sorry all - it’s a long post..... K= Prof Karunadasa
================================================

Hi Michael, TG, James & All,

As I've said before, I don't agree with everything K. writes, but I think
that on these questions I agree with his comments and reference sources
more than many others do;-)Why not save this post instead, TG??;-)
....
--- Michael Beisert <mbeisert@...> wrote:
<...>
> Sabhava
<...>
>Karunadasa
> says
> that the Theravadins rejected the metaphysical speculations of the
> Sarvastivadins but also that “it was not without influence on the
> Theravada
> version of the dhamma theory” and that this influence “can be seen in
> the
> post-canonical exegetical literature of Sri Lanka,” i.e. the Buddhaghosa
>
> commentaries.
....
S: However, Karunadasa has already explained that the Pali tradition,
including the Buddhaghosa commentaries, ‘did not succomb to this
error...’:

K: “As we shall soon see, about a hundred years after the formulation of
the dhamma-theory, such a trend surfaced within certain schools of
Buddhist thought and culminated in the view that the dhammas exist in all
three periods of time. But the Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka did not succumb to
this error of conceiving the dhammas as ultimate unities or discrete
entities. In the Pali tradition it is only for the sake of definition and
description that each dhamma is postulated as if it were a separate
entity; but in reality it is by no means a solitary phenomenon having an
existence of its own. This is precisely why the mental and material
dhammas are often presented in inter-connected groups. In presenting them
thus the danger inherent in narrowly analytical methods has been avoided
-- the danger, namely, of elevating the factors resulting from analysis to
the status of genuinely separate entities. Thus if analysis shows that
composite things cannot be considered as ultimate unities, synthesis shows
that the factors into which the apparently composite things are analysed
(ghana-vinibbhoga) are not discrete entities.13 [Vism 137]
*****
<...>
M: >This is an essencialist
> metaphysical stand point which relegates to the background the
> understanding
> of the dhammas in terms of their dependence.
>
> But probably the most important aspect highlighted by Karunadasa is that
> the
> definition of dhammas as sabhava goes against the Patisambhidamagga,
> which
> is a Canonical text attributed to Sariputta, that specifically states
> that
> khandhas, and by extension dhammas, are devoid of own-nature
> (sabhavena-suññat).
>
> And finally Karunadasa also says, “Does not the very use of the term
> sabhava, despite all the qualifications under which it is used, give the
>
> impression that a given dhamma exists in its own right? And does this
> not
> amount to the admission that a dhamma is some kind of substance?”
....
S: What you (Michael) omit here are Karunadasa’s answers to these
questions. Following on from this last quote, he writes:

K: “The commentators were not unaware of these implications and they
therefore took the necessary steps to forestall such a conclusion. This
they sought to do by supplementing the former definition with another
which actually nullifies the conclusion that the dhammas might be
quasi-substances. This additional definition states that a dhamma is not
that which bears its own-nature, but that which is borne by its own
conditions (paccayehi dhariyanti ti dhamma).47 Whereas the earlier
definition is agent-denotation (kattusadhana) because it attributes an
active role to the dhamma, elevating it to the position of an agent, the
new definition is object-denotation (kamma-sadhana) because it attributes
a passive role to the dhamma and thereby downgrades it to the position of
an object. What is radical about this new definition is that it reverses
the whole process which otherwise might culminate in the conception of
dhammas as substances or bearers of their own-nature. What it seeks to
show is that, far from being a bearer, a dhamma is being borne by its own
conditions.

"Consonant with this situation, it is also maintained that there is no
other thing called a dhamma than the "quality" of being borne by
conditions.48 The same idea is expressed in the oft-recurrent statement
that what is called a dhamma is the mere fact of occurrence due to
appropriate conditions.49 In point of fact, in commenting upon the
Patisambhidamagga statement that the five aggregates -- and, by
implication, the dhammas -- are devoid of sabhava, the commentator
observes that since the aggregates have no self-nature, they are devoid of
own-nature.50 It will thus be seen that although the term sabhava is used
as a synonym for dhamma, it is interpreted in such a way that it means the
very absence of sabhava in any sense that implies a substantial mode of
being.”
*****
S: The references here are to a variety of ancient commentaries.

In other words, there is, according to the commentaries and Karunadasa, no
conflict of meaning or any suggestion of ‘sabhava in any sense that
implies a substantial mode of being’ when used in the commentaries and no
conflict in interpretation with the Patisambhidamagga.
...
M: > Paramatha
<..>
> There is a recurrent argument in the list that although paramatha as
> such is
> not mentioned in the Canon, its meaning is there implicit. Karunadasa
> clarifies this point, when he talks about paññatti:
....
S: Before he talks about pannatti, he clarifies what is meant by
paramattha:

