For hegel-marx group


This is the last part of response to VF and for others.

What is the point in saying that Plato's Academy closed in [AD 87]? What
relevance does it have when compared to say, Aristotle's early grudge and later
polemic against his teacher Plato because Plato did not name him as his
successor and appointed Speusippus, with kinship ties with Plato as his
successor to the Academy. Hegel thought Plato's appointee was the `right man.
This episode imparted pathos, marking that as a feature of Aristotle's `soul'
the great "displeasure at being passed over�is said to have been the cause for
Aristotle leaving Athens after Plato' death." What Nietzsche would call the
`conceit' of philosophers?[ Laroux, P Thought takes Form, 1993, Antiquities;
Hegel, LHP 1,447]

Heraclitus is considered a thinker who revolutionized philosophy, the first and
only revolution by Hegel. It is not a matter of who was the first recorded or
known philosopher, it is not about places and names either and this can be seen
independent of the fascination that Hegel built about the Greek world. Hegel is
not given to making na�ve and irresponsible utterances. But whether this is
said in the right place and time may be disputed and seen as Hegel's `bad
faith', which is something Kierkegaard knew after getting a personal accounting
of Hegel from Schelling's lecture of 1844. This point is made primarily to
refute the strong, prevalent view that names Parmenides as the first philosopher
for articulating the `one that is, and that it cannot be ` as the way of
persuasion for `truth is its companion' and `the other, that it is not and need
not be', for you cannot know and speak of that which is not, it is impossible'
[cited by George Thompson, The First Philosophers]. The immutable and
self-identical Being of Parmenides based on the principle of non-contradiction
has been said. That one is being completely sundered from non-being and fixed
by understanding. Now, to make it clear, to Hegel, the issue of when and where
philosophy arises is accidental. This accidentality is in time and insofar as
its perception can be justified as progress in time. If philosophy is seen to
begin in a form that has its advance in the immanence of a form of thought then
that cannot be the form of fixed understanding. The `is' of understanding
remains fixed like a barrier for any advance or diachronic that has the
potential for evolution. The mode of philosophical cognition is speculative
whose form as universal is where diachrony actualizes by working out as method.
With Heraclitus, thinking takes on a speculative form while `the reasoning of
Parmenides and Zeno is abstract understanding' after which Hegel says something
that should have been said before, in Science of Logic or thereabouts instead of
Encyclopedia Logic, that `there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not
adopted in my Logic' [LHP 1, p.279] I find Hegel's presumptuousness in this
declaration. Further exaltation of Heraclitus, without any basis in his own
corpus follows as he `called Plato's teacher.' [LHP 1, p.294] So let us move
over to the issue at hand and Heraclitus not with any intent to test Hegel's
`bad faith'.

The protohistory of philosophy in archaic Greece has been explored from
different perspectives of philologists won over by P Bourdieu, linguistics
inspired E Cassirer's hypothesis that vocabulary may be more of a conceptual
system than lexicon, ethnology and anthropological views has been admirably put
together by the classicist, M Detienne. Detienne shows the adequacy of these
approaches for cultural constructs like the word for truth, Aletheia in a
landscape of nascent cities with its schemas and procedures for oracular
pronouncements passing through assemblies where decisions were taken to have
them engraved in stones in some unfixed place in cities. In these assemblies all
those who desired to speak the truth are called the `masters of truth' [M
Detienne, Return to the Mouth of Truth, Antiquity, v.111] like Hesiodic muses
and bee-women of Apollo. In political assemblies there were many whose decisions
are carved though the `philosophers' wasted no time in monopolizing this
terrain, not to much avail though. Matter get complex from Homeric verse to
Hesiodic `speech' while in Iliad the Muses are all knowing that makes the poet
see both the bards and daughters camps while in Hesiod, the speech is both the
first person and the third, both the poet and the prophet. Here the muses
reflect on the narrative subject and the order of discourse id logos in two
registers, one being the fiction and the other it's `true understanding'.
