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What an obnoxious stand!
India must not remain satisfied with the capabilities to kill hundreds of thousands in one single shot, but must go in for the ability to kill millions and millions!
Never mind that India already has at least about 100 of these weapons of mass murder. And with the deal coming into effect, imported uranium being used for power production and indigenously produced uranium being freed up exclusively for Bomb-making, the capacity to produce such apocalyptic machines would go up manifold.
That's about the shocking lack of moral scruples underlying such objections.
This also makes complete nonsense of the doctrine of "minimum credible deterrence", which India has unilaterally and voluntarily committed to adopt. Of course it also makes a mockery of India's unilateral and voluntary moratorium on further explosive testing since as far back as May 98.
This is also transparently and utterly irrational as this additional killing power (to be acquired) can hardly add to any "deterrence" effects. If the threat to kill hundreds of thousands cannot "deter", then nor can the threat to kill millions and millions.
The other problems include that it completely disregards the crucial fact that other 44 members of the NSG who are now free to have nuclear trade with India, through the US initiative and much more than that, subject to their own willingness - won't be guided either by the Hyde Act or the 123 Agreement. They're to follow only (i) the provisions of the India-IAEA Agreement; (ii) the terms of NSG waiver; and (iii) their own domestic stipulations.
Russia and France are the frontrunners. Australia, which had supported the NSG waiver, won't supply uranium to India nevertheless. Japan is somewhere in between.
This line of argument also obliterates the lines dividing the Bush Administration and its critics/opponents in the NSG and within the US. All the riders are the contributions of these critics. Bush fought tooth and nail to set aside these riders, with grand success in the IAEA and NSG - through open and brazen armtwisting, and far less in the US Congress itself.
It is not without significance that India refused to sign the 123 Agreement till Bush issued his clarificatory statement while signing the bill passed by the US Congress into law assuring nullification of the various riders laid out in actual implementation of the 123 Agreement. Never mind the merit, or lack of it, of such assurances.
And even signing of the 123 Agreement would not automatically result in placing of actual orders for nuclear reactors on US-based firms - GE and Westinghouse. There are other hurdles to be crossed.
And if the worst comes to worst (if one terms it that way out of passionate craze for the Bigger (H) Bomb), India would be constrained from carrying out further explosive tests, while happily augmenting its capacity to produce fissile materials or A-Bombs by being able to divert its indigenously produced uranium exclusively for (A) Bomb-production having access to imported uranium for (nuclear) power production.
The deal has of course to be opposed on the ground that by granting a unique exception to India, a grossly aberrant state, it constitutes a frontal assault on the current non-proliferation regime and thereby the prospects of global nuclear disarmament. And pushes the world a few notches closer to the final apocalypse.
Sukla
P.S.: Here is an article by Ashley Tellis - understandably the drafter of the deal from the US side, reiterating his account of the upsides of the deal from the US standpoint and an essential history/implications of the deal. He also has no moral qualms whatever about the claim that India now would have "the right to peaceful nuclear cooperation internationally, even as it continues to develop and maintain its nuclear arsenal".
And also the latest statement by the CNDP.
I/II.
The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP)
Demands
Parliamentary Review before Signing of 123 Agreement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Demands
Parliamentary Review before Signing of 123 Agreement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) notes with great concern various reports to the effect that the government of India is to sign the "123 Agreement" with the US as regards civilian nuclear trade between the two countries anytime now. In fact the signing of the agreement appears to be overdue in that it has reportedly already been twice postponed for certain reasons. And a similar agreement has already been signed with the French government.
This does clearly contradict the solemn promise made by the Indian Prime Minister on the floor of the parliament on July 22 last in his concluding reply to the debate on the confidence motion moved by him a day earlier. He then had categorically assured: "I have said on several occasions that our nuclear agreement after being endorsed by the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group would be submitted to this august House for expressing its view."
While the CNDP desists from speculating whether going ahead with signing of bilateral agreements with foreign nations pursuant to the waivers granted by the NSG and the IAEA constitutes a breach of parliamentary privilege, it emphatically demands that before taking up any such bilateral agreement the GoI must come back to the parliament to obtain its view on the whole gamut of issues and the momentous developments since July 22 as per the solemn commitment made by the Indian Prime Minister.
The CNDP takes this opportunity also to reiterate its firm, consistent and principled opposition to the "nuclear deal" as it surely undermines the prospects of global nuclear disarmament, promotes the cause of nuclear militarism and nuclear-weapon build-up in India, threatens to intensify the arms race between India and Pakistan , carries forward the perilous US-India "strategic partnership", and seriously distorts India's energy priorities.
