Hi Alan and other readers,

I like your example of a riddle:

>Riddles are propositions that are solved when we shift our
>perspective to as to see an alternative way of grasping the
>meaning of what is being said. So to take a simple example,
>when Hegel at the beginning of the Logic says “Nothing is.”
>this can be read two ways. It could mean that there is nothing
>to think or it can mean nothing is what we are to think.
>The first way of reading this proposition is skeptical
>while the second is speculative.

Plato's, 'Georgias' was also the first play
I read that really blew me away.
Together with Zeno's paradox, it was Georgias'
tongue in cheek? 'What is Not',
about something and nothing existing and or
not existing, that really got me hooked on philosophy.

As regards, "nothing is", I have settled on
a less abstract choice then you propose;
the idea that nothing, as in not existing for one property
is something, as in existing for another property e.g.,
an impossible past (the one that happened), future
(the one that can happen), or a thought that cannot
be conceived (ones that can); beyond human sapience
(for greater intelligence) etc; to see all properties
simultaneously, would make the filtering
of information for consciousness is impossible i.e.,
the die landed on a 3, means the three can be counted.
To count all the other properties that occur at the same
time in our universe, is the physicalitists big bad bug;
number would be unintelligible.

For many, the notion of the universal, let alone
the absolute will no doubt remain an enigma.
All they will care about is extending their ego;
by mapping their particular desires
onto the existence of others minds (the folk
psychology that breeds delusions of grandeur).

Hegel's take on history, for what is no more, not happened
cannot happen; as in no thing then seems to be at the heart
of speculative philosophy. For temporal properties,
I take are necessary to measure
and compare <events> so choices can be made.
So why does Hegel not use the later argument;
if in fact he does not (references appreciated)?
Is the German use of 'event' a word very different
from the English; has no general name because
it is buried within references to the
particular?

Perhaps a better starting point for a
reading of the phenomenology is to say:
understandings of experience are only made
intelligible through our ideas? Ideas as such
are not equivalent to sensory phenomena,
but are necessary to construct concepts with
an aim to determine the reason (as in doing, asking
and giving: the thematized acts and hermeneutics)
for sensory phenomena. How else to resolve the
move to the master/slave dialectic?
Hegel, can be said to be relevant;
achieved a lot by his writing that has benefited
the progress of our world's culture.


Regards,


Paul Healey

--- On Tue, 8/12/09, Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:

From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...>
Subject: RE: [hegel] Re: Primer on  the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Date: Tuesday, 8 December, 2009, 22:13







 



 


   
     
     
      Hi Paul,



My own view is that as you say there is a problem of understanding how Hegel’s
logic actually works. For one, I do not think it follows any form of logical
reasoning that we might already be familiar with. As far as I can see, Hegel
does not argue from premises to conclusions. What I think he does do is
introduce a dual view of propositions as a vital feature of how his thinking
works. If there is any truth to this then it would not be possible for him to
speak in anything other than riddles. Riddles are propositions that are solved
when we shift our perspective to as to see an alternative way of grasping the
meaning of what is being said. So to take a simple example, when Hegel at the
beginning of the Logic says “Nothing is.” this can be read two ways. It
could mean that there is nothing to think or it can mean nothing is what we are
to think. The first way of reading this proposition is skeptical while the
second is speculative.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups. com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups. com] On Behalf Of Paul
Healey

Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2009 7:09 AM

To: hegel@yahoogroups. com

Subject: RE: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions



Hello Alan,



thank you, Randall and Beat for your analysis'.

Alan, you remarked:



>Thus the absolute makes an appearance but only to

>prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration

>many readers have with what they see as the obscurity

>or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion



>about the absolute). I don't know if this puts

>me in the metaphysical camp,



>but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved

>transcendental philosopher.



Perhaps this frustration results, as there is

a lack of economy, exposition and example to explain how

Hegel's reasoning for an understanding of logic

actually works? either that or the binary and critical

thinking of the Anglo-American analytical schools has become

so pervasive, as to actually achieve an evolutionary

end to the philosophy of our species?



This I think could be resolved by taking

many of Brandom's insights on board with

a clear aim: to establish the significance of the inferences

that constitute a scientific method; the modalities of its

function (for doing and asking for reasons) as a set of

predicated relations; what the concept of a

totality (where the part cannot be equal to the whole)

actually means for such a set.



I therefore see Hegel's use of the dialectic as a function,

so instead of reducing the argument down to the

presupposition versus the presuppositionless, you have

conditionals for the supposition, the indifference and the

measure of the credence given a manifold.

An idea of the absolute?



What is greater than, as in Anselm's ontological argument

can then be turned into a metaphysical principle. In affect,

Hegel gave us all the pieces and put some of them together.

What a different world it would of been

if he had spelt the principle out in the same way that

Aristotle had; as a propositional relation?



So the question that should of been asked, is how is

Hegel's metaphysics superior to Aristotle's?

As translated, for the most part the later's

commentary is easier to follow.

Given the depth and detail of Hume and Kant's works,

this should not be much of a surprise.

By my interpretation of an Hegelian metaphysics,

his principle means the identity and difference

of the agents decisions have a consequences.

In this way I think Hegel's

Philosophy of Right is consistent

with his Phenomenology and his Logic.



Paul Healey



--- On Mon, 7/12/09, Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@gmail. com <mailto:ponikvaraj%
40gmail.com> > wrote:



From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@gmail. com <mailto:ponikvaraj% 40gmail.com> >

Subject: RE: [hegel] Re: Primer on  the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions

To: hegel@yahoogroups. com <mailto:hegel% 40yahoogroups. com>

Date: Monday, 7

December, 2009, 19:37



Hi Beat,



I think this notion that reality is conceptual "all the way down" as John



McDowell puts it originates with the thought of Wilfred Sellars who was the



mentor for most of the analytical philosophers who have taken an interest in



Hegel. This lends itself quite nicely to what has been called the



'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel which sees his philosophy as primarily an



exercise in conceptual clarification. The problem I have with this reading



is that these thinkers then want to take these clarified concepts as norms



or correctives to be applied to our worldly knowledge. I see Pippin and



Winfield as taking this tack even though in many respects their views differ



from one another. I tend to think that Hegel was of the camp that wanted to



leave the world pretty much as it is. In this respect, I think Marx's



frustration about philosophers (wanting to understand rather than change the



world) is on the mark even if I would side with the philosophers. But of



course I may be wrong about this view of Hegel and the world.



I tend to see the absolute as what I like to think of as a shadow companion



to the conceptual development. That is, the discussion in the system about



determinate concepts I believe takes on its peculiar Hegelian twist due to



how the determinate and the indeterminate (the absolute) interrelate. Thus I



am sympathetic to Zizek's discussion that I believe draws on parallels



between the Hegelian absolute and the Lacanian Real. On my view, the



absolute roughly takes the place that in traditional metaphysics would be



the real or the other to thought - being (or the special beings, God, soul,



world) as it is apart from our thought of it. I think Hegel is attempting to



have it both ways in that the absolute as indeterminate - and yet as what



instigates the non-objective speculative dialectic - is both distinct from



and very much a part of the circle of determinations that always tend to



terminate for Hegel in his works with the appearance of an absolute within



the realm so constituted. Thus the absolute makes an appearance but only to



prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration many readers have



with what they see as the obscurity or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion



about the absolute). I don't know if this puts me in the metaphysical camp,



but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved transcendental philosopher.



One of the more curious stances is that of Houlgate who seems to agree with



the nonmetaphysicians that all Hegel is about is conceptual clarification



but thinks that because in this clarification thought and being are one that



Hegel's thought is also an ontology (see Houlgate's "Hegel's Logic" in The



Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy). Thought all



the way down is equally being all the way down. I think this is a correct



thought but only if it is related to what is dialectical in Hegel's thought.



Houlgate in my view does not have a proper appreciation for dialectics, a



feature common to the nonmetaphysicians. So, he seems to me instead to be a



modern day Anselm, simply finding being where he finds thought. He thus sees



himself as giving a metaphysical reading of Hegel. I agree, but see this



sort of metaphysics as too much like the bad metaphysics that tends to



embarrass modern thinkers.



So much for this little excurses. Except I should mention for anyone



interested that Brandom's book on Hegel's Phenomenology can be downloaded



from his website. It appears as a series of attachments to his class on the



Phenomenology at the University of Pittsburgh. I found this out oddly enough



through a chance meeting with a student who actually had taken this class.



When I asked when Brandom's book was coming out he told me about the free



download.



Regards, Alan



-----Original Message-----



From: hegel@yahoogroups. com [mailto:hegel@ yahoogroups. com] On Behalf Of Beat



Greuter



Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 3:38 AM



To: hegel@yahoogroups. com



Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The



Notion, and notions



Alan Ponikvar writes:



>> Hi Randall,



>>



>>I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it



appears in 81-82 with Kant's insight that all consciousness implies



self-consciousness. And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is



shared by many commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel's



description of natural consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or



transcendental account. If Hegel is to limit himself to knowledge as it



appears then one might suppose that anything he has to say must be read off



of the phenomena themselves. This would make his description what he says it



is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with Kant's approach. Hegel's



first interest is in what he calls "the abstract determinations of knowledge



and truth." This leads to another question: is this description meant to



peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing giving us the



reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask Hegel what



justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these



determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself then we



are right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability



of appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind



appearances?



>>



>>It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is



one cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both



awareness and the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be confused



with general principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction



between informing matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking



about the former, Hegel about the latter.



>>



>>That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a



speculative and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers



to the general form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to



what is going to happen such that the experience of consciousness actualizes



its own truth. These will prove to be two distinct features of knowledge as



it appears. It is what lies behind Hegel's cryptic claim that the



realization of the concept is to be the loss of the reality of



consciousness.



>>



>>Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of



what he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this



passage creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper



understanding of the exposition. If guided by what we know about the common



conceptions of knowing it is easy to understand what it might mean to arrive



at the point where a concept and an object might correspond. But what would



this mean with respect to the dialectical actualization of the concept that



Hegel claims is the truth of each shape of consciousness? This concept does



not correspond with - in fact it is not clear that it even has - some



object.



>>



>>regards, Alan   



>>



I think this is very well expressed. If we take the latest development



of Analytic Philosophy then we can summarize - and Hegel was the first



who did this - there is no fact behind the fact. There is a truth



relation between the proposition and the fact which is not independent



of the proposition itself but its inherent (not identical) criterion



(Phenomenology of Spirit). This truth relation is dynamic and all our



facts are recalled experiences we collect during our life. The feature



of the experience is the synthesis of objective and subjective spirit -



a synthesis which is the absolute for a while. But most important: our



experience is from the very beginning always conceptual. There is no



such thing as an independent pre-conceptual intuition and transcendental



concepts with facts given in the world for looking after by given



subjects as Kant thought (there are indeed other interpretations of



Kant's respective thought, however, I am sceptical about this). Our



facts are made (fac-tum, Tat-sache) and this requires actions. Otherwise



we are subject to a bad Platonism.



Regards,



Beat Greuter



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Hi Beat,



You have focused on my maximum point of uncertainty: how to relate Hegel�s
thinking to the world. This is important because I think the challenge for
Hegel is not so much is his account true, but is it relevant. That is, an
understandable reaction to Hegel�s peculiar way of expressing himself is to
ask what this has to do with the world as we know it. I agree that the world
we live in is an expression of our thought. But I think the issue with Marx
is does this mean that philosophical thought finds expression in the world
as a result of the intentional acts of individuals or does it mean that
philosophical thought does its work recollectively, noticing new
constellations that are already in place awaiting the insight that will mark
this. In paragraph 11 of the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel talks about
how spirit does its work slowly and unnoticed and then �The gradual
crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a
sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the feature of the new world.�
This flash is the insight that is able to see what is there to see but which
has as of yet gone unnoticed.



Of course, this leaves it to us to understand this work of spirit in
actuality that seems to happen without our knowing anything about it until
the �one flash�. I am reading Amos Funkenstein� �Theology and the Scientific
Imagination� in which he mentions the conceptual shifts that occurred in the
seventeenth century world view. He remarks that he can see where these came
about but does not pretend to be able to explain how this happened. As I
read your remarks, the lack of a causal explanation of the world fits in
with this view. So I guess it all comes down to how one is to understand
your phrase: �the world cannot resist our thought.� Hegel�s view that the
actual is rational would speak to this. The world as we would like it to be
� the world fitting in with our interests � is something that does not seem
to interest Hegel all that much. But the world as the expression of a
rationality in the Hegelian sense � the non-intentional rationality of what
is � is something we can recollect.



At least, that is how it seems to me.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Beat
Greuter
Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2009 3:49 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions





Dear Alan,

You write:

>
>
> Hi Beat,
>
> I think this notion that reality is conceptual "all the way down" as John
> McDowell puts it originates with the thought of Wilfred Sellars who
> was the
> mentor for most of the analytical philosophers who have taken an
> interest in
> Hegel. This lends itself quite nicely to what has been called the
> 'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel which sees his philosophy as
> primarily an
> exercise in conceptual clarification. The problem I have with this reading
> is that these thinkers then want to take these clarified concepts as norms
> or correctives to be applied to our worldly knowledge. I see Pippin and
> Winfield as taking this tack even though in many respects their views
> differ
> from one another. I tend to think that Hegel was of the camp that
> wanted to
> leave the world pretty much as it is. In this respect, I think Marx's
> frustration about philosophers (wanting to understand rather than
> change the
> world) is on the mark even if I would side with the philosophers. But of
> course I may be wrong about this view of Hegel and the world.
>

I do not think that the analytical philosophers having found Hegel
interesting for their own unsolved problems have in general a
'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel (if they have a reading at all). Of
course, it depends what 'metaphysical' does mean for you. For Hegel
metaphysics after Kant is a critical epistemology which Kant started
with but could not implement it because of his dualistic intellectual
edifice and his unknowable thing in itself. Analytical philosophy itself
has passed through this path again (Russell, Wiener Kreis, Wittgenstein,
Austin, Armstrong, Strawson, Goodman, Davidson, McDowell). Looking at
this path with a metaphysical eye we can observe that first the fact was
outside in the world independent of thought (Russell, Wiener Kreis).
After this fact and thought became identical (Strawson). On the third
level fact and thought are kept separated by thought as the being in
itself and the being for itself: the thinking on our experiences
(McDowell). In Hegel's Logic you can follow the same (dialectical) path:
being - essence - concept. It is the path of our thinking. This path is
deeply metaphysical in the sense of a critical sight on our world
relationship, on our being which is never merely separated from our
thinking otherwise we could not think and act at all.

Having this in mind I am surprised that for you "Hegel was of the camp
that wanted to leave the world pretty much as it is". For Hegel the
world cannot resist our thought because thought made it. However, for
him there is no causal explanation of the world as a whole with which we
could justify our action for change. With such causal explanation we
absolutize both, the being and thinking, without considering their
mutual relationship in the development of the concept. Considering this
does not mean an uncritical accordance with the given but a critical
comprenhension which neither presupposes a critical position beyond the
world nor an uncritical one within it.

Regards,
Beat Greuter

>
>
> I tend to see the absolute as what I like to think of as a shadow
> companion
> to the conceptual development. That is, the discussion in the system about
> determinate concepts I believe takes on its peculiar Hegelian twist due to
> how the determinate and the indeterminate (the absolute) interrelate.
> Thus I
> am sympathetic to Zizek's discussion that I believe draws on parallels
> between the Hegelian absolute and the Lacanian Real. On my view, the
> absolute roughly takes the place that in traditional metaphysics would be
> the real or the other to thought - being (or the special beings, God,
> soul,
> world) as it is apart from our thought of it. I think Hegel is
> attempting to
> have it both ways in that the absolute as indeterminate - and yet as what
> instigates the non-objective speculative dialectic - is both distinct from
> and very much a part of the circle of determinations that always tend to
> terminate for Hegel in his works with the appearance of an absolute within
> the realm so constituted. Thus the absolute makes an appearance but
> only to
> prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration many readers have
> with what they see as the obscurity or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion
> about the absolute). I don't know if this puts me in the metaphysical
> camp,
> but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved transcendental
> philosopher.
>
> One of the more curious stances is that of Houlgate who seems to agree
> with
> the nonmetaphysicians that all Hegel is about is conceptual clarification
> but thinks that because in this clarification thought and being are
> one that
> Hegel's thought is also an ontology (see Houlgate's "Hegel's Logic" in The
> Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy).
> Thought all
> the way down is equally being all the way down. I think this is a correct
> thought but only if it is related to what is dialectical in Hegel's
> thought.
> Houlgate in my view does not have a proper appreciation for dialectics, a
> feature common to the nonmetaphysicians. So, he seems to me instead to
> be a
> modern day Anselm, simply finding being where he finds thought. He
> thus sees
> himself as giving a metaphysical reading of Hegel. I agree, but see this
> sort of metaphysics as too much like the bad metaphysics that tends to
> embarrass modern thinkers.
>
> So much for this little excurses. Except I should mention for anyone
> interested that Brandom's book on Hegel's Phenomenology can be downloaded
> from his website. It appears as a series of attachments to his class
> on the
> Phenomenology at the University of Pittsburgh. I found this out oddly
> enough
> through a chance meeting with a student who actually had taken this class.
> When I asked when Brandom's book was coming out he told me about the free
> download.
>
> Regards, Alan
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
<mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
<mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>] On
> Behalf Of Beat
> Greuter
> Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 3:38 AM
> To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
<mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal
> Knowledge, The
> Notion, and notions
>
> Alan Ponikvar writes:
>
> >> Hi Randall,
> >>
> >>I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it
> appears in 81-82 with Kant's insight that all consciousness implies
> self-consciousness. And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is
> shared by many commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel's
> description of natural consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or
> transcendental account. If Hegel is to limit himself to knowledge as it
> appears then one might suppose that anything he has to say must be
> read off
> of the phenomena themselves. This would make his description what he
> says it
> is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with Kant's approach. Hegel's
> first interest is in what he calls "the abstract determinations of
> knowledge
> and truth." This leads to another question: is this description meant to
> peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing giving us the
> reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask Hegel what
> justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these
> determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself
> then we
> are right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability
> of appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind
> appearances?
> >>
> >>It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is
> one cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both
> awareness and the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be
> confused
> with general principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction
> between informing matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking
> about the former, Hegel about the latter.
> >>
> >>That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a
> speculative and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers
> to the general form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to
> what is going to happen such that the experience of consciousness
> actualizes
> its own truth. These will prove to be two distinct features of
> knowledge as
> it appears. It is what lies behind Hegel's cryptic claim that the
> realization of the concept is to be the loss of the reality of
> consciousness.
> >>
> >>Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of
> what he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this
> passage creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper
> understanding of the exposition. If guided by what we know about the
> common
> conceptions of knowing it is easy to understand what it might mean to
> arrive
> at the point where a concept and an object might correspond. But what
> would
> this mean with respect to the dialectical actualization of the concept
> that
> Hegel claims is the truth of each shape of consciousness? This concept
> does
> not correspond with - in fact it is not clear that it even has - some
> object.
> >>
> >>regards, Alan
> >>
>
> I think this is very well expressed. If we take the latest development
> of Analytic Philosophy then we can summarize - and Hegel was the first
> who did this - there is no fact behind the fact. There is a truth
> relation between the proposition and the fact which is not independent
> of the proposition itself but its inherent (not identical) criterion
> (Phenomenology of Spirit). This truth relation is dynamic and all our
> facts are recalled experiences we collect during our life. The feature
> of the experience is the synthesis of objective and subjective spirit -
> a synthesis which is the absolute for a while. But most important: our
> experience is from the very beginning always conceptual. There is no
> such thing as an independent pre-conceptual intuition and transcendental
> concepts with facts given in the world for looking after by given
> subjects as Kant thought (there are indeed other interpretations of
> Kant's respective thought, however, I am sceptical about this). Our
> facts are made (fac-tum, Tat-sache) and this requires actions. Otherwise
> we are subject to a bad Platonism.
>
> Regards,
> Beat Greuter
>
>
>

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Dear Alan,

You write:

>
>
> Hi Beat,
>
> I think this notion that reality is conceptual "all the way down" as John
> McDowell puts it originates with the thought of Wilfred Sellars who
> was the
> mentor for most of the analytical philosophers who have taken an
> interest in
> Hegel. This lends itself quite nicely to what has been called the
> 'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel which sees his philosophy as
> primarily an
> exercise in conceptual clarification. The problem I have with this reading
> is that these thinkers then want to take these clarified concepts as norms
> or correctives to be applied to our worldly knowledge. I see Pippin and
> Winfield as taking this tack even though in many respects their views
> differ
> from one another. I tend to think that Hegel was of the camp that
> wanted to
> leave the world pretty much as it is. In this respect, I think Marx's
> frustration about philosophers (wanting to understand rather than
> change the
> world) is on the mark even if I would side with the philosophers. But of
> course I may be wrong about this view of Hegel and the world.
>

I do not think that the analytical philosophers having found Hegel
interesting for their own unsolved problems have in general a
'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel (if they have a reading at all). Of
course, it depends what 'metaphysical' does mean for you. For Hegel
metaphysics after Kant is a critical epistemology which Kant started
with but could not implement it because of  his dualistic intellectual
edifice and his unknowable thing in itself. Analytical philosophy itself
has passed through this path again (Russell, Wiener Kreis, Wittgenstein,
Austin, Armstrong, Strawson, Goodman, Davidson, McDowell). Looking at
this path with a metaphysical eye we can observe that first the fact was
outside in the world independent of thought (Russell, Wiener Kreis).
After this fact and thought became identical (Strawson). On the third
level fact and thought are kept separated by thought as the being in
itself and the being for itself: the thinking on our experiences
(McDowell). In Hegel's Logic you can follow the same (dialectical) path:
being - essence - concept. It is the path of our thinking. This path is
deeply metaphysical in the sense of a critical sight on our world
relationship, on our being which is never merely separated from our
thinking otherwise we could not think and act at all.

Having this in mind I am surprised that for you "Hegel was of the camp
that wanted to leave the world pretty much as it is". For Hegel the
world cannot resist our thought because thought made it. However, for
him there is no causal explanation of the world as a whole with which we
could justify our action for change. With such causal explanation we
absolutize both, the being and thinking, without considering their
mutual relationship in the development of the concept. Considering this
does not mean an uncritical accordance with the given but a critical
comprenhension which neither presupposes a critical position beyond the
world nor an uncritical one within it.

