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Albanian Power Struggle Traps U.S. Troops
22 January 2001

Summary

The effort of Kosovar Albanian militants in the Presevo region of Serbia
to damage relations between Belgrade and KFOR is failing. In fact, it
has been counterproductive, as Belgrade's restrained response to the
rebel provocations has drawn praise from the U.S. and European
governments, which already are eager to work with the new Yugoslav
regime. The militants now will seek another strategy to bolster the
dwindling prospects for an independent Kosovo. The power struggle in
Albania may offer just such an opportunity. The situation now emerging,
which could include the influence of Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden,
will make it increasingly hard, if not impossible, for the Bush
administration to withdraw U.S. forces.

Analysis

Soldiers of the KFOR Multinational Brigade East reportedly intercepted
and detained eleven suspected members of the Liberation Army of Presevo,
Medvedja, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) as they attempted to cross into Kosovo
from Serbia Jan. 12. These arrests follow the capture of nine heavily
armed and camouflaged men attempting to cross into Kosovo Jan. 6, and
still more infiltrators earlier in the month and last year.

Eager to build on good relations with the new government in Belgrade,
KFOR is attempting to stifle an ethnic Albanian insurgency that erupted
last November in the demilitarized buffer zone between Kosovo and the
rest of Serbia. With their attempt to disrupt growing cooperation
between KFOR and Yugoslavia thwarted, the Kosovar Albanian militants may
soon be drawn into Albania's domestic power struggle in hopes of
solidifying support from Tirana.

Kosovar Albanian militants have taken advantage of the 3-mile-wide
demilitarized buffer zone between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia to seize
control of ethnic Albanian enclaves outside Kosovo. The Ground Safety
Zone, as it is officially known, was created under the June 1999
Military Technical Agreement ending NATO's bombardment of Yugoslavia. It
was intended to be a means of avoiding accidental confrontations between
KFOR and Yugoslav military forces. However, as KFOR does not patrol the
buffer zone, and Yugoslav forces are allowed only limited access to the
area, Kosovar Albanian militants have been able to act there with
relative impunity.

The UCPMB's stated intention is to free ethnic Albanian enclaves in
Serbia from Belgrade's control and to annex those regions to an
independent Kosovo. This alone appears to confirm the longstanding fear
in the region that militant Albanians would not stop at Kosovo, but
would try to annex enclaves of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia,
Montenegro, Greece and Serbia into a greater Albania. But the militants'
campaign is more an attempt to secure their existing gains than to
expand the areas under their control. The primary motive behind the
militants' campaign in the Presevo Valley is the desire to provoke a
harsh Serbian response and thus damage relations between the new
Yugoslav government and KFOR. It is an attempt to preclude any chance of
returning Kosovo to Yugoslav control.

This three-part series will explore the impact of the militant's efforts
in the Balkans to free other ethnic Albanian population centers in
Serbia from Belgrade's control and to annex those regions to an
independent Kosovo. The second part will look at how the militants soon
could be drawn into the Albanian power struggle, in hopes of installing
a regime uncompromisingly committed to an independent Kosovo. Part three
will examine how infamous Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden, eager to
re-establish his network in the Balkans, could use or even facilitate
the violence in Albania to achieve his goal.

The future of Kosovo is a critical issue to the new administration of
President George W. Bush. Bush has talked of removing U.S. forces from
the region. If violence in the Balkans escalates, particularly in the
wake of actions by bin Laden, Bush stands little chance of bringing
American troops home without reigniting widespread conflict in the
region.

The ouster of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and his replacement
by opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica posed a grave threat to Kosovar
Albanian aspirations for independence. As long as Milosevic remained in
power there was no hope of negotiating the final status of Kosovo. That
effectively meant de facto independence for Kosovo, with KFOR tied down
indefinitely. But KFOR believes it can work with Kostunica. And not only
has the new Yugoslav government been generally cooperative, the Albanian
government has also been rather moderate in recent months, launching an
anti-crime initiative with Europe and normalizing relations with
Yugoslavia. Prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem
also received a boost when moderate Kosovar Albanian moderates won an
overwhelming victory in local elections in Kosovo last October.

Isolated, and with hopes for an independent Kosovo or Greater Albania
fading, the Kosovar Albanian militants launched attacks in the buffer
region to return the Kosovo debate to stalemate. But the gambit is
failing. In fact, it has proven to be counterproductive. The Kostunica
government has kept Serb forces in check in the disputed region, winning
the public relations war if not the war on the ground. KFOR has stepped
up its campaign to seal Kosovo's border with the rest of Serbia,
deploying its operational reserve force to the area Jan. 5 and arresting
some 130 suspected UCPMB members since the fighting began. Rather than
painting the new Yugoslav regime as despotic, the militants have
succeeded only in strengthening relations between KFOR and Yugoslavia.

KFOR has been clear and united in its condemnation of the militants'
actions. On Dec. 19, the U.N. Security Council demanded Albanian
militant organizations immediately disband and withdraw from the buffer
zone. U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade William Montgomery Dec. 22 praised
Yugoslav efforts to resolve the current crisis without resorting to
major military operations. In a Dec. 28 interview with the Austrian
newspaper Die Presse, Austrian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Albert
Rohan came out in favor of a Yugoslav request to reduce or eliminate the
buffer zone.

In a speech Jan. 12, France's Bernard Kouchner, outgoing U.N.
administrator for Kosovo, warned Kosovo Albanians that, "in the eyes of
the international community, they had turned from victims to
oppressors," according to the BBC. Kouchner issued a veiled warning to
the militants, stating Serbia and Kosovo were in a "race to democracy,"
the outcome of which could help determine the ultimate relationship
between the two. The BBC also cited NATO Secretary-General George
Robertson as warning the Kosovar Albanians that, though the
international community had invested a great deal of time, effort, and
money in to make Kosovo safe and secure, "that firm support could easily
be undermined."

Given their losing position in the political battle, and potential
setbacks on the ground, Kosovar Albanian militants now must look for
another means by which to control Kosovo's destiny. To achieve their
goals, the militants need the backing of at least one of the states
involved in settling the Kosovo problem. In the guerrilla campaign that
preceded NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the militants had the
sponsorship of the Albanian government. During the war, they had the
somewhat unwitting support of the United States. Both are now fixed on
other priorities.

The United States and KFOR want to settle the Kosovo problem peacefully
and, more importantly, to integrate Yugoslavia into a program for
long-term regional stability. The current Albanian government, caught up
in a domestic power struggle, is casting its fortunes with Europe and
the United States. Since one approach necessary to win U.S. support -
victimization by the Serbs - is not working, and the other - peaceful
cooperation - does not further their goal of independence, the Kosovar
Albanian militants may now focus their attention on Albania, where a
power struggle threatens both the Kosovar militants and their Albanian
backers.