> The ontological dynamic is recursive and as such reflects the dynamics of
> the chaos game. That reflection demands consideration of the methodology and
> its properties and methods that can be confused with what is under analysis.
> Chris.

uh, as one of the science guys on the list, Chris, would you care to
comment on the end of the world possibility this Wed. Sept. 10th when
the mad scientists of the Large Hedron Collider attempt to create their
mini black hole?:)

aija

> -----Original Message-----
> From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Aija Veldre Beldavs
> Sent: Monday, 8 September 2008 8:35 PM
> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [existlist] Re: Concurrence of Be-ing,
> Think-ing, & Tim-ing
>
>
> > The ontological dynamic is recursive and as such reflects
> the dynamics
> > of the chaos game. That reflection demands consideration of the
> > methodology and its properties and methods that can be
> confused with what is under analysis.
> > Chris.
>
> uh, as one of the science guys on the list, Chris, would you
> care to comment on the end of the world possibility this Wed.
> Sept. 10th when the mad scientists of the Large Hedron
> Collider attempt to create their mini black hole?:)
>

;-) it is a problem isn't it! forgive them ...  for they know not what they
do...? If 5% of the universe is all we perceive and the rest is detected
only due to unexplained gravity anomalies then perhaps a little more thought
is required - that said, given the focus on self-referencing so all they
will get is the next level of iteration and so more of the same but in finer
details (more distinctions) -  but as already covered, the making of
distinctions creates a border and so lets loose what lives on borders -
complexity/chaos dynamics and so 'emergences'....uh-oh... ( i did mention
that movement into the realm of the proactive includes emergence of
hubris...) -- roll on Wednesday...

;-)

Chris.

Louise:

Well, if you ask me, it isn't even scientism. It is gibberish. My mind
is preoccupied, right now anyway, with things that are pretty far
removed from what Chris is into.

I am reading Heidegger's Essence of Human Freedom right now. Have you
read it? He is right on the spot, I think, with his interpretation of
the existential significance of Kant's proposed solution to the third
antinomy.

The reason why it is possible for us to think beings in both ways, as
things determined by cause-effect, and, for some kinds of beings, that
is, being like us, who are intelligences, as essentially free self-
determinations, IS because causality is ultimately grounded in the
possibility of freedom.

This is an ontological thesis that has far reaching consequences for
how we look at what metaphysics is, and for how we look at what the
sciences are. Not to mention for how we look at who and what WE are.
AND, for what we might ultimately think beings in general ARE.

It goes back to that knowledge and freedom thing that I was harping on
a few months back. The supposed antagonism between the compulsion to
know and the existential necessity of freedom, is for the most part, I
now think, an illusory antagonism. In point of fact, our compulsion to
know is a symptom of our freedom to be, a "to be" about which we really
have no choice.

That seems paradoxical, "to be" fated to be free. But I am okay with
that. In a weirdly intimate and existential sense, it DOES kind of ring
true does it not?

Fate guides those who are willing. It drags the rest along in chains.
To paraphrae good old Seneca.

Here is what I think is an exquisite summation, on Heidegger's part,
from the ending of chapter three of the first part of Essence of
Freedom. It hits the nail right on the head:

"Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but
man as a possibility of freedom."

To me, that is right on the money.

Here is some of the rest:

"Human freedom is the fredom that breaks through in man and takes him
up unto itself, thus making man possible."

Who could DENY that the essence of man is man's freedom? Certainly no
existentialist. At least, not a REAL existentialist. But Heidegger is
talking about all of this on a deeper level, an ontological level. The
FACT that man is existentially free is ONTOLOGICALLY primary.

Heidegger brings this ontological primacy of human existential freedom
out in the very next sentence:

"If freedom is the ground of the possibility of existence, the root of
Being and Time, and thus the ground of the possibility of understanding
Being in its whole breadth and fullness, then man, as grounded in his
existence upon and in this freedom, is the site where beings in the
whole become revealed, i.e., he is that particular Being through which
beings as such announce themselves."

For Heidegger, the fundamental problems of philosophy, those questions
about Being, about truth, about who and what man is, about knowing,
about man's freedom, and the relation of man's freedom to man's inner
compulsion to know Being, as well as time and history, are no mere
haphazard collection of philosophical curiosities. All of these
questions are united. They belong together. Like the facets of the
diamond, they are the various angles into and upon the one central
question of Being, the question, "Why is there Being as such?" which,
it turns out, can not be separated from the question, "Why is there a
Being who questions Being?"

The answer to this why question is, in a single word, FREEDOM. A more
detailed answer would be something like this: For the sake of freedom.
For the possibility of freedom. But this answer, because it is framed
in terms of possibility, in terms of an ultimate possibility of Being,
an ultimate possibility for man, is an answer that rebounds back into a
question. It is a challenge, more so than it is either an answer or a
question.

To be, or not to be. That is the question. That is the answer. That is
the challenge.

But the challenge, and the ultimate possibility that the challenge is
all about, has to do with time. It has to do with the future. We could
ask, "Why freedom?" The answer to that can only be: For the sake of a
future. So that there can be, there will be, some kind of a future.

Now what is up with that? Do we go Darwinian about it here? I think
not. It would be very easy, and, I think, very WRONG, for us to try and
reduce our having a future to some kind of blind mechanism like
survival of the fitter. The real relationship, the ontological
relationship, is almost exactly the other way around, AND, it is a
teleological relationship, an entelecheia of Being. The reason why
there is survival of the fitter, why there is evolution, is because
Being IS, in its umtimate essence, an ultimate possibility, the ability
to HAVE a future, and that is why beings like us, beings who actually
have a future, i.e., some kind of a history, are not just accidental
beings, but an inevitability of Being itself.

To me, this makes all of that scientism look kind of trivial. But hey,
this really is against the grain of our modern time, with its supremacy
of technology, reality TV, and the authority of science that we so take
for granted. And rightly so. Philosophers are supposed to be radicals.
They are supposed to go against the grain. Otherwise, what good are
they? How can one claim to have earned the right to be called
philosopher if, on the one hand, one is subservient to the authority of
anything, and, on the other hand, one has never even attempted to
penetrate down into the very core, the root, the fundamental essence,
of every thing there is?

Okay. Why go there? Why not just stay on the surface? Why not just
remain superficial? Why not just take some authority's word for it.
This is what it is, and it is what it is. Don't question it. Just
accept it. Just press the "I believe" button and everything will turn
out all right.

I say, not because we can, that is the instrumental view of human
existence, the authority of the instrumentality of man that lies behind
all forms of authority, the technologization of our Dasein that turns
us into a mere thing that is only present-at-hand. I say it is because
we must, because our freedom necessitates the taking of this dangerous
step into the abyss of our own Being. If we don't go there, if we don't
take that step, then, we have given up our selves. We have given up on
man. Then, it is Man, not just god, who is really dead to the world,
and that, right there, is the true nihilism of our having given up on
ourselves, the nihilism that becomes, now, the warrant for every kind
of holocaust, every variation of apocalypse, every pornographic excess,
that we can imagine, and even bring into action.

So, why care about man, if man does not matter? Why be noble, if there
is nothing noble left to strive for? If, as the believers in scientism
would have us believe, we ourselves are just the result of a blind
calculation, nothing more than the computation of some quantity, WHO, I
would ask, is doing the calculating? It isn't some god. We aren't
children anymore. But it isn't science that grew us up. I will tell you
that right now. Science, right now, here in the twenty first century,
is merely an adolescent stage for us, and it is really nothing more
than that. We know a lot less than we think we do, and we are mistaken
to think that who and what we are can be measured either by how much we
think we know or by how much we think we can just make happen just for
the sake of making it happen. There is a backlash to the "because we
can" that can shock us back into our center; if, that is, that shock
doesn't come too late.

Hb3g

--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "louise" <hecubatoher@...> wrote:
>
> in the course of recent discussion with newbie chris lofting, i took
> the attitude, 'live and let live', on the basis that he was an
exponent
> of a scientism that in the context of everyday life is not illegal,
and
> that my own opinion (in which i am clearly not alone) that his theses
> are essentially off-topic to the list, is consequence of my
existential
> commitment, subjective, and based in philosophical enquiry.   it is,
> however, annoying, that so much mental space becomes occupied with
what
> looks to me like the forays of a religious zealot.  it would not be
> that, posted at a neurology list.
>
> louise
> ... who believes angels are angels
>

HB,

You are going way too far, basically into the realm of onto-theology,
the very thing, btw, that Heidegger opposed.

Wil


-----Original Message-----
From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>
To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 9:02 am
Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate

























Louise:



Well, if you ask me, it isn't even scientism. It is gibberish. My mind

is preoccupied, right now anyway, with things that are pretty far

removed from what Chris is into.



I am reading Heidegger's Essence of Human Freedom right now. Have you

read it? He is right on the spot, I think, with his interpretation of

the existential significance of Kant's proposed solution to the third

antinomy.



The reason why it is possible for us to think beings in both ways, as

things determined by cause-effect, and, for some kinds of beings, that

is, being like us, who are intelligences, as essentially free self-

determinations, IS because causality is ultimately grounded in the

possibility of freedom.



This is an ontological thesis that has far reaching consequences for

how we look at what metaphysics is, and for how we look at what the

sciences are. Not to mention for how we look at who and what WE are.

AND, for what we might ultimately think beings in general ARE.



It goes back to that knowledge and freedom thing that I was harping on

a few months back. The supposed antagonism between the compulsion to

know and the existential necessity of freedom, is for the most part, I

now think, an illusory antagonism. In point of fact, our compulsion to

know is a symptom of our freedom to be, a "to be" about which we really

have no choice.



That seems paradoxical, "to be" fated to be free. But I am okay with

that. In a weirdly intimate and existential sense, it DOES kind of ring

true does it not?



Fate guides those who are willing. It drags the rest along in chains.

To paraphrae good old Seneca.



Here is what I think is an exquisite summation, on Heidegger's part,

from the ending of chapter three of the first part of Essence of

Freedom. It hits the nail right on the head:



"Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but

man as a possibility of freedom."



To me, that is right on the money.



Here is some of the rest:



"Human freedom is the fredom that breaks through in man and takes him

up unto itself, thus making man possible."



Who could DENY that the essence of man is man's freedom? Certainly no

existentialist. At least, not a REAL existentialist. But Heidegger is

talking about all of this on a deeper level, an ontological level. The

FACT that man is existentially free is ONTOLOGICALLY primary.



Heidegger brings this ontological primacy of human existential freedom

out in the very next sentence:



"If freedom is the ground of the possibility of existence, the root of

Being and Time, and thus the ground of the possibility of understanding

Being in its whole breadth and fullness, then man, as grounded in his

existence upon and in this freedom, is the site where beings in the

whole become revealed, i.e., he is that particular Being through which

beings as such announce themselves."



For Heidegger, the fundamental problems of philosophy, those questions

about Being, about truth, about who and what man is, about knowing,

about man's freedom, and the relation of man's freedom to man's inner

compulsion to know Being, as well as time and history, are no mere

haphazard collection of philosophical curiosities. All of these

questions are united. They belong together. Like the facets of the

diamond, they are the various angles into and upon the one central

question of Being, the question, "Why is there Being as such?" which,

it turns out, can not be separated from the question, "Why is there a

Being who questions Being?"



The answer to this why question is, in a single word, FREEDOM. A more

detailed answer would be something like this: For the sake of freedom.

For the possibility of freedom. But this answer, because it is framed

in terms of possibility, in terms of an ultimate possibility of Being,

an ultimate possibility for man, is an answer that rebounds back into a

question. It is a challenge, more so than it is either an answer or a

question.



To be, or not to be. That is the question. That is the answer. That is

the challenge.



But the challenge, and the ultimate possibility that the challenge is

all about, has to do with time. It has to do with the future. We could

ask, "Why freedom?" The answer to that can only be: For the sake of a

future. So that there can be, there will be, some kind of a future.



Now what is up with that? Do we go Darwinian about it here? I think

not. It would be very easy, and, I think, very WRONG, for us to try and

reduce our having a future to some kind of blind mechanism like

survival of the fitter. The real relationship, the ontological

relationship, is almost exactly the other way around, AND, it is a

teleological relationship, an entelecheia of Being. The reason why

there is survival of the fitter, why there is evolution, is because

Being IS, in its umtimate essence, an ultimate possibility, the ability

to HAVE a future, and that is why beings like us, beings who actually

have a future, i.e., some kind of a history, are not just accidental

beings, but an inevitability of Being itself.



To me, this makes all of that scientism look kind of trivial. But hey,

this really is against the grain of our modern time, with its supremacy

of technology, reality TV, and the authority of science that we so take

for granted. And rightly so. Philosophers are supposed to be radicals.

They are supposed to go against the grain. Otherwise, what good are

they? How can one claim to have earned the right to be called

philosopher if, on the one hand, one is subservient to the authority of

anything, and, on the other hand, one has never even attempted to

penetrate down into the very core, the root, the fundamental essence,

of every thing there is?



Okay. Why go there? Why not just stay on the surface? Why not just

remain superficial? Why not just take some authority's word for it.

This is what it is, and it is what it is. Don't question it. Just

accept it. Just press the "I believe" button and everything will turn

out all right.



I say, not because we can, that is the instrumental view of human

existence, the authority of the instrumentality of man that lies behind

all forms of authority, the technologization of our Dasein that turns

us into a mere thing that is only present-at-hand. I say it is because

we must, because our freedom necessitates the taking of this dangerous

step into the abyss of our own Being. If we don't go there, if we don't

take that step, then, we have given up our selves. We have given up on

man. Then, it is Man, not just god, who is really dead to the world,

and that, right there, is the true nihilism of our having given up on

ourselves, the nihilism that becomes, now, the warrant for every kind

of holocaust, every variation of apocalypse, every pornographic excess,

that we can imagine, and even bring into action.



So, why care about man, if man does not matter? Why be noble, if there

is nothing noble left to strive for? If, as the believers in scientism

would have us believe, we ourselves are just the result of a blind

calculation, nothing more than the computation of some quantity, WHO, I

would ask, is doing the calculating? It isn't some god. We aren't

children anymore. But it isn't science that grew us up. I will tell you

that right now. Science, right now, here in the twenty first century,

is merely an adolescent stage for us, and it is really nothing more

than that. We know a lot less than we think we do, and we are mistaken

to think that who and what we are can be measured either by how much we

think we know or by how much we think we can just make happen just for

the sake of making it happen. There is a backlash to the "because we

can" that can shock us back into our center; if, that is, that shock

doesn't come too late.



Hb3g



--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "louise" <hecubatoher@...> wrote:

>

> in the course of recent discussion with newbie chris lofting, i took

> the attitude, 'live and let live', on the basis that he was an

exponent

> of a scientism that in the context of everyday life is not illegal,

and

> that my own opinion (in which i am clearly not alone) that his theses

> are essentially off-topic to the list, is consequence of my

existential

> commitment, subjective, and based in philosophical enquiry.   it is,

> however, annoying, that so much mental space becomes occupied with

what

> looks to me like the forays of a religious zealot.  it would not be

> that, posted at a neurology list.

>

> louise

> ... who believes angels are angels

>

--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "chris lofting" <lofting@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Aija Veldre
Beldavs
> > Sent: Monday, 8 September 2008 8:35 PM
> > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: Re: [existlist] Re: Concurrence of Be-ing,
> > Think-ing, & Tim-ing
> >
> >
> > > The ontological dynamic is recursive and as such reflects
> > the dynamics
> > > of the chaos game. That reflection demands consideration of the
> > > methodology and its properties and methods that can be
> > confused with what is under analysis.
> > > Chris.
> >
> > uh, as one of the science guys on the list, Chris, would you
> > care to comment on the end of the world possibility this Wed.
> > Sept. 10th when the mad scientists of the Large Hedron
> > Collider attempt to create their mini black hole?:)
> >
>
> ;-) it is a problem isn't it! forgive them ...  for they know not
what they
> do...?

Chris,

It was already obvious from your earlier remarks that you do not
understand the essence of the Christian religion, nor in this
instance do you see the shallowness of the disrespect revealed by
your throwaway comment.  Jesus understood what he meant by saying,
they know not what they do, and if he was merely mortal the point is
lost.  As far as human frailty goes, quite often wrongdoers are
perfectly aware of what they are doing, but fail to understand its
significance.  Of course.  They are not usually philosophers, in the
Greek sense of the term, interested with subjective passion in their
thought.  This rather solemn statement is needful, because it
concerns disagreements at the list concerning Kierkegaard's view of
the Christian faith, and is hardly a trifling matter.