Regards,
Beat Greuter

>
>
> I tend to see the absolute as what I like to think of as a shadow
> companion
> to the conceptual development. That is, the discussion in the system about
> determinate concepts I believe takes on its peculiar Hegelian twist due to
> how the determinate and the indeterminate (the absolute) interrelate.
> Thus I
> am sympathetic to Zizek's discussion that I believe draws on parallels
> between the Hegelian absolute and the Lacanian Real. On my view, the
> absolute roughly takes the place that in traditional metaphysics would be
> the real or the other to thought - being (or the special beings, God,
> soul,
> world) as it is apart from our thought of it. I think Hegel is
> attempting to
> have it both ways in that the absolute as indeterminate - and yet as what
> instigates the non-objective speculative dialectic - is both distinct from
> and very much a part of the circle of determinations that always tend to
> terminate for Hegel in his works with the appearance of an absolute within
> the realm so constituted. Thus the absolute makes an appearance but
> only to
> prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration many readers have
> with what they see as the obscurity or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion
> about the absolute). I don't know if this puts me in the metaphysical
> camp,
> but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved transcendental
> philosopher.
>
> One of the more curious stances is that of Houlgate who seems to agree
> with
> the nonmetaphysicians that all Hegel is about is conceptual clarification
> but thinks that because in this clarification thought and being are
> one that
> Hegel's thought is also an ontology (see Houlgate's "Hegel's Logic" in The
> Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy).
> Thought all
> the way down is equally being all the way down. I think this is a correct
> thought but only if it is related to what is dialectical in Hegel's
> thought.
> Houlgate in my view does not have a proper appreciation for dialectics, a
> feature common to the nonmetaphysicians. So, he seems to me instead to
> be a
> modern day Anselm, simply finding being where he finds thought. He
> thus sees
> himself as giving a metaphysical reading of Hegel. I agree, but see this
> sort of metaphysics as too much like the bad metaphysics that tends to
> embarrass modern thinkers.
>
> So much for this little excurses. Except I should mention for anyone
> interested that Brandom's book on Hegel's Phenomenology can be downloaded
> from his website. It appears as a series of attachments to his class
> on the
> Phenomenology at the University of Pittsburgh. I found this out oddly
> enough
> through a chance meeting with a student who actually had taken this class.
> When I asked when Brandom's book was coming out he told me about the free
> download.
>
> Regards, Alan
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>] On
> Behalf Of Beat
> Greuter
> Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 3:38 AM
> To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
> Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal
> Knowledge, The
> Notion, and notions
>
> Alan Ponikvar writes:
>
> >> Hi Randall,
> >>
> >>I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it
> appears in 81-82 with Kant's insight that all consciousness implies
> self-consciousness. And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is
> shared by many commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel's
> description of natural consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or
> transcendental account. If Hegel is to limit himself to knowledge as it
> appears then one might suppose that anything he has to say must be
> read off
> of the phenomena themselves. This would make his description what he
> says it
> is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with Kant's approach. Hegel's
> first interest is in what he calls "the abstract determinations of
> knowledge
> and truth." This leads to another question: is this description meant to
> peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing giving us the
> reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask Hegel what
> justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these
> determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself
> then we
> are right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability
> of appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind
> appearances?
> >>
> >>It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is
> one cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both
> awareness and the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be
> confused
> with general principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction
> between informing matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking
> about the former, Hegel about the latter.
> >>
> >>That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a
> speculative and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers
> to the general form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to
> what is going to happen such that the experience of consciousness
> actualizes
> its own truth. These will prove to be two distinct features of
> knowledge as
> it appears. It is what lies behind Hegel's cryptic claim that the
> realization of the concept is to be the loss of the reality of
> consciousness.
> >>
> >>Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of
> what he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this
> passage creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper
> understanding of the exposition. If guided by what we know about the
> common
> conceptions of knowing it is easy to understand what it might mean to
> arrive
> at the point where a concept and an object might correspond. But what
> would
> this mean with respect to the dialectical actualization of the concept
> that
> Hegel claims is the truth of each shape of consciousness? This concept
> does
> not correspond with - in fact it is not clear that it even has - some
> object.
> >>
> >>regards, Alan
> >>
>
> I think this is very well expressed. If we take the latest development
> of Analytic Philosophy then we can summarize - and Hegel was the first
> who did this - there is no fact behind the fact. There is a truth
> relation between the proposition and the fact which is not independent
> of the proposition itself but its inherent (not identical) criterion
> (Phenomenology of Spirit). This truth relation is dynamic and all our
> facts are recalled experiences we collect during our life. The feature
> of the experience is the synthesis of objective and subjective spirit -
> a synthesis which is the absolute for a while. But most important: our
> experience is from the very beginning always conceptual. There is no
> such thing as an independent pre-conceptual intuition and transcendental
> concepts with facts given in the world for looking after by given
> subjects as Kant thought (there are indeed other interpretations of
> Kant's respective thought, however, I am sceptical about this). Our
> facts are made (fac-tum, Tat-sache) and this requires actions. Otherwise
> we are subject to a bad Platonism.
>
> Regards,
> Beat Greuter
>
>
>





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Hi Bob,



I tend to think that self-deception is an unavoidable constant in life which
is also an essential feature of philosophic inquiry. In a Socratic manner we
are seeking what we do not know about what we currently hold as an
unexamined certainty. The split of subjectivity not only makes
self-deception a constant, it also does the same for sincerity. This is most
evident for those who have the misfortune of living under a totalitarian
regime where everyone - even the most sincere - are suspect. As for this
site, I see it as a place where people interested in Hegel can bounce ideas
off of one another. I for one find this useful.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
Robert Wallace
Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2009 11:35 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] "What monster is Hegel creating?"





Hi Alan,

Your comments on sincerity and self-deception are very interesting.
You have thought harder than I have about the Phenomenology, and I'm
intrigued by all of your postings.

But if I'm self-deceived, I am (still) completely unaware of it. And
contrary to Randall's supposition, what I wrote was in no way tongue-
in-cheek. I agree with you, Alan, that Hegel's absolute idealism is
completely counter-intuitive. That's why I think it needs to be
clarified (made initially plausible) as succinctly as possible,
because if we can't give a short statement of why it should be and can
be taken seriously, no one is going to find the time to read our long
commentaries!

So my message was meant as a challenge to all of us, to come up with
such a short statement, aimed at an audience of uncommitted bystanders.

I extend this challenge also and especially to Stephen Theron, whose
ongoing commentary on the Encyclopedia Logic has now reached (in ch.
19) the transition from Essence to Concept, and is thus at the very
point where Hegel announces the new relation between Concept and
Reality that appears so counter-intuitive ("monstrous") to
philosophical common sense.

I am thrilled by the group of serious interpreters who are currently
contributing to this list. Let's see what we can do!

Best to all, Bob

>
>
>

Robert Wallace
website: www.robertmwallace.com (Philosophical Mysticism; The God of
Freedom)
email: bob@... <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>
phone: 414-617-3914

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Hi Alan,

Your comments on sincerity and self-deception are very interesting.
You have thought harder than I have about the Phenomenology, and I'm
intrigued by all of your postings.

But if I'm self-deceived, I am (still) completely unaware of it. And
contrary to Randall's supposition, what I wrote was in no way tongue-
in-cheek. I agree with you, Alan, that Hegel's absolute idealism is
completely counter-intuitive. That's why I think it needs to be
clarified (made initially plausible) as succinctly as possible,
because if we can't give a short statement of why it should be and can
be taken seriously, no one is going to find the time to read our long
commentaries!

So my message was meant as a challenge to all of us, to come up with
such a short statement, aimed at an audience of uncommitted bystanders.

I extend this challenge also and especially to Stephen Theron, whose
ongoing commentary on the Encyclopedia Logic has now reached (in ch.
19) the transition from Essence to Concept, and is thus at the very
point where Hegel announces the new relation between Concept and
Reality that appears so counter-intuitive ("monstrous") to
philosophical common sense.

I am thrilled by the group of serious interpreters who are currently
contributing to this list. Let's see what we can do!

Best to all, Bob

>
>
>

Robert Wallace
website: www.robertmwallace.com (Philosophical Mysticism; The God of
Freedom)
email: bob@...
phone: 414-617-3914









[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

I just got a copy of 'The Philosopher',
and it struck me that the absolute idealist
(British Idealists) are arguing for that which
doesn't change. Understanding this, is perhaps
the key to understanding Hegel.

For me, change in Hegel's philosophy
appears to be about the real, but the actual value
of ideas appears to belong to the Platonic realm.
If you like, the only way I can make sense
of Hegel, is if there is a freedom
constituted by a moral ranking of ideas.
Ideas as such are ideal in that
they constitute choices.

Material things, as belonging to events;
sets of properties which have temporal states,
are subject to the truth of these ideas.
I.e. what is true for the particular is not true
for the universal. Both fall within
the absolute, so I see Hegel's notion,
by extrapolation, denying the empiricist
supposition of multiple universes; as if the
real means the contingent alone is absolute.
For the empiricist, all the truth as
being about facts fall to descriptions,
the transcendentalist to representations.

This leaves the dialectical philosopher to
reveal; explain what other <historical notions>
of phenomena fails to account for;
the identity of the ideas in its difference;
the notion being true so that
its contradiction is false.
As such the idea of absolute knowledge
can be owned by no agent; as all knowledge
is subject to convention, revision and loss.
Hence Hegel's Geist; the freedom of
an ontological spirit.
Does this resolve the tension?


Paul Healey

Hi Bob,



As Randall suggests there is an issue of your sincerity that is based upon
our possible self-deception. In the Phenomenology Hegel uses a divide and
conquer strategy to deal with one of the more intractable problems of truth:
how to overcome these twin deceptions of subjectivity.



First, we see in sense certainty how rather than wondering if consciousness
is really saying what it means we find it first in a position from which it
might want to protest � if it were an actual consciousness capable of
speaking for itself � how it means something other than what it has
inadvertently said. So consciousness is immediately confronted as to its
sincerity. �You say the true is immediate but all you have to offer is a
mediated universal. Are you being straight with us?� So rather than being
the master of its situation which might create the conditions under which we
might wonder if consciousness is being sincere when it speaks, we have a
consciousness that is subject to a fate that it is unable to control, making
it appear other than it means to appear. It is to make it appear as a fraud.
In the final test of sense certainty the subject is driven to distraction as
its object keeps slipping away and it finds out for itself that it truly is
unable to say what it means. Consciousness is driven to a state of madness.
Thus, the issue of deception � is he sincere or insincere � is disarmed as
consciousness is clearly besides itself and out of touch with the object it
believes it knows. Only as either found out as a fraud or as disarmed by its
madness can the truth of this way of knowing appear because if truth were to
be spoken by a self-confident subject as a proposition about what is the
case we could always wonder how this truth is meant. Does consciousness mean
what it says or does it mean it in some other way or mean something else
entirely. That is, sincerity would be an issue. This is an unavoidable
consequence of communication between self-conscious beings.



The second deception is self-deception, and this is where Hegel�s divide and
conquer strategy is put to work. Someone can speak forthrightly with
confidence but this will not necessarily determine how he is perceived. The
easiest example of this is the comic situation of a teacher speaking in
front of a class unaware that his fly is open. The observer can always be
more clever than the speaker simply because he is able to observe something
about the speaker of which the speaker is unaware. Thus either the true
intent of what is being said or the true situation of the one who is
speaking can remain concealed. In the Phenomenology, it is the observer � we
readers � who are given this observational advantage over natural
consciousness. But what we eventually come to learn is that the joke is on
us. What we notice that remains concealed from natural consciousness � the
dialectic that appears when consciousness is failing to speak sense about
what is � proves in time not to be a mere observation about someone else but
what will be eventually a recollection of our own activity as observers. So,
natural consciousness will be blocked from being in a position where its
sincerity becomes the issue for us � even though sincerity itself will arise
as an issue for consciousness within the context of a community of other
self-seeking individuals -  and the reader will have its world turned on its
head when he comes to discover the real import of what he has been observing
is how it points to what has been his own activity. Thus, the self-deception
applies to and is an issue for the reader. It would be an issue for natural
consciousness if this consciousness ever engaged in the task of
self-adjudication apparently assigned to it by Hegel in the Introduction.
But since it never appears as engaged in self-adjudication, self-deception
only appears for consciousness as it pertains to how it lives and not to how
it assesses itself.



Now these twin problems of deception I would maintain is one reason why in
the Phenomenology we never have self-confident subjects allowed to square
off and speak for themselves. If something that can be recognized as truth
is to come out of a discussion about what a self-conscious subject can know
and justify to others then it can only do so if sincerity and self-deception
are made irrelevant. The usual way of doing this is by setting up what looks
like thought experiments where the relevant conditions  and issues are
established in advance and then put to the test. Argument is the usual
method by which such tests are carried out. If we all can agree about the
conditions or premises upon which we are to base our examination then the
truth can appear as a forceful presence that is nothing more than what
follows from a rigorous attention to what reason compels us to accept. But
we can be deceived about the correctness of the premises or even about what
the argument really proves. Heat quickly replaces light as the preferred
medium of discussion at which point the motives of the participants come
under suspicion. What starts out as a community of sincere like-minded
individuals dedicated to uncovering the truth soon enough becomes a squabble
among self-interested individuals. Argument crumbles as a way to the truth
due to the deceptions that await the na�ve, honest, and selfless seeker of
truth who feel betrayed either by others or by reason itself. That Hegel
does not take this way is indicated in at least two ways: First, Hegel makes
use of what he calls the cunning of reason � reason that marks
self-deception. And second, he creates experiments that seem irrelevant to
the skeptical issues of knowing � creating a concern about his sincerity.
Thus, he seems to want to appropriate these twin deceptions to his own
purposes.



With regard to the self-development of the concept we can see how the twin
deceptions are put to use. Sincere speech is made to look insincere or
unserious in that sense quickly devolves into something more akin to
nonsense. This happens to thought it knows not how. But it is followed soon
enough by an insight that appears to right the ship. The nonsense is grasped
as a newfound sense thanks to the cunning of reason that reveals what is
concealed from this apparent speaking of nonsense. So from the thought that
seems to cycle us between �being is nothing� and �nothing is� we are
provided with the saving thought that becoming is the truth of this cycle of
thoughts. And this is the seeming parlor trick that disturbs so many readers
of Hegel. One may not be able to say how but one certainly knows that Hegel
has created nothing but sophisms. The fact that it is difficult to get a
handle on what this thinking is about � yes, self-thinking thought, but does
this mean the Logic is a transcendental account, a metaphysical account,
simply the self-articulation of concepts, some combination of these, or
something else entirely � makes it all the more difficult to assess how
seriously one is to take all of this. Is Hegel being sincere? Is he simply
engaged in a colossal self-deception?



My exegetical suggestion is that Hegel�s philosophy is not comprehensible as
a step by step process even though there is much in his mode of presentation
that would suggest that it is to be comprehended in this way. The sincere
reader who approaches Hegel expecting to be led by the hand along a path
where each moment follows upon what has preceded should only lead to
frustration or self-deception about the nature of Hegel�s thought. If it
does not then this suggests to me that the reader has not given enough
thought to what lies before him. But the members of this site can read this
as an invitation to show how I am misguided. On my view, we need to be open
to the fact that from the point of view of what Hegel has to teach us, where
we stand is in the middle of various self-deceptions about truth. The
Phenomenology appears to be offered as a way for one to rid oneself of these
self-deceptions � and in a way it is � but it is rarely read in the proper
spirit. It is read as if it is not about us. It is read as if there is
nothing for us to do other than keep quiet and pay attention, observe, if
you will, what unfolds. In my view, the primary problem that is never
overcome is the belief that the paradoxes and inconsistencies evident within
the text are a sign of our failure to understand rather than clues to be
thoughtfully pursued. My bold suggestion is that Hegel never comes straight
because he cannot if he is to be true to the spirit of a truth that only
shows itself by means of cunning.



I have suggested previously that Hegel protects himself from speaking in the
self-confident voice of the understanding by speaking primarily in riddles.
In this way, the issue of sincerity and self-deception cannot be avoided.
They are front and center concerns and not matters that might nag one after
the fact or after a well-argued presentation. If one chooses to study Hegel
it can hardly be because one is impressed by some principle that would seem
to be true. �The actual is the rational.� �Substance is just as much
subject.� �The true is the absolute.� Are these statements meant to excite
or disturb the reader? If one is so inclined, one can do no more than dive
in. The basis of this inclination cannot be a confidence about what will
discover. If those who dive do well enough while in the water then maybe
others less presupposed to dive will come back and reconsider. But I should
have qualified what it is I expect from non-Hegelians. Even if the quality
of work on Hegel improves there is no guarantee that others will be
impressed. In this sense, Fichte may be right. The kind of person one is
will determine one�s philosophic inclinations.



The attentive reader will have noted that I have still said precious little
about the self-development of the concept. I will make some external
reflections about what I take to be the general drift of Hegel�s philosophy.
These may strike one as unwarranted pronouncements. But I will offer them
for what they are worth.



1.      I believe that Hegel�s absolute is not Schelling�s. It is not the
One as the night within which all cows are black. (Although, this makes for
a good first thought for a sense certainty interested in what is immediately
and otherwise indeterminately present). Hegel�s absolute can be stipulated
as pure difference. This difference of the absolute will serve as a hinge or
pivot point for much of the movement within Hegel�s thought. These dynamic
points as mere presences will tend to be shrouded in mystery. The
dialectical insights, inversions, and transitions will be happenings in need
of clarification.



2.      Hegel�s famous dialectic � I talked about how I conceive of this in
a previous post � appears as inadvertent to whatever thought trajectory is
being entertained. It marks the self-deception of the self-confident
assertion of the understanding and thus shows itself as the cunning of
reason. It marks a point of difference between itself and an understanding
that has run itself into a rut. This point of difference has understanding
and reason dealing with the same cycle of thought, but whereas this cycle
has become mindless and to no purpose for the understanding it is
reconceived and intelligible as a dialectic.



3.      This point of intelligibility is the speculative insight. But this
is a peculiar sort of insight. It brings to light a truth that is not there
to be seen prior to this insight. The insight creates that into which it has
insight. Prior to the insight there is simply the mindless cycle of thoughts
that lead the understanding around by the nose. It is the insight that
transforms these thoughts into moments of a self-development. This
transformation comes about due to a change in one�s point of view such that
it is not the mindless thoughts as they are thought to which one attends but
it is the thoughts as they show themselves in the dynamic of thought�s
activity.



a.       Consider the third test of sense certainty. As consciousness
focuses on the single point of time � the now of its attention � this point
immediately vanishes. But thought that is self-conscious does not merely
blindly move to the next now. It notes that the now that was is no longer
and that a new now has emerged to take its place. It is this entire sweep of
thought that one is invited to consider. One changes one�s perspective from
asserting a now, denying the just asserted now, and asserting a new now
endlessly to reflecting on this process taken as a whole. When this is done
then it becomes possible to note � although there is nothing that forces
taking this new point of view or once there to note this thought � that each
now is mediated by the process of coming into and out of existence. The
stable thought that replaces the mindless cycle is the thought that what we
have before us is a mediated immediacy. This is the insight that
characterizes both any given moment as experienced and the whole of the
cycle. Until this insight is noted, there is nothing there to see that
differs from what consciousness sees.

b.      So in this simple example the concept expressed as a mediated
immediacy is not an abstract concept like pure being. It does not mean to be
the essence to which instances correspond. Instead, it is itself a concept
constituted out of the activity of actual moments of knowing. Without these
moments there is no concept as Hegel conceives it.

c.       I should mention that there is a clever twist in this truth of
sense certainty. The inability of consciousness to hold on to its instances
of pure being means that it behaves as if it is as empty as the pure being
that is its truth. This frustrating activity of consciousness perfectly
corresponds with its essence. This is not what it meant but this is what the
truth demands � an indeterminate actual knowing.



4.       What I have just described is self-development as it arises at each
moment along whatever path Hegel�s thought is on. Any self-developed concept
is a manifestation of the absolute, Hegel�s absolute. That is, it is present
as the truth distinct from the thought caught in the mindless motion, and it
is present in two guises as the emergent dialectic � the reconceived
movement of thought - and as the insight that both sparked this dialectic
into being and is a conceptual expression of this dialectic. Thus, on this
view, each regional absolute has both an outer and inner difference without
which it does not exist.



5.      On this understanding, there is nothing grand about the absolute in
and of itself. If one attends to how it operates to facilitate the
development it becomes very difficult to take Hegel�s god talk all that
seriously. Religion, yes, that is a serious matter. But God becomes simply
yet another regional manifestation of the absolute � a manifestation of
human speculative insight and nothing more. What is creative and pertains to
the absolute is human insight when it is speculative. And what is created is
meaning that settles into being � or the emergent sense of what first
appears as nonsense that becomes an actual item of real interest in the
world. What is absolute is the pure indeterminate void of pure difference
which when taken in this way has no recognizable referent. It is not
something that we can think about in its own right except as it makes its
brief appearance at the end and in service to this end within each of
Hegel�s accounts. So, the absolute is that around which everything turns
though it itself is nothing but the indeterminate or the nothing that is.



6.      So in summary, what we have is this insight that requires or in some
sense presupposes that which it posits � it is an insight into a dialectic
that does not exist as such until it is recognized as such. Thus it is an
insight that actually creates that of which it has an insight into. There is
no dialectic until it is recognized as such. And yet there is no recognition
unless there is something to recognize. In effect, until there is an insight
there has been no process, but without the process there is no resulting
insight. This is one reason why the absolute does not appear until the end
of a process that did not in any intentional or guided sense direct us to
our end. To the understanding this is all very paradoxical. To reason it
simply marks the inner division of the absolute between the final insightful
moment and the dialectical process. Since one side of this division is the
movement while the other is a stable insight the absolute itself harbors
within itself a difference that simply is or a difference whose sense is yet
to be determined.