K: “The term paramattha is sometimes paraphased as bhutattha (the
actual).67 This is explained to mean that the dhammas are not non-existent
like an illusion or mirage or like the soul (purisa) and primordial nature
(pakati) of the non-Buddhist schools of thought.68 The evidence for their
existence is not based either on conventions (sammuti) or on mere
scriptural authority (anussava).69 On the contrary, their very existence
is vouchsafed by their own intrinsic nature.70 The very fact of their
existence is the very mark of their reality. As the Visuddhimagga
observes: "It (= dhamma) is that which, for those who examine it with the
eye of understanding, is not misleading like an illusion, deceptive like a
mirage, or undiscoverable like the self of the sectarians, but is rather
the domain of noble knowledge as the real unmisleading actual state." 71
The kind of existence implied here is not past or future existence, but
present actual and verifiable existence (satvijjamanata).72 This emphasis
on their actuality in the present phase of time rules out any association
with the Sarvastivadins' theory of tri-temporal existence. Thus, for the
Theravadin, the use of the term paramattha does not carry any
substantialist implications. It only means that the mental and material
dhammas represent the utmost limits to which the analysis of empirical
existence can be pushed.”
*****
S: Clearly as Karunadasa reads the Visuddhimagga and other ancient
commentarial texts, ‘the term paramattha does not carry any substantialist
implications’ and simply refers to namas and rupas which can be directly
known.
.....
M: <...>
> So, samutti is not the same as paramatha and the Canon does not
> contemplate
> real existents.
....
S: No one to my knowledge on DSG as ever suggested that samutti (common
designation) means the same as paramattha (ultimate truth).
K: “Accordingly the term ‘person’ becomes a common designation (sammuti)
given to a congeries of dependently, originated psycho-physical
factors.”[i.e namas and rupas or paramattha dhammas].
....
M: >And by Abhidhamma, Karunadasa must be referring to
> Abhidhamma commentaries since the Canonical Abhidhamma has a
> non-discursive
> style.
...
S: He’s referring to both. As he says, the first formal definition of
pannatti occurs in the Dhammasangani. He gives quotes from this. We find a
variety of styles in the Abhid.canon.
....
M: > Another way of understanding the philosophy of the Abhidhamma, in
> addition
> to the Abhidhamma commentaries, is by reference to the Kathavatthu since
> it
> has an authoritative status of a canonical text, and represents a closer
> companion to other canonical texts than the commentaries.
....
S: I’m glad to see your confidence in the Abhidhamma texts and this is why
I quoted a couple of times from the Kathavatthu before, clearly showing
the same point that Karunadasa makes in this quote I’d like to add:

K: “As recorded in the Kathavatthu, the "Points of Controversy," the main
contention of the Puggalavadins or "Personalists" is that the person is
known in a real and ultimate sense (saccikatthaparamatthena
upalabbhati).20 Against this proposition a number of counter-arguments are
adduced, which need not concern us here. What interests us, however, is
that in denying that the person is known in a real and ultimate sense, the
Theravadins admit that the khandhas or dhammas are known in a real and
ultimate sense. Thus in their view what is real and ultimate is not the
person but the khandhas or dhammas that enter into its composition.21”
*****
S: Finally, you add a quote from Prof Kalupahana about the Kathavatthu and
suggesting that the Abhidhamma does not deal with ultimate realities
(paramattha). At first I took the quote to be Karunadasa’s as it was his
article we were discussing and I was amazed as it would have contradicted
the rest of the paper. It wasn’t. I would simply urge everyone to read
the Kathavatthu and other texts for themselves rather than relying on
comments such as these.

Another quote from Karunadasa:

K: “For if the dhammas are defined as real and ultimate, this means, not
that they partake of the nature of absolute entities, but that they are
not further reducible to any other reality, to some kind of substance
which underlies them. That is to say, there is no "behind the scenes"
substance from which they emerge and to which they finally return. This
means, in effect, that the dhammas represent the final limits of the
Abhidhammic analysis of empirical existence. Hence this new definition
does not erode the empirical foundation of the dhamma theory as presented
by the Theravadins. Moreover, this view is quite consonant with the
statement occurring in the earlier texts that the dhammas come to be
without having been (ahutva sambhonti) and disappear without any residue
(hutva pativenti).”22
*****
M: > Since the concept of paramatha and svabhava underlie the main line of

> thinking prevalent in this list I will probably be more selective in my
> involvement in discussions in the future in order to avoid unnecessary
> stress and weariness for myself and for my dhamma fellows. Pls. don’t
> feel
> offended if I don’t answer replies to this message.
....
S: Michael, I think it’s been very helpful raising these topics. No
offence will be taken either way, but we’ll all be glad to hear from you
on any topic.

Metta,

Sarah
=====
> "The Dhamma Theory" - Prof. Y. Karunadasa:
> http://www.abhidhamma.org/dhamma_theory_philosophical_corn.htm

K: "The validity of the two kinds of statement corresponding to sammuti
and paramattha is set out as follows:

Statements referring to convention-based things (sanketa) are valid
because they are based on common agreement; statements referring to
ultimate categories (paramattha) are valid because they are based on the
true nature of the real existents."142

142. San1ketavacanat saccat lokasammutikarana
Paramatthavacanat saccat dhammanat bhutalakkhana.

(A I 54; KvuA 34; DA I 251)
==========================




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