Louise

> -----Original Message-----
> From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of louise
> Sent: Tuesday, 9 September 2008 5:10 AM
> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [existlist] Re: Concurrence of Be-ing, Think-ing, & Tim-ing
>
> --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "chris lofting" <lofting@...> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > > [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Aija Veldre
> Beldavs
> > > Sent: Monday, 8 September 2008 8:35 PM
> > > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > > Subject: Re: [existlist] Re: Concurrence of Be-ing, Think-ing, &
> > > Tim-ing
> > >
> > >
> > > > The ontological dynamic is recursive and as such reflects
> > > the dynamics
> > > > of the chaos game. That reflection demands consideration of the
> > > > methodology and its properties and methods that can be
> > > confused with what is under analysis.
> > > > Chris.
> > >
> > > uh, as one of the science guys on the list, Chris, would
> you care to
> > > comment on the end of the world possibility this Wed.
> > > Sept. 10th when the mad scientists of the Large Hedron Collider
> > > attempt to create their mini black hole?:)
> > >
> >
> > ;-) it is a problem isn't it! forgive them ...  for they know not
> what they
> > do...?
>
> Chris,
>
> It was already obvious from your earlier remarks that you do
> not understand the essence of the Christian religion, nor in
> this instance do you see the shallowness of the disrespect
> revealed by your throwaway comment.  Jesus understood what he
> meant by saying, they know not what they do, and if he was
> merely mortal the point is lost.  As far as human frailty
> goes, quite often wrongdoers are perfectly aware of what they
> are doing, but fail to understand its significance.  Of
> course.  They are not usually philosophers, in the Greek
> sense of the term, interested with subjective passion in
> their thought.  This rather solemn statement is needful,
> because it concerns disagreements at the list concerning
> Kierkegaard's view of the Christian faith, and is hardly a
> trifling matter.
>

;-) you should have realised by now that I lean more to Nietzsche than
Kierkegaard. I find any religious perspective as de-humanising and as such
agree with Marx re 'opiate of the masses' .. or was it 'people'? ;-)

There is a sharp distinction between spirituality vs religion. Spirituality
comes as a property of being a social species and so elements of the
parallel when compared to the serial - the organic position brings out
properties of symmetry and so a sense of 'all is connected'. This sense
serves to integrate be it between members of the species or within each
member as singular beings. Not understanding these basics allows for
mis-interpretations of what is going on to a degree our interpretive skills
get out of control when not grounded in reality through use of science
research - an example of this form of  'mis-guided' interpretation given by
a Rabbi describing 'angels' when the dynamics covered is more the neurology
responding to the push of context on instincts/habits and consciousness
having no idea what is going on -- see
http://members.iimetro.com.au/~lofting/myweb/angels.html

Chris

--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "chris lofting" <lofting@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of louise
> > Sent: Tuesday, 9 September 2008 5:10 AM
> > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: [existlist] Re: Concurrence of Be-ing, Think-ing, & Tim-
ing
> >
> > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "chris lofting" <lofting@>
wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > > > [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Aija Veldre
> > Beldavs
> > > > Sent: Monday, 8 September 2008 8:35 PM
> > > > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > > > Subject: Re: [existlist] Re: Concurrence of Be-ing, Think-
ing, &
> > > > Tim-ing
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > The ontological dynamic is recursive and as such reflects
> > > > the dynamics
> > > > > of the chaos game. That reflection demands consideration of
the
> > > > > methodology and its properties and methods that can be
> > > > confused with what is under analysis.
> > > > > Chris.
> > > >
> > > > uh, as one of the science guys on the list, Chris, would
> > you care to
> > > > comment on the end of the world possibility this Wed.
> > > > Sept. 10th when the mad scientists of the Large Hedron
Collider
> > > > attempt to create their mini black hole?:)
> > > >
> > >
> > > ;-) it is a problem isn't it! forgive them ...  for they know
not
> > what they
> > > do...?
> >
> > Chris,
> >
> > It was already obvious from your earlier remarks that you do
> > not understand the essence of the Christian religion, nor in
> > this instance do you see the shallowness of the disrespect
> > revealed by your throwaway comment.  Jesus understood what he
> > meant by saying, they know not what they do, and if he was
> > merely mortal the point is lost.  As far as human frailty
> > goes, quite often wrongdoers are perfectly aware of what they
> > are doing, but fail to understand its significance.  Of
> > course.  They are not usually philosophers, in the Greek
> > sense of the term, interested with subjective passion in
> > their thought.  This rather solemn statement is needful,
> > because it concerns disagreements at the list concerning
> > Kierkegaard's view of the Christian faith, and is hardly a
> > trifling matter.
> >
>
> ;-) you should have realised by now that I lean more to Nietzsche
than
> Kierkegaard. I find any religious perspective as de-humanising and
as such
> agree with Marx re 'opiate of the masses' .. or was it 'people'? ;-)
>
> There is a sharp distinction between spirituality vs religion.
Spirituality
> comes as a property of being a social species and so elements of the
> parallel when compared to the serial - the organic position brings
out
> properties of symmetry and so a sense of 'all is connected'. This
sense
> serves to integrate be it between members of the species or within
each
> member as singular beings. Not understanding these basics allows for
> mis-interpretations of what is going on to a degree our
interpretive skills
> get out of control when not grounded in reality through use of
science
> research - an example of this form of  'mis-guided' interpretation
given by
> a Rabbi describing 'angels' when the dynamics covered is more the
neurology
> responding to the push of context on instincts/habits and
consciousness
> having no idea what is going on -- see
> http://members.iimetro.com.au/~lofting/myweb/angels.html
>
> Chris
>

Chris,

It is you who have no idea what is going on.  You are a newbie.
Please try to show a little humility.

Louise

Serious attention to the cultures of the classical world, and in
particular to the glory that was Greece, offers some kind of respite,
at least for myself, from the ghastly misunderstandings that have
recently haunted the list.  Of course, I have been branded insane
before now, if my interpretation does not mislead me.  So for the
present I favour quotation from that great book by E.R.Dodds, "The
Greeks and the Irrational".  The third chapter is titled, 'The
Blessings of Madness'.

~ "Our greatest blessings," says Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, "come to
us by way of madness": *ta megista ton agathon hemin gignetai dia
manias*.  That is, of course, a conscious paradox.  No doubt it
startled the fourth-century Athenian reader hardly less than it
startles us; for it is implied a little further on that most people
in Plato's time regarded madness as something discreditable, an
*oneidos*.  But the father of Western rationalism is not represented
as maintaining the general proposition that it is better to be mad
than sane, sick than sound.  He qualifies his paradox with the words
*theia mentoi dosei didomenes*, "provided the madness is given us by
divine gift."  And he proceeds to distinguish four types of
this "divine madness", which are produced, he says, "by a divinely
wrought change in our customary social norms" (*upo theias exallages
ton eiothoton nomimon*).  The four types are:
1) Prophetic madness, whose patron god is Apollo.
2) Telestic or ritual madness, whose patron is Dionysus.
3) Poetic madness, inspired by the Muses.
4) Erotic madness, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros. ~

Dodds goes on to explain that he wishes to concentrate on evidence
which may help us to find answers to two specific questions.

~ One is the historical question: how did the Greeks come by the
beliefs which underlie Plato's classification, and how far did they
modify them under the influence of advancing rationalism?  The other
question is psychological: how far can the mental states denoted by
Plato's "prophetic" and "ritual" madness be recognised as identical
with any states known to modern psychology and anthropology?  Both
questions are difficult ... ~

The author goes on to say:

~ Before approaching Plato's four "divine" types, I must first say
something about his general distinction between "divine" madness and
the ordinary kind which is caused by disease.  The distinction is of
course older than Plato.  From Herodotus we learn that the madness of
Cleomenes, in which most people saw the godsent punishment of
sacrilege, was put down by his own countrymen to the effects of heavy
drinking.  And although Herodotus refuses to accept this prosaic
explanation in Cleomenes' case, he is inclined to explain the madness
of Cambyses as due to congenital epilepsy, and adds the very sensible
remark that when the body is seriously deranged it is not surprising
that the mind should be affected also. ~

The clarity of this writing, about such a complex subject, is
something for which I feel immense gratitude.  As someone caught in
the kindly meshes of the modern mental health system in the UK, it
has me wondering just what psychiatry really is.  And various other
questions arise, which one day I might be able to formulate, or,
better, shape in some more artistic manner.  Hope springs eternal ...

Louise

> -----Original Message-----
> From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of louise
> Sent: Tuesday, 9 September 2008 10:13 AM
> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [existlist] Ancient themes
>
> Serious attention to the cultures of the classical world, and
> in particular to the glory that was Greece, offers some kind
> of respite, at least for myself, from the ghastly
> misunderstandings that have recently haunted the list.  Of
> course, I have been branded insane before now, if my
> interpretation does not mislead me.  So for the present I
> favour quotation from that great book by E.R.Dodds, "The
> Greeks and the Irrational".  The third chapter is titled,
> 'The Blessings of Madness'.
>
> ~ "Our greatest blessings," says Socrates in the *Phaedrus*,
> "come to us by way of madness": *ta megista ton agathon hemin
> gignetai dia manias*.  That is, of course, a conscious
> paradox.  No doubt it startled the fourth-century Athenian
> reader hardly less than it startles us; for it is implied a
> little further on that most people in Plato's time regarded
> madness as something discreditable, an *oneidos*.  But the
> father of Western rationalism is not represented as
> maintaining the general proposition that it is better to be
> mad than sane, sick than sound.  He qualifies his paradox
> with the words *theia mentoi dosei didomenes*, "provided the
> madness is given us by divine gift."  And he proceeds to
> distinguish four types of this "divine madness", which are
> produced, he says, "by a divinely wrought change in our
> customary social norms" (*upo theias exallages ton eiothoton
> nomimon*).  The four types are:
> 1) Prophetic madness, whose patron god is Apollo.
> 2) Telestic or ritual madness, whose patron is Dionysus.
> 3) Poetic madness, inspired by the Muses.
> 4) Erotic madness, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros. ~
>
> Dodds goes on to explain that he wishes to concentrate on
> evidence which may help us to find answers to two specific questions.
>
> ~ One is the historical question: how did the Greeks come by
> the beliefs which underlie Plato's classification, and how
> far did they modify them under the influence of advancing
> rationalism?  The other question is psychological: how far
> can the mental states denoted by Plato's "prophetic" and
> "ritual" madness be recognised as identical with any states
> known to modern psychology and anthropology?  Both questions
> are difficult ... ~
>

all VERY EASY to do if you understand how we categorise basd on how our
brains seed all meaning - IOW a little neuroscience as covered in my
"Categories of Mediation" material. The brains of the ancient Greeks were
still like ours and so used the same oscillations in the brain to
categorise.

The general qualities of being fall into a category space where:

Apollo maps to the Choleric, a focus on serving God, values driven,
religious, over-sensitive, huamanitarian. In modern times this is the MBTI
temperament of a NF (intuitive feelers), identity seekers

Dionysian maps to Sanguine, a focus on self-serving, artisans, the cycloid
(concrete, sensation seeking). Risk and independence driven, too excitable,
manic, imaginative, innovative. In modern times this is the MBTI temperament
of an SP (sensing perceiving).

The other two are in fact extensions of the above, where the erotic link
stems from Dionysian category and the poetic from the Apollo category.

Overall the above categories are a bit short and spans a level of type
categories. The core four are in fact:

Apollonian (serve God), Epimethean (serve man, guardians, can be too
serious), Promethean (rationals, science focus, can be too insensitive),
Dionysian (self serving, manic)

These derive from self-referencing the general qualities mapped to
Apollo/Dionysus ( modern form NF/SP) - we cover:

identity seekers (NF), security seekers(SJ), solution seekers(NT), sensation
seekers(SP)

The next level covers more self-referencing to give us more modern terms of
persona (all 'normal' or not) - to use Keirsey terms (they come in pairs due
to the self-referencing of a dichotomy by the brains oscillations across
differentiating/integrating):

Most integrating
............................................................................
.......Most differentiating
Advocates, Mentors(muses) | Conservators, Monitors | Engineers, Organisers |
Players (lovers not fighters), Operators (fighters)

My material extends all of this to 64 and if need be on to 4096 and on to
16+ million - but this level is too much! the 64 level is 'just right' and
reflects the properties and methods of language.

Note that the self-referencing leads to all eight above being found in EACH
at the level of 64 categories (eight octets). These 64 categories contribute
to the full spectrum of EACH category through use of analogy.

Any form of neurotic/psychotic state will 'fit' into this spectrum other
than in severe psychotic states that can present as paradoxical due to
'unique' wiring that is disabling. the mania aspect present in all is more
often seen as a 'divine' form of expression and so the differentiation of
divine from disease.

A generic category of 'mental' states mapped to the above:

Advocates - amnesic or delusive hysterics
Mentors - seizure hysterics ('Midas touch')
Conservators - anxious or melancholic depressives
monitors - hypocholeric or neurasthenic depressives
engineers - inhibited obsessives
organisers - driven obsessives
players - masochistics
operators - manics

All of these categories come out of the ONE set of categories derived by the
neurology at the unconscious level and then 'grounded' by consciousness
using words to link the universal qualities to a local context. The lack of
understanding about what is going on 'in here' means a lot of ad-hoc
development and differences in ordering etc to give us the unique
perspectives of local contexts but behind all of that uniqueness is a level
of sameness sourced in our neurology.

the DEPTH is an issue in that to get to the language-producing level (use of
analogies etc) you have to go to 6 levels of iteration (64 categories). A
this level we can acquire a spectrum of each type.

The 'ancients' had no idea of the science-derived data we have these days
and so their thinking was 'limited' to development of categories a bit short
in precision. With depth comes their use as analogies is describing each
category.

SO - Louise - behind ANY culture's local categorisation systems you will
find the ONE methodology, self-referencing, but done in an ad-hoc manner and
so some areas well fleshed out and going down a number of levels and other
areas seemingly ignored/not-realised due to contextual biases in behaviours
etc.
Go deep enough and it will all join up and in doing so allow for finer
descriptions of each category through reference to all of them.

Chris.