7.      Thus, the truth is not merely the dialectic nor the insight but the
seemingly indifferent togetherness of the two. This is what is there to
observe which has yet to be resolved for speculative thought. What this
means is that the stages of Hegel�s various systematic works have as their
terminus a working out of the self-deception or of the cunning of reason as
it applies to reason itself.



This I am sure is more than enough for now.



Regards, Alan







From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
Robert Wallace
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2009 12:31 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] "What monster is Hegel creating?" (was: Primer on Absolute
Idealism vs. Subject Idealism)





Dear all,

Referring to pp. 587-8 of the SL, Randall wrote:

> My God! What monster is Hegel creating? It appears that Hegel is
> trying to
> say "the Notion" produces reality from its own resources!

and Alan P. commented:

> The challenge is to
> make such a claim intelligible. What divides the Hegelian from the
> non-Hegelian philosophic community are claims such as these.
> Hegelians seem
> perfectly comfortable with such claims and believe that either it is
> intelligible on its face or that they can make it intelligible by
> means of
> commentary. The non-Hegelians remain unmoved by most of what is said
> to
> defend the intelligibility of such claims. ...
> Certainly, our common understanding of concepts ["Begriffe"/also
> translated as "notion"] does not give them such
> powers.

I hope that Randall and Alan will now address themselves to explaining
as _succinctly_ and as clearly as possible just how we can take these
Hegelian claims seriously! (If indeed we can.) This is probably the
single most interesting question about Hegel's SL, his system, and his
philosophy in general. We are all ears!!

Best, Bob

> _,___

Robert Wallace
website: www.robertmwallace.com (Philosophical Mysticism; The God of
Freedom)
email: bob@... <mailto:bob%40robertmwallace.com>
phone: 414-617-3914

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Hi Paul,



My own view is that as you say there is a problem of understanding how Hegel’s
logic actually works. For one, I do not think it follows any form of logical
reasoning that we might already be familiar with. As far as I can see, Hegel
does not argue from premises to conclusions. What I think he does do is
introduce a dual view of propositions as a vital feature of how his thinking
works. If there is any truth to this then it would not be possible for him to
speak in anything other than riddles. Riddles are propositions that are solved
when we shift our perspective to as to see an alternative way of grasping the
meaning of what is being said. So to take a simple example, when Hegel at the
beginning of the Logic says “Nothing is.” this can be read two ways. It
could mean that there is nothing to think or it can mean nothing is what we are
to think. The first way of reading this proposition is skeptical while the
second is speculative.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Paul
Healey
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2009 7:09 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions





Hello Alan,

thank you, Randall and Beat for your analysis'.
Alan, you remarked:

>Thus the absolute makes an appearance but only to
>prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration
>many readers have with what they see as the obscurity
>or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion

>about the absolute). I don't know if this puts
>me in the metaphysical camp,

>but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved
>transcendental philosopher.

Perhaps this frustration results, as there is
a lack of economy, exposition and example to explain how
Hegel's reasoning for an understanding of logic
actually works? either that or the binary and critical
thinking of the Anglo-American analytical schools has become
so pervasive, as to actually achieve an evolutionary
end to the philosophy of our species?

This I think could be resolved by taking
many of Brandom's insights on board with
a clear aim: to establish the significance of the inferences
that constitute a scientific method; the modalities of its
function (for doing and asking for reasons) as a set of
predicated relations; what the concept of a
totality (where the part cannot be equal to the whole)
actually means for such a set.

I therefore see Hegel's use of the dialectic as a function,
so instead of reducing the argument down to the
presupposition versus the presuppositionless, you have
conditionals for the supposition, the indifference and the
measure of the credence given a manifold.
An idea of the absolute?

What is greater than, as in Anselm's ontological argument
can then be turned into a metaphysical principle. In affect,
Hegel gave us all the pieces and put some of them together.
What a different world it would of been
if he had spelt the principle out in the same way that
Aristotle had; as a propositional relation?

So the question that should of been asked, is how is
Hegel's metaphysics superior to Aristotle's?
As translated, for the most part the later's
commentary is easier to follow.
Given the depth and detail of Hume and Kant's works,
this should not be much of a surprise.
By my interpretation of an Hegelian metaphysics,
his principle means the identity and difference
of the agents decisions have a consequences.
In this way I think Hegel's
Philosophy of Right is consistent
with his Phenomenology and his Logic.

Paul Healey

--- On Mon, 7/12/09, Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...
<mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com> > wrote:

From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@... <mailto:ponikvaraj%40gmail.com> >
Subject: RE: [hegel] Re: Primer on  the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com>
Date: Monday, 7
December, 2009, 19:37








       Hi Beat,

I think this notion that reality is conceptual "all the way down" as John

McDowell puts it originates with the thought of Wilfred Sellars who was the

mentor for most of the analytical philosophers who have taken an interest in

Hegel. This lends itself quite nicely to what has been called the

'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel which sees his philosophy as primarily an

exercise in conceptual clarification. The problem I have with this reading

is that these thinkers then want to take these clarified concepts as norms

or correctives to be applied to our worldly knowledge. I see Pippin and

Winfield as taking this tack even though in many respects their views differ

from one another. I tend to think that Hegel was of the camp that wanted to

leave the world pretty much as it is. In this respect, I think Marx's

frustration about philosophers (wanting to understand rather than change the

world) is on the mark even if I would side with the philosophers. But of

course I may be wrong about this view of Hegel and the world.

I tend to see the absolute as what I like to think of as a shadow companion

to the conceptual development. That is, the discussion in the system about

determinate concepts I believe takes on its peculiar Hegelian twist due to

how the determinate and the indeterminate (the absolute) interrelate. Thus I

am sympathetic to Zizek's discussion that I believe draws on parallels

between the Hegelian absolute and the Lacanian Real. On my view, the

absolute roughly takes the place that in traditional metaphysics would be

the real or the other to thought - being (or the special beings, God, soul,

world) as it is apart from our thought of it. I think Hegel is attempting to

have it both ways in that the absolute as indeterminate - and yet as what

instigates the non-objective speculative dialectic - is both distinct from

and very much a part of the circle of determinations that always tend to

terminate for Hegel in his works with the appearance of an absolute within

the realm so constituted. Thus the absolute makes an appearance but only to

prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration many readers have

with what they see as the obscurity or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion

about the absolute). I don't know if this puts me in the metaphysical camp,

but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved transcendental philosopher.

One of the more curious stances is that of Houlgate who seems to agree with

the nonmetaphysicians that all Hegel is about is conceptual clarification

but thinks that because in this clarification thought and being are one that

Hegel's thought is also an ontology (see Houlgate's "Hegel's Logic" in The

Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy). Thought all

the way down is equally being all the way down. I think this is a correct

thought but only if it is related to what is dialectical in Hegel's thought.

Houlgate in my view does not have a proper appreciation for dialectics, a

feature common to the nonmetaphysicians. So, he seems to me instead to be a

modern day Anselm, simply finding being where he finds thought. He thus sees

himself as giving a metaphysical reading of Hegel. I agree, but see this

sort of metaphysics as too much like the bad metaphysics that tends to

embarrass modern thinkers.

So much for this little excurses. Except I should mention for anyone

interested that Brandom's book on Hegel's Phenomenology can be downloaded

from his website. It appears as a series of attachments to his class on the

Phenomenology at the University of Pittsburgh. I found this out oddly enough

through a chance meeting with a student who actually had taken this class.

When I asked when Brandom's book was coming out he told me about the free

download.

Regards, Alan

-----Original Message-----

From: hegel@yahoogroups. com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups. com] On Behalf Of Beat

Greuter

Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 3:38 AM

To: hegel@yahoogroups. com

Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The

Notion, and notions

Alan Ponikvar writes:

>> Hi Randall,

>>

>>I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it

appears in 81-82 with Kant's insight that all consciousness implies

self-consciousness. And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is

shared by many commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel's

description of natural consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or

transcendental account. If Hegel is to limit himself to knowledge as it

appears then one might suppose that anything he has to say must be read off

of the phenomena themselves. This would make his description what he says it

is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with Kant's approach. Hegel's

first interest is in what he calls "the abstract determinations of knowledge

and truth." This leads to another question: is this description meant to

peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing giving us the

reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask Hegel what

justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these

determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself then we

are right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability

of appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind

appearances?

>>

>>It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is

one cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both

awareness and the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be confused

with general principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction

between informing matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking

about the former, Hegel about the latter.

>>

>>That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a

speculative and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers

to the general form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to

what is going to happen such that the experience of consciousness actualizes

its own truth. These will prove to be two distinct features of knowledge as

it appears. It is what lies behind Hegel's cryptic claim that the

realization of the concept is to be the loss of the reality of

consciousness.

>>

>>Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of

what he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this

passage creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper

understanding of the exposition. If guided by what we know about the common

conceptions of knowing it is easy to understand what it might mean to arrive

at the point where a concept and an object might correspond. But what would

this mean with respect to the dialectical actualization of the concept that

Hegel claims is the truth of each shape of consciousness? This concept does

not correspond with - in fact it is not clear that it even has - some

object.

>>

>>regards, Alan

>>

I think this is very well expressed. If we take the latest development

of Analytic Philosophy then we can summarize - and Hegel was the first

who did this - there is no fact behind the fact. There is a truth

relation between the proposition and the fact which is not independent

of the proposition itself but its inherent (not identical) criterion

(Phenomenology of Spirit). This truth relation is dynamic and all our

facts are recalled experiences we collect during our life. The feature

of the experience is the synthesis of objective and subjective spirit -

a synthesis which is the absolute for a while. But most important: our

experience is from the very beginning always conceptual. There is no

such thing as an independent pre-conceptual intuition and transcendental

concepts with facts given in the world for looking after by given

subjects as Kant thought (there are indeed other interpretations of

Kant's respective thought, however, I am sceptical about this). Our

facts are made (fac-tum, Tat-sache) and this requires actions. Otherwise

we are subject to a bad Platonism.

Regards,

Beat Greuter

------------ --------- --------- ------

Homepage: http://hegel. net

Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel. net/en/ml. htm

Listowners Homepage: http://kai.in

Group policy:

slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no attachments,

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Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific attitude both

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that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the author and hegel.net.

Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify the mails of this

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Commons Developing Nations license (see footer of http://hegel. net/en/e0. htm

) Yahoo! Groups Links













[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Robert Wallace <bob@...> wrote:

> Dear all,
>
> Referring to pp. 587-8 of the SL, Randall wrote:
>
>> My God! What monster is Hegel creating? It appears that Hegel is
>> trying to
>> say "the Notion" produces reality from its own resources!
>
>
> and Alan P. commented:
>
>> The challenge is to make such a claim intelligible. What divides
>> the Hegelian from the non-Hegelian philosophic community are
>> claims such as these. Hegelians seem perfectly comfortable with
>> such claims and believe that either it is intelligible on its face
>> or that they can make it intelligible by means of commentary. The
>> non-Hegelians remain unmoved by most of what is said to defend the
>> intelligibility of such claims. ...

>> Certainly, our common understanding of concepts ["Begriffe"/also
>> translated as "notion"] does not give them such powers.
>
>
> I hope that Randall and Alan will now address themselves to
> explaining as _succinctly_ and as clearly as possible just how we
> can take these Hegelian claims seriously! (If indeed we can.) This
> is probably the single most interesting question about Hegel's SL,
> his system, and his philosophy in general. We are all ears!!
>
> Best, Bob

Hi Bob,

Thanks for building the suspense. I am not sure how much of your response is
"tongue-in-cheek".

I was of course joking about the "My God! What monster is Hegel creating?" It is
a play on one of my first discussions on this Hegel list.

I take what Hegel says in the section 'The Notion in General' at face value.

That is, I take Hegel to be an Abosoule Idealist. So, I reject the claim that
Hegel is a mere transcendental Philosopher.

However, I have no doubt that my discussion with Alan has been the best
philosophical discussion that I have had on this list.

Why?  Because to arrive to this point of the "single most interesting question
about Hegel" we must overcome the transcendental philosopher.

But on the other side of the same coin, it is the transcendental philosopher who
keeps all the other forms of knowing at bay.

I don't know if I can (as you say):

"explain as _succinctly_ and as clearly as possible just how we can take these
Hegelian claims seriously"

But what I can do is demonstrate why Hegel is not a transcendental philosopher,
and in doing so I can also demonstrate [in part] how we can take Hegel's claims
that "the Notion produces reality from its own resources" seriously.

In order to do this I am going to concentrate on the origin of the sensory
"instance" (i.e. the 'This') that we encounter in Sense Certainty.

Of course in the Phenomenology of Spirit the 'This' is an unexplained given, so
we must go to the 'Philosophy of Mind' to find the origin of this sensory
episode in the SOUL.

It is here where I can take the list another step forward.

But before I arrive to this point I must face several of Alan's challenges head
on.

Randall

Dear all,

Referring to pp. 587-8 of the SL, Randall wrote:

> My God! What monster is Hegel creating? It appears that Hegel is
> trying to
> say "the Notion" produces reality from its own resources!


and Alan P. commented:

> The challenge is to
> make such a claim intelligible. What divides the Hegelian from the
> non-Hegelian philosophic community are claims such as these.
> Hegelians seem
> perfectly comfortable with such claims and believe that either it is
> intelligible on its face or that they can make it intelligible by
> means of
> commentary. The non-Hegelians remain unmoved by most of what is said
> to
> defend the intelligibility of such claims. ...
> Certainly, our common understanding of concepts ["Begriffe"/also
> translated as "notion"] does not give them such
> powers.


I hope that Randall and Alan will now address themselves to explaining
as _succinctly_ and as clearly as possible just how we can take these
Hegelian claims seriously! (If indeed we can.) This is probably the
single most interesting question about Hegel's SL, his system, and his
philosophy in general. We are all ears!!

Best, Bob


> _,___

Robert Wallace
website: www.robertmwallace.com (Philosophical Mysticism; The God of
Freedom)
email: bob@...
phone: 414-617-3914









[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Hello Alan,

thank you, Randall and Beat for your analysis'.
Alan, you remarked:

>Thus the absolute makes an appearance but only to
>prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration
>many readers have with what they see as the obscurity
>or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion

>about the absolute). I don't know if this puts
>me in the metaphysical camp,

>but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved
>transcendental philosopher.

Perhaps this frustration results, as there is
a lack of economy, exposition and example to explain how
Hegel's reasoning for an understanding of logic
actually works? either that or the binary and critical
thinking of the Anglo-American analytical schools has become
so pervasive, as to actually achieve an evolutionary
end to the philosophy of our species?

This I think could be resolved by taking
many of Brandom's insights on board with
a clear aim: to establish the significance of the inferences
that constitute a scientific method; the modalities of its
function (for doing and asking for reasons) as a set of
predicated relations; what the concept of a
totality (where the part cannot be equal to the whole)
actually means for such a set.

I therefore see Hegel's use of the dialectic as a function,
so instead of reducing the argument down to the
presupposition versus the presuppositionless, you have
conditionals for the supposition, the indifference and the
measure of the credence given a manifold.
An idea of the absolute?

What is greater than, as in Anselm's ontological argument
can then be turned into a metaphysical principle. In affect,
Hegel gave us all the pieces and put some of them together.
What a different world it would of been
if he had spelt the principle out in the same way that
Aristotle had; as a propositional relation?

So the question that should of been asked, is how is
Hegel's metaphysics superior to Aristotle's?
As translated, for the most part the later's
commentary is easier to follow.
Given the depth and detail of Hume and Kant's works,
this should not be much of a surprise.
By my interpretation of an Hegelian metaphysics,
his principle means the identity and difference
of the agents decisions have a consequences.
In this way I think Hegel's
Philosophy of Right is consistent
with his Phenomenology and his Logic.



Paul Healey

--- On Mon, 7/12/09, Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:

From: Alan Ponikvar <ponikvaraj@...>
Subject: RE: [hegel] Re: Primer on  the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Date: Monday, 7
  December, 2009, 19:37







 



 


   
     
     
      Hi Beat,



I think this notion that reality is conceptual "all the way down" as John

McDowell puts it originates with the thought of Wilfred Sellars who was the

mentor for most of the analytical philosophers who have taken an interest in

Hegel. This lends itself quite nicely to what has been called the

'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel which sees his philosophy as primarily an

exercise in conceptual clarification. The problem I have with this reading

is that these thinkers then want to take these clarified concepts as norms

or correctives to be applied to our worldly knowledge. I see Pippin and

Winfield as taking this tack even though in many respects their views differ

from one another. I tend to think that Hegel was of the camp that wanted to

leave the world pretty much as it is. In this respect, I think Marx's

frustration about philosophers (wanting to understand rather than change the

world) is on the mark even if I would side with the philosophers. But of

course I may be wrong about this view of Hegel and the world.



I tend to see the absolute as what I like to think of as a shadow companion

to the conceptual development. That is, the discussion in the system about

determinate concepts I believe takes on its peculiar Hegelian twist due to

how the determinate and the indeterminate (the absolute) interrelate. Thus I

am sympathetic to Zizek's discussion that I believe draws on parallels


between the Hegelian absolute and the Lacanian Real. On my view, the

absolute roughly takes the place that in traditional metaphysics would be

the real or the other to thought - being (or the special beings, God, soul,

world) as it is apart from our thought of it. I think Hegel is attempting to

have it both ways in that the absolute as indeterminate - and yet as what

instigates the non-objective speculative dialectic - is both distinct from

and very much a part of the circle of determinations that always tend to

terminate for Hegel in his works with the appearance of an absolute within

the realm so constituted. Thus the absolute makes an appearance but only to

prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration many readers have

with what they see as the obscurity or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion

about the absolute). I don't know if this puts me in the metaphysical camp,

but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved transcendental philosopher.



One of the more curious stances is that of Houlgate who seems to agree with

the nonmetaphysicians that all Hegel is about is conceptual clarification

but thinks that because in this clarification thought and being are one that

Hegel's thought is also an ontology (see Houlgate's "Hegel's Logic" in The

Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy). Thought all

the way down is equally being all the way down. I think this is a correct

thought but only if it is related to what is dialectical in Hegel's thought.

Houlgate in my view does not have a proper appreciation for dialectics, a

feature common to the nonmetaphysicians. So, he seems to me instead to be a

modern day Anselm, simply finding being where he finds thought. He thus sees

himself as giving a metaphysical reading of Hegel. I agree, but see this

sort of metaphysics as too much like the bad metaphysics that tends to

embarrass modern thinkers.



So much for this little excurses. Except I should mention for anyone

interested that Brandom's book on Hegel's Phenomenology can be downloaded

from his website. It appears as a series of attachments to his class on the

Phenomenology at the University of Pittsburgh. I found this out oddly enough

through a chance meeting with a student who actually had taken this class.

When I asked when Brandom's book was coming out he told me about the free

download.



Regards, Alan



-----Original Message-----

From: hegel@yahoogroups. com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups. com] On Behalf Of Beat

Greuter

Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 3:38 AM

To: hegel@yahoogroups. com

Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The

Notion, and notions



Alan Ponikvar writes:



>> Hi Randall,

>>

>>I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it

appears in 81-82 with Kant's insight that all consciousness implies

self-consciousness. And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is

shared by many commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel's

description of natural consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or

transcendental account. If Hegel is to limit himself to knowledge as it

appears then one might suppose that anything he has to say must be read off

of the phenomena themselves. This would make his description what he says it

is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with Kant's approach. Hegel's

first interest is in what he calls "the abstract determinations of knowledge

and truth." This leads to another question: is this description meant to

peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing giving us the

reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask Hegel what

justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these

determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself then we

are right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability

of appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind

appearances?

>>

>>It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is

one cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both


awareness and the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be confused

with general principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction

between informing matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking

about the former, Hegel about the latter.

>>

>>That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a

speculative and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers

to the general form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to

what is going to happen such that the experience of consciousness actualizes

its own truth. These will prove to be two distinct features of knowledge as

it appears. It is what lies behind Hegel's cryptic claim that the

realization of the concept is to be the loss of the reality of

consciousness.

>>

>>Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of

what he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this

passage creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper

understanding of the exposition. If guided by what we know about the common

conceptions of knowing it is easy to understand what it might mean to arrive

at the point where a concept and an object might correspond. But what would

this mean with respect to the dialectical actualization of the concept that

Hegel claims is the truth of each shape of consciousness? This concept does

not correspond with - in fact it is not clear that it even has - some

object.

>>

>>regards, Alan   

>>



I think this is very well expressed. If we take the latest development

of Analytic Philosophy then we can summarize - and Hegel was the first

who did this - there is no fact behind the fact. There is a truth

relation between the proposition and the fact which is not independent

of the proposition itself but its inherent (not identical) criterion

(Phenomenology of Spirit). This truth relation is dynamic and all our

facts are recalled experiences we collect during our life. The feature

of the experience is the synthesis of objective and subjective spirit -

a synthesis which is the absolute for a while. But most important: our

experience is from the very beginning always conceptual. There is no

such thing as an independent pre-conceptual intuition and transcendental

concepts with facts given in the world for looking after by given

subjects as Kant thought (there are indeed other interpretations of

Kant's respective thought, however, I am sceptical about this). Our

facts are made (fac-tum, Tat-sache) and this requires actions. Otherwise

we are subject to a bad Platonism.



Regards,

Beat Greuter



------------ --------- --------- ------



Homepage: http://hegel. net

Hegel mailing lists: http://Hegel. net/en/ml. htm

Listowners Homepage: http://kai.in

Group policy:

slightly moderated, only plain Text (no HTML/RTF), no attachments,

only Hegel related mails, scientific level intended.



Particpants are expected to show a respectfull and scientific attitude both

to Hegel and to each other. The usual "netiquette" as well as scientific

standards apply.



The copyright policy for mails sent to this list is same as for Hegel.Net,

that is the copyright of the mails belongs to the author and hegel.net.

Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify the mails of this

list under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or

any later version, published by the Free Software Foundation. The mails are

also licensed under a Creative Commons License and under the Creative

Commons Developing Nations license (see footer of http://hegel. net/en/e0. htm

) Yahoo! Groups Links





   
     

   
   






 

Hi Beat,

I think this notion that reality is conceptual "all the way down" as John
McDowell puts it originates with the thought of Wilfred Sellars who was the
mentor for most of the analytical philosophers who have taken an interest in
Hegel. This lends itself quite nicely to what has been called the
'nonmetaphysical' reading of Hegel which sees his philosophy as primarily an
exercise in conceptual clarification. The problem I have with this reading
is that these thinkers then want to take these clarified concepts as norms
or correctives to be applied to our worldly knowledge. I see Pippin and
Winfield as taking this tack even though in many respects their views differ
from one another. I tend to think that Hegel was of the camp that wanted to
leave the world pretty much as it is. In this respect, I think Marx's
frustration about philosophers (wanting to understand rather than change the
world) is on the mark even if I would side with the philosophers. But of
course I may be wrong about this view of Hegel and the world.

I tend to see the absolute as what I like to think of as a shadow companion
to the conceptual development. That is, the discussion in the system about
determinate concepts I believe takes on its peculiar Hegelian twist due to
how the determinate and the indeterminate (the absolute) interrelate. Thus I
am sympathetic to Zizek's discussion that I believe draws on parallels
between the Hegelian absolute and the Lacanian Real. On my view, the
absolute roughly takes the place that in traditional metaphysics would be
the real or the other to thought - being (or the special beings, God, soul,
world) as it is apart from our thought of it. I think Hegel is attempting to
have it both ways in that the absolute as indeterminate - and yet as what
instigates the non-objective speculative dialectic - is both distinct from
and very much a part of the circle of determinations that always tend to
terminate for Hegel in his works with the appearance of an absolute within
the realm so constituted. Thus the absolute makes an appearance but only to
prove to be elusive to our grasp (hence the frustration many readers have
with what they see as the obscurity or insufficiency of Hegel's discussion
about the absolute). I don't know if this puts me in the metaphysical camp,
but I certainly do not see Hegel as an improved transcendental philosopher.

One of the more curious stances is that of Houlgate who seems to agree with
the nonmetaphysicians that all Hegel is about is conceptual clarification
but thinks that because in this clarification thought and being are one that
Hegel's thought is also an ontology (see Houlgate's "Hegel's Logic" in The
Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy). Thought all
the way down is equally being all the way down. I think this is a correct
thought but only if it is related to what is dialectical in Hegel's thought.
Houlgate in my view does not have a proper appreciation for dialectics, a
feature common to the nonmetaphysicians. So, he seems to me instead to be a
modern day Anselm, simply finding being where he finds thought. He thus sees
himself as giving a metaphysical reading of Hegel. I agree, but see this
sort of metaphysics as too much like the bad metaphysics that tends to
embarrass modern thinkers.

So much for this little excurses. Except I should mention for anyone
interested that Brandom's book on Hegel's Phenomenology can be downloaded
from his website. It appears as a series of attachments to his class on the
Phenomenology at the University of Pittsburgh. I found this out oddly enough
through a chance meeting with a student who actually had taken this class.
When I asked when Brandom's book was coming out he told me about the free
download.

Regards, Alan

-----Original Message-----
From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Beat
Greuter
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 3:38 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions

Alan Ponikvar writes:

>> Hi Randall,
>>
>>I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it
appears in 81-82 with Kant's insight that all consciousness implies
self-consciousness. And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is
shared by many commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel's
description of natural consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or
transcendental account. If Hegel is to limit himself to knowledge as it
appears then one might suppose that anything he has to say must be read off
of the phenomena themselves. This would make his description what he says it
is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with Kant's approach. Hegel's
first interest is in what he calls "the abstract determinations of knowledge
and truth." This leads to another question: is this description meant to
peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing giving us the
reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask Hegel what
justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these
determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself then we
are right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability
of appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind
appearances?
>>
>>It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is
one cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both
awareness and the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be confused
with general principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction
between informing matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking
about the former, Hegel about the latter.
>>
>>That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a
speculative and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers
to the general form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to
what is going to happen such that the experience of consciousness actualizes
its own truth. These will prove to be two distinct features of knowledge as
it appears. It is what lies behind Hegel's cryptic claim that the
realization of the concept is to be the loss of the reality of
consciousness.
>>
>>Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of
what he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this
passage creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper
understanding of the exposition. If guided by what we know about the common
conceptions of knowing it is easy to understand what it might mean to arrive
at the point where a concept and an object might correspond. But what would
this mean with respect to the dialectical actualization of the concept that
Hegel claims is the truth of each shape of consciousness? This concept does
not correspond with - in fact it is not clear that it even has - some
object.
>>
>>regards, Alan
>>

I think this is very well expressed. If we take the latest development
of Analytic Philosophy then we can summarize - and Hegel was the first
who did this - there is no fact behind the fact. There is a truth
relation between the proposition and the fact which is not independent
of the proposition itself but its inherent (not identical) criterion
(Phenomenology of Spirit). This truth relation is dynamic and all our
facts are recalled experiences we collect during our life. The feature
of the experience is the synthesis of objective and subjective spirit -
a synthesis which is the absolute for a while. But most important: our
experience is from the very beginning always conceptual. There is no
such thing as an independent pre-conceptual intuition and transcendental
concepts with facts given in the world for looking after by given
subjects as Kant thought (there are indeed other interpretations of
Kant's respective thought, however, I am sceptical about this). Our
facts are made (fac-tum, Tat-sache) and this requires actions. Otherwise
we are subject to a bad Platonism.

Regards,
Beat Greuter



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Hi Randall,



Okay, one last compliment before we get down to business. Your choice of
passages from Hegel is excellent. Simply thinking about what Hegel is trying
- and I truly mean trying - to convey in these passages would be worthwhile
for anyone trying to get to the heart of his philosophy.



Due to the free form nature of these exchanges obscurity is a constant
danger. So I will begin by responding to your request for clarity. You ask
for an example of the principle/instance distinction.



I quote from paragraph 92 from the chapter on sense certainty:



"But when we look carefully at this pure being which constitutes the essence
of this certainty, and which this certainty pronounces to be its truth, we
see that much more is involved. An actual sense-certainty is not merely this
pure immediacy, but an instance of it."



He then goes on to say in 93:



"It is not just we who make this distinction between essence and instance,
between immediacy and mediation; on the contrary, we find it within
sense-certainty itself, and it is to be taken up in the form in which it is
present there ."



So when I refer to the principle/instance distinction I have in mind what
Hegel refers to in these passages as the essence/instance distinction. But
this leads me to wonder if not this distinction then what distinction do you
think Hegel is working with when he describes natural consciousness?



As for my talk about "self-standing intelligible thought items" I admit I
could have been more careful here. What I have in mind is the distinction
between how Kant's categories function and how the standards that are meant
to define each mode of natural consciousness are meant to function. For
Kant, the categories in and of themselves refer to nothing particular. They
do not in and of themselves define a certain realm of phenomenal knowledge.
Their only role is to function as rules of synthesis for given sensations
for all and any phenomenal knowledge. Being limited in this way establishes
the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal domains. On the other
hand, the standards for each mode of knowing in the Phenomenology determine
what each mode of knowing is to be about. So perception is about things with
properties and this is intelligible - it defines a particular domain of
knowing - whether we are talking about it as the general standard for
identifying what will count as knowledge or if it means to refer to the
particular things we perceive. We know the referent for things with
properties. We do not know the referent for 'negation' or 'plurality' or
'causality' in Kant's table of categories. It is the task of the Critique
merely to establish limits for the application of these categories. But even
these limits simply have these categories as universally applicable within
the domain of phenomenal knowledge in general. Hegel's principles are more
determinate and cut up the domain of phenomenal knowledge. Thus the sought
for correspondence between principle and instance seems like a
straightforward task. We are to take the principle - which is easy enough to
know - and show that the instances - also easy enough to identify -
correspond to the principle. I should note that this simple task has never
been an issue in any modern epistemology other than Hegel's. That is, this
simple task is unique to the Phenomenology (but common enough in Plato's
dialogues).



I should mention that I cannot be sure if these clarifications will be
sufficient in part because I cannot know what thoughts you have that
conflict with mine and thus make mine appear confusing to you. I don't yet
know what your conception is of what Hegel describes in 81 as the method of
the inquiry. I see this method described in the second part of the
Introduction to the Phenomenology to be about a consciousness intent upon
demonstrating that what it takes to be in itself - its principle, essence or
standard - is something that it relates to what to it is for itself - the
instances of what it actually knows. I don't think this is a particularly
controversial reading. In fact, it is quite commonplace - which or course
does not make it right.



My assertion that we must heed Kant's warning about sensations and concepts
was directed to you and not to Hegel. My fear is that you seem to want to
identify the in itself moment of natural consciousness with Kant's
categories and the for consciousness moment with mere sensation apart from
categories. If I am mistaken about this then we can let it pass as my
misreading of your comments about the method of inquiry in the
Phenomenology.



In your quote from p. 587 of the Logic the second paragraph should strike
most readers as a challenge. To say that reality is to "be derived from the
concept itself" on the face of it is an absurd claim. The challenge is to
make such a claim intelligible. What divides the Hegelian from the
non-Hegelian philosophic community are claims such as these. Hegelians seem
perfectly comfortable with such claims and believe that either it is
intelligible on its face or that they can make it intelligible by means of
commentary. The non-Hegelians remain unmoved by most of what is said to
defend the intelligibility of such claims. The problem is not so much as you
suggest that this claim makes Hegel into an idealist. There are many
varieties of idealism that would not dare to make such a claim. To say as
Berkeley does that what is, is what is perceived is easy enough to
understand even if one does not agree with it. To say that reality is the
self-constitution of, not the self as Fichte might say, but of the concept
challenges us to come to terms with what kind of concept this might be.
Certainly, our common understanding of concepts does not give them such
powers.



By the way, one reason why I prefer the more common translation of Begriff
as 'concept' rather than Miller's 'notion' is that concept clearly has a
conventional sense whereas notion is vague and might lead one to think Hegel
has something special in mind. I believe that Hegel wants to work with
conventional thoughts because he wishes to create the jarring effect of
having a common term turned on its head. He is not talking about something
different from what we commonly think of as a concept. He is taking this
common term that is easy enough to understand and transforming it so that it
might be comprehended. The second or unconventional Hegelian take on concept
actually is related to the first or conventional take. Making this clear
would involve a long digression that I will avoid making.



After more quotes from the Logic I am glad to see you exclaim: "My God! What
monster is Hegel creating?"  Most of your summary statements about what is
conveyed in these passages - both p.588 and p. 591-592 - are concise
statements of the riddles that appear as the first and direct gloss of these
passages. We should not be deterred by this. We need to acknowledge that the
surface of what Hegel conveys is for the most part nothing but riddles or
challenges to the understanding.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
TheJack
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2009 6:41 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Primer on Absolute Idealism vs. Subject Idealism





[Alan]

> I think the oppositions that concern Kant - between the
> understanding and sensation or even between the phenomenal and
> noumenal realms - do not easily map on to Hegel's more pedestrian
> designation of the opposition within consciousness.

> If we just limit ourselves to the understanding/sensation
> distinction we must heed Kant's warning that sensations without
> concepts are blind and concepts without sensations are empty.

> On my view, the principle/instance distinction employed by Hegel
> follows after the Kantian a priori synthesis of the understanding
> with sensation.

> Both principles and instances are synthesized intelligible items
> for Hegel.

> Thus I cannot agree with your suggestion that the principles
> employed by natural consciousness can be understood as analogous to
> Kant's empty forms.

Hello Alan, hello Hegel list

There are still some problems with your terminology. For example you
attribute the "principle/instance distinction" to Hegel.

Can you supply any textual evidence of this terminology in Hegel? I am not
looking for hair splitting, I just don't know what you are talking about.

And this below is mush to me:

[Alan]

> Now the principles of natural consciousness are intended to be self-
> standing intelligible thought items to which are meant to correspond
> equally self-standing instances.

Also, maybe someone else can spell this out for me if I am just missing
what's right in front of me, but I don't think there is any textual evidence
to support such terminology.

While you clarify that point for me, you had asked:

[Alan]

> You seem to note in passing Hegel's distinction between a subjective
> and an absolute idealism. I think it is an important distinction. I
> would be curious as to what you think it means given that you bring
> it up.

Well, this relates to my prior request for a clarification from you, because
I had been perplexed by your statement:

[Alan]

> we must heed Kant's warning that sensations without concepts are
> blind and concepts without sensations are empty".

Because Hegel doesn't take heed of Kant's warning.

See below for *lots* of textual proof:

-------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
-------------

"The conception of this relation both in ordinary psychology and in the
Kantian transcendental philosophy is that the empirical material, the
manifold of intuition and representation, first exists on its own account,
and that then the understanding approaches it, brings unity into it and by
abstraction raises it to the form of universality. The understanding is in
this way an intrinsically empty form which, on the one hand, obtains a
reality through the said given content and, on the other hand, abstracts
from that content, that is to say, lets it drop as something useless, but
useless only for the Notion. In both these actions the Notion is not the
independent factor, not the essential and true element of the prior given
material; on the contrary, it is the material that is regarded as the
absolute reality, which cannot be extracted from the Notion.

Now it must certainly be admitted that the Notion as such is not yet
complete, but must rise to the Idea which alone is the unity of the Notion
and reality; and this must be shown in the sequel to be the spontaneous
outcome of the nature of the Notion itself. For the reality which the Notion
gives itself must not be received by it as something external but must, in
accordance with the requirement of the science, be derived from the Notion
itself. But the truth is that it is not the material given by intuition and
representation that ought to be vindicated as the real in contrast to the
Notion." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 587)

---------------

Above, Hegel suggests that .

- an essential proposition of the Kantian transcendental philosophy was that
without intuitions, notions were empty, and were valid solely as relations
of the manifold given by intuition.

- according to Kant, the empirical material, the manifold of intuition and
representation, first exists on its own account.

- the understanding approaches the given material, and then brings unity
into it raising this material into the form of universality.

- The understanding is in this way an intrinsically empty form which only
obtains a reality through the said given content.

- In this regard, it is the material that is considered as the absolute
reality for Kant, not the Notion.

-Therefore the Notion considered as such is not complete.

- the reality which the Notion gives itself must not be received by it as
something external but must be derived from the Notion itself.

So, clearly above Hegel is not taking heed of Kant's warning that thought
"left to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain".

Q: But does this mean that Hegel was a subjective Idealist?

A: We need to understand more about how Hegel formulates the argument.

So, let's again have a look at more evidence from the text:

--------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
-------------

"Now to regard the given material of intuition and the manifold of
representation as the real in contrast to what is thought, to the Notion, is
a view, the abandonment of which is not only a condition of philosophising
but is already presupposed by religion; for how can there be any need for
religion, how can religion have any meaning, if the fleeting and superficial
phenomena of the world of sensuous particulars are still regarded as the
truth? But philosophy gives a reasoned insight into the true state of the
case with regard to the reality of sensuous being; it assumes the stages of
feeling and intuition as precedent to the understanding in so far as they
are conditions of its genesis, but only in the sense that it is conditioned
by their reality. Abstract thinking, therefore, is not to be regarded as a
mere setting aside of the sensuous material, the reality of which is not
thereby impaired; rather is it the sublating and reduction of that material
as mere phenomenal appearance to the essential, which is manifested only in
the Notion." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller 587-588)

---------------

Above Hegel suggests that.

-To enter into philosophy we must abandon the view that the given material
of the sensory manifold is "the real" [in contrast to Thought which is the
unessential].

- The "reality" of this sensuous material is instead grounded in "the
Notion".

Here we should go back to para. 45 that I quoted in my previous post:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel/message/5891

That paragraph had suggested:

- For Hegel, things that we are directly conscious of are indeed
"phenomena", but they are not grounded in a mere subjective Idealism, but
instead an Absolute Idealism.

See below for more textual proof:

---------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
-------------

"A capital misunderstanding which prevails on this point is that the natural
principle or the beginning which forms the starting point in the natural
evolution or in the history of the developing individual, is regarded as the
truth, and the first in the Notion. Now in the order of nature, intuition or
being are undoubtedly first, or are the condition for the Notion, but they
are not on that account the absolutely unconditioned; on the contrary, their
reality is sublated in the Notion and with it, too, the illusory show they
possessed of being the conditioning reality. When it is a question, not of
truth but merely of history, as in pictorial and phenomenal thinking, we
need not of course go beyond merely narrating that we start with feelings
and intuitions and that from the manifold of these the understanding
extracts a universality or an abstraction and naturally requires for this
purpose the said substrate of feelings and intuitions which, in this process
of abstraction, remains for representation in the same complete reality with
which it first presented itself. But philosophy is not meant to be a
narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true in them, and
further, on the basis of this cognition, to comprehend that which, in the
narrative, appears as a mere happening.

If the superficial conception of what the Notion is, leaves all manifoldness
outside the Notion and attributes to the latter only the form of abstract
universality or the empty identity of reflection, we can at once appeal to
the fact that quite apart from the view here propounded, the statement or
definition of a notion expressly includes not only the genus, which itself
is, properly speaking, more than a purely abstract universality, but also
the specific determinateness. If one would but reflect attentively on the
meaning of this fact, one would see that differentiation must be regarded as
an equally essential moment of the Notion. Kant has introduced this
consideration by the extremely important thought that there are synthetic
judgements a priori." (Hegel, SL trans Miller p. 588)

-----------------------------

Hegel suggests above that..

-What comes first for Natural Consciousness is unquestionably the given
material of intuition (and feeling). However, it is a big mistake to take
this sensory manifold as the truth just because it comes first historically
in the individual consciousness.

-Viewed from the perspective of Natural Consciousness, the given material of
intuition conditions the notion, but this "conditioning reality" will prove
to be an illusion.

-The reality of the given sensory material will be sublated by the Notion.
Thus the Notion will prove to be the ground of the sensory particulars.

-It is only the superficial conception of "the Notion" that leaves the
sensory manifold separate from the Notion.

- The definition of "the Notion" includes not only the genus (i.e. the
Universality), but also the specific determinateness (i.e. the particulars).

My God! What monster is Hegel creating? It appears that Hegel is trying to
say "the Notion" produces reality from its own resources!

See below for more textual proof:

-----------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
----------------

"It has therefore been freely admitted that the cognition that stops short
at the Notion purely as such, is still incomplete and has only as yet
arrived at abstract truth. But its incompleteness does not lie in its lack
of that presumptive reality given in feeling and intuition but rather in the
fact that the Notion has not yet given itself a reality of its own, a
reality produced from its own resources. The demonstrated absoluteness of
the Notion relatively to the material of experience and, more exactly, to
the categories and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this
material as it appears apart from and prior to the Notion has no truth; this
it has solely in its ideality or its identity with the Notion. The
derivation of the real from it if we want to call it derivation, consists in
the first place essentially in this, that the Notion in its formal
abstraction reveals itself as incomplete and through its own immanent
dialectic passes over into reality; but it does not fall back again onto a
ready-made reality confronting it and take refuge in something which has
shown itself to be the unessential element of Appearance because, having
looked around for something better, it has failed to find it; on the
contrary, it produces the reality from its own resources. It will always
stand out as a marvel how the Kantian philosophy recognised the relation of
thought to sensuous reality, beyond which it did not advance, as only a
relative relation of mere Appearance, and perfectly well recognised and
enunciated a higher unity of both in the Idea in general and, for example,
in the Idea of an intuitive understanding, and yet stopped short at this
relative relation and the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly
separate from reality thus asserting as truth what it declared to be finite
cognition, and denouncing as an unjustified extravagance and a figment of
thought what it recognised as truth and of which it established the specific
notion." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 591-592)

-------------------

Above Hegel suggests

- Cognition that stops at the Notion in its immediacy is still incomplete.
However this incompleteness is not due to the lack of some external material

-Instead this incompleteness, is due to the fact that the Notion in its
immediacy hasn't yet given itself a reality of its own (i.e. a reality
produced from its own resources)

-the appearance of the material experience has no truth prior to its ground
in the Notion.

-The Notion through its own immanent dialectic conceives reality from within
its own resources.

- The identity of Notion and reality (i.e. the realization of the Idea) is
ensured if "the Notion" conceives reality. Kant himself had conceived this
"higher unity" of Notion and reality in his idea of an intuitive
understanding but never followed through with it.

Okay, I'll stop here for now.

Randall





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[Alan]

> I think the oppositions that concern Kant � between the
> understanding and sensation or even between the phenomenal and
> noumenal realms � do not easily map on to Hegel's more pedestrian
> designation of the opposition within consciousness.

> If we just limit ourselves to the understanding/sensation
> distinction we must heed Kant's warning that sensations without
> concepts are blind and concepts without sensations are empty.

> On my view, the principle/instance distinction employed by Hegel
> follows after the Kantian a priori synthesis of the understanding
> with sensation.

> Both principles and instances are synthesized intelligible items
> for Hegel.

> Thus I cannot agree with your suggestion that the principles
> employed by natural consciousness can be understood as analogous to
> Kant's empty forms.

Hello Alan, hello Hegel list

There are still some problems with your terminology. For example you attribute
the "principle/instance distinction" to Hegel.

Can you supply any textual evidence of this terminology in Hegel? I am not
looking for hair splitting, I just don't know what you are talking about.

And this below is mush to me:

[Alan]

> Now the principles of natural consciousness are intended to be self-
> standing intelligible thought items to which are meant to correspond
> equally self-standing instances.

Also, maybe someone else can spell this out for me if I am just missing what's
right in front of me, but I don't think there is any textual evidence to support
such terminology.

While you clarify that point for me, you had asked:

[Alan]

> You seem to note in passing Hegel's distinction between a subjective
> and an absolute idealism. I think it is an important distinction. I
> would be curious as to what you think it means given that you bring
> it up.


Well, this relates to my prior request for a clarification from you, because I
had been perplexed by your statement:

[Alan]

> we must heed Kant's warning that sensations without concepts are
> blind and concepts without sensations are empty".

Because Hegel doesn't take heed of Kant's warning.

See below for *lots* of textual proof:

-------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
-------------

"The conception of this relation both in ordinary psychology and in the Kantian
transcendental philosophy is that the empirical material, the manifold of
intuition and representation, first exists on its own account, and that then the
understanding approaches it, brings unity into it and by abstraction raises it
to the form of universality. The understanding is in this way an intrinsically
empty form which, on the one hand, obtains a reality through the said given
content and, on the other hand, abstracts from that content, that is to say,
lets it drop as something useless, but useless only for the Notion. In both
these actions the Notion is not the independent factor, not the essential and
true element of the prior given material; on the contrary, it is the material
that is regarded as the absolute reality, which cannot be extracted from the
Notion.

