Dear Hindu Friends:

Here are some interesting revelations from Raman of the Institute of Topical
Studies in Chennai, India.

Ram Narayanan


MUSHARRAF: FROM CIA WITH LOVE?

B.RAMAN

Some circles in the US see a linkage between the recent high-profile visit of
Mr.Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State, to New Delhi, the
unpublicised visit of Mr.George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), to Islamabad where he had an unusually long meeting with Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, the self-styled Chief Executive of Pakistan, and the surprise
decision of the Government of India to invite the General to New Delhi for talks
without any longer insisting on the stoppage of Pakistani support to
cross-border terrorism as a pre-condition for a resumption of the bilateral
dialogue at the political level.

Mr.Armitage, who had spent some years of his career in the CIA/DIA and holds the
highest Pakistani civil decoration that could be awarded to a foreigner for his
role during the Afghan war of the 1980s, has a large circle of friends in the
Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.

Mr.Tenet had worked for some years as an aide to one of the Congressional
Intelligence Oversight Committees before he was nominated by Mr. Bill Clinton as
the Director of the CIA.

Significantly, he was one of the very few ( the Director of the FBI was another)
important appointees of the Clinton Administration to have been asked by
President Bush to continue in his post despite the criticism of the functioning
of the CIA and its failure to detect the preparations for India's Pokhran II
nuclear tests of 1998 by Mr.Bush and his advisers during the Presidential
election campaign last year.

These circles attribute this decision not to disturb Mr.Tenet from his post to
an important behind-the-scene role, which he has reportedly been playing since
last year in working for a rapprochement between the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO) and Israel in West Asia and between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir. Mr. Bush and his senior aides, who do not want the President to
personally play an active mediatory role in West Asia or elsewhere similar to
the high-profile roles played by Mr.Clinton, reportedly felt that US interests
could be better served by continuing to use the deniable, stealth services of
the CIA chief.

It is said that Mr.Tenet was involved in the secret goings-on which preceded the
subsequently-aborted cease-fire between the Government of India and the Hizbul
Mujahideen and in the events preceding and following the non-initiation of
combat operations in Kashmir by the Govt. of India. He operated directly as well
as through Maj.Gen. (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, who like Gen.Musharraf, was a
blue-eyed boy of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and who is now a close confidante of
the self-styled Chief Executive.

Maj.Gen.Durrani had in the past served as the ISI station chief in Washington
and was responsible for the ISI's liaison with the CIA and the FBI. Last year,
Jamaat-e-Islami circles in Pakistan had alleged that he had, at the instance of
the CIA, played a role, in consultation with Gen.Musharraf, in persuading the
Hizbul Mujahideen to agree to a cease-fire. However, the whole exercise was
sabotaged by Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS),
who is a Sudan from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and had not been consulted by
Gen.Musharraf and Maj.Gen. Durrani. Gen. Musharraf had him subsequently
transferred to Lahore as a Corps Commander.

It is claimed by these circles in the US that the Ramzan initiative of the Govt.
of India (non-initiation of combat operations) was to have been reciprocated by
the General with an order to his troops for restraint along the Line of Control
(LOC) and action to moderate the activities of the jehadi terrorist
organisations in Jammu & Kashmir which, in turn, would have been reciprocated by
India with permission to the Hurriyat leaders to visit Pakistan.

While the General issued the restraint order to his troops, he allegedly went
back on his word to the CIA to issue a similar restraint order to the jehadis on
the ground that this was being opposed by some of his Corps Commanders. It is
said to be correct that some of his Corps Commanders and retired military
officers such as Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul and Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir, former chiefs of the
ISI, had strongly urged that any restraint by the jehadis should be conditional
on progress in a resumed political dialogue with India.

Lt.Gen.Nasir reportedly even urged that if the dialogue was resumed, any
restraint on the jehadi organisations should be only as a quid pro quo to a
similar restraint by the Govt. of India on the alleged anti-Muslim activities of
the RSS, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Shiv Sena, but his advice on this
issue did not reportedly enjoy the support of other officers, serving or
retired.

It is claimed that in the face of this log jam, Mr.Tenet once again stealthily
stepped into the scene through his recent visit to Islamabad and worked out a
formula, which could be projected by both India and Pakistan as a vindication of
their respective stand hitherto.

Ever since capturing power in October,1999, Gen.Musharraf has been repeatedly
expressing his desire for talks at any place, at any time and at any level. Even
if the forthcoming summit has really been midwifed by the CIA as claimed, this
need not detract from the significance of the turn of events.

But, one has to keep one's fingers crossed till the summit actually takes place.
Gen.Musharraf, sarcastically called in Pakistan Gen.Retreat, had in the past
repeatedly reversed decisions which were opposed by the jehadis. If the jehadis
outside and inside the army continue to oppose the summit, it is to be seen
whether he would resist their pressure and stick to his decision to come to
India.

The summit would at least provide an opportunity to our Prime Minister to test
the military dictator's sincerity and to judge whether the reasonableness
projected by him is an act of desperation to move Pakistan out of its continuing
diplomatic isolation and economic difficulties or just one more crafty move to
catch India on the wrong foot.

In the past, India had had no qualms about negotiating with Pakistan's military
dictators, but Gen.Musharraf cannot be compared to them:

The past dictators were either Punjabis or Pakhtoons, who hold the majority of
the posts in the military. Gen.Musharraf is a Mohajir, who is looked down upon
by the Punjabi officers as a Mohajir parvenu.

As Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, often points out, the
past dictators seized power themselves, but it was Gen.Musharraf's subordinates
who seized power in his absence and made him the ruler. He, therefore, owes his
gratitude to them and cannot easily over-rule them.

The past dictators enjoyed absolute power, but Gen. Musharraf is only the first
among equals.

He has conceded more demands of the Islamic fundamentalists during his 19 months
in office than Gen.Zia. Till now, he has been extremely amenable to pressure
from the Jehadis.

In recent weeks, significant sections of Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy and,
particularly its economic managers, have been coming round to the view that
Pakistan's continued involvement in Afghanistan and J & K was coming in the way
of its economic recovery and that the harping of the military leadership on the
nuclear flashpoint theme in the hope of thereby internationalising the Kashmir
issue was scaring foreign investors away There has been a dramatic drop in
foreign investments since the General seized power.

The Corps Commanders, however, do not share this perception and continue to
believe in their present policy of keeping Indian security forces bleeding in J
& K in the hope of thereby weakening them and keeping the jehadis fighting and
dying at the hands of the Indian security forces in order to prevent their
returning to Pakistan and talibanising the country.

India should guard itself against any illusion that the summit could lead to
peace in J & K. What will really lead to peace is better governance and
attention to the grievances of the people in the State , effective control of
human rights violations by the Security Forces and a willingness, capability and
readiness to take the proxy war to Pakistani territory. (27-5-01)

(The writer is Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai).