not just of Burmese history but of the specific perspective of this murderous military junta. Many would criticize this argument that we need to understand bad guys. Dick Cheney offered extreme contempt for American liberals by saying something like, “Liberals want to put terrorists on the couch and psychoanalyze them.” In a way, you take a step in that direction. Tell me what the benefits of understanding the generals are.

Morten Pedersen: I think to address Cheney’s point, there are definitely people who cannot be reformed. But accepting that is not to accept that you can’t make a difference. Of course, if there are people who can’t be reformed then the difference that you can make is with other people, including other people in the regime. Some people say hardliners and softliners; it’s a useful way of distinguishing [how] the Burmese regime has softliners just as any other regime. And to the extent that engagement can change minds, can change policies, those are the people we’re looking at. So engagement at best can reinforce or empower people within the regime who are interested in [change].

Guernica: Of course now the Obama administration is engaging “pragmatically” with the regime. To make this engagement more productive, you argue that Burmese history ought to be better understood. What does that history look like?

Morten Pedersen: I think we have to accept that this is a military that genuinely believes that Burma without its military in control (not necessarily as rulers, but certainly in a key role) would not have survived and even today would not survive.
Guernica: Besides the Buddhist clergy, the military is the only viable institution with any longevity in Burma. And that goes back to just after World War II when independence came; Aung San Suu Kyi’s dad, feeling angry and humiliated by decades and decades of colonial rule, impatiently but understandably told the British to beat it before the Brits could rebuild the country. With the chaos that ensued, the military was the only feasible institution. This was the view that developed, in part as a justification for the generals’ curtailing democracy. Many have argued, including Burmese historian Thant Myint-U, that the military remains the only viable institution in Burma.

Morten Pedersen: Yeah, I mean I’m not personally prepared to accept the argument that a depoliticized military would be the end of Burma.

Guernica: Which is what military hardliners argue.

Morten Pedersen: My point is that I do accept that there are a lot of people in the military who believe that. So we’re not dealing with a regime that is solely interested in personal power and privilege, although that is obviously an element, as it is everywhere. It is a regime that also has a founding ideology, a self-image as having a critical national role, and which does, in fact, act on that. Not just running the country as their own kind of bank or business, although some of them seem to; there are others who are concerned with much more. But I should clarify that the distinction between aid and diplomatic engagement is actually not that big. A lot of the most effective conversations with the regime are conversations that are being had on the ground by agencies that are engaged there on practical projects.

So it’s not Kurt Campbell flying into the capital, talking about how they should conduct the elections. I don’t think that’s gonna lead anywhere. I don’t think that conversation is wrong. But the idea that you can negotiate significant changes at the political level in a short timespan, I don’t believe that’s gonna work. But we do know that conversations about economic policy, for example, do from time to time have an impact and lead to changes in governance. When engaging in these conversations, a good place to start in a country like Burma is to accept that we’re not gonna be able to change Burma. We simply don’t have the means, the leverage, to change a country like that in the dramatic ways that we tend to focus on.

Guernica: China’s stance seems to further undermine any influence that sanctions could once have had.

Morten Pedersen: I think pressure is important. But where I want the sanctions to stop is… you need just enough to have that possible effect. But if you take them too far, as I believe we have done in Burma, then you start blocking other things that I think would be more effective in helping the Burmese people and bringing about improvements in their human rights.

Guernica: Specifically, what parts of sanctions should be kept?

Morten Pedersen: If you’re gonna use sanctions on Burma they have to be strictly targeted. It should be the kind of sanctions that don’t really have an impact on the broader economy or the broader population. Things like the visa ban and freezing the generals’ accounts. None of this really bites that much. And I’m not saying it’s gonna usher in change. But it sends the message that we are unhappy with the way you are doing things, and says this is not according to international standards.

Guernica: But it isn’t counterproductive, in your view?

Morten Pedersen: In comparing the different types of sanctions, those are at the end of the continuum where it’s something we can look at. But there may be counterproductive effects. When you move into broader economic sanctions, then we’re in the middle now. Then it starts to become problematic. It is not possible to target sanctions; because if you target them to hurt the generals, they can pass it on. They can deflect it.

Guernica: It could even end up increasing their corruption over things like aid.

Morten Pedersen: It could, yeah. So once you move into economic sanctions, we’re already beyond what I think is strategically smart to do. But where it becomes really problematic is where you have aid sanctions. Because aid is the wench in the door that we have. You get people in there on the ground who have conversations, build capacity, change minds all across the state and society. No, they don’t engage with Senior General Than Shwe. But they engage at the ministerial level and then all the way down to people living in the villages. And with the amount of aid, we aren’t talking about dramatic changes. But we are talking about positive changes, both in terms of immediate outcomes and I believe also in terms of beginning to create conditions for bigger change, which will have to be primarily domestically driven. But if you can get the people in the regime to loosen up a little bit. I mean they are so paranoid; they have been paranoid for many years. Well, paranoid, but it started out not being paranoia. I mean, it was real.

Guernica: You mean in the period around 1950?

Morten Pedersen: The whole country was at war in the early nineteen fifties. Back then it wasn’t paranoid to believe you needed to control things.

Guernica: Everything was fragmenting.

Morten Pedersen: Yeah.

Guernica: There were something like a dozen ethnic groups that rebelled. There was a communist faction. The U.S. had supported Chinese nationalists within Burmese borders, arming them to the teeth. So the country was total chaos, falling apart…

Morten Pedersen: Yeah. You had other countries in the region, Vietnam, Korea, at different times or a bit later, that were split in two. This is the nightmare scenario.

Guernica: Some of the U.S. and Europe’s policy is a result of a fixation on Aung San Suu Kyi as the main entry point into Burmese history, which is certainly compelling. It hooked me. As did conversations with Karen and other Burmese exiles. But you seem to argue that we don’t see Burma enough through the filter of the history of the people we have to deal with.

Morten Pedersen: What I would say is [these Burma watchers] see Burma through the last twenty years, which is equivalent to the Suu Kyi period. The reason it’s twenty years is because that period has not changed. That’s exactly the point. It’s exactly the same issues we’re dealing with now that were the issues in 1988. And this of course is why everybody should start having a look at existing policies. When, twenty years down the road, absolutely nothing has changed [in what] you have stated as your goals, then certainly you have a very good reason for a revision of what you’re doing.

Guernica: Critics of sanctions equate them with sanctions on Cuba, Iran, or Iraq, where they have failed to change governments, except perhaps to entrench them, in ways that seem counterproductive and certainly hurt the public. Yet proponents of sanctions cite South Africa, where sanctions helped bring down a regime built around institutionalized racism. Which scenario is more pertinent to Burma?

Morten Pedersen: South Africa was actually a partial democracy. Blacks were not involved in that democracy. But there was a white constituency that had influence on government decisions. In Burma, there is no such constituency. There’s no one outside the army that has influence on policy decisions. There’s a close business community. But while they’re close to the generals, they have no political influence. In South Africa, there was a large business community that had direct influence through electoral processes and beyond that. And South Africa was also heavily integrated into the global economy, and the global cultural community. The whites were really hurt by being shunned by what was in fact their peer group in Europe. So they were hurt, culturally they felt isolated, the shaming worked, and the economic pressure worked. And they then put pressure on the government. That may not have changed otherwise.

Guernica: In Burma, those elements are not there?

Morten Pedersen: The Burmese generals have no affinity at all with the people who are sanctioning them. Culturally, there’s no link whatsoever.

Guernica: In fact, there’s still resentment against the U.S. for backing Chinese nationalists, Great Britain for backing the…

Morten Pedersen: And for what the Americans have been doing for the last twenty years. And economically they just aren’t integrated. So the economic pain that you can impose is very limited. And even if you could impose pain on the cronies, they don’t have the political influence to change anything. So the generals, as far as I’m concerned, are isolated in terms of political effects of sanctions. If you do something and the Burmese generals gain a little from it but the Burmese people gain a lot, then by my calculation that’s the moral thing to do.

Guernica: For instance, regarding aid.

Morten Pedersen: Diplomacy too. If you go and talk to the generals, then maybe they feel a little good that the ‘Americans come and talk to us, we’re somebody.’ You can make the argument at any level, really. And, ideally, I would not want them to feel good. But if that conversation can help open space for something that benefits the people, or can begin to change their mind so they do govern in a way that is less abusive, then to me it’s the right thing to do.

Guernica: Reading your book is confusing to me. I have read many others that make the story of the Karen, for instance, very compelling. But your book seems to point back at the generals to remind us of their story, in order to better engage them. Aren’t these two arguments contradictory, or can they be complimentary?

Morten Pedersen: That’s a tricky one to answer. Because I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the narrative we’re being told about the suffering [of groups like the Karen] in the border areas. I don’t have any doubt that it is extreme and has been ongoing for a very long time. There’s nothing good to say about what is going on out there. I think the implicit argument in the book is that there is more to Burma than the eastern border areas. So that doesn’t mean less attention to the eastern border areas, but it means more attention to the rest of Burma.

Guernica: The argument of these books, books like Mac McClelland’s For Us Surrender Is Out of the Question, and Edith Mirante’s books, is that the eastern and other border areas have been most neglected, because these people live far out on the border and have marginal influence inside Burma, let alone in the broader world of international policy. If we want to understand the morality of this regime, look to the eastern border area where we have something tantamount to genocide. You say, essentially, it’s the generals we should be looking at. Why?

Morten Pedersen: Well, I guess because I’m coming at it from a policy angle. In order to analyze the impact of sanctions policy, the key thing that we need to understand is why the generals do what they do, so that we can have a more effective conversation.

Guernica: In a way, I keep trying to ask you this: why do the generals do what they do?

Morten Pedersen: You need to accept that national security, as the generals define it, is their key concern; you can argue about whether that’s the right way of defining it. And I would disagree with that way [as well]. But that is how they define it. That is a significant objective and a significant motivating factor in everything they do. So when you engage with them you need to recognize and acknowledge that. And you need maybe even to go a bit further and frame your conversations in a way that kind of accepts that there are security concerns that are legitimate. But maybe there are other ways of addressing those security concerns. I mean other countries in Southeast Asia have also faced risks of their country, if not splitting apart, then fragmenting in some significant way. Rather than addressing that problem militarily like the Burmese have done, they have addressed it economically by pushing economic growth and spreading it to provinces.

Guernica: So to get the Burmese generals to think of a new story about how to hold the country together, it’s productive and helpful for those dealing with them to understand how the generals see the country’s national security problems now, and show some acknowledgment of that in dealing with them?

Morten Pedersen: If the purpose is changing their mind, which is hard anyway, then coming in and saying, ‘You are evil, you need to go away,’ will get you nowhere. But if you come in and you recognize some of what I believe are real concerns of the military, however misunderstood they may be, then you have the start of a conversation which can possibly lead to suggesting [policies] that are more acceptable to the international community, but, more importantly, are better for the Burmese people.

Guernica: Zoya Phan suggests an arms embargo. What’s your take on that?

Morten Pedersen: I think that looking at an arms embargo is where we should have started. But an arms embargo wouldn’t be very effective because you probably wouldn’t get cooperation of the neighboring countries and even if you did we all know how the arms trade works. I mean the arms trade breaks through sanctions everywhere. You can make it more expensive but you can’t stop it. So it would be a symbolic sanction more than an instrumental or effective one but that is definitely on the side that I would call good, or better sanctions.

Guernica: There’s a reasonable debate on that?

Morten Pedersen: Yeah, reasonable sanctions. But one that would be very hard to get.

Depayin masterminds wield power in USDP – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Several of the Burmese junta officials who recently resigned their military positions to found the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) were responsible for the deadly ambush on pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy in Depayin, Sagaing Division, in 2003.About 5,000 armed thugs recruited from rural areas under the authority of the pro-junta Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) ambushed Suu Kyi’s convoy in the evening of May 30, 2003, and killed an estimated 100 people, according to independent observers. Suu Kyi narrowly escaped with her life.

USDP leaders together: Burma’s Prime Minister Thein Sein (left) talks with Aung Thaung (center) and Rangoon Mayor Aung Thein Linn in Mandalay on April 29. (Photo: AP)
Since the massacre, several of those involved in the incident have been promoted, have established close business relations with the junta or, in at least one case, have married their family members into the military elite.

Former Lt-Col Aung Thaung, a hardline minister who was a USDA leader in 2003, has seen his business interests grow exponentially since the Depayin Massacre. His family’s IGE Co Ltd is now one of wealthiest and most diverse companies in the country with interests in banking, pipeline construction, exporting and logging.

Nowadays, he is not only personally close to Than Shwe, but also to junta No. 2 Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye. One of his sons is married to Maung Aye’s daughter. Aung Thaung is the current minister of Industry-1, but is expected to lead the USDP in this year’s general election along with Prime Minister Thein Sein.

Another hardliner, Minister of Information Kyaw Hsan has also seen his star rise since he was the leader of the USDA in Sagaing Division at the time of the Depayin attack. He is now head of the junta’s Spoke Authoritative Team and a powerful leader within the newly formed USDP.

The commander of Northwestern Regional Military Command in 2003 is the current minister of Hotels and Tourism Soe Naing. Both Kyaw Hsan and Soe Naing were among the more than 20 ministers who resigned from their military posts to become founder members of the USDP.

Perhaps the highest rising “butcher” of Depayin was Gen Soe Win. As secretary-2 of the junta in 2003, it is believed he ordered the attack on Suu Kyi’s convoy without the knowledge of the Military Intelligence Service, which was led by Gen Khin Nyunt. Local sources in Sagaing Division have said that Soe Win commanded the attack from the headquarters of the Northwestern Regional Military Command.

Soe Win died of leukemia in October 2007, but not before serving as Burma’s prime minister, personally appointed by Than Shwe, from 2004-07.

Another military commander accused of playing a role in the Depayin Massacre is the 2003 commander of the Central Regional Military Command Lt-Gen Ye Myint who is now the junta’s chief negotiator with the ethnic cease-fire groups, as well as heading Military Affairs Security. Ye Myint however, has not been named as a member of the USDP.

A Depayin survivor, Tin Oo, who is the deputy chairman of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party, recently told foreign broadcasters that he witnessed several groups of about 50 persons per group moving in to attack the convoy on May 30.

Insein court tacks 10 years on to youth’s term – Phanida
Mizzima News: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – The jail term of a National League for Democracy party youth member serving a sentence for distributing Aung San Suu Kyi’s portrait has been extended 10 years bringing the total penalty to 14½ years, according to a political prisoners’ rights group based in Thailand. Rangoon East District court yesterday heard the case of NLD Tamwe Township youth wing chief Kyaw Moe Naing, a.k.a. Kyaw Gyi, inside Insein prison and added 10 years to his jail term under the Electronic Act.

The military regime widely uses this Electronics Act to punish for punishing pro-democracy oppositions. Section 33(b) bans the disseminating of information on the internet which can destabilise the state and undermine state security.

Among the more than 2,100 political prisoners, almost all sentenced to long terms after 2005 were charged under this law, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP-B) secretary Teik Naing said.

“The judge said that the defendant had used the internet to disseminate information to ‘unlawful exile associations’,” said Myo Than Htiek, who witnessed the verdict.

The judge failed however to refer specific unlawful associations.

The police arrested Kyaw Moe Naing and his party colleagues Aung Aung, a.k.a. Aung Aung Oo, Kyaw Win Tun, a.k.a. Bo Tun, on June 12 last year near the Tamwe roundabout while they were distributing portraits of opposition leader and Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to passers-by.

Kyaw Moe Naing was originally sentenced to two years in prison under section 505(b) of the Penal Code for offences against the state and public tranquility and another two years for contact with unlawful associations. He was already serving these terms in Insein prison. His colleagues were also each serving two-year terms on the same charge of committing an offence against the state.

The youths were arrested while pro-democracy leader Suu Kyi was on trial inside Insein prison charged with violating the terms of her house arrest by “entertaining” intruder US citizen John Yettaw, who had swum across Inya Lake in Rangoon and stayed at her crumbling villa for two nights.

Burma intelligence probes political inmates – Yee May Aung
Democratic Voice of Burma: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Political prisoners in northwestern Burma are being questioned about their stance on the National League for Democracy (NLD) party’s boycott of elections this year.Intelligence officers from the Burmese government’s Special Branch (SB) have been visiting prisoners in Sagaing division’s Shwebo prison, according to the sister of Yin Yin Wyne, a jailed cyclone relief worker and one of 22 political inmates in the prison.

“[Yin Yin Wyne] was asked for an opinion on the NLD not entering the elections and she answered that she didn’t even know what the NLD’s stance was,” said the sister, Ma Moe, who visited her at the end of last month. “Then [the officials] showed her the NLD’s Shwegondai declaration and let her read to tell them what she thought about it.”

The Shwegondaing declaration, signed in April 2009, calls for the release of all political prisoners, recognition of the 1990 election results, a review of the 2008 constitution and the start of dialogue between the junta and the NLD.

Ma Moe added that the officers had acknowledged they were from the Special Branch and had interviewed every political inmate in the prison. The reasons for the questioning however remain unclear, although it may be a precursor to releasing ’softer’ political prisoners prior to elections this year, as the junta looks to further appease the international community.

Burma holds around 2,150 activists, journalists, lawyers, monks and aid workers in jails across the country. Yin Yin Wyne was jailed for four years in 2008 under the Unlawful Associations Act after assisting victims of cyclone Nargis in May that year, which killed 140,000 people and left 2.4 million destitute.

Ma Moe said that her conversation with Yin Yin Wyne during the visit was recorded by two Special Branch officers.

But families of political prisoners in Burma’s western Arakan state said that no such questioning had taken place. The sister of imprisoned 88 Generation Student leader, Htay Kywe, said after a recent visit that Special Branch police had not been to the remote prison.

“His health was good; he said he didn’t have such a discussion,” she said of her brother. “For his opinion, he [wished] the elections should be open for everyone and a dialogue with the NLD put in place. He said he can’t accept the elections unless everyone participating.”

Htay Kywe was sentenced after the Saffron Revolution in 2007 to 65 years in prison. He had been prominent during the infamous 1988 uprising and was one of the last student leaders from that era to have been arrested.

Five facts about China-Myanmar relations
Reuters: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Here are five facts about the complex relationship between China and Myanmar:World

*In 1949 Burma, as Myanmar was then known, was one of the first countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China. But relations soured in the 1960s following anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon (now called Yangon).

* Following a crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 1988, the West imposed broad sanctions on Myanmar. China stepped into the void, providing aid and weapons and ramping up trade.

Beijing has continued to provide broad diplomatic support for Myanmar’s military government, although the ruling generals remain wary of their powerful northern neighbour.

* China has invested more than $1 billion in Myanmar, primarily in the mining sector, and is the country’s fourth largest foreign investor, say state media. Bilateral trade grew by more than one-quarter in 2008 to about $2.63 billion. Chinese firms are heavily involved in logging in Myanmar.

* Myanmar gives China access to the Indian Ocean, not only for imports of oil and gas and exports from landlocked southwestern Chinese provinces, but also potentially for military bases or listening posts.

In October, China’s state energy group CNPC started building a crude oil port in Myanmar, part of a pipeline project aimed at cutting out the long detour oil cargoes take through the congested and strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait.

* The relationship has had rocky patches of late. In August, refugees flooded across into China following fighting on the Myanmar side of the border between rebels and government troops, angering Beijing.

In 2007, China’s Foreign Ministry published an unflattering account of Myanmar’s new jungle capital Naypyidaw, expressing surprise that the poor country would consider such an expensive move without even first telling its supposed Chinese friends.

(Writing by Ben Blanchard; editing by Emma Graham-Harrison)

The ghost of elections past – Ko Ko Thett
Irrawaddy: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Since the 1922 introduction of a “legislative council” election to Burma, the notion of elections has always been suspect to the Burmese populace. This is not surprising, for Burma’s ballot boxes have never served their purpose—the electing of people’s representatives whose constitutional mandate can change or enforce government’s policy. Under both the British colonial administration and subsequent post-colonial governments, Burma’s elections have never translated into genuine political change. In the 1920s, the dyarchy in which 80 members of the 130-member legislative council were elected and the rest were appointed by the British fractured the Burmese nationalist movement.

While moderates sought to change the system from within, radical nationalists in the movement called for “home rule”—a separation from British India—before they articulated independence for the country. The dyarchy election law disenfranchised most people in the peasantry since the suffrage for 44 constituencies in rural areas was based on the payment of taxation.

Out of a Burmese population of 12 million in 1922, there were only 1.8 million eligible voters. The voter turnout was very low, only 6.9 percent of eligible voters participated in Burma’s very first election.

The legislative council hopefuls were labeled “sellouts” to the British. Intimidation of the would-be voters by elections boycotters, nationalist monks and agitators was not uncommon. In fact, little effort was really needed to dissuade people, who had never known an election, from voting.

The second legislative council election in 1925 saw a 10 percent increase in voter turnout: 16.26 percent of the qualified voting population. The increased political participation was explained by the elected representatives’ success in making amendments to controversial laws, such as the 1907 Village Act of Burma and the 1920 Rangoon University Act. The attempts to encourage people into political participation by the elected politicians and the increased number of political parties also contributed to the increased voter turnout.

In 1927, the Simon Commission, chaired by Sir John Simon who was appointed by Westminster, started probing the possibility of “self-governing institutions” in Burma. British colonialists thought it expedient to keep Burma away from “the disturbing influence of Indian politics.” The 1930 Simon Commission report recommended that Burma be governed separately from India.

It took five years for the British to come up with the Government of Burma Act to implement the recommendations of the 1930 Simon Report. The constitution of 1935 discarded the dyarchy and added 33 new constituencies, increasing the number of ethnic Karen constituencies from five to 12.

By the time the 1936 election was held, all features of multi-party politics, from factionalism and forming coalitions to switching allegiance, flip-flopping, politicking, character assassination, party thuggery and boycotting of the electoral process were no longer new to the Burmese. The populace, by and large, learned to despise their politicians as much as they hated the British colonialists. The year also saw the Rangoon University strike and the emergence of the student activists Aung San and future premier Ko Nu as leaders of the hugely popular nationalist “Dobama Thakin” (“We Burmese Masters”) movement.

The thakin were not keen on “legislative politics” and downright rejected the 1935 Constitution. Yet the 1936 election on the offer was seen as a political opening by some dobama leaders. In the end the thakin belatedly founded the Komin-Kochin Aphwe (Our King, Our Affair Party) and fielded no less than 30 candidates to contest in the election. Ironically, one of their avowed aims was to disrupt the legislture’s proceedings. Only three thakin were elected to the constituent assembly in 1936.

Fabian Ba Khine, one of the witnesses at the time, noted that the three elected thakin attended the assembly meetings with their adopted aim to revoke the 1935 Constitution and always sided with the party in opposition. They consistently opposed the government. It also meant that the thakin could not take up ministerial posts.

Senior politician Dr. Ba Maw, the founder leader of Sinyetha (Proletariat Party), became the first premier of Burma under the 1935 Constitution as he cleverly maneuvered different political forces to form a coalition government. Having formed her own government, Burma was finally separated from British India in 1937.

In the latter half of the 1930s, the ascendancy of Marxist politics in the Dobama movement naturally led to the consideration of “independence by any means” and extra-parliamentary activities to overthrow the British. Perhaps the thakins’ failure in parliamentary politics also contributed to the strategy formulation of the Dobama. In 1938, the Marxist-Leninist thakin spearheaded a general strike to paralyze the British administration, but failed.

As most thakin leaders were jailed or outlawed, Burma nationalist movement took an unexpected turn at the onset of the Second World War. The Japanese occupation of Burma, assisted by the thakin-led Burmese army, from 1942 to 1945 was as devastating as it was elsewhere in Asia.

The worst thing that had happened to Burma during the Japanese occupation was the exacerbation of the ethnic conflict, especially that between the Burman and the Karen, fuelled by the war. As the British reoccupied Burma following the Japanese defeat, parliamentary democracy was reintroduced. The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), a broad alliance of nationalists dominated by the thakin who had turned against the Japanese, became the most formidable opposition party in the post-war years.

In April 1947, an election to the constituent assembly was held under the 1935 election law. The AFPFL claimed the election was a British attempt to defuse the post-war political tensions in the country to prolong their colonial rule. To the AFPFL, which had the largest mass following in Burma at the time, 1947 was an opportune moment to become involved in legislative politics in what Aung San called “a transition to independence.” The AFPFL entered the election to the echoes of its slogan, “Independence within one Year!”

But many politicians who had been influential in prewar parliamentary politics—such as Dr. Ba Maw from the Maha-Bama (Great Burman) Party, and U Saw of the Myochit (Patriotic) Party, as well as many former thakin, such as Thakin Ba Sein (Dobama Party) and Thakin Soe (Communist Party of Burma “Red Flag”)—boycotted the election for different reasons. The Karen National Union also stayed away.

The remaining opposition parties, including the Communist Party of Burma (Thakin Than Tun’s “White Flag”) and the Karen Youth Organization, could only field less than 30 candidates for the 255-member assembly.

The result was predictable, but it had been made certain by the widespread intimidation of voters by pro-AFPFL militia, the People’s Voluntary Organization (PVO), which came into existence as the result of the post-war British retrenchment of the Burma Independence Army.

British scholar Shelby Tucker notes: ‘‘Armed PVO units dragooned voters and escorted them to the polling booths that were guarded by other armed PVO units, while League supporters manned the government-provided electoral information facilities.’’

It was customary for the political parties in Burma to have an armed wing, but the PVO was the biggest armed group that could be turned into a nationalist army against the British. The League won more than 95.3 percent of the seats and dominated the constituent assembly without much opposition. In June 1947, the assembly approved Aung San’s motion that an independent Burma should exist outside the Commonwealth. It also approved a draft of what would be known as the 1947 Constitution, proposed by Aung San.

Postwar Burmese politics were dominated by the AFPFL and its charismatic leader, Aung San, who was only 32 in 1947. Widely considered to be asocial and rash, he was unable to convince his senior political rivals to swing his way.

Consequently, most of Aung San’s opposition was effectively excluded from the parliament and from the policymaking process that would determine Burma’s future as an independent nation. The assassination of Aung San and six of his cabinet members in July 1947 left the entire country in mourning.

Aung San’s colleague U Nu (formerly Thakin Nu) took over the AFPFL and delivered Aung San’s promise of “Independence within one Year.” In January 1948, Burma became independent under U Nu and his government; they were undoubtedly apprehensive, but the country rejoiced and there was an air of hope for the future.

* Ko Ko Thett is a Helsinki-based Burma analyst. This is the first of three articles he has written for The Irrawaddy on Burma’s previous elections.

Than Shwe’s electronic dream – Min Lwin
Irrawaddy: Fri 28 May 2010

Burma’s military junta has expanded its Fiber Optic Cable (FOC) project to its Eastern Regional Command, bringing to a total four military regional command centers whose electronic systems are linked to Naypyidaw via the country’s most modern network.
The FOCs have been laid in Pekon, Aung Pan and Kalaw townships in eastern Shan State, according to local people and military sources. The FOC cables—which are individually no wider than a strand of hair—transmit Internet, telephone and cable TV.

Local people in an area controlled by the ethnic cease-fire group, the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), said that two- and six-feet deep trenches were dug to hold the FOC pipelines that were installed in late April. The cables connect the Burmese army’s Eastern Regional Command, based in the Shan State capital of Taunggyi, to its Triangle Regional Command center, based in Kengtung.

Since 2000, the Burmese junta has implemented an FOC project in its Western Regional Military Command center in Arakan State; in Northern Regional Command in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State; and in its Northeastern Regional Command center in Lashio in northern Shan State.

The FOC program is conducted by the Directorate of Signals and overseen by the Ministry of Defense. According to military sources, a map of the cables’ transmission routes has been kept so secret that even staff officers at the Directorate of Signals do not know the details.

Sources have speculated that junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe is personally involved in the project and is insistent that the military maintains an independent electronics network from the rest of the country. He is reputedly concerned that military communications are intercepted by hostile agencies, ethnic insurgents, cease-fire groups or foreign intelligence agencies.

“Tet Chauk [Military Chief Than Shwe] has a dream about military communications,” said a military source in Rangoon. “He is suspicious of wireless communication, because he thinks it will be intercepted by hostile organizations. That’s why he wants all his military bases to be linked by FOCs.”

“Than Shwe’s dream is to hold his four-monthly meetings via electronic links, so no regional commander need come to military headquarters,” said a retired commander who spoke to The Irrawaddy. “At the same time, he believes the FOCs will prevent any information being intercepted.”

Transocean drilled in Burmese waters linked to drug lord – Thomas Maung Shwe
Mizzima News: Fri 28 May 2010

Chiang Mai – Swiss-American firm Transocean, presently embroiled in the BP Gulf of Mexico disaster, did exploratory drilling last autumn in Burmese waters owned by a partnership between a Chinese state-run energy company and a firm owned by Stephen Law, a junta crony alleged by the US to be a major drug-money launderer, according to corporate filings with the US stock market regulator.
Stephen Law, (a.k.a. Tun Myint Naing), his Singaporean wife and his “narco warlord” father are on the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) blacklist, officially called the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. All three are also on a similar European travel ban and sanctions lists.

The SDN blacklist targets the Burmese junta’s senior leadership, its cronies and the financial networks that continue to support the military dictatorship. The US Treasury website states that when an individual, firm or other entity is added to the sanctions list “any assets the designees may have subject to US jurisdiction are frozen, and all financial and commercial transactions by any US person with the designated companies and individuals are prohibited”.

Transocean International’s corporate 8-K filing to the US Securities and Exchance Commission on November 2 last year shows that Chinese state-run energy company CNOOC hired Transocean’s semi-submersible Actinia, a Panamanian registered drilling rig, to operate in Burma from last October to December. An 8-K form is the “current report” companies must file with the US market regulator to announce major events that shareholders should know about. The 82-metre-long, 78-metre-wide rig was hired at a daily rate of US$206,000. Transocean could not be reached for comment.

According to the CNOOC website, all of the firm’s stakes in Burma’s gas industry are held in partnership with China Focus Development (formerly known as Golden Aaron) and China Global Construction, with CNOOC as the operator. China Focus Development is a privately owned Singapore-registered firm whose sole shareholders are Stephen Law and his wife Ng Sor Hong (a.k.a. Cynthia Ng). The US and EU sanctions list show Ng Sor Hong to be chief executive of the firm, which is also among more than a dozen companies controlled by Law on the OFAC blacklist of banned Burma-related entities.

Industry journal International Oil Daily reported last February that the CNOOC-China Focus Development partnership held onshore blocks C-1, C-2 and M and offshore blocks A-4, M-2 and M-10. It also said CNOOC’s attempt in 2008 to swap its stake in two of its blocks with the Thai national oil firm PTEEP was vetoed by the Burmese regime.

Law’s Sino-Burmese father Lao Sit Han (a.k.a. Lo Hsing Han) is believed by US drug-trafficking analysts to have controlled Southeast Asia’s best-armed narcotics militias during the 1970’s.

According to the US Treasury in February, 2008: “In addition to their support for the Burmese regime, Steven Law and Lo Hsing Han have a history of involvement in illicit activities.”

“Lo Hsing Han, known as the ‘Godfather of Heroin’, has been one of the world’s key heroin traffickers dating back to the early 1970s. Steven Law joined his father’s drug empire in the 1990s and has since become one of the wealthiest individuals in Burma,” the Treasury statement said.

Calls for a US government investigation

In an interview with Mizzima, Wong Aung of the Shwe Gas movement called on the US government to immediately probe the links between Transocean and Stephen Law.

“Transocean’s drilling for Stephen Law’s natural gas consortium appears to be a serious breach of American sanctions on Burma,” he said. “The US government must investigate Transocean’s Burmese operations as soon as possible and send a clear message that it is not acceptable for multinational firms such as Transocean to do business with Burma’s most notorious narco-oligarch.”

Last month Transocean was involved in what has been described as one of the worst environmental disasters in US history. On April 20, 2010, Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico while it was drilling under contract for oil giant BP. The explosion killed 11 workers.

Early this month at a special US congressional hearing convened to investigate the disaster, senior executives from BP, Transocean and contractor Halliburton all testified the other firms were responsible for the blast and subsequent unprecedented oil spill.

Following the hearing, a furious US President Barack Obama chided the executives for their refusal to accept responsibility saying, “I did not appreciate what I considered to be a ridiculous spectacle”. He added that the millionaire executives were “falling over each other to point the finger of blame at somebody else. The American people could not have been impressed with that display and I certainly wasn’t”.

North Korea exporting nuke technology to Burma: UN experts – Edith Lederer
Associated Press: Fri 28 May 2010

UNITED NATIONS — North Korea is exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology and using multiple intermediaries, shell companies and overseas criminal networks to circumvent U.N. sanctions, U.N. experts said in a report obtained by The Associated Press.

The seven-member panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicates that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Burma. It called for further study of these suspected activities and urged all countries to try to prevent them.

The 47-page report, obtained late Thursday by AP, and a lengthy annex document, details sanctions violations reported by U.N. member states, including four cases involving arms exports and two seizures of luxury goods by Italy — two yachts and high-end recording and video equipment. The report also details the broad range of techniques that North Korea is using to try to evade sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council after its two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

Council diplomats discussed the report by the experts from Britain, Japan, the United States, France, South Korea, Russia and China at a closed-door meeting on Thursday.

Its release happened to coincide with heightened tensions between North Korea and South Korea over the March sinking of a South Korean navy ship which killed 46 sailors. The council is waiting for South Korea to decide what action it wants the U.N.’s most powerful body to take in response to the sinking, which a multinational investigation determined was caused by a North Korean torpedo.

The panel of experts said there is general agreement that the U.N. embargoes on nuclear and ballistic missile related items and technology, on arms exports and imports except light weapons, and on luxury goods, are having an impact.

But it said the list of eight entities and five individuals currently subject to an asset freeze and travel ban seriously understates those known to be engaged in banned activities and called for additional names to be added. It noted that North Korea moved quickly to have other companies take over activities of the eight banned entities.

The experts said an analysis of the four North Korean attempts to illegally export arms revealed that Pyongyang used “a number of masking techniques” to avoid sanctions. They include providing false descriptions and mislabeling of the contents of shipping containers, falsifying the manifest and information about the origin and destination of the goods, “and use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions,” the panel said.

It noted that a chartered jet intercepted in Thailand in December carrying 35 tons of conventional weapons including surface-to-air missiles from North Korea was owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates, registered in Georgia, leased to a shell company registered in New Zealand and then chartered to another shell company registered in Hong Kong — which may have been an attempt to mask its destination.

North Korea is also concealing arms exports by shipping components in kits for assembly overseas, the experts said.

As one example, the panel said it learned after North Korean military equipment was seized at Durban harbor in South Africa that scores of technicians from the North had gone to the Republic of Congo, where the equipment was to have been assembled.

The experts called for “extra vigilance” at the first overseas port handling North Korean cargo and close monitoring of airplanes flying from the North, saying Pyongyang is believed to use air cargo “to handle high valued and sensitive arms exports.”

While North Korea maintains a wide network of trade offices which do legitimate business as well as most of the country’s illicit trade and covert acquisitions, the panel said Pyongyang “has also established links with overseas criminal networks to carry out these activities, including the transportation and distribution of illicit and smuggled cargoes.”

This may also include goods related to weapons of mass destruction and arms, it added.

Under council resolutions, all countries are required to submit reports on what they are doing to implement sanctions but as of April 30 the panel said it had still not heard from 112 of the 192 U.N. member states — including 51 in Africa, 28 in Asia, and 25 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

While no country reported on nuclear or ballistic missile-related imports or exports from North Korea since the second sanctions resolution was adopted last June, the panel said it reviewed several U.S. and French government assessments, reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency, research papers and media reports indicating Pyongyang’s continuing involvement in such activities.
These reports indicate North Korea “has continued to provide missiles, components, and technology to certain countries including Iran and Syria … (and) has provided assistance for a nuclear program in Syria, including the design and construction of a thermal reactor at Dair Alzour,” the panel said.

Syria denied the allegations in a letter to the IAEA, but the U.N. nuclear agency is still trying to obtain reports on the site and its activities, the panel said.

The experts said they are also looking into “suspicious activity in Burma,” including activities of Namchongang Trading, one of the companies subject to U.N. sanctions, and reports that Japan in June 2009 arrested three individuals for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer — which measures magnetic fields — to Burma via Malaysia allegedly under the direction of a company known to be associated with illicit procurement for North Korea’s nuclear and military programs. The company was not identified.

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From: shreeram chaudhary <chaudhary_srmail@...>
Date: Thu Jun 10, 2010 10:50 am
Subject: Re: [Readingroom] Re-sending: News on Burma - 5/6/10

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--- On Thu, 10/6/10, CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...> wrote:

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Subject: [justpeaceinasia] [Readingroom] Re-sending: News on Burma - 5/6/10
To: readingroom@...
Date: Thursday, 10 June, 2010, 10:59 AM

Burma’s military budget to increase significantly

National Library goes in regime’s latest property sale

Desperate plight of Burma’s Rohingya people

Most trafficking victims in Thailand ‘are Burmese’

Burma tops ‘worst of the worst’ list of human rights violators

Report says Burma is taking steps toward nuclear weapons program

Myanmar’s nuclear bombshell

Expert says Burma ‘planning nuclear bomb’

Ethnic leaders dividing community

EU neighbours sign up to Myanmar sanctions

Caught between a vote and a hard place

Myanmar’s military ambitions

The international community’s naive beliefs on Burma

Sanctioning disaster

Depayin masterminds wield power in USDP

Insein court tacks 10 years on to youth’s term

Burma intelligence probes political inmates

Five facts about China-Myanmar relations

The ghost of elections past

Than Shwe’s electronic dream

Transocean drilled in Burmese waters linked to drug lord

North Korea exporting nuke technology to Burma: UN experts

Burma’s military budget to increase significantly
Irrawaddy: Fri 4 Jun 2010

At the four-monthly meeting of Burma’s top generals held in Naypyidaw during the last week of May, the junta significantly increased its military budget from last year, according to sources close to the Burmese military. A military source told The Irrawaddy on Thursday that although the amount budgeted to the military is unavailable, it is known to be much larger than last year’s military budget.

“The money allocated to the military was budgeted under the heading ‘Defense Budget’, but there was no specific line items for separate expenses,” he said.

The military source added, however, that it is generally believed that large military equipment purchases will be made within the next six months.

In 2009, Burma signed a contract with Russia for the purchase of 20 MiG-29 jet fighters at a cost of nearly US $570 million.

Analysts believe that many of Burma’s future military purchases may come from North Korea.

According to a report by UN experts obtained by The Associated Press last month, North Korea is exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology and using multiple intermediaries, shell companies and overseas criminal networks to circumvent UN sanctions.

The UN’s seven-member panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicates that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Burma.

In November 2008, Gen Thura Shwe Mann, the regime’s No 3 ranking general, made a secret visit to North Korea and signed a memorandum of understanding, officially formalizing military cooperation between Burma and North Korea with his North Korean counterpart, Gen Kim Kyok-sik.

During his trip to Pyongyang, Shwe Mann also visited sites of secret tunnel complexes built into the sides of mountains to store and shield jet aircraft, missiles, tanks and nuclear and chemical weapons.

In addition, according to Burmese Maj Sai Thein Win, a former deputy commander of a top-secret military factory who defected and brought with him top secret documents and photographs about Burma’s nuclear projects, secret underground bunkers and tunnels have been built at many locations in Burma.

Sai Thein Win, who was trained in Burma as a defense engineer and later in Russia as a missile expert, said that about 10,000 Burmese officials have been sent to Russia thus far to study military technology, including nuclear technology.

Sai Thein Win also said in a report that Burma is trying to build medium-range missiles such as SCUDs under a memorandum of understanding with North Korea. “Burma wants to have rockets and nuclear warheads. Burma wants to be a nuclear power,” Sai Thein Win said.

One reason the regime is able to increase its military budget and import expensive military equipment and technology may be its expected increase in energy revenues.

A study by the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace said that Burma’s export earnings from the country’s growing energy sector will double in the next five years, due mainly to oil and gas transit pipelines now being built from Burma to China. The Institute said the calculation is based on energy exports—mostly gas—accounting for at least 45 percent of the $6.6 billion earnings declared by Burmese interests in 2008.

Burma’s military regime is infamous for spending a large percentage of its national budget on the military, rather than on education, health and other public services. According to Burma military experts, 40 to 60 percent of the national budget is allocated to the military.

In contrast, 0.4 percent of the national budget is spent on healthcare, while 0.5 percent is spent for education, according to a report released in 2007 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank based in London.

In other news regarding the four-monthly meeting, according to military sources there was no major military reshuffle in Naypyidaw.

National Library goes in regime’s latest property sale – Nayee Lin Latt
Irrawaddy: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Burma’s National Library and a TV studio complex are among five state-owned buildings sold to private investors, according to informed sources in Rangoon.Apart from the National Library, the regime has shed itself of the MRTV 3 news and studio complex, the People’s Department Store, the Yadanapon Theater and a six-story office building, said sources close to the regime’s Privatization Commission.

The buildings were among more than 20 administered by the regime’s Department of Human Settlement and Housing Department. The buildings that are still unsold belong to the Ministry of Industry No. 1, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Ministry of Health, Rangoon Division Department of Health, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Co-operatives.

A Privatization Commission official said that since late 2009 a total of 147 state-owned buildings, including factories and government ministry offices, had been sold off.

A Rangoon Municipal Committee engineer said the sale was aimed at offering “economic opportunities” not only to business investors but also to the “general public.”

One of the customers in the latest sell out, however, was the Shwe Taung Development Co., Ltd., which enjoys a close relationship with the regime. It paid 130 billion kyat (about US $13 million) for the MRTV 3 complex.

The National Library went for only about 100 million kyat ($100,000), while the Yadanapon Theater, which belonged to the Myanma Motion Picture Enterprise of the Ministry of Information, fetched more than 920 million kyat (nearly $1 million).

One businessman with close contacts to regime officials suggested that state-run property was being sold off to raise funds for the development of the government quarter in Naypyidaw and help finance the upcoming election.

A retired professor from Rangoon’s University of Economics expressed sorrow at the sale of the National Library, saying it contradicted an official statement assuring support for Burmese literature.

Desperate plight of Burma’s Rohingya people
BBC News: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Nasima, 22, is from the Rohingya ethnic group, a Muslim minority that lives in western Burma. Rights groups say it is one of the most persecuted communities in the world – they were made stateless in 1982, and deemed to be illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.Several hundred thousand have since crossed into Bangladesh, where people speak a similar language. This year Dhaka has been accused of arresting hundreds of Rohingya and forcing them over the border – claims the government denies. It says it is too poor to help them. The BBC’s Mark Dummett spoke to Nasima in the Kutupalong makeshift camp, which is now home to more than 30,000 Rohingyas.

“In Burma my people face persecution, so that’s why we come to Bangladesh,” Nasima said.

“In my family’s case, we came under pressure from the government because we had some property.

“One day, the army accused my father of sheltering someone who had just returned from Bangladesh. Anyone who comes back to Burma is sent to jail, so it is illegal to look after them. But that accusation was false.

“They took my father to a military camp and beat him up. After seven days they sent us his blood-stained clothes and said they would kill him.

“So we sold all our cattle and chickens at the market. We sent that money to the camp and they then released him.

“Later, my brother was attacked by some Buddhist people. He was badly injured and after lots of suffering he eventually died.

“As I grew up, my father decided that I wasn’t safe in Burma. The government doesn’t let us marry so he told me to leave for Bangladesh.

“We had a relative who was handicapped and a beggar, and she agreed to look after me.

“We took a boat over the river and it was very dangerous. On the other side we were stopped by the Bangladesh Rifles [BDR].

“They demanded bribes of 100 taka each [$1.50] to let us through, but we only had 100 taka between us.

“‘You must leave the girl with us then,’ the BDR men said. But my relative refused and argued that she could not move without me helping her. So finally they let us through.”

Police raid

Nasima said: “I already had one sister in Bangladesh but I didn’t know where she was living. So we went to Cox’s Bazar and lived as beggars.

“Sometimes people would give us a little rice or a bit of money to survive.

“Finally I met a man who knew my sister. She was living in Alikadam, and her husband came and got me.

“I lived there for two years, working as a farm labourer. Life was fine, and I was able to marry and have a child.

“But five days after the baby was born the police arrived. They came without warning when we were having dinner.

“They rounded up all the Burmese men including my husband and my sister’s husband and put them in a police truck.

“I told the police that I had a newborn and that we could not survive without my husband.

“I begged them to let him stay, but they said that the Rohingya should expect no mercy. So I told them to take me too.

“They put me into the lorry and drove us to the river.

“They found a fishing boat and threatened to beat up the captain if he didn’t take us to the other side – to Burma.

“Once we got there, he told us that he had seen some other Rohingyas being shot by the Nasaka [the Burmese border guards], and he told us how to follow the river upstream and then sneak back into Bangladesh.

“We walked the whole night and then finally in the morning we got back to this side.

“That’s when I noticed there was something wrong with my baby. He had died during the journey and I hadn’t even realised it. We dug a small hole with our bare hands and buried him there.

“We came to a road and waved to a passing jeep. We begged the driver to save our lives and take us away from there. All I had to pay him with was my scarf.

“He had heard about the Kutupalong camp and said that the Rohingya were safe there.

“One week after arriving at the camp my husband said he had to go and find work. He left and I have no idea where he is now.

“I survive by going into the jungle and collecting firewood to sell. If I collect some, I can then eat a little.

“This week I have only had three meals. But I am living alone. It is much worse for some of the families with 10 or 11 mouths to feed.

“Death would be better than this life.”

Most trafficking victims in Thailand ‘are Burmese’ – Usa Pichai
Mizzima News: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – Burmese workers rank the highest in numbers of human-trafficking victims in Thailand, while a labour shortage in the kingdom’s expanding fisheries industry is set to exacerbate the problem, rights groups say.Sompong Sakaew, director of the Labour Rights Promotion Network, told Mizzima today that human trafficking in Thailand was ranked by the United States as “worrisome” and that the situation had worsened in recent years. The NGO is based in the fish-farming and salt-producing province of Samut Sakhon, on the Gulf of Thailand south of Bangkok.

“The biggest problem is in the fishery industries, where Burmese workers are deceived and forced to work the hardest and longest,” he said.

A recent estimate of the number of migrant workers in Thailand was set at more than three million, but the registered number is 700,000 workers, and they are mainly from Burma.

Sompong said business owners in Thailand still lacked the conscience to employ workers legally. Many wanted cheap labour and ignored the realities of the illicit trade that was supplying and exploiting these workers.

“Thailand is at risk of an international boycott of its seafood products if the human trafficking in this industry remains unresolved,” he warned.

According to the Mirror Foundation anti-human-traffick ing centre in Bangkok, up to 138 cases were reported to the foundation last year – three times than in the previous year. The report was released at a press conference yesterday in Bangkok prior to National Anti-human Trafficking Day tomorrow.