Now it must certainly be admitted that the Notion as such is not yet complete,
but must rise to the Idea which alone is the unity of the Notion and reality;
and this must be shown in the sequel to be the spontaneous outcome of the nature
of the Notion itself.  For the reality which the Notion gives itself must not be
received by it as something external but must, in accordance with the
requirement of the science, be derived from the Notion itself. But the truth is
that it is not the material given by intuition and representation that ought to
be vindicated as the real in contrast to the Notion." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller
p. 587)

---------------

Above, Hegel suggests that �

- an essential proposition of the Kantian transcendental philosophy was that
without intuitions, notions were empty, and were valid solely as relations of
the manifold given by intuition.

-  according to Kant, the empirical material, the manifold of intuition and
representation, first exists on its own account.

- the understanding approaches the given material, and then brings unity into it
raising this material into the form of universality.

- The understanding is in this way an intrinsically empty form which only
obtains a reality through the said given content.

- In this regard, it is the material that is considered as the absolute reality
for Kant, not the Notion.

-Therefore the Notion considered as such is not complete.

- the reality which the Notion gives itself must not be received by it as
something external but must be derived from the Notion itself.


So, clearly above Hegel is not taking heed of Kant's warning that thought "left
to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain".

Q: But does this mean that Hegel was a subjective Idealist?

A: We need to understand more about how Hegel formulates the argument.


So, let's again have a look at more evidence from the text:

--------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
-------------

"Now to regard the given material of intuition and the manifold of
representation as the real in contrast to what is thought, to the Notion, is a
view, the abandonment of which is not only a condition of philosophising but is
already presupposed by religion; for how can there be any need for religion, how
can religion have any meaning, if the fleeting and superficial phenomena of the
world of sensuous particulars are still regarded as the truth? But philosophy
gives a reasoned insight into the true state of the case with regard to the
reality of sensuous being; it assumes the stages of feeling and intuition as
precedent to the understanding in so far as they are conditions of its genesis,
but only in the sense that it is conditioned by their reality. Abstract
thinking, therefore, is not to be regarded as a mere setting aside of the
sensuous material, the reality of which is not thereby impaired; rather is it
the sublating and reduction of that material as mere phenomenal appearance to
the essential, which is manifested only in the Notion." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller
587-588)

---------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

-To enter into philosophy we must abandon the view that the given  material of
the sensory manifold is  "the real" [in contrast to Thought which is the
unessential].

- The "reality" of this sensuous material is instead grounded in "the Notion".

Here we should go back to para. 45 that I quoted in my previous post:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/hegel/message/5891

  That paragraph had suggested:

- For Hegel, things that we are directly conscious of are indeed "phenomena",
but they are not grounded in a mere subjective Idealism, but instead an Absolute
Idealism.

See below for more textual proof:

---------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
-------------

"A capital misunderstanding which prevails on this point is that the natural
principle or the beginning which forms the starting point in the natural
evolution or in the history of the developing individual, is regarded as the
truth, and the first in the Notion. Now in the order of nature, intuition or
being are undoubtedly first, or are the condition for the Notion, but they are
not on that account the absolutely unconditioned; on the contrary, their reality
is sublated in the Notion and with it, too, the illusory show they possessed of
being the conditioning reality. When it is a question, not of truth but merely
of history, as in pictorial and phenomenal thinking, we need not of course go
beyond merely narrating that we start with feelings and intuitions and that from
the manifold of these the understanding extracts a universality or an
abstraction and naturally requires for this purpose the said substrate of
feelings and intuitions which, in this process of abstraction, remains for
representation in the same complete reality with which it first presented
itself. But philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a
cognition of what is true in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition,
to comprehend that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening.

If the superficial conception of what the Notion is, leaves all manifoldness
outside the Notion and attributes to the latter only the form of abstract
universality or the empty identity of reflection, we can at once appeal to the
fact that quite apart from the view here propounded, the statement or definition
of a notion expressly includes not only the genus, which itself is, properly
speaking, more than a purely abstract universality, but also the specific
determinateness. If one would but reflect attentively on the meaning of this
fact, one would see that differentiation must be regarded as an equally
essential moment of the Notion. Kant has introduced this consideration by the
extremely important thought that there are synthetic judgements a priori."
(Hegel, SL trans Miller p. 588)

-----------------------------

Hegel suggests above that..

-What comes first for Natural Consciousness is unquestionably the given material
of intuition (and feeling). However, it is a big mistake to take this sensory
manifold as the truth just because it comes first historically in the individual
consciousness.

-Viewed from the perspective of Natural Consciousness, the given material of
intuition conditions the notion, but this "conditioning reality" will prove to
be an illusion.

-The reality of the given sensory material will be sublated by the Notion. Thus
the Notion will prove to be the ground of the sensory particulars.

-It is only the superficial conception of "the Notion" that leaves the sensory
manifold separate from the Notion.

- The definition of "the Notion"  includes not only the genus (i.e. the
Universality), but also the specific determinateness (i.e. the particulars).

My God! What monster is Hegel creating?  It appears that Hegel is trying to say
"the Notion" produces reality from its own resources!

See below for more textual proof:

-----------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
----------------

"It has therefore been freely admitted that the cognition that stops short at
the Notion purely as such, is still incomplete and has only as yet arrived at
abstract truth. But its incompleteness does not lie in its lack of that
presumptive reality given in feeling and intuition but rather in the fact that
the Notion has not yet given itself a reality of its own, a reality produced
from its own resources. The demonstrated absoluteness of the Notion relatively
to the material of experience and, more exactly, to the categories and concepts
of reflection, consists in this, that this material as it appears apart from and
prior to the Notion has no truth; this it has solely in its ideality or its
identity with the Notion. The derivation of the real from it if we want to call
it derivation, consists in the first place essentially in this, that the Notion
in its formal abstraction reveals itself as incomplete and through its own
immanent dialectic passes over into reality; but it does not fall back again
onto a ready-made reality confronting it and take refuge in something which has
shown itself to be the unessential element of Appearance because, having looked
around for something better, it has failed to find it; on the contrary, it
produces the reality from its own resources. It will always stand out as a
marvel how the Kantian philosophy recognised the relation of thought to sensuous
reality, beyond which it did not advance, as only a relative relation of mere
Appearance, and perfectly well recognised and enunciated a higher unity of both
in the Idea in general and, for example, in the Idea of an intuitive
understanding, and yet stopped short at this relative relation and the assertion
that the Notion is and remains utterly separate from reality thus asserting as
truth what it declared to be finite cognition, and denouncing as an unjustified
extravagance and a figment of thought what it recognised as truth and of which
it established the specific notion." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 591-592)

-------------------

Above Hegel suggests

- Cognition that stops at the Notion in its immediacy is still incomplete.
However this incompleteness is not due to the lack of some external material

-Instead this incompleteness, is due to the fact that the Notion in its
immediacy hasn't yet given itself a reality of its own (i.e. a reality produced
from its own resources)

-the appearance of the material experience has no truth prior to its ground in
the Notion.

-The Notion through its own immanent dialectic conceives reality from within its
own resources.

- The identity of Notion and reality (i.e. the realization of the Idea) is
ensured if "the Notion" conceives reality. Kant himself had conceived this
"higher unity" of Notion and reality in his idea of an intuitive understanding
but never followed through with it.

Okay, I'll stop here for now.

Randall

Randall,

I presume you wrote:

>Phenomenal Knowledge *MUST* be in a self-relation to the rules in which
>it uses to know an object, otherwise it wouldn't be able to have
>experience of an object at all.

>There's no room for quibbling about whether or not this insight from
>Kant maps on to Hegel's formulation of phenomenal consciousness.


For my benefit, if not the other readers,
I think there needs to be some further explanation.
That is, I would of thought a self-relation vs an other-relation,
(See what Hegel says 'Sense Certainty' section 103 in the PhG
as well as articles by Kenneth R. Westphal in the Bulletin for
the HSGB) is not unlike having a dichotomy between apperception
and apprehension?; what is true for the function
of the dialectic is true for speculative logic;
if the ego can exist within what is true for an other-relation,
it can have a self; an identity within a culture so to speak.
Yet the other-relation; of the whole i.e., a culture, is
also in a relation to itself. To exit the vicious circle
from that which is one-sided and merely finite, the immediacy
of sense-certainty as an idea must exclude all opposition to it.
In this way I see Westphal's Realism as an absolute idealism,
in that it crushes objectivity.

By my use of Hegel's semantics, the empirical attitude of the
Realists' is based on a presupposition only
one stage better than the scholastic metaphysics.
I would take it as being short of Kant's subjective idealism.
To use an analogy, Kant's is more like standing on the fence.

What I'm saying, is that the abstract or formal
focus that is indifferent to what is true (unlike the
dogmatism of the empiricist, where the understanding
is merely grounded upon presupposition, so it is further down
the ladder) cannot grasp the truth
of the notion so to speak. Hence, what is absolute
for the unity of thought and being as is true for the totality
of events, includes the universal and or contingent
in that order as concepts of lesser value. That is, so none
of the above are empty words.

Regards,



Paul Healey

--- On Sun, 6/12/09, TheJack
  <thejackjam@...> wrote:

From: TheJack <thejackjam@...>
Subject: [hegel] Re: Primer on  the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Date: Sunday, 6 December, 2009, 10:38







 



 


   
     
     
     

[Alan]



> The general trajectory of your quotes about Hegel's concept and

> Kant's unity of apperception seems to be first to show the

> similarity and then to emphasize how they are radically distinct.



Hello Alan,



It is true Alan that there are both similarities and distinctions between
Hegel's "the Notion" and Kant's unity of apperception.



But the key element of similarity for this discussion remains Kant's insight
that in order for consciousness to have knowledge of objects at all, it must
first be in a self-relation (i.e. self-consciousness) to the rules in which it
uses to take up the object.



Phenomenal Knowledge *MUST* be in a self-relation to the rules in which it uses
to know an object, otherwise it wouldn't be able to have experience of an object
at all.



There's no room for quibbling about whether or not this insight from Kant maps
on to Hegel's formulation of phenomenal consciousness.



The big difference between Kant and Hegel in this context is that for Kant "the
specific modes in which the Ego refers to itself…are the pure Concepts of the
Understanding, or the Categories".



And of course Hegel was very critical of Kant for not "exhibiting the necessity
of these categories and giving a genuine deduction of them".

 

Because what Kant had in mind with the categories was the "stock and trade"
forms of  logic that had been handed down from the old metaphysics. Moreover,
Kant considered these forms as universal in every knower.



But for Hegel, the rules in which Phenomenal Knowing uses to take up the object,
are merely the arbitrary posit of the phenomenal knower himself (or the
arbitrary posit of the culture).



The two big clues that indicate this in the Introduction are that…



1. "Phenomenal Knowledge" takes different forms.



                       [and]



2. Phenomenal Knowledge is "explicitly the notion of itself".



If the rules in which Phenomenal Knowing used to know its object were universal
as Kant had suggested then different forms or configurations of consciousness
wouldn't be possible.



For #2 we should have a look directly at the text:



------------ ------

[Hegel] PhG Introduciton

------------ -----



"80. But the goal is as necessary fixed for knowledge as the serial progression;
it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where
knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to
Notion.  Hence the progress towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of
it no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations along the way. Whatever
is confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go
beyond its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by something else,
and this uprooting entails its death. Consciousness, however, is explicitly the
Notion of itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these
limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these
limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself." (Hegel, PhG trans.
Miller p. 51)



------------ --------



I have to take a break here to do some Christmas related stuff with my family. 
I will continue later today.



Randall





   
     

   
   






 

Alan Ponikvar writes:

>> Hi Randall,
>>
>>I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it appears
in 81-82 with Kant�s insight that all consciousness implies self-consciousness.
And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is shared by many
commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel�s description of natural
consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or transcendental account. If Hegel is to
limit himself to knowledge as it appears then one might suppose that anything he
has to say must be read off of the phenomena themselves. This would make his
description what he says it is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with
Kant�s approach. Hegel�s first interest is in what he calls �the abstract
determinations of knowledge and truth.� This leads to another question: is this
description meant to peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing
giving us the reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask
Hegel what justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these
determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself then we are
right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability of
appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind appearances?
>>
>>It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is one
cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both awareness and
the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be confused with general
principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction between informing
matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking about the former, Hegel
about the latter.
>>
>>That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a speculative
and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers to the general
form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to what is going to
happen such that the experience of consciousness actualizes its own truth. These
will prove to be two distinct features of knowledge as it appears. It is what
lies behind Hegel�s cryptic claim that the realization of the concept is to be
the loss of the reality of consciousness.
>>
>>Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of what
he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this passage
creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper understanding of the
exposition. If guided by what we know about the common conceptions of knowing it
is easy to understand what it might mean to arrive at the point where a concept
and an object might correspond. But what would this mean with respect to the
dialectical actualization of the concept that Hegel claims is the truth of each
shape of consciousness? This concept does not correspond with � in fact it is
not clear that it even has � some object.
>>
>>regards, Alan
>>

I think this is very well expressed. If we take the latest development
of Analytic Philosophy then we can summarize - and Hegel was the first
who did this - there is no fact behind the fact. There is a truth
relation between the proposition and the fact which is not independent
of the proposition itself but its inherent (not identical) criterion
(Phenomenology of Spirit). This truth relation is dynamic and all our
facts are recalled experiences we collect during our life. The feature
of the experience is the synthesis of objective and subjective spirit -
a synthesis which is the absolute for a while. But most important: our
experience is from the very beginning always conceptual. There is no
such thing as an independent pre-conceptual intuition and transcendental
concepts with facts given in the world for looking after by given
subjects as Kant thought (there are indeed other interpretations of
Kant's respective thought, however, I am sceptical about this). Our
facts are made (fac-tum, Tat-sache) and this requires actions. Otherwise
we are subject to a bad Platonism.

Regards,
Beat Greuter

>  Hi Randall,
>
> I have no trouble relating what Hegel has to say about knowledge as it appears
in 81-82 with Kant�s insight that all consciousness implies self-consciousness.
And your interest in reading Hegel in light of Kant is shared by many
commentators. But then one might want to know if Hegel�s description of natural
consciousness in 81-82 is an empirical or transcendental account. If Hegel is to
limit himself to knowledge as it appears then one might suppose that anything he
has to say must be read off of the phenomena themselves. This would make his
description what he says it is: a fact. But this would seem to conflict with
Kant�s approach. Hegel�s first interest is in what he calls �the abstract
determinations of knowledge and truth.� This leads to another question: is this
description meant to peer into the essence behind the phenomenon that is knowing
giving us the reality of knowing behind the appearance? If so, can we not ask
Hegel what justifies this essentialist definition? If he tells us that these
determinations are valid because this is how knowledge shows itself then we are
right back in the skeptical circle of reasons. How can the reliability of
appearances be used to justify an insight into the essences behind appearances?
>
> It is your reference to rules with respect to phenomenal knowing that is one
cause of my concern. Again, for Kant the a priori rules make both awareness and
the objects of awareness possible. They are not to be confused with general
principles that rule over instances. This is the distinction between informing
matter and serving as a one over many. Kant is speaking about the former, Hegel
about the latter.
>
> That phenomenal knowledge is its own concept of itself has both a speculative
and nonspeculative meaning. As nonspeculative it simply refers to the general
form characteristic of knowing. As speculative it refers to what is going to
happen such that the experience of consciousness actualizes its own truth. These
will prove to be two distinct features of knowledge as it appears. It is what
lies behind Hegel�s cryptic claim that the realization of the concept is to be
the loss of the reality of consciousness.
>
> Finally, your reference to 80 precedes rather than follows an account of what
he might be talking about. And given what I have just said above this passage
creates what will be the overriding challenge of a proper understanding of the
exposition. If guided by what we know about the common conceptions of knowing it
is easy to understand what it might mean to arrive at the point where a concept
and an object might correspond. But what would this mean with respect to the
dialectical actualization of the concept that Hegel claims is the truth of each
shape of consciousness? This concept does not correspond with � in fact it is
not clear that it even has � some object.
>
> regards, Alan
>


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[Alan]

> The general trajectory of your quotes about Hegel's concept and
> Kant's unity of apperception seems to be first to show the
> similarity and then to emphasize how they are radically distinct.

Hello Alan,

It is true Alan that there are both similarities and distinctions between
Hegel's "the Notion" and Kant's unity of apperception.

But the key element of similarity for this discussion remains Kant's insight
that in order for consciousness to have knowledge of objects at all, it must
first be in a self-relation (i.e. self-consciousness) to the rules in which it
uses to take up the object.

Phenomenal Knowledge *MUST* be in a self-relation to the rules in which it uses
to know an object, otherwise it wouldn't be able to have experience of an object
at all.

There's no room for quibbling about whether or not this insight from Kant maps
on to Hegel's formulation of phenomenal consciousness.

The big difference between Kant and Hegel in this context is that for Kant "the
specific modes in which the Ego refers to itself�are the pure Concepts of the
Understanding, or the Categories".

And of course Hegel was very critical of Kant for not "exhibiting the necessity
of these categories and giving a genuine deduction of them".

Because what Kant had in mind with the categories was the "stock and trade"
forms of  logic that had been handed down from the old metaphysics. Moreover,
Kant considered these forms as universal in every knower.

But for Hegel, the rules in which Phenomenal Knowing uses to take up the object,
are merely the arbitrary posit of the phenomenal knower himself (or the
arbitrary posit of the culture).

The two big clues that indicate this in the Introduction are that�

1. "Phenomenal Knowledge" takes different forms.

                        [and]

2. Phenomenal Knowledge is "explicitly the notion of itself".

If the rules in which Phenomenal Knowing used to know its object were universal
as Kant had suggested then different forms or configurations of consciousness
wouldn't be possible.

For #2 we should have a look directly at the text:

------------------
[Hegel] PhG Introduciton
-----------------

"80. But the goal is as necessary fixed for knowledge as the serial progression;
it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where
knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion.
Hence the progress towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it no
satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations along the way. Whatever is
confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go beyond
its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by something else, and this
uprooting entails its death. Consciousness, however, is explicitly the Notion of
itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits
are its own, it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits are
its own, it is something that goes beyond itself." (Hegel, PhG trans. Miller p.
51)

--------------------

I have to take a break here to do some Christmas related stuff with my family. 
I will continue later today.

Randall

Hi Randall,



I am sure that most readers are satisfied with what Hegel has to say about
phenomenal knowledge in paragraphs 81-82 and did not have to wait many years
for this to be clarified in another book. But things are not as clear as you
suggest. First, the reference to ordinary consciousness in the Logic seems
to be to knowledge as a phenomenon that is broader than it is in the
Phenomenology when Hegel introduces natural consciousness in a way that
would seem to limit the knowledge that is to be considered to a knowing of
knowing. That is, it is easy � because Hegel does not really help his
readers here � to confuse two oppositions of consciousness: there is the
simple subject object opposition and then there is the opposition between
knowing and the knowing of knowing. I would suggest that it is the latter
and not the former opposition that is to be the exposition of knowledge as
it appears in the Phenomenology. But Hegel does not explicitly speak to
this. And I can imagine that some readers might want to defend the view that
it is the simple subject/object opposition that is to be examined. After
all, there is plenty of talk of this opposition in the Phenomenology. But if
the examination is to be as Hegel says a self-examination of natural
consciousness then this would argue for seeing the latter opposition between
knowing and a knowing of knowing as the one we should focus upon.



As to whether it is helpful or not to refer to Kant depends on how the
reference is made. I am merely suggesting that how you make the reference
might be at best not very useful and at worst misleading.



Your final quote indicates to me that you are quite willing to conflate what
Hegel calls �ordinary common sense� with natural consciousness. I believe
this is a mistake, but it is a mistake that is easy to make given how
difficult it is to get a handle on what exactly Hegel means when he says he
is going to examine knowledge as it appears. Does he mean all knowledge or
only knowledge of a certain sort � knowledge of knowledge as such? It seems
that you are allowing Hegel to lull you to sleep right at the point that you
should be poking Hegel in the ribs with annoying questions.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
TheJack
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:15 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions





Hello Alan,

Let me use your latest post as an opportunity to post some final remarks on
Phenomenal Knowledge.

[Alan]

> When Hegel begins paragraph 77 with the observation that phenomenal >
knowledge is to be our object. At this point, a careful reader
> would be within his rights if he were to ask Hegel what in the
> world he is talking about. So, to say as you do that one obscure
> notion � natural consciousness � is to explain another obscure
> notion � phenomenal knowledge � does not help much.

Well Alan, if the reader does ask, "what in the world is Hegel talking
about" with the term "Phenomenal Knowledge", Hegel gives them a *direct*
response in the Intro to the SL.

See textual proof below:

---------------------
[Hegel] General Notion of Logic
--------------------

"Hitherto, the Notion of logic has rested on the separation, presupposed
once and for all in the ordinary consciousness, of the content of cognition
and its form, or of truth and certainty. First, it is assumed that the
material of knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world
apart from thought, that thinking on its own is empty and comes as an
external form to the said material, fills itself with it and only thus
acquires a content and so becomes real knowing.

Further, these two constituents � for they are supposed to be related to
each other as constituents, and cognition is compounded from them in a
mechanical or at best chemical fashion � are appraised as follows: the
object is regarded as something complete and finished on its own account,
something which can entirely dispense with thought for its actuality, while
thought on the other hand is regarded as defective because it has to
complete itself with a material and moreover, as a pliable indeterminate
form, has to adapt itself to its material. Truth is the agreement of thought
with the object, and in order to bring about this agreement � for it does
not exist on its own account � thinking is supposed to adapt and accommodate
itself to the object.

Thirdly, when the difference of matter and form, of object and thought is
not left in that nebulous indeterminateness but is taken more definitely,
then each is regarded as a sphere divorced from the other. Thinking
therefore in its reception and formation of material does not go outside
itself; its reception of the material and the conforming of itself to it
remains a modification of its own self, it does not result in thought
becoming the other of itself; and self-conscious determining moreover
belongs only to thinking. In its relation to the object, therefore, thinking
does not go out of itself to the object; this, as a thing-in-itself, remains
a sheer beyond of thought.