Apollo's bee-women will speak the truth [Aletheia] after eating honey but won't,
would speak falsely, if deprived. But Hesiod's muses do not feel the need for
ecstasy in the customary forms like ambrosia even, more down to earth. In
Theogny, Lethe is far from being a kind of awareness is as much a `divine power
as are words of deception. We get a mythico-religious aspects of memory [
Mnemosyne] and oblivion in their relation to blame and praise just as deception
is listed along with children of night along with sleep and death. The horizons
of meaning and knowledge expand and they have been found in recently discovered
papyrus, scroll's with commentaries on Orphic poems or testifying to Bacchic
ritual. A tablet, dated 500 BC has, beneath a shortened version of Dionysus the
word soul [psyche] associated with Aletheia. But the move of the trajectory
from `Hesiod to Parmenides', after a sensible critique of Heidegger's enclosed
concern with Aletheia ,seems to return the beginning of philosophic thought to
Parmenides under a simplistic logic of the contrast between a principle of
ambiguity [mythic] and principle diversity of configurations that include
Aletheia. Detienne's more advanced formulation comes in the end of the paper do
not settle matters on the `rise and fall of Aletheia' with which he started.

What Detienne says about the socio-cultural landscape in which certain notions
like logos, Aletheia, Lethe serves the purposed for showing the kind of
background horizon that Heraclitus was referring to. He was not really taking on
Parmenides but the trajectory of Aletheia from Homer, Hesiod and coming to
pre-philosophical polymaths, sectarians[ Homar, Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes,
Hecataeus and their associations `as though they had their own wisdom] who also
exercised their influence upon the polis. Heraclitus grew up in Ephesus a polis
on the margins of the Greek world but withdrew philosophy from the public that
had turned into the `mob, taking the crowd as their teacher, without any sense
and thought' [cited by Proclus, Commentaries]. He lived in marginality, ending
up as a misanthrope, a relative term. Mindful of the horizon and its trajectory
Heraclitus says `Being no more is than non-being'. This exposes the negativity
of abstract being and its identity with abstract non-being and Heraclitus says
both flow in the same, which make both the abstracts untenable. Considering
the build-up to the philosophy of being, what Heraclitus does is to dialecticize
being and non-being in becoming though it is not as prosaic as Hegel, who says,
`All is flowing' enunciates all existence as becoming. Similarly the separation
made by Hesiod's speech in the double registers that is only open to
understanding gets united in a concrete thought-term, the `same', meaning the
unity of opposites, e,g., day and night, darkness and light. This is the level
of sublating/ Aufheben-relations with all that the predecessor systems under the
sign of being that are held under the principle of identity and the principle of
non-contradiction. This makes Heraclitus as the first thinker who overthrew the
predecessor systems and modes of thought. That involved thinking enunciating
speculative dialectic that has unity of opposites [being and non-being] raised
to determinate beginning. Heraclitus specifically opposed hybrid thinking of
Pherecydes who deployed a formal tautology that cancels poles by making them
binaries like being and non-being but not able to raise it to the speculative
mode of becoming. The same drawback is pointed out when he makes time [zas] and
chthonic being the same and both are the first. As Hyppolytus makes clear, all
opposites are one not all things because of `unapparent connections'

Science of Logic draws its �lan vitale from Heraclitus, whose presence in almost
all `turning points' remains as obscure as Aristotle described his philosophy
the logos that is common to day and night � as day for it is nous that is
common, the most active. But `other men fail to notice what they do when they
are awake just as they forget what they do when they are asleep' Here the
lathe/alethia relation that figures with Homar, Hesiod and the
religio-mythological context has been made sharply distinct by the speculative
mode of thought.

Heraclitus committed his thought to writing. Here he seems to have taken the
wisdom from pre-Greek, mainly eastern Sibylline verses which, form what little
remains about them have a strong prophetic element. These are not like the Greek
oracles. The `soul' that is derived from these verses is not the divine eternal
one of Plato and the Greeks. It is as though space-time had impregnated the soul
to such an extent that it becomes difficult for the soul to distinguish from
thoughts. We get consciousness. Heraclitus says `I enquired into myself' since
`philosophical men must be versed in very many things' and `found the soul,
logos changing�'This is not the eternal soul but the that in becoming `for soul
it is death to become water, for water death is to become earth; but from earth
water comes into being, from water soul..' Here only Socrates is frankly baffled
when he comments that Heraclitus's soul is deeper that that plumbed by Dilean
divers.