Conditions in northern Thailand have also declined. Burmese boys from Mae Sot were deceived and forced to sell roti in Chiang Mai. Traffickers have also persuaded children from Burmese families to work in Thailand, and later forced them to sell flowers in the northern city, according to Duan Wongsa, manager of the Anti-Trafficking Co-ordination Unit Northern Thailand, in Chiang Mai.

“Recently… traffickers brought children from refugee camps along the border in Tak Province to inner provinces of Thailand,” she added. “Children would be brought and forced to work as domestic helpers for pitiful wages.”

Ekkalak Lumchomkae, head of the Mirror Foundation centre, told Mizzima the situation was in crisis, particularly in the fisheries sector.

GreenFacts.org ranked Thailand third in the world in 2006 among its top 10 exporters and importers of fish and fishery products, but the country faces a severe labour shortage, with an estimated deficit of more than 10,000 workers. The shortage provides impetus for the traffickers to tries harder to search workers to serve businesses.

“From our fieldwork in some areas, there are politicians and officials behind the traffickers,” Ekkalak said. “Legal measures to control the fisheries sector are ineffective or local officials are negligent in applying the law.”

The situation in other sectors, such as prostitution, begging and flower-selling remained unchanged in 2008 and last year, the centre’s report said.

Ekkalak said the rate Burmese workers have to pay to middlemen to work in Thailand had increased, from the recent figure of around 20,000 baht (US$606), to 25,000 baht, nearly twice the amount demanded in the previous year. It takes most of them at least a year to repay the brokers.

He added that police have only been able to arrest minor Burmese traffickers after raids on suspected factories, failing to net the masterminds. “Local police were not brave enough to charge them [trafficking kingpins] under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 2008, but tend to lay charges for lesser offences.”

The centre blacklisted four seaside provinces with severe trafficking problems: Songkhla, Chonburi, Samut Sakhon and Samut Prakan.

A 14-year-old Muslim girl in Mae Sot, lured into working as a flower-seller in Bangkok, said she went unpaid during two years work for her employers.

“They told me that the money would be paid to my mother but she also never saw it,” the teen said. “They also hit me in the head when I could not bring in enough money.”

She later escaped from her taskmasters with the help of her neighbours and returned to Mae Sot – which along with the fishing town of Ranong on the southwest coast of Thailand near a marine border with Burma, and Chiang Rai in the far north – is a hotspot of activity for human traffickers.

Thai Minister of Social Development and Human Security Issara Somchai said at the opening of anti-human trafficking campaign in Bangkok that recent trafficking has become a more complex process.

Transnational networks put children and young people at high risk because their desire for better livelihoods leaves them open to exploitation, according to a report on Thailand’s Public Relations Department website on Friday.

Thailand’s first anti-trafficking legislation took effect in June, 2008, and was aimed at tackling the ever-increasing problem. The content specified provisions banning trafficking that involves the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by threats or use of force for the purpose of exploitation.

Exploitation is defined as seeking benefit from prostitution, or production or distribution of pornographic materials. The law also bans other forms of sexual exploitation, slavery, forced begging, other forced labour or provision of services, coerced removal of organs for the purpose of trade, or any other similar practices resulting from forced or harmful work with extortion as the result, regardless of a person’s consent.

However, activists said the problem was not in the law, but in its application. Local police are reluctant to charge traffickers, who are often violent or armed, or employers in their jurisdictions, who usually have considerable social power. Police therefore seek far lesser penalties than the legislation prescribes, rights activists have said.

Burma tops ‘worst of the worst’ list of human rights violators – Howard LaFranchi
Christian Science Monitor: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Washington — The hit parade of the world’s worst human rights violators is out, and it reads like a rap sheet of the usual suspects.The “worst of the worst,” as Washington-based human rights watchdog Freedom House calls them, is comprised of nine countries and one territory: Burma, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tibet (under Chinese jurisdiction) .

What Freedom House calls “shameful” is that one of those “worst” – Libya – was just elected to the United Nations’ premier human rights organization, the Human Rights Council. Moreover, three countries on the organization’s expanded list of countries with only slightly better human-rights records – China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia – are already members.

“It’s a badge of shame that these countries sit on the council, but the shame really goes to the [UN] General Assembly countries that elected these egregious violators of rights in the first place,” says Paula Schriefer, Freedom House’s director of advocacy. She notes that Saudi Arabia, for example, was elected to the council with more than 150 votes out of the 192 General Assembly members.

In all, 20 countries and territories have such appalling human rights records as to be considered the world’s worst. Rounding out the list Freedom House issued Thursday are: Belarus, Chad, Guinea, Laos, Syria, and two territories: South Ossetia and Western Sahara.

The “worst of the worst” list is just one piece of evidence that Freedom House offers to support its conclusion that freedom globally is on the decline, after several decades of general expansion.

“By absolute standards, the world is still freer than it was 30 years ago,” Freedom House Executive Director Jennifer Windsor says in the report’s overview. The less-good news: “The last four years have seen a global decline in freedom,” she adds, including in such specific areas the organization measures globally as multiparty elections, freedom of association, freedom of speech, rights of minorities, and the rule of law.

The report finds that the countries on the “worst” list represent a “narrow range” of political systems with such familiar names as dictatorship, military junta, and one-party rule. Another common factor in many of the countries on the list is corruption.
The Human Rights Council, which sits in Geneva, is dismissed by some rights advocates because of the participation of some “worst” rights violators. The council was snubbed by the Bush administration for that reason, but the Obama administration reversed course and decided to try to reform the body from within.

Ms. Schriefer, who was reached by phone in Geneva where she is representing Freedom House with the council, calls the presence of “egregious” rights violators on the council an “embarrassment,” but adds, “There’s no reason the majority can’t get down to business on the work of promoting and supporting human rights in all corners of the world.”

She notes on the bright side that the council has managed to appoint an independent expert on Sudan, and is about to consider renewing the expert’s mandate. “You can tell issues like this matter to countries [that become the object of rights probes] by the energy and resources they put into avoiding it,” she says.

The council has also registered a number of setbacks. A group of rights-promoting countries attempted to pass a resolution in May 2009 condemning Sri Lanka for repressive actions against its own citizens. But the effort backfired when supporters of the Sri Lankan regime on the council amended the resolution so it ended up praising the government’s steps.

“Now Sri Lanka uses the resolution as part of its propaganda trumpeting the support it has garnered internationally,” Schriefer says. “That was not a positive step for human rights.”

Report says Burma is taking steps toward nuclear weapons program – Joby Warrick
Washington Post: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Burma has begun secretly acquiring key components for a nuclear weapons program, including specialized equipment used to make uranium metal for nuclear bombs, according to a report that cites documents and photos from a Burmese army officer who recently fled the country.The smuggled evidence shows Burma’s military rulers taking concrete steps toward obtaining atomic weapons, according to an analysis co-written by an independent nuclear expert. But it also points to enormous gaps in Burmese technical know-how and suggests that the country is many years from developing an actual bomb.

The analysis, commissioned by the dissident group Democratic Voice of Burma, concludes with “high confidence” that Burma is seeking nuclear technology, and adds: “This technology is only for nuclear weapons and not for civilian use or nuclear power.”

“The intent is clear, and that is a very disturbing matter for international agreements,” said the report, co-authored by Robert E. Kelley, a retired senior U.N. nuclear inspector. Officials for the dissident group provided copies of the analysis to the broadcaster al-Jazeera, The Washington Post and a few other news outlets.

Hours before the report’s release, Sen. James Webb (D-Va.) announced that he was canceling a trip to Burma, also known as Myanmar, to await the details. “It is unclear whether these allegations have substantive merit,” Webb, who chairs a Senate Foreign Relations panel on East Asia, said in a statement released by his office. “[But] until there is further clarification on these matters, I believe it would be unwise and potentially counterproductive for me to visit Burma.”

There have been numerous allegations in the past about secret nuclear activity by Burma’s military rulers, accounts based largely on ambiguous satellite images and uncorroborated stories by defectors. But the new analysis is based on documents and hundreds of photos smuggled out of the country by Sai Thein Win, a Burmese major who says he visited key installations and attended meetings at which the new technology was demonstrated.

The trove of insider material was reviewed by Kelley, a U.S. citizen who served at two of the Energy Department’s nuclear laboratories before becoming a senior inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency. Kelley co-wrote the opposition group’s report with Democratic Voice of Burma researcher Ali Fowle.

Among the images provided by the major are technical drawings of a device known as a bomb-reduction vessel, which is chiefly used in the making of uranium metal for fuel rods and nuclear-weapons components. The defector also released a document purporting to show a Burmese government official ordering production of the device, as well as photos of the finished vessel.

Other photographs show Burmese military officials and civilians posing beside a device known as a vacuum glove box, which also is used in the production of uranium metal. The defector describes ongoing efforts on various phases of a nuclear-weapons program, from uranium mining to work on advanced lasers used in uranium enrichment. Some of the machinery used in the Burmese program appears to have been of Western origin.

The report notes that the Burmese scientists appear to be struggling to master the technology and that some processes, such as laser enrichment, likely far exceed the capabilities of the impoverished, isolated country.

“Photographs could be faked,” it says, “but there are so many and they are so consistent with other information and within themselves that they lead to a high degree of confidence that Burma is pursuing nuclear technology.”

A Washington-based nuclear weapons analyst who reviewed the report said the conclusions about Burma’s nuclear intentions appeared credible and alarming. “It’s just too easy to hide a program like this,” said Joshua H. Pollack, a consultant to the U.S. government.

Myanmar’s nuclear bombshell – Bertil Lintner
Asia Times: Fri 4 Jun 2010

Bangkok – Myanmar’s ruling generals have started a secret program to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them in a high-stakes bid to deter perceived hostile foreign powers, according to an investigative report by the Democratic Voice of Burma that will be aired later on Friday by television news network al-Jazeera.Asia Times Online contributor Bertil Lintner was involved in reviewing materials during extensive authentication processes conducted by international arms experts and others during the report’s five-year production. In the strategic footsteps of North Korea, Myanmar’s leaders are also building a complex network of tunnels, bunkers and other underground installations where they and their military hardware would be hidden against any external aerial attack, including presumably from the United States.
Based on testimonies and photographs supplied by high-ranking military defectors, the documentary will show for the first time how Myanmar has developed the capacity and is now using laser isotope separation, a technique for developing nuclear weapons. It will also show how machinery and equipment has been acquired to develop ballistic missiles.

That Myanmar is now trying to develop nuclear weapons and has become engaged in a military partnership with North Korea will dramatically change the region’s security dynamic. Myanmar is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a 10-nation grouping whose members jointly signed the 1995 Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Bangkok Treaty.

The nuclear bid will also put the already diplomatically isolated country on a collision course with the US. US Senator Jim Webb, who has earlier led a diplomatic drive to ”engage” the junta, abruptly canceled his scheduled June 4 trip to Myanmar when he learned about the upcoming documentary. The explosive revelations about Myanmar’s nuclear initiative are expected to freeze Washington’s recent warming towards the generals.

It is possible that the junta’s grandiose schemes could amount to little more than a monumental waste of state resources. According to one international arms expert familiar with the materials on Myanmar’s program, the laser isotope separation method now being employed by Myanmar’s insufficiently trained scientists ”is probably one of the worst that is yet to be invented. The major countries of the world have spent billions of dollars trying to make the process work without success.”

There is thus a risk that the generals will further undermine the country’s already wobbly economic fundamentals on ill-conceived weapons projects, ones that may yield little more than lots of radioactive holes in the ground and some crude Scud-type missiles.

Western military experts assert that any sophisticated bunker-buster bomb could easily penetrate the newly built network of tunnels and other underground facilities, constructed near the new capital of Naypyidaw. In light of the country’s lack of technical know-how, Myanmar’s desired nuclear bomb may also turn out to be a huge white elephant. It is not even certain that its homegrown missiles will fly. At least that is the conclusion of weapons’ experts who have closely examined the materials that will be presented in al-Jazeera’s investigative report.

The program was produced over five-years by the Democratic Voice of Burma, or DVB, a Norway-based radio and TV station run by Myanmar exiles. They have made their case based on leaked photographs, documents and testimonies from key military defectors. The documentary was directed by London-based Australian journalist Evan Williams.

Nuclear turncoat

The report’s main source, Sai Thein Win, is a former Myanmar army major who recently defected to the West, bringing with him a trove of information never seen before outside of the country. His documentation has been scrutinized by, among others, Robert Kelley, a former US weapons scientist at the Los Alamos facility where work is conducted towards the design of nuclear weapons.

>From 1992 to 1993 and 2001 to 2005, Kelley also served as one of the directors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “Sai Thein Win reminds us to some degree of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli technician at the Dimona nuclear site in the Negev desert … Sai is providing similar information,” said Kelley.

Vanunu blew the whistle on Israel’s nuclear program, and, according to Kelley, Sai Thein Win has “provided photographs of items that would appear to be very useful in a nuclear program as they are specific to nuclear issues. They could be seen as for other things, but they look like they were designed for a nuclear program.”

Geoff Forden, another international arms expert, says Myanmar appears to be “pursuing at least two different paths towards acquiring a missile production capability. One is a more or less indigenous path. The less indigenous comes from the fact that they have sent a number of Myanmar military officers to Moscow for training in engineering related to missile design and production.”

Sai Thein Win was among the Myanmar army officers sent to Russia and he has produced photographs of himself taken during his training there. He also has pictures of a top secret nuclear facility located 11 kilometers from Thabeikkyin, a small town near the Irrawaddy River in northern Myanmar.

He claims this is the headquarters of the army’s nuclear battalion and that it is there the regime is trying to build a nuclear reactor and enrich uranium for weapons. Missile development, he says, is carried out at another facility near Myaing, southwest of Mandalay, in central Myanmar.

Machinery for the Myaing plant has been supplied by two German firms, which also sent engineers to install the equipment. The Germans, Sai Thein Win says, were told that “the factories were educational institutions … those poor German engineers don’t know, didn’t know that we were aiming to use those machines in producing rocket parts or some parts for military use.”

How useful those machines will be for missile development is questionable. Despite their training in Russia, the Myanmar engineers handling them have little or no knowledge of producing sophisticated weapons, according to experts who say the generals’ apparent dream of having a nuclear reactor may also be just that: a pipedream.

Another high-ranking Myanmar military official also provided DVB’s researchers with classified information related to the country’s nuclear and missile program. He, however, fell out of view while in Singapore some time last year and his current whereabouts is now unknown.

Myanmar was one of the first countries in the region to launch a nuclear research program. In 1956, the country’s then-democratic government set up the Union of Burma Atomic Energy Center in the former capital Yangon. Unrelated to the country’s defense industries, it came to a halt when the military seized power in 1962. The new military power-holders, led by General Ne Win, did not trust the old technocrats and saw little use in having a nuclear program designed for peaceful purposes.

In 2001, Myanmar’s present ruling junta aimed to revitalize the country’s nuclear ambitions. An agreement was signed with Russia ’s Atomic Energy Ministry, which announced plans to build a 10-megawatt nuclear research reactor in central Myanmar. That same year, Myanmar established a Department of Atomic Energy, believed to be the brainchild of the Minister for Science and technology, U Thaung, a graduate of the Defense Services Academy and former ambassador to the US. At the time, US-trained nuclear scientist Thein Po Saw was identified as a leading advocate for nuclear technology in Myanmar.

Reports since then have been murky, including speculation that the deal was shelved due to Myanmar’s lack of finances. The Russian reactor was never delivered, but in May 2007 Russia ’s atomic energy agency, Rosatom, again announced it would build Myanmar ’s nuclear-research reactor. Under the initial 2001 agreement, Myanmar nationals, most military personnel, were sent to Russia for training. Nearly 10 years later, Russia has yet to deliver the reactor because Myanmar “refused to allow inspection by the IAEA”, according to DVB.

North Korean ally

Myanmar thus appears to have embarked on its own indigenous program to build a nuclear research reactor. Unconfirmed reports circulated on the Internet claim that North Korea is assisting the Myanmar authorities in the endeavor. Diplomatic relations between North Korea and Myanmar, which were severed in 1983 when North Korean agents detonated a bomb in Yangon, were officially restored in April 2007.

Only days later, a North Korean freighter, the Kang Nam I, docked at Thilawa port near the old capital. Heavy crates were unloaded under strict secrecy and tight security. A journalist working for a Japanese news agency was detained and interrogated for attempting to photograph the unloading.

Last year, the Kang Nam I was back in the news when, destined for Myanmar, it was turned back by US naval warships. At the time, it was thought to be carrying material banned under UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing North Korea from exporting material related to the production and development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

North Korea’s role in Myanmar ’s nascent nuclear program is still a matter of conjecture. But in May this year, a seven-member UN panel monitoring implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicated that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Myanmar.

The experts in the documentary said they were looking into “suspicious activity in Myanmar”, including the presence of Namchongang Trading, one of the North Korean companies sanctioned by the UN. North Korean tunneling experts are also known to have provided crucial assistance to the construction of Myanmar’s underground facilities.

According to an unnamed Myanmar army engineer, who was also interviewed for the DVB documentary, “a batch of eight North Koreans came each time and [were] sent back, [then] another eight came and were sent back. At the Defense Industry factories, there are at least eight to 16 of them … they act as technical advisers.”

In November 2008, Gen Shwe Mann, the third-highest ranking official in Myanmar’s military hierarchy, paid a secret visit to Pyongyang. Traveling with an entourage of military officers, he visited a radar base and a factory making Scud missiles, and signed a memorandum of understanding with the North Koreans to enhance military cooperation between the two countries.

A photo file and other details of the visit were leaked to Myanmar exiles and were soon available on the Internet, prompting the authorities to carry out a purge within its own ranks. On January 7 this year, one Foreign Ministry official and a retired military officer were sentenced to death for leaking the material.

Military insecurity

Aung Lin Htut, a former intelligence officer attached to the Myanmar Embassy in Washington until he defected in 2004, claims that soon after General Than Shwe came to power in 1992 he “thought that if we followed the North Korean example we would not need to take into account America or even need to care about China. In other words, when they have nuclear energy and weapons other countries … won’t dare touch Myanmar.”

The tunnels and bunkers – some of which are large enough to accommodate hundreds of soldiers – should be seen in the same light, Aung Lin Htut has argued. “It is for their own safety that the government has invested heavily into those tunnel projects,” he said.

The generals may fear not only an outside attack, which is highly unlikely according to security experts, but also another popular uprising. In 1988, millions of people took to the streets to demand an end to military dictatorship. In 2007, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks led marches for national reconciliation and a dialogue between the military government and the pro-democracy movement.

On both occasions, the generals responded with military force and brutally suppressed the popular movements. But the generals were shaken and apparently saw the need to move themselves and vital military facilities underground and away from populated areas, as also seen in the junta’s bizarre and sudden move to the new capital Naypyidaw in November 2005.

For other reasons, North Korea reacted similarly after the war on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is believed to have one of the world’s most extensive complexes of tunnels, storage facilities – and even weapons’ factories – all hidden from the prying eyes of real and imagined enemies.

That is likely why Myanmar’s generals see Pyongyang as a role model and why relations between the two countries have warmed since the 1990s – hardly by coincidence at the same time the US has become one of Myanmar’s fiercest critics. In 2005, then-secretary of state Condoleezza Rice branded Myanmar, along with Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Zimbabwe as “outposts of tyranny”, and the US tightened financial sanctions against the regime and its supporters.

The present US administration of President Barack Obama adopted a more conciliatory approach, sending emissaries to Myanmar to “engage” the generals and nudge them towards democracy. But sources close to the decision-making process in Washington also believe that concern over Myanmar’s WMD programs – and increasingly close ties with North Korea – should be equally important considerations in any new US policy towards Myanmar.

One of the negotiators recently sent to Myanmar, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell, is interviewed in the DVB documentary. When asked about Myanmar’s new security-related polices and initiatives, he replies rather cryptically:

Some of it is sensitive so really can’t be discussed in great detail, but I will say we have seen enough to cause us some anxiety about certain kinds of military and other kinds of relationships between North Korea and Burma [Myanmar]. We have been very clear with the authorities about what our red lines are … we always worry about nuclear proliferation and there are signs that there has been some flirtation around these matters.

According to internal documents presented by the DVB, the total cost of Myanmar’s tunneling projects and WMD programs is astronomical, running into billions of US dollars. This appears to be one reason why several Myanmar military officers have defected to the West – and brought with them the evidence that will be seen by global audiences on Friday.

* Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea Under the Kim Clan. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.

Expert says Burma ‘planning nuclear bomb’ – DVB and Robert Kelley
Democratic Voice of Burma: Fri 4 Jun 2010

A five-year investigation by DVB has uncovered evidence that Burma is embarking on a programme to develop nuclear weaponry. At the centre of the investigation is Sai Thein Win, a former defense engineer and missile expert who worked in factories in Burma where he was tasked to make prototype components for missile and nuclear programs.Sai contacted DVB after learning of its investigation into Burma’s military programmes, and supplied various documents and colour photographs of the equipment built inside the factories. The investigation has also uncovered evidence of North Korean involvement in the development of Burmese missiles, as well as Russia’s training of Burmese nuclear technicians.

In collaboration with DVB, American nuclear scientist and a former director in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Robert Kelley, has spent months examining this material. Here he writes in an exclusive report for DVB that Burma is probably mining uranium and exploring nuclear technology that is only “useful only for weapons”. For the full 30-page report, click here.

A remarkable individual has come out of Burma to describe nuclear-related activities in that secretive country. DVB has interviewed this man at length and is presenting his evidence here for all to see. His name is Sai Thein Win, and until recently he was a major in the Burmese army. He was trained in Burma as a defense engineer, and later in Russia as a missile expert. He returned to Burma to work in special factories, built to house modern European machining tools, to build prototypes for missile and nuclear activities.

Sai brought with him some documents and colour photographs of equipment built in these factories. DVB is publishing these photos and has arranged with experts to analyze what they have discovered. Some will no doubt want to weigh in and add their conclusions – no doubt there will be detractors who do not agree with the analysis and our conclusion that these objects are designed for use in a nuclear weapons development program. We invite their criticism and hope that any additional analysis will eventually reinforce our view that Burma is engaged in activities that are prohibited under international agreements.

DVB has hundreds of other photos taken in Burma inside closed facilities, as well as countless other information sources and documents. Background information is given for the very specific information Sai is providing.

In the last two years certain “laptop documents” have surfaced that purport to show that Iran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear program. The origin of these documents is not clear but they have generated a huge international debate over Iran’s intentions. The Burmese documents and photographs brought by Sai are much closer to the original source materials and the route of their disclosure is perfectly clear. The debate over these documents should be interesting in the non-proliferation community.

Who is Sai Thein Win?

Sai was a major in the Burmese army. He saw a DVB documentary about special factories in Burma that had been built by the regime to make components for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). He worked in two of these factories and felt there was more that needed to be conveyed outside Burma. Sai came out to Thailand to tell the world what he has seen and what he was asked to do. What he has to say adds to the testimony of many other Burmese defectors, but he supplements it with many colour photographs of the buildings and what they are building inside them. In addition he can describe the special demonstrations he attended and can name the people and places associated with the Burmese nuclear program that he visited.

Sai Thein Win reminds us of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli technician at the Dimona nuclear site in the Negev desert. Vanunu took many photographs of activities in Israel that were allegedly related to nuclear fuel cycle and weapons development. These photos were published in the Sunday Times in London in 1986. They purportedly showed nuclear weapons activities in Israel at the time. Israel has never confirmed that the images were taken in their facilities; much less that Israel even has a nuclear weapons program. But Vanunu was abducted, tried in an Israeli court and sentenced to many years in prison for divulging state secrets. Sai is providing similar information.

What is the Program that Sai Describes?

Sai tells us that he was tasked to make prototype components for missile and nuclear programs. He is an experienced mechanical engineer and he is capable of describing machining operations very accurately.

Sai has very accurately described a missile fuel pump impeller he made because he is trained as a missile engineer. His information on nuclear programs is based upon many colour photographs and two visits to the nuclear battalion at Thabeikkyin, north of Mandalay. The Nuclear Battalion is the organization charged with building up a nuclear weapons capability in Burma. The Nuclear Battalion will try to do this by building a nuclear reactor and nuclear enrichment capabilities.

It is DVB consultants’ firm belief that Burma is probably not capable of building the equipment they have been charged to build: to manufacture a nuclear weapon, to build a weapons material supply, and to do it in a professional way. But the information provided by Sai and other reporters from Burma clearly indicates that the regime has the intent to go nuclear and it is trying and expending huge resources along the way.

Factories filled with European equipment

Two companies in Singapore with German connections sold many machine tools to the Burmese government, notably the Department of Technical and Vocational Education (DTVE). DTVE is closely associated with the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) which is subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). A great deal of information is known about people and organizations in this chain. DTVE is probably a front for military purchasing for weapons of mass destruction; that is to say nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them, largely missiles.

The German government did not have derogatory information about DTVE when the tools were sold and allowed the sale. Fortunately, although the machine tools were very expensive and capable, they were sold without all of the accessories to make the very precision parts required for many missile and nuclear applications. These factories are only making prototypes and first models of equipment for other research organizations. They are not making serial copies for a production program and they do not do research themselves

The companies believed the machines were to be used for educational and vocational training, but the German government, suspicious about the end use, sent a diplomat and an expert to examine the machines that were installed in two special factories in Burma. The expert was suspicious that the machines would be used for uses other than training; there were no students and no universities nearby, and there were no women students. The expert noted that none of the male students wore military uniforms. DVB has examined the photos and some of the “students” who wore civilian clothes during the expert visit wear military uniforms when the Europeans are not there.

Sai provided recognizable photos of the equipment installers and the Germans during their site visit. This is one of many indications that he was at the factories and that his story is very credible. It is also fortunate that the German government was diligent and visited these factories to verify the end use. The Burmese were probably not telling the whole truth, but the visits allow serious verification of the facts.

Sai describes equipment the Nuclear Battalion is building

Sai has provided DVB with many photos of material that the Nuclear Battalion at Thabeikkyin is requesting. One of the most obvious ones is requested in an accompanying secret memo from the No (1) Science and Technology Regiment at Thabeikkyin to the Special Factory Number One near Pyin Oo Lwin. It is for a “bomb reactor” for the “special substance production research department” and there are some sketches of what is wanted as well as pictures. A bomb reactor in a nuclear program is a special device for turning uranium compounds into uranium metal for use in nuclear fuel or a nuclear bomb. The pictures and sketches are of such a bomb reactor and one of the pictures has been subjected to high temperature. The paint is burned off and it has been used. It may be a design from a foreign country or a Burmese design. But the need for a bomb reactor in a Burmese Nuclear Battalion is a strong signal that the project is trying to make uranium metal. Whether the uranium metal is used in a plutonium production reactor or a nuclear device, Burma is exploring nuclear technology that is useful only for weapons.

Sai also provided photos of chemical engineering machinery that can be used for making uranium compounds such as uranium hexafluoride gas, used in uranium enrichment. He describes nozzles used in advanced lasers that separate uranium isotopes into materials used for bombs. He provides pictures of a glove box for mixing reactive materials and furnaces for making uranium compounds. All of these things could have other uses, but taken together, in the context of the Nuclear Battalion, they are for a nuclear weapons program.

Sai has been told that the regime is planning to build a nuclear reactor to make plutonium for a nuclear bomb. He has seen a demonstration of a reactor component called a “control rod” that fits this story. He has been told that the regime plans to enrich uranium for a bomb and he has seen a demonstration of a carbon monoxide laser that will be part of this enrichment process. He has named the individuals he met and heard from at Thabeikkyin and they can be correlated through open source information with their jobs for the Burmese Department of Atomic Energy. Many are frequent visitors to IAEA grant training projects. He himself was tasked to make nozzles for the carbon monoxide laser. He actually knows less about the chemical industrial equipment seen in his photos than we can judge, but his overall story is quite interesting. It is also clear that the demonstrations and explanations that he has seen are quite crude. If they are the best Burma can do they have a long way to go.

How does Sai fit into the overall Burma story?

Sai is a mechanical engineer with experience in machining parts on highly specialized and modern machine tools. These machine tools make items that are very precise and can be used in nuclear energy programs or to make missiles. Sai is not a nuclear expert and he has little to say about the things he made, or that his factory made other than what he was told about their uses. He does provide photos of items that would be used in the nuclear industry to process uranium compounds into forms used in the nuclear weapons development process. These photos or his descriptions could be faked, but they are highly consistent with the uses he suggests.

Sai received a degree as a defense engineer in Burma. He then went to Russia to train in missile technology at the prestigious Bauman Institute in Moscow. He can document all of this. His friends went to Russia as well and studied nuclear and chemical technology at the Moscow Institute of Engineering Physics (MIFI) and the Mendeleev Institute of Chemical Technology. MIFI was the main training institute for Soviet nuclear weapons designers for many years. The ones who studied chemistry at Mendeleev are probably the ones who are most important in building the special equipment that Sai knew about.

Stories about a nuclear reactor in Burma

There have many wild stories about a nuclear reactor in Burma. It is clear that Burma and Russia considered building a 10 Megawatt (10 MW) research reactor in Burma in 2000. It is also clear that this deal was not closed and that Russia announced only intent to build a 10 MW reactor around 2008. This reactor has not been built and Russia is highly unlikely to approve such a deal unless Burma signs a new special agreement with the IAEA. This agreement is called an Additional Protocol and Burma is very unlikely to sign it because it would give the IAEA the access it needs to discover a clandestine nuclear program in Burma.

Furthermore, a 10 MW nuclear reactor is a very small concern for proliferation. Such reactors are common in the world and they are simply too small to be of serious proliferation concern. They can be used to teach students how to work in the nuclear area, but they are not appropriate to rapidly make any serious quantities of plutonium for bombs. IAEA has standards for which reactors are especially suitable for plutonium production and this proposed reactor is below that limit. It is appropriate only for nuclear technology training and the production of medical radioisotopes. Local production of medical isotopes is one of the main reasons for reactors in the 10 MW class around the world. Burma could use this reactor for training, but reports that it bought a 10 MW reactor from Russia are clearly untrue, and stories that they want to build one of their own for a bomb program are nonsense.

The idea that Burma is building a larger reactor, like the alleged one Israel destroyed in Syria, is more interesting. This could be a plutonium production reactor, like the 25 MW (thermal) one that North Korea operated in Yongbyon. The fact that North Korea would consider supporting nuclear programs outside its own borders, in client states like Syria, is of serious concern when evaluating Burma. North Korea does have a memorandum of understanding to help Burma build intermediate range ballistic missiles but their role in the nuclear program is only anecdotal.

Is Burma violating its international agreements?

The most important agreement that Burma must satisfy is its agreement with the IAEA. It signed an agreement with the IAEA in 1995 that it would not pursue nuclear weapons under a carefully defined standard international legal agreement. A supplement to this agreement, a so-called Small Quantities Protocol, said that Burma had no nuclear facilities and very small amounts of nuclear materials, which it did not even have to itemise. As a result of this declaration, which was accepted by the IAEA, there are no nuclear safeguards inspections in Burma. There are some IAEA visits to Burma, because Burma is a recipient of IAEA scientific grant money for humanitarian purposes. Some of these grants train Burmese scientists for nuclear activities that could enable them to produce nuclear materials, but these are not the majority of the grants.

Burma has certified that it has no nuclear facilities, has minimal nuclear materials, and has no plans to change this situation. The information brought by Sai suggests that Burma is mining uranium, converting it to uranium compounds for reactors and bombs, and is trying to build a reactor and or an enrichment plant that could only be useful for a bomb. There is no chance that these activities are directed at a reactor to produce electricity in Burma. This is beyond Burma’s engineering capabilities. It is up to Burma to notify the IAEA if these conditions have changed. Clearly, if it is trying to secretly build a bomb and is breaking these rules it will not be voluntarily notifying the IAEA.

Burma has also purchased high quality machine tools from a German machine tool broker in Singapore that can be used for weapons of mass destruction manufacture. These tools could be used to make many things but they are of a size and quality that are not consistent with student training, the declared end use.

The Department of Technical and Vocational training is a front for weapons procurement and is associated with the DAE and MOST. All of these departments, programs, and people associated with them, should be sanctioned and prohibited from buying anything that could contribute to weapons programs.

What is the state of Burma’s nuclear program?

We have examined the photos of the Burmese nuclear program very carefully and looked at Sai’s evidence. The quality of the parts they are machining is poor. The mechanical drawings to produce these parts in a machine shop are unacceptably poor. If someone really plans to build a nuclear weapon, a very complex device made up of precision components, then Burma is not ready. This could be because the information brought by Sai is not complete or because Burma is playing in the field but is not ready to be serious. In any case, nothing we have seen suggests Burma will be successful with the materials and component we have seen.

What is significant is intent. Burma is trying to mine uranium and upgrade uranium compounds through chemical processing. The photos show several steps in this intent. Burma is reported to be planning and building a nuclear reactor to make plutonium and is trying to enrich uranium to make a bomb. These activities are inconsistent with their signed obligations with the IAEA.

Even if Burma is not able to succeed with their illegal program, they have set off alarm bells in the international community devoted to preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation. The IAEA should ask Burma if its stated declarations are true. If these allegations appear real there should be follow-up questions and inspections of alleged activities. This effort will be hampered by Burma’s failure to sign the Additional Protocol. Under the current Small Quantities Protocol Agreement, IAEA has no power to inspect in Burma.

Burma is also trying to build medium-range missiles such as SCUDs under a memorandum of understanding with North Korea. SCUDS are not likely to carry a Burmese nuclear warhead because first generation nuclear warheads are usually too heavy and large for the SCUD missile. But there is little reason to embark on SCUD missiles and nuclear weapons other than to threaten ones near-neighbours. Burma is ruled by a junta that has no real political philosophy other than greed. The junta rules for the purpose of enriching a small cadre with the rich resources of the country: teak, gold, jade, other minerals and the labour of the people. Like their model, North Korea, the junta hopes to remain safe from foreign interference by being too dangerous to invade. Nuclear weapons contribute to that immunity.

Conclusions

DVB has interviewed many sources from inside Burma’s military programs. Many other researchers are interviewing former Burmese military people, for example Dictator Watch and Desmond Ball with Phil Thornton. They have provided anecdotal evidence pointing to a Burmese nuclear weapons program. Sai has clarified these reports and added to them with colour photos and personal descriptions of his visits to the Nuclear Battalion. He trained in Moscow in missile technology along with friends who trained in nuclear technology who later vanished into the Nuclear Battalion of Thabeikkyin. All were trained in some of Russia’s first quality institutes.

The total picture is very compelling. Burma is trying to build pieces of a nuclear program, specifically a nuclear reactor to make plutonium and a uranium enrichment program. Burma has a close partnership with North Korea. North Korea has recently been accused of trying to build a nuclear reactor inside Syria to make plutonium for a nuclear program in Syria or North Korea. The timeframe of North Korean assistance to Syria is roughly the same as Burma so the connection may not be coincidental.

If Burma is trying to develop nuclear weapons the international community needs to react. There needs to be a thorough investigation of well-founded reporting. If these reports prove compelling, then there need to be sanctions of known organizations in Burma and for equipment for any weapons of mass destruction.

* Kelley, 63, a former Los Alamos weapons scientist, was an IAEA director from 1992 to 1993, and again from 2001 to 2005. Based in Vienna, Austria, he conducted weapons inspections in Libya, Iraq, and South Africa, and compliance inspections in Egypt, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, Syria, Tanzania, Pakistan, India, and Congo, among others.

Ethnic leaders dividing community: critics
Irrawaddy: Thu 3 Jun 2010

Seven leading ethnic political leaders inside and outside Burma have been criticized for their election activities by a Rangoon-based group called the Burma Ethnic Politics Watch Network (BEPWN).
“We strongly condemned these seven people and their political movement, which helps the Burmese regime stay in power and delay democratic reform in Burma,” said a statement released by the BEPWN on May 22.

“Their actions could divide unity among the ethnic political movement inside and outside Burma and also mislead understanding in the international community in its support to the democracy movement in Burma,” the statement said. The organization accused the seven leaders of being “self-interest seekers” and ignoring the plight of ethnic people in Burma.

The statement by the Rangoon-based network has been widely circulated through the Internet. The statement received by The Irrawaddy named of seven ethnic leaders and criticized their political background and activities.

They are Harn Yawnghwe (Shan), the executive director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office; Dr. Lian H. Sakhong (Chin) of the Ethnic Nationalities Council; Dr. Saw Simon Tha, a Karen physician-turn- politician; Sai Aik Pao, former secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD); San Tha Aung of the Khami National Solidarity Organization; Dr. Saboi Jum, a peace broker between the Burmese regime and Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and Wa politician Philip Sem, who will contest in the general election.

According to the statement, Harn Yawnghwe of the Euro-Burma Office (EBO) has funded a number of ethnic individuals or organizations in order to form parties or contest in the general election.

The network said Harn has requested funds from the European Commission (EC) to finance ethnic politicians in Burma who plann to contest in the election. The statement said he is misusing the money intended for humaniatrian projects.

In an interview with The Irrawaddy in Dec. 2009, Harn said the EBO would provide financial support to opposition parties or ethnic groups that will contest in the general elections in 2010 if they need support, but it should not be misconstrued as EBO support for the Burmese regime 2008 Constitution and planned 2010 election.

The aim of supporting the groups is to let them strive for democracy and ethnic rights within any political space that might be opened up by the Burmese regime, he said.

When contacted by The Irrawaddy this week, Harn Yawnghwe said the group’s allegations were not accurate, and his organization has not provided money to people to contest in the election.

“We give education to them about the election law,” he said. “But, we don’t provide money to them.”

The Rangoon-based network said that Dr. Saw Simon Tha, a committee member of the newly formed Kayin People’s Party, supported the Burmese regime and ignoring the plight of Karen who have been displaced for decades in the jungle in Karen State due to military government attacks.

Simon Tha and 15 Karen politicians in Rangoon registered the KPP to contest in the general elections in 2010.

He was accused of dividing the Karen community in Karen State and those in other parts of Burma.

In an interview with The Irrawaddy in March, Simon Tha said his party will contest in Irrawaddy, Rangoon and Pegu divisions and Mon State, but not Karen State. He said that his party will represent all Karen people in Burma.

Simon Tha is well-known as a peace negotiator between Karen rebel groups and the Burmese regime. In 2004, he arranged peace talks in Rangoon between the Karen National Union, led by the late Gen Saw Bo Mya, and a government delegation led by former Burmese Premier Gen Khin Nyunt.

The statement said that Chin politician Lian H. Sakhong, the EBO research director, abused democracy and worked for his own interests. Sakhong is active in the United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD-LA), and the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) based in Thailand.

The statement said Shan politician Sai Aik Pao supported the Burmese regime. He is a former secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) which won a majority of seats in the Shan State in 1990 election. The statement said he was a hand-picked ethnic representative of the Burmese junta national convention from 1993-1996. He is leading the Shan Democratic Party that will contest in the election in 2010.

The statement said that Saboi Jum was close to the Burmese authorities and provided them with secret information about the KIO. He is a founder of the Nyein Foundation in Kachin State and a peace broker between the Burmese regime and KIO.

The statement said ethnic Wa politician Saw Philip, also known as U Philip Sam, is a leading member of the Wa Democratic Party which supports the Burmese regime, and supported the junta’s national convention.

The statement said that San Tha Aung, who will contest in the election for the Arakan National Party, was a hand-picked representative of the junta and supported it in the national convention.

EU neighbours sign up to Myanmar sanctions
Earth Times: Thu 3 Jun 2010

Brussels – Countries neighbouring the European Union, from Iceland to Armenia, have signed up to the bloc’s decision to keep trade and visa bans on the Myanmar regime, the EU said Thursday.
The EU first brought in sanctions in 2006 in a bid to push the junta towards democracy. In April, it extended them for a year, arguing a “lack of improvement in the human rights situation and the absence of substantive progress towards an inclusive democratisation process.”

Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Norway “have declared that they share the objectives” of the sanctions regime and “will ensure that their national policies conform” to it, an EU statement said.

The sanctions include measures such as a ban on the import of wood and metals from Myanmar, a ban on arms exports, a ban on financial links with over 1,200 regime-linked companies, and a visa ban on some 400 regime figures and their families.

Caught between a vote and a hard place; Suu Kyi’s democracy party splinters over decision whether to contest coming election under junta’s harsh rules – Mark MacKinnon
The Globe and Mail (Canada): Thu 3 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai, Thailand – After clinging for two decades to their stolen victory in a 1990 election, Myanmar’s main opposition party – led by Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is suddenly fragmenting and may be dissolved altogether, ironically over the prospect of another election.
When the military regime in Myanmar, also known as Burma, announced that it was altering the country’s constitution and would hold its first election since Ms. Suu Kyi and her party won a landslide victory in the 1990 vote, it presented her National League for Democracy with a stark choice. It could take part in elections it had no chance of winning under the military’s rules, or boycott and ignore the first hint of political opening the repressive junta has allowed in 20 years.

Taking part would mean renouncing the 1990 election results, as well as expelling the revered Ms. Suu Kyi – who has been under some form of arrest for most of the past two decades – and other political prisoners from the party, since no one with a conviction on their record is allowed to be a member of any party running in the elections.

Not registering for the elections may now lead to the forced dissolution of the party that has led the struggle for democracy inside the repressive country since it was founded in 1988. The election law specifies that only those parties that take part in the elections will be considered legal. Since the deadline for registration passed, the state-run media has taken to referring to the NLD as a “former political party.”

The decision not to run has split the NLD, with Ms. Suu Kyi and the bulk of the party deciding to stick to their position that the results of the 1990 election must be honoured, while a smaller faction has decided to break away from the main pro-democracy movement and to take part in the election.

The new party, headed by long-time NLD member Than Nyein, has adopted the name National Democratic Front. A reportedly furious Ms. Suu Kyi said through her lawyer that the new party was “undemocratic” – since it ignored a party vote not to take part in the elections – and has asked her supporters to boycott the election or spoil their ballots.

It’s a situation that likely pleases the generals, who have ruled Myanmar since the end of British colonial rule in 1962. “The government has been trying to divide the NLD for the past 20 years. Only now can they see that happening,” said Htet Aung, a reporter at The Irrawaddy magazine, a publication run by Myanmarese exiles that publishes out of Chiang Mai, a Thai city roughly 100 kilometres from the border with Myanmar.

Like many exiles, Mr. Htet was unsure of where he stood on the issue. “I understand the NLD’s position and Aung San Suu Kyi’s position. They are committed to genuine democracy and when they see no hope for genuine democracy, they don’t want to participate in these elections,” he said. “But on the other hand, when you’re under a dictatorship, if you want democracy you must pass through the election process.”

So far, the junta has not set a specific date for the vote, only saying that it will take place by the end of 2010. Few see the election as anything but an attempt by the junta to give its rule a coat of legitimacy that it currently lacks. The election will be conducted under emergency laws that forbid criticisms of the government and gatherings of more than five people.

The newly passed election law sets aside one-quarter of the 440 seats in the lower house for the military, and with the opposition weak and barred from getting its message out, the generals and their allies look sure to sweep to a large majority.

General Thein Sein and 22 members of his cabinet recently resigned their positions in the military to run in the election under the banner of the junta’s Union Solidarity and Development Party. Should, as expected, the regime control parliament after the election, the junta’s senior leader, General Than Shwe will likely be voted into the powerful new post of president.

“The regime has 100 per cent of the power now, and they’ll try and keep 100 per cent, but with the legitimacy of an elected government. They wanted the NLD to take part in the elections and then to allow them to win only 5 per cent of the seats,” said Nyo Ohn Myint, the Thailand-based chair of the NLD foreign affairs committee.

“Political parties [that take part in the election] won’t have the opportunity to do any campaigning, or to criticize, because the election laws do not allow you to attack the government. You can’t talk about the electricity shortages, you can’t talk about the water shortage, you can’t talk about the basic problems of the people, because every problem is related to the state. You can’t criticize, so the election campaign is for what?”

However, Mr. Nyo admitted the decision not to participate had deeply divided the party. He characterized those who broke away to form the National Democratic Front as “moderates” willing to give the junta more benefit of the doubt than Ms. Suu Kyi and her allies were.

The election comes as both the United States and China have stepped up diplomatic efforts to engage with the government in Rangoon. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will visit Myanmar this month, and Mr. Nyo said he feels China, which is worried about ethnic conflicts in the north of Myanmar spilling over its border, may be able to pass messages between the regime and the opposition.

The United States, meanwhile, is increasingly concerned by Myanmar’s growing relationship with North Korea, as well as reports that it recently has been trying to acquire materials that could allow it to follow Pyongyang’s lead by producing nuclear weapons. It’s believed that two nuclear reactors are under construction in Myanmar, which has reportedly received aid from both Russia and North Korea in the effort.

“Burma could become another problem like North Korea,” said Aung Zaw, editor of The Irrawaddy, who met with U.S. assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell before the latter’s recent trip to Myanmar. “That’s why the U.S. engagement is no longer about [promoting] democracy alone. It’s about proliferation, too, now.”

Myanmar’s military ambitions
Al Jazeera: Thu 3 Jun 2010

Myanmar’s ruling generals have started a programme to build nuclear weapons. They are trying to develop long-range missiles.
Elections later this year are aimed at convincing the world they are moving towards democracy. But fearing attack from the US and an uprising by their own people, Myanmar’s generals are instead digging themselves in with a nationwide network of bunkers.

With top-secret material gathered over five years, this film reveals how Myanmar is trying to become the next nuclear-armed North Korea.

Key files and other information has been smuggled out by defecting army Major Sai Thein Win, a former deputy commander of a top-secret military factory at a town called Myaing.

Before leaving, he smuggled out thousands of files detailing a secret programme by Myanmar’s ruling generals to build nuclear weapons.

To check Sai Thein Win’s claims, the Democratic Voice of Burma had him show the files to Bob Kelley, a former intelligence officer at North America’s nuclear facility Los Alamos and an ex-director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Files and photos were also shown to Geoff Forden, a military research scientist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The experts agree Myanmar is a long way from achieving its goals.

But many believe that with its stated intent to one day acquire nuclear weapons, Myanmar’s military ambitions should be taken seriously.

Myanmar’s military ambitions can be seen from Friday, June 4, at the following times GMT: Friday: 0600; Saturday: 1900; Sunday: 0300; Monday: 1400; Tuesday: 0530; Wednesday: 1900; Thursday: 0300.

[http://english. aljazeera. net/programmes/ general/2010/ 05/2010531104709 90951.html ]

The international community’s naive beliefs on Burma – Editorial
Nation (Thailand): Wed 2 Jun 2010

Global think-tanks are ignoring the fact that nothing is free or fair in the junta-ruled country, least of all ballots.Most people are saying “at least it’s better than nothing”, in reference to the upcoming elections in Burma. This is especially true for those who are desperate to see some progress in the junta-ruled country.

The latest briefing from the International Crisis Group gave the impression that the election, despite the international community pointing out all the faults with it, would serve as “the best opportunity in a generation to influence the future direction of the country”.