These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the
determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal
consciousness; but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of
reason as if the same relation obtained there, as if this relation were
something true in its own self, then they are errors � the refutation of
which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is
philosophy, or rather, as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be
discarded at its portals. (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p.44-45)

-------------------

Hegel suggests above that�

- Phenomenal Knowledge rests on the separation between the content of
cognition and its form.

- Phenomenal Knowledge assumes that the material of knowing is present on
its own account as a ready-made world apart from thought.

- The form and content of Phenomenal Knowledge are regarded as a spheres
divorced from the other.

- Phenomenal Knowledge assumes that thinking on its own is empty and comes
as an external form to the material that is present on its own account.

- Phenomenal Knowledge only becomes real knowing by acquiring a content.

-The cognition of Phenomenal Knowledge is the result of a mechanical
combination of this independent material and the form of cognition.

-The truth of Phenomenal Knowing is the agreement of its thinking with the
object.

So, with the above passage, combined with para. 77-82 in the PhG, and all
the Kant references that I have supplied, I don't understand how you can
claim that Hegel's use of "Phenomenal Knowledge" is obscure.

[Alan]

> You then go on to draw parallels between what Kant has to say about
> knowledge and what Hegel might [have] meant by phenomenal
> knowledge. I think the oppositions that concern Kant � between the
> understanding and sensation or even between the phenomenal and
> noumenal realms � do not easily map on to Hegel's more pedestrian
> designation of the opposition within consciousness.

What Hegel says in the paragraph above leaves no doubt about what the
meaning of Phenomenal Knowing is for Hegel.

And whether or not you think that Hegel's "designation of the opposition
within consciousness" maps on to "what Kant has to say about knowledge",
does not change the fact that Hegel invokes Kant whenever he uses the term
"Phenomenal Knowledge".

In corroboration with this connection between the meaning of "Phenomenal
Knowledge" and Kant, Hegel just one paragraph after explicitly defining
"phenomenal consciousness" in the above paragraph above, again invokes Kant.

See textual proof below:

----------------
[Hegel] The General Notion of Logic
-------------

"But reflective understanding took possession of philosophy. We must know
exactly what is meant by this expression which moreover is often used as a
slogan; in general it stands for the understanding as abstracting, and hence
as separating and remaining fixed in its separations. Directed against
reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth
rests on sensuous reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it
is sense perception which first gives them filling and reality and that
reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain. In
this self-renunciation on the part of reason, the Notion of truth is lost;
it is limited to knowing only subjective truth, only phenomena, appearances,
only something to which the nature of the object itself does not correspond:
knowing has lapsed into opinion."(Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 45)
-------------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- The knowing that remains fixed in its separations (i.e. the separation
between form and content), invariably imposes the view that the truth rests
on sensuous reality, and that "thought" left to its own resources engenders
only figments of the brain.

- This knowing that remains fixed in its separations renounces truth and
settles for a knowing that is only subject truth, the knowing of
"phenomena".

Okay so now back to the business of replying to your previous post. I may
not be able to respond today, but for sure by tomorrow.

Randall





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Hi Randall,



The limit I was referring to was a self-limitation in that I had referred to
two distinctions and only want to address the first one I mentioned between
the understanding and sensation. You do not need to limit yourself in this
way, but if I read you right you do seem to want to draw an analogy between
the principles that are to guide each form of natural consciousness and
Kant�s a priori concepts.



The point I am trying to make about Kant�s a priori concepts is that they
are meant to be employed as rules of synthesis. Apart from this employment
they are in Kant�s view empty. They become �filled� not by serving as
general forms or abstract universals as do the principles for natural
consciousness but by being used in a priori synthesis. This synthesis is
really only imaginative. It does not really happen. We see only the results
� synthesized items of knowledge. Now the principles of natural
consciousness are intended to be self-standing intelligible thought items to
which are meant to correspond equally self-standing instances. So I am
saying that we have conflicting models. For Kant, there is nothing to know
until a priori concepts have synthesized sensations. For Hegel, principles
and instances are knowable apart from their comparison.



I hope this helps.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
TheJack
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:08 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions





Hi Alan,

Thanks for your response, I should finish my thoughts on your previous post
today. But I have a few questions about your position that I need you to
clarify for me.

> If we just limit ourselves to the understanding/sensation distinction
> we must heed Kant's warning that sensations without concepts are
> blind and concepts without sensations are empty.

I don't understand what you mean by "limit ourselves to the
understanding/sensation distinction".

For example, what happens when we don't limit ourselves to "the
understanding/sensation distinction"?

And does this mean that you think thay Hegel maintains the distinction?

> On my view, the principle/instance distinction employed by Hegel
> follows after the Kantian a priori synthesis of the understanding
> with sensation. Both principles and instances are synthesized
> intelligible items for Hegel.

I don't understand this. Please re-formulate this part of your argument.

Thanks,

Randall





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Hi John,



Given that Absolute Knowing is the title of the final chapter and also given
that there is not much reference to such knowing until this final chapter it
is understandable that you characterize it as the result of the
Phenomenology. But for Hegel all truths are both the process and the result.
I would like to suggest that absolute knowing as a process is present along
the way of the Phenomenology at the transition points. It would take some
work to explain this, but I find that once one focuses on what is meant by
absolute knowing it becomes possible to see it at work as facilitating the
movement along the way. Your quote from the Logic which states that absolute
knowing is: �the truth of every mode of consciousness� suggests that Hegel
would not object to my claim.



Your direct talk of the subject/object opposition as if this was Hegel�s
interest is not well supported if one considers what occurs in the
examination of the various shapes. For instance, if Hegel were interested in
the subject/object distinction as such then we would have expected that when
he discusses knowing as perception in the second chapter that he would
consider the skeptical difficulties well known to philosophy about what we
know my means of perception. He talks of the deceptions of perception but
these are not the expected perceptual deceptions but rather the conceptual
deceptions of trying to express a coherent view of what we might mean by the
object of perception. Moreover, what would Hegel mean if he were to say that
�phenomenal knowledge � abolishes itself in favor of absolute or pure
knowing�? If perceptual knowing abolishes itself does that mean that
perception � not to mention all the other abolished shapes - cannot be a
source of knowledge and that we should stop trying to perceive what is the
case or believe that what we perceive gives us anything we could call
knowledge? Should we give up on modern science? I do not believe that Hegel
would wish to have us draw such radical conclusions, which leaves us with
the difficulty of trying to determine exactly what Hegel means by setting
aside each shape of consciousness in turn.



As your final quote from the Logic indicates Hegel is not adverse to making
summary statements that reduce a speculative truth to something that can be
neatly packaged for the understanding. But even in this seemingly innocent
passage Hegel conceals a puzzle when he says: �truth is now equated with
certainty and this certainty with truth." Something that is missed by all
commentaries that I am aware of is a question directed to why Hegel
incessantly uses what I call inverse couplets to express truths that seeming
can be stated in more direct language. Why not just say �truth is now
equated with certainty�? This recalls the most famous of such couplets in
the Phenomenology where he first speaks of spirit as �The we that is I and
the I that is we.� In my view this is a veiled reference to how we who read
are to descend to the level of natural consciousness and how natural
consciousness is to ascend to the level of spiritual self-understanding that
had been the readers special domain of knowing. Only in the final chapter
does this double movement become explicit both for us and for consciousness.



As for the beginning of the Logic, it is also my view � a view that set off
this discussion line � that Hegel negates and preserves the opposition of
consciousness. It is employed to get us into the Logic both with the
discussion of a presuppositionless beginning and the product of this
discussion � pure being. That is, as a product of abstraction pure being is
easy enough to understand. No knowledge of Hegelian philosophy is required.
It is only with the jarring asserting that nothing is that the speculative
element is introduced and the Logic gets on its way. In this way Hegel is
able to answer his own question as to how we are to begin. Our first
beginning � pure being � is an immediacy mediated by the understanding and
thus not a true beginning. The second thought � nothing is � is speculative
and thus the first truly logical move, but being second this first is not
first but follows. What I mean to suggest is that Hegel is more subtle and
clever than we give him create for being. We tend to want to reduce his
thought to simplicities.



Regards, Alan



From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of john
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 11:39 AM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Re: Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The
Notion, and notions







--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com <mailto:hegel%40yahoogroups.com> , "Alan
Ponikvar" <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
>
...
>
> First, there is a long and curious build up in paragraph 76 which
culminates
> in the claim that "It is for this reason that an exposition of how
knowledge
> makes its appearance will here be undertaken." I would suggest that the
> `reason' offered is strange and not on the face of it very convincing. The
> fact that science because it makes an appearance is thus no better than
any
> other appearance is a strange claim to make. If science has something
> important to say and says it in a convincing manner then why should it
have
> to apologize for making an appearance or take the appearance of what it
has
> to say as a defect? How has the appearance of truth become a defect of
this
> truth? Hegel does not take the trouble to enlighten us here. But given
this
> newly discovered problem it is not at all clear as to why this should lead
> us to undertake an exposition of how knowledge appears.

Moreover, this
> formal problem � the how of appearance � seems effortlessly to transform
> itself into a problem pertaining to content � the what of appearance �
when
> Hegel begins paragraph 77 with the observation that phenomenal knowledge
is
> to be our object. At this point, a careful reader would be within his
rights
> if he were to ask Hegel what in the world he is talking about.

So, to say as
> you do that one obscure notion � natural consciousness � is to explain
> another obscure notion � phenomenal knowledge � does not help much.

Now,
> clearly Hegel will in a few paragraphs turn to a discussion of what he
means
> by these notions. But everything he has to say in 77 � 80 about what is
> about to take place is offered in light of this obscurity. I imagine some
> might see these comments as a mere quibble. So what if Hegel goes off on
> enthusiastic ungrounded ramblings in 77 � 80. He eventually gets down to
the
> hard business of saying what he means. But does he really? I tend to read
> the text as thoroughly ironic. He never is direct even when he seems to
mean
> to be. But the only way to show this is with a patient reading.
>

....

>
> You seem to note in passing Hegel's distinction between a subjective and
an
> absolute idealism. I think it is an important distinction. I would be
> curious as to what you think it means given that you bring it up.
>

...

> I
> get the sense that you want to locate the concept as Kant locates the
unity
> of apperception as the original act that grounds knowledge. I don't want
to
> put words into your mouth, but if this is the direction you are heading
then
> it would seem to me that you would be taking Hegel to be offering a
> subjective rather absolute idealism.
>

Dear Alan,

The exposition of how knowledge appears is the Phenomenology as a whole.

The "result" of the Phenomenology is absolute knowing.

Phenomenal knowing--where the subject is here considering the object over
there--abolishes itself in favor of absolute or pure knowing, which might be
described as thought thinking itself. Hegel writes:

"Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because, as
the course of the Phenomenology showed, it is only in absolute knowing that
the separation of the object from the certainty of itself [the subject] is
completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this
certainty with truth." [SL, page 49]

So the Phenomenology just gets you to the beginning of Science--thought
thinking itself purely in the element of thought.

And it makes a pretty poor first appearance as being/nothing. From this
paltry beginning, Hegel derives the categories.

Fichte and Schelling derived the categories from the subject. And, really,
as you say, what Randall writes does seem to suggest a subjective rather
than absolute idealism--a derivation of the categories from the subject
rather than from absolute knowing.

One big difference between the two is that Fichte and Schelling start
Science very immediately. It just makes its appearance! For Hegel, on the
other hand, the start of Science is, as I mentioned, the result of the long
path of the Phenomenology.

But then, oddly enough, consciousness comes back in the Philosophy of Spirit
with Logic and Nature as its presuppositions, rather than its self-erasure
being the presupposition of the Logic as is the case here.

John





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Alan Ponikvar" <ponikvaraj@...> wrote:
>
...
>
> First, there is a long and curious build up in paragraph 76 which culminates
> in the claim that "It is for this reason that an exposition of how knowledge
> makes its appearance will here be undertaken." I would suggest that the
> `reason' offered is strange and not on the face of it very convincing. The
> fact that science because it makes an appearance is thus no better than any
> other appearance is a strange claim to make. If science has something
> important to say and says it in a convincing manner then why should it have
> to apologize for making an appearance or take the appearance of what it has
> to say as a defect? How has the appearance of truth become a defect of this
> truth? Hegel does not take the trouble to enlighten us here. But given this
> newly discovered problem it is not at all clear as to why this should lead
> us to undertake an exposition of how knowledge appears.

Moreover, this
> formal problem � the how of appearance � seems effortlessly to transform
> itself into a problem pertaining to content � the what of appearance � when
> Hegel begins paragraph 77 with the observation that phenomenal knowledge is
> to be our object. At this point, a careful reader would be within his rights
> if he were to ask Hegel what in the world he is talking about.

So, to say as
> you do that one obscure notion � natural consciousness � is to explain
> another obscure notion � phenomenal knowledge � does not help much.

Now,
> clearly Hegel will in a few paragraphs turn to a discussion of what he means
> by these notions. But everything he has to say in 77 � 80 about what is
> about to take place is offered in light of this obscurity. I imagine some
> might see these comments as a mere quibble. So what if Hegel goes off on
> enthusiastic ungrounded ramblings in 77 � 80. He eventually gets down to the
> hard business of saying what he means. But does he really? I tend to read
> the text as thoroughly ironic. He never is direct even when he seems to mean
> to be. But the only way to show this is with a patient reading.
>

....


>
> You seem to note in passing Hegel's distinction between a subjective and an
> absolute idealism. I think it is an important distinction. I would be
> curious as to what you think it means given that you bring it up.
>

...

>  I
> get the sense that you want to locate the concept as Kant locates the unity
> of apperception as the original act that grounds knowledge. I don't want to
> put words into your mouth, but if this is the direction you are heading then
> it would seem to me that you would be taking Hegel to be offering a
> subjective rather absolute idealism.
>


Dear Alan,

The exposition of how knowledge appears is the Phenomenology as a whole.

The "result" of the Phenomenology is absolute knowing.

Phenomenal knowing--where the subject is here considering the object over
there--abolishes itself in favor of absolute or pure knowing, which might be
described as thought thinking itself. Hegel writes:

"Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because, as the
course of the Phenomenology showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the
separation of the object from the certainty of itself [the subject] is
completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty
with truth." [SL, page 49]

So the Phenomenology just gets you to the beginning of Science--thought thinking
itself purely in the element of thought.

And it makes a pretty poor first appearance as being/nothing. From this paltry
beginning, Hegel derives the categories.

Fichte and Schelling derived the categories from the subject. And, really, as
you say, what Randall writes does seem to suggest a subjective rather than
absolute idealism--a derivation of the categories from the subject rather than
from absolute knowing.

One big difference between the two is that Fichte and Schelling start Science
very immediately. It just makes its appearance! For Hegel, on the other hand,
the start of Science is, as I mentioned, the result of the long path of the
Phenomenology.

But then, oddly enough, consciousness comes back in the Philosophy of Spirit
with Logic and Nature as its presuppositions, rather than its self-erasure being
the presupposition of the Logic as is the case here.

John

Hello Alan,

Let me use your latest post as an opportunity to post some final remarks on
Phenomenal Knowledge.


[Alan]

> When Hegel begins paragraph 77 with the observation that phenomenal >
knowledge is to be our object. At this point, a careful reader
> would be within his rights if he were to ask Hegel what in the
> world he is talking about. So, to say as you do that one obscure
> notion � natural consciousness � is to explain another obscure
> notion � phenomenal knowledge � does not help much.

Well Alan, if the reader does ask, "what in the world is Hegel talking about"
with the term "Phenomenal Knowledge", Hegel gives them a *direct* response in
the Intro to the SL.

See textual proof below:

---------------------
[Hegel] General Notion of Logic
--------------------

"Hitherto, the Notion of logic has rested on the separation, presupposed once
and for all in the ordinary consciousness, of the content of cognition and its
form, or of truth and certainty. First, it is assumed that the material of
knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world apart from thought,
that thinking on its own is empty and comes as an external form to the said
material, fills itself with it and only thus acquires a content and so becomes
real knowing.

Further, these two constituents � for they are supposed to be related to each
other as constituents, and cognition is compounded from them in a mechanical or
at best chemical fashion � are appraised as follows: the object is regarded as
something complete and finished on its own account, something which can entirely
dispense with thought for its actuality, while thought on the other hand is
regarded as defective because it has to complete itself with a material and
moreover, as a pliable indeterminate form, has to adapt itself to its material.
Truth is the agreement of thought with the object, and in order to bring about
this agreement � for it does not exist on its own account � thinking is supposed
to adapt and accommodate itself to the object.

Thirdly, when the difference of matter and form, of object and thought is not
left in that nebulous indeterminateness but is taken more definitely, then each
is regarded as a sphere divorced from the other. Thinking therefore in its
reception and formation of material does not go outside itself; its reception of
the material and the conforming of itself to it remains a modification of its
own self, it does not result in thought becoming the other of itself; and
self-conscious determining moreover belongs only to thinking. In its relation to
the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this,
as a thing-in-itself, remains a sheer beyond of thought.

These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the
determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal
consciousness; but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of
reason as if the same relation obtained there, as if this relation were
something true in its own self, then they are errors � the refutation of which
throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is philosophy, or
rather, as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be discarded at its
portals. (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p.44-45)

-------------------

Hegel suggests above that�

- Phenomenal Knowledge rests on the separation between the content of cognition
and its form.

- Phenomenal Knowledge assumes that the material of knowing is present on its
own account as a ready-made world apart from thought.

- The form and content of Phenomenal Knowledge are regarded as a spheres
divorced from the other.

- Phenomenal Knowledge assumes that thinking on its own is empty and comes as an
external form to the material that is present on its own account.

- Phenomenal Knowledge only becomes real knowing by acquiring a content.

-The cognition of Phenomenal Knowledge is the result of a mechanical combination
of this independent material and the form of cognition.

-The truth of Phenomenal Knowing is the agreement of its thinking with the
object.

So, with the above passage, combined with para. 77-82 in the PhG, and all the
Kant references that I have supplied, I don't understand how you can claim that
Hegel's use of "Phenomenal Knowledge" is obscure.


[Alan]

> You then go on to draw parallels between what Kant has to say about
> knowledge and what Hegel might [have] meant by phenomenal
> knowledge. I think the oppositions that concern Kant � between the
> understanding and sensation or even between the phenomenal and
> noumenal realms � do not easily map on to Hegel's more pedestrian
> designation of the opposition within consciousness.

What Hegel says in the paragraph above leaves no doubt about what the meaning of
Phenomenal Knowing is for Hegel.

And whether or not you think that Hegel's "designation of the opposition within
consciousness" maps on to "what Kant has to say about knowledge", does not
change the fact that Hegel invokes Kant whenever he uses the term "Phenomenal
Knowledge".

In corroboration with this connection between the meaning of "Phenomenal
Knowledge" and Kant, Hegel just one paragraph after explicitly defining
"phenomenal consciousness" in the above paragraph above, again invokes Kant.

See textual proof below:

----------------
[Hegel] The General Notion of Logic
-------------

"But reflective understanding took possession of philosophy. We must know
exactly what is meant by this expression which moreover is often used as a
slogan; in general it stands for the understanding as abstracting, and hence as
separating and remaining fixed in its separations. Directed against reason, it
behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on
sensuous reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it is sense
perception which first gives them filling and reality and that reason left to
its own resources engenders only figments of the brain. In this
self-renunciation on the part of reason, the Notion of truth is lost; it is
limited to knowing only subjective truth, only phenomena, appearances, only
something to which the nature of the object itself does not correspond: knowing
has lapsed into opinion."(Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 45)
-------------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- The knowing that remains fixed in its separations (i.e. the separation between
form and content), invariably imposes the view that the truth rests on sensuous
reality, and that "thought" left to its own resources engenders only figments of
the brain.

-  This knowing that remains fixed in its separations renounces truth and
settles for a knowing that is only subject truth, the knowing of "phenomena".

Okay so now back to the business of replying to your previous post. I may not be
able to respond today, but for sure by tomorrow.

Randall

Hi Alan,

Thanks for your response, I should finish my thoughts on your previous post
today. But I have a few questions about your position that I need you to clarify
for me.


> If we just limit ourselves to the understanding/sensation distinction
> we must heed Kant's warning that sensations without concepts are
> blind and concepts without sensations are empty.

I don't understand what you mean by "limit ourselves to the
understanding/sensation distinction".

For example, what happens when we don't limit ourselves to "the
understanding/sensation distinction"?

And does this mean that you think thay Hegel maintains the distinction?


> On my view, the principle/instance distinction employed by Hegel
> follows after the Kantian a priori synthesis of the understanding
> with sensation. Both principles and instances are synthesized
> intelligible items for Hegel.

I don't understand this.  Please re-formulate this part of your argument.

Thanks,

Randall

Hi Alan,

Thanks for your response, I should finish my thoughts on your previous post
today. But I have a few questions about your position that I need you to clarify
for me.


> If we just limit ourselves to the understanding/sensation distinction
> we must heed Kant's warning that sensations without concepts are
> blind and concepts without sensations are empty.

I don't understand what you mean by "limit ourselves to the
understanding/sensation distinction".

For example, what happens when we don't limit ourselves to "the
understanding/sensation distinction"?

And does this mean that you think thay Hegel maintains the distinction?


> On my view, the principle/instance distinction employed by Hegel
> follows after the Kantian a priori synthesis of the understanding
> with sensation. Both principles and instances are synthesized
> intelligible items for Hegel.

I don't understand this.  Please re-formulate this part of your argument.

Thanks,

Randall

Hi Randall,



I almost hesitate to respond to these comments since as you say they are
only meant to serve as a foundation for what you promise will be a more
direct response to my previous posting. But I would like to make a few
observations that I hope will not deflect you from your task.