regards
debussyyee





--- In hegel-marx@yahoogroups.com, "debabrata" <debub20@...> wrote:
>
>
> For hegel-marx group
>
> There main argument was not completed in the previous part since for that the
critical side must be presented.Here is the refutation of the view stated by
Victor Friedlander on the status of nature and Marx's critique of Hegel in
minimalistic terms.There remains the Heraclitan moment that I anyway wanted to
make though not in any polemical vein.I guess that should follow soon.
>
> # Eternity is child's play, playing draughts�
>
> # Time is the world-child�
> [attributed to Heraclitus]
>
> The neoplatonists did complete Plato's dialectic of self-movement,
auto-kinesis , but shared a major defect with Plato. Embarking on the most
daring project, the dialectic had firmly established the concept as the capacity
to account for all knowledge and as before, similarly after that return back
upon itself as an unrestricted universal, without any distinction between the
internal and external mode, like the end recoiling with the beginning. The
return back to its simple unity, the concept would indwell in the soul. This is
also the indwelling divinity, the self-moving soul even in its neoplatonic
accounting retains the self-same universal as eternal motion. Time is absent
from soul. Nature and concept come together by the self-knowing reason to remain
eternally active in a geocentric cosmos. Aristotle says that speculation
[theoria] is the most enjoyable since God is always in the enjoyable state. But
`God has life. For the activity of thought [energeia] is life. But God is
activity; activity directed to itself is the..eternal life. We say that God is
an eternal life�So God acquires life and permanent, eternal existence."[
Metaphysics, Bk 12.7, Hegel's translation; Hegel translates nous variously as
Gedanke [thought], Denken [thinking], denkende Vernuft [thinking reason],
reproduced version by Nicolin and Poggeler, Werke, v 14, Berlin 1833]In the
closed circle, in the closed system human time is amiss. Marx sensed the
breakdown of the Greek intellectual world, long before Darwin's `Origins�' in
his doctoral dissertation that was a post-Kantian interpretation of two Greek
atomists in a `loss'.`�It is the `same' form of god burning the heat, the `same'
which drank the poison cup and the same god of Aristotle enjoying greatest
blessedness'. In all this there is a loss of the central theme, `actual
historical development. All we find is the same' [M-E CW, V.1 ]
>
> With the closure of concept, the `logical idea enclosed within pure thought'.
Cognition has posited the concept as the `all embracing soul whose truth lies in
form alone'.Method would have separated itself in the logical `aspect'for which
the content is now given as externality since it is no longer a beginning,
`infected' by the negation. For any beginning to advance from simple immediacy
thought or reason makes the advance with the negative. Only a beginning with the
negative can bring out the immanent in immediacy as the universal form by using
its determinations to make distinct the universal in-itself from its other in
the content. This is negative relating to itself in the content, in the shape of
opposition. Once this distinction is made, the course of the entire movement,
all the logical determinations take on the character of transitoriness or
untruth for their impossibility as proofs of the pure form. It is by
distinguishing from all the predecessor stages, from the totality of the
determinations does the universal declare its reality and closure. We find that
Hegel submits to Plato's demands for proofs and the concept in the end remains
the `same' like some homeomorphic defect .Science of Logic ends up saying that
this science `is the science only of divine Notion'. Now, the concept `no longer
issues from a process of becoming, nor is it a transition'. Ekstatic in
ascension , the concept is raised to a `liberation', not the Ego raised to
self-transparency, but freedom is enclosed by the concept, where `no transition
takes place' [Hegel, SL, p., 843] All determinations, competing versions,
modification, controversary or the dialectic-dialogue is over, privileging some
words by capitalization is now clear and Science of Logic ends as monologue
pure eternity.