With such an endorsement, even though a mild one by international standards, the junta leaders in Rangoon will end up having the last laugh. Persistence and complete control is a virtue these days because stability and the status quo are easy to deal with.

Political turmoil in Thailand has added fuel to the international community’s growing anxiety about democratic development in the region. Many scholars tend to view countries with continuous political stability as preferred models of development and investment.

The Thai situation was repeatedly used to demonstrate one salient point – stability is linked to prosperity. If one wants prosperity then one must forget about freedom and democracy. Thailand wants both, so the experiment and healing continues.

What is sad about the the international community and most independent think-tanks is that they are not really serious about the suffering of the Burmese people.

For 20 years, the Burmese people have been living under the military junta, tightly monitored and suppressed. And yet, the international community is slow in taking collective action. Investments from the West, dubious positions and awkward neighbourly policies by China, India, as well as Asean, have only strengthened the regime.

Why should the junta accommodate calls for fairness and justice?

The Burmese generals know full well that international focus is short-lived, as there are a myriad global issues to pay attention to. The current Korean Peninsula crisis will continue to dominate the headlines. It would not be a surprise if the junta suddenly declared the date of polls now that global attention has shifted away to the northeast of Asia.

The ICG’s claim that the voting in Burma could be “relatively fair” is preposterous. Yet, such belief is proliferating. That is exactly what the junta wants to see, and that explains why dictatorial governments around the world no longer succumb to any international pressure.

The ICG has not asked if the voters are free to cast their ballots with free will.

How can voters cast their ballots freely if they are being controlled and watched by plain-clothes police officers and thousands of spies in the neighbourhood? They are scared to hell. Every name and household has been scrutinised and put in the records.

The people know that what they do at the polling stations will come back to haunt them. The atmosphere of fear is rising every day.

It is naïve to think that the 1990 poll victory by the opposition party may take place once again because the Burmese voters will be prepared to reject the junta en masse. Similarly, the junta leaders are prepared to make sure they win the polls, now that they’ve learned from past mistakes.

Indeed, if the ICG continues believing what it does, the regime has already won the election!

Sanctioning disaster – Joel Whitney interviews Morten Pedersen
Guernica (US): Wed 2 Jun 2010

The Burma expert defends aid, diplomacy, and “understanding” Burma’s dictators in order to improve human rights, sway softliners, and save lives.Early last month, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi and offered a battery of human rights demands to her wardens in the military government. The dictators have been gearing up for elections later this year. Yet, unfazed by Campbell’s demands, they yawned and pressed on with elections from which Suu Kyi, who won in 1990, and her opposition party, the National League for Democracy, are banned. International election monitors? Also banned. And don’t expect election-day scoops from a country where a foreign journalist was shot point-blank for covering monks’ protests in 2007. “I think they learned their lesson from 1990 when they actually allowed for a free and fair election and lost in a landslide,” said Jared Genser, Suu Kyi’s international counsel.

Days after his visit, Campbell admitted “profound disappointment” that more had not come from the talks. Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK, noted judiciously: “… Clearly after two visits [by Campbell] since last September, engagement with the regime has produced no results at all.” [Emphasis added] On May 15, the president renewed economic sanctions against the regime. But members of Congress sought to make those sanctions even tougher. “In a further sign of fraying American patience,” the Guardian reported, “a bipartisan coalition in the U.S. House of Representatives called this week for a ‘tougher and more robust application of sanctions on Burma’ and urged the Obama administration to back an international war crimes inquiry.”

President Obama’s policy on Burma has something for everyone. It’s a hodgepodge of baby-step diplomacy, self-righteous threats, and crippling economic sanctions. The sanctions condemn the dictators for rights violations by blocking U.S. investments (except for Chevron, which is somehow allowed to stay), including all non-humanitarian aid. Morten Pedersen, a Burma scholar lurking in the bibliography of a lot of Burma policy books, insists that the sanctions, especially the ban on aid, are undermining the president’s diplomacy. Oh, and starving the Burmese.

During his six-year stay in Burma, where he was able to use his conversant Burmese to interview experts and ordinary people, Pedersen says the most dire rights violation he found was crushing poverty. Alongside political rights, he argues that socioeconomic rights must be seen as part of the array of human rights. But such an approach would seem anathema to a Congress that prioritizes condemnation and punishment of the generals over the well being of the people of Burma.

Advocating an approach he calls principle engagement, Pedersen writes in an op-ed in the Canberra Times, “pressure can be exercised without mindlessly ratcheting up sanctions, which have little practical impact other than limiting our ability to influence broader social, political and economic processes. Quiet, but persistent, pressure and support for incremental gains is likely over time to shape the political behaviour of the military more effectively than public condemnation and sanctions.”

Calling the generals’ outlook Hobbesian, Pedersen argues in Promoting Human Rights in Burma, “We may feel that the military leaders hold socially deviant values, or that their fears regarding political reform are unjustified. Yet, like many leaders who believe they have a higher purpose, they are largely impervious to criticism, and do not expect nonbelievers—foreigners in particular—to understand.” So what’s the point of talking to them? Well, like all regimes, Burma’s has hardliners and softliners. As distasteful as it may sound, can “understanding” the generals, even speaking in their terms, bring about human rights improvements, bolster military softliners, and save lives? And if so, is it politically viable?

Pedersen is a research fellow at the Australian National University’s Centre for International Governance and Justice. Burmese historian Thant Myint-U calls him “one of the foremost students and scholars of Burmese politics anywhere outside the country.” Pedersen previously worked as senior analyst for the International Crisis Group in Burma and consultant on Burmese politics and development affairs with the UN, the World Bank, and the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. I spoke with him at the Algonquin Hotel in New York City in late March, while he was in town for a conference. We sat amidst a throng of tourists who drank high-priced martinis and ate complimentary nuts.

—Joel Whitney for Guernica

Guernica: You lived in Burma for six years. The generals are killing and imprisoning and torturing a lot of their people. Some say they are committing genocide against groups like the Karen. Liberals and conservatives in the U.S. and Europe seem to have converged on this idea that if there is ‘evil’ there, we certainly shouldn’t fund it. It’s not moral for us to deal with them. Do you disagree?

Morten Pedersen: There’s two ways of looking at morality. One would be when you look at the act itself, [asking] is that moral or immoral? Many people would define it as immoral, because it funds a bad regime. To me, morality is better looked at in terms of its consequences. I look at how our acts impact the Burmese people. If there is a net benefit from our acts for the Burmese people, I see it as moral. You often are accused of being immoral when you argue for engagement. I think it’s important to make that point up front that that’s not the issue. We can disagree on things, but it’s not about morality. And of course it all depends on what type of engagement we’re talking about.

People especially in the U.S., are quick to say, “If you’re not sanctioning then you are doing ASEAN-style engagement, which is commercial engagement.” The kind of engagement I’m talking about is what I term “principle engagement,” whose up-front objective is to bring improvements in human rights for the Burmese people. By that I mean the entire range of human rights, not just political and civil rights, but also socioeconomic rights, which, as far as I’m concerned, are of equal value. That’s certainly something that [was clear from] my six years in Burma, that socioeconomic issues are uppermost in people’s minds.

Guernica: So just to define principle engagement…

Morten Pedersen: So if there’s a net benefit flowing from the engagement in human rights terms, then I see it as being the way to go. And that then gets into these rather difficult calculations of what is the relative benefit of one approach versus the other. A lot of the discussion is about aid, because that really is where the door is in Burma. The reality is that there wouldn’t be a lot of trade and investment flowing into Burma even if sanctions were lifted, because of the economic environment. (You would get more of it than now, but not a lot.) So I’ve spent a lot of my time looking at aid as a way of having a dialog or a conversation both with the regime but also with society. Of course [that means] a financial relationship that can improve living conditions of people on the ground.

Guernica: Because right now the U.S., for one, doesn’t give significant amounts of aid?

Morten Pedersen: The U.S., as part of this new diplomatic engagement policy has also for the first time committed to openly giving aid inside the country. For many years, it was all outside. But that has kind of been shifting over the last seven years. They have begun to do little things inside.

Guernica: And the E.U.?

Morten Pedersen: The E.U. made a decisive shift seven or eight years ago where they said we’re going to separate politics and humanitarian issues. My argument is that you’re dealing with a long-term crisis. Humanitarian aid by definition is aid that saves lives in a crisis. Burma is an extended crisis; therefore going in and saving lives of course has value. But it doesn’t make sense to only do that. Because you save a life today but then tomorrow the crisis will come back and threaten it again. There has to be more ambition than that.

Guernica: How?

Morten Pedersen: Principle engagement is changing governance to the extent that you can so that human rights improve. But [you’re] also helping people cope with whatever situation exists. So in the short term, it’s about helping people cope. And in the medium term, I think it is also a strategy for beginning to effect changes that over time can lead to bigger things. But it will be domestically driven change and you [see] at best international aid or engagement, or whatever it is, as possibly being a catalyst for that.

The idea that aid props up the regime is ludicrous. In power terms, it is irrelevant. If you stick to the concept of morality where we shouldn’t be doing anything that benefits a corrupt regime, yes, then you’ve got a problem. But if you look at morality in utilitarian terms, I don’t believe that you do, because there’s not significant power consequences of the aid going in. Or at least you can make sure that there isn’t. Of course, I am assuming here that aid agencies are being principled themselves and that they look after their money and that there is proper monitoring and so forth. There’s been an easy argument out there for years, you know, ‘Aid won’t make a difference, you’re not allowed to do anything that’s meaningful and they will steal all of it.’ But it has been proven by the agencies that have engaged that this is not the case.

Guernica: So in its limited way, aid works?

Morten Pedersen: Aid works to the extent that aid works in any country. Usually it doesn’t change a country, right? But it can do things at the individual level.

Guernica: Your book strongly argues for more understanding not just of Burmese history but of the specific perspective of this murderous military junta. Many would criticize this argument that we need to understand bad guys. Dick Cheney offered extreme contempt for American liberals by saying something like, “Liberals want to put terrorists on the couch and psychoanalyze them.” In a way, you take a step in that direction. Tell me what the benefits of understanding the generals are.

Morten Pedersen: I think to address Cheney’s point, there are definitely people who cannot be reformed. But accepting that is not to accept that you can’t make a difference. Of course, if there are people who can’t be reformed then the difference that you can make is with other people, including other people in the regime. Some people say hardliners and softliners; it’s a useful way of distinguishing [how] the Burmese regime has softliners just as any other regime. And to the extent that engagement can change minds, can change policies, those are the people we’re looking at. So engagement at best can reinforce or empower people within the regime who are interested in [change].

Guernica: Of course now the Obama administration is engaging “pragmatically” with the regime. To make this engagement more productive, you argue that Burmese history ought to be better understood. What does that history look like?

Morten Pedersen: I think we have to accept that this is a military that genuinely believes that Burma without its military in control (not necessarily as rulers, but certainly in a key role) would not have survived and even today would not survive.
Guernica: Besides the Buddhist clergy, the military is the only viable institution with any longevity in Burma. And that goes back to just after World War II when independence came; Aung San Suu Kyi’s dad, feeling angry and humiliated by decades and decades of colonial rule, impatiently but understandably told the British to beat it before the Brits could rebuild the country. With the chaos that ensued, the military was the only feasible institution. This was the view that developed, in part as a justification for the generals’ curtailing democracy. Many have argued, including Burmese historian Thant Myint-U, that the military remains the only viable institution in Burma.

Morten Pedersen: Yeah, I mean I’m not personally prepared to accept the argument that a depoliticized military would be the end of Burma.

Guernica: Which is what military hardliners argue.

Morten Pedersen: My point is that I do accept that there are a lot of people in the military who believe that. So we’re not dealing with a regime that is solely interested in personal power and privilege, although that is obviously an element, as it is everywhere. It is a regime that also has a founding ideology, a self-image as having a critical national role, and which does, in fact, act on that. Not just running the country as their own kind of bank or business, although some of them seem to; there are others who are concerned with much more. But I should clarify that the distinction between aid and diplomatic engagement is actually not that big. A lot of the most effective conversations with the regime are conversations that are being had on the ground by agencies that are engaged there on practical projects.

So it’s not Kurt Campbell flying into the capital, talking about how they should conduct the elections. I don’t think that’s gonna lead anywhere. I don’t think that conversation is wrong. But the idea that you can negotiate significant changes at the political level in a short timespan, I don’t believe that’s gonna work. But we do know that conversations about economic policy, for example, do from time to time have an impact and lead to changes in governance. When engaging in these conversations, a good place to start in a country like Burma is to accept that we’re not gonna be able to change Burma. We simply don’t have the means, the leverage, to change a country like that in the dramatic ways that we tend to focus on.

Guernica: China’s stance seems to further undermine any influence that sanctions could once have had.

Morten Pedersen: I think pressure is important. But where I want the sanctions to stop is… you need just enough to have that possible effect. But if you take them too far, as I believe we have done in Burma, then you start blocking other things that I think would be more effective in helping the Burmese people and bringing about improvements in their human rights.

Guernica: Specifically, what parts of sanctions should be kept?

Morten Pedersen: If you’re gonna use sanctions on Burma they have to be strictly targeted. It should be the kind of sanctions that don’t really have an impact on the broader economy or the broader population. Things like the visa ban and freezing the generals’ accounts. None of this really bites that much. And I’m not saying it’s gonna usher in change. But it sends the message that we are unhappy with the way you are doing things, and says this is not according to international standards.

Guernica: But it isn’t counterproductive, in your view?

Morten Pedersen: In comparing the different types of sanctions, those are at the end of the continuum where it’s something we can look at. But there may be counterproductive effects. When you move into broader economic sanctions, then we’re in the middle now. Then it starts to become problematic. It is not possible to target sanctions; because if you target them to hurt the generals, they can pass it on. They can deflect it.

Guernica: It could even end up increasing their corruption over things like aid.

Morten Pedersen: It could, yeah. So once you move into economic sanctions, we’re already beyond what I think is strategically smart to do. But where it becomes really problematic is where you have aid sanctions. Because aid is the wench in the door that we have. You get people in there on the ground who have conversations, build capacity, change minds all across the state and society. No, they don’t engage with Senior General Than Shwe. But they engage at the ministerial level and then all the way down to people living in the villages. And with the amount of aid, we aren’t talking about dramatic changes. But we are talking about positive changes, both in terms of immediate outcomes and I believe also in terms of beginning to create conditions for bigger change, which will have to be primarily domestically driven. But if you can get the people in the regime to loosen up a little bit. I mean they are so paranoid; they have been paranoid for many years. Well, paranoid, but it started out not being paranoia. I mean, it was real.

Guernica: You mean in the period around 1950?

Morten Pedersen: The whole country was at war in the early nineteen fifties. Back then it wasn’t paranoid to believe you needed to control things.

Guernica: Everything was fragmenting.

Morten Pedersen: Yeah.

Guernica: There were something like a dozen ethnic groups that rebelled. There was a communist faction. The U.S. had supported Chinese nationalists within Burmese borders, arming them to the teeth. So the country was total chaos, falling apart…

Morten Pedersen: Yeah. You had other countries in the region, Vietnam, Korea, at different times or a bit later, that were split in two. This is the nightmare scenario.

Guernica: Some of the U.S. and Europe’s policy is a result of a fixation on Aung San Suu Kyi as the main entry point into Burmese history, which is certainly compelling. It hooked me. As did conversations with Karen and other Burmese exiles. But you seem to argue that we don’t see Burma enough through the filter of the history of the people we have to deal with.

Morten Pedersen: What I would say is [these Burma watchers] see Burma through the last twenty years, which is equivalent to the Suu Kyi period. The reason it’s twenty years is because that period has not changed. That’s exactly the point. It’s exactly the same issues we’re dealing with now that were the issues in 1988. And this of course is why everybody should start having a look at existing policies. When, twenty years down the road, absolutely nothing has changed [in what] you have stated as your goals, then certainly you have a very good reason for a revision of what you’re doing.

Guernica: Critics of sanctions equate them with sanctions on Cuba, Iran, or Iraq, where they have failed to change governments, except perhaps to entrench them, in ways that seem counterproductive and certainly hurt the public. Yet proponents of sanctions cite South Africa, where sanctions helped bring down a regime built around institutionalized racism. Which scenario is more pertinent to Burma?

Morten Pedersen: South Africa was actually a partial democracy. Blacks were not involved in that democracy. But there was a white constituency that had influence on government decisions. In Burma, there is no such constituency. There’s no one outside the army that has influence on policy decisions. There’s a close business community. But while they’re close to the generals, they have no political influence. In South Africa, there was a large business community that had direct influence through electoral processes and beyond that. And South Africa was also heavily integrated into the global economy, and the global cultural community. The whites were really hurt by being shunned by what was in fact their peer group in Europe. So they were hurt, culturally they felt isolated, the shaming worked, and the economic pressure worked. And they then put pressure on the government. That may not have changed otherwise.

Guernica: In Burma, those elements are not there?

Morten Pedersen: The Burmese generals have no affinity at all with the people who are sanctioning them. Culturally, there’s no link whatsoever.

Guernica: In fact, there’s still resentment against the U.S. for backing Chinese nationalists, Great Britain for backing the…

Morten Pedersen: And for what the Americans have been doing for the last twenty years. And economically they just aren’t integrated. So the economic pain that you can impose is very limited. And even if you could impose pain on the cronies, they don’t have the political influence to change anything. So the generals, as far as I’m concerned, are isolated in terms of political effects of sanctions. If you do something and the Burmese generals gain a little from it but the Burmese people gain a lot, then by my calculation that’s the moral thing to do.

Guernica: For instance, regarding aid.

Morten Pedersen: Diplomacy too. If you go and talk to the generals, then maybe they feel a little good that the ‘Americans come and talk to us, we’re somebody.’ You can make the argument at any level, really. And, ideally, I would not want them to feel good. But if that conversation can help open space for something that benefits the people, or can begin to change their mind so they do govern in a way that is less abusive, then to me it’s the right thing to do.

Guernica: Reading your book is confusing to me. I have read many others that make the story of the Karen, for instance, very compelling. But your book seems to point back at the generals to remind us of their story, in order to better engage them. Aren’t these two arguments contradictory, or can they be complimentary?

Morten Pedersen: That’s a tricky one to answer. Because I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the narrative we’re being told about the suffering [of groups like the Karen] in the border areas. I don’t have any doubt that it is extreme and has been ongoing for a very long time. There’s nothing good to say about what is going on out there. I think the implicit argument in the book is that there is more to Burma than the eastern border areas. So that doesn’t mean less attention to the eastern border areas, but it means more attention to the rest of Burma.

Guernica: The argument of these books, books like Mac McClelland’s For Us Surrender Is Out of the Question, and Edith Mirante’s books, is that the eastern and other border areas have been most neglected, because these people live far out on the border and have marginal influence inside Burma, let alone in the broader world of international policy. If we want to understand the morality of this regime, look to the eastern border area where we have something tantamount to genocide. You say, essentially, it’s the generals we should be looking at. Why?

Morten Pedersen: Well, I guess because I’m coming at it from a policy angle. In order to analyze the impact of sanctions policy, the key thing that we need to understand is why the generals do what they do, so that we can have a more effective conversation.

Guernica: In a way, I keep trying to ask you this: why do the generals do what they do?

Morten Pedersen: You need to accept that national security, as the generals define it, is their key concern; you can argue about whether that’s the right way of defining it. And I would disagree with that way [as well]. But that is how they define it. That is a significant objective and a significant motivating factor in everything they do. So when you engage with them you need to recognize and acknowledge that. And you need maybe even to go a bit further and frame your conversations in a way that kind of accepts that there are security concerns that are legitimate. But maybe there are other ways of addressing those security concerns. I mean other countries in Southeast Asia have also faced risks of their country, if not splitting apart, then fragmenting in some significant way. Rather than addressing that problem militarily like the Burmese have done, they have addressed it economically by pushing economic growth and spreading it to provinces.

Guernica: So to get the Burmese generals to think of a new story about how to hold the country together, it’s productive and helpful for those dealing with them to understand how the generals see the country’s national security problems now, and show some acknowledgment of that in dealing with them?

Morten Pedersen: If the purpose is changing their mind, which is hard anyway, then coming in and saying, ‘You are evil, you need to go away,’ will get you nowhere. But if you come in and you recognize some of what I believe are real concerns of the military, however misunderstood they may be, then you have the start of a conversation which can possibly lead to suggesting [policies] that are more acceptable to the international community, but, more importantly, are better for the Burmese people.

Guernica: Zoya Phan suggests an arms embargo. What’s your take on that?

Morten Pedersen: I think that looking at an arms embargo is where we should have started. But an arms embargo wouldn’t be very effective because you probably wouldn’t get cooperation of the neighboring countries and even if you did we all know how the arms trade works. I mean the arms trade breaks through sanctions everywhere. You can make it more expensive but you can’t stop it. So it would be a symbolic sanction more than an instrumental or effective one but that is definitely on the side that I would call good, or better sanctions.

Guernica: There’s a reasonable debate on that?

Morten Pedersen: Yeah, reasonable sanctions. But one that would be very hard to get.

Depayin masterminds wield power in USDP – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Several of the Burmese junta officials who recently resigned their military positions to found the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) were responsible for the deadly ambush on pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy in Depayin, Sagaing Division, in 2003.About 5,000 armed thugs recruited from rural areas under the authority of the pro-junta Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) ambushed Suu Kyi’s convoy in the evening of May 30, 2003, and killed an estimated 100 people, according to independent observers. Suu Kyi narrowly escaped with her life.

USDP leaders together: Burma’s Prime Minister Thein Sein (left) talks with Aung Thaung (center) and Rangoon Mayor Aung Thein Linn in Mandalay on April 29. (Photo: AP)
Since the massacre, several of those involved in the incident have been promoted, have established close business relations with the junta or, in at least one case, have married their family members into the military elite.

Former Lt-Col Aung Thaung, a hardline minister who was a USDA leader in 2003, has seen his business interests grow exponentially since the Depayin Massacre. His family’s IGE Co Ltd is now one of wealthiest and most diverse companies in the country with interests in banking, pipeline construction, exporting and logging.

Nowadays, he is not only personally close to Than Shwe, but also to junta No. 2 Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye. One of his sons is married to Maung Aye’s daughter. Aung Thaung is the current minister of Industry-1, but is expected to lead the USDP in this year’s general election along with Prime Minister Thein Sein.

Another hardliner, Minister of Information Kyaw Hsan has also seen his star rise since he was the leader of the USDA in Sagaing Division at the time of the Depayin attack. He is now head of the junta’s Spoke Authoritative Team and a powerful leader within the newly formed USDP.

The commander of Northwestern Regional Military Command in 2003 is the current minister of Hotels and Tourism Soe Naing. Both Kyaw Hsan and Soe Naing were among the more than 20 ministers who resigned from their military posts to become founder members of the USDP.

Perhaps the highest rising “butcher” of Depayin was Gen Soe Win. As secretary-2 of the junta in 2003, it is believed he ordered the attack on Suu Kyi’s convoy without the knowledge of the Military Intelligence Service, which was led by Gen Khin Nyunt. Local sources in Sagaing Division have said that Soe Win commanded the attack from the headquarters of the Northwestern Regional Military Command.

Soe Win died of leukemia in October 2007, but not before serving as Burma’s prime minister, personally appointed by Than Shwe, from 2004-07.

Another military commander accused of playing a role in the Depayin Massacre is the 2003 commander of the Central Regional Military Command Lt-Gen Ye Myint who is now the junta’s chief negotiator with the ethnic cease-fire groups, as well as heading Military Affairs Security. Ye Myint however, has not been named as a member of the USDP.

A Depayin survivor, Tin Oo, who is the deputy chairman of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party, recently told foreign broadcasters that he witnessed several groups of about 50 persons per group moving in to attack the convoy on May 30.

Insein court tacks 10 years on to youth’s term – Phanida
Mizzima News: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – The jail term of a National League for Democracy party youth member serving a sentence for distributing Aung San Suu Kyi’s portrait has been extended 10 years bringing the total penalty to 14½ years, according to a political prisoners’ rights group based in Thailand. Rangoon East District court yesterday heard the case of NLD Tamwe Township youth wing chief Kyaw Moe Naing, a.k.a. Kyaw Gyi, inside Insein prison and added 10 years to his jail term under the Electronic Act.

The military regime widely uses this Electronics Act to punish for punishing pro-democracy oppositions. Section 33(b) bans the disseminating of information on the internet which can destabilise the state and undermine state security.

Among the more than 2,100 political prisoners, almost all sentenced to long terms after 2005 were charged under this law, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP-B) secretary Teik Naing said.

“The judge said that the defendant had used the internet to disseminate information to ‘unlawful exile associations’,” said Myo Than Htiek, who witnessed the verdict.

The judge failed however to refer specific unlawful associations.

The police arrested Kyaw Moe Naing and his party colleagues Aung Aung, a.k.a. Aung Aung Oo, Kyaw Win Tun, a.k.a. Bo Tun, on June 12 last year near the Tamwe roundabout while they were distributing portraits of opposition leader and Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to passers-by.

Kyaw Moe Naing was originally sentenced to two years in prison under section 505(b) of the Penal Code for offences against the state and public tranquility and another two years for contact with unlawful associations. He was already serving these terms in Insein prison. His colleagues were also each serving two-year terms on the same charge of committing an offence against the state.

The youths were arrested while pro-democracy leader Suu Kyi was on trial inside Insein prison charged with violating the terms of her house arrest by “entertaining” intruder US citizen John Yettaw, who had swum across Inya Lake in Rangoon and stayed at her crumbling villa for two nights.

Burma intelligence probes political inmates – Yee May Aung
Democratic Voice of Burma: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Political prisoners in northwestern Burma are being questioned about their stance on the National League for Democracy (NLD) party’s boycott of elections this year.Intelligence officers from the Burmese government’s Special Branch (SB) have been visiting prisoners in Sagaing division’s Shwebo prison, according to the sister of Yin Yin Wyne, a jailed cyclone relief worker and one of 22 political inmates in the prison.

“[Yin Yin Wyne] was asked for an opinion on the NLD not entering the elections and she answered that she didn’t even know what the NLD’s stance was,” said the sister, Ma Moe, who visited her at the end of last month. “Then [the officials] showed her the NLD’s Shwegondai declaration and let her read to tell them what she thought about it.”

The Shwegondaing declaration, signed in April 2009, calls for the release of all political prisoners, recognition of the 1990 election results, a review of the 2008 constitution and the start of dialogue between the junta and the NLD.

Ma Moe added that the officers had acknowledged they were from the Special Branch and had interviewed every political inmate in the prison. The reasons for the questioning however remain unclear, although it may be a precursor to releasing ’softer’ political prisoners prior to elections this year, as the junta looks to further appease the international community.

Burma holds around 2,150 activists, journalists, lawyers, monks and aid workers in jails across the country. Yin Yin Wyne was jailed for four years in 2008 under the Unlawful Associations Act after assisting victims of cyclone Nargis in May that year, which killed 140,000 people and left 2.4 million destitute.

Ma Moe said that her conversation with Yin Yin Wyne during the visit was recorded by two Special Branch officers.

But families of political prisoners in Burma’s western Arakan state said that no such questioning had taken place. The sister of imprisoned 88 Generation Student leader, Htay Kywe, said after a recent visit that Special Branch police had not been to the remote prison.

“His health was good; he said he didn’t have such a discussion,” she said of her brother. “For his opinion, he [wished] the elections should be open for everyone and a dialogue with the NLD put in place. He said he can’t accept the elections unless everyone participating.”

Htay Kywe was sentenced after the Saffron Revolution in 2007 to 65 years in prison. He had been prominent during the infamous 1988 uprising and was one of the last student leaders from that era to have been arrested.

Five facts about China-Myanmar relations
Reuters: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Here are five facts about the complex relationship between China and Myanmar:World

*In 1949 Burma, as Myanmar was then known, was one of the first countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China. But relations soured in the 1960s following anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon (now called Yangon).

* Following a crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 1988, the West imposed broad sanctions on Myanmar. China stepped into the void, providing aid and weapons and ramping up trade.

Beijing has continued to provide broad diplomatic support for Myanmar’s military government, although the ruling generals remain wary of their powerful northern neighbour.

* China has invested more than $1 billion in Myanmar, primarily in the mining sector, and is the country’s fourth largest foreign investor, say state media. Bilateral trade grew by more than one-quarter in 2008 to about $2.63 billion. Chinese firms are heavily involved in logging in Myanmar.

* Myanmar gives China access to the Indian Ocean, not only for imports of oil and gas and exports from landlocked southwestern Chinese provinces, but also potentially for military bases or listening posts.

In October, China’s state energy group CNPC started building a crude oil port in Myanmar, part of a pipeline project aimed at cutting out the long detour oil cargoes take through the congested and strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait.

* The relationship has had rocky patches of late. In August, refugees flooded across into China following fighting on the Myanmar side of the border between rebels and government troops, angering Beijing.

In 2007, China’s Foreign Ministry published an unflattering account of Myanmar’s new jungle capital Naypyidaw, expressing surprise that the poor country would consider such an expensive move without even first telling its supposed Chinese friends.

(Writing by Ben Blanchard; editing by Emma Graham-Harrison)

The ghost of elections past – Ko Ko Thett
Irrawaddy: Tue 1 Jun 2010

Since the 1922 introduction of a “legislative council” election to Burma, the notion of elections has always been suspect to the Burmese populace. This is not surprising, for Burma’s ballot boxes have never served their purpose—the electing of people’s representatives whose constitutional mandate can change or enforce government’s policy. Under both the British colonial administration and subsequent post-colonial governments, Burma’s elections have never translated into genuine political change. In the 1920s, the dyarchy in which 80 members of the 130-member legislative council were elected and the rest were appointed by the British fractured the Burmese nationalist movement.

While moderates sought to change the system from within, radical nationalists in the movement called for “home rule”—a separation from British India—before they articulated independence for the country. The dyarchy election law disenfranchised most people in the peasantry since the suffrage for 44 constituencies in rural areas was based on the payment of taxation.

Out of a Burmese population of 12 million in 1922, there were only 1.8 million eligible voters. The voter turnout was very low, only 6.9 percent of eligible voters participated in Burma’s very first election.

The legislative council hopefuls were labeled “sellouts” to the British. Intimidation of the would-be voters by elections boycotters, nationalist monks and agitators was not uncommon. In fact, little effort was really needed to dissuade people, who had never known an election, from voting.

The second legislative council election in 1925 saw a 10 percent increase in voter turnout: 16.26 percent of the qualified voting population. The increased political participation was explained by the elected representatives’ success in making amendments to controversial laws, such as the 1907 Village Act of Burma and the 1920 Rangoon University Act. The attempts to encourage people into political participation by the elected politicians and the increased number of political parties also contributed to the increased voter turnout.

In 1927, the Simon Commission, chaired by Sir John Simon who was appointed by Westminster, started probing the possibility of “self-governing institutions” in Burma. British colonialists thought it expedient to keep Burma away from “the disturbing influence of Indian politics.” The 1930 Simon Commission report recommended that Burma be governed separately from India.

It took five years for the British to come up with the Government of Burma Act to implement the recommendations of the 1930 Simon Report. The constitution of 1935 discarded the dyarchy and added 33 new constituencies, increasing the number of ethnic Karen constituencies from five to 12.

By the time the 1936 election was held, all features of multi-party politics, from factionalism and forming coalitions to switching allegiance, flip-flopping, politicking, character assassination, party thuggery and boycotting of the electoral process were no longer new to the Burmese. The populace, by and large, learned to despise their politicians as much as they hated the British colonialists. The year also saw the Rangoon University strike and the emergence of the student activists Aung San and future premier Ko Nu as leaders of the hugely popular nationalist “Dobama Thakin” (“We Burmese Masters”) movement.

The thakin were not keen on “legislative politics” and downright rejected the 1935 Constitution. Yet the 1936 election on the offer was seen as a political opening by some dobama leaders. In the end the thakin belatedly founded the Komin-Kochin Aphwe (Our King, Our Affair Party) and fielded no less than 30 candidates to contest in the election. Ironically, one of their avowed aims was to disrupt the legislture’s proceedings. Only three thakin were elected to the constituent assembly in 1936.

Fabian Ba Khine, one of the witnesses at the time, noted that the three elected thakin attended the assembly meetings with their adopted aim to revoke the 1935 Constitution and always sided with the party in opposition. They consistently opposed the government. It also meant that the thakin could not take up ministerial posts.

Senior politician Dr. Ba Maw, the founder leader of Sinyetha (Proletariat Party), became the first premier of Burma under the 1935 Constitution as he cleverly maneuvered different political forces to form a coalition government. Having formed her own government, Burma was finally separated from British India in 1937.

In the latter half of the 1930s, the ascendancy of Marxist politics in the Dobama movement naturally led to the consideration of “independence by any means” and extra-parliamentary activities to overthrow the British. Perhaps the thakins’ failure in parliamentary politics also contributed to the strategy formulation of the Dobama. In 1938, the Marxist-Leninist thakin spearheaded a general strike to paralyze the British administration, but failed.

As most thakin leaders were jailed or outlawed, Burma nationalist movement took an unexpected turn at the onset of the Second World War. The Japanese occupation of Burma, assisted by the thakin-led Burmese army, from 1942 to 1945 was as devastating as it was elsewhere in Asia.

The worst thing that had happened to Burma during the Japanese occupation was the exacerbation of the ethnic conflict, especially that between the Burman and the Karen, fuelled by the war. As the British reoccupied Burma following the Japanese defeat, parliamentary democracy was reintroduced. The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), a broad alliance of nationalists dominated by the thakin who had turned against the Japanese, became the most formidable opposition party in the post-war years.

In April 1947, an election to the constituent assembly was held under the 1935 election law. The AFPFL claimed the election was a British attempt to defuse the post-war political tensions in the country to prolong their colonial rule. To the AFPFL, which had the largest mass following in Burma at the time, 1947 was an opportune moment to become involved in legislative politics in what Aung San called “a transition to independence.” The AFPFL entered the election to the echoes of its slogan, “Independence within one Year!”

But many politicians who had been influential in prewar parliamentary politics—such as Dr. Ba Maw from the Maha-Bama (Great Burman) Party, and U Saw of the Myochit (Patriotic) Party, as well as many former thakin, such as Thakin Ba Sein (Dobama Party) and Thakin Soe (Communist Party of Burma “Red Flag”)—boycotted the election for different reasons. The Karen National Union also stayed away.

The remaining opposition parties, including the Communist Party of Burma (Thakin Than Tun’s “White Flag”) and the Karen Youth Organization, could only field less than 30 candidates for the 255-member assembly.

The result was predictable, but it had been made certain by the widespread intimidation of voters by pro-AFPFL militia, the People’s Voluntary Organization (PVO), which came into existence as the result of the post-war British retrenchment of the Burma Independence Army.

British scholar Shelby Tucker notes: ‘‘Armed PVO units dragooned voters and escorted them to the polling booths that were guarded by other armed PVO units, while League supporters manned the government-provided electoral information facilities.’’

It was customary for the political parties in Burma to have an armed wing, but the PVO was the biggest armed group that could be turned into a nationalist army against the British. The League won more than 95.3 percent of the seats and dominated the constituent assembly without much opposition. In June 1947, the assembly approved Aung San’s motion that an independent Burma should exist outside the Commonwealth. It also approved a draft of what would be known as the 1947 Constitution, proposed by Aung San.

Postwar Burmese politics were dominated by the AFPFL and its charismatic leader, Aung San, who was only 32 in 1947. Widely considered to be asocial and rash, he was unable to convince his senior political rivals to swing his way.

Consequently, most of Aung San’s opposition was effectively excluded from the parliament and from the policymaking process that would determine Burma’s future as an independent nation. The assassination of Aung San and six of his cabinet members in July 1947 left the entire country in mourning.

Aung San’s colleague U Nu (formerly Thakin Nu) took over the AFPFL and delivered Aung San’s promise of “Independence within one Year.” In January 1948, Burma became independent under U Nu and his government; they were undoubtedly apprehensive, but the country rejoiced and there was an air of hope for the future.

* Ko Ko Thett is a Helsinki-based Burma analyst. This is the first of three articles he has written for The Irrawaddy on Burma’s previous elections.

Than Shwe’s electronic dream – Min Lwin
Irrawaddy: Fri 28 May 2010

Burma’s military junta has expanded its Fiber Optic Cable (FOC) project to its Eastern Regional Command, bringing to a total four military regional command centers whose electronic systems are linked to Naypyidaw via the country’s most modern network.
The FOCs have been laid in Pekon, Aung Pan and Kalaw townships in eastern Shan State, according to local people and military sources. The FOC cables—which are individually no wider than a strand of hair—transmit Internet, telephone and cable TV.

Local people in an area controlled by the ethnic cease-fire group, the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), said that two- and six-feet deep trenches were dug to hold the FOC pipelines that were installed in late April. The cables connect the Burmese army’s Eastern Regional Command, based in the Shan State capital of Taunggyi, to its Triangle Regional Command center, based in Kengtung.

Since 2000, the Burmese junta has implemented an FOC project in its Western Regional Military Command center in Arakan State; in Northern Regional Command in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State; and in its Northeastern Regional Command center in Lashio in northern Shan State.

The FOC program is conducted by the Directorate of Signals and overseen by the Ministry of Defense. According to military sources, a map of the cables’ transmission routes has been kept so secret that even staff officers at the Directorate of Signals do not know the details.

Sources have speculated that junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe is personally involved in the project and is insistent that the military maintains an independent electronics network from the rest of the country. He is reputedly concerned that military communications are intercepted by hostile agencies, ethnic insurgents, cease-fire groups or foreign intelligence agencies.

“Tet Chauk [Military Chief Than Shwe] has a dream about military communications,” said a military source in Rangoon. “He is suspicious of wireless communication, because he thinks it will be intercepted by hostile organizations. That’s why he wants all his military bases to be linked by FOCs.”

“Than Shwe’s dream is to hold his four-monthly meetings via electronic links, so no regional commander need come to military headquarters,” said a retired commander who spoke to The Irrawaddy. “At the same time, he believes the FOCs will prevent any information being intercepted.”

Transocean drilled in Burmese waters linked to drug lord – Thomas Maung Shwe
Mizzima News: Fri 28 May 2010

Chiang Mai – Swiss-American firm Transocean, presently embroiled in the BP Gulf of Mexico disaster, did exploratory drilling last autumn in Burmese waters owned by a partnership between a Chinese state-run energy company and a firm owned by Stephen Law, a junta crony alleged by the US to be a major drug-money launderer, according to corporate filings with the US stock market regulator.
Stephen Law, (a.k.a. Tun Myint Naing), his Singaporean wife and his “narco warlord” father are on the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) blacklist, officially called the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. All three are also on a similar European travel ban and sanctions lists.

The SDN blacklist targets the Burmese junta’s senior leadership, its cronies and the financial networks that continue to support the military dictatorship. The US Treasury website states that when an individual, firm or other entity is added to the sanctions list “any assets the designees may have subject to US jurisdiction are frozen, and all financial and commercial transactions by any US person with the designated companies and individuals are prohibited”.

Transocean International’s corporate 8-K filing to the US Securities and Exchance Commission on November 2 last year shows that Chinese state-run energy company CNOOC hired Transocean’s semi-submersible Actinia, a Panamanian registered drilling rig, to operate in Burma from last October to December. An 8-K form is the “current report” companies must file with the US market regulator to announce major events that shareholders should know about. The 82-metre-long, 78-metre-wide rig was hired at a daily rate of US$206,000. Transocean could not be reached for comment.

According to the CNOOC website, all of the firm’s stakes in Burma’s gas industry are held in partnership with China Focus Development (formerly known as Golden Aaron) and China Global Construction, with CNOOC as the operator. China Focus Development is a privately owned Singapore-registere d firm whose sole shareholders are Stephen Law and his wife Ng Sor Hong (a.k.a. Cynthia Ng). The US and EU sanctions list show Ng Sor Hong to be chief executive of the firm, which is also among more than a dozen companies controlled by Law on the OFAC blacklist of banned Burma-related entities.

Industry journal International Oil Daily reported last February that the CNOOC-China Focus Development partnership held onshore blocks C-1, C-2 and M and offshore blocks A-4, M-2 and M-10. It also said CNOOC’s attempt in 2008 to swap its stake in two of its blocks with the Thai national oil firm PTEEP was vetoed by the Burmese regime.

Law’s Sino-Burmese father Lao Sit Han (a.k.a. Lo Hsing Han) is believed by US drug-trafficking analysts to have controlled Southeast Asia’s best-armed narcotics militias during the 1970’s.

According to the US Treasury in February, 2008: “In addition to their support for the Burmese regime, Steven Law and Lo Hsing Han have a history of involvement in illicit activities.”

“Lo Hsing Han, known as the ‘Godfather of Heroin’, has been one of the world’s key heroin traffickers dating back to the early 1970s. Steven Law joined his father’s drug empire in the 1990s and has since become one of the wealthiest individuals in Burma,” the Treasury statement said.

Calls for a US government investigation

In an interview with Mizzima, Wong Aung of the Shwe Gas movement called on the US government to immediately probe the links between Transocean and Stephen Law.

“Transocean’s drilling for Stephen Law’s natural gas consortium appears to be a serious breach of American sanctions on Burma,” he said. “The US government must investigate Transocean’s Burmese operations as soon as possible and send a clear message that it is not acceptable for multinational firms such as Transocean to do business with Burma’s most notorious narco-oligarch.”

Last month Transocean was involved in what has been described as one of the worst environmental disasters in US history. On April 20, 2010, Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico while it was drilling under contract for oil giant BP. The explosion killed 11 workers.

Early this month at a special US congressional hearing convened to investigate the disaster, senior executives from BP, Transocean and contractor Halliburton all testified the other firms were responsible for the blast and subsequent unprecedented oil spill.

Following the hearing, a furious US President Barack Obama chided the executives for their refusal to accept responsibility saying, “I did not appreciate what I considered to be a ridiculous spectacle”. He added that the millionaire executives were “falling over each other to point the finger of blame at somebody else. The American people could not have been impressed with that display and I certainly wasn’t”.

North Korea exporting nuke technology to Burma: UN experts – Edith Lederer
Associated Press: Fri 28 May 2010

UNITED NATIONS — North Korea is exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology and using multiple intermediaries, shell companies and overseas criminal networks to circumvent U.N. sanctions, U.N. experts said in a report obtained by The Associated Press.

The seven-member panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicates that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Burma. It called for further study of these suspected activities and urged all countries to try to prevent them.

The 47-page report, obtained late Thursday by AP, and a lengthy annex document, details sanctions violations reported by U.N. member states, including four cases involving arms exports and two seizures of luxury goods by Italy — two yachts and high-end recording and video equipment. The report also details the broad range of techniques that North Korea is using to try to evade sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council after its two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

Council diplomats discussed the report by the experts from Britain, Japan, the United States, France, South Korea, Russia and China at a closed-door meeting on Thursday.

Its release happened to coincide with heightened tensions between North Korea and South Korea over the March sinking of a South Korean navy ship which killed 46 sailors. The council is waiting for South Korea to decide what action it wants the U.N.’s most powerful body to take in response to the sinking, which a multinational investigation determined was caused by a North Korean torpedo.

The panel of experts said there is general agreement that the U.N. embargoes on nuclear and ballistic missile related items and technology, on arms exports and imports except light weapons, and on luxury goods, are having an impact.

But it said the list of eight entities and five individuals currently subject to an asset freeze and travel ban seriously understates those known to be engaged in banned activities and called for additional names to be added. It noted that North Korea moved quickly to have other companies take over activities of the eight banned entities.

The experts said an analysis of the four North Korean attempts to illegally export arms revealed that Pyongyang used “a number of masking techniques” to avoid sanctions. They include providing false descriptions and mislabeling of the contents of shipping containers, falsifying the manifest and information about the origin and destination of the goods, “and use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions,” the panel said.

It noted that a chartered jet intercepted in Thailand in December carrying 35 tons of conventional weapons including surface-to-air missiles from North Korea was owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates, registered in Georgia, leased to a shell company registered in New Zealand and then chartered to another shell company registered in Hong Kong — which may have been an attempt to mask its destination.

North Korea is also concealing arms exports by shipping components in kits for assembly overseas, the experts said.

As one example, the panel said it learned after North Korean military equipment was seized at Durban harbor in South Africa that scores of technicians from the North had gone to the Republic of Congo, where the equipment was to have been assembled.

The experts called for “extra vigilance” at the first overseas port handling North Korean cargo and close monitoring of airplanes flying from the North, saying Pyongyang is believed to use air cargo “to handle high valued and sensitive arms exports.”

While North Korea maintains a wide network of trade offices which do legitimate business as well as most of the country’s illicit trade and covert acquisitions, the panel said Pyongyang “has also established links with overseas criminal networks to carry out these activities, including the transportation and distribution of illicit and smuggled cargoes.”

This may also include goods related to weapons of mass destruction and arms, it added.

Under council resolutions, all countries are required to submit reports on what they are doing to implement sanctions but as of April 30 the panel said it had still not heard from 112 of the 192 U.N. member states — including 51 in Africa, 28 in Asia, and 25 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

While no country reported on nuclear or ballistic missile-related imports or exports from North Korea since the second sanctions resolution was adopted last June, the panel said it reviewed several U.S. and French government assessments, reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency, research papers and media reports indicating Pyongyang’s continuing involvement in such activities.
These reports indicate North Korea “has continued to provide missiles, components, and technology to certain countries including Iran and Syria … (and) has provided assistance for a nuclear program in Syria, including the design and construction of a thermal reactor at Dair Alzour,” the panel said.

Syria denied the allegations in a letter to the IAEA, but the U.N. nuclear agency is still trying to obtain reports on the site and its activities, the panel said.

The experts said they are also looking into “suspicious activity in Burma,” including activities of Namchongang Trading, one of the companies subject to U.N. sanctions, and reports that Japan in June 2009 arrested three individuals for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer — which measures magnetic fields — to Burma via Malaysia allegedly under the direction of a company known to be associated with illicit procurement for North Korea’s nuclear and military programs. The company was not identified.

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Date: Tue Jun 15, 2010 7:57 am
Subject: [Readingroom] News on Burma - 15/6/10

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Pro-junta group to guard ballots
Suu Kyi ‘happy with party unity’
Sons of top generals handed fuel-station permits
Will the new Burma envoy focus on engagement or sanctions?
Burma’s nuke wish needs response
Hapless doesn’t mean harmless
What If Burma goes nuclear?
Press Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding nuclear programme
Suu Kyi says Burmese have right not to vote
Mon party to push for free market, development
Oil companies financing nuclear threat in Burma, refusing transparency
Secrets will out
PM’s party appoints Chinese businessman
20,000 trees planted for Suu Kyi, 65
Burma elections ‘on 10 October’
Burma’s authoritarian upgrade: 1990-2010
Child soldiers spotted in Chin state army camp
Burma to fix gas prices
Inside Burma’s black box
New tempests over Burma as U.N. aid rolls in
“We are cheap labour, we have no rights”
ILO targets Myanmar’s military over forced labour
China plundering natural resources in Burma
Burma economy in ‘artificial deficit’
No clear sign Myanmar wants help with vote
Burma’s military budget to increase significantly

Pro-junta group to guard ballots – Ahunt Phone Myat
Democratic Voice of Burma: Mon 14 Jun 2010

Members of the junta proxy Union and Solidarity Development Association (USDA) are being trained in lieu of their role in monitoring ballot boxes during Burma’s elections this year.Workshops are being conducted in Rangoon and Mandalay division and Sagaing, Shan, Mon and Arakan states, by the Election Commission (EC), according to a retired government official in Sagaing division who is close to the USDA.