First, there is a long and curious build up in paragraph 76 which culminates
in the claim that �It is for this reason that an exposition of how knowledge
makes its appearance will here be undertaken.� I would suggest that the
�reason� offered is strange and not on the face of it very convincing. The
fact that science because it makes an appearance is thus no better than any
other appearance is a strange claim to make. If science has something
important to say and says it in a convincing manner then why should it have
to apologize for making an appearance or take the appearance of what it has
to say as a defect? How has the appearance of truth become a defect of this
truth? Hegel does not take the trouble to enlighten us here. But given this
newly discovered problem it is not at all clear as to why this should lead
us to undertake an exposition of how knowledge appears. Moreover, this
formal problem � the how of appearance � seems effortlessly to transform
itself into a problem pertaining to content � the what of appearance � when
Hegel begins paragraph 77 with the observation that phenomenal knowledge is
to be our object. At this point, a careful reader would be within his rights
if he were to ask Hegel what in the world he is talking about. So, to say as
you do that one obscure notion � natural consciousness � is to explain
another obscure notion � phenomenal knowledge � does not help much. Now,
clearly Hegel will in a few paragraphs turn to a discussion of what he means
by these notions. But everything he has to say in 77 � 80 about what is
about to take place is offered in light of this obscurity. I imagine some
might see these comments as a mere quibble. So what if Hegel goes off on
enthusiastic ungrounded ramblings in 77 � 80. He eventually gets down to the
hard business of saying what he means. But does he really? I tend to read
the text as thoroughly ironic. He never is direct even when he seems to mean
to be. But the only way to show this is with a patient reading.



You then go on to draw parallels between what Kant has to say about
knowledge and what Hegel might meant by phenomenal knowledge. I think the
oppositions that concern Kant � between the understanding and sensation or
even between the phenomenal and noumenal realms � do not easily map on to
Hegel�s more pedestrian designation of the opposition within consciousness.
If we just limit ourselves to the understanding/sensation distinction we
must heed Kant�s warning that sensations without concepts are blind and
concepts without sensations are empty. On my view, the principle/instance
distinction employed by Hegel follows after the Kantian a priori synthesis
of the understanding with sensation. Both principles and instances are
synthesized intelligible items for Hegel. Thus I cannot agree with your
suggestion that the principles employed by natural consciousness can be
understood as analogous to Kant�s empty forms. They are abstract to be sure,
but not entirely untethered from determinate existence. They have content, a
content that is lacking in Kant�s forms. You also list some of the features
of Kant�s project and wish to relate them to what Hegel has to say about
phenomenal knowledge. The most troubling suggestion you make on my view is
that Kant�s thing in itself might map on to one of the distinctions draw by
Hegel when he speaks about the method of his inquiry. But you are not
explicit here so I will wait to see what more you might have to say about
this.



You seem to note in passing Hegel�s distinction between a subjective and an
absolute idealism. I think it is an important distinction. I would be
curious as to what you think it means given that you bring it up.



The general trajectory of your quotes about Hegel�s concept and Kant�s unity
of apperception seems to be first to show the similarity and then to
emphasize how they are radically distinct. I do agree that it would be
useful to show how concepts relate to the concept. There is enough in the
material you quote to suggest that they are animals of a different sort. I
get the sense that you want to locate the concept as Kant locates the unity
of apperception as the original act that grounds knowledge. I don�t want to
put words into your mouth, but if this is the direction you are heading then
it would seem to me that you would be taking Hegel to be offering a
subjective rather absolute idealism.



Regards, Alan







From: hegel@yahoogroups.com [mailto:hegel@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
TheJack
Sent: Friday, December 04, 2009 1:07 PM
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [hegel] Primer on the meaning of Phenomenal Knowledge, The Notion,
and notions





Hello Alan, hello Hegel List,

Thanks for the compliment Alan. Putting your ideas on the line is not what I
call "fooling" around. So, no you're not wasting anyone's time.

But debating you does require a lot of work. To answer your most recent post
requires providing a primer on what the term "Phenomenal Knowing" means for
Hegel, and also on what the term "notions" and "the Notion" mean.

[Alan]

> We should begin by noting that natural consciousness is employed
> here by Hegel before its sense is stipulated. The reader at this
> point has no proper idea of what natural consciousness might be for >
Hegel.

If we look at para. 77 (i.e. the paragraph directly before 78), we learn two
very specific things concerning "what natural consciousness might be for
Hegel":

---------------
[Hegel]
----------------

"77. Now, because it has only phenomenal knowledge for its object, this
exposition seems not to be Science, free and self-moving in its own peculiar
shape; yet from this standpoint it can be regarded as the path of the
natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge; or as the way
of the Soul which journeys through the series of its own configurations as
though they were the stations appointed for it by its own nature, so that it
may purify itself for the life of the Spirit, and achieve finally, through a
completed experience of itself, the awareness of what it really is in
itself." (Hegel, PhG, trans Miller p. 49)
------------------

Above Hegel suggests�

- Firstly, that natural consciousness is "phenomenal knowledge".

[and]

- Secondly, we learn that "natural consciousness" takes different
forms.

As the next few pages unfold, Hegel will use the following terms
interchangeably: "Natural Consciousness", "phenomenal knowledge",
"phenomenal consciousness" and "consciousness".

So, to understand "what natural consciousness might be for Hegel", we should
just look at the most concrete association that Hegel gives us, i.e.
"PHENOMENAL KNOWLEDGE".

Consistent with the prior paragraphs, Hegel is again alluding to Kant when
he invokes the term.

---------------
[Hegel] The Critical Philosophy
--------------

"The view that the objects of immediate consciousness, which constitute the
body of experience, are mere appearances (phenomena) was another important
result of the Kantian philosophy. Common Sense, that mixture of sense and
understanding, believes the objects of which it has knowledge to be
severally independent and self-supporting; and when it becomes evident that
they tend towards and limit one another, the interdependence of one upon
another is reckoned something foreign to them and to their true nature. The
very opposite is the truth. The things immediately known are mere
appearances � in other words, the ground of their being is not in themselves
but in something else. But then comes the important step of defining what
this something else is. According to Kant, the things that we know about are
to us appearances only, and we can never know their essential nature, which
belongs to another world we cannot approach.Plain minds have not
unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its reduction
of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created by
ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is rather as follows.
The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for
us only, but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these
things, finite as they are, is to have their existence founded not in
themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This view of things, it is
true, is as idealist as Kant's; but in contradistinction to the subjective
idealism of the Critical philosophy should be termed absolute
idealism."(Hegel, EL trans. Wallace p. 73)

---------------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- According to Kant, the objects of immediate consciousness are mere
"phenomena"

- Phenomena [according to Hegel's definition] have the ground of their
being, not in themselves but in something else.

- For Kant, the ground of Phenomena was in the categories. But for Kant the
categories were merely subjective, and thus experience was reduced to mere
subjective idealism.

- For Hegel, things that we are directly conscious of are indeed
"phenomena", but they are not grounded in a mere subjective Idealism, but
instead an Absolute Idealism.


Today's reader of Hegel may not know Kant well enough to make the automatic
assumptions that go along with the term "phenomenal knowledge", but the
assumptions basically coincide with the presuppositions that I outlined in
my first response :

[Randall]

> >1) Consciousness embraces within itself the opposition of the ego
> > and its object
> >
> >2) The ego refers to objects through antecedently given rules that
> > supply the criterion for true knowledge.
>
>>3) Objects on their side are considered to be present on their own
> > account independent from the ego (and it's a priori constructs)

Because of the opposition inherent in it (see #1 above), "Phenomenal
Knowledge" can never truly comprehend its object. Instead, Phenomenal
Knowing can be only a knowledge of appearances.

The opposition inherent in "Phenomenal Knowing" is a result of:

- Firstly, the given and merely formal way in which the foundational forms
of its knowing are constituted (i.e. the antecedently given forms are
considered empty without sensory content)

---------
[note]
--------

[1] Kant called these formal foundational principles of knowing the
categories, and he located them exclusively in the subjective ego.

[2] In Hegel's language, these foundational forms of its knowing are
Phenomenal Knowledge's "Notion" of itself (see para 80 in the Introduction
to the PhG).

-------------

- Secondly, the opposition inherent in "Phenomenal Knowing" is a result of
the assumption that the object (i.e. the in-itself) exists on its own
account independent of knowing.

Now, whenever Hegel mentions Kant, he always outlines the above mentioned
presuppositions: (1) the opposition inherent in phenomenal knowledge, (2)
the notions that refer a priori to objects and (3) the residual
"thing-in-itself".

Look below for textual proof:

--------------
[Hegel] General Division of Logic
-------------

"Recently Kant has opposed to what has usually been called logic another,
namely, a transcendental logic. What has here been called objective logic
would correspond in part to what with him is transcendental logic. He
distinguishes it from what he calls general logic in this way, [a] that it
treats of the notions which refer a priori to objects, and consequently does
not abstract from the whole content of objective cognition, or, in other
words, it contains the rules of the pure thinking of an object, and [b] at
the same time it treats of the origin of our cognition so far as this
cognition cannot be ascribed to the objects. It is to this second aspect
that Kant's philosophical interest is exclusively directed. His chief
thought is to vindicate the categories for self-consciousness as the
subjective ego. By virtue of this determination and its opposition; and
besides the empirical element of feeling and intuition it has something else
left over which is not posited and determined by thinking
self-consciousness, a thing-in-itself, something alien and external to
thought � although it is easy to perceive that such an abstraction as the
thing-in-itself is itself only a product of thought, and of merely
abstractive thought at that.

If other disciples of Kant have expressed themselves concerning the
determining of the object by the ego in this way, that the objectifying of
the ego is to be regarded as an original and necessary act of consciousness,
so that in this original act there is not yet the idea of the ego itself �
which would be a consciousness of that consciousness or even an objectifying
of it � then this objectifying act, in its freedom from the opposition of
consciousness, is nearer to what may be taken simply for thought as such.
But this act should no longer be called consciousness; consciousness
embraces within itself the opposition of the ego and its object which is not
present in that original act." (Hegel SL, trans. Miller p. 61-62)
--------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- Kant's transcendental logic treats of the notions which refer a priori to
objects

-These notions which refer a priori to objects contain the rules of the pure
thinking of an object

-Kant's transcendental logic treats of the origin of our cognition in so far
as this cognition cannot be ascribed to the objects.

-Kant locates these notions which refer a priori to objects in the
subjective ego.

-Transcendental logic also has something left over that is not determined by
these a priori rules, the residual "thing-in-itself".

Ok, if we were to stop here, I think we could agree that in the paragraph
cited above, Hegel has simply articulated the three presuppositions that I
had outlined before concerning "phenomenal knowledge".

And as we take pause here, we should emphasize the specific terminology that
Hegel uses in the above paragraph:

"the notions which refer a priori to objects"

This terminology, especially Hegel's reference to "notions" in this context,
should help us in our reading of the paragraphs in question in the
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit (viz. para 77-82).

However, before we move on, the above cited paragraph has something
additional to teach us about Phenomenal Knowing and "the Notion":

In the above paragraph Hegel suggests that�

- there is an "original act" that first constitutes the ego itself.

- this original act is prior to the opposition inherent in phenomenal
consciousness.

- this original act that constitutes the ego is not yet consciousness but
"Thought as such" (i.e. The Notion).

Related to the above reference to "the Notion", in the SL section entitled
`The Notion in General', Hegel will laud Kant for providing the insight that
in order for consciousness to have knowledge of objects at all, it must
first be in a self-relation (i.e. self-consciousness) to the rules in which
it uses to take up the object.

This self-relation (or original unity with itself) is the original synthetic
act of consciousness that first "objectifies" the ego.

See below for textual proof:

--------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
--------------

"It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the
Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes the nature of the
Notion is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as
unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness. This proposition constitutes
the so-called transcendental deduction of the categories�" (Hegel, SL trans.
Miller 584)

------------

Hegel suggests above that�

-the unity recognized by Kant as the original synthetic unity of
apperception, is the unity of self-consciousness (i.e. "the Notion"); the
unity that first constitutes the ego.

-the origin of the term "the Notion" [in Hegel's sense of the term] then, is
Kant's original synthetic unity of apperception.
See below there for more textual proof:

-------------
[Hegel] The Critical Philosophy
-------------

"Cognition qua cognition. The specific ground of the categories is declared
by the Critical system to lie in the primary identity of the `I' in thought
what Kant calls the `transcendental unity of self-consciousness'. The
impressions from feeling and perception are, if we look to their contents, a
multiplicity or miscellany of elements: and the multiplicity is equally
conspicuous in their form. For sense is marked by a mutual exclusion of
members; and that under two aspects, namely space and time, which, being the
forms, that is to say, the universal type of perception, are themselves a
priori. This congeries, afforded by sensation and perception, must however
be reduced to an identity or primary synthesis. To accomplish this the `I'
brings it in relation to itself and unites it there in one consciousness
which Kant calls `pure apperception'. The specific modes in which the Ego
refers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure concepts of the
understanding, the Categories.
Kant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in discovering
the categories. `I', the unity of self-consciousness, being quite abstract
and completely indeterminate, the question arises, how are we to get at the
specialised forms of the `I', the categories? Fortunately, the common logic
offers to our hand an empirical classification of the kinds of judgment.
Now, to judge is the same as to think of a determinate object. Hence the
various modes of judgment, as enumerated to our hand, provide us with the
several categories of thought. To the philosophy of Fichte belongs the great
merit of having called attention to the need of exhibiting the necessity of
these categories and giving a genuine deduction of them."(Hegel, EL, trans.
Wallace p. 68-69)

------------------

Above Hegel suggest that...

- The ground of the categories is the `transcendental unity of
self-consciousness', which is the primary identity of the `I' in thought.

-For knowledge to have an object, given sensory data must first be brought
to a primary synthesis in the unity of the ego (i.e. pure apperception or
"the Notion").

-The different modes in which the given sensory data is brought to a
synthesis are called the categories.

-Yet Kant did not put forth much effort in discovering the categories,
instead he dogmatically accepted them from traditional logic.

See below for more textual proof:

---------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
--------------

"An object, says Kant, is that in the notion of which the manifold of a
given intuition is unified. But all unifying of representations demands a
unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is this
unity of consciousness which alone constitutes the connection of the
representations with the object and therewith their objective validity and
on which rests even the possibility of the understanding. � Through the
categories which are � [the] objective determinations, the manifold of given
representations is so determined as to be brought into the unity of
consciousness. According to this exposition, the unity of the notion is that
whereby something is not a mere mode of feeling, an intuition, or even a
mere representation, but is an object, and this objective unity is the unity
of the ego with itself. In point of fact, the comprehension of an object
consists in nothing else than that the ego makes it its own, pervades it and
brings it into its own form, that is, into the universality that is
immediately a determinateness, or a determinateness that is immediately
universality." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 584-585)

--------------

Hegel suggests above that�

-For knowledge to have an object, the manifold of given sensory data must be
brought to a synthesis, where that same sensory manifold is unified through
(or determined by) given categories.

-This synthesis between given sensory data and the categories, first
originates in the unity of the ego with itself (i.e. the unity of the
Notion, or pure self-consciousness)

-the term "the Notion" is again identified with the original unity of the
ego with itself (i.e. the unity of self-consciousness, or pure apperception)

See below for more textual proof:

----------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
----------------

"The object therefore has its objectivity in the Notion and this is the
unity of self-consciousness into which it has been received; consequently
its objectivity, or the Notion, is itself none other than the nature of
self-consciousness, has no other moments or determinations than the I
itself.
Thus we are justified by a cardinal principle of the Kantian philosophy in
referring to the nature of the I in order to learn what the Notion is. "
(Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 585)

-----------------
Hegel suggests above that�

- The term "the Notion" is again identified with unity of self-consciousness
(i.e. the original synthesis of apperception, or the unity of the ego with
itself).

See below for more textual proof:

-------------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
------------------

"Kant has introduced this consideration by the extremely important thought
that there are synthetic judgments a priori. This original synthesis of
apperception is one of the most profound principles for speculative
development; it contains the beginning of a true apprehension of the nature
of the Notion and is completely opposed to that empty identity or abstract
universality which is not within itself a synthesis. The further
development, however, does not fulfil the promise of the beginning. The very
expression synthesis easily recalls the conception of an external unity and
a mere combination of entities that are intrinsically separate. Then, again,
the Kantian philosophy has not got beyond the psychological reflex of the
Notion and has reverted once more to the assertion that the Notion is
permanently conditioned by a manifold of intuition. It has declared
intellectual cognition and experience to be a phenomenal content, not
because the categories themselves are only finite but, on the ground of a
psychological idealism, because they are merely determinations originating
in self-consciousness. It is in keeping with this standpoint, too, that the
Notion without the manifold of intuition is again declared to be empty and
devoid of content despite the fact that it is a synthesis a priori; as such,
it surely does contain determinateness and difference within itself.
Moreover, since the determinateness is that of the Notion and therefore
absolute determinateness, individuality, the Notion is the ground and source
of all finite determinateness and manifoldness."

-----------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- To grasp the term "The Notion" [in the sense that he intended it], we must
identify it with Kant's insight that there are synthetic judgments a priori.

- Yet we must also recognize that Kant's synthesis never fulfilled its
promise, because Kant understood this original synthesis as merely a
combination of entities that were intrinsically separate (i.e. the
combination of the categories and the sensory manifold).

-Because Kant's original synthesis was only a combination of intrinsically
separate entities, cognition could only result in phenomenal content.

------------------------------

Okay, the textual proof that I have provided above is all an effort by me to
inform "the reader" [of para. 77 in the Introduction] of the assumptions
that go along with the term "Phenomenal Knowledge".

I have also provided the "the reader" with a basic understanding of what the
terms "Notions" and "the Notion" mean for Hegel.

To summarize:

- "Notions" are the antecedently given rules or principles in which
Phenomenal knowledge uses to determine its object.

- "The Notion" is the original self-relation that constitutes the unity of
the ego itself.

What remains is for me to provide some insight on the relationship between
"Notions" and "the Notion".

See below for textual proof:

-------------------
[Hegel] SL Preface to the second edition
-------------------

"The inadequacy of this way of regarding thought which leaves truth on one
side can only be made good by including in our conception of thought not
only that which is usually reckoned as belonging to the external form but
the content as well. It is soon evident that what at first to ordinary
reflection is, as content, divorced from form, cannot in fact be formless,
cannot be devoid of inner determination; if it were, then it would be only
vacuity, the abstraction of the thing-in-itself; that, on the contrary, the
content in its own self possesses form, in fact it is through form alone
that it has soul and meaning, and that it is form itself which is
transformed only into the semblance of a content, hence into the semblance
of something external to this semblance. With this introduction of the
content into the logical treatment, the subject matter is not things but
their import, the Notion of them. But in this connection we can be reminded
that there is a multitude of Notions, a multitude of objects [Sache]. We
have, however, already said how it is that restrictions are imposed on this
multitude, that the Notion, simply as thought, as a universal, is the
immeasurable abbreviation of the multitudes of particular things which are
vaguely present to intuition and pictorial thought; but also a Notion is,
first, in its own self the Notion, and this is only one and is the
substantial foundation; secondly, a Notion is determinate and it is this
determinateness in it which appears as content: but the determinateness of
the Notion is a specific form of this substantial oneness, a moment of the
form as totality, of that same Notion which is the foundation of the
specific Notions.

This Notion is not sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an
object, a product and content of thinking, and is the absolute,
self-subsistent object, the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of
what we call things; it is least of all the logos which should be left
outside of the science of logic.
Therefore its inclusion in or omission from this science must not be simply
a matter of choice. When those determinations of thought which are only
external forms are truly considered in themselves, this can only result in
demonstrating their finitude and the untruth of their supposed independent
self-subsistence, that their truth is the Notion.." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller
p. 39)

-----------------------

Hegel suggests above that �

- Thought cannot be considered a mere external FORM divorced from CONTENT.

-determinations of thought which are only external forms will result in
these forms demonstrating their own finitude and the untruth of their
supposed independent self-subsistence.

-The truth of these mere external forms is "the Notion"

- "the Notion", simply as thought, as a universal, is the immeasurable
abbreviation of the multitudes of particular things and "notions".

- "a notion" is, first, in its own self "the Notion", and this is only one
and is the substantial foundation (i.e. the ground of " a notion" is in "the
Notion")

- "a notion" is determinate and it is this determinateness in it which
appears as content, but "notions" in their truth are specific forms of the
substantial oneness of "the Notion".

-"The Notion" cannot be sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an
object, a product and content of thinking ("the original act"), and is the
absolute, self-subsistent object, the logos, the reason of that which is,
the truth of what we call things.

Alright this concludes the "primer", now I will move on to the actual
response to the rest of Alan's post.

Randall





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
>
>
>  John,
>
> The anthropic principle, as you summarize it, is as uncontroversial as you
say, but that, sadly, is NOT how not it has been exploited. I, in fact, had not
brought the matter up. Now, why do you suppose it HAD been? If you review the
debate, you will see that  the inference was that something quite like God
'out-stands' (prior to, in addition to, etc.) the universe such that we can
recline in our shorts in comfort and not care about the demise of fermions after
the "big stretch".
>
> Although this may have missed your attention, the anthropic principle has been
misused as a Deus Ex Machina invocation for god. See Weinberg on this.
>
> It is quite a kick in the wood that I am being asked to leave God out of it,
when my whole purpose was to ask that God be left out of it! You should read the
posts before making accusations. -- Unless  by "leaving God out of it" you mean
'leaving others' God talk unchallenged'. If the latter is the case, as you say,
"well ...".
>
> Yours,
> Wil
>


Dea Wil,

I was sort of joking with that "leave God out of it" business.

The problem with physics is that it is all in math. The reason this is a problem
is that, while in spite of the difficulties, it is possible to translate ideas
from one language to another, it really isn't possible to translate ideas
expressed in advanced math in language.

This leads to the so-called "two cultures". Really, physicists aren't able to
communicate their ideas to people who aren't fluent in math even if they want
to.

But an even worse problem is that physicists end up, basically, having two
minds--their language mind or every day mind, on the one hand, and their math
mind, on the other.

But a person's "I" is in his everyday mind. The math mind is completely
impersonal.

So, although the ideas of physics are very real, and although the physicists are
really thinking them, they can't personnally "understand" them any better than
anyone else. To "understand" them, they would have to translate them into
language.

There's the same sort of thing in music. Obviously musical ideas can't be
translated into language.

But, anyway, this is one of the reasons I got out of physics. What's the point
in thinking ideas that you can't understand?

And, unlike the ideas of music, we really do feel the need to understand the
ideas of physics. And this is, I think, a function that philosophy should
fulfill, in so far as it is possible.