OK, Chris. Have fun.  End of conversation, for me.  Louise

--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "chris lofting" <lofting@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of louise
> > Sent: Tuesday, 9 September 2008 10:13 AM
> > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: [existlist] Ancient themes
> >
> > Serious attention to the cultures of the classical world, and
> > in particular to the glory that was Greece, offers some kind
> > of respite, at least for myself, from the ghastly
> > misunderstandings that have recently haunted the list.  Of
> > course, I have been branded insane before now, if my
> > interpretation does not mislead me.  So for the present I
> > favour quotation from that great book by E.R.Dodds, "The
> > Greeks and the Irrational".  The third chapter is titled,
> > 'The Blessings of Madness'.
> >
> > ~ "Our greatest blessings," says Socrates in the *Phaedrus*,
> > "come to us by way of madness": *ta megista ton agathon hemin
> > gignetai dia manias*.  That is, of course, a conscious
> > paradox.  No doubt it startled the fourth-century Athenian
> > reader hardly less than it startles us; for it is implied a
> > little further on that most people in Plato's time regarded
> > madness as something discreditable, an *oneidos*.  But the
> > father of Western rationalism is not represented as
> > maintaining the general proposition that it is better to be
> > mad than sane, sick than sound.  He qualifies his paradox
> > with the words *theia mentoi dosei didomenes*, "provided the
> > madness is given us by divine gift."  And he proceeds to
> > distinguish four types of this "divine madness", which are
> > produced, he says, "by a divinely wrought change in our
> > customary social norms" (*upo theias exallages ton eiothoton
> > nomimon*).  The four types are:
> > 1) Prophetic madness, whose patron god is Apollo.
> > 2) Telestic or ritual madness, whose patron is Dionysus.
> > 3) Poetic madness, inspired by the Muses.
> > 4) Erotic madness, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros. ~
> >
> > Dodds goes on to explain that he wishes to concentrate on
> > evidence which may help us to find answers to two specific
questions.
> >
> > ~ One is the historical question: how did the Greeks come by
> > the beliefs which underlie Plato's classification, and how
> > far did they modify them under the influence of advancing
> > rationalism?  The other question is psychological: how far
> > can the mental states denoted by Plato's "prophetic" and
> > "ritual" madness be recognised as identical with any states
> > known to modern psychology and anthropology?  Both questions
> > are difficult ... ~
> >
>
> all VERY EASY to do if you understand how we categorise basd on how
our
> brains seed all meaning - IOW a little neuroscience as covered in my
> "Categories of Mediation" material. The brains of the ancient
Greeks were
> still like ours and so used the same oscillations in the brain to
> categorise.
>
> The general qualities of being fall into a category space where:
>
> Apollo maps to the Choleric, a focus on serving God, values driven,
> religious, over-sensitive, huamanitarian. In modern times this is
the MBTI
> temperament of a NF (intuitive feelers), identity seekers
>
> Dionysian maps to Sanguine, a focus on self-serving, artisans, the
cycloid
> (concrete, sensation seeking). Risk and independence driven, too
excitable,
> manic, imaginative, innovative. In modern times this is the MBTI
temperament
> of an SP (sensing perceiving).
>
> The other two are in fact extensions of the above, where the erotic
link
> stems from Dionysian category and the poetic from the Apollo
category.
>
> Overall the above categories are a bit short and spans a level of
type
> categories. The core four are in fact:
>
> Apollonian (serve God), Epimethean (serve man, guardians, can be too
> serious), Promethean (rationals, science focus, can be too
insensitive),
> Dionysian (self serving, manic)
>
> These derive from self-referencing the general qualities mapped to
> Apollo/Dionysus ( modern form NF/SP) - we cover:
>
> identity seekers (NF), security seekers(SJ), solution seekers(NT),
sensation
> seekers(SP)
>
> The next level covers more self-referencing to give us more modern
terms of
> persona (all 'normal' or not) - to use Keirsey terms (they come in
pairs due
> to the self-referencing of a dichotomy by the brains oscillations
across
> differentiating/integrating):
>
> Most integrating
> ....................................................................
........
> .......Most differentiating
> Advocates, Mentors(muses) | Conservators, Monitors | Engineers,
Organisers |
> Players (lovers not fighters), Operators (fighters)
>
> My material extends all of this to 64 and if need be on to 4096 and
on to
> 16+ million - but this level is too much! the 64 level is 'just
right' and
> reflects the properties and methods of language.
>
> Note that the self-referencing leads to all eight above being found
in EACH
> at the level of 64 categories (eight octets). These 64 categories
contribute
> to the full spectrum of EACH category through use of analogy.
>
> Any form of neurotic/psychotic state will 'fit' into this spectrum
other
> than in severe psychotic states that can present as paradoxical due
to
> 'unique' wiring that is disabling. the mania aspect present in all
is more
> often seen as a 'divine' form of expression and so the
differentiation of
> divine from disease.
>
> A generic category of 'mental' states mapped to the above:
>
> Advocates - amnesic or delusive hysterics
> Mentors - seizure hysterics ('Midas touch')
> Conservators - anxious or melancholic depressives
> monitors - hypocholeric or neurasthenic depressives
> engineers - inhibited obsessives
> organisers - driven obsessives
> players - masochistics
> operators - manics
>
> All of these categories come out of the ONE set of categories
derived by the
> neurology at the unconscious level and then 'grounded' by
consciousness
> using words to link the universal qualities to a local context. The
lack of
> understanding about what is going on 'in here' means a lot of ad-hoc
> development and differences in ordering etc to give us the unique
> perspectives of local contexts but behind all of that uniqueness is
a level
> of sameness sourced in our neurology.
>
> the DEPTH is an issue in that to get to the language-producing
level (use of
> analogies etc) you have to go to 6 levels of iteration (64
categories). A
> this level we can acquire a spectrum of each type.
>
> The 'ancients' had no idea of the science-derived data we have
these days
> and so their thinking was 'limited' to development of categories a
bit short
> in precision. With depth comes their use as analogies is describing
each
> category.
>
> SO - Louise - behind ANY culture's local categorisation systems you
will
> find the ONE methodology, self-referencing, but done in an ad-hoc
manner and
> so some areas well fleshed out and going down a number of levels
and other
> areas seemingly ignored/not-realised due to contextual biases in
behaviours
> etc.
> Go deep enough and it will all join up and in doing so allow for
finer
> descriptions of each category through reference to all of them.
>
> Chris.
>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of louise
> Sent: Tuesday, 9 September 2008 6:54 PM
> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [existlist] Re: Ancient themes to Modern themes
>
> OK, Chris. Have fun.  End of conversation, for me.  Louise
>

is this list a form of therapy for you? for anyone else?

does it work as a place you feel 'safe'?

do you prefer 'being' existentialist or 'doing' existentialism? or is it all
linked up as an existentialist continuum?

Do you understand that 'mindless' evolution is more pragmatist and so open
to using existentialist perspective when necessary (as in some context
pushes buttons that 'fit' an existentialist perspective and when the button
pushing changes you change or fight it), but recognising that there are
contexts where it does not fit and so some alternative is required for 'best
fit'?

Do you understand that the fitting of universals into a local context
without customisation elicits neuroses? - as does generalising a particular
without customisation to the general also causes 'issues'?

Chris.

Chris,

Please, move on.

Wil

In a message dated 9/9/08 6:03:18 AM, lofting@... writes:


>
> is this list a form of therapy for you? for anyone else?
>
> does it work as a place you feel 'safe'?
>
> do you prefer 'being' existentialist or 'doing' existentialism? or is it all
> linked up as an existentialist continuum?
>
> Do you understand that 'mindless' evolution is more pragmatist and so open
> to using existentialist perspective when necessary (as in some context
> pushes buttons that 'fit' an existentialist perspective and when the button
> pushing changes you change or fight it), but recognising that there are
> contexts where it does not fit and so some alternative is required for 'best
> fit'?
>
> Do you understand that the fitting of universals into a local context
> without customisation elicits neuroses? - as does generalising a particular
> without customisation to the general also causes 'issues'?
>
> Chris.
>




**************
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plus the latest fall trends and hair styles at StyleList.com.

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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Wil:

Heidegger never gave up on his question of Being now did he? Sure, he
tried to reinvent the basic terms of metaphysics, and rightly so,
because the language of metaphysics remains entrenched in a
constellation of linguistic confusions that obscure the essence of
the question of Being. Yes, it is necessary to rethink what
metaphysics is supposed to be, and it is necessary to examine our
more or less unconscious usage of language in the doing of
metaphysics.

But, metaphysics, in the broadest sense, as a foundational inquiry
into the meaning of Being, the very thing that the philosopher is
called to do, is what Heidegger always had in mind. Heidegger stayed
a metaphysician, in this sense of the term, to the very end.

What Heidegger was against was not metaphysics, per se, but a certain
kind of metaphysics, the most common kind, a kind of metaphysics
based upon substance ontology, a kind of metaphysics based upon the
conflation of transcendence and infinitude; i.e., the kind of
metaphysics that assumes that what is transcendental, i.e.,
constitutive of the very possibility of knowing beings in some
fashion, must be some kind of an infinite substance either not
related to man and man's freedom, or, related to man and man's
freedom as a creator is related to its created thing.

That is the onto-theology, the traditional metaphysics, that
Heidegger was trying to overcome. The problem of transcendence, and
the relation of that problem of transcendence to the philosophical
interpretation of human existence, human existence here being seen as
a possible kind of Being, for Being, a potentiality of Being, and the
intimate connection of that to our knowledge and our freedom, was
never repudiated by Heidegger.

After all, who, or what, actually proposes to DO the metaphysics? A
knower that is a WHO, not just a what, a knower that is a FREE Being,
a being that is fundamentally unique, and different from, other kinds
of beings, a Being that is, in the existential sense, a fulfillment
of the potentiality of Being itself.

Heidegger's turn was not a turn away from metaphysics. It was a turn
toward a more radical way of doing metaphysics, a way of doing
metaphysics that brings the poesis of noesis, the poeticizing
character of understanding, into a sharper focus. Heidegger saw the
turn that way, and he described it that way. The reason why that turn
is particularly crucial for philosophy, right now, is a fudamentally
historical reason, and it has to do with the domination of Being,
here and now, on the planet, by the instrumentality of man. The
question, concerning technology, is the historical place where the
question of the meaning of Being is now being worked out, according
to Heidegger.

In spite of the fact that, thanks to the authority of science, and
the impact that science has had upon our instrumental relation to our
world, we are right in the middle of something, here, that we do not
understand, that we utterly fail to comprehend, and that is the
predicament of our so-called progress.

Of course, it is easy, all too easy, to just label what Heidegger is
up to as a reactionary conservatism, a going back to the good old
days, when things were folksy and parochial. But labels don't solve
problems. They just obscure them. And I think that kind of
characterization of Heidegger is rather self-serving and just too
convenient. It plays right into our technocratic illusion of being
superior, because we are the modern ones, we have our power and our
tehcnology, we think we can step beyond our history, and live into a
future without a history, a future where history is no longer
relevant. In our headlong rush to go where we think we are headed, we
need to think long and hard about what we tacitly propose to leave
behind. Where we came from, has everything to do with where we are
going.

Yes, according to Heidegger, the futural dimension of our existence
is, in an important sense, primary, becaue the future is where we are
going, and it is the region of our possibilities. But, Heidegger
isn't being one-sided about it. Having a future means also having a
history. What that means, as far as the history of metaphysics is
concerned, is not the repudiation of that history, but the
appropriation of that history. And this, of course, plays out,
existentially, factically, in the real world, in the political realm,
where all of the Daseins are together with one another, for better or
for worse, in the same world, and not up in the clouds, at the summit
of some ivory tower.

The nagging question about Heidegger, of course, is his relation to
German National Socialism. What was that all about? How could
Heidegger have gone there? But, more importantly, I think, is what
that was all about, vis-a-vis our situation right now, some sevnty or
so years later, a mere blink of an eye in terms of historical time,
and how Heidegger's writings, as well as his involvement in all of
that, may illuminate what that could still mean for us.

My professor in phenomenology and existentialism, way back when, who
intoduced me to Heidegger's Being and Time, was an altar boy in
Austria during the Holocaust. He remembered seeing the bodies piled
up in the courtyard of the church. He remembered the insanity of it
all. As an adult, his emotional scars were obvious, even though, in
true philosophical fashion, he was probably the most stoic of any of
the professors I had studied under. I think that is what I admired
about Doctor Pasterk the most. Not his learning. Not his mastery of
ancient Greek and German philosophy. Not his ability to read, write,
speak, and think in, at least seven different languages. It was his
attitude, his comportment, his state of mind, that I admired the most.

Cyrill once pointed out an uncomfortable possibility that we don't
like to look at very much. It could happen here too. It already has
happened, at least a couple of times, now hasn't it? The subjugation
of the native American indian. The enslavement of the African. Our so-
called "being civilized" and our noble and manifest destiny to be a
moral beacon for the world, turns out to be a mere pretext for our
will to power over the world and history, a thin veneer of pretense,
over an abyss of violent intent.

It would be nice to be able to look back upon the Holocaust as a
nightmare that can be blissfully forgotten, as an aberration that
can't possibly happen again, or at least that can't happen again more
radically, more destructively, than it already has. But we are only
kidding ourselves is we think that the Holocaust, per se, can be
resigned to history, that Holocaust, per se, no longer constitutes a
real possibility for our Dasein, a possible future of humanity. That
is the knife egde upon which modernity, or post-modernity, or
whatever we call our situation, is so precariously balanced right now.

Heidegger, I think, is important because his thinking, as
metaphysical and seemingly far removed as it is from the nitty gritty
existential concerns that still trouble us, actually resides at the
very center of that uncomfortable truth about our modern existence,
the reason for our existential angst concerning our present
historical situation. I certainly get that feeling from Heidegger's
later writings, the work he did after the second world war, work
that, in retrospect, is driven by the disturbing, and disturbed,
consciousness of the existential gravity of the situation that only
began to unfold with the Holocaust.

It ain't over. Not by a long shot. But we have all kinds of things to
distract us from a poignant awareness of what is really going on the
world these days. We have the elections, reality TV, pornography. In
fact, I would sum it all up under the designation, pornography. It is
an apt metaphor for what obsesses us at every moment of our lives --
the SPECTACLE.

You name it. We got it.

Is it not a wonder that good old down home metaphysics seems so far
removed from us? So irrelevant? That, right there, is actually part
of the metaphysical story. Who knows? It might be the final chapter
of that story. If there ever is an end to metaphysics, it will be
because WE ourselves have ended. That was what Malthus was talking
about. This endless progress of our humanity, this illusion of our
unlimited potential for growth, cannot go on. That, right there, is a
mathematical necessity about which we, in our smug modernity, seem to
be totally oblivious. Heidegger is right. What we are all about, IS
this obliviousness. Go figure.