__________________________________________________________________________
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace – CNDP
A – 124 / 6, 1st Floor, Katwaria Sarai
New Delhi – 110016,
telefax - 011-26517814
e mail – cndpindia@...
II.
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/29/bush-singh-nuclear-oped-cx_at_0929tellis_print.html
Commentary
American Giver
Ashley J. Tellis 09.29.08, 1:30 PM ET
The House of Representatives has voted to approve the U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. This action brings the controversial Bush initiative to the edge of completion, and when concluded in the Senate--an outcome expected any day now--the president will secure a rare and dramatic foreign policy victory with far-reaching consequences.
Although the U.S. and India have been democracies since their inception, disagreement over India's nuclear weapons program during the Cold War became the single most important impediment to closer bilateral ties. President Bush's decision to change course--after over 30 years of failing U.S. opposition to India's nuclear program--was intended to decisively remove this impediment.
With the impending conclusion of legislative action in Congress, the president's vision of an empowered India entrenched in the ranks of America's friends and allies will have been realized. No one in New Delhi, Washington or elsewhere can have any doubt that the successful consummation of this improbable initiative is owed fundamentally to Bush's personal investment--and his willingness to expend his scarce and diminishing capital selling it to a skeptical Nuclear Suppliers Group and an initially furious Congress.
That he has succeeded in both arenas is an enormous achievement. In just under four years, Bush has completely overturned 34 years of U.S. global nonproliferation policy with India. Thanks to his policies, India has now been treated as a de facto nuclear weapons state with the right to peaceful nuclear cooperation internationally, even as it continues to develop and maintain its nuclear arsenal. After such a momentous change, no skeptic in New Delhi can have any reason to doubt the American commitment to assist India's rise as a major global power.
That, in effect, was Bush's promise to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005. But in consummating the civilian nuclear initiative in the way he did, the president has accomplished even more. By pressing the Nuclear Suppliers Group to provide a clean waiver that permits India to begin nuclear trade without conditions not simply with the U.S., but with the entire international community, Bush has effectively thrown New Delhi multiple lifelines that could become critical should Washington become unable to make good on its own commitments to India in the future. By so doing, Bush has ensured the survival of his initiative irrespective of what happens in Washington and New Delhi over time.
The president's gamble is premised on the conviction that whatever specific Indian policies at any point may be, India's national interests converge fundamentally with that of the U.S. Consequently, India will remain a friendly state whose growth in capabilities ought to be assisted because it comports with larger American interests in Asia and globally.
Given these judgments, Bush was comfortable offering India a nuclear cooperation initiative that did not require any constraints on its weapons program. Some in the U.S. Congress, however--either because they had a more jaundiced view of India, or because they felt compelled to protect their vision of the larger nonproliferation interests--attempted to "re-balance" Bush's deal by explicitly integrating various nonproliferation conditions.
These efforts at re-balancing the deal caused much angst in New Delhi, even precipitating an odd alliance between the Indian Left and the Indian Right, which joined together to oppose Prime Minister Singh for accepting congressional directives that were perceived as either undermining Bush's original commitments or constraining Indian sovereignty.
Many U.S. and international nonproliferation advocates vociferously egged the U.S. Congress in its attempts to re-balance the deal. While the recent congressional votes in support of the nuclear cooperation agreement ought to signal the decisive defeat of the nonproliferation lobby in this regard, there is no assurance--as far as India is concerned--that this rout will be either permanent or conclusive. After all, a less well-disposed president or Congress could be tempted to impose new constraints on nuclear cooperation with India in the future.
Both the executive and the legislative branches, however, ought to resist strongly the temptation to head in this direction. Any restrictive U.S. policy toward nuclear cooperation with India would neither constrain New Delhi nor limit its growing capabilities. All it would do is price the American nuclear industry out of India's burgeoning energy business. With unconstrained international nuclear cooperation now open to India, New Delhi will be able to secure the entire gamut of nuclear goods--fuel, reactors, technology and ancillary services--from many countries other than the U.S.
Trying to reinstate restrictive U.S. policies toward India--either through legal constraints or by stingy licensing policies--might satisfy American nonproliferation impulses, but it would effectively drive New Delhi into the arms of foreign suppliers whose national policies are more liberal than Washington's.