The government-appointed Electoral Commission has been charged as the supreme authority during polls, rumoured for October this year.

The reports will likely heighten fears about the integrity of the elections: the USDA is closely tied to the government, and is believed to be the group that spawned the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which is headed by Burmese prime minister Thein Sein and has been widely tipped to win the elections.

Furthermore, the EC head, Thein Soe, said in May that international election monitors “would not be welcome” in Burma. Critics of the ruling junta have derided the polls as a sham aimed at extending military rule in the country.

“USDA members…and those who are to become ward-level EC [members] are being trained; we believe there is a motivation for these people to guard the ballot stations to make sure the USDP wins,” said Phyo Min Thein of the Union Democracy Party, which has registered for the elections.

“Given the circumstances, questions need to be asked as to what procedures will be carried out to ensure free and fair elections, and also how fair the EC will be.”

The same training is also being given to village, ward and town-level government authorities, as well as judges and administrators, said a government worker in Taunggyi, capital of Burma’s northeastern Shan state.

Similar concerns were raised around the time of the 2008 constitution, when the government conducted training workshops for proxy groups to ensure the smooth ratification of what was widely considered an unfair and controversial procedure.

“During the constitution referendum, [authorities] were told to make sure that 92 percent votes were in favour, by any means,” said the Sagaing official. “Some villages used ordinary voting procedures and collected about 60 percent ‘yes’ votes, but [the government] ordered them to change the results to 92 percent [in favour].”

Their were reports around the time of the constitution referendum, which began barely a week after cyclone Nargis struck Burma’s southern coast, that voters were forced to mark their choice with a pencil.

The constitution then set the ball rolling for the elections this year, in which around a quarter of parliamentary seats have already been awarded to the military and which contributed to the boycott of the opposition National League for Democracy party.

Suu Kyi ‘happy with party unity’ – Salai Han Thar San
Mizzima News: Mon 14 Jun 2010

New Delhi – Burma’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi is glad her National League for Democracy party’s member are united despite its automatic dissolution in accordance with the junta’s one-sided electoral laws, the opposition leader said in a two-hour meeting with a lawyer and engineers on Friday.Suu Kyi’s comments came during a meeting with her lawyer to discuss the revocation by the Rangoon civic body of a permit allowing her to dismantle a badly damaged wooden building inside her compound on University Avenue Road, Rangoon Division, where she is being held under house arrest.

“I’m very glad that all of NLD members, including young members and women, are very united even at the difficult time”, lawyer and NLD central executive committee member Nyan Win told Mizzima, quoting Suu Kyi.

“She said it was the duty of government, political parties and people to raise the young people,” Nyan Win said. “She said when we provide moral support to nations’ young, it must be done with generosity and comradeship.”

Suu Kyi also said party members needed to help the people clearly understand democracy. According to her, political parties and the people were responsible for understanding democratic values and putting them into practice, Nyan Win said.

Authorities had allowed Suu Kyi to meet on June 11 from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. lawyer Nyan Win and engineers Khun Thar Myint and Htin Kyaw, whom Suu Kyi assigned to monitor renovations at her crumbling villa beside Inya Lake.

The Nobel Peace laureate’s compound at No. 54-56 University Avenue Road in Bahan Township comprises the main building, a badly damaged wooden house and two huts – one a gatehouse and another adjacent to the lake.

The wooden house is 25 feet (eight metres) east of the main building and is overrun with bushes. The Rangoon City Development Committee approved on June 4 Suu Kyi’s application to have it demolished but the permit was revoked the following day.

Nyan Win explained the city’s reasoning: “They [the Rangoon committee] said that as the house [compound] was subject to an inheritance case … if the wooden house was destroyed, the compound would lose its original [historic] character.”

He said he would submit an appeal to the Rangoon mayor next week.

Meanwhile, Suu Kyi said members should celebrate her 65th birthday on June 19 at the home of Mogoke member of parliament May Hnin Kyi at 10 Miles Gone in Mingaladon Township, Rangoon, Nyan Win said, amid fears that a gathering at party headquarters would provoke a crackdown by the junta.

“In accordance with her [Suu Kyi] request, we will donate books and pencils to underprivileged students [at the anniversary celebrations]”, Nyan Win said.

Suu Kyi will have to spend her birthday in detention amid a continuing 18-month sentence imposed for “entertaining” uninvited American visitor John Yettaw, who on May 4 last year had swum uninvited across Inya Lake and stayed at her house for two nights. She was similarly forced to spend her 64th birthday in a special room at Insein Prison as the prosecution over Yettaw’s visit was being processed.

Yettaw’s trespass occurred two weeks before Suu Kyi’s scheduled release from house arrest on May 27 last year.

Sons of top generals handed fuel-station permits
Mizzima News: Mon 14 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – Burma’s ruling military junta has issued petrol-station permits to the sons of Senior General Than Shwe and General Thura Shwe Mann, and junta cronies, according to an Energy Ministry report. Myanmar Naing Group, owned by Than Shwe’s son Tun Naing Shwe, has obtained permission to run a total of six petrol stations in Rangoon and Mandalay divisions, and in Shan State, a Ministry of Energy report received by Mizzima reveals.

Tun Naing Shwe’s company also operating jade-mining business in Pharkant in Kachin State, in the country’s north. He holds the controlling share of J-Donut outlet in Rangoon, a retail pastry shop styled on Dunkin’ Donuts and frequented by the children of Burma’s corrupt elite.

Since Burma’s oil sector was privatised on May 15, Ayar Shwewa/Shwe Yamone and Zaygabar, linked to sons of military chief of staff, Thura Shwe Mann – Aung Thet Mann and Toe Naing Mann – were given permission to open private petrol stations. The former company was licensed to run 12 stations, the latter, two.

The application for Zaygabar’s license to run the two stations is under Toe Naing Mann’s despite the company being owned by his father-in-law, Khin Shwe.

Concessions to the likely lucrative petrol-station business went to junta nationalist social organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, and Myanmar Economic Holdings – a company that feeds income to the junta – which received 15 and 14 stations respectively.

The other big junta crony companies that have been awarded petrol station licenses are: Tay Za’s Htoo Trading, Shwetaung Development, Shwe Than Lwin, Nilar Trading, Asia World and Kanbawza.

Will the new Burma envoy focus on engagement or sanctions? – Josh Rogin
Foreign Policy: Mon 14 Jun 2010

The Obama administration is getting ready to select a new special envoy to Burma, who if confirmed could take up his post just after the Burmese junta holds elections the administration has already said won’t be legitimate.An administration official told The Cable, “The Department of State is reviewing several candidates now and will be in consultation shortly with Capitol Hill on the pick to be selected.” The current list contains several names, and State is looking at established diplomats, former policymakers, think tank wonks, those with experience on Capitol Hill, etc., the official said.

It’s been seven months since the Obama administration announced its new Burma policy, which calls for limited engagement with the brutal regime while keeping sanctions in place. The leading player on Burma policy, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, has been to the country twice in his current role. The other most active public official on Burma, Senate Foreign Relations Asia Subcommittee chair Jim Webb, D-VA, has gone once.

The idea was to feel out Burmese leaders to try to make incremental progress leading up to the upcoming elections later this year that a future special envoy could build on. But none of that seems to be happening, and Campbell acknowledged upon leaving Burma May 10 that the elections are likely to be a farce.

“What we have seen to date leads us to believe that these elections will lack international legitimacy,” Campbell said following his last visit.

Webb canceled his recently planned trip altogether, only days after a leaked U.N. report was said to accuse North Korea of using several countries and companies, including those in Burma, to export nuclear and missile technology.

The current administration thinking is to lay low until after the elections and then try to reengage with the Burmese regime after that. They calculate that putting the election in the rearview mirror will eliminate it as a source of contention.

“What’s happened inside the country is that they’re completely focused on this upcoming exercise that they are calling an election,” the administration official said. “Our best opportunities for some form of engagement will come after the elections, even though we don’t believe they are credible.”

Experts point out that even after the election, the issue of Burma’s suspected nuclear cooperation with North Korea will remain.

“The administration has not denied that there are serious transactions between Burma and North Korea that are troubling,” said Michael Green, former National Security Council senior director for Asia and President George W. Bush’s nominee for special envoy to Burma. “In the midst of this engagement from the Obama administration, the junta just went ahead on these kinds of deals.”

The administration, led by Campbell, approached the Burmese government last year with a set of requests: for Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi to be released, for the government to reach out in some way to ethnic minorities groups, and for a reduction in government-sponsored violence.

“State was ought there on a limb, but they thought if they could get something concrete from the junta they could justify further engagement,” said Green. “But the fact is they got nothing, nada.”

Green said he is out of the running for envoy, having seen his nomination languish at the end of the Bush administration and then meet its end in 2009 when then-subcommittee chairwoman Barbara Boxer, D-CA, refused to move it forward pending an unspecified favor from the White House that she did not get.

Everybody liked Green, but the Obama team needs its own person for the job — someone who can quietly probe for diplomatic openings while avoiding negative blowback from Capitol Hill.

And therein lies the rub. Senators, especially Republican senators, will want an envoy whose focus is on enforcing existing sanctions against Burma. The State Department needs someone who can continue the engagement track.

“There’s an anomaly in the situation,” said one longtime Washington Burma hand. “The legislation very clearly calls for senatorial approval. But the legislation also talks about direct engagement with the Burmese.”

Webb wrote June 8 to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to “strongly recommend” Eric John, the current U.S. ambassador to Thailand, who had some experience dealing with North Korea when he was a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

But John’s one noted interaction with the Burmese junta, in Beijing in June 2006, didn’t produce any results. Also, some privately question his handling of the Bangkok embassy during the recent period of severe political unrest there.

The administration will have to keep an eye on Webb, a key senator in this issue, as the envoy selection process finishes up. Officials would also be wise to keep an eye on Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-KY, and Sam Brownback, R-KS, both of whom are sure to want to have a say in this debate because of their keen interest in both North Korean proliferation and human rights.

Overall, the administration will have to decide what else it can do to persuade Burma’s leaders to clean up their act — and whether further sanctions may be warranted.

“We’ve done certain things and they’ve done certain things, but neither is sufficient from either point of view,” the Burma hand said. “So we’re in a deadlock.”

Burma’s nuke wish needs response – Kavi Chongkittavorn
China Post: Mon 14 Jun 2010

U.S. Senator James Webb, Chairman of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, abruptly postponed his visit to Burma on June 3 — only a few hours before his scheduled flight–after learning of a report about Burma’s nuclear ambition. It was a bad time to do that, he said, due to new allegations the Rangoon junta leaders were collaborating with Pyongyang to develop a nuclear program. A few days ago, after his return to the U.S., Scot Marciel, ASEAN ambassador said that if the allegation is true, it would impact on the stability and security in the region.Webb would not take such a drastic step if he just ignored the report produced by Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma through Aljazeera that alleged Burma is moving toward nuclear technology. Since last August, he has miraculously widened the U.S. engagement with Burma and created storms of controversies following the first high-level visit by any U.S. political figure. He has always hoped to bring peaceful changes and prosperity to Burma as he once did in Vietnam.

However, the 10-month intensified dialogues and contacts between the U.S. and Burma, symbolized by the two trips of Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, have not yet produced breakthroughs or the kind of regime that the U.S. or the international community would like to see — a regime that promises an inclusive, free and fair election with creditable international polls monitoring. Equally important on the U.S. agenda is to ensure that there is no violation of the U.N. Security Resolution 1874 that imposes sanctions against North Korea. Indeed, these endeavors have actually turned to continued frustration.

Worse is the prospect of stronger Burma-North Korea relations. Both are rogue states, which used to be enemies for the past 23 years. Now they are each other’s best friends amid growing international isolation and tightening economic sanctions. Thanks to Pyongyang’s willingness and foreign-exchanges need, Burma’s nuclear confidence has shot up that one day it would have the kind of bargaining power enjoyed by other nuclear aspirants.

After decades of complacency, the Thai security apparatus, especially the National Security Council (NSC), have finally paid more attention to its long-standing assumption that Burma does not and will not have the capacity to assemble a nuclear bomb. The main argument was very simplistic — Burma is poor and backward so it is highly impossible for the country to embark on the project. In addition, persons familiar with the NSC analyses on Burma would immediately recognize the narrative pattern of “appeasement” and “don’t rock the boat” syndrome in handling this Western neighbor.

The often cited justifications are fragile security along the porous 2004 kilometers border and Thailand’s growing dependency on natural gas from Gulf of Martaban. Last year, the Foreign Ministry asked energy-related agencies and their top decision-makers to come up with policy options to reduce energy needs from Burma and other neighbors. So far, they have not yet done it arguing much was at stake as a lump sum of money have been invested already in the natural-gas related development projects with Burma. Thailand imports an estimate of US$880-million worth of energy from Burma annually. From their vantage point, preservation of status quo at any cost is desirable fearing the country’s future energy security would be compromised.

Additional problem is the deep-rooted fear of Burma’s aggression (what the Burmese generals can and willing to do against the country and its people). Anytime the word “Pha-mah” — meaning Burma in Thai — is mentioned to ordinary Thais, not to mention the authorities, they would go hysterical with negative comments and endless condemnation. It immediately would conjure up the heartless burning of Ayuthya, which took place in 1774 — some 236 years ago. However, to the Thais the total annihilation of the Siamese capital is as vivid as before with the aid of numerous historical books, dramas, folk tales and words of mouth. One would think that such phobia should serve as a kind of energizer to consolidate the Thai security officials and related agencies to look for common policy options to counter Burma’s move. It has not happened.

Strangely enough, the Thai military’s intelligence officials, who have been working closely with the U.S. and Australian counterparts in tracking the junta’s nuclear ambition for the past decade, know all along this dangerous ambition but they have not shared information and done serious assessments with the energy sector.

No wonder, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya is very concerned as he is well informed of Burma’s well-kept secret. It is possible that Thailand, along with other ASEAN members, might raise the nuclear weapon program at the ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting next month in Hanoi (July 13-19) asking Rangoon to further clarify the issue. Seriously, nobody expects Burma to tell the truth. But ASEAN needs to put on record as its reputation is at stake, especially at the time the grouping wants to increase its profile to promote peace and stability as well as economic well-being internationally. After all, Burma was among the 10 signatories of the region’s first no-nuke treaty, the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. ASEAN members are also parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty, but quite a few members have not yet ratified it.

The Obama Administration has been pushing for a nuclear-free world and trying to rid the world of potential nuclear terrorists. Expectation in the region is high that the U.S. would continue to pressure Burma internationally to comply with the relevant U.N. resolutions as well as any future engagement of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect all nuclear-related allegations. Sooner than later, ASEAN must take up Burma’s nuclear plan and other global issues to iron out differences in order to forge common views and positions, which the ASEAN foreign ministers have to submit to their leaders at the ASEAN Summit in October in Hanoi.

Hapless doesn’t mean harmless – Christian Caryl
Foreign Policy: Mon 14 Jun 2010

Burma has a nuclear program. It’s a mess, but it’s still a nuclear program.If you’re interested in international security, I strongly recommend that you check out a new documentary titled Burma’s Nuclear Ambitions. The film comes from the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), an Oslo-based nongovernmental organization that has made a name for itself as a source of good independent reporting on events inside that benighted country. The reporters at DVB spent the past five years collecting the material for this project, which makes a persuasive case that the generals who run Burma (aka Myanmar) have spent vast sums on a program to develop weapons of mass destruction. Robert Kelley, an ex-U.S. nuclear scientist and former U.N. nuclear inspector who collaborated with the filmmakers, told me that their effort offers a unique opportunity to blow the whistle on a rogue state’s nuclear plans earlier rather than later. “This is a small program at early stages,” he says. “I hope that by releasing this information we’re letting the cat of the bag, and that no one can put it back now. There should be a public debate.”

There will be — though so far a lot of major media outlets (including the New York Times and CNN) have notably failed to pick up on the story. And that’s a pity — not only because this scoop has broad ramifications for Southeast Asia and the future of the long-suffering Burmese people in particular, but also because it will almost certainly raise new concerns about the scandalous ineffectiveness of the existing international system to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (Yep, looks like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been caught asleep at the wheel once again.)

The documentary — which aired earlier this month on the English-language version of Al Jazeera — shows how Burma’s reigning generals have used their profits from the sale of natural resources to fund the purchase of sophisticated equipment and the training of thousands of Burmese engineers abroad (mostly in Russia). The DVB reporters had been plugging away at the story for years without getting beyond the level of tantalizing hearsay. They’d heard that the government was spending billions on vast underground command centers and an underground fiber-optic communications system to go with them. They’d learned about the attempts to train Burmese engineers in various military-related disciplines outside the country, and they knew — like the U.S. government — that the generals in the test-tube capital of Naypyidaw were engaging in various kinds of suspicious cooperation with North Korea.

But they still didn’t have hard evidence. So they decided to beam a message back into Burma by satellite, asking for sources to come forward. In February of this year someone finally responded. An army major by the name of Sai Thein Win defected to Thailand, bringing with him a trove of photos and detailed knowledge of a military-run defense plant where he had worked as a manager. Sai, who had spent five years in Russia studying engineering, revealed how he and his colleagues at the factory had used German-made precision machine tools to manufacture rocket parts. At another installation he saw — and photographed — equipment that was allegedly intended for uranium enrichment. (Kelley, who served as a consultant to the DVB production, confirmed that it was highly likely that the equipment shown in the photos was being used for nuclear purposes.)

And of course there is the highly incriminating back story of North Korean involvement in Burma. It should be said that, though the DVB documentary includes photos showing purported North Korean advisors giving the Burmese help with large-scale tunneling (one of the few areas in which the North Koreans have world-class expertise), it doesn’t provide any solid evidence that Kim Jong Il has shared his nuclear technology with the generals. That isn’t to say there isn’t good reason to harbor suspicions, though. The film does include photos of the Burmese regime’s No. 3 general visiting his jovial counterparts in Pyongyang in November 2008. (The person who passed the photos on has apparently since been shot.) Bertil Lintner, an expert on Burmese politics who also collaborated with the filmmakers, says that Western diplomats have verified the presence of North Korean technicians at a Burmese missile production facility.

And what, for example, was on board the Kang Nam 1, the North Korean ship freighter that was sailing for a Burmese port last year until the U.S. Navy persuaded it to turn around? U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed concern about deepening ties between the two pariah states at a meeting of regional leaders last year. In May, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell issued a statement calling on the Burmese leaders to comply with the U.N. sanctions imposed on North Korea after Pyongyang’s nuclear test a few years back.

The question that arises from all this, of course, is why Burma would want to get into the WMD business in the first place. The country has no threatening neighbors, no regional rivals that want to take it over. But that, say the experts, would be to underestimate the regime’s xenophobia and pathological suspicions of the outside world. The film offers clues. One Burmese ex-diplomat defector interviewed on camera puts it like this: “In 1992, when General Than Shwe came to power, he thought that if we followed the North Korean example, we would not need to take account of America or even need to care about China. In other words, when they have nuclear energy and weapons, others will respect us.” Burma analyst Lintner points to the domestic context as well. “According to the people I have talked to, the Burmese generals believe they need a strong deterrent to remain in power, against the outside world as well as their own population.” In 2007, it should be recalled, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to protest against the country’s leadership. If having nukes would make it that much harder for outsiders to pressure them, that would, conceivably, make life harder for internal opponents as well.

We could, perhaps, take some consolation from the fact that the Burmese WMD program doesn’t seem to be terribly sophisticated. Geoffrey Forden, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology expert who examined the evidence on the Burmese missile program, gives them five to 10 years to get a rocket launched and built — and much longer to come up with one that would have serious range. Kelley says that, based on the evidence, the nuclear program looks even less serious. The generals don’t appear to have any coherent strategy for actually making a functioning nuclear weapon. The only enrichment technique they seem to be using so far is the laser isotope method, which several developed countries have tried and dropped as unduly complicated. Kelley speculates that bureaucrat-scientists might be leading the generals on a bit (something, he says, that’s been known to happen in other countries where political leaders are eager to get their hands on powerful weapons). One of the defectors tells a story about the scientists demonstrating a laser to visiting higher-ups by burning a hole in a piece of wood. One of the attending generals was so discomfited by this mysterious device that he immediately asked them to stop.

Yet there is still plenty of cause to worry. For one thing, the generals have plenty of cash. Over the next few years they’ll be earning tens of billions of dollars from natural gas sales to the Chinese — and much of that money is apparently slated for the nascent WMD program. And even though the Russians halted work on a promised reactor project when they started to harbor doubt about Burmese intentions, it’s clear that there’s little the international community can do to prevent the junta from doing what it wants inside the country. (It turns out that the IAEA basically gave Burma a pass a few years ago when the country essentially declared itself a nonnuclear power, and has little leverage to exert as a result.) Our best bet, it would seem, is that the brutal, paranoid, and astrology-driven generals who run Burma really are just as wasteful and incompetent as they appear to be from the outside. So why doesn’t that seem especially comforting?

What If Burma goes nuclear? – Nehginpao Kipgen
Asian Tribune: Mon 14 Jun 2010

The Burmese military regime’s desire to become a nuclear power is an alarming development for the Burmese people, especially ethnic minorities, as well as nations which like to see a nuclear free world.The documentary, broadcasted by the Al Jazeera news network on June 4, is an indication of how the Burmese military junta has planned to acquire nuclear weapons, with the help of North Korea.

Both Burma and North Korea, along with other totalitarian regimes or dictatorships such as Belarus, Cuba, Iran, and Zimbabwe, were identified as “outposts of tyranny” in 2005 by Condoleezza Rice, the then U.S. secretary of state.

The Al Jazeera report featured extensive documentation, including photos and blueprints of tunnels and suspected nuclear facilities. The materials which were provided by a military defector, a former army major, add credibility to the suspicion that Burma is pursuing a nuclear program.

The revelation of such covert activities, by its own military rank at this juncture, is something the Burmese military generals would not like to have happened. Not only has the junta denied such allegations, but also supported establishing a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ).

The joint statement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States of America, in November 2009 “welcomed the efforts of the president of the United States in promoting international peace and security including the vision of a nuclear weapons free world.”

The ASEAN-US leadership also “agreed to work towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and work together to build a world without nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.”

What could have prompted Burma to build nuclear facilities is an interesting subject. North Korea has managed to defy the U.N. sanctions, and has now considered itself as a nuclear power. Pyongyang flexes its military muscles against the threat of any attacks by Seoul and Washington.

The lack of a strong coordinated international response, despite U.N. sanctions, has emboldened North Korea. Amidst international condemnations, North Korea still enjoys the support of China, its closest communist ally which is also a U.N. Security Council member.

Such ineffectiveness on the part of the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation has encouraged the Burmese military junta. The military generals believe that their nuclear ambition will not be blocked by China and Russia – the two veto-wielding powers of the U.N. Security Council.

If Burma becomes a nuclear nation, it will make the military leaders more arrogant and intransigent. Having no foreign enemy, the junta will not hesitate to use its power to suppress the county’s ethnic armed movements, which are fighting for autonomy in their respective territories.

The hope of establishing a federal Union of Burma will become slimmer, if not infeasible. The voice of the international community on human rights abuses and exploitation of other democratic rights will also have lesser impact on the military regime.

Moreover, a nuclear Burma will likely make Southeast Asia insecure, unstable, and possibly might pave the way for nuclear arms race in the region.

In the larger interest of the international community and the Burmese people, it is important that the International Atomic Energy Agency investigates the report and act responsibly to maintain peace and stability.

ASEAN should abjure its traditional policy of non-interference, especially when an action of its own member state can disturb the peaceful existence of the entire populace in the region.

It is expected that the United States government, in its capacity, will work with the international community to prevent Burma from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, North Korea is an example where the U.S. has a limited role to play when it comes to international crisis.

Unless it is for a peaceful purpose, nuclear powers such as China, India and Russia need to work together with other world powers to prevent Burma from acquiring destructive weapons. Proliferation of nuclear bombs, especially in the hands of totalitarian regimes or military dictatorships, should be considered a threat to humanity.

It is important that the Obama administration appoints a special envoy for Burma, which was authorized by the U.S. congress during George Bush’s presidency in 2008. The White House should consider the model of the North Korean six-party talk, involving the United States, European Union, ASEAN, China, India, and Burma.

Burma pursuing nuclear weapons is a violation of ASEAN’s collective commitment for establishing SEANWFZ and nuclear weapons free world. It is also a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) for North Korea to export nuclear materials.

A nuclear Burma is a grave danger to its own ethnic minorities who have suffered racially and psychologically, in the hands of the military junta, for decades.

* Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004) and general secretary of the U.S.-based Kuki International Forum (www.kukiforum.com)

Press Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs on unfounded allegations against Myanmar regarding nuclear programme
New Light of Myanmar: Mon 14 Jun 2010

Nay Pyi Taw – Following is a Press Statement issued today by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on unfounded allegations against Myanmar regarding the nuclear programme. The full text of the statement is as follows:-

In recent days, the international media reported allegations that Myanmar has been attempting to develop a nuclear programme in collaboration with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with an aim to acquire nuclear weapons.

Those reports are merely groundless allegations with political motives to exert pressure on Myanmar.

Moreover, as these accusations are fallacious information originated from media sources and individuals who are seeking to undermine the national interest of Myanmar, and are also based on a single source of some deserters, fugitives and exiles, the news reports lack reliability, objectivity and impartiality. Myanmar did not see the need to respond to these groundless accusations as they are totally far from the realities in Myanmar.

Following the adoption of US government’s engagement policy towards Myanmar, the US Senator Jim Webb and Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell visited Myanmar and started the engagement process between the two countries.

At a time of resumption of engagement between Myanmar and the US, those unfounded allegations were made up by the anti-government elements in collaboration with news media with political purpose in a timely manner. Besides it was also an attempt to tarnish the image of the Myanmar government and to disrupt its on-going political process at a time when the government is exerting all out efforts to holding general elections for democratic transformation. As a result of surfacing of those allegations, Senator Jim Webb who was scheduled to visit Myanmar in early June has postponed his planned visit.

Being a member of the United Nations, Myanmar always respects and abides by resolutions and decisions adopted by the United Nations. Moreover, it has been actively participating in the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as a founding member of the Conference.

Myanmar is also a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and has signed the Safeguard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1995. At the regional level, Myanmar as a member of ASEAN, acceded to the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

In its drive for the advancement of science and technology and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose in health and education sectors, Myanmar had had an agreement with Russia for the construction of a 10-Megawatt Nuclear Research Reactor, in addition to sending trainees to other countries including Russia.

However, the plan was suspended without implementation due to inadequacy of resources and the government’s concern for misunderstanding it my cause among international community. In fact, that project was arranged to be implemented under the Safeguard Agreement of IAEA.

It is necessary to view separately with a clear differentiation between peaceful use of nuclear energy and production of nuclear weapons.

Myanmar has all along supported the legitimate rights of every state to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Myanmar supports the principles of non-politicizing the NPT and nondiscrimination against developing countries in the NPT implementation.

Myanmar has constantly contributed to regional peace and stability in collaboration with ASEAN member countries. Myanmar will never engage in activities that would affect regional peace and stability.

Exerting pressure on Myanmar based on groundless nuclear accusations and making allegations with political intent to intervene in the internal affairs or with geopolitical strategic purpose will in no way contribute to the regional and international peace and stability.

Myanmar is just a developing country which lacks sufficient infrastructures, technology and financial resources to make nuclear weapons. Some experts concluded that Myanmar is not in a position to make nuclear weapons.

Based on these facts, it is reiterated that the allegations of Myanmar trying to develop nuclear weapons are unfounded and no efforts have been made to do so.

Myanmar only wants peace and has no ambition to become a nuclear power state.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nay Pyi Taw

Suu Kyi says Burmese have right not to vote – Ba Kaung
Irrawaddy: Fri 11 Jun 2010

Burmese people have the right not to vote in the upcoming election, detained Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi told her lawyer on Friday. She also commented on US Sen. Jim Webb’s support of the election.“Daw Suu said that just as the people have the right to vote, they also have the right not to vote,” Suu Kyi’s lawyer Nyan Win told The Irrawaddy shortly after meeting with her on Friday afternoon.

Although her comment seems to allude to the possibility that she and her now-disbanded National League for Democracy (NLD) may call for a boycott of the planned election, Nyan Win declined to elaborate on her comment.

During a two-hour meeting that focused on legal issues relating to repairs to her home, Suu Kyi also said that she believed Webb’s views on the election were his personal opinion only, and did not reflect his official position as chairman of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Webb, a strong advocate of US engagement with the Burmese regime, canceled his scheduled visit to Burma earlier this month amid fresh reports that junta was trying to develop nuclear weapons.

On Wednesday, the Democratic lawmaker called for support of Burma’s election, saying it was a step forward and that the junta would allow at least some opposition figures to stand for seats.

Nyan Win also said that Suu Kyi heard about Burma’s alleged nuclear program, but she did not wish to make any comment on the issue at this point, as there was not enough information available.

Suu Kyi decided against her party re-registering under the regime’s “unjust” election laws. The NLD was dissolved in May for its failure to meet the regime’s party registration deadline.

Mon party to push for free market, development – Phanida
Mizzima News: Fri 11 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – All Mon Region Democracy Party chairman Nai Ngwe Thein said that in parliament it would demand a free-market economy and industrial development with foreign investment. Observers say the party is guaranteed seats as it is the only Mon party in the state and it will only contest constituencies inhabited by the Mon ethnic group. But they add however that per-parliamentarian monetary limits could work against the party’s building much of a mandate.

“We will strive for an appropriate free-market economy, attracting more foreign investment in the country and developing modes of production with modern technology,” Nai Ngwe Thein told Mizzima. “We can able to develop our country only if we can achieve industrial development.”

He said the economy of the state was such that people could survive on agriculture and rubber plantations for their livelihood but inter-regional and intra-state trading in was so poor so that many people had sought opportunities elsewhere.

“In Mon State, agriculture, rubber plantations and [other] cash crops are good but trade is so poor so that many people leave to find work in other countries,” he said. “We [members of parliament] will demand a free-market economy in our country.”

Nai Ngwe Thein career has included postings as former assistant Mon State education officer, Kachin State and Pegu Division education officer and basic education department for Upper Burma administrative director.

The party’s vice-chairman is Nai Hla Aung. Its main objectives for the country are: complete restoration of democratic and human rights in the country; solid ethnic unity based on equality and the right of self-determination; genuine multiparty democracy and democratic systems in the country.

Moreover party members will strive to: establish and perpetuate a genuine Union, eradicate corruption and bribery; work for social development and build a peaceful world social order, party sources said.

The party will contest in areas mostly inhabited by Mon people such as 10 townships in Mon State, two townships in Karen State, one township in Tanintharyi Division, one township in Pegu Division totaling 15 townships.

Currently 53 candidates were shortlisted for the upcoming general elections but party sources said it was yet to be decided how many candidates would stand.

Most members were former government employees or former New Mon State Party (NMSP) members, and almost all are ethnic Mon, the party said.

The minimum party membership requirement at the national level is 1,000 so the party has been electioneering in Ye and Thanphyu Zayat townships since early this month by presenting their party policies and intended programmes.

Local military intelligence personnel were reportedly monitoring the party’s campaigning and questioning its canvassers.

As it is the sole ethnic Mon party in Mon State, Nai Ngwe Thein firmly believed the people were attracted much interested in a party comprising ethnic Mon.

Political observers speculated that former NMSP central executive committee members Nai Chan Twe and two central committee members who recently resigned from their posts would join the AMRDP.

If these former NMSP leaders could accept the AMRDP platform they might join the party by resigning from their party, Nai Ngwe Thein said. But sources said they have not yet approached the new Mon party.

A total 42 political parties have applied for party registration and re-registration with the Union Election Commission as of June 8. Out of those, 37 parties have been allowed to form and five parties successful in the 1990 general election have been allowed to be re-registered. The remaining five parties have yet to receive such permission from the commission.

Oil companies financing nuclear threat in Burma, refusing transparency – Matthew Smith
Huffington Post: Fri 11 Jun 2010

The world has a new nuclear threat on its hands; the first ever in Southeast Asia.According to a disturbing five-year study released Friday by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), carried on Al Jazeera, and vetted by a nuclear scientist and former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the ruling military junta in Burma (Myanmar) is “mining uranium, converting it to uranium compounds for reactors and bombs, and is trying to build a reactor and or an enrichment plant that could only be useful for a bomb.”

This follows a UN report leaked last month claiming North Korea is exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Burma using intermediaries, shell companies, and overseas criminal networks designed to circumvent UN sanctions against Pyongyang.

A key question underlies the scandal: how could Burma, Southeast Asia’s poorest country, possibly afford to finance a nuclear program?

The answer involves the military regime’s partnerships with multinational companies, including some of the world’s largest and best known oil firms from the US, France, Japan, China, India, Thailand and elsewhere.

In 2009, my colleagues and I at EarthRights International (ERI) calculated that the Yadana natural gas pipeline — operated by the French oil giant Total, with the American company Chevron, and the Thai company PTTEP — has generated nearly $8 billion dollars in gas sales since payments commenced just a decade ago. Transporting Burmese natural gas from the Andaman Sea across Burma to neighboring Thailand, ERI estimated that from 2000-2008, billions of dollars of that revenue went directly to Burma’s ruling junta, a claim the companies have never denied.

Compounding the junta’s notoriously low domestic spending on health and education, in 2009 we also documented that portions of the country’s gas dollars found their way into private offshore bank accounts in Singapore, from where the money could be spent on any number of things, including perhaps nuclear technology.

According to a defected senior junta member interviewed by DVB in the documentary that aired on Aljazeera last week, “when [the regime] got that [gas] money, they started the nuclear project.”

(This is to say nothing of the ongoing instances of forced labor, rape, torture, killings and other abuses we continue to document against local people in direct connection to the companies’ pipeline).

Earlier this year, we traveled to Bangkok to launch an international campaign urging Total, Chevron, and PTTEP to practice complete revenue transparency in Burma and to publish all the data surrounding their last 18 years of payments to the Burmese regime. The campaign is backed by over 160 world leaders, NGOs, unions, scholars, and investment firms, including global leaders like Mary Robinson, Kjell Magne Bondevik, and Kerry Kennedy. It occurred to us that only a monumental degree of intransigence from the companies would lead them to deny the reasonable request for transparency from such a diverse and powerful coalition — but that’s exactly what happened.

About two weeks ago, Total and Chevron released statements effectively saying they had no plans to practice revenue transparency in Burma and no plans to cooperate with the initiative. Had they cooperated, they would have been the first ever companies to practice revenue transparency in the notoriously repressive country.

Curiously, however, the companies cited different reasons for their secrecy. Chevron claimed they’re contractually restricted from publishing their payments, while Total implied simply that the regime didn’t want them to practice transparency.

Chevron’s argument — that its “contractual obligations related to the Yadana Project do not permit disclosure of payments or other confidential information relative to the Project” — is simply inconsistent with the company’s actual contracts with the junta, which Unocal (now Chevron) disclosed during the partial trial in the human rights suit Doe v. Unocal Corp. In those contracts, there’s nothing that would prevent revenue transparency. Moreover, Unocal also chose to disclose dozens of actual payment records to the junta — records that were introduced at trial as part of Unocal’s defense — without suggesting that their defense was hampered by contracts that required confidentiality. So unless the relevant contracts have changed significantly, or unless Unocal violated court orders in Doe v. Unocal and withheld key documents, Chevron appears to be misleading the public and its shareholders about its contractual obligations in Burma.

Total’s markedly different tack is equally concerning. While privately the companies claim the same contractual restrictions as Chevron, now publicly they simply imply, in exceedingly vague terms, that the Burmese authorities might be averse to their transparency (“Total cannot disclose any financial or contractual information if the host country is opposed to such disclosure”).

Either way, it appears both Chevron and Total would simply prefer to hide their payments to the world’s newest nuclear threat.

Which raises the question: Just how real is the nuclear threat?

The story surfaced in 2009 after a two-year investigation by notable author and journalist Phil Thornton and prominent Australian National University scholar Desmond Ball. Drawing on radio intercepts and a series of interviews with key defectors from Burma, the duo demonstrated that the uncomfortable rumors circulating through intelligence communities were credible: Burma’s nuclear intent is real. Their conclusion was that if all accounts surrounding Burma’s clandestine program were true, the regime would eventually be able to arm itself with nuclear warheads.

Any existing doubts are now fading fast. The DVB report released last week reflects thousands of top secret internal documents and photographs smuggled out of the closed country by a senior defector from Burma’s military ranks. The evidence is clear and damning. Not only is the xenophobic regime constructing an intricate tunnel system throughout the country at exorbitant costs and with the help of North Korea, but it’s also developing long-range missiles and nuclear technologies that would only be used for weapons.

The current president of the IAEA Yikiya Amano claims that the UN watchdog group is now looking into the reports and if necessary will seek some clarifications from the junta, and Ban Ki Moon’s Special Advisor on Burma just arrived in Singapore for talks with the authorities there about the situation in the country.

A principal concern is that if Burma is capable of long range missile strikes and weapons of mass destruction, the security dynamic in Asia will alter significantly, from India to China and beyond. It would be hard to imagine such a necessary shift in governments’ priorities could ever benefit the region’s least advantaged citizens, let alone the people of Burma.

Perhaps now that the geopolitical stakes are higher, Total and Chevron can finally be persuaded to start practicing disaggregated revenue transparency in the country. At this point, it’ll be difficult to interpret their continued secrecy as anything but nefarious.

Secrets will out
Economist: Fri 11 Jun 2010

RUMOURS that Myanmar is the next recruit to a shady nuclear and missile network that seems to link North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Syria and possibly others swirl intermittently. The missile link is clearest: in all these cases, including Myanmar’s, North Korea has either sold missiles or helped them build their own. But aside from an agreement in principle in 2007 for Russia to build a small research reactor for Myanmar, there has been little hard evidence of its junta’s nuclear ambitions. The recent defection of a former major in the Burmese army, Sai Thein Win, however, and the documents and photographs he brought with him, appear to confirm Myanmar’s intent, if not yet capacity, to enrich uranium and eventually build a bomb.Sai Thein Win handed over his evidence to the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), an émigré-run broadcaster based in Norway. The material has been analysed by Robert Kelley, an experienced former inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear guardian. His 27-page report has plenty of caveats: Sai Thein Win is a missile expert, not a nuclear boffin, and some of what he reports is hearsay; some drawings are crude at best; some equipment seen in pictures could at a pinch have civilian uses too. But experimental work on lasers that could eventually be used to enrich uranium and other equipment for making uranium metal, a necessary step in bomb-making, heighten suspicion. So do close links between supposedly civilian nuclear officials and the Burmese army’s “nuclear battalion”, officially the Number One Science and Technology Regiment.

All this and other evidence, Mr Kelley’s report concludes, lead to the inescapable conclusion that such work is “for nuclear weapons and not civilian use or nuclear power”. An earlier report, published in January by the Institute for Science and International Security, an independent Washington-based outfit, debunked some of the wilder rumours about Myanmar’s nuclear quest. But it also concluded that foreign companies should treat inquiries from Myanmar no differently from “those from Iran, Pakistan or Syria”. All are known purchasers of illicit nuclear equipment.

Myanmar has only a “Small Quantities Protocol” with the IAEA. This exempts it from regular inspections, on the government’s assurance that it has nothing to inspect. Sharper questions are now likely to be asked. The agency had already been trying to dissuade Myanmar and Russia from the research reactor. Sai Thein Win, who learned missile expertise in Russia, says that since about 2002 hundreds of Burmese scientists have trained in Russian nuclear institutes, including one formerly linked to the Soviet nuclear-weapons programme.

Sai Thein Win offers no new insight into the North Korean link. But Western intelligence agencies watch North Korea’s activities in Myanmar. There have been reports that a company associated with the construction of a secret nuclear reactor in Syria (until it was bombed by Israel in 2007 just before completion) has worked in Myanmar too.

PM’s party appoints Chinese businessman – Khin Nnin Htet
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 10 Jun 2010

The party headed by Burma’s current prime minister, Thein Sein, has appointed a Chinese businessman with close ties to the ruling junta as an election candidate in the country’s northern Kachin state.The man, known only as Yawmo, is from China’s southern Yunnan province and, according to a local in Kachin state’s Bhamo, is “business partners” with the Burmese government. He will run for the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in Momauk town, about 30 kilometres from the China border.

“He is Miao [ethnic Chinese minority group] from Yunnan province,” said the local. “He came and settled in Momauk in 1990 and later moved to Hpakant [a jade mining town] where his brothers-in-law already live.”

Election laws announced in February ban foreigners, and spouses of foreigners, from participating. This factor played a key role in forcing the party of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was married to UK-born Michael Aris, to boycott the polls.

But numbers of influential Chinese businessmen close to the government are known to buy Burmese passports and ID cards. Burma has become heavily reliant on China as one of the junta’s principal economic allies; a visit to Naypyidaw by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao last week saw the two countries sign some 15 trade deals.

Burma’s economy has also undergone a significant revamp in recent months, with the government selling off swathes of previously state-owned industry to private businesses, many of whom have close ties to the Burmese junta. It is unclear to what extent Chinese businesses have benefitted from this, but analysts believe that Chinese investment in Burma, at both an entrepreneurial and state level, will continue to rise as Burma’s markets open up.

Many of Burma’s wealthy Chinese elites, including Yawmo, made their fortunes in the country’s lucrative jade mining industry, which is predominantly focused in the north, before moving to Mandalay in central Burma. Now Burma’s second city has an estimated Chinese population of up to 40 percent.

Another USDP candidate in Kachin state has been named as Htun Htun, a Burmese-born entrepreneur who also became rich through jade mining. The choice of candidates by the USDP, which is widely tipped to win what critics deride as a sham election, appears to validate suggestions that businessmen with close ties to the ruling junta will play key roles in the post-election government.

Moreover, the USDP has begun unofficially campaigning in several states and divisions around Burma while the 35 or so other registered parties must wait for official approval from the government before they can begin canvassing.

Ward officials in towns around Kachin and Chin state have reportedly been told by the USDP, which is believed to be an offshoot of the government-proxy organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), to recruit at least 10 percent of voters as party members.

“They are persuading people that they will get privileges for businesses and travelling – they will be prioritised when buying train, buses and air tickets,” said the Kachin local. “They said that even if a party member breaks the law and gets into trouble, senior authorities can speak in his or her favour and soften [the punishment].”

20,000 trees planted for Suu Kyi, 65 – Phanida
Mizzima News: Thu 10 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – National League for Democracy party young members have started planting more than 20,000 saplings today in states and divisions in honour of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s 65th birthday on June 19. In tribute to their leader, NLD Youth members plan to grow 66 saplings in each of the 318 townships across the country, except in Kayah State, which has no NLD branch offices. Burmese traditionally plant saplings on birthdays for each year of life up to their age for the coming year: thus the 66 trees for Suu Kyi’s 65th anniversary.

NLD central committee member Phyu Phyu Thin said the campaign to plant 20,998 saplings on June 19 was also a conservation awareness campaign.

Members today planted the shady tree varieties, Padauk, Gangaw, Khayay, rain tree, and Bandar (Indian almond), at their offices, in monastery compounds, on personal land holdings or at pagodas in South Dagon, Hlaing Tharyar and South Okkalapa townships in Rangoon Division.

Suu Kyi will be again forced by the ruling Burmese junta to celebrate her birthday under house arrest as her current 18-month sentence for entertaining uninvited guest, US citizen John Yettaw, is scheduled to end in November.

The remainder of the sentence would be waived if she “stays at her home in discipline”, the government announced recently.

NLD Pegu Township chairman Myat Hla said members would plant 66 gold mohur saplings in Pegu on June 19.

Rangoon-based Forest Resource Environment and Development Association (Freda) vice-chairman U Ohn said the trees should be grown in forests, on mountains and on barren hilltops in a “sweeping manner”, so the trees’ roots can play their part in preserving topsoil.

“Growing trees is good but conservation of standing forests and trees is better,” he said. “Felling a tree and replanting a new tree … can [still] damage the environment.”

“Forests absorb all [most of] the rainfall, which can make the climate comfortable. Depletion of forest leads to erosion, which can make climate change.”

Freda started its tree-growing activities in 1999 and since Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy Delta its groves reportedly cover 3,000 acres (1,214 hectares).

In 1975, forest covered 60 per cent of Burma’s total area of 656,577 square kilometres. That cover was now just 41 per cent, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation reported last month.

Burma elections ‘on 10 October’ – Francis Wade
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 10 Jun 2010

US senator Jim Webb has said he expects elections in Burma this year to be held on 10 October and said that people should vote in order to “build the future a step at a time”.Webb has long been an advocate for engagement with the Burmese junta, a stance that has riled the factions within the old guard of Burma’s pro-democracy movement. A fortnight ago, a senior member of the now-disbanded National League for Democracy (NLD) party warned that Webb would not be welcomed on a diplomatic visit to Burma.

The NLD announced they would boycott the elections in light of laws that ban leader Aung San Suu Kyi from participating, but other details surrounding the election date have remained typically vague.

“What I’m hearing is that they will take place…on 10-10-10,” Webb told the Asia Society. If true, the date would be in keeping with successive Burmese generals’ fixation on numerology, which has dictated key decisions in the past: Ne Win, Burma’s first dictator, ordered that the Burmese currency be issued in denominations of 45 and 90, which are divisible by nine, his lucky number.

He also initially set the date of his resignation for 8 August 1988, which triggered the bloody student protests known as the ‘8888 uprising’, an auspicious figure in Burmese numerology.

The government is yet to confirm the date for the elections, although senior ministers have set they will be held in the latter half of 2010. Leaked details from a meeting in January this year between Burma’s agriculture minister, Htay Oo, and the head of Japan’s Nippon Foundation, Yohei Sasakawa, suggested that Htay Oo had told Sasakawa elections would be in October.

International opinion on the elections has been mixed: while the Obama administration and other Western leaders officially support the NLD’s decision, and Webb has acknowledged that the polls are designed to preserve the military regime, he told reporters yesterday that he did not support a boycott.

“In East Asia, in Southeast Asia, you have to build the future a step at a time,” he said. “When’s the last time China had an election? When’s the last time Vietnam had an election?