Hb3g

--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
>
> HB,
>
> You are going way too far, basically into the realm of onto-
theology,
> the very thing, btw, that Heidegger opposed.
>
> Wil
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>
> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> Sent: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 9:02 am
> Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Louise:
>
>
>
> Well, if you ask me, it isn't even scientism. It is gibberish. My
mind
>
> is preoccupied, right now anyway, with things that are pretty far
>
> removed from what Chris is into.
>
>
>
> I am reading Heidegger's Essence of Human Freedom right now. Have
you
>
> read it? He is right on the spot, I think, with his interpretation
of
>
> the existential significance of Kant's proposed solution to the
third
>
> antinomy.
>
>
>
> The reason why it is possible for us to think beings in both ways,
as
>
> things determined by cause-effect, and, for some kinds of beings,
that
>
> is, being like us, who are intelligences, as essentially free self-
>
> determinations, IS because causality is ultimately grounded in the
>
> possibility of freedom.
>
>
>
> This is an ontological thesis that has far reaching consequences for
>
> how we look at what metaphysics is, and for how we look at what the
>
> sciences are. Not to mention for how we look at who and what WE are.
>
> AND, for what we might ultimately think beings in general ARE.
>
>
>
> It goes back to that knowledge and freedom thing that I was harping
on
>
> a few months back. The supposed antagonism between the compulsion to
>
> know and the existential necessity of freedom, is for the most
part, I
>
> now think, an illusory antagonism. In point of fact, our compulsion
to
>
> know is a symptom of our freedom to be, a "to be" about which we
really
>
> have no choice.
>
>
>
> That seems paradoxical, "to be" fated to be free. But I am okay with
>
> that. In a weirdly intimate and existential sense, it DOES kind of
ring
>
> true does it not?
>
>
>
> Fate guides those who are willing. It drags the rest along in
chains.
>
> To paraphrae good old Seneca.
>
>
>
> Here is what I think is an exquisite summation, on Heidegger's part,
>
> from the ending of chapter three of the first part of Essence of
>
> Freedom. It hits the nail right on the head:
>
>
>
> "Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but
>
> man as a possibility of freedom."
>
>
>
> To me, that is right on the money.
>
>
>
> Here is some of the rest:
>
>
>
> "Human freedom is the fredom that breaks through in man and takes
him
>
> up unto itself, thus making man possible."
>
>
>
> Who could DENY that the essence of man is man's freedom? Certainly
no
>
> existentialist. At least, not a REAL existentialist. But Heidegger
is
>
> talking about all of this on a deeper level, an ontological level.
The
>
> FACT that man is existentially free is ONTOLOGICALLY primary.
>
>
>
> Heidegger brings this ontological primacy of human existential
freedom
>
> out in the very next sentence:
>
>
>
> "If freedom is the ground of the possibility of existence, the root
of
>
> Being and Time, and thus the ground of the possibility of
understanding
>
> Being in its whole breadth and fullness, then man, as grounded in
his
>
> existence upon and in this freedom, is the site where beings in the
>
> whole become revealed, i.e., he is that particular Being through
which
>
> beings as such announce themselves."
>
>
>
> For Heidegger, the fundamental problems of philosophy, those
questions
>
> about Being, about truth, about who and what man is, about knowing,
>
> about man's freedom, and the relation of man's freedom to man's
inner
>
> compulsion to know Being, as well as time and history, are no mere
>
> haphazard collection of philosophical curiosities. All of these
>
> questions are united. They belong together. Like the facets of the
>
> diamond, they are the various angles into and upon the one central
>
> question of Being, the question, "Why is there Being as such?"
which,
>
> it turns out, can not be separated from the question, "Why is there
a
>
> Being who questions Being?"
>
>
>
> The answer to this why question is, in a single word, FREEDOM. A
more
>
> detailed answer would be something like this: For the sake of
freedom.
>
> For the possibility of freedom. But this answer, because it is
framed
>
> in terms of possibility, in terms of an ultimate possibility of
Being,
>
> an ultimate possibility for man, is an answer that rebounds back
into a
>
> question. It is a challenge, more so than it is either an answer or
a
>
> question.
>
>
>
> To be, or not to be. That is the question. That is the answer. That
is
>
> the challenge.
>
>
>
> But the challenge, and the ultimate possibility that the challenge
is
>
> all about, has to do with time. It has to do with the future. We
could
>
> ask, "Why freedom?" The answer to that can only be: For the sake of
a
>
> future. So that there can be, there will be, some kind of a future.
>
>
>
> Now what is up with that? Do we go Darwinian about it here? I think
>
> not. It would be very easy, and, I think, very WRONG, for us to try
and
>
> reduce our having a future to some kind of blind mechanism like
>
> survival of the fitter. The real relationship, the ontological
>
> relationship, is almost exactly the other way around, AND, it is a
>
> teleological relationship, an entelecheia of Being. The reason why
>
> there is survival of the fitter, why there is evolution, is because
>
> Being IS, in its umtimate essence, an ultimate possibility, the
ability
>
> to HAVE a future, and that is why beings like us, beings who
actually
>
> have a future, i.e., some kind of a history, are not just accidental
>
> beings, but an inevitability of Being itself.
>
>
>
> To me, this makes all of that scientism look kind of trivial. But
hey,
>
> this really is against the grain of our modern time, with its
supremacy
>
> of technology, reality TV, and the authority of science that we so
take
>
> for granted. And rightly so. Philosophers are supposed to be
radicals.
>
> They are supposed to go against the grain. Otherwise, what good are
>
> they? How can one claim to have earned the right to be called
>
> philosopher if, on the one hand, one is subservient to the
authority of
>
> anything, and, on the other hand, one has never even attempted to
>
> penetrate down into the very core, the root, the fundamental
essence,
>
> of every thing there is?
>
>
>
> Okay. Why go there? Why not just stay on the surface? Why not just
>
> remain superficial? Why not just take some authority's word for it.
>
> This is what it is, and it is what it is. Don't question it. Just
>
> accept it. Just press the "I believe" button and everything will
turn
>
> out all right.
>
>
>
> I say, not because we can, that is the instrumental view of human
>
> existence, the authority of the instrumentality of man that lies
behind
>
> all forms of authority, the technologization of our Dasein that
turns
>
> us into a mere thing that is only present-at-hand. I say it is
because
>
> we must, because our freedom necessitates the taking of this
dangerous
>
> step into the abyss of our own Being. If we don't go there, if we
don't
>
> take that step, then, we have given up our selves. We have given up
on
>
> man. Then, it is Man, not just god, who is really dead to the world,
>
> and that, right there, is the true nihilism of our having given up
on
>
> ourselves, the nihilism that becomes, now, the warrant for every
kind
>
> of holocaust, every variation of apocalypse, every pornographic
excess,
>
> that we can imagine, and even bring into action.
>
>
>
> So, why care about man, if man does not matter? Why be noble, if
there
>
> is nothing noble left to strive for? If, as the believers in
scientism
>
> would have us believe, we ourselves are just the result of a blind
>
> calculation, nothing more than the computation of some quantity,
WHO, I
>
> would ask, is doing the calculating? It isn't some god. We aren't
>
> children anymore. But it isn't science that grew us up. I will tell
you
>
> that right now. Science, right now, here in the twenty first
century,
>
> is merely an adolescent stage for us, and it is really nothing more
>
> than that. We know a lot less than we think we do, and we are
mistaken
>
> to think that who and what we are can be measured either by how
much we
>
> think we know or by how much we think we can just make happen just
for
>
> the sake of making it happen. There is a backlash to the "because we
>
> can" that can shock us back into our center; if, that is, that shock
>
> doesn't come too late.
>
>
>
> Hb3g
>
>
>
> --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "louise" <hecubatoher@> wrote:
>
> >
>
> > in the course of recent discussion with newbie chris lofting, i
took
>
> > the attitude, 'live and let live', on the basis that he was an
>
> exponent
>
> > of a scientism that in the context of everyday life is not
illegal,
>
> and
>
> > that my own opinion (in which i am clearly not alone) that his
theses
>
> > are essentially off-topic to the list, is consequence of my
>
> existential
>
> > commitment, subjective, and based in philosophical enquiry.   it
is,
>
> > however, annoying, that so much mental space becomes occupied with
>
> what
>
> > looks to me like the forays of a religious zealot.  it would not
be
>
> > that, posted at a neurology list.
>
> >
>
> > louise
>
> > ... who believes angels are angels
>
> >
>

You have written quite a lot here, and it will take some time to digest
it all. But, in fact, I cannot remember Heidegger talking about a
'good' metaphysics, and while I agree that he WAS engaging in a form of
negative idealism, he clearly did not think so. In any case, Heidegger
would not concur on your statements recently concerning entelechy.

Thx,
Wil


-----Original Message-----
From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>
To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 3:00 pm
Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate

























Wil:



Heidegger never gave up on his question of Being now did he? Sure, he

tried to reinvent the basic terms of metaphysics, and rightly so,

because the language of metaphysics remains entrenched in a

constellation of linguistic confusions that obscure the essence of

the question of Being. Yes, it is necessary to rethink what

metaphysics is supposed to be, and it is necessary to examine our

more or less unconscious usage of language in the doing of

metaphysics.



But, metaphysics, in the broadest sense, as a foundational inquiry

into the meaning of Being, the very thing that the philosopher is

called to do, is what Heidegger always had in mind. Heidegger stayed

a metaphysician, in this sense of the term, to the very end.



What Heidegger was against was not metaphysics, per se, but a certain

kind of metaphysics, the most common kind, a kind of metaphysics

based upon substance ontology, a kind of metaphysics based upon the

conflation of transcendence and infinitude; i.e., the kind of

metaphysics that assumes that what is transcendental, i.e.,

constitutive of the very possibility of knowing beings in some

fashion, must be some kind of an infinite substance either not

related to man and man's freedom, or, related to man and man's

freedom as a creator is related to its created thing.



That is the onto-theology, the traditional metaphysics, that

Heidegger was trying to overcome. The problem of transcendence, and

the relation of that problem of transcendence to the philosophical

interpretation of human existence, human existence here being seen as

a possible kind of Being, for Being, a potentiality of Being, and the

intimate connection of that to our knowledge and our freedom, was

never repudiated by Heidegger.



After all, who, or what, actually proposes to DO the metaphysics? A

knower that is a WHO, not just a what, a knower that is a FREE Being,

a being that is fundamentally unique, and different from, other kinds

of beings, a Being that is, in the existential sense, a fulfillment

of the potentiality of Being itself.



Heidegger's turn was not a turn away from metaphysics. It was a turn

toward a more radical way of doing metaphysics, a way of doing

metaphysics that brings the poesis of noesis, the poeticizing

character of understanding, into a sharper focus. Heidegger saw the

turn that way, and he described it that way. The reason why that turn

is particularly crucial for philosophy, right now, is a fudamentally

historical reason, and it has to do with the domination of Being,

here and now, on the planet, by the instrumentality of man. The

question, concerning technology, is the historical place where the

question of the meaning of Being is now being worked out, according

to Heidegger.



In spite of the fact that, thanks to the authority of science, and

the impact that science has had upon our instrumental relation to our

world, we are right in the middle of something, here, that we do not

understand, that we utterly fail to comprehend, and that is the

predicament of our so-called progress.



Of course, it is easy, all too easy, to just label what Heidegger is

up to as a reactionary conservatism, a going back to the good old

days, when things were folksy and parochial. But labels don't solve

problems. They just obscure them. And I think that kind of

characterization of Heidegger is rather self-serving and just too

convenient. It plays right into our technocratic illusion of being

superior, because we are the modern ones, we have our power and our

tehcnology, we think we can step beyond our history, and live into a

future without a history, a future where history is no longer

relevant. In our headlong rush to go where we think we are headed, we

need to think long and hard about what we tacitly propose to leave

behind. Where we came from, has everything to do with where we are

going.



Yes, according to Heidegger, the futural dimension of our existence

is, in an important sense, primary, becaue the future is where we are

going, and it is the region of our possibilities. But, Heidegger

isn't being one-sided about it. Having a future means also having a

history. What that means, as far as the history of metaphysics is

concerned, is not the repudiation of that history, but the

appropriation of that history. And this, of course, plays out,

existentially, factically, in the real world, in the political realm,

where all of the Daseins are together with one another, for better or

for worse, in the same world, and not up in the clouds, at the summit

of some ivory tower.



The nagging question about Heidegger, of course, is his relation to

German National Socialism. What was that all about? How could

Heidegger have gone there? But, more importantly, I think, is what

that was all about, vis-a-vis our situation right now, some sevnty or

so years later, a mere blink of an eye in terms of historical time,

and how Heidegger's writings, as well as his involvement in all of

that, may illuminate what that could still mean for us.



My professor in phenomenology and existentialism, way back when, who

intoduced me to Heidegger's Being and Time, was an altar boy in

Austria during the Holocaust. He remembered seeing the bodies piled

up in the courtyard of the church. He remembered the insanity of it

all. As an adult, his emotional scars were obvious, even though, in

true philosophical fashion, he was probably the most stoic of any of

the professors I had studied under. I think that is what I admired

about Doctor Pasterk the most. Not his learning. Not his mastery of

ancient Greek and German philosophy. Not his ability to read, write,

speak, and think in, at least seven different languages. It was his

attitude, his comportment, his state of mind, that I admired the most.



Cyrill once pointed out an uncomfortable possibility that we don't

like to look at very much. It could happen here too. It already has

happened, at least a couple of times, now hasn't it? The subjugation

of the native American indian. The enslavement of the African. Our so-

called "being civilized" and our noble and manifest destiny to be a

moral beacon for the world, turns out to be a mere pretext for our

will to power over the world and history, a thin veneer of pretense,

over an abyss of violent intent.



It would be nice to be able to look back upon the Holocaust as a

nightmare that can be blissfully forgotten, as an aberration that

can't possibly happen again, or at least that can't happen again more

radically, more destructively, than it already has. But we are only

kidding ourselves is we think that the Holocaust, per se, can be

resigned to history, that Holocaust, per se, no longer constitutes a

real possibility for our Dasein, a possible future of humanity. That

is the knife egde upon which modernity, or post-modernity, or

whatever we call our situation, is so precariously balanced right now.



Heidegger, I think, is important because his thinking, as

metaphysical and seemingly far removed as it is from the nitty gritty

existential concerns that still trouble us, actually resides at the

very center of that uncomfortable truth about our modern existence,

the reason for our existential angst concerning our present

historical situation. I certainly get that feeling from Heidegger's

later writings, the work he did after the second world war, work

that, in retrospect, is driven by the disturbing, and disturbed,

consciousness of the existential gravity of the situation that only

began to unfold with the Holocaust.



It ain't over. Not by a long shot. But we have all kinds of things to

distract us from a poignant awareness of what is really going on the

world these days. We have the elections, reality TV, pornography. In

fact, I would sum it all up under the designation, pornography. It is

an apt metaphor for what obsesses us at every moment of our lives --

the SPECTACLE.



You name it. We got it.



Is it not a wonder that good old down home metaphysics seems so far

removed from us? So irrelevant? That, right there, is actually part

of the metaphysical story. Who knows? It might be the final chapter

of that story. If there ever is an end to metaphysics, it will be

because WE ourselves have ended. That was what Malthus was talking

about. This endless progress of our humanity, this illusion of our

unlimited potential for growth, cannot go on. That, right there, is a

mathematical necessity about which we, in our smug modernity, seem to

be totally oblivious. Heidegger is right. What we are all about, IS

this obliviousness. Go figure.



Hb3g



--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:

>

> HB,

>

> You are going way too far, basically into the realm of onto-

theology,

> the very thing, btw, that Heidegger opposed.

>

> Wil

>

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>

> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com

> Sent: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 9:02 am

> Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

> Louise:

>

>

>

> Well, if you ask me, it isn't even scientism. It is gibberish. My

mind

>

> is preoccupied, right now anyway, with things that are pretty far

>

> removed from what Chris is into.

>

>

>

> I am reading Heidegger's Essence of Human Freedom right now. Have

you

>

> read it? He is right on the spot, I think, with his interpretation

of

>

> the existential significance of Kant's proposed solution to the

third

>

> antinomy.

>

>

>

> The reason why it is possible for us to think beings in both ways,

as

>

> things determined by cause-effect, and, for some kinds of beings,

that

>

> is, being like us, who are intelligences, as essentially free self-

>

> determinations, IS because causality is ultimately grounded in the

>

> possibility of freedom.

>

>

>

> This is an ontological thesis that has far reaching consequences for

>

> how we look at what metaphysics is, and for how we look at what the

>

> sciences are. Not to mention for how we look at who and what WE are.

>

> AND, for what we might ultimately think beings in general ARE.

>

>

>

> It goes back to that knowledge and freedom thing that I was harping

on

>

> a few months back. The supposed antagonism between the compulsion to

>

> know and the existential necessity of freedom, is for the most

part, I

>

> now think, an illusory antagonism. In point of fact, our compulsion

to

>

> know is a symptom of our freedom to be, a "to be" about which we

really

>

> have no choice.

>

>

>

> That seems paradoxical, "to be" fated to be free. But I am okay with

>

> that. In a weirdly intimate and existential sense, it DOES kind of

ring

>

> true does it not?

>

>

>

> Fate guides those who are willing. It drags the rest along in

chains.

>

> To paraphrae good old Seneca.

>

>

>

> Here is what I think is an exquisite summation, on Heidegger's part,

>

> from the ending of chapter three of the first part of Essence of

>

> Freedom. It hits the nail right on the head:

>

>

>

> "Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but

>

> man as a possibility of freedom."

>

>

>

> To me, that is right on the money.

>

>

>

> Here is some of the rest:

>

>

>

> "Human freedom is the fredom that breaks through in man and takes

him

>

> up unto itself, thus making man possible."

>

>

>

> Who could DENY that the essence of man is man's freedom? Certainly

no

>

> existentialist. At least, not a REAL existentialist. But Heidegger

is

>

> talking about all of this on a deeper level, an ontological level.

The

>

> FACT that man is existentially free is ONTOLOGICALLY primary.

>

>

>

> Heidegger brings this ontological primacy of human existential

freedom

>

> out in the very next sentence:

>

>

>

> "If freedom is the ground of the possibility of existence, the root

of

>

> Being and Time, and thus the ground of the possibility of

understanding

>

> Being in its whole breadth and fullness, then man, as grounded in

his

>

> existence upon and in this freedom, is the site where beings in the

>

> whole become revealed, i.e., he is that particular Being through

which

>

> beings as such announce themselves."

>

>

>

> For Heidegger, the fundamental problems of philosophy, those

questions

>

> about Being, about truth, about who and what man is, about knowing,

>

> about man's freedom, and the relation of man's freedom to man's

inner

>

> compulsion to know Being, as well as time and history, are no mere

>

> haphazard collection of philosophical curiosities. All of these

>

> questions are united. They belong together. Like the facets of the

>

> diamond, they are the various angles into and upon the one central

>

> question of Being, the question, "Why is there Being as such?"

which,

>

> it turns out, can not be separated from the question, "Why is there

a

>

> Being who questions Being?"

>

>

>

> The answer to this why question is, in a single word, FREEDOM. A

more

>

> detailed answer would be something like this: For the sake of

freedom.

>

> For the possibility of freedom. But this answer, because it is

framed

>

> in terms of possibility, in terms of an ultimate possibility of

Being,

>

> an ultimate possibility for man, is an answer that rebounds back

into a

>

> question. It is a challenge, more so than it is either an answer or

a

>

> question.

>

>

>

> To be, or not to be. That is the question. That is the answer. That

is

>

> the challenge.

>

>

>

> But the challenge, and the ultimate possibility that the challenge

is

>

> all about, has to do with time. It has to do with the future. We

could

>

> ask, "Why freedom?" The answer to that can only be: For the sake of

a

>

> future. So that there can be, there will be, some kind of a future.

>

>

>

> Now what is up with that? Do we go Darwinian about it here? I think

>

> not. It would be very easy, and, I think, very WRONG, for us to try

and

>

> reduce our having a future to some kind of blind mechanism like

>

> survival of the fitter. The real relationship, the ontological

>

> relationship, is almost exactly the other way around, AND, it is a

>

> teleological relationship, an entelecheia of Being. The reason why

>

> there is survival of the fitter, why there is evolution, is because

>

> Being IS, in its umtimate essence, an ultimate possibility, the

ability

>

> to HAVE a future, and that is why beings like us, beings who

actually

>

> have a future, i.e., some kind of a history, are not just accidental

>

> beings, but an inevitability of Being itself.