>
>
> This is the target of Marx's critique and polemic � the eternity as the
divine, the highest, utmost privileged, God, and eternity had to leave history,
not in the Enlightenment way but by the force of the negative, critical
dialectic from history. This is what Marx said he `found new' in the letter to
Wyendmayer, in March, 1852 : "What I did new was to demonstrate 1] existence of
classes is linked to particular historical phases in the development of
production�"Marx takes up nature only to show its working in historically
different circumstances, by showing how the form of assertion of its laws change
under `historically different circumstances. At hand is the issue of human
historical modification of nature. I f some of the `laws'pertaining to the
capitalist epoch, e.g. production cycles, move like heavenly bodies this has a
contradictory meaning in that movement of heavenly bodies are not eternal. They
are disturbed and brought down'Fear of nature or fear of a loss of nature is not
what Marx has in mind when labour-process is considered as transforming
activity. It was Bacon who said that it is necessary to loose nature, to
alienate it so that analysis, freed from nature becomes possible. But this is
precisely what does not happen in a laboratory. Free nature is not the object of
any lab. analysis and work. The knowledge produced from labs are not necessarily
universal but depends on location. What is at hand is not some vague,
generalized man-nature mediated by labour type of question, or at the next
level, culture-nature relationship formulated in broad terms as in the mixed,
hybrid discourse [ biology + power; biology+ politics] that evokes the fear of
the loss of nature by taking up the transformation of nature by culture while
ignoring altogether the work going on in labs. Also the culture-nature relation
is taken as some universal assumption that even forgets to ask : which culture
is referred to while talking about cultural transformation of the concepts of
discourse ? Some critics who speak s though the planet is seized by the
laboratory or other critics that cites `intelligence tests', paternity tests',
pharma tests' as instances of `laboratarization of society, since each
individual is a potential for lab. tests that gets carried over to entire
society and/or culture. This critique does not formulate the issue in terms of
cultural variability, so many cultures and societies that differ basically in
terms of such an attitude. It does not even look inside the lab. � in the box �
and its internal history where de-skilling in substantial practices like
handling DNA, restrictions and rationalization on vocal parties involved in
handling microbiological specimen and other changes. Arguments that
conceptualize labs. in terms similar to a factory are the defining ones. They
transform the optics of seeing in order to grasp the reciprocal transformation
between natural-ontology and social-ontology, activity and reproduction rhythms
in supplying some standard model organisms, work hours of scientists, auxiliary
workers, etc, as an architecturally designed place having symbols indicating
`intruders', `troublemakers' `disturbing peace', and so forth.
>
> The historical process that Marx investigates concerned with variability's,
including thought forms, the `organ by which thinking is done'. As a variant of
production, the `essence of bourgeois society consists' in an a priori that
there is no conscious, `regulated production'Here the rational and necessary
assert themselves `only as blindly working averages. However, Marx comes to the
crux that `once the interconnections beneath appearances is grasped , all
theoretical belief in the permanent necessity of existing conditions collapse
before their collapse in practice', while it is in absolute interest of the
ruling class to perpetuate absolute confusion. [ Letter to L Kugelmann, July 14,
1868]Marx presents the network of capital relations through thinking that grasps
relations as contradictions. Because these relations contain contradiction, the
resultant concept shines through them. Marx demonstrates historical, economic
laws in their appearance and disappearance. And after granting the absurdities
in Hegel's philosophy of nature, Engels insisted that Hegel's `real philosophy
of nature is to be found in second part of logic in the Doctrine of Essence'
[Engels to F A Lange, March 29, 1865] Returning to the concept that shows the
truth of being, following Hegel's Logic, it can be said that `the sum total of
all realities become absolute contradiction within itself.' [SL, p., 442].