“It doesn’t mean we don’t talk to them, and it doesn’t mean we don’t try to advance the notions of a fairer society.”

Burma’s authoritarian upgrade: 1990-2010 – David Scott Mathieson
Open Democracy (UK): Thu 10 Jun 2010

The Burmese junta’s sophisticated and ruthless project of reinvention – “SPDC 2.0” – is preparing the way for an extension of its rule in civilian guise, says David Scott Mathieson.The twentieth anniversary of Burma’s last elections on 27 May 1990 was recalled by many Burmese inside and outside the country as a defining date in the country’s political history. It is also an opportunity to measure the prospects for the elections scheduled by the country’s military rulers to take place sometime (perhaps 10 October) in 2010.

It is worth recalling the scale and impact of the events of 1990. The election took place two years after the Burmese military in August 1988 massacred more than 3,000 protesters, part of a huge popular uprising that called for an end to military rule and a transition to democracy. In this context the election itself was a surprisingly free and fair process which delivered a resounding defeat for the military regime, as the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won more than 60% of the popular vote and 80% of parliamentary seats. Yet the stunned regime recovered its balance, refused to hand over power, and restored its security; in the process it reinvented itself from the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

In the 2000s, the regime started carefully to draft a new constitution and prepare the ground for the next elections. But this time, Burma’s military junta is not steering any sort of democratic transition; it is upgrading to a more sophisticated authoritarian model – SPDC Version 2.0. The generals learnt a valuable lesson in 1990: elections must not be left to the people’s free choice, for we may not get the result we want (see Joakim Kreutz, “Burma: sources of political change”, 27 August 2008).

The military’s reinvention

The elections may produce a more user-friendly civilian parliament, one that other countries may feel more comfortable engaging with (which indeed is part of their purpose). But the new parliament will remain tightly controlled by the same military that has turned Burma into a political and economic abomination. There is little hope that the so-called “roadmap to disciplined democracy” will produce any semblance of a genuinely open society, or even begin to address the dire ills of contemporary Burma: a major health and poverty crisis, a wrecked education system, and continued social divisions based on wealth, ethnicity and to a lesser extent religion. Burma has been a divided society for decades, and the military has exploited and profited from such divisions in order to justify its oppressive rule (see “Burma: A Disastrous Taste of Democracy”, Bangkok Post, 2 May 2010).

The Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, has spent the past twenty years preparing for this upgrade through marginalising the political opposition; rewriting the constitution; drafting electoral laws that leave nothing to chance; and exploiting the economy to redistribute assets in favour of the officer-corps. Some observers contend that this upgrade will benefit the country if Burma becomes more like Vietnam, China, or even Singapore – all authoritarian states with thriving economies.

The military leadership and their close business associates control key sectors of the economy and have benefited from recent government “privatisations” of state assets. For instance, in February 2010, the junta began to sell off a network of government-controlled gas-stations, shipping-ports, factories, cinemas and other assets. It is suspected such sales may in part provide a source of electioneering finance for the Tatmadaw’s friends and allies who contest the elections.

Burma’s military government also controls nearly $5 billion in foreign reserves, accumulated thanks to lucrative natural-gas sales and the use of an accounting trick: for domestic purposes, gas revenues are recorded at the official exchange rate ($1 to 6 Burmese Kyat) but actual payments are made in US dollars (worth $1 to 800-1,000 Burmese Kyat at the market rate), the difference being deposited (it is suspected) in offshore bank-accounts.

At the same time, thousands of military officers are taking off their uniforms in order to take positions of authority in the civilian government. These former officers will want to be compensated for the loss of rank and privileges; the result could be the emergence of a new, more sophisticated patronage system.

The new parliament will ensure this patronage system functions effectively. More than thirty political parties, many with links to the military, have already applied to Burma’s electoral commission to be registered. In late April 2010, prime minister Thein Sein and more than twenty other senior generals resigned from their military posts and – in a move was long expected as part of the authoritarian-upgrade script – registered the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This could make the party supremely powerful, for it will utilise the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass-based social-welfare organisation created by the regime in 1993, which currently has more than 26 million members, and offices and economic interests throughout Burma.

The 2008 constitution reserves one-quarter of lower-house seats to serving military officers, and one-third of upper-house seats. The most important ministerial portfolios reserved for the military include defence (control over their budget and military justice), home affairs (domestic repression), and border affairs (cross-border trade, access to illicit rackets such as drugs, logging and smuggling, and license to conduct ongoing offensives against ethnic minorities). In other words, the military’s interests will continue to be safeguarded without civilian oversight, and free from the drudgery of everyday governance.

The prospect of power

The release of long-awaited electoral laws in March 2010 has set the ground-rules for the elections. The laws exclude serving prisoners from being members of political parties or electoral candidates: a cruel provision that neuters more than 2,100 political prisoners, including dissidents and people who won seats in the last election in 1990. Many of the prisoners, such as famous student leaders Min Ko Naing and Htay Kwe, and leaders of ethnic-Shan political parties, have been detained because their peaceful, popular and conciliatory style poses a challenge to the military government.

An estimated 428 members of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy are in detention. The laws prescribe that the party, if it chose to re-register with the electoral commission, would then have to expel these individuals – including the NLD’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains under house-arrest. On 29 March, the NLD decided that these legal provisions were unjust and announced it would not contest the elections.

Some of the already registered parties competed in the 1990 elections; they include ethnic-based parties (such as the Pa-O National Organisation) and new configurations of elites. An optimistic view (to which some analysts subscribe) is that the election may be part of a slow but inevitable process of change – not a mere SPDC 2.0 upgrade, but a new SPDC 2010. They expect the new version to bring about real democratic progress, if not overnight but in the years ahead. The coming months will reveal more about the machinations of the process, but the optimism seems sadly unwarranted. The basic configurations of power in Burma are unlikely to change, regardless of the electoral results. It is hard to imagine the military is devoting all this effort only to transfer its inheritance to civilians it has long repressed. The next two decades may well be the same as the past two, but with the disguise of a less overt and near-caricatural regime.

The prospect, then, is that the authoritarian upgrade ushers in a new era of military rule in Burma with a civilian face. The best way to avoid this fate is for the international community to speak with one voice and refuse to endorse the flawed process in any way, either through election monitoring or cynical paeans of progress just because polls are being held.

The next step would be to strengthen the targeted financial sanctions against senior members of the military government; and combine this with principled diplomacy that calls for the release of political prisoners, an inclusive political process, and more humanitarian assistance directly to Burmese communities.

These are the vital ways to exert pressure on the SPDC. Only if they are followed will there be hope that the military’s more outwardly sophisticated control of the country can be exchanged for a genuinely democratic package.

* David Scott Mathieson is Burma researcher for Human Rights Watch

Child soldiers spotted in Chin state army camp
Khonumthung News: Wed 9 Jun 2010

Hakha: That the Burmese junta continues to recruit under age persons into the Burmese Army, despite its posturing that it has banned such recruitment, was evident with reports of child soldiers sighted in the Falam town based LIB 268 in Chin state western Burma.Maung Thet Lwin (16) recruited by the Kalemyo military base in October 2009 said, “I joined because I had some problems with my family members. But now I regret the decision. I cannot leave the army though my family had requested our commanders to let me go. They refused.”
Thet lwin is now posted in the cattle farm of a military camp near Talangzang village 25 miles from Hakha town.

There are more child soldiers in the Falam based LIB 268 military camp, Thet lwin added.
The Burmese military junta had signed on the agreement of Human Rights on Children on 16 July 1991, and became a member of CRC on 15 August 1991.

Burmese law prohibits recruiting persons under the age of 18 years into the military. But the government flouts its own law.

Recently the Weekly Eleven journal in Burma reported that over a hundred child soldiers were sent back home by the military regime to their parents.

A UN statement said that child soldiers are still being recruited by the Burmese military regime and the armed groups like the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).

Burma to fix gas prices – Joseph Allchin
Democratic Voice of Burma: Wed 9 Jun 2010

Some 250 privatised petrol stations will open across Burma tomorrow with an apparent fix on prices at 2,500 kyat ($US2.5) per gallon.But analyst Aung Thu Nyein believes the price fixing is more about security than economics, with fuel price hikes prompting both the 1988 uprising and the September 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’.

The Weekly Eleven magazine in Burma said that the government will distribute the fuel at 2,350 kyat ($US2.35) on the gallon and forbid retailers from selling above the 2,500 kyat mark.

The problem of fluctuation of gas prices is compounded by Burma’s limited refining capabilities, which have degraded steadily since independence in 1948 through lack of investment and upkeep. As a result, the country is reliant upon imports of refined petrol or diesel – the process of refining crude oil is responsible for around 28 percent of the cost of the finished product.

At present crude prices are relatively low, but the trend over time, particularly with the rapid growth of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China), means that prices are liable to rise. As a result, the oil producing cartel OPEC could increase steadily the cost on the barrel. If a country has the capability to refine oil, pump price can to an extent be controlled.

While international gas price increases will affect this, so will a country’s lack of foreign currency reserves needed to buy refined petroleum products. Many suspect this was the cause of the 2007 price rises in Burma in which both natural gas and petrol rose by around 500 percent, with no official explanation provided.

Australia-based Burma economics expert Sean Turnell points out that much of the Burmese government’s foreign reserve earnings are burrowed away in Singaporean banks in order to hide them from the public accounts, while the ruling generals can also utilise the discrepancy between official and real exchange rates.

But if the junta is unable to make use of the vast profits accrued from natural gas sales at realistic exchange rates, it is liable to run low on foreign exchange reserves. This issue is particularly concerning for them given the stringent US and EU sanctions on Burma that increase costs for business people trading outside the country.

Burmese citizens are also watchful of fuel price fluctuations given their reliance on power generators during the country’s frequent electricity blackouts. Electricity shortages were compounded by a leak on a gas pipeline used to generate electricity on 2 June which left the commercial hub Rangoon some 300 megawatts short of sufficient electricity supply.

A nation like China meanwhile enacts export limitations to control the price of commodities. The lack of a global market for raw materials keeps prices low and in turn keeps the economies higher up the chain flourishing; this is something that both the US and the EU have been heavily critical of.

In the case of Burma, export limitations on natural gas or crude oil, given greater refining capabilities, would help the nearly two billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves in Burma work for the Burmese economy, but at present such a provision seems a pipe dream.

Meanwhile the Burmese government’s foreign currency supervising commission has made what appears a welcome liberalisation by allowing foreign earnings to be used for imports, breaking from previous stipulation that only export earnings could officially be utilised to make imports. This could increase the flow of foreign currency into the nation, with such speculation causing the unofficial rate on the kyat to rise against the dollar.

Inside Burma’s black box – David E. Hoffman
Foreign Policy: Wed 9 Jun 2010

A former Army major has courageously parted the curtains on what looks like secret efforts at missile and nuclear activity in Burma. Sai Thein Win delivered to a dissident group, the Democratic Voice of Burma, a fascinating cache of color photographs and personal recollections that reinforce the suspicion that the generals who run the country have launched a primitive quest for nuclear weapons. Looking at the evidence, retired United Nations weapons inspector Robert E. Kelley wrote: “Photographs could be faked, but there are so many and they are so consistent with other information and within themselves that they lead to a high degree of confidence that Burma is pursuing nuclear technology.” Kelley’s report, co-written with Ali Fowle of Democratic Voice of Burma, can be found here, and a discussion of the technical side at Arms Control Wonk.

Aside from the revelatory nature of the materials, what’s so interesting about Sai Thein Win’s cache is that he decided to bring it out. He reminds us that despite the very best technology in intelligence and monitoring — satellite imagery and listening devices — there’s tremendous value in the eyewitness account of a participant in a closed state like Burma, also known as Myanmar.

Some of the snapshots inside the Burmese program — pieces of equipment, drawings and such — could never have been captured by a satellite. Sai Thein Win was not a nuclear expert, but a missile engineer, and in some cases he is reporting on overheard conversations or trying to puzzle out bits and pieces of evidence. Nonetheless, the generals who rule the country must be just fuming.

The disclosures recall another case more than 20 years ago. On a drizzly cold October day in 1989, Vladimir Pasechnik, director of a top-secret Soviet biological weapons facility, defected to Britain. When he got settled in a safe house, what he described was nothing short of astounding.

For many years, Western intelligence agencies puzzled over hints the Soviets possessed a germ warfare program, but lacked solid proof. (The satellite images didn’t show what was going on inside laboratory test tubes.) The thinking among many analysts and policymakers in the West was that nuclear weapons were so devastating, they trumped all. The analysts assumed the Soviets had reached a similar conclusion.

As I described in The Dead Hand, Pasechnik changed all that. He disclosed the Soviets were working on pathogens as strategic weapons, and that they had built a hidden archipelago of laboratories and industrial plants in violation of their treaty obligations. He revealed a different Soviet mindset than the West had assumed existed for many years.

Despite our advanced efforts to glean understanding from the hard data of satellites and intercepts, the greater challenge is to get inside the minds of people, to figure out what leaders are thinking, especially those who cherish deception and mask their ambitions. Sometimes this information comes by good intelligence work, and sometimes it spills out quite in the open.

Sai Thein Win took his evidence to a dissident group and they used nongovernmental experts to analyze it. Others have taken their case to the press, or to intelligence agencies. Almost all the people who do this go through deep emotional turmoil and have widely varying motivations, including antipathy to the state they are betraying. They also seem to possess some deep well of trust that those who receive their information will do the right thing. In the end, the world’s ability to stop proliferation may depend on insiders continuing to walk away from secret weapons programs, a process sometimes called “societal verification.”

The Burma file offers a valuable clue about the world we live in today. Instead of trying to isolate our adversaries, we should do what we can to generate winds of glasnost or openness in those states which have something to hide.

This is the age of two powerful revolutions: information and globalization. With illicit weapons threats more diffuse than during the Cold War, it is never going to be easy to detect them. Yet the information and globalization revolutions should not frighten us. The trick is to harness them. Instead of “containment,” cutting ourselves off from places like Iran and North Korea, we ought to be everywhere, sitting in the cafes and apartments, walking down alleys and doing business with all kinds of people, keeping our ears to the ground. The best information often comes from the hard detective work of diplomacy and intelligence, the one-to-one contacts and acute observations that only people can make.

Some of those who show up in cafes will be seeking pay and a comfortable retirement abroad. Others will act out of conscience. The important point is that someone be there to listen.

Certainly there will be dead ends, deceptions, blunders and cover-ups. It was hard, unforgiving work to figure out the intentions of Soviet leaders during the Cold War, and not always successful. Yet we have more tools today than ever before.

Who will be having coffee with the next Sai Thein Win?

New tempests over Burma as U.N. aid rolls in – George Russell
FOXNews.com: Wed 9 Jun 2010

The United Nations, which is quietly planning a major aid program to North Korea despite U.N. sanctions against the regime, also intends to ship hundreds of millions of dollars to Burma, another brutal Asian dictatorship, despite allegations that the country also known as Myanmar is trying to acquire nuclear weapons technology.At least one U.N. organization, the United Nations Children’s fund, or UNICEF, has now found the Burma issue too thorny to tackle — for the moment.

UNICEF has discreetly postponed approval of a four-year plan starting next January to spend $198.5 million, including $115 million in additional donated funds, for its programs in the country at least until the fall — while the nuclear weapons concerns have a chance to die down.

UNICEF’s plans, prepared in close collaboration with the Burmese government, were originally intended for approval at a four-day meeting of the organization’s 36-nation supervisory Executive Board, which ended June 4.

According to a UNICEF spokesman, Christopher de Bono, the plan won’t be formally approved until the Board’s next meeting, probably in September.

The Burmese bomb-making program was allegedly developed with help from nearby North Korea — whose own nuclear weapons program became enmeshed in scandals involving U.N. aid programs.

Just three years ago, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) closed its offices in North Korea amid allegations — later confirmed by an “independent investigative review panel” — that it had handed over hard currency and sensitive equipment to the bellicose Kim Jong Il regime while it was successfully circumventing international sanctions sparked by its own nuclear weapons program.

The UNDP office in North Korea is in the process of reopening, after making changes in its procedures.

In the case of Burma, a dissident organization known as the Democratic Voice of Burma late last month released a documentary summarizing what it called a five-year investigation of the military regime’s clandestine nuclear quest. It included claims by an alleged defector from the nuclear program who says the regime wants “nuclear warheads.”

When Fox News asked the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog, for comment, IAEA spokesperson Gill Tudor replied: “The Agency has seen the media reports and continues its analysis of information on, as it does with information on other countries.”

The UNICEF program aims to support infant vaccinations and feeding supplements, bolster clinical care for children and expectant mothers, expand water and sanitation networks (especially in schools), fight the spread of AIDS and bolster early childhood education. The programs also include hefty amounts for “communication activities promoting and engaging child participation” and awareness of childrens’ rights, plus extensive funding to help the Burmese regime collect social and health data.

As is common with U.N. agency in-country plans, the execution of the plans will largely be in the hands of the government and its various branches. The current UNICEF in-country staff of 220 international and local personnel would be expanded to support and monitor the programs through 10 field offices, but the bulk of the work would be carried out by government doctors, educators and other officials.

“I have been worried about Myanmar for years,” says John Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under George W. Bush, and a longtime critic of how — and how much — the U.N. spends. “UNICEF needs to be clearer about its obligation not to be manipulated by governments for their own ends.” (Bolton is also a Fox News contributor.)

When it comes to monitoring whether the programs actually are implemented as planned, however, UNICEF sounds confident of its abilities. A spokesman says that official permission is required to monitor “certain parts of the country,” but he adds that “we have no recent experience of permission being denied.”

Hundreds of millions of dollars of other U.N. program aid also hangs in the balance in Burma and the issue of monitoring what the government does with the money has been very much at issue in the immediate past.

Case in point: some $320 million in aid from the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis (GFAMT), a public-private venture based in Switzerland that gets funding from Bill and Melinda Gates and from a variety of governments — including the U.S., which kicks in 28 percent of the Fund’s budget.

The applicant for the five-year Global Fund grants is a “country coordinating mechanism” in Burma that includes, along with representatives of the regime’s health services, representatives of the U.N. World Health Organization (WHO), UNDP, the U.N. Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), as well as the British government’s foreign development agency.

The recipient, if the grants get their final sign-off, is another U.N. agency, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which according to its website provides “technical and administrative support” to other U.N. agencies.

But “none of these grants are signed yet,” says Global Fund spokesman Jon Liden, because the Fund got badly burned once before by the Burmese government — precisely on the issue of monitoring what was going on with Fund money.

In July 2005, just months after the Global Fund had spent nearly $10 million of anti-AIDS, anti-malaria and anti-TB funding worth $98.4 million over five years, the Fund abruptly bailed on the program.

It charged the Burmese regime with reneging on its written agreements to allow Global Fund staff, U.N. personnel and non-government organizations unimpeded access to areas where programs were supposedly underway.

The government also put new barriers in the way of Global Fund review of supply procurement for the programs, meaning the Fund could no longer be sure the government was buying what it said it was buying in the way of medicines, among other things.

After the Fund left, the programs went ahead anyway, thanks to support from yet another outside donor known as the Three Diseases Fund, which was created in 2006 by, among others, the governments of Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, plus the European Commission. UNOPS managed the fund.

But in November 2009, Burma and the U.N. organizations working there came back to the Global Fund for more. Whether they will get it is still unclear.

At the time, says Lidon, “The Global Fund reiterated that none of our procedures or requirements had changed and that they would not in any way be relaxed” if Burma reapplied. Grant negotiations, he added, “are ongoing.”

That by no means exhausts the amount and variety of U.N. agency activity in Burma. UNOPS, for example, also manages another $100 million fund known as LIFT — Livelihoods and Food Security Trust — provided by European donors.

For its part, UNDP in January extended its separate, three-year “Human Development Initiative” in Burma by an extra year, meaning it will have spent another $65 million by the end of 2011. The organization currently aims to present a successor program to its executive board in either June or September of next year. According to a UNDP spokesman, “The details and budget estimate will be developed over the coming months.”

A lot has happened in Burma since the Global Fund last cut off its medical grants in 2005, including Cyclone Nargis, the horrific typhoon that devastated the country in 2008 and left at least 138,000 dead.

In response to that disaster, the world sent hundreds of millions in aid to the stricken country via the U.N. and other institutions, without much thought for what other uses the regime might have for the money.

The official recovery from the Nargis calamity is supposed to end this year.

Now, with the alleged help of the dangerously unstable North Korean regime, a different kind of catastrophic threat might be in the offing.

And how the U.N. — and the Burma regime — accounts for its money might have everything to do with the outcome.

* George Russell is executive editor of Fox News.

Maung Win, “We are cheap labour, we have no rights”
IRIN (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs): Tue 8 Jun 2010

UMPIEM CAMP, 8 June 2010 (IRIN) – Umpiem is one of about a dozen refugee camps along the Thailand-Myanmar border for displaced persons who have fled poverty as well as ethnic, religious and political persecution. The camp is home to about 27,000 people, according to the Karen Refugee Committee. Under Thai law, displaced persons are prohibited from leaving the camps, but authorities often allow refugees to leave for day labour. Maung Win*, 36, an ethnic Arakan, told IRIN about his recent arrest outside camp.“I leave the camp most days to find work nearby. I leave early in the morning, walk 5km to the area where we wait by the side of the road to be picked up for day labour at 4am, and I return to the camp at 5pm.

“I get 80 baht [US$2.50] a day. A Thai worker is paid more than twice this amount. We are cheap labour, and we have no rights. This is the only way I can earn a bit of money. Without work, it’s hard to survive just on the rations we are given.

“More and more people from the camp started going out for work, so there was a smaller chance of getting chosen for the day. A couple of hundred people leave the camp each day now. There was no more work nearby, so I had to start going farther away.

“Once a week, I would to go to Umphang to work on a farm. The last time I tried to go to Umphang, I was arrested [at a roadside check point] and sent to jail for being outside the camp.

“In jail, the guards had me carry bricks for them, and my wife had to send money for the police to provide me with food. We sold some of our possessions.

“I fled Myanmar in 1990. After our local Arakan leader was executed in jail, we demonstrated and then it was dangerous for some of us to stay around.

“From 1990 to 1994, I lived in Mae La camp with my uncle. After that I worked in a factory in Mae Sot. During that time the police would harass me but I managed to avoid getting arrested. I met my wife in Mae Sot in 2005.

“Now it’s impossible for me to work in a factory because of the new [nationality verification] programme that says we must register with the Burmese government in order to get permission to work here. Of course, that’s not possible. So now I can only try to work near the camp, if there is any work available.”

ILO targets Myanmar’s military over forced labour
Agence France Presse: Mon 7 Jun 2010

Geneva – International labour experts warned on Sunday that Myanmar’s military is still resorting to forced labour despite signs of progress with civilian local authorities.An International Labour Organisation (ILO) committee backed calls for the release of six people who have been imprisoned for up to 18 months after they sought the help of the agency’s office in the country, and renewed criticism of Myanmar’s military, ILO officials said.

“There is an indication that the use of forced labour systematically by civilian authorities in some areas is reducing,” Steve Marshall, liaison officer for the UN labour agency in Myanmar, told AFP.

“The other side is there is no evidence of any change in attitude to the use of forced labour by the military,” he added.

The 183-nation ILO’s committee on standards has assessed Myanmar’s record with forced labour annually since an inquiry concluded that the practice was widespread and systematic there.

It met on Saturday but its conclusions were only due to be published on Monday.

In 2007, Myanmar’s military junta bowed to pressure from the UN labour agency and allowed an official based in the capital, Yangon, to deal with complaints from victims.

Marshall, who took part in the meeting in Geneva, indicated that the committee upheld his assessments and reiterated calls for changes to parts of Myanmar’s constitution and laws that could condone forced labour.

It also noted that official efforts in the country to raise awareness to help prevent the practice were gaining pace.

“There has been a lot of awareness raising and education, and a lot of seminars. Credit was given that that is new,” Marshall said.

“However, the committee feels that there’s a lot more work to be done in the area, particularly because you’re in an environment where there’s military rule.”

Marshall found a pattern of forced labour caused by a lack of proper funding for projects demanded from rural authorities.

But the bulk of the problem, he cautioned, involved adults and youngsters pressed into working for the army.

China plundering natural resources in Burma
Kachin News Group: Mon 7 Jun 2010

China was variously described as plunderer and arch destroyer of Burma’s natural resources on the 38th World Environment Day today, by local people and environmental activists.Mindless logging and rampant mining in northern Burma by China for over two decades has led to widespread deforestation, pollution of rivers and land with Mercury used in gold mining. There is now varied ecological dysfunction that the country has to contend with.
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Chinese trucks loading with timber from Kachin State headed to the China border. Photo: Kachin News Group.

Since 1988, China has been the only super power ally of the natural resource-rich military-run Burma. It is the only country authorized to access these resources by the Burmese military junta.

All natural resources in Kachin State have been controlled by Chinese companies. Besides, all wild animals in the state have been exported to China as food and traditional medicine since a ceasefire agreement was signed between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the junta in 1994.

The Kachin state-produced natural resources like the world-class and famous Hpakant jade, timber, gold mines and other mineral mines like Molybdenum and Graphite are controlled by Chinese firms.

According to businessmen on the Sino-Burma border, there are no hardwood and teak, east and west of Irrawaddy River in Kachin State because of rampant felling for over a decade. Only small timber is left near the Indo-Burma border in western Kachin State.

Since 2006, the junta-backed Yuzana Company headed by Chinese-Burmese U Htay Myint seized over 200,000 acres of land in Hukawng Valley from native Kachins. It swept clean natural forests for crops and felled trees for export.

Timber in Hukawng Valley is mainly logged for export by two companies backed by the junta— Htoo Company owned by Burmese business tycoon Tay Za or Teza, the son-in-law of junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe and Yuzana Company.

Timber traders on the border say, hundreds of thousands of tons of logs were damaged in the logging forests in Kachin State without being brought to the border timber camps given the extra demands for bribe by local Burmese military units.

Rampant gold mining is also taking its toll on rivers, paddy fields and forests in the valley, destroying and polluting the paddy fields, forests and rivers. The Chinese-sponsored Sea Sun Stars Company is mainly involved in gold mining activities.

Hukawng Valley was dubbed the world’s largest tiger sanctuary in 2004 by the US-based Wildlife Conservative Society (WCS) but, while the name has stuck Hugawng tigers are endangered given the widespread deforestation and gold mining activities.

Now, Chinese gold mining activities are on in other places around Kachin State such as the Irrawaddy River, Mali Hka River, N’Mai Hka River, Puta-O district, Waingmaw district, Myitkyina district and Bhamo district.

Chinese companies are also secretly mining Molybdenum, lead and graphite in Bhamo district and Waingmaw Township, near the border with China’s Yunnan province for several years now.

China imports wild animals including mammals, birds and reptiles such as elephants, tigers, bears, monkeys, wild buffaloes, tortoises, different birds including falcons and parrots, rhinos, crocodiles, elks, deer and snakes. All these are now in the endangered species list in Kachin State, said local environmentalists.

Since 2006, China’s state-owned China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) is constructing seven hydropower projects in Irrawaddy River’s confluence called Myitsone, Mali Hka River and N’Mai Hka River in Kachin State. It will generate over 20,000 MW of electricity to be sold to China.

Since 2007 native Kachins and environmentalists have urged that the Myitsone dam project be halted as it poses risk of social and environmental disaster. However the pleas have been ignored by the authorities.

Many people and environmentalists feel China is being hypocritical for it regulates strictly domestic environmental protection laws but is eager to plunder all the natural resources of the political pariah state of Burma.

Sources close to Chinese authorities on the border said, China’s economic policy vis-a-vis military-ruled Burma entails “Grab economic benefits as much as possible”. However, it wants its citizens in Burma to come back home because of the fear of civil war.

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Burma on June 2 and 3 and reaffirmed the ties between the two countries. He discussed energy issues– oil pipeline from the coast of Rakhine (Arakan) state and hydropower projects in Kachin State.

Burma economy in ‘artificial deficit’ – Joseph Allchin
Democratic Voice of Burma: Mon 7 Jun 2010

Gas revenues being banked at the official exchange rate in Burma are causing an artificial deficit, when in fact there should be a 15 percent fiscal surplus, a prominent economist on Burma has said.A “fresh look” at data of Burma’s economy is “worse than I had long thought, and the regime’s culpability so much worse,” said Sean Turnell, from the Sydney-based Burma Economic Watch (BEW), who released the ‘Dissecting the Data’ report on Burma.

He believes the government is fudging the economic figures: “I had a look at how the regime is recording these earnings from the gas in the public accounts and what is revealed when you look into it is that Burma’s fiscal deficit is artificial,” he said.

“[It’s an] an artifice of the regime itself; if you brought those [gas] revenues into the public account at the proper exchange rate, what is currently a fiscal deficit of about four percent of GDP turns into a fiscal surplus of around 15 percent of GDP.”
The report notes that in 2008/09, official figures showed a fiscal deficit of around 3.5 percent, adding that this was not extraordinary given the global recession. This was added to by a deficit of 1.9 percent from Burma’s state-owned enterprises, representing obviously poor management, particularly when one thinks of the gas revenues earned by the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE).

MOGE also uses the official exchange rate of six kyat to the dollar, but the money is “rendered into the accounts at the unofficial [but realistic] exchange rate of around 1000 kyat to the dollar, then these earnings [5,270 billion kyat instead of 24.7 billion kyat] would have an extraordinary impact.”

He added that “those gas revenues are kept offshore where they are used for all sorts of things and, I dare say, as per recent reports by you guys suggest on nuclear activities and so on”.

The report also once again highlighted the junta’s questionable response to cyclone Nargis reconstruction: “The amount of spending on post-Nargis reconstruction was a paltry figure of around $US85 million spent by the government, when the Tripartite Core Group [UN, ASEAN and Burmese government] estimated that $US600 million was required. They would earn more than this every single month from the gas earnings, which really illustrates nicely their priorities.”

He also indicated that Burma’s supposed shift to a ‘market economy’ is a fiction, given that “domestic capital is a mere 15 percent so the state controls 85 percent of the capital. [And] when you compare it to Laos or Cambodia,” the opposite is true,.

There is also an apparent “famine” of credit in the country which is particularly destructive to the agricultural sector, which provides for 70 percent of the population and earned 50 percent of GDP. The sector only received 0.4 percent of the credit created, whilst the overall credit of the private sector has been in steady decline from 19 percent in 2004/05 to 15 percent in 2008/09.

The mismanagement of the economy then leads to massive government borrowing from the central bank. “Persistent annual double-digit percentage increases in central bank advances to the State across the last decade (including an extraordinary 21.8 percent growth in the incomplete 2008/09 financial year),” the report says.

This in turn is the “primary driver of Burma’s high inflation rates [easily the highest in the region], which have seldom been under 25 percent in the last decade”.

The analysis that Turnell presents seems to confirm a complete lack of foresight or people-orientated planning, as privatization continues apace with the recent selling of the national library, and real doubt about Burma’s ability to develop alongside its Asian neighbours is apparent. Even more worrying however is Turnell’s belief that government policy is “actively destructive of Burma’s prospects”.

No clear sign Myanmar wants help with vote
Agence France-Presse: Mon 7 Jun 2010

HO CHI MINH CITY– Myanmar has given no clear signs that it would welcome regional help with its elections expected later this year, its Southeast Asian neighbors said on Sunday.The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union have urged Myanmar to ensure the elections are “credible and transparent”.

ASEAN secretary general Surin Pitsuwan told reporters on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum on East Asia: “We don’t have any clear signal that member states of ASEAN will be asked to help but the offer is on the table.”

Surin said in Madrid late last month that the election “won’t be perfect” but would be the start of a process that could lead to real democracy.

ASEAN groups Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

State media in military-ruled Myanmar reported last month that the country has no need for foreign observers to monitor its first elections in two decades, despite international concerns that the polls will lack legitimacy.

The National League for Democracy (NLD) of detained democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi has been forcibly dissolved under widely criticized laws governing the elections.

The NLD refused to meet a May 6 deadline to re-register as a party — a move that would have forced it to expel its own leader — and boycotted the vote.

Suu Kyi, a Nobel peace laureate, has been held in detention for 14 of the past 20 years.

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#760

From: Goldy George <goldymgeorge10@...>
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 8:30 pm
Subject: Sign in this petition against discrimination of Dalit students in Indian Universities

goldymgeorge10@...

Send Email

Dear all!

Jai Bhim!
The following is an online petition against discrimination of Dalit students in Indian universities. Please sign in this and make this campaign a success. This comes as another reminder to all friends who haven't either received this message or got but haven't signed this petition.�Please ignore this message if you have already signed in this.�This needs to be taken up seriously when hundreds of Dalit students are denied of their right to higher studies in most of the professional institutions. Also there are several cases where Dalit students were forced out of the campus even after geting admitted. Futher there are scores of cases of suicide of Dalit students. Hence I request you to take it seriously and also to send it to friends on your list so that we could have at least 10 million (1 crore) signatures by July 15.

�

Kindly follow this link to sign in the petition http://www.petitiononline.com/93466770/petition.html

�

Kind regards

Goldy

--
---------------------------------
Goldy M. George
PhD candidate
TISS, Mumbai

Founder
Dalit Mukti Morcha
Chhattisgarh

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#761

From: Max Ediger <ediger.max@...>
Date: Mon Jun 28, 2010 1:53 am
Subject: Fwd: Please sign petition to end discrimination on dalit students in universities, it will take only one minute to sign and support the cause

maxediger

Send Email

Friends:� All of us had experience with Dalit communities during our time in SOP so we know the kind of situations they face.� Here is a petition, sent by a close friend of mine, which gives us an opportunity to support Dalit students for the right to a good education.

�

Max

Dear all!

Jai Bhim!
The following is an online petition against discrimination of Dalit students in Indian universities. Please sign in this and make this campaign a success. This comes as another reminder to all friends who haven't either received this message or got but haven't signed this petition.�Please ignore this message if you have already signed in this.�This needs to be taken up seriously when hundreds of Dalit students are denied of their right to higher studies in most of the professional institutions. Also there aer several cases where Dalit students were forced out of the campus even after geting admitted. Futher there are scores of cases of suicide of Dalit students. Hence I request you to take it seriously and also to send it to friends on your list so that we could have at least 10 million (1 crore) signatures by July 15.

�

Kindly follow this link to sign in the petition http://www.petitiononline.com/93466770/petition.html

�

Kind regards

Goldy

---------------------------------
Goldy M. George
PhD candidate
TISS, Mumbai

Founder
Dalit Mukti Morcha
Chhattisgarh

--
Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. Persons who have given up both victory and defeat, the contented, they are happy. (Buddhist wisdom)
"Education is the ability to listen to almost anything without losing your temper or your self-confidence."
�-- �Robert Frost

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#762

From: CHAN Beng Seng <bengseng@...>
Date: Mon Jun 28, 2010 5:04 am
Subject: [Readingroom] News on Burma - 28/6/10

piapi

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Junta interrogates political prisoners on election
Wa army switch ‘inevitable’
Burma increases airport tax as tourism jumps
Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices
Life and times of a dictator
More North Korean rockets reported in Burma
Starting trade union unlawful, police say
PM’s party enticing Muslims
China weapons giant to mine Burma
Myanmar restricts political activity ahead of polls
NLD leaders tour Burma
China remains silent on Burma’s nuclear ambitions
Than Shwe the third ‘worst of the worst’
Myanmar vote will ‘lack international legitimacy’
Union Election Commission issues Directive No.2/2010
NLD top leaders take roadshow to grass roots
The junta’s new look
Burma’s nuclear ambition is apparently real and alarming
Election Commission begins poll preparations
Words must be turned into action for Aung San Suu Kyi
Parties seek allies to meet election expenses
Burmese tycoon brokered arms deal with China
Ban Ki-moon called Burma gas pipeline a ‘win-win’
Burmese activists fear extension of army’s power
The Burma-North Korea axis

Junta interrogates political prisoners on election – Zarni Mann
Irrawaddy: Fri 25 Jun 2010

The Burmese military junta has been interrogating political prisoners since early June about their opinions of the upcoming election and their intentions for future political activity, according to the families of political prisoners.Than Than Win, the wife of Shwe Maung, a political prisoner being held in Mandalay Division, told The Irrawaddy that her husband said the special police came to his prison and asked him to give his opinion on the election and tell them whether he will continue his political activity when he gets released.

She said her husband, who was sentenced to six years in prison for his involvement in the 2007 Saffron Revolution, told the special police that, if necessary, he will enter politics again.

Family members of prisoners wait for their release in front of the Insein prison gate in Rangoon last year. (Photo: Reuters)
Shwe Maung was tortured when he was arrested, and now has a heart condition and back pain. His wife requested that the prison authorities give him a medical examination outside the prison, but the authorities refused.

The family of another political prisoner, Zaw Thet Htwe, also said the police have recently interrogated him. “The police asked Zaw Thet Htwe about his opinion of the election and what he is going to do when he gets outside,” they said.

Zaw Thet Htwe is being detained in Taungyi Township, the capital of Shan State. He was chief sports editor at a journal in Rangoon when he was sentenced in 2008 to nine years in prison for helping Cyclone Nargis victims in the Irrawaddy delta.

Ashin Gambira, a prominent monk and leader of the Saffron Revolution, has also been asked the same questions by authorities. Gambira was sentenced to 63 years in prison and is being held in Kalay prison, Sagaing Division.

There are 2,157 political prisoners in Burma, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP). Many of them were arrested in 2007 during the Saffron Revolution.

Many in the international community have called on the junta to release all political prisoners, including pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, before the election to be held late this year—the first election in Burma since 1990.

Although some political observers believe the junta will release a number of political prisoners before the election to improve its credibility with the international community, most believe the junta will release only low-profile political prisoners who won’t oppose the junta or the election.

Wa army switch ‘inevitable’ – Nan Kham Kaew
Democratic Voice of Burma: Fri 25 Jun 2010

The Wa army in northeastern Burma will one day have to join with the ruling military government because a country with more than one army is unacceptable, the junta has warned the group.A government delegation led by the head of Burma’s Northern Military Command, Win Thein, met with the 30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA) on Tuesday after a bi-annual visit to China to discuss border security with officials in the country’s southern Yunnan province.

Beijing has urged the Burmese government to maintain stability along its shared border following escalating tension over the UWSA’s reluctance to transform into a Border Guard Force, which would bring it under the wing of the Burmese army. Reports earlier this month of government workers returning to the volatile Wa region in Shan state suggests however that tension had eased.

“[Win Thein] said there shouldn’t be various armed groups in one country; that is not supposed to happen,” a Wa official told DVB on condition of anonymity. “He said that sooner or later, we will definitely have to transform [into a border force] – there is supposed to be only one army in the country.”

The government is desperately trying to shore up its support base prior to elections this year as it draws up a grand design for a future Union of Burma, with ethnic armies either assimilated into the Burmese army, or otherwise eliminated.

The Wa official said that although the UWSA did not formally respond to the statement, it continues to urge peace with the government. The UWSA is Burma’s largest armed ethnic group and signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1989, although that is now looking tenuous.

The group has also been labelled by the US government as one of the world’s top opium producers, although its output has significantly declined in the past decade. It has now reportedly switched to methamphetamine production, and a UN report released yesterday said Burma’s output of the drug has soared in the past year.

“We wish for development in the region and more crops to be grown here, rather than poppy fields [for opium],” said the Wa official. “We asked the government whether they wanted peace or war with us.”

He added that the group “has been busy” as it prepares for a visit by Chinese authorities to inspect whether poppy cultivation has been eliminated, but refused to elaborate on exactly how the group was preparing.The Shan Herald Agency for News reported however that it was organising a ‘”drug bonfire” to mark the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June.

The Wa also claims it is being assisted by the Chinese in the development of rubber plantations as a substitute for opium, with Beijing supplying farming equipment.

Burma increases airport tax as tourism jumps – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Fri 25 Jun 2010

Burmese authorities will double the airport tax for foreigners and increase it six times for Burmese citizens, two months after a new visa on-arrival was unveiled to boost tourism. The Department of Civil Aviation said on Wednesday that the airport passenger service charge will be increased to US $10 for each departing international passenger and 3,000 kyat ($3) for Burmese nationals starting on Thursday.

Hot air balloons fly over the temple-studded plains of Pagan in January. Pagan, the ancient capital of Burma, is the popular tourist attraction of the country. (Photo: Reuters
According to travel agents in Rangoon, the current airport tax for foreigner is $5 and 500 kyat for Burmese. However, travel agents said that the visa on-arrival, which started on May 1, has increased foreign arrivals by an estimated 100 percent.

“Since the new visa regulations, tourism has been more developed,” said a travel agent staffer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

She estimated that “more than double the number of tourists now visit.”

Meanwhile, the London-based Cox & Kings global travel company said it will reintroduce tours to military-ruled Burma offering the first 13-day escorted trip leaving in October. The company previously withdrew from the country after Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi said tourism would prolong military rule and human rights violations in Burma.

Cox & Kings said it changed its policy because Suu Kyi is reported to have said tourism should be encouraged if it is run through private firms with no link to the junta, according to Travel Trade Gazette.

Visas to Burma were tightly restricted through for nearly five decades following a military coup in 1962.

Foreigners who wanted to enter the country had to apply for a visa at a Burmese embassy and wait at least one week for approval, and they were frequently turned down.

“I visited Burma two years ago,” recalled one Canadian tourist. “I applied at the Burmese embassy in Bangkok. The embassy said I had to wait for a week. I couldn’t wait, so I gave an agent money to get a visa in one day.”

According to a notice at the Burmese immigration office, a visa on-arrival is $30 for a 28-day, non-extendable visa; $40 for a 70-day, extendable business visa or a 28-day extendable social visa; and $18 for a 24-hour transit visa.

An individual must have a minimum of $300 and a family must have $600 to enter the country. The overstay fee for a tourist with a 28-day visa is $3 a day.

Burma’s visa on-arrival carries a limitation in that foreigners are restricted from going to certain areas of the country.

Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices – Brian McCartan
Asia Times: Fri 25 Jun 2010

BANGKOK – Elections slated for later this year in Myanmar seem increasingly unlikely to democratically empower the country’s various ethnic minority groups, which combined account for over 30% of the population.While the ruling generals have touted the inclusiveness of their tightly controlled democratic transition, critics say the new constitution ignores ethnic demands for federalism while junta-drafted election laws prohibit the participation of the largest ethnic parties, some of which are attached to armed insurgent groups who for decades have fought for greater autonomy.

The ruling junta has yet to announce a date for the elections, but many observers believe they will he held sometime in October. They will be the first polls held in Myanmar since 1990, when the opposition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory against military-sponsored parties, only to see the results annulled by the military before they could take power.

The generals have made clear their intention to hold new polls and that the participation of the NLD and ethnic ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups is not essential to their credibility. The NLD announced on March 29 that it would not re-register under the new election laws, which it considered unfair because of regulations that bar Aung San Suu Kyi, the party’s detained leader, from contesting the polls.

A number of NLD party leaders and other members have argued that non-participation plays into the regime’s hands by not providing an alternative to the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National Unity Party (NUP).

At least 39 other political parties have so far applied for registration with the newly formed election commission. Of those, only 15 are considered national parties, while many of the rest aim specifically to represent the interests of ethnic groups, including the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan.

The question of whether to participate in the elections has been as contentious an issue among ethnic political groups as it was with the NLD. Some see the electoral process as a sham for perpetuating military rule under the guise of democracy and advocate a boycott of the polls. Others believe the elections offer an unique chance to work from within the system and an alternative to the confrontation and armed struggle that has plagued Myanmar politics since independence from the UK in 1948.

The second and third most successful parties in the 1990 elections after the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan League for Democracy, have both supported the NLD’s stand and opted not to re-register their parties for the upcoming election. The SNLD’s decision was also based on the junta’s refusal to free its two top leaders, who were both arrested on political charges in 2005.

Local contests

Significantly, many of the ethnic-based parties are looking to contest seats in local legislatures rather than at the national level. With their relative small sizes, the high cost of party registration and their lack of a national voice, many aspiring ethnic politicians feel that their chances of success and ability to effect change are better on the local level.

Parties representing larger ethnic groups, such as the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), are seeking to contest the elections at all levels within their own states. Still other parties representing ethnic groups with much wider geographic coverage, such as the Kayin People’s Party (KPP) and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), intend to contest the election for both local legislatures and at the national level across several states and divisions.

Competing for seats on state legislatures may have some real, if limited, advantages for ethnic aspirations. The new legislatures mandated by the 2008 constitution are a departure from the military-dominated “Peace and Development Committees” that currently decide policy in ethnic minority areas and are often a direct arm of the central government.

Ethnic politicians hope that the local legislative bodies will be more representative of local communities and give them more say over affairs that matter to their ethnic constituents. With popular representation, there may be more opportunities for the promotion of local cultures and languages though influence over the media and education. Also important is to gain more influence and scrutiny over the exploitation of natural resources in ethnic minority areas.

According to a recent report on the elections by the Transnational Institute, “Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders point out that they will have a legitimate voice for the first time. This will allow ethnic grievances, in the past too easily dismissed as the seditious rumblings of separatist insurgents, to be openly raised.”

Without ethnic participation, the government backed, and largely ethnic Myanmar USDP and NUP will be calling the shots not only nationally, but also in the regional legislatures. While a far cry from the federalism that many ethnic leaders aspire for, the local legislatures offer the first forms of local autonomy since the post 1962 coup government of General Ne Win abolished ethnic councils established under the 1947 constitution.

A post-independence federal system was promised as a result of a conference held at the town of Panglong in northern Myanmar between independence leader General Aung San and representatives of several ethnic groups. Federal principles agreed to at the conference were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but by the late 1950’s many felt they had not been adequately implemented. Agitation for a more truly federalist system was a major cause of the 1962 military coup, which was carried out in the name of preserving national unity.

Myanmar’s 2008 constitution keeps the seven ethnic states and creates seven new self-administered zones for less numerous ethnic groups such as the Pa-O, Kokang and Wa. However, it makes few other concessions to ethnic aspirations for federalism and power sharing between ethnic groups and the majority Myanmar population. During the 1993-2008 National Convention that drafted the constitution, calls by ethnic representatives for a federal union were ignored.

There is growing evidence that the generals are seeking to undermine and split the ethnic vote at the upcoming elections. This is being done largely through the junta’s mass organization, the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), and its newly formed political party, the USDP.

Many members of the USDP are former military officers and current members of government who have resigned their ranks to participate in the polls. They have actively courted ethnic minorities to join the junta-backed USDP. In the case of the disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar, that has taken the form of offering identity cards granting them formal citizenship in exchange for their votes.

According to the exile-run media group Shan Herald Agency for News, USDP members have used the USDA and local government officials to canvass for votes and to pressure villagers in Shan State to sign their names on the party’s rolls. Shan leaders in Mandalay Division, where there are significant Shan populations, were approached in March to run as part of the USDP.

