In the short interview of JH about religion in the
U.S., March 2005, he responds to a query of his sense
of the degree of religious life in the U.S. vs. Europe
by reference to "my American colleague [University of
Michigan political scientist] Ronald Inglehart [who]
defends the...idea that secularization goes
hand-in-hand with an increased existential security in
economic and social living conditions." So, real
conditions of induced "risk" and "personal
vulnerability" and the traditionalism of a large
immigrant population seems to account for the high
degree of religious life in the U.S. vs. Europe.

Socioeconomic progress causes secularization. Religion
dwindles accordingly.

You see above that Habermas refers to "economic and
social living conditions," but Inglehart's research is
in terms of "socioeconomic" living conditions, but
also conditions of "culture," "human development," and
"democratic" political life. That is, there is no
separate dimension of the social in Inglehart's
research, as indicated in the recent report of his
research, which is considered a "landmark,"
encompassing 2 decades of accumulating and analyzing a
"massive body" of survey information in 85% of the
world's population. _Modernization, Cultural Change,
and Democracy: the human development sequence_,
Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Cambridge UP, 2005,
"presents a revised version of modernization theory
that integrates socioeconomic development, cultural
change, and democratization under the overarching
theme of human development" (1).

Unsurprisingly to an American, "self-expression
values," i.e., values of autonomy, individuality, and
free choice, "prove to be more strongly linked
[statistically] with [degree of] democracy [in the
society] than any other factor, including...trust,
associational membership, and per capita GDP" (4), but
this proves to be true worldwide.

I take from this result that the appeal of "American"
culture is no hegemony, rather the happenstantial
expression of where human evolution is well showing
its universality. This may seem hyperbolic, but, they
claim, their 81-nation research over 2+ decades has
become not only compelling but predictive.

It's not only that culture matters primarily for
democracy (socioeconomic progress and constiutionalism
alone won't cause democracy), but that (1) "secular",
"humanistic" culture follows socioeconomic progress
(religious traditionalism empirically declines), and
(2) secular, humanistic culture is highly correlated
with degree of democracy in the society. Democracy
doesn't cause secular, humanistic culture; rather
democracy is caused by secular, humanistic culture and
depends on this for its effectiveness. "[T]he
inherently emancipative nature of self-expression
values makes democracy increasingly likely to emerge;
indeed, beyond a certain point it becomes increasingly
difficult to *avoid* democratization.... The growth of
human autonomy is the theme underlying the processes
of modernization, rising self-expression values, and
democratization. These processes give rise to
increasingly humanistic societies...." (5-6).

"Traditionally, the family represents the basic
reproductive unit of any society. Consequently,
traditional cultures tend to condemn harshly any
behavior that seems to threaten reproduction and
childrearing within the family....But in
postindustrial societies with advanced welfare
institutions, a strong family is no longer necessary
for survival. These rigid norms gradually lose their
function, and more room is given to individual
self-expression" (7), which is correlated with
decrease in religious culture. The spread of
self-expression values, their decades of research
shows, "will make publics more *humanistic* but not
more egocentric" (8).

"Changes in international context have sometimes been
necessary in order to unlock the impact of social
forces rooted in mass self-expression values. But the
international context cannot create these
values---they are generated by the public's firsthand
existential experiences" (10).

This research correlates superbly with Habermas'
orientation in "Development of Normative Structures,"
_CES_, such that [JH} "only individuals learn," such
that structures evolve via an
ego-identity/group-identity isomorphism, i.e.,
"social" change is an emergent property ("wisdom of
crowds") of the only real learning that there is:
individuals acting (with communicative efficacy) to
*create* collaborations and aggregate effects. (So THE
question is: How To Do This, in complex organizations,
in political action, etc.). Inglehart and Welzel note
"individual-level attitudes, such as self-expression
values, have central tendencies that are genuine
societal-level characteristics that can affect other
societal-level characteristics, such as democracy"
(10). Tame claim, but it's massively corroborated
empirically.

But contrary to Habermas, their 2 decades of data from
81 nations yield "results [that] are clear: emphasis
on self-expression values is more important for
democracy than...confidence in public institutions,
membership in associations, and norm
abidingness....And surprising as it may seem,
self-expression values play an even more crucial role
in strengthening democracy than does overt support for
democracy itself...[explained by] an intrinsic
commitment to autonomous human choice, the core
element of democracy. These findings support the
interpretation that democratization is above all a
process of human emancipation that empowers people.
Its essence is the institutionalization of free
choice, and this process is largely driven by the
social forces linked with human self-expression" (11).


This research vastly corroborates the work of Amartya
Sen, welfare economist and Nobel Laureate, that
focuses on engineering capability formation as
precondition for everything else: social prosperity,
flourishing culture, and democracy. Martha Nussbaum
carries this Senian approach into theory of law.

"Chapter 13[, the last chapter,] examines the
normative implications and historical context of our
unified version of modernization theory. We argue that
self-expression values are not egocentric, but
*humanistic*: they emphasize not only autonomy for
oneself, but for *others* as well[, antidiscriminatory
list,]...and such universal goals as environmental
protection and ecological sustainability" (12). This
empirically corroborates Michael Slote's claim that an
"agent-centered virtue ethic" can provide the basis
for humanitarian values that, in turn, may ground
theories of justice. This approach gels with Nussbaum,
too.

"This wide range of antidiscriminatory social
movements [correlated with self-expression values]
reflects a broad trend that places increasing emphasis
on humanistic norms. The Conclusion[ of the book,...]
"Emancipatory Theory of Democracy" [indicates
that....c]onsolidating and sustaining democracy is not
simply a matter of designing the right constitution or
having elites who are committed to democratic norms.
It reflects rising mass emphasis on human
autonomy....the broader liberating forces inherent in
human development" (12).

The universalism vs. communitarian debate disappears
in the reality of humanistic autonomy in modernization
worldwide. No Eurocentrism, no Americanist "West".
It's the way that human development naturally tends.
The guilty consciences of the universalists may relax.
Humanity speaks for itself just fine.

But don't go buying this paperback immediately. It's
empirical reporting, which the authors have rigorously
summarized in the "Introduction" that I've
highlighted. *But*, to my mind, it's an empirical
vindication of the claim that humanism is the basis of
modernity, individuality is the engine of democracy,
and humanitarian values grow naturally in social
evolution.


Gary



.