Consequently, the determinate essential differences, in their display of the
force of domination and compulsion over labour and inversion of real into a
further regression to nothing for the capitalist is, for critical dialectic seen
as an advance that pass over to contradictory moments. Since all the appearance
forms under condition of real subsumption of labour under capital imply that the
contradictions are grounded in a higher reality of appearance, in the sense of
appearance of essential relations of existence. [Cf, SL, p. 499]The notions of
actuality and necessity employed by Marx can arise in the absolute unrest of
becoming that is contingent. When raised above ground-relations, contingency is
free, essential [inherently] necessary actuality. It is a unreflected [
reflection less] freedom, whose `essence is light shy' that breaks forth as
negated `free otherness', their self- based shape, as content indifferent to
form. The becoming now are immediate self-negations of determinate actuality and
necessity, which they blindly destruct in otherness, breaking forth as illusory
showing. Now contingency in this affirmative becoming is a transition to a unity
that is an advance to substance as expansive, but as positive self-relation,
whereas the blind transition is a retreat to interiority where the exposition
reveals movement as a return to ground relations and its further
sublation/aufheben to existence. Marx would assert the moment of advance rather
than `blind transition'
>
> best
> debussyyee
>
>
>
>
> --- In hegel-marx@yahoogroups.com, Victor Friedlander <oudeyyis@> wrote:
> >
> > The mode of identification of and differentiation between individuals and
collectivities in this part of the world is considerably different than the
European.  On the one hand the region, much larger than Europe may I add, is
united by a single language of scholarship, religion, trade and so on, on the
other it is a fine mosaic of religions and sects, regional languages and
dialects, and diverse cultural practices and traditions.  A further
complication is that with the exception of Egypt and, possibly, Iran, the region
has rarely been united into a single political entity.  The various regional
political arrangements usual here are temporary, coercive and mostly unrelated
to ethnic, religious, or linguistic distributions.  Finally, add to this the
dominance of urbanization and industry and trade over the more stolid modes of
political economy of village life and agriculture and the weakness of all
unifying institutions other than the extended
> > family, and you have a society characterized by high mobility, social and
geographical, and a virtually uncontrolled individualism that is hard to match
anywhere else in the world. 
> >  
> >      The universal use of Arabic as the language of scholarship (very
much), literature (less), and ritual (very little) while uniting somewhat the
extreme diversities of the region has much less relevance to the content of the
scholarship than, say, French, German, or English has on scholarly works and
literature in the European sphere.  For example, despite the fact that the
Christian Abulkhair Alkhammar and Jewish Musa ibn Maymun both wrote in Arabic
and studied in the Universities in Baghdad, their ethnic and sectarian
differences could not but be reflected in the topics they chose to write on and
on their observations on philosophical issues.   Musa ibn Maymun, whose works
I’m well acquainted with, writes on philosophy within the context of SW Asian
religion, and, of course for him this religion is Judaism. His book Dalalat
al-Za'ereen (The Distinction between Reason and Inspiration) is the most
important of his works. It is a philosophical
> > work, written for people who are in doubt or dilemma, and who are not able
to reconcile reason and inspiration.  His genius is evidenced by the fact that
though his references are strictly to the Hebrew sacred writings and later
Jewish commentary, his book had great appeal for many Muslims.  Among other
things it was his brilliant handling of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist
theoretical framework of the Dalalat al-Za'ereen that appealed to the non-Jewish
public.  Another example, the Rubaiyat of Umar ibn Ibrāhīm Khayyām
Neyshābūri contains particularly ethnic Iranian elements and sectarian Muslim
concerns, such as, respectively, the celebration of wine drinking and a severe
criticism of Iranian Sufism. Again despite the repeated references to wining and
dining and the sharp criticism of the doctors of religion, the poetry and
profound thinking made his books popular to many pious, teetotaling Muslims.
 Ironically, those very same Sufis later
> > made every effort to adopt quatrains from the Rubaiyat to express their
mystical experiences and the theologies of their cults.
> >  
> >     The Ismaili’s are heterodox Shia, represented  today by a number
of schismatic sects, the Nizaris, Druze, and Mustali. Though much persecuted by
Shia and Sunni, the Imaili Fatimid Califate (909 to 1,171 CE) was one of the
most powerful and long-lived of the Arab empires.
> >  
> >     From a quick perusal of your message I see the response demands some
additional research and thought.  I will be away for about 5 days, so the
presentation of my arguments may take a little time.
> > Regards,
> > Victor Friedlander
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________
> > From: debabrata <debub20@>
> > To: hegel-marx@yahoogroups.com
> > Sent: Tuesday, 7 July, 2009 1:55:00
> > Subject: [hegel-marx] Re: On the existence of a materialist logic
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > For hegel-marx group
> >
> > The previous mail was sent abruptly because of sudden irruption of blinks.
So I am continuing from where I left, hoping this time the computer would hold a
steady state.