>

>

>

> To me, this makes all of that scientism look kind of trivial. But

hey,

>

> this really is against the grain of our modern time, with its

supremacy

>

> of technology, reality TV, and the authority of science that we so

take

>

> for granted. And rightly so. Philosophers are supposed to be

radicals.

>

> They are supposed to go against the grain. Otherwise, what good are

>

> they? How can one claim to have earned the right to be called

>

> philosopher if, on the one hand, one is subservient to the

authority of

>

> anything, and, on the other hand, one has never even attempted to

>

> penetrate down into the very core, the root, the fundamental

essence,

>

> of every thing there is?

>

>

>

> Okay. Why go there? Why not just stay on the surface? Why not just

>

> remain superficial? Why not just take some authority's word for it.

>

> This is what it is, and it is what it is. Don't question it. Just

>

> accept it. Just press the "I believe" button and everything will

turn

>

> out all right.

>

>

>

> I say, not because we can, that is the instrumental view of human

>

> existence, the authority of the instrumentality of man that lies

behind

>

> all forms of authority, the technologization of our Dasein that

turns

>

> us into a mere thing that is only present-at-hand. I say it is

because

>

> we must, because our freedom necessitates the taking of this

dangerous

>

> step into the abyss of our own Being. If we don't go there, if we

don't

>

> take that step, then, we have given up our selves. We have given up

on

>

> man. Then, it is Man, not just god, who is really dead to the world,

>

> and that, right there, is the true nihilism of our having given up

on

>

> ourselves, the nihilism that becomes, now, the warrant for every

kind

>

> of holocaust, every variation of apocalypse, every pornographic

excess,

>

> that we can imagine, and even bring into action.

>

>

>

> So, why care about man, if man does not matter? Why be noble, if

there

>

> is nothing noble left to strive for? If, as the believers in

scientism

>

> would have us believe, we ourselves are just the result of a blind

>

> calculation, nothing more than the computation of some quantity,

WHO, I

>

> would ask, is doing the calculating? It isn't some god. We aren't

>

> children anymore. But it isn't science that grew us up. I will tell

you

>

> that right now. Science, right now, here in the twenty first

century,

>

> is merely an adolescent stage for us, and it is really nothing more

>

> than that. We know a lot less than we think we do, and we are

mistaken

>

> to think that who and what we are can be measured either by how

much we

>

> think we know or by how much we think we can just make happen just

for

>

> the sake of making it happen. There is a backlash to the "because we

>

> can" that can shock us back into our center; if, that is, that shock

>

> doesn't come too late.

>

>

>

> Hb3g

>

>

>

> --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "louise" <hecubatoher@> wrote:

>

> >

>

> > in the course of recent discussion with newbie chris lofting, i

took

>

> > the attitude, 'live and let live', on the basis that he was an

>

> exponent

>

> > of a scientism that in the context of everyday life is not

illegal,

>

> and

>

> > that my own opinion (in which i am clearly not alone) that his

theses

>

> > are essentially off-topic to the list, is consequence of my

>

> existential

>

> > commitment, subjective, and based in philosophical enquiry.   it

is,

>

> > however, annoying, that so much mental space becomes occupied with

>

> what

>

> > looks to me like the forays of a religious zealot.  it would not

be

>

> > that, posted at a neurology list.

>

> >

>

> > louise

>

> > ... who believes angels are angels

>

> >

>

Hb3g


"Heidegger never gave up on his question of Being now did he? Sure, he tried
to reinvent the basic terms of metaphysics, and rightly so, because the
language of metaphysics remains entrenched in a constellation of linguistic
confusions that obscure the essence of the question of Being. Yes, it is
necessary to
rethink what metaphysics is supposed to be, and it is necessary to examine our
more or less unconscious usage of language in the doing of metaphysics."

Response: He did change his programme later on, but I am more in the
nominalist camp these days as far as Heidegger's project goes. My basic feeling
is
that Heidegger's quest is something of the proverbial fool's errand. There
simply
is no point in the endeavor. As I said before, B&T is the only text that has
had an important impact on my thinking, especially the phenomenological
'deduction' of the categories of otherness, the existentialia.
---
"But, metaphysics, in the broadest sense, as a foundational inquiry into the
meaning of Being, the very thing that the philosopher is called to do, is what
Heidegger always had in mind. Heidegger stayed a metaphysician, in this sense
of the term, to the very end."

Response: I do not agree with that definition of metaphysics. I am given to
the more traditional definition as "why is there something rather than
nothing", as well as the questions resulting from that which involve the radical
nature of inhering concerns, not the overly general "question" that never gets
even
properly articulated in Heidegger. Every one of his texts is always an
introductory question that never delivers much of anything at all. My patience
is
rather too limited for his eternal propaedeutics.
---
"What Heidegger was against was not metaphysics, per se, but a certain kind
of metaphysics, the most common kind, a kind of metaphysics based upon
substance ontology, a kind of metaphysics based upon the conflation of
transcendence
and infinitude; i.e., the kind of metaphysics that assumes that what is
transcendental, i.e., constitutive of the very possibility of knowing beings in
some
fashion, must be some kind of an infinite substance either not related to man
and man's freedom, or, related to man and man's freedom as a creator is
related to its created thing."

Response: If you take a look at Heidegger's texts on Nietzsche or Hegel or
Kant, and especially those places where he compares himself with them, it is
clear that he was critical of metaphysics-proper. But more importantly, I think
you are right that Heidegger was doing a negative ontology, or as it should be
written, a negative theology. If I put on my Nietzsche hat, I would call
Heidegger a decadent, a nihilist. He, like the scholastics and priests before
him,
wants to contemplate the god thinking thought, and thus spurns the real life
of actual persons and their "ontic" history.
---
... "Heidegger's turn was not a turn away from metaphysics. It was a turn
toward a more radical way of doing metaphysics, a way of doing metaphysics that
brings the poesis of noesis, the poeticizing character of understanding, into a
sharper focus. Heidegger saw the turn that way, and he described it that way.
The reason why that turn is particularly crucial for philosophy, right now,
is a fudamentally historical reason, and it has to do with the domination of
Being, here and now, on the planet, by the instrumentality of man. The question,
concerning technology, is the historical place where the question of the
meaning of Being is now being worked out, according to Heidegger."

Response: That is a proper concern, but a false solution. You cannot protect
"man" by denying the actual everydayness of 'him' (sic). See Adorno, Marx,
even Hegel.
---
"In spite of the fact that, thanks to the authority of science, and the
impact that science has had upon our instrumental relation to our world, we are
right in the middle of something, here, that we do not understand, that we
utterly fail to comprehend, and that is the predicament of our so-called
progress."

Response: That is just wrong. It apes the 19th Century prejudices that still
appear in Husserl and Heidegger. What's next, a screed against Darwin and
secularism?
---
... "Heidegger, I think, is important because his thinking, as metaphysical
and seemingly far removed as it is from the nitty gritty existential concerns
that still trouble us, actually resides at the very center of that
uncomfortable truth about our modern existence, the reason for our existential
angst
concerning our present historical situation. ..."

Response: I couldn't disagree more, for the most part. If you are losing your
job or facing some loss at the hands of injustice, the contemplation of Being
would seem a Bourgeois luxury, at best. If you are not facing these problems
or ones like them, that, too, would seem a Bourgeois luxury.
---
"It ain't over. Not by a long shot. But we have all kinds of things to
distract us from a poignant awareness of what is really going on the world these
days. We have the elections, reality TV, pornography. In fact, I would sum it
all
up under the designation, pornography. It is an apt metaphor for what
obsesses us at every moment of our lives -- the SPECTACLE."

Response: I know you mean well, but this kind of moralism strikes me as
reactionary.
---
... "This endless progress of our humanity, this illusion of our unlimited
potential for growth, cannot go on. That, right there, is a mathematical
necessity about which we, in our smug modernity, seem to be totally oblivious.
Heidegger is right. What we are all about, IS this obliviousness. Go figure."

Response: Aha! Now you have exposed yourself! If you have problems with our
socio-political world, do politics, not metaphysics. Forget Heidegger; read
Foucault.

Wil




**************
Psssst...Have you heard the news? There's a new fashion blog,
plus the latest fall trends and hair styles at StyleList.com.

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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Wil: You have written quite a lot here, and it will take some time to
digest it all...

Hb3g: Yes, I have been talking here a lot lately. I am on at least
eigh othere lists. Not only am I not talking on those lists but
neither is anybody else. I wonder why?

Wil: But, in fact, I cannot remember Heidegger talking about a 'good'
metaphysics...

Hb3g: What I have in mind, here, is Heidegger's fundamental ontology.
He conceives of as distinct from, but not totally unrelated to,
substance ontology, the metaphysical tradition inspired mostly by
Aristotle. But Heidegger also what he means by transcendence. He goes
into it in Being and Time and in other texts, especially, Essence of
Freedom, wher he relates it to Kant.

The gist of the transcendence thing for Heidegger, as far as I
understand it so far, is this. We should not be too quick to identify
transcendence with infinity. This is something that I, myself, have
pretty much had to reverse my thinking on as of late, precisely
because of Heidegger's thoughts on the matter. Rememeber how
Heidegger describes the trasncendence of Dasein in B & T? It is a
finite transcendence. At first blush, that almost seems like an
oxymoron. But, in point of fact, as Heidegger explains in B & T, the
characteristic finitude of Dasein, its finite and at first pre-
conceptual understanding of Being, IS its transcendence over beings.

Wil: and while I agree that he WAS engaging in a form of negative
idealism, he clearly did not think so...

Hb3g: I don't get this. Can you unpack it a bit?

Wil: In any case, Heidegger would not concur on your statements
recently concerning entelechy.

Hb3g: And yet, in the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) Heidegger,
point blank, describes this entelecheia as Aristotle's highest
concept of Being. He explicitly takes up entelecheia in Essence of
Freedom too.

Let me ask you: How are we supposed to conceive of Heidegger's
projection of possibilities as described in B & T? Why is the futural
dimension of Dasein's temporality the most important dimension for
Heidegger?