The junta has also effectively blocked several of the major ethnic political players from taking part in the elections due to an impasse over the transformation of armed ceasefire groups into army-controlled border guard units. The regime’s seven-step “roadmap to democracy” had originally envisioned that the groups would either hand over their weapons or join the border guard force as a prelude to forming political parties and contesting the election.

Pre-election tension

That step was supposed to be accomplished before an election date was announced. Instead tensions have spiked between the junta and the ethnic militias as several deadlines have passed – the latest on April 28 – and the issue still remains unresolved. Over 20 ethnic insurgent groups have agreed to ceasefires with the junta since 1989 and have since largely run their own affairs. They consider retaining their weapons as a necessary protection until the generals can prove the sincerity of their political promises.

Only a few, mostly small groups have agreed to the junta’s terms, including the National Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA). However, their political leaders have resigned and are now seeking to register respectively as the Union Democracy Party (Kachin State) and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party.

The Kokang only agreed after a short offensive by the army drove out the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2009 and brought in new leadership. The new leadership quickly declared its support for the 2010 elections and formed a political party.

Larger groups such as the United Wa State Party (UWSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have not been allowed to register parties for the election. Instead the regime has threatened to revoke the ceasefire status of groups and declare them illegal. Most recently tensions have increased in Mon State, where the NMSP has refused to meet with the military’s intelligence head Lieutenant General Ye Myint to discuss the border guard issue. The junta has threatened to use force if the Mon does not agree to a meeting.

Keeping the ceasefire groups out of the polls may work to the generals’ electoral advantage. A June 2010 report by the Transnational Institute on the ethnic political situation described the ethnic ceasefire organizations, “in terms of history, membership, finance, and territorial control, the ceasefire forces far outweigh electoral parties in their ability to operate independently and, with an estimated 40,000 troops under arms, their existence was a continued reminder of the need for conflict resolution.”

Both the Wa and the Kachin have said that they would like to support ethnic parties in the polls and negotiate the decommissioning of their armed wings with the new government after the elections. After two decades of unresolved political issues and disappointment in the 2008 constitution, they want to see proof of real political reform before agreeing to hand over their weapons.

Indeed, the election commission has so far refused to accept the registration of three Kachin political parties. While two of the parties represent former ceasefire groups who have now become border guards, the KSPP has several former KIO members, including its leader, former KIO vice chairman Tu Ja. Some observers believe the party’s registration has yet to be approved because of these links.

There is also a fear that the government will declare a state of emergency in the ceasefire areas, which would prohibit people standing for elections and voting. Already areas of southern Shan State and Karen State are unlikely to be allowed to vote due to a legal provision that says elections can only be held in areas free of conflict. This would mean that large portions of Myanmar would not be allowed to elect representatives to local or national legislatures.

Border-based ethnic political organizations, many of which are attached to armed insurgent groups still fighting the government, will not be able to take part in the elections. Although they have seemingly declined in strength and influence in recent years, their message of equal rights and justice still resonates with many people who see the newly formed parties as junta stooges.

Peace talks with the government will also have to wait until a new government is formed following the elections. A section of the Political Parties Registration Law prohibits registration to any party that is involved with groups engaged in armed rebellion or involved with groups declared as “unlawful associations”.

The generals will be hard-pressed to prove the legitimacy of the elections without the participation of ethnic opposition parties or adequate ethnic representation. Should the ethnic groups continue to feel disempowered and a democratically elected pro-military government maintain the junta’s current confrontational policies, further conflict will be almost unavoidable and hinder the country’s supposed democratic transition.

* Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist.

Life and times of a dictator – Bertil Lintner
Asia Times: Fri 25 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – When Myanmar military dictator General Ne Win was still alive, foreign pundits often postulated that the country would change for the better once he passed from the scene. The country would still be ruled by the military, they predicted, but by a younger generation of more reform-minded officers that would bring Myanmar, also known as Burma, out of the Dark Ages.Ne Win relinquished formal power in the late 1980s and pulled strings from behind the scenes leading up to his death in 2002. Did Myanmar change after that? Yes – but arguably for the worse. Repression intensified, with the number of political prisoners reaching into the thousands. Economic reforms put more money in circulation, but intensified already rampant corruption. The government spent even less on health and education while ramping up military spending.

Today, the Myanmar military is more firmly entrenched in power than at any time since Ne Win’s coup d’etat in 1962, which ended a 14-year period of weak but functioning parliamentary democracy. Now the era of Myanmar’s current strongman, General Than Shwe, is drawing to an end. The 77-year-old general will soon retire and he has promised the country’s first democratic elections in 20 years to mark the transition.

A new generation of pundits has predicted hopefully that Myanmar is on the cusp of positive change. They believe a hitherto unknown generation of Young Turks and other supposed closet liberals within the military will come to the fore and push the country in a more democratic direction. Elections, they predict, will at long last give civilian leaders some say over the country’s governance.

In all likelihood, however, foreign pundits will be proven wrong yet again. Benedict Rogers’ highly readable new book shows why Myanmar’s military, even with Than Shwe’s imminent retirement, has no intention of giving up power any time soon. After this year’s polls Than Shwe may no longer be Myanmar’s de facto head of state, but he has ensured through that he and his by now immensely wealthy family will be well protected when the next generation of soldiers assume power.

“Motivated by power and a determination to hold onto it,” Rogers writes, “Than Shwe will use any tool necessary, from detention, torture and violence against his opponents, to lies, deceit, delay and false promises to the international community, or the manipulation of astrology and religion to convince his own people.”

There is scant evidence that the next generation of military officers will be any more liberal in their outlook than their predecessors – in the same way as Than Shwe’s generation certainly was no more broadminded after taking over from Ne Win. After half a century of wielding absolute power, the Myanmar military has developed its own ways of dealing with internal dissent and external criticism.

And democratic reforms, even minor and gradual ones, are not part of that mindset, as Rogers’ book thoughtfully illustrates. Ne Win set the repressive agenda when he and the army seized power 48 years ago, and those ways have survived him through several of his successors.

To be sure, Rogers does not feign objectivity in his assessment of Than Shwe’s life and times. As a member of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a human-rights organization that specializes in religious freedoms, he has been a Myanmar activist for many years and openly declared his support for the country’s pro-democracy opposition. But that does not detract from this well-researched book.

To the contrary, it is the first thorough study of Myanmar’s undisputed strongman. It chronicles with detail how Than Shwe rose from a lowly position as a junior postal clerk to the most powerful soldier in the military-run country. Joining the military as a teenager, he was always immensely loyal to his commanders, a trait the book argues was a key to his eventual success. Those who questioned their superiors and official policies were ruthlessly purged under the new military order that Ne Win introduced after 1962.

Despite claims in his own official glorified biography, Than Shwe did not see as much combat as other top army officers who fought in jungle battlefields against ethnic insurgent groups. Rather he was attached to the military’s Psychological Warfare Department and, later, the grandly named Central School of Political Science, where officers and other soldiers were taught Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” ideology.

Rogers quotes one of his inside sources as saying that Than Shwe “never talked about the country and its prospects with me. He seemed only focused on pleasing the higher officers and leaders. He always praised the leaders and never showed any ambition. He was certainly proud of being a soldier. He followed orders … very carefully.”

Rogers traces Than Shwe’s rise through Myanmar’s post-World War II period, the short-lived democratic era in the 1950s, and the disastrous years of austere socialism in the 1960s and 1970s which brought on the 1988 popular uprising and its bloody suppression. In 1992, Than Shwe became chairman of the ruling junta, known then as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC. He was promoted following the resignation of his predecessor General Saw Maung, who had become increasingly erratic.

Once in a position of absolute power, the postman-cum-tyrant, to use Rogers’ description of Than Shwe, was surprisingly durable. Over the years he displayed an unprecedented megalomania among Myanmar military leaders. Few could have guessed that the often sullen and always taciturn soldier would endeavor to build a new capital city, Naypyidaw, or “the Abode of Kings”, from an obscure patch in the jungle.

Nor did many foresee that he would replace Myanmar’s original national philosophy of “unity in diversity” with a new concept of a unitary state in honor of the country’s ancient warrior kings and empire-builders, Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. Many believe his construction of the new capital city aims to leave behind a “Fourth Myanmar Empire” as a legacy of his rule.

It is unclear how Than Shwe’s promised democratic transition fits with those kingly designs. Whether Myanmar holds elections this year, next year, or never, all the structures he put in place signal that the military is geared to remain in power for the foreseeable future. Rogers correctly portrays Than Shwe and his military henchmen as modern-day “tyrants” – and history shows that from a position of power tyrants have seldom negotiated their own demise.

Anyone who believes that a post-Than Shwe Myanmar is headed in a democratic direction should read this valuable book.
Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma’s Tyrant by Benedict Rogers with a foreword by Vaclav Havel. Silkworm Books (May 2010). ISBN – 978-974-9511-91-6. Price US$20, 256 pages.
Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.

More North Korean rockets reported in Burma – Min Lwin and Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Thu 24 Jun 2010

North Korean-made truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems have been reportedly set up at Burmese army bases in northern, eastern and central Burma, according to military sources.The North Korean rockets were recently delivered to missile operation commands in Mohnyin in Kachin State, Naungcho and Kengtung in Shan State and Kyaukpadaung in Mandalay Division, sources said. Missile operation commands were reportedly formed in 2009.

It is not clear when the multiple launch rocket systems were shipped from North Korea. However, military sources said delivery of rocket launchers mounted on trucks occurred several times in recent years.

The North Korean troop with M1985 multiple launch rocket system. (Source: www.military-today.com)
Sources said they witnessed at least 14 units of 240-mm truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems arrive at Thilawa Port near Rangoon on the North Korean vessel, Kang Nam I, in early 2008. Previous reports said Burma had purchased 30 units of 240-mm truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems from North Korean.

According to GlobalSecurity.org, North Korea produces two different 240mm rocket launchers, the 12-round M-1985 and the 22-round M-1991. The M-1985 rocket pack is easily identified by two rows of six rocket tubes mounted on a cab behind an engine chassis. The M-1991 is mounted on a cab over an engine chassis. Both launch packs can be adapted to a suitable cross-country truck.

The Kang Nam I was believed enroute to Burma again in June 2009. However, it reversed course and returned home after a US Navy destroyer followed it amid growing concern that it was carrying illegal arms shipments.
However, more arms shipments from North Korea appear to have been delivered to Burma in 2009-2010. The latest report about a North Korean vessel’s arrival was in April. The ship, the Chong Gen, docked at Thilawar port.

Last week, the junta acknowledged that the Chong Gen was at the port, but it denied involvement in any arms trading with Pyongyang, saying Burma follows UN Security Council resolution 1874 which bans arms trading with North Korea. The junta said the North Korean vessel came to Burma with shipments of cement and exported rice.

According to reports by Burma military experts Maung Aung Myoe and Andrew Selth, purchasing multiple-launch rocket systems is a part of the junta’s military modernization plan. While the junta has acquired 107-mm type 63 and 122-mm type 90 multiple-launch rocket from China, North Korea has provided it with 240-mm truck-mounted launch rocket.

Some experts have said North Korea is also involved in a secret relationship with Burma for the sale of short and medium-range ballistic missiles and the development of underground facilities. Other experts and Burmese defectors claim that North Korea is also providing Burma with technology designed to create a nuclear program.

Burma severed its relationship with North Korea in 1983 following North Korean agents’ assassination of members of a South Korean delegation led by President Chun Doo Hwan. The two countries restored relations in early 1990s and officially re-establish diplomatic ties in April 2007.

Starting trade union unlawful, police say – Myint Maung
Mizzima News: Thu 24 Jun 2010

New Delhi – Aspiring trade unionists had their request to form a national industrial and farm workers union flatly rejected yesterday by police carrying the response from junta leader Senior General Than Shwe, according to the workers’ representatives.Rangoon Division Western District Police Colonel Aung Daing met seven workers’ representatives at his station and told them forming a trade union would be “unlawful” and that police would take action if they went ahead.

Twenty-two trade union activists including eminent labour rights lawyer Pho Phyu had told the junta leader in a letter that they intended to form a “Trade Union for the Protection of National Industrial Workers’ and Farmers’ Interests” and asked for permission to do so.

“No right at all to form such union. It’s unlawful, they told us”, Pho Phyu said.

According to Pho Phyu, they responded to authorities that to protect the rights of workers and farmers that they would go ahead with their plan at the risk of being arrested and imprisoned.

“The working people and Burmese citizens have suffered bitterly for many years, even many decades. Now it’s time for a trade union for them”, he said.

But this was not the first rejection or fierce reaction from authorities Pho Phyu has experienced. He represented farmers whose lands were seized by the army and then he himself was imprisoned last March. He was released from prison just three months ago.
If they went ahead with their trade union, it would be considered “unlawful association” and a violation of the law. Moreover publishing and printing about this organisation will be in violation of the printers and publishers act and will be subjected to stern action, Aung Daing told the workers’ representatives.

In the early morning on the same day, Labour Department Director-General Thet Naing Oo also met trade union leaders and told them to wait until the new government takes office after the general election.

Though it was a private meeting, about 20 intelligence personnel watched the unionists and took photographs and video recordings.

Tin Oo, vice-chairman of main opposition party, the National League for Democracy , said the government should not make such a prohibition.

Other trade union leaders who met with authorities are Par Lay and Win Naing from Taungdwingyi, Kyi Lin from South Dagon Township, Ma Nwe Yee Win from Tharyarwady, Khaing Thazin from Hlaingtharyar and Aye Chan Pye from Shwepyithar.

Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB) joint general-secretary Dr. Zaw Win Aung said, “The regime should enact laws permitting freedom in forming of trade unions and they should eliminate all hurdles and obstacles in this regard”.

Out of the more than 2,100 political prisoners behind bars, 15 are trade union activists, based in Thailand, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP-B) joint general-Secretary Bo Kyi said.

The successive military regimes have banned and deprived of right to freedom of association in Burma since 1962.

But at least 10 labour strikes since last December, staged by workers demanding for better wages and working environment have taken place at private industries since last December.

PM’s party enticing Muslims – Aye Nai
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 24 Jun 2010

Burma’s minority Muslim population will be issued with identification cards and allowed to freely travel the country if they make the right vote in elections, the party headed by Burma’s prime minster has reportedly said.The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has been campaigning in the country’s western Arakan state and appears to be targeting Muslims for votes. One man in Sandwoy town said that local authorities were urging them to join the party.

“It is likely that [the USDP] has no chance in recruiting Buddhist residents after the [September 2007] monk-led protests so they are now targeting Muslims, promising them ID cards and travel permission,” he told DVB.

Muslims are widely persecuted by the Buddhist ruling junta in Burma; the ethnic Rohingya minority in particular is denied any sort of legal status and thousands have now fled to Bangladesh. The government claims that four percent of Burmese are practising Muslims, but the US state department claims the figure could be as high as 30 percent.

He said that Muslims tired of the restrictions placed on them by the government “very much agreed to join the party”. A USDP leader and former government transport minister, Thein Swe, arrived in Sandwoy earlier this month and “summoned Muslim leaders [to talk about] the ID cards and the travel permission”.

“He assured these things will be OK because [Burmese junta chief] Than Shwe has also given his approval. He said a minister-level discussion was underway and told [Muslims] to wait one or two months and the travel issues will be OK.”

But a number of Buddhists in the town have reportedly spoken of their disappointment at the number of Muslims joining the party, which is widely tipped to win the elections later this year. The Sandwoy man said that the issue could trigger tension between the two religious groups.

“Burma has a majority Buddhist populaton but even [Buddhists] are being oppressed so it will be impossible for Muslims to get more privileges than [Buddhists],” he said.

Earlier this week the USDP was asked by an election candidate to ensure it had severed ties with the ruling junta prior to the polls. Phyo Min Thein, head of the Union Democratic Party (UDP), said the lines between the USDP and the government were blurred.

Other hopefuls for Burma’s first elections in two decades have complained that preferential treatment given to the USDP has hindered the chances of other parties running for office. The USDP’s social wing, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), allegedly began canvassing voters some weeks ago, while reports of coercion of civilians by the USDA have already surfaced.

China weapons giant to mine Burma – Francis Wade
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 24 Jun 2010

One of China’s biggest weapons manufacturers is to begin developing a copper mine in central Burma after agreeing to terms with the Burmese government earlier this month.A statement on the website of the state-owned China North Industries Corp (or Norinco) said the project will serve the dual purpose of “strengthening the strategic reserves of copper resources in [China], and enhancing the influence of our country in Myanmar [Burma]”. Norinco also bills itself as an engineering company.

At the beginning of June a top-level Chinese delegation, including prime minister Wen Jiabao, spent five days in Burma to ink a raft of new trade deals and mark the 60th anniversary of China-Burma diplomatic relations. It was during this visit that Wen oversaw the agreement for Norinco to take charge of the Monywa mine in Sagaing division.

China’s investments in Burma are soaring and will soon match those of Thailand and Singapore, the pariah state’s two main economic backers. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has already begun work on the multi-billion dollar Shwe pipeline pipeline project, while Beijing has been busily damming Burma’s major rivers to feed its energy-hungry population.

Investment in Burma’s mines provides the ruling junta with one of its largest sources of legal foreign capital, behind hydropower and gas. The Monywa area is rich in copper, and operations there had been dominated by Canadian giant Ivanhoe Mines until it allegedly withdrew in March 2007 and transferred ownership to The Monywa Trust. At its peak the mine had been producing some 39,000 tonnes of copper per year.

The Norinco statement said only that the two countries agreed a “cooperation contract” but did not mention who the other party in the project was. The agreement was signed by Norinco general manager, Zhang Guoqing.

Tin Maung Htoo, from the Canadian Friends of Burma (CFOB), says however that Ivanhoe transferred its lot to a blind trust who have taken “[responsibility] for the firm’s 50 percent stake in Monywa copper project, officially known as Myanmar Ivanhoe Copper Company Limited [MICCL],” thereby meaning that Ivanhoe has retained some presence in the project.

The managing director of MICCL, Glenn Ford, told DVB however that MICCL “has nothing to do with the Norinco project” and that Ivanhoe Mines had nothing to do with MICCL, which was blacklisted in July 2008 by both the EU and US for its “key financial backing” of the Burmese regime.

Norinco was also sanctioned by the US in 2003 for its ongoing weapons sales to Iran, with the White House calling the company a “serial proliferator”. Tin Maung Htoo said that the company’s contract with Burma was an “apparent copper for weapons deal”. China also happens to be Burma’s biggest arms supplier.

GlobalSecurity.org claims that Norinco’s “main business is supplying products for the Chinese military”, and has a registered capital of US$30 billion. The value of China-Burma trade in the 2008-2009 fiscal year was US$2.6 billion.

Myanmar restricts political activity ahead of polls
Agence France Presse: Wed 23 Jun 2010

Yangon — Members of political parties contesting Myanmar’s first elections in two decades will be banned from marching, waving flags and chanting to garner support, under rules announced Wednesday.The directive, which did not reveal a date for the polls, requires party members who want to gather and deliver speeches at places other than their offices to apply for a permit one week in advance, according to state media.

The rules prohibit “the act of marching to the designated gathering point and the venue holding flags, or marching and chanting slogans in procession” in a bid to enlist members, the New Light of Myanmar newspaper said.

Parties must have at least 1,000 members to contest the nationwide election.

Holding knives, weapons and ammunition are also banned, along with acts that harm security and the rule of law or tarnish the image of the military. Misuse of religion for political gains is also not allowed, state media said.

Critics have dismissed the election — which is scheduled for some time later this year — as a sham due to laws that have effectively barred opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from participating.

The United States said Tuesday that the polls will “not be free or fair and will lack international legitimacy”.

Suu Kyi’s party won the last polls in 1990 but was never allowed to take office. Her National League for Democracy (NLD) was forcibly dissolved last month under widely criticised laws governing the polls.

The NLD refused to meet a May 6 deadline to re-register as a party — a move that would have forced it to expel Suu Kyi, who is under house arrest — and is boycotting the vote.

Under election legislation unveiled in March, anyone serving a prison term is banned from being a member of a political party and parties that fail to obey the rule will be abolished.

The latest directive for drumming up support among voters has upset some parties who fear they will make it harder to connect with people.

“The political parties will be in a tight corner because of these rules,” said Ye Tun, chairman of the 88th Generation Student Youths (Union of Myanmar), which despite its name is pro-government.

“We are in difficult position to work in some places. They restricted our movements such as holding flags.”

But other parties welcomed the rules, saying they could have been even more restrictive.

“We can transform from party politics to people politics if we can get in touch with the people through party meetings,” said Phyo Min Thein, chairman of the Union Democratic Party.

A faction from within the disbanded NLD has applied to form a new political party, to be called the National Democratic Force, in a bid to advance the movement’s two-decade campaign to end military rule.

According to official figures, 36 out of 42 groups which have applied to form political parties have been registered.

NLD leaders tour Burma – Lawi Weng
Irrawaddy: Wed 23 Jun 2010

Despite being disbanded for failing to register for this year’s upcoming election, the National League for Democracy (NLD) remains active, sending senior members to branch offices around Burma to discuss strategy.
On Sunday, Win Tin, an NLD executive member, traveled to Karen State to meet with former party members. “I told them not to vote in the election,” he said, speaking to The Irrawaddy on Wednesday.

Win Tin, who was accompanied by two other party members from the the NLD’s Rangoon headquarters, said he also urged the members in Karen State to boycott the pro-junta Union Solidarity and Development Party, led by Prime Minister Thein Sein, and the National Unity Party, formed from late dictator Ne Win’s authoritarian Burma Socialist Programme Party.

“The purpose of the trip was to consolidate party unity and listen to the voices of members who face difficulties since the party decided not to register. We also wanted to tell them that we will not abandon them. We will continue to work more actively in politics,” said Win Tin.

Nyan Win, an NLD spokesperson, said that party leader Aung San Suu Kyi agreed with the trips. So far, senior party members from Rangoon have traveled to party offices in Shan, Karen and Mon states and Mandalay, Pegu and Irrawaddy divisions.

“It is important to meet with our members during these difficult times,” said Nyan Win.

The NLD decided not to register to run in the election because the 2008 Constitution bans Suu Kyi and other detained political leaders from participating. The NLD won a landslide victory in Burma’s last election in 1990.

Since deciding not to register for the election, the party has been unable to hold meetings at their offices, release official statements or engage in any other political activities.

“We traveled to see our members because we heard some of them are having trouble running their offices since the party was dissolved,” said Ohn Kyine, a central executive committee member of the NLD who recently visited the party’s office in Mandalay. “We want to know how they are dealing with the situation.”

Senior members of the NLD said they will continue to work for the Burmese people through humanitarian projects to support families of political prisoners, HIV/AIDS patients and Nargis victims.

“We will work in public politics and social politics even without party registration,” said Win Tin.

During his trip to Karen State, Win Tin also visited pagodas and met a Karen abbot known as Taungkalay Sayadaw to talk about national reconciliation and the current political situation.

Meanwhile, eight senior members of the NLD met with Robin Lerner, counsel of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and assistant to one-time US presidential candidate, John Kerry, yesterday.

“She asked us about our current situation and our future plans and what we will do after the election,” said Nyan Win.

The US said on Wednesday that the election will not be free and fair and will lack international legitimacy. No date has yet been set for the vote, the first in 20 years.

China remains silent on Burma’s nuclear ambitions – Hseng Khio Fah
Shan Herald Agency for News: Wed 23 Jun 2010

While the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been in grave concern on Burma’s nuclear weapons program with North-Korea’s support, its neighboring country, China has been conspicuously silent about it, say Burma Army observers on the Sino-Burma border.The reason is because China had acted as a facilitator between the two countries, according to Aung Kyaw Zaw, a well-known Burma watcher.

Burma and North-Korea suspended their relations in 1983, after members of a high profile delegation from South-Korea were assassinated by North-Korean agents while they were on a visit to Burma, known since then as the Mausoleum massacre.

China later had arranged a rapprochement between the two because it was unable to sell Burma other than conventional weapons, according to him.

“China is therefore partly responsible for the junta’s nuclear program,” he said. “But it should at least know that letting Burma to do whatever it wants is dangerous. It should have also realized that the junta military, from top to bottom, is unhappy with China. What happened at Kokang (last year) and Mongkoe (in 2000) should serve as examples.”

On 24 October 2000, a faction of the Mongkoe Defence Army (MDA), a breakaway group from Kokang, had mutinied. A month later, the mutineers were executed by the Burma Army and the MDA leader Mong Sala put in jail and the territory occupied by the Burma Army.

Likewise, in 2009 August, Kokang was attacked by the military junta and its territory has been occupied by the Burma Army since.

According to Aung Kyaw Zaw, the military junta has maintained relations with China because of military weapons and economic needs.

Burma’s nuclear program can be dangerous not only to western countries but also to ethnic groups in its country, according to him. “They might use these nuclear weapons to destroy any group that opposes them,” he said.

There are two main reasons Burma wants to have nuclear weapons: to stay in power and to use them as a deterrent to western countries if they interfere in its domestic affair.

Burma has reportedly been planning this nuclear weapons program since 2000 and has been sending up to 10,000 officers to Russia to study nuclear technology since 2002.

At the same time, there have been reports that Burma is hosting two Pakistani nuclear experts who took sanctuary in Burma after being accused by the CIA of helping Osama bin Laden to build nuclear weapons.

There are 9 countries that have nuclear warheads including North-Korea, that reportedly has 4-8 nuclear warheads.

Than Shwe the third ‘worst of the worst’
Irrawaddy: Wed 23 Jun 2010

In an article titled “The Worst of the Worst,” Foreign Policy magazine named junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe the world’s third worst dictator, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il ranked No 1 and Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe No 2.Than Shwe, Kim Jong Il and Mugabe were pictured on the magazine cover with the caption, “The committee to destroy the world.”

Than Shwe, who has been ruling Burma by force for almost 20 years, was described by Foreign Policy as a “heartless military coconut head whose sole consuming preoccupation is power.”

(Source: Foreign Policy)
The article said the Burmese dictator has decimated the opposition with arrests and detentions, denied humanitarian assistance to his people in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, which devastated Burma in May 2008, and thrived off a black market economy and natural gas exports.

“This vainglorious general bubbling with swagger sports a uniform festooned with self-awarded medals, but he is too cowardly to face an honest ballot box,” the article said.

Kim Jong Il, in power for 16 years, was described as a personality-cult-cultivating isolationist. Foreign Policy said Kim has pauperized his people, allowed famine to run rampant, thrown hundreds of thousands in prison camps and spent his country’s resources on a nuclear program.

Robert Mugabe, in power for 30 years, was described as a liberation “hero” in the struggle for independence who has since transformed himself into a murderous despot. He was condemned by Foreign Policy for arresting and torturing the opposition, squeezing his economy into astounding negative growth and billion-percent inflation and funneling off a juicy cut for himself using currency manipulation and offshore accounts.

The article named 23 world dictators in total, including the leaders of Uganda, Rwanda, Cuba, China, Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt.

Myanmar vote will ‘lack international legitimacy’: US
Agence France Presse: Wed 23 Jun 2010

Washington — The United States said that elections planned in military-run Myanmar this year will “lack international legitimacy.”“US believes elections planned for this year in Burma will not be free or fair and will lack international legitimacy,” the State Department said on the micro-blogging site Twitter, using Myanmar’s former name of Burma.

US Senator Jim Webb said earlier this month he expected Myanmar to hold elections on October 10 and urged support for the vote despite the military regime’s exclusion of the democratic opposition.

Webb is a leading US advocate for engagement with the junta, although he called off a trip to Myanmar this month due to allegations the country was developing nuclear weapons with support from North Korea.

Myanmar plans to hold its first elections in two decades later this year, although the regime has not set an exact date.

The Obama administration last year initiated dialogue with North Korea but has voiced concern about the elections, ahead of which Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy was forcibly dissolved.

Webb acknowledged that the election was designed to preserve the military regime, but said it was a step forward that the country would allow at least some opposition figures to stand for seats.

Union Election Commission issues Directive No.2/2010
New Light of Myanmar: Wed 23 Jun 2010

Nay Pyi Taw – The Union Election Commission issued Directive No.2/2010 dated 21 June 2010. The informal translation of the directive is as follows:-

Union of Myanmar
Union Election Commission
Nay Pyi Taw
Directive No.2/2010
10th Waxing of First Waso 1372 ME
(21 June 2010)

Subject: Enlisting the strength of political parties

Introduction

1. For holding a free and fair multi-party democracy general election in 2010, the Union Election Commission is granting permission to set up political parties and register as political parties in accord with the Political Parties Registration Law.

2. Under Section 9 of Political Parties Registration Law, the parties that have been granted permission to register as political parties shall have to submit a report to the UEC that they have enlisted the prescribed strength of their parties in accord with Section11 and Rule 13(a) (b) after mobilizing their members in accordance with Section 10.

3. The UEC, therefore, has issued the directive under Section 26 of Political Parties Registration Law in order that the political parties that have been granted permission to register shall act in conformity with the law in enlisting the prescribed number of party members.

Procedures to follow

4. Political parties may follow the following procedures for enlisting the prescribed number of party members:-

(a) Assembling and giving speeches at a designated place with the permission of the sub-commission concerned

(b) Writing, printing and publishing

Applying for permission to assemble and give speeches

5. Those political parties that want to assemble and give speeches at a designated place shall have to apply to the sub-commission concerned at least seven days ahead as mentioned hereunder to get a permit.

(a) The State or Division Sub-commission concerned for the townships where State or Division Sub-commission office is resided

(b) The District Sub-commission concerned for the townships where District Sub-commission office is resided

(c) The Township Sub-commission concerned for the remaining townships except the townships mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b)

6. Those political parties that want to assemble and give speeches at their party headquarters or branches shall have to report to the sub-commission concerned at least seven days ahead without necessity to apply for permission.

7. The political parties entitled to apply: In applying for permission according to the paragraph 5, the chairman, the secretary of the party headquarters, state/division, district, or township concerned or a person who takes the same responsibility of the said chairman or secretary shall have to sign the application.

8. Points to be mentioned in the application: In applying for the permit, political parties concerned shall have to mention that they will assemble and give speeches in conformity with the prohibitions, provisions included in the permit and the rules and regulations in addition to the following points in the application.

(a) the planned place

(b) the planned date

(c) starting time and finishing time (estimate)

(d) the number of attendees (estimate)

(e) the names, National Registration Card Nos. and addresses of permitted speaker or speakers

(f) The name, NRC No and address of the applicant

9. Scrutiny to be conducted by the sub-commission concerned: As regards for applying for the permit according to paragraphs 5, 7 and 8, the subcommission concerned:-

(a) shall issue the permit or reject the application after scrutinizing the application as necessary

(b) shall have to mention the following points in the permit if it is to be issued:-

(1) date and venue of the issuance

(2) Starting time and finishing time.

(3) Name, NRC No and address of permitted speaker or speakers.

(c) Rules prohibiting the act of marching to the designated gathering point and the venue holding flags or marching and chanting slogans in procession, and stating to disperse without any slogan-chanting marches at the end of assembling and speeches shall be stipulated in the permit.

(d) The followinpoints shall be stipulated in a permit as necessary:

(1) Not to disturbany public places such as government offices, organizations, factories, workshops, workplaces, markets, sports grounds, religious places, schools and people’s hospitals.

(2) Not to exceed the capacity of buildings or halls designated as assembling vanue for speeches (To make the party concerned to take the responsibility to ensure that there is no assembling outside the building or hall).

(3) If a place permitted for assembling and giving speeches is a ground, the number of the attendees shall not exceed the capacity of the ground.

(4) Holding sticks, knives, weapons and ammunition, and any harmful objects are prohibited.

(5) Any acts to disturb traffic or to block roads are prohibited.

(6) The sound amplified by sound boxes shall be just loud enough to hear inside the permitted room or ground in order to avoid public annoyance.

(7) The sound amplifying system shall be used in accordance with the existing rules and regulations as necessary.

(8) Other restrictions as necessary.

(e) The permit to assembly and give speeches shall be issued at least 48 hours before the due time. If the application for assembling and giving speeches is rejected, the rejection shall be informed with the reasons at least 48 hours before the due time for assembling and giving speeches.

(f) If necessary, the rules and regulations enumerated in the permit may be amended or the permit may be revoked for the sake of security, the rule of law and peace.

(g) Potential public places for permission to assemble and give speeches in home regions shall be designated in advance in coordination with Peace and Development Councils concerned.

(h) Measures shall be taken through coordination for Peace and Development Councils and security forces concerned to provide protection in order that the process of assembling and giving speeches cannot be harmed.

(i) Measures shall be taken through coordination for Peace and Development Councils and security forces concerned to make necessary arrangements to ward off any forms of acts that can harm security, the rule of law and community peace.

The right of publication

10. If political parties wish to publish and distribute documents, booklets and pamphlets for public knowledge of their policies, vision and work programmes, they shall strictly follow Directive (42) dated 17 March 2010 issued in accordance with 1962 Printers and Publishers Registration Law by the Central Body for Supervising Registration of Printers and Publishers and Scrutinization of Literary Works.

Prohibitions

11. In assembling, giving speeches and publishing and distributing publications, political parties shall not violate any of the following prohibitions.

(a) acts to harm non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national unity, and perpetuation of sovereignty,

(b) acts to harm security, the rule of law, and community peace,

(c) failure to respect the constitution of the Union of Myanmar and existing laws,

(d) giving talks and publishing and distributing publications with the intention tarnishing the image of the State,

(e) giving talks and publishing and distributing publications with the intention of breaking up the Tatmadaw or tarnishing the image of the Tatmadaw,

(f) creating literary works, giving talks or taking organizing measures that can spark disputes on racial affairs or religious affairs or individuals or others, and that can harm dignity and morality,

(g) misusing religion for political gains,

(h) Making instigation, giving talks and publishing and distributing publications with the intention of harming peaceful pursuit of education,

(i) Making instigation giving talks and publishing and distributing publications with the intention that government service personnel cannot shoulder their duties with a sense of duty or they take to the streets to protest the government.

12. Political parties shall not be against the existing laws, prohibitions, stipulated in this directive, and principles in the permit in giving talks and publishing and distributing publications on their policies, vision and work programmes.

13. If a political party fails to honour any of the prohibitions in this directive, or any of the rules and regulations in the permit, action will be taken against the party in accordance with not only the existing law but also Political Parties Registration Law.

Conclusion

14. Therefore, political parties are to honour this directive in recruiting new party members, giving speeches and publishing and distributing publications to ensure that the Multi-Party Democracy General Election to be held in 2010 will be free and fair.

Chairman
Union Election Commission

____________________________________
PRESS RELEASE

June 23, Burma Campaign UK
New report on crimes against humanity against Rohingyas strengthens case for UN Inquiry

The Burma Campaign UK today welcomed a new report – Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of the Rohingyas – published by the Irish Centre for Human Rights.

The report was supervised by Prof Schabas, an expert on international human rights law, who served as one of the seven commissioners on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The report was funded by the Irish government.

The hard-hitting report exposes how the Rohingya ethnic minority in Burma are subject to a range of different human rights abuses which constitute, or may constitute, crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute. These include:

• Forced labour
• Deportation and forcible transfer
• Rape and sexual violence
• Persecution

The report states that; “there is a reliable body of evidence pointing to acts constituting a widespread or systematic attack against the Rohingya civilian population….These appear to satisfy the requirements under international criminal law for the perpetration of crimes against humanity.”

The report recommends that the United Nations Security Council establish a commission of inquiry into the crimes exposed in the report, and into potential crimes being committed in other parts of Burma.

It also calls on the International Labour Organisation to reconsider referring Burma to the International Court of Justice unless there are “swift satisfactory changes.”

In March this year the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Burma also called for a UN commission of inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma.

So far Australia, UK, Czech Republic, and Slovakia have publicly stated that they support a UN commission of inquiry. On 17th June The Elders joined international calls for the establishment of such an inquiry.

“This report provides yet more evidence that the generals ruling Burma are criminals who are breaking international law and avoiding justice,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Governments cannot continue to ignore the evidence; ignorance is no longer an excuse for inaction. We need to see governments publicly supporting a UN commission of inquiry and then taking action to establish it. The European Union should state that it supports the establishment of a UN commission of inquiry. The Irish government should be congratulated for funding this report. We hope they will now express their clear support for a UN inquiry and work for the EU as a whole to also adopt this position.”

NLD top leaders take roadshow to grass roots – Myint Maung
Mizzima News: Tue 22 Jun 2010

New Delhi – Leaders of the National League for Democracy are conducting a roadshow of states and divisions to meet grass-roots members, explain policies and listen to the challenges they are facing since the party was declared illegal and disbanded by the ruling military junta early last month after deciding against registering under “unjust” electoral laws, a senior leader said. The tour comes at the request of NLD general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, central executive committee member Ohn Kyaing said.

From June 12, NLD central executive committee members Ohn Kyaing and Kyi Win have been on a tour set to take in Moegyoke, Thapatekyin, Mattaya, Patheingyi, Meiktila, Myinchan, Kyaukpadaung, Nyaung Oo in Mandalay Division and Pakokku in Magway Division. Similarly, central executive committee members Dr Win Tin and Han Tha Myint, and Bahan Township NLD chairman Aung Myint, have been touring Karen State since Saturday, Suu Kyi’s 65th birthday.

“We will not hold political meetings, issue political statements or direct the grass roots of the party. But we do need to find out about conditions on the ground,” Ohn Kyaing told Mizzima. “Aung San Suu Kyi told us to meet our political colleagues and listen to their difficulties.”

Suu Kyi issued the directive to listen to grass-roots voices when she met her lawyer Nyan Win. At the meeting, she asked the leaders to carry the message to township leaders that although the NLD had been barred from political activities, the group should continue working for national reconciliation, human rights and democracy as a leading political opposition group.

In the states and divisions visited so far during the NLD tours, the senior party executives explained to grass-roots party members the nature of the junta’s one-sided and unjust electoral laws and the party’s decision against re-registering with the junta’s Union Election Commission (UEC). Township members said they supported the party’s decisions and that they would follow unanimously the leadership of Suu Kyi and party policy, the party sources said.

Ohn Kyaing said: “Aung San Suu Kyi, party’s vice-chairman Tin Oo and CEC member Win Tin told us to carry out non-profit social services under a political agenda.”

CEC members met grass-roots party leaders Thein Tan and Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, NLD leaders in Mandalay Division. NLD members Myo Naing and Maung Maung Than also attended. Ohn Kyaing said the team would visit townships in Magway including Pakkoku after Mandalay.

A group led by Win Tin has since Saturday visited Hlaingbwe and Phaan in Karen State. He called in on the party grass roots in Mandalay, Pegu (Bago) and Rangoon Divisions early this year.

The junta’s new look
Irrawaddy: Tue 22 Jun 2010

Is this photo a sneak preview of what civilian rule in Burma will look like?While many observers predict that the end of military rule will bring no more than superficial change, they may not have realized just how cosmetic it will be.

After years of wearing the same old uniforms, it seems that Prime Minister Thein Sein and his entourage of government ministers couldn’t wait to make a statement that would really tell the world that Burma is about to break out of the straitjacket of military rule.

The photo shows Thein Sein et al welcoming visiting Laotian Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh (wearing a business suit) at a military compound in Naypyidaw on Monday. From head to toe, they are dressed in nothing but the best in traditional Burmese finery: gaungbaung headdresses, immaculately white taikpon jackets, brightly colored silk longgyi and velvet sandals normally reserved for Buddhist novitiation ceremonies.

Along with Thein Sein, 26 other generals resigned from the military in April to take part in this year’s election as political candidates for the pro-junta Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), including many who appear in this photograph.

The USDP has been officially registered by Burma’s election commission and currently faces criticism from other political parties that its inclusion of government ministers violates election laws.

Their ostentatious fashion statement notwithstanding, it is interesting to note that the ministers who appear in this photograph are standing stiffly at attention—more like good soldiers than ministers greeting a foreign dignitary.

Burma’s nuclear ambition is apparently real and alarming – Robert Kelly
Nation (Thailand): Tue 22 Jun 2010

The evidence presented in the Democratic Voice of Burma’s documentary, “Burma’s Nuclear Ambitions”, is thorough, compelling and alarming. Although Burma’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has long been rumoured, the documentary contains new information from a recent defector who provided DVB with photographs, documents and a view from inside the secretive military that should finally put to rest any doubt about Burma’s nuclear ambition. The evidence includes chemical processing equipment for converting uranium compounds into forms for enrichment, reactors and bombs. Taken altogether in Burma’s covert programme, they have but one use – nuclear weapons. Prior to the airing of the documentary, the DVB invited a team of international experts, including individuals with experience in military tunneling, missiles, nuclear proliferation, and weapons inspections protocol to review its information and assess its conclusions. The evidence was so consistent – from satellite images to blueprints, colour photographs, insider accounts and detailed budgets – and so copious that I agreed to appear in the documentary to offer my advice concerning Burma’s nuclear ambitions.

As a former Los Alamos analyst and a director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I have spent 30 years investigating allegations of this nature. After a careful review of the information, I became convinced that Burma’s pursuit of nuclear technology violates the limits imposed on it by its agreements with the IAEA.

I authored a report on the findings, “Nuclear Activities in Burma”, which explains the evidence and concludes that Burma is probably in violation of several international agreements concerning nuclear proliferation.

However, the IAEA is limited in its leverage over Burma, which has failed to upgrade its two obsolete IAEA agreements and failed to execute a new IAEA agreement called the “Additional Protocol”, which would give the IAEA greater powers to question Burma and demand inspections in the country.

The Additional Protocol was a priority of former IAEA director-general and Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed El Baradei. In May, Chad became the 100th country to sign the Additional Protocol, while only a few remain outside its reach, including Iran and Syria. Burma also shields itself from questions and inspections using another out-of-date agreement called a “Small Quantities Protocol”. This exempts states that only have small amounts of nuclear materials and no nuclear facilities from IAEA inspections and close oversight. The new evidence presented in the DVB documentary makes a compelling case that Burma’s pursuit of nuclear weapons now places it in the category of countries where the Small Quantities Protocol would no longer apply.

With outdated protocols governing its IAEA participation, Burma may believe it can resist IAEA demands. However, given the serious and troubling nature of the allegations of Burma’s nuclear ambitions, the IAEA and the international community must vigorously pursue all tools at their disposal to compel Burma’s cooperation. For starters, the IAEA can unilaterally cut off all aid to Burma in improving its nuclear infrastructure through expert visits, grants and equipment purchases, and to any other state that has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty or agreed to the Additional Protocol.

While these new agreements are voluntary, the provision of so-called technical cooperation funds is a voluntary act on the part of the IAEA as well. It would send a clear message to Burma that the IAEA takes this issue seriously and will no longer tolerate anything less than Burma’s full cooperation with the international community on the monitoring of Burma’s nascent nuclear programme. Although some of the aid (US$1.3 million in 2008-2009) goes for medical and humanitarian assistance, other programmes support training nuclear experts and professionals in Burma, which is clearly inconsistent with the IAEA’s interest in trying to nip a covert nuclear programme in the bud.

The new information on Burma’s nuclear ambitions is now available to experts and governments around the world. Yet, even before the IAEA has even officially enquired about it, the Burmese government has denied it. Given Burma’s track record in working with the international community, there is little doubt what Burma’s answer will be when it is formally asked.

DVB’s reportage brought to light Burma’s nuclear ambition; it is also a call to anyone in Burma who knows more about covert programmes in nuclear, missile technology, and other weapons of mass destruction to come forward. Other defectors, such as Major Sai Thein Win, are likely to come forward. Many people know the truth, and it will take only a few more brave souls to expose the programme for the world to see.

Too many states have proliferated while the world stood back and watched. The A Q Khan network sold nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan and operated observed but untouched for possibly twenty years. The possibility that Burma is trying to build nuclear weapons has been a suspicion for the last decade, but now the evidence is much clearer. The world needs to get serious about choking off Burma’s covert programme through export controls via the Nuclear Suppliers Group and strengthening the hand of the IAEA.

Burma is one of the world’s most repressive and secretive regimes. Its ample natural wealth, including gas and oil reserves that will bring in billions of dollars annually in hard currency, make it a natural buyer for North Korea and other countries with nuclear know-how to sell. Last month, the UN Security Council received a 47-page report issued by a seven-member panel of experts on North Korea’s export of nuclear technology. The UN experts noted “suspicious activity in Burma”.

Burma’s pursuit of nuclear weapons requires immediate international attention. Allowing yet another dictatorship to acquire the world’s most powerful weapons is not an option.

* Robert Kelley is a recently retired director of the IAEA with over 30 years experience in nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

Election Commission begins poll preparations – Saw Yan Naing
Irrawaddy: Mon 21 Jun 2010

In preparation for the upcoming election, Burmese authorities have tasked 600 schoolteachers in Rangoon Division with the mission of organizing voter lists and inputting the information on computers, according to sources in Rangoon.The schoolteachers were summoned by the authorities on June 9, said one schoolteacher in Rangoon who is participating in the process and who asked for anonymity. They were asked to take lists of eligible voters collected from across the country, organize the lists and place the information on government computers.

The process will take at least two months. The completed voter lists will be sent to the election commission, the schoolteacher said.

According to a report by the Rangoon-based Eleven Media Group, the chairman of the election commission, Thein Soe, held talks with members of the election commission who represent divisions and states about providing election related training and activities in their areas.

The commission members also received demonstrations on and practiced how to operate a polling center, how to set up a polling station and how to perform the voting process. The practice sessions are intended to show international observers and the public that the junta will hold “free and fair elections,” according to the Eleven Media Group report.

The Burmese government has not officially announced the election date, but many observers and diplomats say the election is expected to be held in October. The Eleven Media Group report said that Thein Soe will announce the election date after the election preparations are complete.

Most of the schoolteachers involved in organizing and inputting the voter lists are members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a junta-backed civil organization. In Burma, schoolteachers are usually assigned as supervisors and polling center watchers during elections.

The USDA, founded in 1993, claims more than 24 million members nationwide, including schoolteachers, civil service personnel and members of the military.
On April 29, USDA leaders who are also government ministers and senior officials, including Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein, founded the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to contest the election.

The USDA and USDP have been criticized by analysts and other political parties for their interconnected leadership, current government positions and ties to the military.

Thus far, 33 political parties that plan to contest the upcoming election have been granted registration permission by the election commission, but the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by pro-democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi, decided not to register and was therefore dissolved.

The election will be Burma’s first since 1990, when the NLD won a landslide victory but the military junta refused to transfer power.

Words must be turned into action for Aung San Suu Kyi
Burma Campaign UK: Mon 21 Jun 2010

Burma Campaign today warmly welcomed British Prime Minister David Cameron’s letter of support for Aung San Suu Kyi on her 65th birthday, and asked him to take the lead in supporting UN led efforts to secure negotiations between the dictatorship and Burma’s democracy movement.“The letter from the Prime Minister demonstrates Britain’s continuing commitment to supporting the people of Burma in their struggle for human rights and democracy,” said Zoya Phan, International Coordinator at Burma Campaign UK.