Despite fears about the future, India's own inclinations are to treat the U.S. as a full partner in its emerging civilian nuclear renaissance. President Bush fulfilled his promise to Prime Minister Singh by making this prospect a realistic one. Future U.S. administrations--for the sake of American and Indian interests--ought to keep the faith by building on what Bush has so courageously begun.
Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was recently on assignment to the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the undersecretary of state for political affairs, during which time he was involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India.
On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 9:14 AM, S kumar <kumar_8134@...> wrote:
The Scientists have raised serious objections to the 123 in several articles published, but the mainstream media has totally ignored to give due publicity to these important points.
IT IS A TOTAL BETRAYAL OF THE PUBLIC AND THE COUNTRY BY A COTERIE OF A FEW CONGRESSMEN LED BY PM MANMOHAN SINGH, TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE PARLIEMENT AND EVEN ITS OWN CONSTITUENTS, THE DETAILS OF THE 123, AND LYING SEVERAL TIMES OF THE HYDE ACT APPLICABILITY AS WELL AS OTHER CLAUSES, SURRENDERING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY TO US HEGEMONY AND MORTGAGING THE EXISTING NUCLEAR REACTORS TO US CONTROLS- FOR 4O YEARS!!
AND ALSO BRINGING THE COUNTRY TO HUGE LIABILITIES, BY PROMISED PURCHASE OF REACTORS FROM TOSHIBA, WESTINGHOUSE OR NORTHROP, OF OUTDATED TECHNOLOGY, FOR AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO OUR ANNUAL BUDGET!!
SHOULD THE COUNTRY PARDON THESES TRAITORS FOR SUCH DASTARDLY COMMITMENT DAMAGING THE LIVES OF FUTURE GENERATIONS OF INDIA?
KAKODKAR THE PRESENT INCUMBENT HAS APPARENTLY BEEN FORCED TO TOE THE LINE BUT READ WHAT THE EARLIER CHAIRMAN HA SAY.
True colours of the nuclear deal
-- P K Iyengar
The US House of Representatives has passed a bill (H. R. 7081) that approves the 123 Agreement, but which is contradictory to the assurance given by the Prime Minister to the nation. An identical version is before the US Senate for voting. Even as late as 26 September 2008, the Prime Minster was seeking an agreement that would 'satisfy India'. This has not come to pass, and it will be interesting to see how the Indian government and the Indian media will 'spin' this into a victory for India. The Indian side is supposed to have been unhappy with the language. The fact is that one is not worried about the language, but the content and compulsions of the Bill.
Why is the House bill not satisfactory? Even the title of the Bill, 'United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act', makes it clear that they seek to press their non-proliferation agenda. The Bill makes a number of things explicitly clear, and reveals the true colours of the nuclear deal.
(1) The 123 Agreement is subject to the provisions of the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act, and does not supersede them.
This is said, in so many words, twice in the Bill. Section 101 (page 3, lines 16-21) says that: "The Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, and any other applicable United States law." Section 102 (page 6, lines 8-12) reiterates that: "Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954." Therefore there is now no question of differences in the 'interpretation' of the 123 Agreement. Irrespective of what we think we are bound by, the Americans have made it abundantly clear that they are bound by the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act, and the 123 Agreement does not supersede either of them. If we conduct a test it is now abundantly clear that, as per the provisions of the Hyde Act and
the Atomic Energy Act, it is the end of the nuclear deal.
(2) In the event of a disruption of fuel supply from the US, the Americans will not help arrange for fuel from another country.
Article 5(b-iv) of the 123 Agreement says that in the event of fuel disruption the US will help India get fuel from 'friendly supplier countries'. But it seems that the Congress is having none of this. Section 102 (page 5, lines 4-12) of the Bill explicitly states that in the event of fuel disruption, not only will the US not help arrange for fuel from other countries, but it will also "seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other source."
Since this sentence is not in the 123 Agreement, the Indian government will probably claim that we are not bound by it. However, the simple reality is that if there is a disruption of fuel from America, for whatever reason, the Americans will work hard to ensure that we do not get it from any other source.
(3) There will be no transfer of enrichment technology, and even permission for reprocessing imported fuel may be denied.
This is the most disturbing clause in the Bill. Sec. 204 of the Bill (page 14, lines 11-19) says explicitly that before the 123 Agreement enters into force (according to Article 16), the President has to certify that the US will work with NSG countries to "agree to further restrict the transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel". So, one of the major advantages we were expecting from the NSG waiver and the 123 Agreement will not be forthcoming.