> > I am returning to what Marx was talking about in 1844. To quote " the
greatest thing about Hegel's phenomenology is the dialectic of negativity
proving the final result…in objectification, alienation and as sublation [
auhebung] of this alienation'. He went on to say that `the only labour that
Hegel presupposes and recognizes is abstract mental labour, meaning the labour
of spirit"Even though Hegel's abstract labour is also the activity of experience
and learning, perception and understanding, nevertheless this does not annul
Marx's standpoint that it is one-sided . But what Marx has to say about the
`greatest thing'in Hegel's words would be, `self-consciousness has sublated this
alienation…so that it is at home with itself, with otherness as such…this is
the absolute labour of the negative." [quoted by Chris Arthur, Hegel's M-S
dialectic and Myth of Marxology']
> > With Hegel, the dialectic is the labour of negative that ends up in
Self-consciousness where the negative has also passed a cardinal moment of
struggle in the master-servant dialectic that culminates with the master limited
by desire appetitive, which is unalloyed and infused with the feeling of
satisfaction. Trapped in this limit, the `master is the servant'as contrasted to
the servant's work that is `desire held in check'.The servant puts a check on
immediate impulse and his formative activity is grounded in objective
principles, which is later raised to the level of universal human reason. This
is self-consciousness that turns from the learning process to becoming an
educator. But `the educator must be educated'.Marx does not stop at
class-struggle or takes any credit that struggle between classes is his
discovery or with Person Absolute but demonstrates by linking the existence of
classes to particular historical phases where class-struggle leads to
> > the abolition of all classes. [Letter to Weydenmayer, March 5, 1852]. The
struggle is sublated in social terms into the realm of freedom absolute, through
the historical process of the becoming of commons. Yet, it may be said that in
Berlin Phenomenology there is a hint regarding the outcome of the struggle in
the forming of a `community of need'and visualizing fear of the lord as the
beginning of wisdom, Marx is speaking in terms of very advanced moments.
> >
> > Marx sustains His critique of Hegel on work by underscoring the ontology of
labour. `Abstract labour, labour-power ,commodity form'are real process taking
place in society where these terms are all abstractions , i.e., equally
non-being presupposing being in its immediacy. All the social observations
taking place in the heads of bourgeoisie behind the back of workers immediately
collapse as abstraction in becoming which is the presupposition for
determinations. Thus abstract labour becomes a determination in the form of
labour power or it is nothing, labor-power becomes a determination as the alien
realization of the product in the third or it s nothing,, commodity form is
nothing without its equivalent or universal realization through money-prices or
it is nothing. It is `the development of social individual which appears as the
great foundation stone for production of wealth. As soon as labour time is
ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, it
> > must also cease to be its measure, hence exchange-value as a measure of
value must cease. With the breakdown of exchange-value, direct material
production is stripped of its form of penury and antithesis " [Grundrisse,
www.marxist. org ]. In other words, the realm of necessity must start to
deplete, wither, degrade with the least expenditure of energy [ reminding me of
Mach's talk about `economy of thought'around the same time] .for the beginning
of the true realm of freedom. Marx begins with time as the most abstract moment
of thinking �" being and non-being equally is �" and the mode of its positing
in concrete terms �" shortening of the working day �" in the course of history
is also a social evolution. Marx is at one with the presuppositions of ancient
metaphysics al the way to its extant moments in terms of atomism [Democritus,
Epicurus], preceded much earlier by Heraclitus's flowing, Eleatic flux, and the
height of Greek ontology in the
> > Plato-Aristotle continuum. In terms of science, all that is viewed through
the optics of critical dialectic Many of these as elaborated in Science of Logic
are employed critically and explicitly in Grundrisse and Capital, where there is
a commonality obtaining in their anti-physis/ phusis position. After all, Marx
proclaimed himself an avowed student of Hegel particularly at a time when heaps
of disdain and scorn was poured on Hegel as though he was a dead dog. But this
did not deter from the next sublation/auheben moment of Hegel by the concept of
social evolution.
> >
> > Here is my brief take on ancient science, Plato, Proclus , etc., in response
where the distinctions should be seen as opposites.
> >
> > Plato's eidos-monad justify knowledge as absolute isonomy of minding the
present. In other words, the experience of thinking in inwardness of soul in
motion, which Plato in the later dialogues would term self-movement that is
universal and absolute cause without any point of beginning and ending.