Aung San Suu Kyi is spending her 65th birthday in detention today. She has spent almost 15 years in detention since 1989. The exact time she has spent in detention is 14 years and 238 days. The United Nations has repeatedly ruled that her detention breaks international law.

US President Barak Obama and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon have also issued statements of support.

“We now need action as well as words,” said Zoya Phan. “It is time for the international community to unite around UN led dialogue to bring peace and democracy to Burma. Prime Minister David Cameron must pressure Ban Ki-moon to act.”

On Thursday 17th June The Elders, which includes former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, called on the international community to support a UN led dialogue initiative for national reconciliation in Burma.

The UN has been mandated to work for such dialogue by the UN General Assembly, and it is supported by the UN Security Council, UN Human Rights Council, EU, USA and ASEAN. However, despite this, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) are taking no serious steps to secure such dialogue.

The fact that the DPA website still lists Ibrahim Gambari as leading UN diplomatic efforts on Burma – seven months after his resignation – is an indication of the low priority given to Burma by the Secretary General and DPA.

“Everyone knows the fake elections due in Burma will not bring real change,” said Zoya Phan. “We cannot have a situation where Ban Ki-moon ignores member states and sits back hoping for change. While Ban Ki-moon dithers, more prisoners are tortured, more women are raped, more villages burned, and more children die from hunger and disease because the generals spent the money on guns and luxury homes.”

Full text of the letter from Prime Minister David Cameron:

“Dear Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

Today you will mark yet another birthday under house arrest – cut off from your children and your family. My thoughts, and thoughts of so many people in Britain and across the world, will be with you and with the people of Burma. The injustice of your continuing detention mirrors the injustice that the regime has inflicted on your country and your people for so many years. Throughout that time, you have stood firm, at enormous personal cost, for the principles of liberty and justice. You have become a powerful symbol of the strength of the human spirit.

Like my predecessor, I personally have long found your example deeply inspiring. I want to assure you that as Prime Minister, I will maintain a close interest in Burma. The British Government I lead will do all it can, both internationally, working through the United Nations, and bilaterally, to bring a brighter future for Burma and your people, in which they enjoy full human rights and true democracy.

I have never forgotten your own request: that we should use our liberty to help the Burmese people to obtain theirs. I promise we will do everything we can to achieve that.”

Parties seek allies to meet election expenses – Ko Htwe
Irrawaddy: Fri 18 Jun 2010

Short on funds and with limited manpower at their disposal, several political parties in Burma are looking to pool their resources ahead of this year’s election.The parties, among the dozens that have so far received permission to run in the election, say they are facing severe financial constraints that limit their ability to function effectively. Among other things, they say they can barely afford to publish campaign materials such as political pamphlets and journals.

“Our weak point is our lack of time, money and human resources. That’s why we need to cooperate with other parties,” said Phyo Min Thein, the chairman of Union Democratic Party (UDP), adding that his party is now discussing possible tie-ups with ethnic and democratic parties.

Some parties said that registration fees are especially onerous. In addition to the 300,000 kyat (US $500) that parties must pay to register, there is an additional fee of 500,000 kyat for each candidate that the party fields in the election.

The UDP has released a statement calling on the government to subsidize the candidate registration fee.

Than Than Nu, the general secretary of the Democratic Party (Myanmar), said she welcomed cooperation between parties, but added that forming alliances would likely take a lot of time.

“If we cooperate in the election, democratic forces can be successful. It is difficult to reach agreements on cooperation, but we are all friends. We also welcome other parties’ offers to work together,” she said.

Nan Shwe Kyar, the spokesperson for the Wuntharnu [Patriotic] National League for Democracy, said that finding common ground is the key to forming a successful alliance.

“We are ready to negotiate with parties that share our goals and point of view. Right now we are learning about the political ideologies of other parties,” he said.

So far, 42 political parties have applied for party registration, of which 33 have been accepted. Except for the pro-regime National Unity Party (NUP), none of the major parties from the last election in 1990 will be running.

Both the NUP and the National League for Democracy, which won the 1990 election by a landslide, formed alliances with smaller parties.

Burmese tycoon brokered arms deal with China – Thomas Maung Shwe
Mizzima New: Fri 18 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – Burma’s richest business tycoon and close ally of despotic ruler Senior General Than Shwe, went to China early this month to broker a deal enabling the regime to buy 50 multi-role jet bombers for its air force, trusted sources said.Tay Za was also spotted at the Kunming regional trade fare on June 7, in China’s southern province of Yunnan. The purpose of his visit was to help the Burmese regime acquire the K-8 Karakorum, a two-seat intermediate jet trainer and light attack aircraft developed in a joint venture between China and Pakistan.

Estimates for the price of the aircraft vary widely. Last October, Bolivia announced that it would spend US$57.8 million to buy six of the planes. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly the deal also included “two spare engines, a KTS2000BW test vehicle, an Interactive Multimedia Instructor system, initial spare [parts], training and maintenance equipment”.

Since then, Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez had announced on June 7 that his government would spend US$82 million on 18 of the planes. The air force of the country on the northern coast of South America already has at least 200 aircraft.

The Burmese Air Force had bought 12 K-8 Karakorum. Sources close to the air force told Mizzima that Burma’s rulers want more ground attack fighters than strategic fighters such as the Russian-made MiG-29 or its Chinese-built version, the F-5. Such ground attack fighters could be used to intimidate ethnic groups under ceasefire which have refused to bring their troops under the supervision of the junta’s Border Guard Force.

Planes part of a mystery deal announced om September by Hongdu Aviation?

Last year Jane’s Defence Industry (also part of the Jane’s Intelligence group) reported that K-8’s Chinese manufacturer Hongdu Aviation had released a cryptic statement in September saying it had just secured a contract with an “unnamed Asian country” to export 60 K-8 planes. According to Jane’s, the statement disclosed that a deal had been struck between Hongdu, the mystery Asian nation and China’s National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation on September 6 at Hongdu’s offices in Nanchang, Jiangxi province.

Jane’s speculated that the unnamed Asian partner could be Iran or Indonesia, both seeking to upgrade their air forces. While it is possible that the unnamed partner was in fact the Burmese regime, Mizzima was unable to determine if this was the case.

According to Jane’s the statement Hongdu issued in September disclosed that the deal would transpire in three stages. The first stage would involve the export of 12 aircraft. The second stage would involve the customer acquiring K-8 related technologies, equipment and tools. The third would involve the customer producing the final 48 aircraft under licence locally.

Mizzima has learned that Tay Za was looking to buy an ATR-72 twin-turboprop short-haul regional airliner from Chinese Southern Airlines for his own airline, Air Bagan. He had bought two A-310 Airbuses from China but was unable to use the aircraft because they were grounded in Rangoon for safety reasons.

China is one of the few places where Tay Za can now conduct business transactions with relative ease since he was put on the American, European, Canadian, Australian and Swiss financial sanctions blacklists for Burma. The US government, which commonly refers to Tay Za as “an arms dealer and financial henchman”, was the first Western nation to target the portly tycoon on their black list, citing his close financial ties to Than Shwe and the reclusive dictator’s children. Despite the sanctions against him Tay Za is estimated to have amassed a fortune of more than US$10 billon dollars.

Ban Ki-moon called Burma gas pipeline a ‘win-win’ – Thomas Maung Shwe
Mizzima News: Fri 18 Jun 2010

Chiang Mai – Mizzima has learned that while serving as Korea’s foreign minister, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon promoted and publicly praised Daewoo’s controversial Shwe natural gas pipeline project in Burma, calling it a “win-win situation”. The controversial project that started construction two weeks ago is the effort of a multinational consortium that consists of Chinese, Indian, Burmese and Korean state-owned firms as minority partners, with Daewoo International having the largest stake and taking the lead in its development.

The Korea Herald newspaper in Seoul called the Shwe gas project South Korea’s “largest overseas project”. It is estimated that royalties from it will give the Burmese regime an estimated US$40 billion over three decades, funds that critics fear will empower its army for years to come. Construction of an 800-kilometre pipeline that will send gas from Burma’s west coast to China began last week.

The uncovering of Ban’s pro-Daewoo pipeline comments comes as the UN chief faces intense criticism from international rights advocates who question his commitment to democracy and human rights.

The pro-pipeline comments were made in August 2005 when Ban was in New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart K. Natwar Singh. According to the India press, a high priority for both governments was Daewoo’s collaboration with two Indian state-controlled firms in the Shwe natural gas project: the Gas Authority of India (Gail) and ONGC Videsh, the wholly-owned international subsidiary of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). The Press Trust of India citing the agreed minutes of the meeting described it this way:

“Taking note of the model of Daewoo-OVL-Gail partnership in Myanmar [Burma], the two sides agreed collaboration in exploration of hydrocarbon resources between Indian and South Korean companies would lead to a ‘win-win’ situation.”

That Ban had agreed the Shwe project was a “win-win” has outraged human rights advocates and Burmese exiles who have grave concerns about the devastating environmental impact of the project, which they predict will provide billions in foreign currency for the Burmese military to buy weapons to use against their own people .

Wong Aung from the Shwe Gas Campaign, an advocacy group that is strongly opposed to the Shwe project told Mizzima it “is a ‘win win’ for Ban Ki-moon and Korean industry but certainly not the people of Burma, just the killer generals”.

Naing Htoo from Earth Rights International also objected to the controversial project being called a “win-win”, saying that the “Shwe Project will harm Korea’s reputation, Daweoo’s reputation and it poses direct human rights threat to thousands of villagers in Burma, so I’d say it’s a ‘lose-lose’ situation. Unless the junta completely changes the way it manages natural resource wealth and unless it starts to protect human rights rather than violate them, the Shwe project is a disaster.”

When questioned last year by a reporter from Inner City Press about his stance on Daewoo’s Shwe project Ban refused to comment. On Wednesday June 9 the same reporter, Matthew Russell Lee, asked the UN chief’s spokesman, Farhan Haq, if Ban still believed the project was a “win-win”. Haq claimed he would find out. When reached for comment by Mizzima a week later, Haq claimed he was still looking into the matter and failed to provide an answer.

When Ban travelled to Burma last summer in what many observers believed was a half-hearted attempt to show he was doing something, the Burmese regime refused to let him see detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Many Burma opposition activists believed Ban could have pushed harder for a meeting with the world’s most famous political prisoner, but failed to do so out of fear he would risk angering the regime and harm a project important to Korean industry. Several weeks after Ban’s visit, US Senator Jim Webb was allowed to meet the detained Nobel Peace laureate.

Wong Aung from the Shwe gas movement feels that the Ban has never ceased being Korea’s Foreign Minister, “when he served Korea Ban Ki-moon was clearly a supporter of Daewoo’s Shwe gas project, an environmentally destructive pipeline that will be built on land stolen from the citizens of Burma. Its clear that when he became UN secretary general he didn’t stop pursuing Korean business interests and I strongly believe this has a lot to do with his reluctance to challenge the Burmese regime”.

Wong Aung points out that Ban’s friendly overtures to the dictatorial regime of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan coincide with the massive amounts of Korean investment in that central Asian nation. In addition to Daewoo International, two Korean state-owned firms Korea Gas Corporation (Kogas) and the Korean National Oil Corporation (KNOC) have each invested several billion dollars in the former Soviet republic’s lucrative energy sector. Uzbekistan’s despotic ruler Karimov has been accused by rights groups of jailing and executing large numbers of his opponents. In 2002, Craig Murray, then Britain’s Ambassador to Uzbekistan, commissioned a forensic report concluding that a deceased Uzbek dissident had likely died as a result of his having been boiled alive by his jailers.

He said that he was particularly disturbed to read that spokesman Haq could not confirm if on his April trip to Uzbekistan Ban had raised the conviction in February of a prominent Aids activist who worked closely with United Nations agencies. Human Rights Watch reported that Maxim Popov was sentenced to seven years’ jail for “anti-social behaviour” because he wrote and distributed Aids-awareness pamphlets that were printed with funds from the UN.

The plight of Maxim Popov, Wong Aung believed, was not high on the secretary-general’s list of priorities, if at all. He said: “Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon built up ties between Seoul and places that are priority areas for Korean industry such as Burma and Uzbekistan, helping to make Korea one of the biggest investors in both nations.”

“Evidently Ban Ki-moon thinks he’s still Korean foreign minister and he can’t risk his good standing with Uzbekistan’s dictator by speaking out about the plight of Maxim Popov, a man who was jailed by a paranoid regime for handing out UN-funded material on Aids prevention,” he said.

“Ban Ki-moon’s relationship with Burma’s generals is exactly the same – the rights of Korean business trump human rights. Going by his record as secretary-general it is abundantly clear that Ban Ki-moon is not fit for the job of heading the UN – he really is a disgrace.”

Burmese activists fear extension of army’s power – Ron Corben
Voice of America: Fri 18 Jun 2010

Bangkok – Burmese women activists fear Burma’s military will be entrenched in power after elections later this year and are calling on the international community to reject the outcome. The activists made the calls as they marked Women of Burma Day and the birthday of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi.Fears over the transparency of Burma’s national elections scheduled for this year have led to calls by Burmese political activists for the international community to boycott the election result.

The concern over the election outcome, likely to be in October, comes as Burmese and ethnic communities who support Burma’s opposition parties prepare to mark the 65th birthday of opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi on June 19.

The elections, the first in 20 years, are seen by some analysts as a step forward following two decades of stagnant political progress after the military rejected results from an election in May 1990.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won the 1990 vote in a landslide, but the party never assumed power as the military detained dozens of opposition political leaders as well as harassing party members.

In 2008 a new constitution was pressed through by a national referendum and the government recently announced new election laws. The NLD and other ethnic groups have refused to participate in the election.

Lae Lae Nwe, a former political prisoner who served four years of a 21-year jail sentence before fleeing to Thailand, says she fears the outlook for Burma after the elections.

She says the constitution supports the military’s position with the allocation of seats in a new parliament while the military’s power is supported by recently announced election laws which activists say are biased against the opposition.

“We can see no justice and also the release of the election law,” she said. “The election laws are not fair. I would like to say to the international community please wipe out the 2010 elections and don’t support military junta.”

Her comments came as rights group, the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, released a publication, Burma – Women’s Voices for Peace, a compilation of writings by women of Burma who have faced rights abuses.

Lway Aye Nang, a member of the Women’s League of Burma says the elections will raise concerns over the military’s ongoing influence.

“The election will give legitimacy to the people to the military that they can do whatever they want in officially,” she said. “So it will not change, the situation for Burma it will continue to put the people of Burma in danger.”

Parties closely associated with the military, such as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), are able to campaign while other local parties, including those linked to ethnic communities are being restricted. She says the election is not a way forward for Burma.

“People will say something is better than nothing,” she added. “But this something is putting the people of Burma in danger. So at the end of the day these people from the military personnel, military community these USDA member – they will take the lead, they will take the position to rule the area like officially.”

Burmese communities throughout the world, preparing to mark Augn San Suu Kyi’s birthday, are stepping up calls for her release from house arrest along with the more than 2,500 political prisoners officially recorded as being detained.

The Burma-North Korea axis – Aung Lynn Htut
International Herald Tribune: Fri 18 Jun 2010

Washington — This is a sensitive moment in relations between the United States and the world’s most corrupt regime: the military junta that has plundered Burma for decades as if it were a private fiefdom.The Obama administration has attempted to apply a strategy dubbed “pragmatic engagement.” As it works to rethink its position amid the present cacophony of foreign and domestic crises, there is a danger that Washington might give Burma short shrift and unwittingly soften its stance toward the country’s military leaders. It should be careful not do so. And it should take the junta’s nuclear-weapons ambitions seriously.

The regime in Burma has a history of deceiving American officials. I know; before defecting to the United States in 2005, I was a senior intelligence officer for the war office in Burma. I was also the deputy chief of mission at Burma’s embassy in Washington.

In the autumn of 2003, a senior staff member for a U.S. senator came twice to our embassy in Washington to call on Ambassador U Lin Myaing and me. At about the same time, officials from the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council also met in New York with U Tin Win, from the office of Burma’s prime minister, and Colonel Hla Min, the government’s spokesman.

The American officials were checking reports that Burma had secretly renewed ties with North Korea — one of the three pillars of George W. Bush’s “axis of evil.”

Burma had severed ties with North Korea in 1983, after North Korean operatives attempted to assassinate South Korea’s president, Chun Doo Hwan, during a state visit to Rangoon. Chun was unhurt, but 17 senior South Korean officials — including the deputy prime minister and the foreign and commerce ministers — were killed.

The head of Burma’s junta, Senior General Than Shwe, instructed us to lie to the Americans. We did. We blamed Burma’s political opposition for the “rumors” that Rangoon had renewed ties with Pyongyang. The Americans wanted proof. Than Shwe then ordered Foreign Minister U Win Aung to send a letter denying the reports to Secretary of State Colin Powell. The British government knew the truth. London’s ambassador to Rangoon rightfully called U Win Aung a liar.

Why did Burma renew ties with North Korea? Regime preservation.

In the aftermath of the 1988 nationwide uprising in Burma, many foreign joint ventures for the production of conventional weapons were cancelled. Than Shwe began the secret re-engagement with North Korea in 1992, soon after he took control of Burma’s ruling clique.

He argued that Burma faced potential attack from the United States and India, which at the time was a champion of Burma’s democracy movement. He wanted a bigger army. He wanted more modern weapons. He even wanted nuclear arms. He cared not at all for the poverty of Burma’s people.

Than Shwe secretly made contact with Pyongyang. Posing as South Korean businessmen, North Korean weapons experts began arriving in Burma. I remember these visitors. They were given special treatment at the Rangoon airport. With a huge revenue bonanza from sales of natural gas to Thailand, Burma was soon able to pay the North Koreans cash for missile technology.

The generals thought that they could also obtain nuclear warheads and that, once these warheads were mounted on the missiles, the United States and other powerful countries would not dare to attack Burma and have much less leverage on the junta.

Than Shwe hid these links with North Korea as long as he could from Japan and South Korea, because he was working to lure Japanese and South Korean companies to invest more in efforts to plunder Burma’s natural resources. By 2006, the junta’s generals felt either desperate or confident enough to publicly resume diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Burma has worked for almost a decade to expand its production of missiles and chemical warheads. General Tin Aye — chairman of the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, the military’s business arm — is the top manager of ordinance production and main liaison with North Korea.

According to a secret report leaked last year, the regime’s No. 3 man, General Shwe Mann, also made a secret visit to Pyongyang in November 2008. He signed an agreement for military cooperation that would bring help from North Korea for constructing tunnels and caves for hiding missiles, aircraft, even ships.

That this information was leaked by Burmese military officials working on such sensitive activities shows both the degree of Than Shwe’s military megalomania and the existence of opposition within the regime itself.

The words “pragmatic engagement” should not become synonymous with any weakening of Washington’s firm opposition to Burma’s rulers.

The United States and other nations must continue to question the legitimacy of Than Shwe and the regime. They should not believe his promises to hold free and fair elections this year.

Only coordinated pressure from around the globe will be effective in dealing with this master of deceit.

* Aung Lynn Htut is a former senior intelligence officer in Burma’s Ministry of Defense. He is working on his memoirs.

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Subject: [Readingroom] news on Burma - 5/7/10

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Is USDA handpicking ethnic parties?
Censorship cause party not to compete
DKBA, KNU held secret peace talks
What stigma? Burma (Myanmar) draws energy-hungry neighbors
Jade, jewelry show has good sales
‘No rallies, no slogans’ order shackles parties ahead of poll
Burma clamps down on travelling monks
We have enough money, USDP tells Australians
Myanmar has 30 million eligible voters
India trade dampens Burma sanctions
China’s K-8 jets: A killer for Myanmar
To be Burma’s president or army chief?
Are activists the new Third Force in politics?
Unmasking Than Shwe
North Korean-provided missile, radar base said set up in Kachin state
Myanmar-Singapore bilateral trade reaches 1.86 bln USD
Myanmar-India bilateral trade up sharply
The EC eyes a Kachin angle
Prolonging the misery and postponing the inevitable
Junta starts new censorship rules
South Korea, Myanmar Agree to Jointly Develop Two Gas Blocks
Deception and denials in Myanmar
Suu Kyi’s lawyer warned on reporting
Burma poll will entrench brutality
UN ignores Burma junta’s drugs role

Is USDA handpicking ethnic parties? – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Fri 2 Jul 2010

Signs have emerged that the Burmese military junta’s loyal civic partner, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), has taken on the responsibility of securing pro-regime voting blocs in ethnic minority areas ahead of the election.

According to several sources in ethnic states, the USDA has promised to provide funding for and assist in the establishment of pro-junta ethnic parties, while at the same time guaranteeing that the Union Election Commission (EC) will reject political parties that are related to cease-fire groups that have refused to comply with Naypyidaw’s Border Guard Force (BGF) plan.

This week, a newly founded political party in Kachin State, the Kachin State Unity and Democracy Party, has registered with the EC in Naypyidaw. However, sources in Kachin State and the Chiang Mai-based Kachin News Group have alleged that the new party chairman, Hkyet Hting Nan, and other party members are allied with the USDA, citing their cooperation during the referendum in May 2008.

It is widely believed that Burma’s ruling generals originally planned to allow political parties related to cease-fire groups and other independent parties to contest the general election. However, sources in Naypyidaw said the policy was revised after the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), decided in late March not to contest the coming election. Junta chief Than Shwe began by appointing Prime Minister Thein Sein as chairman of the new Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

“Last year, the government newspapers praised the former vice chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Dr. Tuja, for his involvement in forming the Kachin State Progressive Party to participate in the election,” said a source who spoke to The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity. “But the tide has now changed for Dr. Tuja—the EC may not grant his party’s registration.”

In September 2009, two commentaries in the state-run The New Light of Myanmar heaped praise on Tuja’s steps to support the election process, and condemned other ethnic groups that opposed the election and the BGF plan.

“It is welcome news that negotiations will be made to reconstitute the KIO, which has returned to the legal fold, as a frontier force, and that six Kachin national race leaders, including Vice-Chairman Dr Tuja, have been allowed to resign in order that they can form a political party and run in the 2010 election,” one commentary said.

“Dr Tuja will build a brighter future for Kachin State by forming the Kachin State Progressive Party representing the Kachin nationals,” it concluded.

Speaking to The Irrawaddy recently about his election dilemma, Tuja said, “From what we have heard, the EC’s restrictions are somehow related to the transformation of the KIO to a border guard force under the command of the regime—and if that plan goes well, we will all be approved.”

Some sources have claimed that the USDA is also backing ethnic parties in other regions, such as Shan State, Karen State and Mon State, in a bid to win a majority of seats not only in the Upper and Lower Houses, but in the regional assemblies as well.

One source said that the USDA plans to back the All Mon Region Democracy Party, which is led by Nai Ngwe Thein, a former professor who is allegedly close to the USDA. During a recent interview with The Irrawaddy, Nai Ngwe Thein said that his party would contest the election because “it is an opportunity presented by the Constitution.”

Sources close to the Mon cease-fire group, the New Mon State Party, said that the USDA began planting their associates in Mon State in 2008-9 when many village heads were replaced by those loyal to the USDA.

Censorship cause party not to compete – Ko Htwe
Irrawaddy: Fri 2 Jul 2010

Burma’s press censorship board, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division (PSRD), is strictly censoring political news in weekly journals, causing the Peace and Diversity Party (PDP) to rethink its decision to participate in the coming election.

Col. Myo Myint Maung, the newly appointed joint-director of the PSRD, is strictly monitoring and censoring election and political news, said a Rangoon-based weekly journal editor.

For example, the PDP recently attempted to publish a party member recruiting announcement that read “Candidate Wanted ” in The Voice Weekly journal, but the PSRD excluded the announcement, said Nay Myo Wai, the secretary of the PDP.

On Thursday, the PDP wrote an open letter to the PSRD, asking how to proceed if the PSRD continues banning descriptions of their parties policies and activities in journals.

“If we don’t have free expression, I feel ashamed to participate in the election,” said Nay Myo Wai.

Because the PDP cannot accept PSRD censorship of political party news in the journals, within the next 15 days the PDP will review its decision to compete in the coming election, said Nay Myo Wai. The PDP’s final decision will depend on what the PSRD does during that period.

The PSRD announced on March 17 that registered parties can apply to the censorship board to publish material in accordance with the 1962 Printing and Publishing Act.

However, publications must conform to certain rules: they must not “oppose” the ruling State Peace and Development Council, must not make any attempt to criticize the armed forces and must conform to the law, the statement said.

The PSRD requires political parties to register before they publish campaign material, charging 100,000 kyat (US $100) and a 500,000 kyat ($500) as a deposit.

Although many registered political parties have permission to publish their own election-related materials such as pamphlets, journals and booklets, a large percentage face severe financial problems and so depend on Burma’s weekly journals to publish their party’s policies and activities.

The PSRD routinely inspects and censors books, journals and newspapers. Any media criticism of the military junta is strictly forbidden. After the election laws were announced last month, the PSRD began banning comments and analysis, and censoring articles related to the election in local journals.

Burmese media were recently prohibited by the PSRD from reporting news regarding the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), led by Prime Minister Thein Sein, that related to USDP founders remaining in their government posts. Some journals were forced to publish a blank where these stories would have run.

By contrast, the USDP is allowed to run its own journal, the Nwe Thargi, without interference, said media sources.

Meanwhile, the PSRD has allowed a private Rangoon journal not to publish a junta propaganda article in the coming week.

A Rangoon-based editor told The Irrawaddy on Friday, “We welcome the news. In the past, the PSRD forced us to published propaganda articles without fail. Now we have one more page for a new section. But once a month or so we have to publish propaganda articles if the PSRD pass them to us.”

Another Rangoon-based weekly journal editor said the propaganda articles are a burden and nobody reads them.

Despite their strict rules and regulations and draconian censorship practices, the PSRD currently licenses the publication of 326 newspapers, magazines and journals in Burma, and a further 10 are expected to appear. Some selected journals close to key officials are profitable.

DKBA, KNU held secret peace talks – Lawi Weng
Irrawaddy: Fri 2 Jul 2010

Secret peace talks between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) were held in Kanchanaburi Province in Thailand in June, according to sources close to the KNU.

Speaking to The Irrawaddy on Friday, a KNU source in the Three Pagodas Pass area, said, “The peace talks were held from June 17 to 23 in Kanchanaburi. Three leaders from DKBA and two from the KNU took part in the talks.”

The three DKBA leaders reportedly included influential Buddhist Abbot Ashin Thuzana; Col Lah Pwe, better known as Mr. Beard; and Saw Naw Tayar, a military official. Two KNU leaders, Gen Mu Tu, the commander in chief of the KNLA, and a KNU military officer known as Oliver, also took part.

David Takapaw, the deputy KNU chairman, told The Irrawaddy that he had no information about the talks. He said that the KNU district administration may have initiated the talks and did not have to report to headquarters until a substantive agreement had been achieved.

Chit Thu, the commander of DKBA Brigade 999, said on June 26 at a ceremony honoring fallen DKBA comrades that he favored a halt to the fighting between the DKBA and KNU. He made no mention of peace talks with the KNU at the ceremony.

Observers have said that the Burmese junta’s pressure on the DKBA to transform into a border guard force (BGF) may be pushing the DKBA to settle its differences and join forces.

The military junta has set a final deadline of Aug. 10 for the DKBA to join the BGF. Observers say that some higher DKBA officials favor joining the BGF.

Nai Kao Rot, the former deputy army chief of the New Mon State Party said that the junta’s Southeast Regional Command is monitoring the peace talks and watching the troop movements of the two groups.

Maj-Gen Thet Naing Win of the Southeast Regional Commander reportedly has ordered a government battalion in the Three Pagodas Pass area to observe the two ethnic groups’ activities.

“They are worried that fighting could break out during the election if the two groups join forces,” Nai Kao Rot said.

The DKBA joined forces with Burmese military troops to fight against the KNU after it split from the KNU and signed a cease-fire with the junta in 1995.

The DKBA and KNU also held secret peace talks early in October, but the talks failed and the two armies again clashed.

The DKBA, which was formed 15 years ago, now controls most of the Thai-Burmese border area previously controlled by the KNU.

The DKBA claims to have 6,000 troops and plans to enlarge its army to 9,000, making it Burma’s second largest non-state armed group. It has been accused of human rights abuses in its clashes with KNU forces and also of involvement in human trafficking along Thai-Burmese border.

The Burmese junta has put pressure on all ethnic cease-fire groups to transform their army into a BGF for more than one year. April 22 was the last deadline. Many ethnic groups remain defiant and refuse to accept the order.

What stigma? Burma (Myanmar) draws energy-hungry neighbors
Christian Science Monitor: Fri 2 Jul 2010

Activists who pressured Western companies to boycott Burma (Myanmar) are now preparing to battle Asian firms eager for Burma’s oil and gas.

Six months ago, a construction crew showed up in this sleepy Burmese backwater. Villagers watched the crew put down a black pipeline under their rice fields, on its way north to power-hungry Rangoon (Yangon), the old capital.

The pipeline opened June 12 to acclaim in Burma’s largest city, where households are lucky to get six hours of electricity a day. For villagers living on the pipeline route, the benefits are less clear. At a local store, the only power comes from an old car battery hooked up to a single bulb. Nobody has electricity at home. “The gas is not for us,” says a farmer.

But the villagers were lucky in one respect: Nobody had to move off their land to make way for the pipeline.

Elsewhere in military-ruled Burma (Myanmar), authorities have seized land for energy projects that are increasingly attractive to Asian oil companies unhindered by recent Western sanctions. When the wells are turned on and the energy is exported to richer countries, local communities are often left landless and in the dark.

The pipeline to Rangoon will give more Burmese citizens access to a gas field operated by France-based Total and US-based Chevron that, since 1998, had already been supplying 30 percent of Thailand’s electricity supply via a separate pipeline. Not only has the bulk of gas been exported, but Total and Chevron have been dogged by allegations of human rights abuses over the pipeline’s $1.3 billion construction. In 2005, the companies paid out-of-court settlements to plaintiffs in separate lawsuits alleging complicity in the abuses.

But that project pales in comparison to a new Asian-backed pipeline project that is much bigger and potentially more disruptive than any predecessor, according to US- and Thailand-based activists.

Chinese, South Korean, and Indian energy companies are investing in a gas terminal and an oil tanker dock at the Shwe Gas field in western Arakan state, from where two pipelines will be built to transport Burmese natural gas and imported crude oil to southern China. Construction began in late 2009 and is expected to complete in 2013.

About 100 families have already lost their land to developers, who have paid them little or no compensation, says Wong Aung, a coordinator for the Shwe Gas Movement in Thailand, which opposes the project. Instead they are left to search for vacant land nearby where they can resettle. Many more living inland on the pipeline route face the risk of land confiscation and forced labor by security forces, Wong Aung warns.

“We’d like the companies to suspend the project until we have a democratically elected government in Burma where people can genuinely participate,” he says.

A highly prized pipeline

The Shwe Gas field is close to the border with Bangladesh and is operated by South Korean Daewoo International. The discovery in 2004 of large offshore reserves attracted India’s government, which proposed its own pipeline via Bangladesh. This plan bogged down over concerns by Indian officials that Bangladesh wasn’t a secure route, says Marie Lall, an associate fellow at Chatham House in London who has studied the project.

As India dithered, China swooped in with its proposal of twin pipelines in 2007. The first will transport gas from Daewoo-operated gas fields. The second is designed to carry some 442,000 barrels a day of crude oil, giving China an alternative route for cargoes from Africa and the Middle East, which must travel by sea through the congested Malacca Straits. Security analysts say Beijing wants to lessen its dependence on this route for its essential energy supplies.

The pipelines cross some 600 miles of Burmese territory, including mountainous zones and areas patrolled by armed militia. By contrast, the Burmese section of the Total’s onshore pipeline is 40 miles.

“It’s going to be the most complicated and hazardous terrain for a pipeline that China has ever encountered,” says Ms. Lall.
Activists gear up

In recent years, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized Burma over the practice of forced labor by the military, government agencies, and private companies. Activists say local residents are often coerced to work unpaid on massive infrastructure projects such as road building and energy pipelines.

Steve Marshall, an ILO official in Burma, says he has proposed to the government that it informs local authorities and local communities along the pipeline route that such abuses won’t be tolerated. He says he has also discussed labor issues with Daewoo, the gas operator, but hasn’t given any direct advice on their project.

For activists who successfully convinced major Western brands like Nike and Pepsi to boycott the country in the late-1990s, and who shined a spotlight on the ethics of Western oil firms operating in the country, the onrush of Asian energy companies poses new challenges. Burma’s human rights record seems unlikely to deter China National Petroleum Corporation, the pipeline operator.

Activists say they are lobbying overseas investors and other stakeholders in Asia, Europe, and the US to insist on accountability in the project and ensure that the rights of ordinary Burmese are respected.

“There are creative ways to get companies to do the right thing,” says Matthew Smith, a spokesperson for Earthrights International, the Washington-based group that sued Total and Unocal on behalf of Burmese victims.

Jade, jewelry show has good sales – Nayee Lin Latt
Irrawaddy: Fri 2 Jul 2010

About 2,100 lots of jade have been sold at a special gems emporium at Myanmar Convention Center in Rangoon, which runs from June 25 to July 7, according to sources close to gem dealers.
Buyers inspect the jade stones offered for sale by the Burmese government at the annual gem show in Rangoon. (Photo: Myat Moe Maung/ The Irrawaddy)
A total of 11,500 lots of jade are being shown at the emporium and about 300 national and private jewelry companies have participated. This is the 48th jewelry event at the emporium.

“Most of the jade stones are own by the government,” said a jewelry merchant. “We sell jewelry.”

Another gem dealer said: “We can’t rely on domestic customers economically. But, many foreigners come to buy the gems when we have special show like this. Both private jewelery shops and the government benefit from the sale.”

Burma earned more than 400 million euros from the sale of about 7,000 lots of jade and gems at a gems emporium in March 2001, according to the Myanmar Convention Center.
CA billboard advertisement for the jade and gem show at the Myanmar Convention Center in Rangoon. (Photo: Myat Moe Maung/ The Irrawaddy)

Burma is one of the world’s most well-known producers of rubies, diamonds, pearls, sapphires and other gems.

Burma produced 32,921 tons of jade; 18,728 million carats of gems; and 754 kilograms of pearls and other gems in the 2008-2009 fiscal year, according to the government’s Central Statistical Organization. Gem shows began in 1964.

‘No rallies, no slogans’ order shackles parties ahead of poll – Marwaan Macan-Markar
Inter Press Service: Thu 1 Jul 2010

Bangkok – Burma’s military regime is giving its critics more ammunition, tightening its grip ahead of a general election this year by seeing to it that independent political parties are barred from chanting slogans, marching in rallies and displaying their party flags when they campaign.

Ahead of national elections for parliament – meant to set the foundation for a “discipline flourishing democracy” in the South-east Asian nation — the country’s latest restrictions aim to stamp out the customary colour, animated campaigning and slogan cheering that is the standard feature of pre-poll politics in the more vibrant democracies in the region, such as Indonesia and the Philippines.

These limitations were spelled out in a late June directive issued by Burma’s powerful Election Commission (EC), whose rulings cannot be challenged in a court ahead of the poll. The election date itself has not been announced.

Published in the local media, ‘Directive 2/2010’ reveals the lengths to which the EC has gone to protect the authoritarian order in Burma, also called Myanmar.

Declared taboo during the campaign are any speeches and published material that “tarnish” the image of the military-run state, its over 400,000- strong armed forces and the junta-shaped 2008 Constitution. Candidates have been warned to avoid public utterances that undermine “security and community peace.”

And even if the independent parties – only three of the registered 33 so far – yield to these shackles, they face even more challenges when they organise public meetings for candidates to address the estimated 27.2 million voters across the country.

The parties have to first seek approval from the EC and three different local authorities a week ahead of a planned meeting, specifying the building where it will be held.

In addition, their applications need to state how many people will attend each meeting and give a detailed biography and photograph of each speaker, as well as the exact time each speaker will begin and end speaking.

“This is blatant interference by the junta to try and control the outcome of this year’s election,” said Zin Linn, spokesman for the National Coalition Government for the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the democratically elected government that won Burma’s last general election in 1990 but has since been forced into exile. “Some of these restrictions are more severe than those in the 1990 election.”

That this election will be a “sham” is confirmed by the unlimited freedom enjoyed by the pro-junta Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Zin Linn says. “It is allowed to break all the limits placed by the EC on political parties. The junta is also openly encouraging people to support the USDP,” he told IPS.

The USDP, headed by the junta’s second-in-command, Prime Minister Thein Sein, is the political wing of the pro-regime Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).

But the USDA, which at one time declared that it had 18 million members, does more than serve as the social and welfare arm of the regime. Its members have been used to harass those with the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party led by pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi.

The NLD, which won the 1990 elections with a thumping 82 percent of the 485 seats in parliament, was forced to dissolve as a party after it announced in March that it would boycott the poll given the junta’s restrictions around the conduct of this year’s poll.

The NLD’s high-risk political gamble was in solidarity for Suu Kyi, who has spent over 14 of the past 20 years under house arrest, and the country’s over 2,200 political prisoners.

The poll restrictions come at a time when Burma’s military rulers have a greater stranglehold on the country than they had in 1990. That poll was held two years after a student-led democracy uprising was brutally crushed. Thus, the intervening years saw the regime at the time — in power since a 1962 coup – nurse uncertainty about its absolute hold over the country.

That political atmosphere enabled the 1990 poll to be held with “a bit more openness” than this year’s general election, says Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political analyst living in exile in Thailand. “Political parties had 17 months to campaign and although there were restrictions, not all were properly enforced.”

“There was lot of intimidation against the NLD but no rules against parties that are as restrictive as this year’s,” he told IPS. “Election Day was very, very free and fair; vote counting was very transparent.”

That same poll saw some 230 political parties apply to contest the election, but only 93 vied for seats in the legislature on voting day. And although the military warned that the number of people at campaign meetings in townships could not exceed 50, NLD’s meeting reportedly drew between 300 to 500 people at times.

This time around, the junta appears determined to avoid a repeat of seeing a pro-junta party trounced at the polls, an attitude that has alarmed rights groups.

“The laws have been drafted with broad language as to what would constitute illegal or not,” said Benjamin Zawacki, Burma researcher for the London-based Amnesty International. “The powers vested in the EC gives them complete discretion and there is no appeal process.”

“There are three freedoms utterly fundamental for an election – the human rights for freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association,” he said in an interview. “We see these three freedoms clearly under attack this time.”

Burma clamps down on travelling monks – Min Lwin
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 1 Jul 2010

Suspension of passports for monks in Burma has begun amid suggestions that the Burmese government is attempting to block the influential community from going abroad in the run-up to elections.
Monks have also complained that the government’s passport issuing board in Rangoon is also refusing to extend nearly-expired passports and implementing restrictions on applications for new ones.

One monk told DVB on condition of anonymity that the new regulation required monks looking to go abroad to have the Dhamm?cariy? degree, which is equivalent to a Masters degree in the UK and awards status as a lecturing monk.

“Also there are three requirements when submitting the passport application: you must have the Dhamm?cariy? degree, you must have the sponsor’s letter and must have the approval by the religious affairs minister,” he said. “These are the requirements that cannot be achieved easily and are thus stopping the monks [from going abroad].”

The allegations were denied by Burma’s ministry of religious affairs. According to government statistics, there are some 400,000 monks in Burma out of a total population of around 50 million.

The community is highly revered inside the country, and rose to international attention after the September 2007 uprising in which hundreds of thousands of monks took to the streets in protest against military rule in Burma. A number were shot dead by troops, while hundreds more were forced to flee abroad.

According to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP), 252 monks are currently behind bars in Burma, some serving sentences of more than 70 years. Human Rights Watch said last year on the anniversary of the September 2007 uprising that monks were still subject to oppression, intimidation and surveillance.

Prominent exiled monk, Ashin Issariya (also known as King Zero), said that monks travelling abroad to study were seen by the Burmese government to be defying the ruling generals and were able to speak freely about what they had witnessed inside Burma.

“When [junta chief] Than Shwe visited Sri Lanka [in November 2009], he was boycotted by Burmese monks studying in the country, who refused to accept religious donations from him; he was very disappointed about that,” said Ashin Issariya.

The giving of donations to monks is seen as a symbolically important ‘merit making’ act within Buddhist tradition, and the refusal of this can carry negative ramifications, such as bad karma.

“[Than Shwe] also got the same treatment from majority of the Burmese monks in India when he visited there; the government believes that monks studying abroad are becoming more defiant against [the government],” Ashin Issariya added.

He said this was due to the monks gaining international exposure, “so [the junta] began enacting various restrictions to keep the monks from going abroad”.

We have enough money, USDP tells Australians – Ko Htwe
Irrawaddy: Thu 1 Jul 2010

A leading member of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has told visiting Australian officials that the newly formed party has sufficient finances because it has inherited funds from the junta-backed civic organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), according to a source who attended the meeting but who spoke to The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity.

The remarks were made by Myint Oo, a leading member of the USDP, which is headed by Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein, and told to Australia’s Deputy Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Hugh Borrowman on Wednesday during their meeting in Rangoon.

The Australian Embassy in Rangoon would not comment about the meeting when The Irrawaddy contacted it on Thursday.

The meeting was also attended by representatives of three other political parties—the National Unity Party, the Democratic Party and the Union Democratic Party.

Myint Oo also told the Australian delegation that the USDP will provide the registration fees for some of their candidates, but that other candidates were in a financial position to cover the costs by themselves, the source said.

Parties must pay 500,000 kyat (US $500) for each candidate that it fields in the election.

Short on funds and with limited manpower at their disposal, several political parties in Burma are looking to pool their resources ahead of this year’s election. They say they are facing severe financial constraints that limit their ability to function effectively.

The USDA is a state-sponsored mass civic organization formed by the junta in 1993. It claims to have more than 24 million members nationwide, including civil servants and members of the military. The USDA Central Panel of Patrons include Snr-Gen Than Shwe, Prime Minister Thein Sein and other government ministers.

On April 29, Thein Sein and 26 ministers and senior officials formed the USDP to contest the election later this year. The Election Commission officially recognized the USDP as a political party on June 8.

Meanwhile, members of the USDA have been canvassing for donations for the new party. In addition, the USDA has recently offered small loans to many low-income workers and farmers around Rangoon, sources said. Stallholders who lost their businesses when Rangoon’s Mingalar Market was destroyed by fire last month have been invited to apply for loans from the USDP.

Two members of the Election Commission, Dr. Tin Aung Aye and Win Kyi, met with the Australian officials in Naypyidaw on Tuesday, according to state-run newspapers.

Myanmar has 30 million eligible voters
Associated Press: Thu 1 Jul 2010

About 30 million of Myanmar’s 59 million people will be eligible to vote in the country’s first elections in two decades, a report said Thursday.
The Immigration and Population Ministry collected data through the end of 2009 showing the population is now 59.12 million, the biweekly Eleven journal reported.

Of the total population, 30.74 million are age 18 or older, the journal said. Voting age in Myanmar is 18. Myanmar’s population was listed as 35.3 million in the last official census sponsored by the United Nations in 1983.

The population is growing by roughly 2 percent a year, the journal said.

The elections planned for later this year will be the first since 1990. Critics call the polls a sham designed to cement nearly 50 years of military rule. The junta has not yet announced an election date.

India trade dampens Burma sanctions – Francis Wade
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 1 Jul 2010

Burma’s trade with neighbouring India has seen a 26 percent increase in the past year while Singapore becomes a top destination for Burmese exports.

Statistics from both countries show that foreign interest in Burma’s economy is growing, despite sporadic attempts by the US and EU to pressure regional countries into boycotting the resource-rich pariah.

Trade with India reached US$1.19 billion in 2009-10, Xinhua news reported, but the country still lags behind Singapore, China and Thailand in trading partner rankings. Thailand currently provides the biggest crutch for the ruling junta, but China is rapidly becoming the main impediment to effective sanctions on Burma.

Naypyidaw and Beijing earlier this month inked a raft of new trade deals, including the controversial Monywa copper agreement, which will see Chinese weapons giant, Norinco, move in on one of Burma’s most lucrative mines.

Moreoever, the Shwe pipeline project which will carry oil and gas from western Burma to southern China is expected to net the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) up to US$30 billion over the next three decades.

Despite the US senate yesterday voting to extend an import ban on Burmese goods – a reaction to lack of progress by the junta on human rights abuses and drug trafficking – America’s interest in Burma remains controversial, with US oil giant Chevron able to continue its work in the Yadana oil fields.

The Yadana pipeline, which feeds energy-hungry Thailand, has been mired in controversy, and appears to require a 40-kilometer wide militarised security corridor through southeastern to protect the flow of gas.

Burma’s expansion of its natural energy sector has whetted the appetite of India, which is eyeing a US$5.6 billion investment in two major dam sites. Analysts have said the country is turning to Burma for its hydroelectric needs because of environmental and human rights concerns in India resulting from its own such projects.

The SPDC’s Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) notes that US$137 million worth of Indian capital had been invested in Burma’s oil and gas sector by September 2007; more recent figures show that India’s contracted investment in Burma in 2009-10 reached US$189 million.

China however remains the key funder of Burmese hydropower, and the drying of the Mekong river is partly blamed on Chinese dam construction. China’s reach into Burma is set to soar over the coming decade; already it has forced US policymakers to question the worth of sanctions in light of the rise of regional powerhouses who are willing to trade with the maligned regime.

China’s K-8 jets: A killer for Myanmar
Defense Industry Daily: Thu 1 Jul 2010

Burma’s air force relies heavily on Chinese weapons. A handful of Russian MiG-29s will grow to 30 in the wake of a 2009 order, but the rest of its fighter fleet is made up of Chinese MiG-21 (60 J-7s) and MiG-19 (12 J-6 and 36 Q-5) variants. Reports indicate that they are supported by about 6 Serbian Super Galeb trainer/ light attack jets, and 17 Swiss Pilatus PC-6/7/9 turboprop trainers that have been armed for counterinsurgency.

Recent reports indicate that some standardization may be on the way. In 1998, the Burmese air force bought K-8 Karakorum (export version of China’s JL-8) jet trainers and light attack aircraft, which are a cooperative venture between China and Pakistan. They are now stationed at Taungoo Air Base north of Yangon, and sources vary between 4-12 aircraft. In the wake of a November 2009 visit to China, Burma’s SLORC regime will be adding another 50 K-8s. As one might expect, this deal has a strong Chinese resource angle…

The K-8 jet trainer, also known as the K-8 Karakorum or the Hongdu JL-8, is a joint venture between China’s Nanchang-based Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (HAIG), and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) in the 1990s.

The aircraft has 3 engine options. The most common by production quantity is China’s WS-11, a licensed copy of the Ukranian Ivchenko AI-25TL turbofan. Aircraft so equipped are reportedly designated L-11s. The AI-25TL reportedly delivers 3,600 – 3,800 pounds thrust, and also equips aircraft for most export customers. On the other hand, the WS-11’s Chinese provenance may be an advantage with the Burmese.