I believe Hegel's SL is a good step in the right direction. There you have a
large number of rigorously related concepts. Considering the rigorous training
over many years that physicists and mathematicians go through, how would it be
possible to even begin to understand these ideas without going through an
equally rigorous process?

But the philosophy of nature is especially important. I think it is really
unfortunate that the philosophy of nature has been pretty much banned from
philosophy since the 1950s. If you go to a book-store with a large philosophy
section, there are probably only three books you'll be able to find that adress
this issue: Bergson, Teilhard and Whitehead. And none of these three can be
considered "reactionary", since they all three wrote before the ban went into
effect.

But, anyway, for me personally, this is a major problem that philosophy is
seriously neglecting.

John

Hello Alan, hello Hegel List,

Thanks for the compliment Alan. Putting your ideas on the line is not what I
call "fooling" around. So, no you're not wasting anyone's time.

But debating you does require a lot of work. To answer your most recent post
requires providing a primer on what the term "Phenomenal Knowing" means for
Hegel, and also on what the term "notions" and "the Notion" mean.

[Alan]

> We should begin by noting that natural consciousness is employed
> here by Hegel before its sense is stipulated. The reader at this
> point has no proper idea of what natural consciousness might be for > Hegel.

If we look at para. 77 (i.e. the paragraph directly before 78), we learn two
very specific things concerning "what natural consciousness might be for Hegel":

---------------
[Hegel]
----------------

"77. Now, because it has only phenomenal knowledge for its object, this
exposition seems not to be Science, free and self-moving in its own peculiar
shape; yet from this standpoint it can be regarded as the path of the natural
consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge; or as the way of the Soul
which journeys through the series of its own configurations as though they were
the stations appointed for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself
for the life of the Spirit, and achieve finally, through a completed experience
of itself, the awareness of what it really is in itself." (Hegel, PhG, trans
Miller p. 49)
------------------

Above Hegel suggests�

- Firstly, that natural consciousness is "phenomenal knowledge".

                    [and]

- Secondly, we learn that "natural consciousness" takes different
   forms.

As the next few pages unfold, Hegel will use the following terms
interchangeably: "Natural Consciousness", "phenomenal knowledge", "phenomenal
consciousness" and "consciousness".

So, to understand "what natural consciousness might be for Hegel", we should
just look at the most concrete association that Hegel gives us, i.e. "PHENOMENAL
KNOWLEDGE".

Consistent with the prior paragraphs, Hegel is again alluding to Kant when he
invokes the term.

---------------
[Hegel] The Critical Philosophy
--------------

"The view that the objects of immediate consciousness, which constitute the body
of experience, are mere appearances (phenomena) was another important result of
the Kantian philosophy. Common Sense, that mixture of sense and understanding,
believes the objects of which it has knowledge to be severally independent and
self-supporting; and when it becomes evident that they tend towards and limit
one another, the interdependence of one upon another is reckoned something
foreign to them and to their true nature. The very opposite is the truth. The
things immediately known are mere appearances � in other words, the ground of
their being is not in themselves but in something else. But then comes the
important step of defining what this something else is. According to Kant, the
things that we know about are to us appearances only, and we can never know
their essential nature, which belongs to another world we cannot approach.Plain
minds have not unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with
its reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created
by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is rather as follows. The
things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for us
only, but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these things,
finite as they are, is to have their existence founded not in themselves but in
the universal divine Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as
Kant's; but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical
philosophy should be termed absolute idealism."(Hegel, EL trans. Wallace p. 73)

---------------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- According to Kant, the objects of immediate consciousness are mere "phenomena"

- Phenomena [according to Hegel's definition] have the ground of their being,
not in themselves but in something else.

- For Kant, the ground of Phenomena was in the categories. But for Kant the
categories were merely subjective, and thus experience was reduced to mere
subjective idealism.

- For Hegel, things that we are directly conscious of are indeed "phenomena",
but they are not grounded in a mere subjective Idealism, but instead an Absolute
Idealism.


Today's reader of Hegel may not know Kant well enough to make the automatic
assumptions that go along with the term "phenomenal knowledge", but the
assumptions basically coincide with the presuppositions that I outlined in my
first response :

[Randall]

> >1) Consciousness embraces within itself the opposition of the ego
> >    and its object
> >
> >2) The ego refers to objects through antecedently given rules that
> >     supply the criterion for true knowledge.
>
>>3) Objects on their side are considered to be present on their own
> >   account independent from the ego (and it's a priori constructs)

Because of the opposition inherent in it (see #1 above), "Phenomenal Knowledge"
can never truly comprehend its object. Instead, Phenomenal Knowing can be only a
knowledge of appearances.

The  opposition inherent in "Phenomenal Knowing" is a result of:

- Firstly, the given and merely formal way in which the foundational forms of
its knowing are constituted (i.e. the antecedently given forms are considered
empty without sensory content)

---------
[note]
--------

[1] Kant called these formal foundational principles of knowing the categories,
and he located them  exclusively in the subjective ego.

  [2] In Hegel's language, these foundational forms of its knowing are Phenomenal
Knowledge's "Notion" of itself (see para 80 in the Introduction to the PhG).

  -------------

- Secondly, the opposition inherent in "Phenomenal Knowing" is a result of the
assumption that the object (i.e. the in-itself) exists on its own account
independent of knowing.

Now, whenever Hegel mentions Kant, he always outlines the above mentioned
presuppositions: (1) the opposition inherent in phenomenal knowledge, (2) the
notions that refer a priori to objects and (3) the residual "thing-in-itself".

Look below for textual proof:

--------------
[Hegel] General Division of Logic
-------------

"Recently Kant has opposed to what has usually been called logic another,
namely, a transcendental logic. What has here been called objective logic would
correspond in part to what with him is transcendental logic. He distinguishes it
from what he calls general logic in this way, [a] that it treats of the notions
which refer a priori to objects, and consequently does not abstract from the
whole content of objective cognition, or, in other words, it contains the rules
of the pure thinking of an object, and [b] at the same time it treats of the
origin of our cognition so far as this cognition cannot be ascribed to the
objects. It is to this second aspect that Kant's philosophical interest is
exclusively directed. His chief thought is to vindicate the categories for
self-consciousness as the subjective ego. By virtue of this determination and
its opposition; and besides the empirical element of feeling and intuition it
has something else left over which is not posited and determined by thinking
self-consciousness, a thing-in-itself, something alien and external to thought �
although it is easy to perceive that such an abstraction as the thing-in-itself
is itself only a product of thought, and of merely abstractive thought at that.

If other disciples of Kant have expressed themselves concerning the determining
of the object by the ego in this way, that the objectifying of the ego is to be
regarded as an original and necessary act of consciousness, so that in this
original act there is not yet the idea of the ego itself � which would be a
consciousness of that consciousness or even an objectifying of it � then this
objectifying act, in its freedom from the opposition of consciousness, is nearer
to what may be taken simply for thought as such. But this act should no longer
be called consciousness; consciousness embraces within itself the opposition of
the ego and its object which is not present in that original act." (Hegel SL,
trans. Miller p. 61-62)
--------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- Kant's transcendental logic treats of the notions which refer a priori to
objects

-These notions which refer a priori to objects contain the rules of the pure
thinking of an object

-Kant's transcendental logic treats of the origin of our cognition in so far as
this cognition cannot be ascribed to the objects.

-Kant locates these notions which refer a priori to objects in the subjective
ego.

-Transcendental logic also has something left over that is not determined by
these a priori rules, the residual "thing-in-itself".

Ok, if we were to stop here, I think we could agree that in the paragraph cited
above, Hegel has simply articulated the three presuppositions that I had
outlined before concerning "phenomenal knowledge".

And as we take pause here, we should emphasize the specific terminology that
Hegel uses in the above paragraph:

"the notions which refer a priori to objects"

This terminology, especially Hegel's reference to "notions" in this context,
should help us in our reading of the paragraphs in question in the Introduction
to the Phenomenology of Spirit (viz. para 77-82).

However, before we move on, the above cited paragraph has something additional
to teach us about Phenomenal Knowing and "the Notion":

In the above paragraph Hegel suggests that�

- there is an "original act" that first constitutes the ego itself.

- this original act is prior to the opposition inherent in phenomenal
consciousness.

- this original act that constitutes the ego is not yet consciousness but
"Thought as such" (i.e. The Notion).

Related to the above reference to "the Notion", in the SL section entitled `The
Notion in General', Hegel will laud Kant for providing the insight that in order
for consciousness to have knowledge of objects at all, it must first be in a
self-relation (i.e. self-consciousness) to the rules in which it uses to take up
the object.

This self-relation (or original unity with itself) is the original synthetic act
of consciousness that first "objectifies" the ego.

See below for textual proof:

--------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
--------------

"It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of
Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes the nature of the Notion is
recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the I
think, or of self-consciousness. This proposition constitutes the so-called
transcendental deduction of the categories�" (Hegel, SL trans. Miller 584)

------------

Hegel suggests above that�

-the unity recognized  by Kant as the original synthetic unity of apperception,
is  the unity of self-consciousness (i.e. "the Notion"); the unity that first
constitutes the ego.

-the origin of the term "the Notion" [in Hegel's sense of the term] then, is 
Kant's original synthetic unity of apperception.
See below there for more textual proof:

-------------
[Hegel] The Critical Philosophy
-------------

"Cognition qua cognition. The specific ground of the categories is declared by
the Critical system to lie in the primary identity of the `I' in thought what
Kant calls the `transcendental unity of self-consciousness'. The impressions
from feeling and perception are, if we look to their contents, a multiplicity or
miscellany of elements: and the multiplicity is equally conspicuous in their
form. For sense is marked by a mutual exclusion of members; and that under two
aspects, namely space and time, which, being the forms, that is to say, the
universal type of perception, are themselves a priori. This congeries, afforded
by sensation and perception, must however be reduced to an identity or primary
synthesis. To accomplish this the `I' brings it in relation to itself and unites
it there in one consciousness which Kant calls `pure apperception'. The specific
modes in which the Ego refers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure
concepts of the understanding, the Categories.
Kant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in discovering the
categories. `I', the unity of self-consciousness, being quite abstract and
completely indeterminate, the question arises, how are we to get at the
specialised forms of the `I', the categories? Fortunately, the common logic
offers to our hand an empirical classification of the kinds of judgment. Now, to
judge is the same as to think of a determinate object. Hence the various modes
of judgment, as enumerated to our hand, provide us with the several categories
of thought. To the philosophy of Fichte belongs the great merit of having called
attention to the need of exhibiting the necessity of these categories and giving
a genuine deduction of them."(Hegel, EL, trans. Wallace p. 68-69)

------------------

Above Hegel suggest that...

- The ground of the categories is the `transcendental unity of
self-consciousness', which is the primary identity of the `I' in thought.

-For knowledge to have an object, given sensory data must first be brought to a
primary synthesis in  the unity of the ego (i.e. pure apperception or "the
Notion").

-The different modes in which the given sensory data is brought to a synthesis
are called the categories.

-Yet Kant did not put forth much effort in discovering the categories, instead
he dogmatically accepted them from traditional logic.

See below for more textual proof:

---------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
--------------

"An object, says Kant, is that in the notion of which the manifold of a given
intuition is unified. But all unifying of representations demands a unity of
consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is this unity of
consciousness which alone constitutes the connection of the representations with
the object and therewith their objective validity and on which rests even the
possibility of the understanding. � Through the categories which are � [the]
objective determinations, the manifold of given representations is so determined
as to be brought into the unity of consciousness. According to this exposition,
the unity of the notion is that whereby something is not a mere mode of feeling,
an intuition, or even a mere representation, but is an object, and this
objective unity is the unity of the ego with itself. In point of fact, the
comprehension of an object consists in nothing else than that the ego makes it
its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form, that is, into the
universality that is immediately a determinateness, or a determinateness that is
immediately universality." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 584-585)

--------------

Hegel suggests above that�

-For knowledge to have an object, the manifold of given sensory data must be
brought to a synthesis, where that same sensory manifold is unified through (or
determined by) given categories.

-This synthesis between given sensory data and the categories, first originates
in the unity of the ego with itself (i.e. the unity of the Notion, or pure
self-consciousness)

-the term "the Notion" is again identified with the original unity of the ego
with itself (i.e. the unity of self-consciousness, or pure apperception)

See below for more textual proof:

----------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
----------------

"The object therefore has its objectivity in the Notion and this is the unity of
self-consciousness into which it has been received; consequently its
objectivity, or the Notion, is itself none other than the nature of
self-consciousness, has no other moments or determinations than the I itself.
Thus we are justified by a cardinal principle of the Kantian philosophy in
referring to the nature of the I in order to learn what the Notion is. " (Hegel,
SL trans. Miller p. 585)

-----------------
Hegel suggests above that�

- The term "the Notion" is again identified with unity of self-consciousness
(i.e. the original synthesis of apperception, or the unity of the ego with
itself).

See below for more textual proof:

-------------------
[Hegel] The Notion in General
------------------

"Kant has introduced this consideration by the extremely important thought that
there are synthetic judgments a priori. This original synthesis of apperception
is one of the most profound principles for speculative development; it contains
the beginning of a true apprehension of the nature of the Notion and is
completely opposed to that empty identity or abstract universality which is not
within itself a synthesis. The further development, however, does not fulfil the
promise of the beginning. The very expression synthesis easily recalls the
conception of an external unity and a mere combination of entities that are
intrinsically separate. Then, again, the Kantian philosophy has not got beyond
the psychological reflex of the Notion and has reverted once more to the
assertion that the Notion is permanently conditioned by a manifold of intuition.
It has declared intellectual cognition and experience to be a phenomenal
content, not because the categories themselves are only finite but, on the
ground of a psychological idealism, because they are merely determinations
originating in self-consciousness. It is in keeping with this standpoint, too,
that the Notion without the manifold of intuition is again declared to be empty
and devoid of content despite the fact that it is a synthesis a priori; as such,
it surely does contain determinateness and difference within itself. Moreover,
since the determinateness is that of the Notion and therefore absolute
determinateness, individuality, the Notion is the ground and source of all
finite determinateness and manifoldness."

-----------------

Above Hegel suggests that�

- To grasp the term "The Notion" [in the sense that he intended it], we must
identify it with Kant's insight that there are synthetic judgments a priori.

- Yet we must also recognize that Kant's synthesis never fulfilled its promise,
because Kant understood this original synthesis as merely a combination of
entities that were intrinsically separate (i.e. the combination of the
categories and the sensory manifold).

-Because Kant's original synthesis was only a combination of intrinsically
separate entities, cognition could only result in phenomenal content.

               ------------------------------

Okay, the textual proof that I have provided above is all an effort by me to
inform "the reader" [of para. 77 in the Introduction] of the assumptions that go
along with the term "Phenomenal Knowledge".

I have also provided the "the reader" with a basic understanding of what the
terms "Notions" and "the Notion"  mean for Hegel.

To summarize:

- "Notions" are the antecedently given rules or principles in which Phenomenal
knowledge uses to determine its object.

- "The Notion" is the original self-relation that constitutes the unity of the
ego itself.

What remains is for me to provide some insight on the relationship between
"Notions" and "the Notion".

See below for textual proof:

-------------------
[Hegel] SL Preface to the second edition
-------------------

"The inadequacy of this way of regarding thought which leaves truth on one side
can only be made good by including in our conception of thought not only that
which is usually reckoned as belonging to the external form but the content as
well. It is soon evident that what at first to ordinary reflection is, as
content, divorced from form, cannot in fact be formless, cannot be devoid of
inner determination; if it were, then it would be only vacuity, the abstraction
of the thing-in-itself; that, on the contrary, the content in its own self
possesses form, in fact it is through form alone that it has soul and meaning,
and that it is form itself which is transformed only into the semblance of a
content, hence into the semblance of something external to this semblance. With
this introduction of the content into the logical treatment, the subject matter
is not things but their import, the Notion of them. But in this connection we
can be reminded that there is a multitude of Notions, a multitude of objects
[Sache]. We have, however, already said how it is that restrictions are imposed
on this multitude, that the Notion, simply as thought, as a universal, is the
immeasurable abbreviation of the multitudes of particular things which are
vaguely present to intuition and pictorial thought; but also a Notion is, first,
in its own self the Notion, and this is only one and is the substantial
foundation; secondly, a Notion is determinate and it is this determinateness in
it which appears as content: but the determinateness of the Notion is a specific
form of this substantial oneness, a moment of the form as totality, of that same
Notion which is the foundation of the specific Notions.

This Notion is not sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an object, a
product and content of thinking, and is the absolute, self-subsistent object,
the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of what we call things; it is
least of all the logos which should be left outside of the science of logic.
Therefore its inclusion in or omission from this science must not be simply a
matter of choice. When those determinations of thought which are only external
forms are truly considered in themselves, this can only result in demonstrating
their finitude and the untruth of their supposed independent self-subsistence,
that their truth is the Notion.." (Hegel, SL trans. Miller p. 39)

-----------------------

Hegel suggests above that �

- Thought cannot be considered a mere external FORM divorced from CONTENT.

-determinations of thought which are only external forms will result in these
forms demonstrating their own finitude and the untruth of their supposed
independent self-subsistence.

-The truth of these mere external forms is "the Notion"

- "the Notion", simply as thought, as a universal, is the immeasurable
abbreviation of the multitudes of particular things and "notions".

- "a notion" is, first, in its own self "the Notion", and this is only one and
is the substantial foundation (i.e. the ground of " a notion" is in "the
Notion")

- "a notion" is determinate and it is this determinateness in it which appears
as content, but "notions"  in their truth are specific forms of the substantial
oneness of "the Notion".

-"The Notion"  cannot be sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an
object, a product and content of thinking ("the original act"), and is the
absolute, self-subsistent object, the logos, the reason of that which is, the
truth of what we call things.

Alright this concludes the "primer", now I will move on to the actual response
to the rest of Alan's post.

Randall

John,

The anthropic principle, as you summarize it, is as uncontroversial as you say,
but that, sadly, is NOT how not it has been exploited. I, in fact, had not
brought the matter up. Now, why do you suppose it HAD been? If you review the
debate, you will see that  the inference was that something quite like God
'out-stands' (prior to, in addition to, etc.) the universe such that we can
recline in our shorts in comfort and not care about the demise of fermions after
the "big stretch".

Although this may have missed your attention, the anthropic principle has been
misused as a Deus Ex Machina invocation for god. See Weinberg on this.

It is quite a kick in the wood that I am being asked to leave God out of it,
when my whole purpose was to ask that God be left out of it! You should read the
posts before making accusations. -- Unless  by "leaving God out of it" you mean
'leaving others' God talk unchallenged'. If the latter is the case, as you say,
"well ...".

Yours,
Wil





-----Original Message-----
From: john <jgbardis@...>
To: hegel@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Thu, Dec 3, 2009 2:33 pm
Subject: [hegel] Re: the end of the universe





Dear Wil,

My, aren't you the argumentative one!

I have my degree in physics and spent a year in graduate school before I finally
decided that I was more interested in other things. But, yes, really, it is all
almost impossible to understand. And, yes, there is a fair amount of speculation
to it. String theory is all speculation. There have been experiments to confirm
General realitivity--but in spite of those experiments the whole thing is very
speculative.

The anthropic principle is quite simple. It is just the general observation that
if all sorts of things weren't pretty close to just the way they are, then
things wouldn't work very well. One of my favorite examples is water. Water is a
really strange substance that makes life possible. One of its odd
characteristics is that as it gets colder it gets heavier--until it freezes,
then it gets lighter. If it didn't work that way then lakes would freeze under
istead of freezing over. Usually, of course, the anthropic principle is in
regard to the so-called constants of the universe. If they varied much then all
sorts of bad things would happen. This isn't a theory. Its just pretty much an
observation. But, certainly, taking note of this observation, or these many
observations, has nothing to do with "positing some divine escape". As I said
before, one explanation of all this is the theory about infinite universes. If
this doesn't make any sense to you, well....

That all these constants are set where they should be for human life to emerge
had to be purely by accident. If you even consider any other possibility, then
someone immediately becomes very rude with you. Why they, or, really, why you do
that, I don't know. It's as though there's a "no thinking allowed" sign that's
been posted.

But that any of this has much of anything to do with God--I just fail to
understand that. Why in the world did you bring Him into this to begin with? I
have the feeling that many people have no interest in science what-so-ever
except insofar as it might be used as a foundation for their atheism. If you had
any respect for science, you'd leave God out of it.

John

--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Sindarius" <eupraxis@...> wrote:
>
> John,
>
> You write: "I don't know how seriously we should take the cosmological
speculations of physics. For one thing, it is all pretty nearly impossible to
understand...".
>
> Response: Actually, it isn't hard to understand at all. There are a number of
good texts on the subject. I would also object to the term "speculations" above.
It isn't speculative at all, but is rather based on very good observations of
Type Ia supernovas, and from two independent sources.
> ---
> "... And then, secondly, there are some presuppositions. A big presupposition
is that everything in the universe had to come about by accident. If you
consider any other possibility, then you are immediately outside the bounds of
polite society."
>
> Response: You merely are positing some divine escape from the science. That is
your right. But no Hegelian, qua Hegelian, would accept that mode of argument,
if argument it is. Talk about presuppositions!
> ---
> "So, then, in regard to the so-called anthropic business, to explain that by
accident, they have recourse to infinite universes. Out of these many, many
universes some might be in the highly improbable state in which we find
ourselves--and, in fact, we couldn't possibly find ourselves in a more probable
universe where things like us can't exist."
>
> Response: I am not sure what you have written makes any sense. The so-called
and much abused "anthropic principle" (which is not a respected on this side of
the Atlantic, except as bad metaphysics) in any case has nothing to do with
multiple universes, and string theory and brane theory do not require an
anthropic principle.
> ---
> "... And yet, yes, you raise a serious question--the universe as a whole, for
Hegel, isn't finite, even if everything in it is. And, really, how could it come
to an end? If it reverts back (in terms of the Logic) to the category of
"nothing"... If it can do that, then, probably, it can just as well go in the
other direction--back to the Absolute. Who knows? Not me."
>
> Response: The finitude of the universe does not affect my reading of Hegel all
that much, but it should matter to a mystical one quite a lot. Additionally,
there is no "other direction" back to anything. And, in any case, the absolute
is not to be had by any retrograde motion or de-ontological status.
>
> Yours,
> Wil
>









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