Aristotle did not keep the universal as a cognition that is higher than
understanding and mathematical reasoning before him and by abandoning that
moment, he moved over to pragma defining the particular. Neo-Platonists like
Proclus and others recovered the active universal that Plato left on the
threshold in Alexandria.
> >
> > Compared to Plato the regard for justification of knowledge is matched only
by Kant's pursuit of the principle of experience as the basis of modern
knowledge. In his `Prolegomena' where Kant searches for a metaphysical
justification he takes up experience from phusis & mathema only to find a limit
in the time horizon, or his example from mathematical physics got restricted to
Enlightenment/ Aufklarung period. This restriction would be the very limit of
metaphysics that got suspended in the aporia/ aperion of primitive , shallow,
unresolved unit after consciousness is stripped of `subjectivity' in the still
remaining rudiment empirical individual ego. Kant's metaphysical excursion
stumbled into this primitive `type' that could even be cognizing insanity though
this would be the atomistic individual of civil society. The very acme of
enlightenment would be the individual ego forever yearning, struggling, aiming,
smelling but sadly restricted to space-time
> > axis. Though Kant made epistemology inconceivable without experience, the
justification of knowledge could not adequate as objectively identical. In
addition, for right or wrong reasons, religion did not come under the preview of
experience. It has been said that the problem was Kant's notion of metaphysics
that rebounded from the `objective world' on to a defective, hollow and empty
consciousness, which would be the domain left open for performavity of the `I'
of ego psychology, providing scope for a nihilist activity but anticipating such
negatively bad possibilities Kant had placed `will' in the aporia as a
transcendental notion. However, there is enough room for revision because of the
unanswered or badly, defectively answering the question of justification.
> > The `highest' is the most primitive expression of movement beginning with
the `sky', or the sign for ascent/descent ` &#8596;' allowing Proclus to make
`dialectical arrangements' `<Arithmoi> as in self-gathering, organizing, moving
from `on the high' to all the middle genera as far as the termination of the
first Being. "Speculation must commence with that which is the highest but end
in that which is the least of all things. For the hypraxis of the one proceeds
from on high as far as the most obscure hypothesis of things." Kant had also
followed the question of justification down to the detail of experiencing
empirical consciousness- the shallow, bare, inferior experience reduced to the
lowest point with no intrinsic value except for a sad certitude in the
`enlightened' consciousness, because of the impossibility of empirical
consciousness objectifying itself, which had a restricting effect on Kant though
hardly comparable to the blindness towards
> > religion that Kant shared with the enlightenment `world-view' . In a
different constellation having reached its zenith in Neo-Platonism the `same'
obscurest limit-consciousness would exhibit very different possibilities from
that of Enlightenment apieron .The universal gift of perpetual ekstasis would
`revolve' around the least, seduced by eros for `conjoining' the `beginning with
the end', `proceeding to the end of the whole period they become younger, but at
the same time circulating to the beginning they become older'. Through
`scientific energies and intellectual projections, union with the unknown
follows', which is cardinal to <dialektike> method that has to do with progress
from a hypothesis to an unhypothesized arche. Plato brings out the dialectic as
a fully articulated method comprising of collection <synagogue> followed by
division <dieresis>, meaning the ability to define generically and then to
divide it into various kinds until the limits
> > of divisibility are reached [ Phaedrus 277] or <diaphoresis> , to move from
the more comprehensive form down to <atomon eidos the words of Aristotle . The
Neo-Platonic One is itself the Concept, `beyond all triple distributions and
beyond all time so that it is `not a number…the first number is two, but a
determinate duality and the one is what determines it'. `If this sounds absurd
to anyone he need only be reminded that when we really posit being, the negative
of being is thinking which is very positive' as Hegel would say.