Hb3g

>
> Thx,
> Wil
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>
> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> Sent: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 3:00 pm
> Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Wil:
>
>
>
> Heidegger never gave up on his question of Being now did he? Sure,
he
>
> tried to reinvent the basic terms of metaphysics, and rightly so,
>
> because the language of metaphysics remains entrenched in a
>
> constellation of linguistic confusions that obscure the essence of
>
> the question of Being. Yes, it is necessary to rethink what
>
> metaphysics is supposed to be, and it is necessary to examine our
>
> more or less unconscious usage of language in the doing of
>
> metaphysics.
>
>
>
> But, metaphysics, in the broadest sense, as a foundational inquiry
>
> into the meaning of Being, the very thing that the philosopher is
>
> called to do, is what Heidegger always had in mind. Heidegger stayed
>
> a metaphysician, in this sense of the term, to the very end.
>
>
>
> What Heidegger was against was not metaphysics, per se, but a
certain
>
> kind of metaphysics, the most common kind, a kind of metaphysics
>
> based upon substance ontology, a kind of metaphysics based upon the
>
> conflation of transcendence and infinitude; i.e., the kind of
>
> metaphysics that assumes that what is transcendental, i.e.,
>
> constitutive of the very possibility of knowing beings in some
>
> fashion, must be some kind of an infinite substance either not
>
> related to man and man's freedom, or, related to man and man's
>
> freedom as a creator is related to its created thing.
>
>
>
> That is the onto-theology, the traditional metaphysics, that
>
> Heidegger was trying to overcome. The problem of transcendence, and
>
> the relation of that problem of transcendence to the philosophical
>
> interpretation of human existence, human existence here being seen
as
>
> a possible kind of Being, for Being, a potentiality of Being, and
the
>
> intimate connection of that to our knowledge and our freedom, was
>
> never repudiated by Heidegger.
>
>
>
> After all, who, or what, actually proposes to DO the metaphysics? A
>
> knower that is a WHO, not just a what, a knower that is a FREE
Being,
>
> a being that is fundamentally unique, and different from, other
kinds
>
> of beings, a Being that is, in the existential sense, a fulfillment
>
> of the potentiality of Being itself.
>
>
>
> Heidegger's turn was not a turn away from metaphysics. It was a turn
>
> toward a more radical way of doing metaphysics, a way of doing
>
> metaphysics that brings the poesis of noesis, the poeticizing
>
> character of understanding, into a sharper focus. Heidegger saw the
>
> turn that way, and he described it that way. The reason why that
turn
>
> is particularly crucial for philosophy, right now, is a fudamentally
>
> historical reason, and it has to do with the domination of Being,
>
> here and now, on the planet, by the instrumentality of man. The
>
> question, concerning technology, is the historical place where the
>
> question of the meaning of Being is now being worked out, according
>
> to Heidegger.
>
>
>
> In spite of the fact that, thanks to the authority of science, and
>
> the impact that science has had upon our instrumental relation to
our
>
> world, we are right in the middle of something, here, that we do not
>
> understand, that we utterly fail to comprehend, and that is the
>
> predicament of our so-called progress.
>
>
>
> Of course, it is easy, all too easy, to just label what Heidegger is
>
> up to as a reactionary conservatism, a going back to the good old
>
> days, when things were folksy and parochial. But labels don't solve
>
> problems. They just obscure them. And I think that kind of
>
> characterization of Heidegger is rather self-serving and just too
>
> convenient. It plays right into our technocratic illusion of being
>
> superior, because we are the modern ones, we have our power and our
>
> tehcnology, we think we can step beyond our history, and live into a
>
> future without a history, a future where history is no longer
>
> relevant. In our headlong rush to go where we think we are headed,
we
>
> need to think long and hard about what we tacitly propose to leave
>
> behind. Where we came from, has everything to do with where we are
>
> going.
>
>
>
> Yes, according to Heidegger, the futural dimension of our existence
>
> is, in an important sense, primary, becaue the future is where we
are
>
> going, and it is the region of our possibilities. But, Heidegger
>
> isn't being one-sided about it. Having a future means also having a
>
> history. What that means, as far as the history of metaphysics is
>
> concerned, is not the repudiation of that history, but the
>
> appropriation of that history. And this, of course, plays out,
>
> existentially, factically, in the real world, in the political
realm,
>
> where all of the Daseins are together with one another, for better
or
>
> for worse, in the same world, and not up in the clouds, at the
summit
>
> of some ivory tower.
>
>
>
> The nagging question about Heidegger, of course, is his relation to
>
> German National Socialism. What was that all about? How could
>
> Heidegger have gone there? But, more importantly, I think, is what
>
> that was all about, vis-a-vis our situation right now, some sevnty
or
>
> so years later, a mere blink of an eye in terms of historical time,
>
> and how Heidegger's writings, as well as his involvement in all of
>
> that, may illuminate what that could still mean for us.
>
>
>
> My professor in phenomenology and existentialism, way back when, who
>
> intoduced me to Heidegger's Being and Time, was an altar boy in
>
> Austria during the Holocaust. He remembered seeing the bodies piled
>
> up in the courtyard of the church. He remembered the insanity of it
>
> all. As an adult, his emotional scars were obvious, even though, in
>
> true philosophical fashion, he was probably the most stoic of any of
>
> the professors I had studied under. I think that is what I admired
>
> about Doctor Pasterk the most. Not his learning. Not his mastery of
>
> ancient Greek and German philosophy. Not his ability to read, write,
>
> speak, and think in, at least seven different languages. It was his
>
> attitude, his comportment, his state of mind, that I admired the
most.
>
>
>
> Cyrill once pointed out an uncomfortable possibility that we don't
>
> like to look at very much. It could happen here too. It already has
>
> happened, at least a couple of times, now hasn't it? The subjugation
>
> of the native American indian. The enslavement of the African. Our
so-
>
> called "being civilized" and our noble and manifest destiny to be a
>
> moral beacon for the world, turns out to be a mere pretext for our
>
> will to power over the world and history, a thin veneer of pretense,
>
> over an abyss of violent intent.
>
>
>
> It would be nice to be able to look back upon the Holocaust as a
>
> nightmare that can be blissfully forgotten, as an aberration that
>
> can't possibly happen again, or at least that can't happen again
more
>
> radically, more destructively, than it already has. But we are only
>
> kidding ourselves is we think that the Holocaust, per se, can be
>
> resigned to history, that Holocaust, per se, no longer constitutes a
>
> real possibility for our Dasein, a possible future of humanity. That
>
> is the knife egde upon which modernity, or post-modernity, or
>
> whatever we call our situation, is so precariously balanced right
now.
>
>
>
> Heidegger, I think, is important because his thinking, as
>
> metaphysical and seemingly far removed as it is from the nitty
gritty
>
> existential concerns that still trouble us, actually resides at the
>
> very center of that uncomfortable truth about our modern existence,
>
> the reason for our existential angst concerning our present
>
> historical situation. I certainly get that feeling from Heidegger's
>
> later writings, the work he did after the second world war, work
>
> that, in retrospect, is driven by the disturbing, and disturbed,
>
> consciousness of the existential gravity of the situation that only
>
> began to unfold with the Holocaust.
>
>
>
> It ain't over. Not by a long shot. But we have all kinds of things
to
>
> distract us from a poignant awareness of what is really going on the
>
> world these days. We have the elections, reality TV, pornography. In
>
> fact, I would sum it all up under the designation, pornography. It
is
>
> an apt metaphor for what obsesses us at every moment of our lives --
>
> the SPECTACLE.
>
>
>
> You name it. We got it.
>
>
>
> Is it not a wonder that good old down home metaphysics seems so far
>
> removed from us? So irrelevant? That, right there, is actually part
>
> of the metaphysical story. Who knows? It might be the final chapter
>
> of that story. If there ever is an end to metaphysics, it will be
>
> because WE ourselves have ended. That was what Malthus was talking
>
> about. This endless progress of our humanity, this illusion of our
>
> unlimited potential for growth, cannot go on. That, right there, is
a
>
> mathematical necessity about which we, in our smug modernity, seem
to
>
> be totally oblivious. Heidegger is right. What we are all about, IS
>
> this obliviousness. Go figure.
>
>
>
> Hb3g
>
>
>
> --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@ wrote:
>
> >
>
> > HB,
>
> >
>
> > You are going way too far, basically into the realm of onto-
>
> theology,
>
> > the very thing, btw, that Heidegger opposed.
>
> >
>
> > Wil
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > -----Original Message-----
>
> > From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@>
>
> > To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
>
> > Sent: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 9:02 am
>
> > Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Louise:
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Well, if you ask me, it isn't even scientism. It is gibberish. My
>
> mind
>
> >
>
> > is preoccupied, right now anyway, with things that are pretty far
>
> >
>
> > removed from what Chris is into.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > I am reading Heidegger's Essence of Human Freedom right now. Have
>
> you
>
> >
>
> > read it? He is right on the spot, I think, with his interpretation
>
> of
>
> >
>
> > the existential significance of Kant's proposed solution to the
>
> third
>
> >
>
> > antinomy.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > The reason why it is possible for us to think beings in both ways,
>
> as
>
> >
>
> > things determined by cause-effect, and, for some kinds of beings,
>
> that
>
> >
>
> > is, being like us, who are intelligences, as essentially free
self-
>
> >
>
> > determinations, IS because causality is ultimately grounded in the
>
> >
>
> > possibility of freedom.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > This is an ontological thesis that has far reaching consequences
for
>
> >
>
> > how we look at what metaphysics is, and for how we look at what
the
>
> >
>
> > sciences are. Not to mention for how we look at who and what WE
are.
>
> >
>
> > AND, for what we might ultimately think beings in general ARE.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > It goes back to that knowledge and freedom thing that I was
harping
>
> on
>
> >
>
> > a few months back. The supposed antagonism between the compulsion
to
>
> >
>
> > know and the existential necessity of freedom, is for the most
>
> part, I
>
> >
>
> > now think, an illusory antagonism. In point of fact, our
compulsion
>
> to
>
> >
>
> > know is a symptom of our freedom to be, a "to be" about which we
>
> really
>
> >
>
> > have no choice.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > That seems paradoxical, "to be" fated to be free. But I am okay
with
>
> >
>
> > that. In a weirdly intimate and existential sense, it DOES kind of
>
> ring
>
> >
>
> > true does it not?
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Fate guides those who are willing. It drags the rest along in
>
> chains.
>
> >
>
> > To paraphrae good old Seneca.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Here is what I think is an exquisite summation, on Heidegger's
part,
>
> >
>
> > from the ending of chapter three of the first part of Essence of
>
> >
>
> > Freedom. It hits the nail right on the head:
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > "Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man,
but
>
> >
>
> > man as a possibility of freedom."
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > To me, that is right on the money.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Here is some of the rest:
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > "Human freedom is the fredom that breaks through in man and takes
>
> him
>
> >
>
> > up unto itself, thus making man possible."
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Who could DENY that the essence of man is man's freedom? Certainly
>
> no
>
> >
>
> > existentialist. At least, not a REAL existentialist. But Heidegger
>
> is
>
> >
>
> > talking about all of this on a deeper level, an ontological level.
>
> The
>
> >
>
> > FACT that man is existentially free is ONTOLOGICALLY primary.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Heidegger brings this ontological primacy of human existential
>
> freedom
>
> >
>
> > out in the very next sentence:
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > "If freedom is the ground of the possibility of existence, the
root
>
> of
>
> >
>
> > Being and Time, and thus the ground of the possibility of
>
> understanding
>
> >
>
> > Being in its whole breadth and fullness, then man, as grounded in
>
> his
>
> >
>
> > existence upon and in this freedom, is the site where beings in
the
>
> >
>
> > whole become revealed, i.e., he is that particular Being through
>
> which
>
> >
>
> > beings as such announce themselves."
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > For Heidegger, the fundamental problems of philosophy, those
>
> questions
>
> >
>
> > about Being, about truth, about who and what man is, about
knowing,
>
> >
>
> > about man's freedom, and the relation of man's freedom to man's
>
> inner
>
> >
>
> > compulsion to know Being, as well as time and history, are no mere
>
> >
>
> > haphazard collection of philosophical curiosities. All of these
>
> >
>
> > questions are united. They belong together. Like the facets of the
>
> >
>
> > diamond, they are the various angles into and upon the one central
>
> >
>
> > question of Being, the question, "Why is there Being as such?"
>
> which,
>
> >
>
> > it turns out, can not be separated from the question, "Why is
there
>
> a
>
> >
>
> > Being who questions Being?"
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > The answer to this why question is, in a single word, FREEDOM. A
>
> more
>
> >
>
> > detailed answer would be something like this: For the sake of
>
> freedom.
>
> >
>
> > For the possibility of freedom. But this answer, because it is
>
> framed
>
> >
>
> > in terms of possibility, in terms of an ultimate possibility of
>
> Being,
>
> >
>
> > an ultimate possibility for man, is an answer that rebounds back
>
> into a
>
> >
>
> > question. It is a challenge, more so than it is either an answer
or
>
> a
>
> >
>
> > question.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > To be, or not to be. That is the question. That is the answer.
That
>
> is
>
> >
>
> > the challenge.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > But the challenge, and the ultimate possibility that the challenge
>
> is
>
> >
>
> > all about, has to do with time. It has to do with the future. We
>
> could
>
> >
>
> > ask, "Why freedom?" The answer to that can only be: For the sake
of
>
> a
>
> >
>
> > future. So that there can be, there will be, some kind of a
future.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Now what is up with that? Do we go Darwinian about it here? I
think
>
> >
>
> > not. It would be very easy, and, I think, very WRONG, for us to
try
>
> and
>
> >
>
> > reduce our having a future to some kind of blind mechanism like
>
> >
>
> > survival of the fitter. The real relationship, the ontological
>
> >
>
> > relationship, is almost exactly the other way around, AND, it is a
>
> >
>
> > teleological relationship, an entelecheia of Being. The reason why
>
> >
>
> > there is survival of the fitter, why there is evolution, is
because
>
> >
>
> > Being IS, in its umtimate essence, an ultimate possibility, the
>
> ability
>
> >
>
> > to HAVE a future, and that is why beings like us, beings who
>
> actually
>
> >
>
> > have a future, i.e., some kind of a history, are not just
accidental
>
> >
>
> > beings, but an inevitability of Being itself.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > To me, this makes all of that scientism look kind of trivial. But
>
> hey,
>
> >
>
> > this really is against the grain of our modern time, with its
>
> supremacy
>
> >
>
> > of technology, reality TV, and the authority of science that we so
>
> take
>
> >
>
> > for granted. And rightly so. Philosophers are supposed to be
>
> radicals.
>
> >
>
> > They are supposed to go against the grain. Otherwise, what good
are
>
> >
>
> > they? How can one claim to have earned the right to be called
>
> >
>
> > philosopher if, on the one hand, one is subservient to the
>
> authority of
>
> >
>
> > anything, and, on the other hand, one has never even attempted to
>
> >
>
> > penetrate down into the very core, the root, the fundamental
>
> essence,
>
> >
>
> > of every thing there is?
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Okay. Why go there? Why not just stay on the surface? Why not just
>
> >
>
> > remain superficial? Why not just take some authority's word for
it.
>
> >
>
> > This is what it is, and it is what it is. Don't question it. Just
>
> >
>
> > accept it. Just press the "I believe" button and everything will
>
> turn
>
> >
>
> > out all right.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > I say, not because we can, that is the instrumental view of human
>
> >
>
> > existence, the authority of the instrumentality of man that lies
>
> behind
>
> >
>
> > all forms of authority, the technologization of our Dasein that
>
> turns
>
> >
>
> > us into a mere thing that is only present-at-hand. I say it is
>
> because
>
> >
>
> > we must, because our freedom necessitates the taking of this
>
> dangerous
>
> >
>
> > step into the abyss of our own Being. If we don't go there, if we
>
> don't
>
> >
>
> > take that step, then, we have given up our selves. We have given
up
>
> on
>
> >
>
> > man. Then, it is Man, not just god, who is really dead to the
world,
>
> >
>
> > and that, right there, is the true nihilism of our having given up
>
> on
>
> >
>
> > ourselves, the nihilism that becomes, now, the warrant for every
>
> kind
>
> >
>
> > of holocaust, every variation of apocalypse, every pornographic
>
> excess,
>
> >
>
> > that we can imagine, and even bring into action.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > So, why care about man, if man does not matter? Why be noble, if
>
> there
>
> >
>
> > is nothing noble left to strive for? If, as the believers in
>
> scientism
>
> >
>
> > would have us believe, we ourselves are just the result of a blind
>
> >
>
> > calculation, nothing more than the computation of some quantity,
>
> WHO, I
>
> >
>
> > would ask, is doing the calculating? It isn't some god. We aren't
>
> >
>
> > children anymore. But it isn't science that grew us up. I will
tell
>
> you
>
> >
>
> > that right now. Science, right now, here in the twenty first
>
> century,
>
> >
>
> > is merely an adolescent stage for us, and it is really nothing
more
>
> >
>
> > than that. We know a lot less than we think we do, and we are
>
> mistaken
>
> >
>
> > to think that who and what we are can be measured either by how
>
> much we
>
> >
>
> > think we know or by how much we think we can just make happen just
>
> for
>
> >
>
> > the sake of making it happen. There is a backlash to the "because
we
>
> >
>
> > can" that can shock us back into our center; if, that is, that
shock
>
> >
>
> > doesn't come too late.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Hb3g
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > --- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, "louise" <hecubatoher@> wrote:
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > > in the course of recent discussion with newbie chris lofting, i
>
> took
>
> >
>
> > > the attitude, 'live and let live', on the basis that he was an
>
> >
>
> > exponent
>
> >
>
> > > of a scientism that in the context of everyday life is not
>
> illegal,
>
> >
>
> > and
>
> >
>
> > > that my own opinion (in which i am clearly not alone) that his
>
> theses
>
> >
>
> > > are essentially off-topic to the list, is consequence of my
>
> >
>
> > existential
>
> >
>
> > > commitment, subjective, and based in philosophical enquiry.   it
>
> is,
>
> >
>
> > > however, annoying, that so much mental space becomes occupied
with
>
> >
>
> > what
>
> >
>
> > > looks to me like the forays of a religious zealot.  it would not
>
> be
>
> >
>
> > > that, posted at a neurology list.
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>
> > > louise
>
> >
>
> > > ... who believes angels are angels
>
> >
>
> > >
>
> >
>

There is a Buddhist saying "we live in the land of ten thousand
details" which is borne out in a reductionistic science that I imagine
Chris represents; a break down into the neural parts of reality.  Of
course, there is the reality we meet up with, the big world itself
outside of the mind and external to it.  Science was founded upon the
exclusion of the subjective, the unrepeatable, and the impersonal.
Philosophy returns us to the humanities, to the live-experience, to
the way in which human beings enounter reality and value on other
levels; often missed by an narrow, impersonal, objectivistic
reductionism.  Along with the method goes a host of human values that
appear not to be germaine to the pursuit of scientific knowledge.
Here the fate of the individual may ofwen seem to belong in the hand
of a disciplined science that has forsaken the wider / more inclusive
range of human experiences that philosophy and even religion tend to
retain.

   Yet we live in a world that is recognized as being interconnected
and holistic.  It is a strange world we live in, where on the one hand
we have the micro-world of quarks and gluons and the macro-world of
the ever expanding universe and big-bang cosmology.  All of it beggars
the imagination; philosophy is not a science and it need not lead to
logical demonstrations, just to an intellectually satisfying
discourse.  Philsophy need not be in rivalry with science, but as a
positive companion.  At least; this is my approach.  I am therefore
able to hear Chris offer the scientific details; not because it is the
end all explanation of everything; but because it contributes in some
small way.  However, and I say this to you Chris, neural-sciences need
not ovetrshadow and rival the prose of philosophy; which seeks to
include the subjective, the experiencial, artistic, the uniquely
personal dimensions.  Also Chris, if you hope to engage the
philosophical tradition, opening your descriptions up to the
traditional terminology of phiolosophy might help; but over-using the
reductionistic terminology so specialized in your field begs for 'a
science group'.  That's just my opinion and I neither mean it in any
way as an attack nor do I want you to go away, just a friendly
observation that the paradigms of metaphysical issues are somewhat
incommersurable with science proper; unless you're really trying to
bridge the gap and honestly working at it.  Please give it some
consideration.  Even Aristotle distinguished between physics and
metaphysics.  Philosophers, like religious people are seeking meaning;
they are more into the symbolic than the quantitative.

Respectfully, albb

Wil: and while I agree that he WAS engaging in a form of negative
idealism, he clearly did not think so... // Hb3g: I don't get this. Can
you unpack it a bit?

Hb3g,

By negative idealism I mean, briefly, to cite H's insistence on the
greater 'potentiality of meaning' of Being which is nevertheless
concealed/concealing. Metaphysics becomes problematic when Presence
(parousia) is put in question as the basis of meaning. Meaning falls
away. (If Derrida did nothing else, he has brought out this radicality
in Heidegger.) So, to make a long story mercifully short, the
attributes of Being become negative; its ideality is negative -- not in
the generative sense of Hegel, but in a privative theological sense,
not unlike some forms of Christian mysticism.

In my opinion, Heidegger's philosophy is morbid and depressed. It is
fixated on the limits of presence (on death, I would say). No wonder it
is the philosophy de jour of Catholic priests these days.

Wil

Wil: Metaphysics becomes problematic when Presence (parousia) is put
in question as the basis of meaning.

Hb3g: Correct, according to Heidegger. There is nothing cut and dried
about metaphysics. Of course it is alays a beginning over again.
There is no progress in metaphysics, like there is in science. What
you want from metaphysics is not something that metaphysics can offer
you -- namely, a state of mind characterized by the words, "No
problem!"

Wil: Meaning falls away.

Hb3g: How so? meaning, as based upon presence, falls away. But,
meaning, as based upon aletheia, the unconcealment of the Being of
beings, does not. Parousia presupposes aletheia. But aletheia is not
one-sidedly negative. It is, in fact, quite positive.

Wil: the attributes of Being become negative; its ideality is
negative -- not in the generative sense of Hegel, but in a privative
theological sense, not unlike some forms of Christian mysticism.

Hb3g: But only from the standpoint of an ontology that takes
parousia, wrongly, as what is primordial. That is Heidegger's point.
Presence is not primordial. It is unconcealment, an occurrence, NOT a
thing, that is primordial. But there is more to that unconcealmant
there than mere mysticism. We could follow Heidegger's interpretation
of the allegory of the cave in Essence of Truth, if you want, to
further unpack what Heidegger finds in aletheia, but it would not be
a brief undertaking.

Wil: In my opinion, Heidegger's philosophy is morbid and depressed.
It is fixated on the limits of presence (on death, I would say).