But this Bill goes even further. Section 201 makes it very clear that any future proposal for reprocessing needs explicit approval from the US Congress, and the Congress retains the right to refuse (page 13, lines 1-4). This is a new twist, and extremely dangerous, because it leaves us completely at the mercy of the Congress. The same section also says that the US will pursue efforts with other countries to ensure that reprocessing of fuel from those countries will also be governed by 'similar arrangements and procedures'. This seems to suggest that the US would even like the existing arrangements with Russia for the Kudankulam reactors to be modified along the proposed lines. The same would also apply to any other supplier. It is surprising that in spite of our being a 'strategic partner', the US wants to restrain our fuel-cycle developments. This shows, again, that India is not being treated as an equal, in spite of the fact that for decades India has
developed reprocessing and enrichment technology on its own, and produced plutonium for fast-breeder reactors as well as enriched uranium for the submarine reactor.
These explicit statements in the House Bill only reaffirm what many of us have been saying for a long time. The 123 Agreement does not supersede, and is constrained by, the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act. The House Bill has added new constraints. The entire Indo-US nuclear deal, which must now be taken to comprise of the Congress Bill, the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, is in contradiction to the July 2005 Joint Statement, because it doesn't give India the status of an advanced nuclear state enjoying the same obligations and benefits as others. The nuclear deal does not allow cooperation in enrichment or reprocessing technology. The nuclear deal does not guarantee fuel supplies or a fuel reserve. In the event of a breach of the 123 Agreement, the US will not work with its allies to find alternate solutions – on the contrary it will pressure them to act against Indian interests. 'Full cooperation' in civil nuclear power is meaningless without
assurances of fuel supply and technological cooperation in the fuel cycle.
The House Bill also makes it clear that the US continues to impose on us the existing non-proliferation regime, and is not ready to recognize India as a nation with advanced nuclear technology. President Bush may have made many promises, but he will not be around to fulfil them. The reality is that the nuclear deal will not bring us as equals to the nuclear table. It will only serve to tighten the non-proliferation regime around us, make us dependent on the nuclear cartel for fuel, and completely cripple our strategic programme.
If the government's intention is to import nuclear reactors and fuel, a simple bilateral agreement, which guarantees application of safeguards to the reactors, the fuel, and the end products of reprocessing the fuel, would have been sufficient and meaningful. There is already a precedent for this. In the nuclear deal with Russia, the irradiated fuel from the Kudankulam reactors can be reprocessed in India, provided this is done under IAEA safeguards. The plutonium that is produced in these reactors, when separated, will also attract IAEA safeguards. This is perfectly understandable, and India has accepted this. Why this should not be applicable in a more friendly agreement with the US, is incomprehensible.
In 1974, when India was less developed and had a bleaker future, Indira Gandhi was able to stand firm in supporting a strategic programme, in spite of ominous warnings of the retribution that would follow. It is ironic that in 2008, when India is in a much stronger position, economically and geopolitically, her own party is ready to betray her legacy and put on nuclear shackles, for a few dollars more.
30 September 2008 Dr. P. K. Iyengar Former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
To: psand@..., IHRO@yahoogroups.com, mediainitiative@..., indiathinkersnet@yahoogroups.com, Mahajanapada@yahoogroups.com, Bahujan@yahoogroups.com, india-unity@yahoogroups.com, india-force@yahoogroups.com, issuesonline_worldwide@yahoogroups.com, arkitectindia@yahoogroups.com, invitesplus@yahoogroups.com, peace-mumbai@googlegroups.com, international-peace-festival@googlegroups.com
--- On Thu, 10/9/08, Dr. Shreesh Juyal <Shreesh.Juyal@...> wrote:
From: Dr. Shreesh Juyal <Shreesh.Juyal@...>
Subject: [IHRO] RE: Visit to India
Date: Thursday, October 9, 2008, 11:14 PM
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
Dear Dr. Dhirendra Sharma,
Very many thanks for your article on "To Say No To Indo-US Nuclear
Deal".
Its both insightful and reflective of the manifest concern of a critical
mass of scientists and philosophers.
I will be visiting Dehra Dun during 19-23 November. Although, there may not
be sufficient time for visiting/ conversing with you, I would, nevertheless,
like to avail such an opportunity. In Dehra Dun, I will be visiting my
ailing elder brother Shri Girish C. Juyal (Founder & President Marshall
School, Dehra Dun).
With best wishes,
Shreesh
Dr. Shreesh Juyal, Drs., D.Litt., F.C.I.I.A.