> >
> > Among Neo-Platonists there is to be found at first `the experience of
thought, when the self is awakened to itself beyond any other inwardly'
[Plotinus] which is its most striking feature. Though Kant's merit, his
`infinite merit' according to Hegel lay in rescuing and elevating the dialectic
to the level of reason he did not fathom the depths following from
misapprehending the One that is beyond all including triple distribution �"
syllogistic reasoning- by not cognizing the One as a qualifier, <arithmoi>, to
go along with enlightenment wisdom that saw it as idea, which made Plato into
some idealist philosopher. This type of rank revisionism is what Hegel noticed
to correct it in his `Science of Logic' though the damage resounding in chorus
muted Hegel's anti-revisionist position on this important subject through the
course of the following two centuries of ideology. Kant had `fixed' the One at
the level of abstract understanding whence the eidos
> > became idea and that turned into the ideological straitjacket of idealism.
However, as it turns out from some of the finest research on Plato in the past
few decades, Plato nowhere undertook the task to prove the existence of eidos in
terms of even form. The eidos �" form first appear as hypothesis in Phaedo
followed by a scathing criticism in Parmenides, they are known through faculties
other than reason [Republic], recollection [anamnesis] , the eide known before
birth [palingenesia �" Meno, Phaedo] and as Eros.
> >
> > Phaedrus has most of the strands that would characterize Plato's
philosophical thoughts. In it the turn is a complete reversal from Phaedo. The
soul is now in self-motion, always in motion and whatever is always in motion is
immortal. In contrast to derived motion caused externally, the self-mover ,a
first principle of motion is impossible to destroy since the universe would
collapse immediately. This is `written' on the soul and can be communicated as
another kind of `written speech' in a better way like seeds planted in other
minds from which fresh truths spring up. The finest treatment of subjects come
from a man who goes beyond amusing oneself with discourses about justice and
`employs the art of dialectic, and, fastening upon a suitable soul plants and
sows its truths accompanied by knowledge.' The dialectic of Neo-Platonists
produced strikingly, according to P Marlau, `the derivation of the physical,
i.e., the sensible from the anterior,
> > non-sensible and extended timeless spheres.'.[P Marleu, From Platonism to
neo-Platonism, Hague, 1973] Plato aroused a sensitivity that would carefully
distinguish the <arithmoi eidetikoi> from its physical shadow. The parable of
the cave is well known for illustrate the distinction between the perceptions of
the shadow world and their true shapes residing in souls. Gödel's argument that
it is not a matter of inaccessible truths but the insight gained from Plato
about a world that is beyond formal logic and computational ontology/procedures
tells us that there is something else involved in awakened consciousness.
> > The last part would take up ancient mythologies, polymathy, Sibylline verses
and Heraclitus.
> >
> > regards
> > debussyyee
> >
> > --- In hegel-marx@yahoogro ups.com, Victor Friedlander <oudeyyis@ .> wrote:
> > >
> > > Juergan,
> > > I think I've got it as well as any anglophone can. An example might be
the symbol, an activity or instrument that embeds meaning , the meaning not
implicit in the symbol but in its production and employment by a community in
the course of their interactivity.  If he had to use a binary expression in
this regard, it's evident that Marx too had problems finding a simple expression
for the phenomenon.
> > > VTFR
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ____________ _________ _________ __
> > > From: wmdepot <wmdepot@ >
> > > To: hegel-marx@yahoogro ups.com
> > > Sent: Monday, 6 July, 2009 17:30:03
> > > Subject: [hegel-marx] On the existence of a materialist logic
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > VF wrote:
> > >
> > > ... what I suppose you mean by trans-empirical ...
> > >
> > > JH:
> > > ... with "trans-empirical" , I refer to the term "sinnlich-übersinnli ch"
in "Capital": die Ware und der Wert (commodity and value), ein
sinnlich-übersinnlic hes Ding (a 'sensuous-extrasens ory' thing) ...
> > >
> > > ... sensous-extrasensor y, just my dictionary-translat ion of the term
"sinnlich-übersinnli ch", commodity and value a sinnlich-übersinnlic h
objective ( I 'm not sure what the best translation into English would have to
be ...)
> > >
> > > .... the term "sensuous" scientified could give "empirical";
"exta-sensory" thus qualified as something "transempirical" ;
empirical-transempi rical: just another translation of "sinnlich-übersinnli ch"
... and, as I see it, "transempirical" is only somewhat in relation to
"empirical"; ... sinnlich-übersinnlic h, a strongly connected term, given byf
Marx ...
> > >
> > > regards
> > > Juergen H.
> > >
> > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> >
>