Hb3g: It only seems that way if you have bought into the long
standing notion that all there is to being is presence. You are
trying to criticize, ontically, what Heidegger has presented in B & T
ontologically. If it really is so morbid, then, how does it get tied
into the freedom of Dasein, the authenticity of Dasein, the temporal
ekstases, and the moment of vision?

There is more going on there than a psychological morbidity.
Heidegger is saying somthing about the true nature of our finitude.
That finitude is not a mere privation, but an opening into a
transcendental possibility that belongs only to us, we Daseins, a
possibility of finding our freedom, our sense of having a future that
counts for something. If we, the Daseins, were a kind of being that
could never die, we would be the kind of being that can't possibly be
alaive; we would be a rock, a mere what, not a person, not a who, for
WHOM an ultimate possibility, AND the deprivation of that
possibility, actually counts for something.

But enough of all of that. I want to respond to your last comments
about the political in your other rejoinder. Then I'll let it settle
for a few days, and just see where it goes with you. See my next one.

Hb3g


Hb3g

HB,

Sounds good. We should probably change the string name to something
else. This is no longer a wearying debate!

Wil


-----Original Message-----
From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>
To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Wed, 10 Sep 2008 2:42 pm
Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate



Wil: Metaphysics becomes problematic when Presence (parousia) is put

in question as the basis of meaning.



Hb3g: Correct, according to Heidegger. There is nothing cut and dried

about metaphysics. Of course it is alays a beginning over again.

There is no progress in metaphysics, like there is in science. What

you want from metaphysics is not something that metaphysics can offer

you -- namely, a state of mind characterized by the words, "No

problem!"



Wil: Meaning falls away.



Hb3g: How so? meaning, as based upon presence, falls away. But,

meaning, as based upon aletheia, the unconcealment of the Being of

beings, does not. Parousia presupposes aletheia. But aletheia is not

one-sidedly negative. It is, in fact, quite positive.



Wil: the attributes of Being become negative; its ideality is

negative -- not in the generative sense of Hegel, but in a privative

theological sense, not unlike some forms of Christian mysticism.



Hb3g: But only from the standpoint of an ontology that takes

parousia, wrongly, as what is primordial. That is Heidegger's point.

Presence is not primordial. It is unconcealment, an occurrence, NOT a

thing, that is primordial. But there is more to that unconcealmant

there than mere mysticism. We could follow Heidegger's interpretation

of the allegory of the cave in Essence of Truth, if you want, to

further unpack what Heidegger finds in aletheia, but it would not be

a brief undertaking.



Wil: In my opinion, Heidegger's philosophy is morbid and depressed.

It is fixated on the limits of presence (on death, I would say).



Hb3g: It only seems that way if you have bought into the long

standing notion that all there is to being is presence. You are

trying to criticize, ontically, what Heidegger has presented in B & T

ontologically. If it really is so morbid, then, how does it get tied

into the freedom of Dasein, the authenticity of Dasein, the temporal

ekstases, and the moment of vision?



There is more going on there than a psychological morbidity.

Heidegger is saying somthing about the true nature of our finitude.

That finitude is not a mere privation, but an opening into a

transcendental possibility that belongs only to us, we Daseins, a

possibility of finding our freedom, our sense of having a future that

counts for something. If we, the Daseins, were a kind of being that

could never die, we would be the kind of being that can't possibly be

alaive; we would be a rock, a mere what, not a person, not a who, for

WHOM an ultimate possibility, AND the deprivation of that

possibility, actually counts for something.



But enough of all of that. I want to respond to your last comments

about the political in your other rejoinder. Then I'll let it settle

for a few days, and just see where it goes with you. See my next one.



Hb3g



Hb3g

> -----Original Message-----
> From: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> [mailto:existlist@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
> a_living_breathing_being
> Sent: Thursday, 11 September 2008 3:56 AM
> To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [existlist] Reductionistic vrs Holistic Perspective
>
> There is a Buddhist saying "we live in the land of ten
> thousand details" which is borne out in a reductionistic
> science that I imagine Chris represents; a break down into
> the neural parts of reality.  Of course, there is the reality
> we meet up with, the big world itself outside of the mind and
> external to it.  Science was founded upon the exclusion of
> the subjective, the unrepeatable, and the impersonal.
> Philosophy returns us to the humanities, to the
> live-experience, to the way in which human beings enounter
> reality and value on other levels; often missed by an narrow,
> impersonal, objectivistic reductionism.  Along with the
> method goes a host of human values that appear not to be
> germaine to the pursuit of scientific knowledge.
> Here the fate of the individual may ofwen seem to belong in
> the hand of a disciplined science that has forsaken the wider
> / more inclusive range of human experiences that philosophy
> and even religion tend to retain.
>

My work covers the template that seeds all meaning in the form of the basic
categories of meaning as derived from the dynamics of the neurology. As such
we cover all specialist perspectives derived from that ground where the
focus is on patterns of differentiating(thingness,
objects)/integrating(relatedness, relationships). The self-referencing gives
us finer details that form into such patterns as 'wholeness', 'partness',
'static relatedness', 'dynamic relatedness' and so on. The specialisations
will generate their own languages by relabelling the core patterns, for
example in language we have the noun/verb dichotomy. ITS self-referencing
elicits a dimension of categories coving variations to the level of nouns
that work like verbs and verbs that work like nouns - and so all of what we
write is grounded in the use of those representations that represent the
underlying patterns of differentiating/integrating.

The moment we open our mouths or put pen to paper we move into the realm of
the asymmetric as we create/use language to mediate some position. ALL of
those languages have structure grounded in the identified patterns of the
neurology where such patterns come out of self-referencing - as such
existentialist philosophy is specialist and comes out of philosophy that is
specialist that comes out of, is dependent upon, linguistics that is
specialist that comes out of communication of emotions that is specialist
that comes out of cognition that is specialist that comes out of the
neurology that is general. LOTS of hierarchy.


>   Yet we live in a world that is recognized as being
> interconnected and holistic.

my work shows this in its coverage of serial-to-parallel, parallel-to-serial
dynamics in meaning derivations (and so covers the
serial-mechanistic-partial and the parallel-organic-holistic) - a 'simple'
example being in the Emotional I Ching work where seemingly 'simple',
'vague' questions can elicit a good assessment of a situation based on links
with unconscious emotions -
http://members.iimetro.com.au/~lofting/Emotional/homep.html

There are issues with the holistic in that it ties to symmetry and so a loss
in the precision possible with consciousness but a precision refinable
through feedback (training emotional assessments through making of finer
distinctions as possible using consciousness)

What my work shows is the SAME set of categories being applied at ALL scales
of analysis. Thus the 'wave' nature we get when we self-referencing a
dichotomy in the presence of indeterminacy will manifest itself in any
experiments designed around self-referencing a dichotomy - e.g. experiments
in quantum mechanics (EPR focus using pairs of slits etc etc etc) and even
the play with being/Being in philosophy ;-)

This overall dynamic is manifest at the classical level in the way the brain
processes information dichotomously and by rote to elicit, over time, a rich
associative memory - and so the serial/reason gives way to the
parallel/intuitive over time.

?  It is a strange world we live
> in, where on the one hand we have the micro-world of quarks
> and gluons and the macro-world of the ever expanding universe
> and big-bang cosmology.  All of it beggars the imagination;
> philosophy is not a science and it need not lead to logical
> demonstrations, just to an intellectually satisfying
> discourse.

Philosophy is language and it has sub-sets in the specialist perspectives
offered within philosophy - DIFFERENT labels, SAME set of core meanings that
get refined through distinctions that are labelled to bring out 'difference'
from the 'sameness'.

> Philosophy need not be in rivalry with science,
> but as a positive companion.  At least; this is my approach.

AS I have repeatedly stated, these days philosophy without consideration of
neuroscience work is useless and since science needs to focus on a PAIR so
philosophy has access to the realm of the singular being and so areas not
delt with by science - i.e. issues of personal freedom etc etc and so ethics
etc BUT ALL of this is done on a foundation in the form of a 'language of
the vague' and so seeding all meaning bottom-up as consciousness can refine
meanings top-down.

> I am therefore able to hear Chris offer the scientific
> details; not because it is the end all explanation of
> everything; but because it contributes in some small way.

SMALL?! LOL!

> However, and I say this to you Chris, neural-sciences need
> not ovetrshadow and rival the prose of philosophy; which
> seeks to include the subjective, the experiencial, artistic,
> the uniquely personal dimensions.

The dichotomy of subjective/objective is a specialist form of
differentiating/integrating and as such brings out the LAW focus of the
objective and so GENERAL focus when compared to the particular focus of
differentiating.

Self-reference the dichotomy and we get the range of states covering the
singular/particular nature of our individual being and at another scale the
particular/general nature of our species-being.

From a typology perspective, we can map out using science the particular
nature and as such the subjective character in general. LOCAL context will
contextualise this particular into a unique being and so the singular BUT
the general behaviours are still seeding that particular and so the ease in
which we can experience 'being-in-the-world' and the sense of 'thrown-ness'
and developing sense of issues with authenticity etc

As a social species most do not go past that symmetric, social, dynamic
unless they have well differentiated consciousness and that is more often
determined by a context that can support such combined with a genetic
disposition (and so many creative beings start off on the periphery of
collectives due to their symmetry-distorting/breaking natures)

> Also Chris, if you hope to
> engage the philosophical tradition, opening your descriptions
> up to the traditional terminology of phiolosophy might help;
> but over-using the reductionistic terminology so specialized
> in your field begs for 'a science group'.  That's just my
> opinion and I neither mean it in any way as an attack nor do
> I want you to go away, just a friendly observation that the
> paradigms of metaphysical issues are somewhat incommersurable
> with science proper; unless you're really trying to bridge
> the gap and honestly working at it.

Sort of - my focus is on the SAMENESS beneath all of the DIFFERENCES and so
a focus on essentials of our natures as singular and particular and general
beings that contributing to mapping Being.

>  Please give it some
> consideration.  Even Aristotle distinguished between physics
> and metaphysics.  Philosophers, like religious people are
> seeking meaning; they are more into the symbolic than the
> quantitative.
>

;-) IDM identifies the core level of meaning and so all that is possible
given the neurology - all else is metaphor/analogy linking those core
meanings to local contexts through customisation using labels. - recall my
comments before re science bringing out the core nature of evolution in the
form of pragmatism and so 'any metaphor will do' - mindless evolution is
post-modernist! THEN comes the issues of the mutation - our consciousness
and so its path away from pragmatism to idealism but in doing so becoming
increasingly specialist and so LOCAL. This focus can be exaggerated to a
level we ignore/marginalise the seeding of our being from our species-nature
and so genetic history.

MY work introduces a whole new dimension in the analysis of reality by
identifying the serial-parallel interface in meaning/language development -
since the findings apply to self-referencing in general so they apply to ANY
self-referencing at ANY scale and so brings out the consideration of the
organic and the mechanistic and that means a focus on the philosophical just
as much as the scientific.

regards,

Chris.

Wil: Response: Aha! Now you have exposed yourself! If you have
problems with our socio-political world, do politics, not
metaphysics. Forget Heidegger; read Foucault.

Hb3g: What? And give up on being a friend of Being?

I don't think so...

Yeah, I could have done the "long spiel" thing against what all you
said against me and my buddy Martin. But that just ain't no fun
anymore. The "long spiel" thing, I mean.

Metaphysics? It is a lonely way to go. But hey. That's just me. I
ain't complaining. I picked it. I am a loner anyway. Just ask my
wife. She'll tell you all about my strange and silent ways. She just
can't figure me out.

Metaphysics? Well, since I been doing it, I been a lot "more better
happy" than I was before. What can I say about all of that? Except,
that I am kind of weird, THAT way? I guess...

I just don't fit in. But, I don't WANT TO fit in! HAHA!

Hb3g

How about:

Why do metaphysics?

Well, you know pretty much where I stand in a conversation about
metaphysics. But how is it relevant to existentialism? What if I told
you that I think Kantianism ultimately cashes out into exiwstentialism.
Would you think I am crazy?

Hb3g

Hb3g,

I would like to hear this. Categorial imperatives seem to mitigate against
existentialism as I have come to know it, but the unknowability of the noumenal
self would seem to make existence (dasein) a question. Have you taken a look
at the Zizek text?

As to you being crazy: yes, as a loon, comrade. Glad you have joined the
club.

Wil

In a message dated 9/10/08 6:17:01 PM, hb3g@... writes:


>
>
>
> How about:
>
> Why do metaphysics?
>
> Well, you know pretty much where I stand in a conversation about
> metaphysics. But how is it relevant to existentialism? What if I told
> you that I think Kantianism ultimately cashes out into exiwstentialism.
> Would you think I am crazy?
>
> Hb3g
>
>
>




**************
Psssst...Have you heard the news? There's a new fashion blog,
plus the latest fall trends and hair styles at StyleList.com.

(http://www.stylelist.com/trends?ncid=aolsty00050000000014)


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Bill, Your own particular perceptiveness, humanity and narrative flair
are sorely lacking from the list in recent days.  Among current
contributors, you are alone, in my view, in your ability to write as a
realistic champion of the working man.  Wil and I differ in politics,
as in our perspective on religious faith.  Not that I would wish to
make any comments on American politics, anyway.  In the United Kingdom,
pragmatism tends to prevail.  If it be possible, please return soon
with more of your robust and well-argued posts.  I don't want to die a
terrible death of metaphysics and neuroscience. Louise

Flying swiftly through the air in the arms of Memory, I alight on the
quiet street, amid scenes of the years passed by.  A mist of
impression.  Like a picture, viewed within the skull, young faces
surround, distinct with personality, alien, seeking something never
stated.  Like me, they have white skin.  I am the stranger, walking
among natives.  Close looks, uncommittal, a little push in the back.
Remark from the flank, staccato utterance, always words, unexplained,
I would rather not repeat.  Group thought, a ritual, interrogation
techniques.  The bodies close in, "I haven't finished talking to you
yet".  Keep calm, don't touch them.  If the words provoke you to
retort, in turn, there may be a splash, fizzy pop, staining your
clothes, wetting your face.  They knock off your hat.  Try to go
forward, or else to reach home, the front door, knowing it may not
end, they choose what to do, follow or depart.  It is the repetition,
the not-knowing, the litany of incident, bangs and kicks at the door,
broken windows, recurrent siege, allusive speech or plain.  "Get out
of the village."  Where is there to go, how, under this welter of
memory, conditioned fear, to live alone, away, from what is my home
in this world.  Pleasant memories mingle also, the stream I used to
walk beside, horses in the fenced meadows, meandering paths, green
nooks that surprise and shelter, only a few minutes from the
pavements, the shops where gentle words are offered, in the midst of
bewilderment.  As for physical assaults, with menaces, an atmosphere
of threat, I was not alone, somehow the people are penned in here,
restricted and delayed by system, until another part of that system
pick up the pieces, as with myself, re-housed, inducted, guided along
a new set of pathways.  Still looking for England, still finding it,
often distressingly buried.  Our time runs ahead, I shout, come back,
will all things really be well, for none who is not mad belongs to
this land, my own mind only the more egregious.  Jonathon Swift
caught the mood on the wing, weaved it to narrative, bequeathed to
posterity.  We must go on.  I have hazel eyes, if you are kind, can
dream and reason both.  Louise

Wil:

I got the Zizek text. It came in the mail a couple of weeks ago. But
all my attention is on H right now. I should be finished with Essence
of Truth in a day or so. I'll take up Zizek then, and then Radloff's
Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism. That will be a nice
little break from H there for a couple of weeks.

As for cashing Kant out into existentialism, I will have to drag you
kicking and screaming into the third antinomy and the second
Critique. I would lean heavily on H's Essence of Freedom for this.
Not because I got this idea of cashing Kant out into existentialism
from H, but because H's text, there, confirms the direction I have
wanted to go with Kant lately.

But the trick is to penetrate through the scholastic-Wolffian-
Leibnizian jargon, with Kant, and to get down to the brass tacks of
what Kant is actually talking about when he talks about pure
practical reaosn and the will and such, to see through the formalism
of his ethics into its real content.

That ain't an easy task, mainly, because we all pretty much go at
Kant thinking we already know what he is talking about.

But do we?

First of all, what Kant is up to is pure ontology. We have to get a
fix on that from the get go. He isn't doing any kind of anti-
metaphysical thing at all. He is, through and through, a
metaphysician. But Kant's metaphysics is tainted by an inaadequate
concept of logic, for one thing, and, by an inadequately developed
philosophy of human existence, and, Kant;'s metaphysics, like most
metaphysics, is a substance ontology with all of the confusions
concerning the nature of transcendence and finitude that go along
with substance ontology.