Consultative Status "A" Observer, United Nations ECOSOC & UNESCO
>From: "Sukla Sen" <sukla.sen@...>
>Reply-To: IHRO@yahoogroups.com
>To: mediainitiative@...,
"indiathinkersnet@yahoogroups.com"
><indiathinkersnet@yahoogroups.com>, mahajanapada
><Mahajanapada@yahoogroups.com>, bahujan
<Bahujan@yahoogroups.com>,
>"india-unity@yahoogroups.com"
<india-unity@yahoogroups.com>,
>"india-force@yahoogroups.com"
<india-force@yahoogroups.com>, IHRO
><ihro@yahoogroups.com>, issueonline
><issuesonline_worldwide@yahoogroups.com>, "Wake up India"
><arkitectindia@yahoogroups.com>, invitesplus@yahoogroups.com,
"Peace
>Mumbai" <peace-mumbai@googlegroups.com>,
>international-peace-festival@googlegroups.com
>Subject: [IHRO] Say No to Indo-US Nuclear Deals
>Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2008 14:21:29 +0530
>
> From Dhirendra Sharma.
>
>
>From: "psand@..." <psand@...>
>
>**
>
>*For your signature support and circulation. Dhirendra.*
>
>* *
>
>* **To say No to Indo-US Nuclear Deals***
>
>* *
>
>Recently, *while New Delhi was experiencing serial bombings Prime Minister
>and Defence Minister of India were in Washington and Paris signing the
>Nuclear deals that ended Indian " isolation and sanctions." *
>
>Strong opposition by the Communist Party notwithstanding, most Scientists
>in India observed discreet silence. But according to Dr. Dale Klein,
>Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to revive the
>dormant 'Nuclear sector in the US have to rebuilt supply networks,
craft
>workers and welders to be recruited and trained, component manufacturing
>shops to be built, and industrial infrastructures reinforced to revive the
>(US) Nuclear Power programme.'* Mr. Lothar Wedekind –
Editor-in-Chief and
>Head of the IAEA News and Information Section, Vienna, supported
Klein's
>view that * *Challenges are formidable, the future of Nuclear Power is
>uncertain. But One thing looks clear –' the next generation of
(nuclear)
>plants will not be made in the **USA**.' *
>
>* *
>
>Indo-US Nuclear deal had been presented as an attractive offer to help
>Indiameet its high-energy demands in 2025.
>*Nuclear power is capital-intensive requires high funding before
>construction, during operation and after de-commissioning of nuclear
>plants.
>In the **US**, 48 reactors are nearing or waiting decommissioning. The
>cost
>of decommissioning is estimated roughly $40 billions and no State
>government in the **US** is willing to bear the cost of decommissioning and
>pay for the long-term waste management.*
>
>* *
>
>* *From the hustings it is clear that George Bush is * *out-sourcing
>nuclear business to India . In order to overcome its financial
>difficulties,
>the US embarked on massive arms sale to Georgia, Taiwan, Pakistan, Libya,
>and to oil-rich Arab countries. Washington is negotiating advanced war
>systems sale to India and make New Delhi its strategic partner.
>
>
>
>We do not doubt high caliber of Indian scientists but since
>Chernobylaccident
>(1986), sufficient data is available indicative of long-lasting
>hazards of radiation.
>*The Kyoto Protocol had, therefore, not included nuclear power enlisting
>Clean Development Mechanism and excluded it from the climate change
>mitigation energy options. *
>
>Therefore, it is incumbent on the government of India to consider the
>long-term social and political implications of the N-Deals. Designed life
>of
>a reactor is about 40-50 years. There is no roadmap of economic and
>political organization necessary for maintenance of decommissioned
>reactors.
>NO government is likely to divest millions of public funds for protection
>of
>useless nuclear burial sites. But unguarded they would endanger life and
>liberty of future generations. India still has time to rethink its nuclear
>policy.
>
>
>
>Concerned Scientists and Philosophers:
>
>Signatories include:
>
>
>
>Tony Benn. Former Energy Minister, London (UK).
>
>
>
>Balwant Bhaneja. Former Canadian Science Councilor, Ottowa (Canada).
>
>
>
>Noam Chomsky. Linguists, Social Philospher, MIT. (USA).
>
>
>
>David Krieger.
>
>President: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara , California (USA
>).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Dr. Dhirendra Sharma, Director, Centre for Science Policy, Dehradun 248009.
>(India)
>Convenor: Concerned Scientists & Philosophers. www.psaindia.org
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