The jets can carry up to 4 under-wing pylons rated at 250 kg each. Options include fuel drop tanks, 23mm cannon pods, unguided rockets, unguided bombs, and even short-range air-to-air missiles.

According to Sino Defense, over 500 K-8s have been built since 1993. To date, it has been ordered by Pakistan (120), China (100+), Bolivia (6), Burma/ Myanmar (54-62), Ghana (4), Namibia (4), Sri Lanka (6-8, now 3-5), Sudan (12), Zambia (8), and Zimbabwe (12). A modified version is also produced by Egypt as the K-8E (120). Other reported orders include Tanzania (6), and a recent order from Venezuela (18, may soon become 40).

As one can readily see from the above list, the K-8 is in service with a number of rogue regimes. Chad may have faced supplier issues when it armed its Pilatus PC-7/9 turboprops, but its opponents in Sudan faced no such issues with their K-8s in Darfur and beyond.

The numbers bought by Myanmar make sense only if many of these aircraft are dedicated to a counterinsurgency role, where slower 2-seat aircraft are often more effective than high-speed interceptors.

Irawaddy reports that parts of the K-8 aircraft were transported by cargo ship from China, and are being assembled at the Aircraft Production and Maintenance Base in Meikhtila. It added that Burma’s main air base for maintenance, the Aircraft Production and Maintenance Air Base (APMAB) in Panchangone in Mingaladon Township, has been relocated to Nyaunggone, close to the regime’s Flying Training Base in Shante in Meikhtila Township.

The K-8 jet deal was reportedly brokered by Burma’s business/political tycoon Tay Za, a multi-billionaire go-between for the regime who is on the on the American, European, Canadian, Australian and Swiss financial sanctions blacklists for Burma. Financial terms were not disclosed, but the record of past sales establishes a conventional price between $5-10 million per plane.

In February 2009, “China’s Unusual Deals Working to Grow African Arms Presence” noted the tendency for China to arrange weapons deals as vehicles to secure cut-rate resources: Zambia using its copper resources to pay China in a number of military deals, Kenya negotiating to trade fishing rights for arms, etc. The deal with Burma, aka. Myanmar, is shrouded in secrecy, but related developments in country strongly suggest a continuation of that trend.

Burma is one of the world’s most repressive regimes, and its government faces widespread international sanctions as a result. In recent years, it’s estimated that over 100,000 people may have died in the country because the junta refused to permit international aid after Cyclone Nargis, and promptly significant amounts of the aid that was provided for its own use and/or sale. A long-standing series internal wars with ethnic groups like the Karens adds to the internal misery.

Now the junta faces an additional challenge: securing its portion of a 771 km/ 479 mile dual oil/gas pipeline to its backers in China. The $2.5 billion project, which will be 50.9% owned by China’s CNPC oil firm and 49.1% by the Myanmar junta. The pipeline will ship from the port of Sittwe/ Akyab in Malaysia northward across the country, entering China at the border city of Ruili in Yunnan province, and continuing on through China to the coastal province of Guangxi on Vietnam’s northern border.

While China’s economy has cooled as a result of the global recession, long-term, secure access to the resources needed to supply its growing economy is one of the regime’s top strategic priorities. When it’s complete, the dual-pipeline will give China an alternate route for Middle Eastern oil and gas that is not subject to naval interference around the narrow Straits of Malacca.

It will also serve as a convenient shipping route for Burma’s own oil and natural gas in Arakan state, and the Bay of Bengal. Chinese firms are very heavily involved in Myanmar’s energy sector.

As a side-effect, the combination of Burmese resources and a strategic shipment route for critical energy resources will ensure permanent and unwavering support from China for the Burmese junta, and blockage of future sanctions or international action against the junta.

As a point of comparison, the 60 km Yadana pipeline to Thailand resulted in a 40 km wide cleared “security corridor” around the pipeline, along with reports of forced labor, murder, and widespread rapes by the junta’s forces. The new Chinese pipeline is much longer, and also far more important to a much larger partner country. Reports indicate that the Myanmar junta has already devoted more than 10,000 front-line soldiers (a reported 44 battalions) to clearing the new pipeline’s path.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Chinas-K-8-Jets-A-Killer-for-Myanmar-06457/

To be Burma’s president or army chief? – Khin Maung Tint and Aung Moe Zaw
Irrawaddy: Thu 1 Jul 2010

Halfway through 2010 and the date for Burma’s election has not yet been set. The signs seem to suggest that two years after the first announcement the regime will call a snap election, if they call anything at all.

The election, when or if it is held, will bring change. It will change the leadership within the army and it might even stir conflict within the ranks. Even such a limited cosmetic change appears to be a cause of great angst for Sen-Gen Than Shwe. And that’s why he hesitates.

In Burmese politics today, the chief of the armed forces is the one who holds absolute power. Snr-Gen Than Shwe is No. 1, and he will hold on to power with an iron grip. As long as he has power, he will use it to achieve his goal. His words, as a Burmese proverb goes, can kill the fire.

According to the Constitution, in post-election Burma, the army chief will continue to be the major power holder. Than Shwe has the power to choose: to be president or army chief.

Than Shwe, now in his late-70s, could find the choice difficult.

According to the seniority system in the Burmese army, Vice Sen-Gen Maung Aye should be the next chief of the armed forces, but Gen Thura Shwe Mahn could also be in line since Maung Aye is in his late 70s.

Lt-Gen Myint Swe and Lt-Gen Tin Aye of the defense ministry may also hope to be No 1.

What is clear in Burma is that there are many more generals who have dreams of being army chief than those who dream of becoming the country’s president. This is a direct result of the 2008 Constitution which was written to keep the army chief and his military clique in power.

If Than Shwe chooses himself as the country’s next president, will he be able to continue to control the army as late dictator Gen Ne Win managed to do during the Burmese Socialist Programme Party? The question is: Are his fellow generals loyal to him?

Will Maung Aye, Shwe Mahn, and Myint Swe continue to obey Than Shwe if he leaves the army to be the country’s president? Will enemies from within the army appear at that point? Than Shwe did after all bring down the former dictator Gen Ne Win and then, only six years ago, he put one of the most powerful men in Burma, Gen Khin Nyunt, behind bars.

There may be supporters of these deposed figures lurking in the background, ready to emerge when Than Shwe and his fellow generals take off their army uniforms.

Even though both the president and the next army chief will be selected by Than Shwe, he cannot be certain of the loyalty of the army chief.

Perhaps the election date has not been announced because Than Shwe cannot decide on the next army chief and the next president from within his own elite circle. The power to set the date is purely in his hands. There is no opposition to protest the date. There is no need for a sudden, snap election or for the lack of a decision.

But, for Than Shwe and his clique, the decision is one that could determine their common fate. It is a dilemma of their own making, the very 2008 Constitution which they wrote and which could bring about their own demise, if the wrong decision is made.

One thing is sure now, they have to do something. Having proffered an election, they have to set a date. But the date will only be set after Than Shwe has decided whether to choose himself as the next country’s president and who to select to lead the army.

The decision may set off a course of events which could lead to Than Shwe losing his position to another dictator. He might then face the same fate as Gen Ne Win.

Holding proper talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would certainly have been a better path to choose for himself, his military clique and for the country as a whole.

* Khin Maung Tint and Aung Moe Zaw are the general secretary and chairperson of the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS), which is a Burmese political party based in exile.

Are activists the new Third Force in politics?
The Christian Science Monitor: Thu 1 Jul 2010

The Burma election this year is widely expected to reinforce the junta’s power. But some nonprofits support the vote, and dozens of political parties are taking part, in hopes of chipping away at military rule.
Inside a humid room, rows of neatly dressed Burmese students are quizzing their guest lecturer. The class is Social Entrepreneurship and the topic is the European Union, where the lecturer comes from.

Why is Switzerland not in the EU? Why is marijuana legal in some countries but not in others? “Good questions,” the teacher nods.

The class is run by Myanmar Egress, a nonprofit organization that has become a one-stop shop for civil society activism in military-ruled Burma (Myanmar). Founded in 2006 by academics and businesspeople, it offers paid courses from Development Economics to Public Speaking Skills to Team Building. It also has a public policy research arm and conducts humanitarian relief assessments, while quietly extending into political education.

But the group also takes a conciliatory stance toward the unpopular junta, raising hackles among some democracy activists. It allegedly has close ties to the regime, and supports the controversial elections set for later this year, part of a seven-stage road map toward a “discipline-flourishing democracy.”

Critics say these elections, the first to be held in 20 years, will simply perpetuate military rule behind a civilian facade. The US has warned that voting is unlikely to be free and fair.

Some analysts have identified Myanmar Egress and other moderate groups as a new “Third Force” that seeks to steer a path between the regime and its opponents, including detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy is boycotting the vote.

Others doubt that Myanmar Egress is a force for democratic change because of its alleged close ties with the junta, says Aung Zaw, editor of the Irrawaddy, a magazine published in Thailand by exiled Burmese activists. “It’s a very controversial group of people. They appear to be supporting the regime’s road map and the elections.”

Tin Maung Thann, a co founder of Myanmar Egress, says it would be naive to expect a swift reversion to democracy after nearly 50 years of military rule. He argues that reform can begin at the margins, then move into the mainstream once the rules of the game are established.

Training young people in fields like rural development, and securing the best and brightest to study overseas, is one way to seed this change, he says. “We know how to create the (political) space.”

Unmasking Than Shwe – Simon Roughneen
Irrawaddy: Thu 1 Jul 2010

Mysterious, reclusive, brutal, misunderstood, superstitious, power-mad. These are words used to describe Burma’s ruling strongman, Sen-Gen Than Shwe. Less is know about this man than almost any other head of government, perhaps even less than Kim Jong Il, the apparently ailing ruler of North Korea and Than Shwe’s alleged nuclear collaborator.
Benedict Rogers’ new biography, “Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma’s Tyrant,” is the first detailed study of the man whose iron fist rules Burma.

Question. Your book is being published as Burma gears up for what opposition and exiled Burmese are calling sham elections or military elections. Some voices in the international community, perhaps describing themselves as foreign policy “realists,” have are more positive on the process, saying that it could potentially lead to some sort of democratization sometime in the future. Does this square with Than Shwe’s way of seeing the world, and his vision for Burma in the future?

Answer. Than Shwe’s intentions are to safeguard his legacy and protect himself, his family and cronies. He has absolutely no intention at all of any meaningful reform or democratization. However, there can and should be a difference between what we in the international community do and what people inside Burma do. I have no respect at all for those in the international community who have a rose-tinted view of what these elections mean. All of us should be in no doubt that this is a discredited and illegitimate process. However, I do understand and respect why some Burmese feel that they have no alternative but to make the best out of it. Some Burmese will want to take part and some will not, and I respect both points of view. But in the international community we have to be clear that it offers no hope for change.

Q. In its latest edition, Foreign Policy listed Than Shwe as third from bottom in its “Worst of the Worst” ranking of dictators around the world. Does what you found out in the course of your research tally with such a ranking?

A. Yes, that sounds about right. I think it would think it is a pretty close race between Than Shwe and Mugabe for second place, behind Kim Jong Il.

Q. In practice, researching and writing a biography such as this must be very challenging, given that the subject is a reclusive, isolated, apparently paranoid dictator, hidden in his jungle capital. Can you tell us how you dealt with these obstacles?

A. In the introduction I am up front about the limitations of the book, that I could not get close to Than Shwe and his inner circle . However, I did have access to a number of army defectors who have known him and worked with him at various stages. I had access to international diplomats who had access to him and had dealings with him. While I would never claim that this is the definitive life story of Than Shwe, I can say that I have uncovered and brought to light a comprehensive perspective on the man, and one that has not been published to date. I have been pleasantly encouraged by the reviews so far. Bertil Linter can be quite a tough critic, but he has written a very generous review of the book and that is very encouraging.

Q. Allegations about Burma’s nuclear program hit the headlines recently after an army defector provided classified information to DVB, later broadcast on al-Jazeera. Are there more defectors waiting to tell their story, to tell more about how things are inside Burma? How is the mood and morale within the junta’s army?

A. Over the 10 years or so that I have been working on Burma, I have met many defectors. One defector who helped me a lot with the book is in touch with former colleagues inside Burma and the army. The mood inside the army is very much one of low morale and a desire to defect or at least leak information to people outside, which might in turn undermine the regime. The only thing holding back many potential defectors is the insecurity of their position in neighboring countries, particularly Thailand. If more was done by the international community to ensure that defectors could have place of safety, then more defections would happen and more information would come out.

Q. What specifically are the issues, challenges and dilemmas for a potential defector as he or she weighs-up such a momentous decision?

A. Thailand and other neighbors have an agreement with the regime to return any Burmese soldiers or officers they find, and this makes any defector vulnerable to deportation, and the consequences once he or she is returned to Burma. Otherwise, defectors who come out and are outspoken face attack, assassination or can be disappeared by agents of the regime, for examples in places like Mae Sot near the Thai-Burma border. Another barrier is the attitude of the international community, which has a more complex approach to defectors than other asylum seekers, and countries are generally much more reluctant to accept defectors. Strangely though, when people defect through embassies, it seems to be much easier than if some one tries to defect through Thailand for example.

Q. Than Shwe seems to be trying to re-brand his regime with allusions or references to Burma’s ancient kings and kingdoms, hinting at his own supposed links to a mythologized past. Is Than Shwe a reincarnation of Burma’s long-dead kings?

A. Than Shwe sees himself as a sort of warrior-king, a modern version of those figures from Burma’s history. For example, Burma’s kings liked to build and establish new capitals for themselves, something that he has replicated by building a new capital in Naypidaw, which of course means “Seat of Kings” in Burmese. Though of course he has other reasons for building the new capital—be that paranoia about another uprising in Burma, the need to hide military facilities, fear of an attack from a foreign power. As irrational as some of this might be, these are factors in his thinking.

Q. Can you tell us more about Than Shwe’s psychology of rule? He is rumored to be heavily influenced by astrology and highly superstitious. Is this the case?

A. Astrology is a factor, but it conditions his thinking more about the timing of events, the duration of prison sentences, for example, than it is an over-arching or guiding principle. Certain events are timed to run on given auspicious dates, but that does not mean that Than Shwe is merely a crazed superstitious tyrant, and we must not fall into the trap of stereotyping him or underestimating him. He is brutally clever and adept at divide and rule. Astrology is arguably more important in his wife’s way of thinking than in his own.

Q. How strong an influence is his wife on him personally and politically? Is she a Lady Macbeth figure or is that an overstatement?

A. First, the limitations of how close I could get to Than Shwe come into play here. I wasn’t a fly on the wall in their home, and that is an understatement! But she does have some influence, particularly when it comes to Aung San Suu Kyi. Daw Kyaing Kyaing dislikes her as much, if not more, than her husband.

Q. Can you tell us more about that dislike? Is it personal, political, or a mixture?

A. It is a combination. Politically she represents a challenge to Than Shwe, who sees himself as the elderly father figure in ruling his country. She is younger and upsets that patriarchal vision. She is also everything, frankly, that Daw Kyaing Kyaing is not: she is beautiful, internationally savvy, cultured, well-educated.

Q. As well as your role as East Asia specialist with Christian Solidarity Worldwide, you work closely with the Conservative Party in the UK, which recently returned to power. First, has Prime Minister David Cameron or Foreign Secretary William Hague read your book? Secondly, how do you hope it will influence policy in the UK and internationally.

A. Not that I am aware of, but I hope they will. The Speaker of the House of Commons has kindly agreed to speak at the upcoming UK launch of the book which I am looking forward to very much. I hope that the book will serve as a wake-up call for those who, as I said already, take a somewhat benign or falsely optimistic view of what the scheduled elections mean for Burma.

I also outline that I believe, like many others, that there should be a commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity in Burma and Than Shwe’s role. In terms of British policy, I do not anticipate much difference from the previous government. William Hague has already shown a strong commitment to Burma advocacy while in opposition, inviting Zoya Phan to address the Tory Party conference, as well as speaking at her book launch in London. Both David Cameron and William Hague have met with Charm Tong. David Cameron’s chief-of-staff is a long-time friend of Aung San Suu Kyi. I think, however, that leadership on Burma will come from the Foreign Secretary rather than the prime minister, unlike under Labour where Gordon Brown spoke out on Burma himself.

I want to conclude by saying that I hope the book will dispel beyond doubt the myth that Than Shwe is someone we can just sit down and have a cup of tea with, and launch into a rational discussion of how to reform his country. He understands one word, one concept—that is force. I am not advocating nor do I believe in the use of military force, nor do I believe in isolating the regime. We have to remain aware of the nature of the man who rules Burma, and his unwillingness to listen to reason. The international community needs to come together on a strategic policy to bring targeted pressure and targeted engagement to bear on Than Shwe, including a commission of inquiry, and if my book can contribute to bringing this about, or at least a better understanding of why this is necessary, then it will have achieved something.

North Korean-provided missile, radar base said set up in Kachin state
Democratic Voice of BurmaWed 30 Jun 2010

Work has been completed on a new radar and missile base in northern Burma as army trucks reportedly travel the length of the country to deliver stockpiles of weaponry.

An army source close to the Northern Regional Military Command told DVB that missile launchers, including North Korean-made 122mm Multiple Launch Rocket Systems vehicles, have been moved into place at the Moe Hnyin [Mohnyin] base in Kachin state.

The base is operated by Rocket Battalion 603, and lies around 80 miles southwest of the Kachin state capital, Myitkyina, and equidistant between the Chinese and Indian border. Munitions, including trucks mounted with radar systems known as Fire Control Vehicles, were reportedly delivered from Rangoon over the course several month’s prior to the opening of the base in May.

Another radar base known as Duwun (Pole Star) has been opened on a hill close to Moe Hnyin. Two Russian technicians arrived at the base in early May via Myitkyina for a final installation and inspection of the equipment, the source said.

It is the fourth such base to be opened in Burma this year; two others are operational in Shan state’s Nawnghkio and Kengtung districts, while one was recently opened close to Mandalay division’s Kyaukpadaung town.

The reports will likely stoke suspicions about the contents of a cargo delivered by a North Korean ship, the Jong Gen, in April this year. Two months later, DVB released the findings of an investigation that had unearthered evidence of high-level military cooperation between the two pariahs, but this is the first time that North Korean weaponry has been sighted in Burma.

“When it [the Jong Gen] docked at Thilawa port [near Rangoon], electricity around the whole area was cut. It was dark and there was tight security when they offloaded the material,” said Burma and North Korean expert, Bertil Lintner.

“What I heard was that there was definitely a radar system in the cargo – whether there were missiles too I don’t know, but it’s quite possible.” Leaked photographs taken of a visit to North Korea by the Burmese junta’s third-in-command, Shwe Mann, showed that he had visited a missile factory and air defence radar base.

Lintner said also that two weeks ago reports emerged that a group of North Koreans crossed into Burma from China “disguised as Chinese tourists travelling in a tour bus. There were about 30 or 40 of them and they went straight to a kind of missile development centre west of Mandalay”.

The location of the Moe Hnyin is also odd, Lintner said, because it’s “not near any border. It’s in the middle of the northern tip of Burma so maybe they don’t want to offend the Indians or the Chinese”.

Despite the junta’s myopic focus on its military, Burma faces no external threat, adding weight to claims that the army’s expansion has been done with the country’s various armed opposition groups in mind. The alleged development of a nuclear programme, however, appears to confuse this focus.

“Although the military is pointing to ‘external threats’, they also intend to threaten the ethnic minority groups with the weapons,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a military analyst on the China-Burma border.” The Burmese army wants people to be scared just upon catching sight of the missiles.”

Myanmar-Singapore bilateral trade reaches 1.86 bln USD
Xinhua General News Service: Wed 30 Jun 2010

Myanmar-Singapore bilateral trade reached 1.86 billion U.S. dollars in 2009-10 fiscal year which ended in March, according to the latest figures of the government’ s Central Statistical Organization.

Of the total, Myanmar’s export to Singapore amounted to 671 million dollars, while its import from the Southeast Asian member stood at 1.198 billion dollars, suffering a trade deficit of 4 million dollars.

Singapore rose to the second position from the fifth in Myanmar ’s exporting countries line-up after Thailand to replace India, which declined to the third in 2008-09.

Singapore used to export to Myanmar electronic goods, construction materials, fertilizer and steel products.

In 2008-09 fiscal year, the two countries’ bilateral trade hit 1.91 billion U.S. dollars, of which Myanmar’s export to Singapore took 858.95 million dollars, while its import from Singapore stood 1.05 billion dollar, suffering a trade deficit of 198.96 million dollars.

Myanmar’s foreign trade is mainly with Asian countries, which account for 90 percent of the total. The trade with other member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represents 51.3 percent. The remaining are with European countries with 4.8 percent and American countries 1.5 percent.

Myanmar’s main export goods are natural gas, agricultural, marine and forestry products, while its key import goods are machinery, crude oil, edible oil, pharmaceutical products, cement, fertilizer and consumers goods.

Myanmar-India bilateral trade up sharply in 2009-10
Xinhua General News Service: Wed 30 Jun 2010

Myanmar-India bilateral trade reached 1.19 billion U.S. dollars in the fiscal year of 2009-10, increasing by 26.1 percent from the previous year, and India stands as Myanmar’s fourth largest trading partner after Thailand, China and Singapore, according to the latest official figures available on Wednesday.

Of the total, Myanmar’s export to India amounted to 1 billion U. S. dollars, while its import from India was valued at 194 million dollars, the Central Statistical Organization said.

In 2008-09, the two countries’ bilateral trade was registered at 943 million U.S. dollars, of which Myanmar’s export to India took 144 million U.S. dollars, while its import from the country stood at 797 million U.S. dollars.

Agricultural produces and forestry products led Myanmar’s exports to India whereas medicines and pharmaceutical products topped its imports from India.

Meanwhile, India’s contracted investment in Myanmar reached 189 million U.S. dollars as of March 2010 since the government opened to foreign investment in 1988, of which 137 million were drawn into the oil and gas sector in September 2007, the statistics show.

The EC eyes a Kachin angle -Htet Aung
Irrawaddy: Wed 30 Jun 2010

Burma’s Union Election Commission (EC) has given the green light to 38 out of 42 political parties to contest the general election later this year.

The EC now needs only approve the applications of the four remaining parties in order to fulfill its obligation under the party registration law and move the faltering process along. However, it is worth noting that of the four parties awaiting confirmation, three are ethnic Kachin parties: the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP); the Northern Shan State Progressive Party; and the United Democracy Party (Kachin State). These parties submitted their applications on April 5, 23 and 30 respectively.

The EC has neither approved the applications of these parties nor has it rejected them. The EC has simply delayed making a decision.

So, why would the EC delay the entire electoral process over some relatively insignificant regional parties? The reason lies in the gray shade of the relationships between the Kachin parties and the armed Kachin groups.

The KSPP was formed by former leaders of the rebel Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which signed a cease-fire agreement with the military junta in 1994. One of those leaders is Dr. Tu Ja, a prominent figure in Kachin State who was once vice chairman of the KIO and who now leads the KSPP.

Similarly, the Northern Shan State Progressive Party was formed by a handful of Kachin leaders under the influence of the KIO.

The United Democracy Party (Kachin State) was formed by former leaders of the New Democratic Army–Kachin (NDA-K), another Kachin cease-fire group.

Just as the regime’s Prime Minister Thein Sein and other cabinet ministers resigned their military positions to form a political party called the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Tu Ja and some senior leaders resigned from their positions in the KIO to form the KSPP.

The KSPP leaders’ move to sever ties with the KIO is an overt statement that they no longer belong to the KIO, and clears the way for them to form a political party in accordance with the law. But although the KSPP and the USDP share this distinction, the KSPP will not share the same advantages as the USDP during the election process.

When the KSPP leaders went to Naypyidaw in May to meet the EC members and to ask why the approval of their party had been delayed, the answer given was reportedly: “Because of the KSPP’s ties with the KIO,” said Lahpai Nawdin, the editor of the Thailand-based Kachin News Group, who interviewed the party leaders.

If that were the case, the EC would have to specify which article of the Political Party Registration Law was broken by the KSPP.

Article 12 (A-3) of the law reads: “Contacting or abetting directly or indirectly an insurgent organization and individuals in revolt with arms against the State, organization and individuals designated by the State as committing terrorist acts or organization declared as unlawful association or members of the said organization.”

Did the EC categorize the KIO as a insurgent organization or an unlawful association? If so, does that indicate that the cease-fire agreement between the KIO and the junta has expired or has been annulled?

Looking back over the years at the post-cease-fire relationship between the KIO and the junta, it is clear the junta treated the organization neither as an insurgent organization nor as an unlawful association.

In fact, the KIO has enjoyed a strong status both economically and politically. They have benefited from trade links and business deals, albeit mainly in Kachin State. They joined the junta’s National Convention in 2004 and participated in drawing up the Constitution.

When the junta introduced its program of transforming the armed cease-fire groups into border guard forces (BGF) in April 2009, the relationship intensified due to the junta’s transparent attempt to incorporate the ethnic groups under the command of the Burmese military.

Although the Burmese negotiators used a number of carrots to persuade the KIO to accept the BGF plan, they failed to convince the KIO leaders to alter their deep-seated distrust of the military regime.

When Tu Ja and his colleagues cut ties with the KIO and formed their political party, the junta took revenge by using the EC mechanism to slap the KSPP down a peg or two.

However, at the end of the day, Naypyidaw wants at least one Kachin party contesting the election in order to show the inclusiveness of the ethnic parties in the electoral process.

The junta’s solution will be to urge local Kachin leaders from the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) to form a nationalist Kachin party that is allied to Naypyidaw, and instruct the EC to let the KSPP and the other Kachin parties crash and burn.

Prolonging the misery and postponing the inevitable – Cynthia Boaz
Huffington Post: Wed 30 Jun 2010

Burma (aka Myanmar) is of the world’s most brutal regimes, and unfortunately, it is also amongst the least well understood. In terms of trade and communications, the country is as closed as North Korea and nearly as isolated as Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Its human rights abuses are widespread and increasing. The junta has one of the worst images in the world. It has very few friends, and even it’s powerful regional allies (China and India) keep a safe public distance so as not to catch any of the generals’ political cooties.

Although the monk-led, nonviolent Saffron Revolution, which hit a peak of public activity in the fall of 2007, has failed thus far to bring an end to the repression, the movement (which was a continuation of the student-led uprising from 1988) still persists. Brave activists risk their lives every day to move information in and out of the country, hoping to give global audiences a glimpse of the horrifying truth behind the veil.

The junta is holding elections sometime later in the year (best guesstimates are for October 10 — which would make the date 10/10/10, a date consistent with the paranoid generals’ fixation on numerology and superstition), but Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy party, which won 81% of the seats in the 1990 parliamentary elections (before the junta declared the victory fraudulent), has been imprisoned or under house arrest for most of the past 22 years and has been banned by the junta from participating in the elections. In protest, the NLD has also withdrawn from the elections. Which means that the people will have very little means constructive means through which to channel their discontent and hope for a free and democratic Burma unless the pro-democracy movement can organize an opposition force within the next three months, a feat that would be daunting even in an open society that permitted freedom of speech, association and movement.

So the conventional wisdom is that the junta will “win” the election and that this will “reinforce their power.” This is a dangerous presumption, based on a common and deeply-embedded misconception that violence equals power. The generals will probably win the election because they have beaten, killed, imprisoned and otherwise bullied their competition out of the running. And where the process is corrupted, the result can not be legitimate. So the election will not reinforce the junta’s power. It will simply reinforce the lie that the junta has real power.

Political legitimacy can be understood as the situation where the regime still stands even when the threat of force is removed. If the junta in Burma allowed for a fair and competitive election, they would lose. Resoundingly. Which means that the election is nothing more than a farce, designed to placate the increasingly global community with a show of “legitimacy.” Because these particular tyrants seem even more removed from reality than many of their counterparts around the world, it is likely that their margin of victory will be enormous (in a healthy democratic election, it is very unusual to get a margin of victory of more than 10 percentage points, and where the incumbent party gets more than 70% in a national election, more times than not it is an indicator of corruption or fraud).

The purpose of a democratic election is to 1) ascertain the best social choice, and 2) bestow legitimacy on the legislative/executive authority. If the process is manipulated so that neither of these things can happen, the outcome is meaningless. Understanding this, it is disappointing to think that any legitimate media observers take this farce of an election to be anything but a pathetic demonstration to the world that the generals can still repress their own people with the worst of them.

With their brutality against Buddhist monks — the soul of Burma — the junta gave away their last bits of moral authority. And this farce election is evidence that their last shreds of political legitimacy have evaporated. The international community has an obligation, at the very least, to recognize this inevitable “victory” for what it is — the last gasp of a decaying system. Sadly, the generals have demonstrated that they do not intend to go down alone. They’ll spread the misery as far and wide as possible. But each act of brutality girds the people’s will to resist them, and while the junta may again stretch out their tenure, these elections should be viewed not as a beginning, but as the beginning of the end.

Junta starts new censorship rules – Ba Kaung
Irrawaddy: Tue 29 Jun 2010

Burmese media has been given minimum space for election related news recently, but starting next month the space will likely be further restricted by new censorship rules.

Two months ago, the weekly news journals in Rangoon—an estimated seven journals, each with an average circulation of between 50,000 to 100,000—offered full pages or special stories on election coverage, introducing various political parties and their leaders who plan to contest the election this year.

But beginning in July, Burma’s notorious Press Scrutiny Board (PSB) will reduce election coverage and a newly formed commission will monitor the news journals to make sure the same rules apply to all—meaning that no journals will be able to circumvent the censorship rules with their connections or under-the-table payments, according to editors in Rangoon who spoke to The Irrawaddy.

Currently, journals are now allowed to submit three or four pages to the PSB for last-minute news. Next month, they will be allowed to submit only two pages, which must not include any political news.

Even a 20-page new political publication, the Monitor Journal, which is run by a regime-favored publisher, canceled its publication last week after suffering heavy cuts by the censorship board which approved only four pages. One Rangoon source said that a recent change of officials at the PSB caused the change in rules, while another editor said it was an official policy change in the run-up to the election.

“This is not a change by the censorship board itself. This is a policy shift,” said a Rangoon editor who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The government initially allowed the media a small space to legitimize its planned election in the eyes of the public and the international community. Now it seems to think enough is enough.”

So far, much of the election coverage allowed by the regime has been focused on not allowing any stories to reflect anti-government or anti-election opinions or information.

The journals were allowed to publish interviews with political leaders who want to contest the elections as opposed to those against the election, such as the majority of the members of Aung San Suu Kyi’s disbanded National League for Democracy (NLD). Intentionally or not, the coverage was also focused on the split within the NLD over the election, although the stories never criticized the controversial election laws or the regime’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

Recently, the PSB allowed 1988 nationwide protests to be described as a “general strike”—a major political event which the regime usually terms the “88” disturbance. Reflecting the call for “a free and fair” election, one journal was also allowed to quote a cartoonist, who said: “If the election is properly held in line with democratic norms and standards, a major turnout will happen.”

A Rangoon-based reporter said, “That period is over now. We can’t say it’s fair if the regime only allows us to report on what the pro-government parties are saying.”

The latest developments follow election commission rules released last week that political parties must agree not to say or publish anything that criticizes the military, government, or civil service personnel. According to Rangoon media sources, the government is starting the latest round of censorship to ensure that “the pro-democracy parties” are not allowed to get their message out to the people prior to the election.

“The government wants to make sure that pro-democracy parties like the NLD splinter party, the National Democratic Force, Thu Wai’s Democratic Party [Myanmar] and Phyo Min Thein’s Union Democratic Party do not get their message out through the media,” said one editor.

Burmese officials have made it clear that they do not want regional or international groups to monitor the planned election whose date has not yet been announced.

With tighter censorship rules, the Burmese public will remain dependent mainly on radio stations such as the BBC and VOA, as they were during Burma’s last election in 1990.

While censorship is a real concern, others questioned the level of public interest in the election.

“We’re talking about how we are allowed to cover the election, but we may be missing the fact that people are not very interested in this election,” said one Rangoon editor.

South Korea, Myanmar Agree to Jointly Develop Two Gas Blocks – Tom Grieder
Global Insight: Tue 29 Jun 2010

Following a visit by a South Korean delegation to Myanmar between 9 and 12 June the South Korean government announced that it has reached an agreement with Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE) to jointly exploit two gas blocks–B-2, located onshore northern Myanmar, and A-7, located offshore the Arakan coast in the Bay of Bengal. Following the agreement it is believed that MOGE will allow South Korean firms to operate in the block. According to IHS Global Exploration and Production Service (GEPS), the B-2 block has a total area of 19,066 sq. km and is jointly operated by MOGE and Russia’s Silver Wave Energy. The last known activity was in March, when Silver Wave spudded the Shwe Pinle 3 exploration well. Block A-7 has a size of 8,224 sq. km in water depths of up to 2,000 metres in the Rakhine Basin. The block contains one dry well drilled in 1976, although it is believed to have significant potential for hydrocarbons.

Significance:
Since March the South Korean government has been stepping up co-operation with the junta in Myanmar in a wide range of areas including trade and investment, training, and technology, both as a strategy of accessing energy and mineral resources and to advance its regional soft power and diplomatic position. In the energy sector this strategy has met with some success. South Korean companies such as Hyundai Heavy have gained large contracts for offshore engineering works while Daewoo International is leading the upstream component of the Shwe gas project. The current agreement is unusual as foreign companies have not frequently been invited to invest onshore, where discoveries are generally reserved for domestic consumption. However, the need for investment in onshore acreage due to MOGE’s very low onshore output levels might be opening up new opportunities, perhaps reflected by Chinese company North Petrochem Corp. Limited’s (NPCC) recent award of Block F in the onshore Central Burma Basin. The unilateral termination of the production sharing contract on Block A-7 with Silver Energy in early June–because the company could not fulfill its commitments–may have paved the way for South Korea to reach the agreement, although the South Korean delegation appears to have even broader ambitions, following reports that the two sides also holding discussions over joint exploration of eight additional blocks

Deception and denials in Myanmar – Bertil Lintner
Asia Times: Tue 29 Jun 2010

Bangkok – Myanmar’s military government issued pro-forma denials after al-Jazeera aired an investigative report by the Oslo-based Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) alleging that Myanmar is attempting to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. But as the international community weighs the evidence, the regime could soon face United Nations-imposed sanctions for its military dealings with North Korea.

On June 11, a week after the television network showed the program, Myanmar’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that “anti-government groups” in collusion with the international media had made the allegation with the goal of “hindering Myanmar’s democratic process and tarnishing the political image of the government”. Myanmar “is a developing nation” which “lacks adequate infrastructure, technology and finance to develop nuclear weapons”, the statement continued.

The North Koreans issued a similar denial, blaming the United States for the report. Ten days after the Myanmar denial, the official Korean Central News Agency reported: “The United States is now making much fuss, floating the sheer fiction that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea] is helping Myanmar in its ‘nuclear development’, not content with labeling the DPRK ‘provocative’ and ‘bellicose’.”

In its next sentence, the report denounced US State Department spokesman Philip J Crowley for what Pyongyang seemed to consider an equally serious crime. Crowley, the KCNA stated, had been “making false reports that the DPRK conducted unlicensed TV relay broadcasts about the World Cup matches”.

While the North Korean statement could be dismissed as comical, the Myanmar Foreign Ministry’s denial is more revealing. It did not mention Myanmar’s program to develop ballistic missiles or the extensive network of bunkers, culverts and underground storage facilities for the military that has been constructed near the new capital Naypyidaw and elsewhere where the North Koreans have reportedly been active.

More intriguingly, the Foreign Ministry found it necessary to deny reports that a North Korean ship that docked in Myanmar on April 12 this year was carrying military-related material. The ship, the ministry said, “was on a routine trip to unload cement and to take on 10,000 tons of Myanmar rice”.

However, if carrying only innocuous civilian goods, as the statement maintains, there would seemingly have been no reason for authorities to cut electricity around the area when the Chong Gen, a North Korean ship flying the Mongolian flag of convenience, docked on the outskirts of Yangon.

According to intelligence sources, security was tight as military personnel offloaded heavy material, including Korean-made air defense radars. The ship left the port with a return cargo of rice and sugar, which could mean that it was, at least in part, a barter deal. On January 31 this year, another North Korean ship, the Yang M V Han A, reportedly delivered missile components also at Yangon’s Thilawa port.

Rogue ties

In November 2008, General Shwe Mann, the third-highest ranking member of the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council, paid a visit to North Korea. It was supposed to be a secret trip, but the visit was leaked to Myanmar exiles and reports of his rounds appeared on several Internet news sites. During the visit, Shwe Mann was taken to a missile factory and an air defense radar facility and a memorandum of understanding was signed to outline the nature of cooperation between the two countries, which only recently reestablished diplomatic relations.

However, the full extent of the North Korean presence in Myanmar is still a matter of conjecture. The first report of a delegation from Myanmar making a secret visit to Pyongyang dates to November 2000, where the two sides held talks with high-ranking officials of North Korea’s Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. In June 2001, a high-level North Korean delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Park Kil-yon paid a return visit to Yangon, where it met Myanmar’s Deputy Defense Minister Khin Maung Win and reportedly discussed defense-industry cooperation.

In 2003, the first group of North Korean technicians were spotted at naval facilities near the then-capital Yangon. North Korean planes were also seen landing at military airfields in central Myanmar. Three years later, North Korean tunneling experts arrived at Naypyidaw, and Myanmar military sources began to leak photographs of the North Koreans as well as the underground installations they were involved in digging under and near the new capital.

On June 24, the DVB reported that a new radar and missile base had been completed near Mohnyin in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State. It is not clear in which direction the installations are pointed, as Mohnyin is located on the railway line that cuts through Kachin State and is approximately equidistant between the Indian and Chinese borders.

Work on similar radar and missile bases has been reported from Kengtung in eastern Shan State, 160 kilometers north of the Thai border town of Mae Sai. Since Myanmar is not known to have imported radars and missile components from any country other than North Korea, the installations would appear to be one of the first visible outcomes of a decade of military cooperation.

Until recently reports of such cooperation were met with skepticism among analysts because Myanmar had severed diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1983 after three secret agents planted a bomb at Yangon’s Martyrs’ Mausoleum and killed 18 visiting South Korean officials, including then-deputy prime minister So Suk-chun and three other government ministers. But the two pariah states seem to have built a bond around their common antagonism with the United States.

Expert confirmation

The DVB investigative report shed new light on the nature of this secretive cooperation and of Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions. Photographs and documents smuggled out of the country by a defector from the Myanmar army, Major Sai Thein Win, were scrutinized by international arms experts and found to be credible.
Among the experts was Robert Kelley, a former Los Alamos weapons scientist who was a director with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 1992 to 1993 and again from 2001 to 2005. Now based in Vienna, he conducted weapons inspections in Libya, Iraq, and South Africa, as well as compliance inspections in Egypt, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, Syria, Tanzania, Pakistan, India, and Congo, among others.

Kelley concluded after a careful study of material produced by Sai Thein Win and other Myanmar military defectors: “Our assessment of multiple sources is that Burma [Myanmar] is really developing nuclear technology, that it has built specialized equipment and facilities, and it has issued orders to cadre to build a program.”

It remains to be proven that the North Koreans are involved in Myanmar’s fledgling nuclear program. Even if they are, it is not clear how advanced Myanmar’s program may be. Many skeptics assume the project is an illusion of grandeur bordering on megalomania among Myanmar’s ruling generals.

North Korean involvement in Myanmar’s missile program is more certain, but even so it is unclear that the country’s largely unskilled technicians would be able to produce a missile that works. One intelligence source described it as more of a “phallic fantasy”, a large projectile that Myanmar’s generals would like to show off at the annual March 27 Armed Forces Day parade. “Just imagine how proud they would be to see a truck towing a big and impressive missile past the grandstand,” the source said.

Western intelligence sources are aware of the current presence of 30 to 40 North Korean missile technicians at a facility near Minhla on the Irrawaddy River in Magwe Division. At least some of the technicians reportedly arrived overland by bus from China, to make it appear as if they were Chinese tourists.

According to a Myanmar source with knowledge of the area: “There are several defense industries, DI, around Minhla. More importantly, these are not very far from the Sidotara Dam and suspected DI-20, Pwintbyu and Myaing. In other words, there are many military activities in that area.”

In power-starved Myanmar, it is logical that defense production facilities have been situated near a power-generating dam. Myaing is where Sai Thein Win worked as deputy commander of a top-secret military factory before he defected earlier this year. While Myanmar authorities have denied his testimonies publicly, intelligence agents swooped on his home town of Kyaukme in Shan State soon after the DVB report was aired internationally. His family has been interrogated, but so far no one has been arrested.

On the contrary, the Shan Herald Agency for News, an exile-run news group in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand, reports that Sai Thein Win has become somewhat of a local hero since he went public with his revelations. “Among the security officials who visited Kyaukme, one was also reported to have said that he admired Sai’s courage and his ‘well done expose’,” the news group reported.

If accurately reported, that sentiment would reflect one reason why Sai Thein Win decided to defect: Myanmar’s experiments with nuclear technology and missiles amount to little more than a waste of money in a country that desperately needs more funds dedicated to public health and education.

Meanwhile, the regime’s budding cooperation with North Korea threatens to cost the country more internationally. US Senator Jim Webb, a staunch advocate of engagement with Myanmar’s ruling generals, was forced to cancel his scheduled visit to the country when he learned al-Jazeera would air the DVB report while he was there.

As it becomes increasingly apparent that both countries have violated United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which bans North Korea from exporting all types of weapons, Myanmar could soon be penalized with more international sanctions. The prospect of that happening – and already deep dissatisfaction over the close relationship with a pariah regime like Pyongyang, which is even more isolated than the one in Naypyidaw – is reportedly stoking resentment among the Myanmar officer corps.

Other officers like Sai Thein Win may therefore be waiting in the wings for an opportunity to defect and shed more light on Myanmar’s deep and dark nuclear secrets.

* Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea Under the Kim Clan. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.

Suu Kyi’s lawyer warned on reporting – Khin Hnin Htet
Democratic Voice of Burma: Mon 28 Jun 2010

The lawyer for detained Burmese opposition icon Aung San Suu Kyi has been warned by the government not to relay her opinions about the upcoming elections to media outlets.

Nyan Win, one of the few people permitted by the military junta to visit Suu Kyi, told the Thailand-based Irrawaddy magazine last week that in a recent meeting with the Nobel laureate, she said that Burmese people had the right to choose whether or not to vote.

“The last time I met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, she talked about some legal facts – that by law a voter has the right to vote and the right to not vote. I told this to the media and they reported it but now I’ve been warned against doing this again,” he said.

Suu Kyi’s response to the warning was one of “disappointment”, Nyan Win said. “She also said it was just ‘educating about law’, and that the government has the responsibility to help people understand the law. She said she will complain to those concerned and asked me to find facts.”

He added that authorities told him he was restricted to reporting about her response to her court case; in May, Suu Kyi launched a final appeal against her house arrest, which was handed down in August last year after she was found guilty of ‘sheltering’ US citizen John Yettaw.

Courts are yet to respond to the appeal, but the lawyers who met with Suu Kyi on the 25 June showed her the draft statement that they will present to the court, which the recently-turned 65-year-old made some amendments to.

The Burmese government today enacted an unprecedentedly severe raft of media censorship rules that will curtail the freedom of publications inside Burma to report on the elections, slated for later this year.

Burma already has some of the world’s strictest media laws, and authorities are expected to clamp down on reporters working for exiled media groups as the polls near. Already some 15 journalists are behind bars in the pariah state, some serving sentences as long as 35 years.

Burma poll will entrench brutality – Shirin Ebadi and Jody Williams
Dispatch Online: Mon 28 Jun 2010

Elections in Burma are expected for some time in 2010. The military government claims that this is a step towards real democracy, but all signs point to the contrary.

Under the leadership of our sister peace laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, the main opposition party, the National League of Democracy, recently chose to dissolve rather than take part in a flawed electoral process. They believe the elections will be a sham, and further entrench the military junta’s fierce grip on power. Under this regime, violence and abuse of basic human rights have been a daily reality in Burma for decades.

Meanwhile, Suu Kyi marked her 65th birthday (on June 19), as well as her 14th year under house arrest and almost 20 years since she was democratically elected by the people of Burma to be their leader.

Her story is extraordinary, but also emblematic of the suffering of hundreds of thousands of women in Burma. Like Aung San Suu Kyi, they are trapped in a life of misery under a brutal military regime, in the world’s largest-running, but often forgotten, civil war.

We met some of those women recently when we sat as judges at the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women of Burma in New York. We heard harrowing testimony from 12 courageous women, who told of their experiences of human rights violations at the hands of the military regime in their country.

Chang Chang spoke of being attacked and gang-raped in her village by a group of Burmese military soldiers. As if that was not torture enough, she was then shamed and expelled by her community when news of the attack spread.

Naw Ruth Tha described long days of being forced by soldiers to carry heavy loads on her back, and long nights being raped by the same soldiers. She was five months pregnant at the time.

Ma Pu Sein wept as she recalled the soldiers who burnt down her entire village.

One young woman opened her testimony saying, “I share with you a common story that in its commonness has, in time, become normal.”

Indeed, each of these women stands for the thousands of women, children, and men who, for decades, have struggled under the oppression of the junta. Their stories range from the imprisonment and torture of political dissenters to the conscription of civilians to be used as sexual slaves and human landmine sweepers.

Brutality on this level should never be accepted as normal. But with the exception of rare instances of international attention, the world mostly watches in silence while the regime continues to act with impunity. The testimonies we heard at the tribunal reconfirm that the regime’s actions amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. These human rights violations – including those that target women – must not be allowed to continue. The international community must act now for justice in Burma.

One path of action would be for the UN Security Council to consider the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. Such a commission could be the first step in the long journey to the International Criminal Court for the military junta. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma, Tomas Quintana, has called for the creation of such a commission, which has been publicly supported by the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, and the Czech Republic. Along with our fellow tribunal judges, we also called upon the Security Council to begin the process of referring Burma to the International Criminal Court through the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry.

The upcoming Burmese elections are another arena for international action. Elections will be based on a constitution that was created and ratified without consultation with civil society, including the women of Burma. The constitution also effectively hinders the participation of women in political office – including the generation of women inspired by the example of Aung San Suu Kyi. The recent dissolution of the legitimate governing party and the official opposition is further evidence of the gravity of the problem.

Under such circumstances and in the face of decades of crimes and abuses against the peoples of Burma by the military regime, the international community should unite in their refusal to accept either the upcoming elections or any government that results from them as legitimate.

It is time for the international community to show at least as much courage as the women of Burma. Their leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has dedicated her life – one of great personal loss and privation – for democracy for her country. The women who testified at the tribunal in New York also refuse to silently accept non-action. Instead, they are speaking out, in the hope that doing so will lead to real change for their country. We believe that it will.

In honour of Aung San Suu Kyi and the resilient women of Burma, the international community must stand with the people of Burma in their struggle for justice an

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