The situation is hardly black and white, and we should not be going
at it in a one-sided fashion. A healthy ambiguity is called for, as
always, when we deal with the real heavyweights.

Hb3g

--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:
>
> Hb3g,
>
> I would like to hear this. Categorial imperatives seem to mitigate
against
> existentialism as I have come to know it, but the unknowability of
the noumenal
> self would seem to make existence (dasein) a question. Have you
taken a look
> at the Zizek text?
>
> As to you being crazy: yes, as a loon, comrade. Glad you have
joined the
> club.
>
> Wil
>
> In a message dated 9/10/08 6:17:01 PM, hb3g@... writes:
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> > How about:
> >
> > Why do metaphysics?
> >
> > Well, you know pretty much where I stand in a conversation about
> > metaphysics. But how is it relevant to existentialism? What if I
told
> > you that I think Kantianism ultimately cashes out into
exiwstentialism.
> > Would you think I am crazy?
> >
> > Hb3g
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
> **************
> Psssst...Have you heard the news? There's a new fashion blog,
> plus the latest fall trends and hair styles at StyleList.com.
>
> (http://www.stylelist.com/trends?ncid=aolsty00050000000014)
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>

HB,

I'll be waiting. Incidentally, you might be interested in the more or
less recently published lectures by Adorno on K's CPR, especially as
Adorno has the same attitude towards H as I do these days. Just a
thought.

Wil


-----Original Message-----
From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>
To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 10:09 am
Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate

























Wil:



I got the Zizek text. It came in the mail a couple of weeks ago. But

all my attention is on H right now. I should be finished with Essence

of Truth in a day or so. I'll take up Zizek then, and then Radloff's

Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism. That will be a nice

little break from H there for a couple of weeks.



As for cashing Kant out into existentialism, I will have to drag you

kicking and screaming into the third antinomy and the second

Critique. I would lean heavily on H's Essence of Freedom for this.

Not because I got this idea of cashing Kant out into existentialism

from H, but because H's text, there, confirms the direction I have

wanted to go with Kant lately.



But the trick is to penetrate through the scholastic-Wolffian-

Leibnizian jargon, with Kant, and to get down to the brass tacks of

what Kant is actually talking about when he talks about pure

practical reaosn and the will and such, to see through the formalism

of his ethics into its real content.



That ain't an easy task, mainly, because we all pretty much go at

Kant thinking we already know what he is talking about.



But do we?



First of all, what Kant is up to is pure ontology. We have to get a

fix on that from the get go. He isn't doing any kind of anti-

metaphysical thing at all. He is, through and through, a

metaphysician. But Kant's metaphysics is tainted by an inaadequate

concept of logic, for one thing, and, by an inadequately developed

philosophy of human existence, and, Kant;'s metaphysics, like most

metaphysics, is a substance ontology with all of the confusions

concerning the nature of transcendence and finitude that go along

with substance ontology.



The situation is hardly black and white, and we should not be going

at it in a one-sided fashion. A healthy ambiguity is called for, as

always, when we deal with the real heavyweights.



Hb3g



--- In existlist@yahoogroups.com, eupraxis@... wrote:

>

> Hb3g,

>

> I would like to hear this. Categorial imperatives seem to mitigate

against

> existentialism as I have come to know it, but the unknowability of

the noumenal

> self would seem to make existence (dasein) a question. Have you

taken a look

> at the Zizek text?

>

> As to you being crazy: yes, as a loon, comrade. Glad you have

joined the

> club.

>

> Wil

>

> In a message dated 9/10/08 6:17:01 PM, hb3g@... writes:

>

>

> >

> >

> >

> > How about:

> >

> > Why do metaphysics?

> >

> > Well, you know pretty much where I stand in a conversation about

> > metaphysics. But how is it relevant to existentialism? What if I

told

> > you that I think Kantianism ultimately cashes out into

exiwstentialism.

> > Would you think I am crazy?

> >

> > Hb3g

> >

> >

> >

>

>

>

>

> **************

> Psssst...Have you heard the news? There's a new fashion blog,

> plus the latest fall trends and hair styles at StyleList.com.

>

> (http://www.stylelist.com/trends?ncid=aolsty00050000000014)

>

>

> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

>

Wil: Every one of his texts is always an introductory question that
never delivers much of anything at all. My patience is rather too
limited for his eternal propaedeutics.

Hb3g: I hear you Wil. It is frustrating if what you want is RESULTS.
But take into consideration what H is actually driving at, and how
that is very different from what we think of as science. What counts
as a philosophical result cannot be the same kind of thing as what
counts as a scientific result, or, for that matter, a practical
result.

Here is a sample, from Essence of Truth, of how H might very well
respond to your complaint:

"It is always the beginning that remains decisive. The authenticity
and power of philosophical understanding can only be estimated by
whether and how we measure up to the origin, by whether, if we
ourselves are to begin over again, we are able to make anything of
this origin. The prerequisite for this is that we leave aside
everything which was later thought up, read in, and merely learnt,
and that we feel, out of the most vital actuality, the origin of an
elementary questioning. If philosophy is not to remain just a useless
and groundless shifting around of concepts -- a business in which the
undisciplined agility of the literati and the dry 'accuracy' of the
schoolmaster always hold the upper hand -- it must be constantly
returning to this origin."

In the other Essence lectures, the Essence of Freedom, H makes a
pretty big deal about how philosophy not only needs to be a going
after the whole but also a going down to the root. He lays this all
out in quite a bit of detail there, mostly, by engaging in a
constructive dialogue with Kant. There is nothing vague or nebulous
about what H is proposing there, i.e., the framing of the question of
Being from the angle of human freedom, a theme, moreover, which is
brought up in Essence of Truth, and, of course, also in B & T.

But what H is doing is unsettling, because it doesn't square with our
scientific concept of what philosophy should be.

The angle that Heidegger is going after is that philosophical
questioning is directed at the root, not the result. The
comprehension of the root is the result. But this questioning never
ceases. It is never ultimately settled. It is always beginning over
again.

Why is that?

Well, that has to do with the very essence of truth itself, that
truth is a negative, an un-hiddenness, aletheia, and, as such, truth
also necessitates its untruth.

Remember what Heraclitus says. Phusis, which is Being, not just
nature, loves to hide. Being speaks to us in the riddle. Kant says
this, too, in the third Critique. Along with the un-hidden, there is
always the hidden. H takes this predicament very seriously. The whole
second part of Essence of Truth takes up un-truth, per se,, the
hiddenness as such, the hidden aspect of Being, and the way H attacks
this is by walking us through, atcually, Plato's Theaetetus.

H isn't really going off into some kind of mysticism here. At least,
I don't think so. H is putting his finger on something quite
concrete, something quite real, something that we always experience,
that we are always caught up in, the holding back of some truth that
goes along with the disclosure of any truth. There is always MORE
where that all came from. It is inexhaustible. Not only are we always
beginning, in philosophy, but we are never finished, with beginning,
either.

Needless to say, all of that isn't exactly (how should I say it?)
the "politically correct" definition of philosophy that we are
supposed to adhere to these days, now is it? But why should THAT
matter? You and I both know, I think, that the "politically correct"
definition of philosophy, these days, is a definition of philosophy
that puts philosophy into a subservience to the authority of science
and technology, which, ultimately, cashes out into the agenda of big
business, which has no intrinsic interest in any kind of intellectual
autonomy. It is das Man to the MAX! Is it not? Philosophy, if it is
to truly be philosophy, must be the affirmation of absolute autonomy,
of self-authority, and the absolute repudiation of all externalized
kinds of authority, of the ideologies and the agendas of
authoritarianism. Right?

Freedom is what philosophy is all about. That was what, to get down
to the brass tacks of it, Kant made abundantly clear about the raison
d'etre of philosophy. If philosophy isn't about freedom, if it isn't
FOR freedom, it is worthless. And that, right there, if you follow
how it plays out historically, intellectually, in the run up to the
twentieth century, ultimately DOES cash out into existentialism.

But Heidegger's twist is exactly this. Freedom is all about Being,
and Being is all about Time, and Time is, primarily, as history, the
future, where we are all GOING, not just where we all came from. But
you don't really get THAT, in its fullness, in its authenticity, if
you are disconnected from the ROOT, the ORIGIN of it all. The reason
WHY H wants to go BACK to the beginning, to the origin, is not for
the sake of the good old days, but for the sake of the possibilities
that still lie ahead of us in our global planetary future.

That this is, ultimately, H's concern, what he really cares about, I
think, is made abundantly clear by the ways in which he agonizes,
after the Kehre, over the question of tehcnology, the effective
leveling down of our collective Dasein into the utter banality and
triviality that our cult of technological supremacy has engendered,
and what all of that means, as far as the fate of philosophy, our
sense of commitment to, or lack of commitment to, our autonomy, our
self-authority, and, as far as the collective fate of man is
concerned.

Now, Radloff sums all of this up rather nicely in the finale to his
book, a conclusion which he has entitled Inperial Truth and Planetary
Order. I cheated and jumped ahead, when I saw that, and read it.

Of course, this all HAS TO cash out, politically, existentially. It
has to matter. I see that, and so do you. But none of the old
formulas, the ones we have been going by under the general ideology
of the Enlightenment, and the concept of limitless progress, seem to
be working anymore. That stands to reason. Our situation, for one
thing, IS finite. We are in the middle of an unprecedented
transformation. Not just an historical transformation for us, as
humans, but even a transformation for all life on the planet, an
evolutionary transformation. Nothing like this, nothing like US, has
ever happened on earth before. It is a real mess. It is a crisis, the
depth of which we have barely fathomed as yet. We might NOT make it
through. A third world war is probably the least of our concerns,
looking ahead to what could go down over the next few decades. The
Holocaust, as bad as it was, was just a foreshadowing of how how bad
it could get. Now, wouldn't it be a shame, a travesty, a betrayal, if
we just sat by, and did nothing, and just let it all happen, if we
just let history, the possibility of having a history, all fall
apart, and just disappear into a REAL oblivion?

How un-Dasein-like THAT would be!

Hb3g

This is a long post again (how do have the time?), and it will require
more time than I have now to do it justice. BUT ... I do not think that
H was all that concerned with freedom, and not even all that concerned
with authoritarianism. He was more concerned with duty and service,
destiny and purity. Being as the untrammeled pure unthought, unsullied
by Americans and Russians.

Wil


-----Original Message-----
From: Herman B. Triplegood <hb3g@...>
To: existlist@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 11:29 am
Subject: [existlist] Re: wearying debate

























Wil: Every one of his texts is always an introductory question that

never delivers much of anything at all. My patience is rather too

limited for his eternal propaedeutics.



Hb3g: I hear you Wil. It is frustrating if what you want is RESULTS.

But take into consideration what H is actually driving at, and how

that is very different from what we think of as science. What counts

as a philosophical result cannot be the same kind of thing as what

counts as a scientific result, or, for that matter, a practical

result.



Here is a sample, from Essence of Truth, of how H might very well

respond to your complaint:



"It is always the beginning that remains decisive. The authenticity

and power of philosophical understanding can only be estimated by

whether and how we measure up to the origin, by whether, if we

ourselves are to begin over again, we are able to make anything of

this origin. The prerequisite for this is that we leave aside

everything which was later thought up, read in, and merely learnt,

and that we feel, out of the most vital actuality, the origin of an

elementary questioning. If philosophy is not to remain just a useless

and groundless shifting around of concepts -- a business in which the

undisciplined agility of the literati and the dry 'accuracy' of the

schoolmaster always hold the upper hand -- it must be constantly

returning to this origin."



In the other Essence lectures, the Essence of Freedom, H makes a

pretty big deal about how philosophy not only needs to be a going

after the whole but also a going down to the root. He lays this all

out in quite a bit of detail there, mostly, by engaging in a

constructive dialogue with Kant. There is nothing vague or nebulous

about what H is proposing there, i.e., the framing of the question of

Being from the angle of human freedom, a theme, moreover, which is

brought up in Essence of Truth, and, of course, also in B & T.



But what H is doing is unsettling, because it doesn't square with our

scientific concept of what philosophy should be.



The angle that Heidegger is going after is that philosophical

questioning is directed at the root, not the result. The

comprehension of the root is the result. But this questioning never

ceases. It is never ultimately settled. It is always beginning over

again.



Why is that?



Well, that has to do with the very essence of truth itself, that

truth is a negative, an un-hiddenness, aletheia, and, as such, truth

also necessitates its untruth.



Remember what Heraclitus says. Phusis, which is Being, not just

nature, loves to hide. Being speaks to us in the riddle. Kant says

this, too, in the third Critique. Along with the un-hidden, there is

always the hidden. H takes this predicament very seriously. The whole

second part of Essence of Truth takes up un-truth, per se,, the

hiddenness as such, the hidden aspect of Being, and the way H attacks

this is by walking us through, atcually, Plato's Theaetetus.



H isn't really going off into some kind of mysticism here. At least,

I don't think so. H is putting his finger on something quite

concrete, something quite real, something that we always experience,

that we are always caught up in, the holding back of some truth that

goes along with the disclosure of any truth. There is always MORE

where that all came from. It is inexhaustible. Not only are we always

beginning, in philosophy, but we are never finished, with beginning,

either.



Needless to say, all of that isn't exactly (how should I say it?)

the "politically correct" definition of philosophy that we are

supposed to adhere to these days, now is it? But why should THAT

matter? You and I both know, I think, that the "politically correct"

definition of philosophy, these days, is a definition of philosophy

that puts philosophy into a subservience to the authority of science

and technology, which, ultimately, cashes out into the agenda of big

business, which has no intrinsic interest in any kind of intellectual

autonomy. It is das Man to the MAX! Is it not? Philosophy, if it is

to truly be philosophy, must be the affirmation of absolute autonomy,

of self-authority, and the absolute repudiation of all externalized

kinds of authority, of the ideologies and the agendas of

authoritarianism. Right?



Freedom is what philosophy is all about. That was what, to get down

to the brass tacks of it, Kant made abundantly clear about the raison

d'etre of philosophy. If philosophy isn't about freedom, if it isn't

FOR freedom, it is worthless. And that, right there, if you follow

how it plays out historically, intellectually, in the run up to the

twentieth century, ultimately DOES cash out into existentialism.



But Heidegger's twist is exactly this. Freedom is all about Being,

and Being is all about Time, and Time is, primarily, as history, the

future, where we are all GOING, not just where we all came from. But

you don't really get THAT, in its fullness, in its authenticity, if

you are disconnected from the ROOT, the ORIGIN of it all. The reason

WHY H wants to go BACK to the beginning, to the origin, is not for

the sake of the good old days, but for the sake of the possibilities

that still lie ahead of us in our global planetary future.



That this is, ultimately, H's concern, what he really cares about, I

think, is made abundantly clear by the ways in which he agonizes,

after the Kehre, over the question of tehcnology, the effective

leveling down of our collective Dasein into the utter banality and

triviality that our cult of technological supremacy has engendered,

and what all of that means, as far as the fate of philosophy, our

sense of commitment to, or lack of commitment to, our autonomy, our

self-authority, and, as far as the collective fate of man is

concerned.



Now, Radloff sums all of this up rather nicely in the finale to his

book, a conclusion which he has entitled Inperial Truth and Planetary

Order. I cheated and jumped ahead, when I saw that, and read it.



Of course, this all HAS TO cash out, politically, existentially. It

has to matter. I see that, and so do you. But none of the old

formulas, the ones we have been going by under the general ideology

of the Enlightenment, and the concept of limitless progress, seem to

be working anymore. That stands to reason. Our situation, for one

thing, IS finite. We are in the middle of an unprecedented

transformation. Not just an historical transformation for us, as

humans, but even a transformation for all life on the planet, an

evolutionary transformation. Nothing like this, nothing like US, has

ever happened on earth before. It is a real mess. It is a crisis, the

depth of which we have barely fathomed as yet. We might NOT make it

through. A third world war is probably the least of our concerns,

looking ahead to what could go down over the next few decades. The

Holocaust, as bad as it was, was just a foreshadowing of how how bad

it could get. Now, wouldn't it be a shame, a travesty, a betrayal, if

we just sat by, and did nothing, and just let it all happen, if we

just let history, the possibility of having a history, all fall

apart, and just disappear into a REAL oblivion?



How un-Dasein-like THAT would be!



Hb3g