Thanks Matt! ... Their system is a bit dubious. I mean, do you want "Contact Info" (your mailing address, Email, Tel, Fax) stored on your vote? I don't. What...
Narins, Josh
josh.narins@...
Oct 1, 2002 12:47 pm
10178
... Does either CPO-STV or the alternative proposed by here by Matt satisfy the "proportionality for solid coalitions" property mentioned in the paper by...
Forest Simmons
fsimmons@...
Oct 3, 2002 9:27 pm
10179
A while back I concluded that the Gibbard-Satterwaithe (apologies if I spelled it wrong) Theorem must bar the existence of a ranked method that never gives an...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 3, 2002 10:22 pm
10180
I restricted the categories of voters or ballots to eliminate from consideration truncation or equal rankings of candidates. I suppose that we could admit...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 4, 2002 5:01 am
10181
I was at a boring retreat over the weekend and had the time to ponder two ideas: The most important one is that strong FBC becomes easier to satisfy if we ...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 7, 2002 5:58 am
10182
... Good point. I was wrong. Below I'll show a counter-example to my original assertion. However, I also need to restate my conditions, because your example...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 7, 2002 10:52 pm
10183
... I use Matt's comment as a natural launching point for another installment on Condorcet Flavored PR Methods: CPO-STV considers all head-to-head contests...
Forest Simmons
fsimmons@...
Oct 8, 2002 11:22 pm
10184
My submission to the Pulse column was edited somewhat for the print version of the LP News, but left intact in the online version: ...
Bart Ingles
bartman@...
Oct 9, 2002 11:11 pm
10185
Here's the next installment on the above topic (Condorcet Flavored PR Methods). Suppose we are making an head-to-head comparison of candidate subsets A and B....
Forest Simmons
fsimmons@...
Oct 10, 2002 12:18 am
10186
...and residual approval weights Summary: This method is like the previous one (K) excepted that the elimination order is definer by a ranked pair path instead...
Elisabeth Varin/Steph...
stephane.rouillon@...
Oct 16, 2002 7:15 am
10187
I need to refresh my explanations and notations to be up to date. Summary: Ranked pairs using relative margins uses Mr. Tidemann algorithm for ordering...
Elisabeth Varin/Steph...
stephane.rouillon@...
Oct 16, 2002 7:16 am
10188
Summary: Alternative vote with residual approval weights mixes both IRV and Approval methods. The only difference with IRV is the winner(s) selection. It is...
Elisabeth Varin/Steph...
stephane.rouillon@...
Oct 16, 2002 7:19 am
10189
Hello EM list, first let me invite your members which are not yet participants of the electoral systems designers contests. There are two contests: a...
Elisabeth Varin/Steph...
stephane.rouillon@...
Oct 16, 2002 2:13 pm
10190
I was thinking about Arrow's theorem. As I understand it, one statement of the theorem is that you cannot construct a function of individual preference orders...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 17, 2002 2:58 am
10191
Alex, I think you have it right. (In my experience, the only way to be sure of 'not missing something' is to write out everything, including full definitions,...
Joe Weinstein
jweins123@...
Oct 18, 2002 1:53 am
10192
Steph-- You wrote, regarding the method that you'd described: Trying to identify a lesser of two evil cannot help elect it. I reply: That's a strong claim. Can...
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp@...
Oct 20, 2002 6:00 am
10193
Yes, when the IRV promoters use Arrow to claim that we should give up on finding anything better than IRV, I point out that Approval meets Arrow's criteria (if...
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp@...
Oct 20, 2002 6:45 am
10194
... I ran across a paper (can't remember the journal, but it was recent) by a mathematician at Northwestern. He defined IIAC to account for strategy changes:...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 20, 2002 2:50 pm
10195
Ironically, Borda seems to be one of the least predictable methods when you consider voter strategy. Supporters of one dominant candidate should bury...
Bart Ingles
bartman@...
Oct 20, 2002 7:14 pm
10196
... Considering that tactics like drowning seem to affect a number of strong election methods, I'd join you in doubting such claims a bit. If the claim holds,...
Sampo Syreeni
decoy@...
Oct 20, 2002 10:50 pm
10197
I'm homing in on a strategy for figuring out if strong FBC can ever be satisfied (aside from Random Ballot). At least initially, it's easiest if I restrict...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 20, 2002 11:27 pm
10198
When I actually wrote out the matrices I forgot to transpose the rectangular matrix. ... For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ,...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 20, 2002 11:30 pm
10199
... Mike, my affirmation is indeed wrong "as is". What I meant, is: it allows an elector to specify a lesser of two evil (and thus to increase its winning ...
Elisabeth Varin/Steph...
stephane.rouillon@...
Oct 21, 2002 4:36 am
10200
Alex, I got lost when you started using *. Maybe others did too. How is * DEFINED? It seems to be a kind of dot or matrix product, but I'd like to be sure....
Joe Weinstein
jweins123@...
Oct 21, 2002 5:15 am
10201
... * denotes dot product. I should have used a different symbol then when multiplying a rectangular matrix by a row vector. ... For more information about...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 21, 2002 2:46 pm
10202
I recently learned of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem: pareto efficient and monotonic social choice functions are dictatorial. I was always under the...
Alex Small
asmall@...
Oct 21, 2002 7:40 pm
10203
... Any method that satisfies majority rule when restricted to two candidates fails this version of the IIAC. Forest ... For more information about this list...
Forest Simmons
fsimmons@...
Oct 22, 2002 1:03 am
10204
Yes, it seems unlikely that any 1-balloting method can do better than the better Condorcet versions (the wv versions of RP, BeatpathWinner/CSSD, SSD, SD, PC, &...
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp@...
Oct 22, 2002 6:53 am
10205
Hello all. I am new to the list and thought I would introduce myself. I am Tom Mull and I live in Hoquiam, WA, USA. I am particularly interested in using IRV...
Tom Mull
tommull@...
Oct 22, 2002 1:32 pm
10206
Good question. I wonder if "Pareto Efficient" means the same as satisfying the Pareto Condition that we are all familiar with and that you use in your proof...
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