http://www.antiwar.com/malic/pf/p-m113000.html

ANTIWAR, Thursday, November 30, 2000

Balkan Express
by Nebojsa Malic
Antiwar.com

Bandits on the Border

It’s not easy being Vojislav Kostunica(1) these days. Your Number Two is
plotting your demise; the other partner in your federation is
threatening secession; militant American interventionists are calling on
you to give in on that demand, and grant Kosovo independence as well;
your people are hungry, cold and angrier by the day; your nemesis,
though admitting defeat, is heckling you from the ranks of opposition;
your country’s worst enemy is determined to boost her political rating
by meeting you at a major conference; and on top of all that, you have
to deal with bandits invading your southern border.

A lesser man would have gone insane. Kostunica has somehow still managed
to keep his cool. How long can this situation last is anyone’s guess.
This conundrum is the new government’s first big test, and the next
three weeks will show the shape of things to come in the Balkans
heartland.

FACING THE HYDRA

It is hard for Kostunica to decide which problem facing his government
is the most pressing one. Like the mythical Hydra’s heads, each one that
he cuts off only spawns more. Until October 5, the issue was mainly
replacing Milosevic. Now he has to deal with Zoran Djindjic’s ambitions,
Montenegrin separatism, Milosevic again, and the resurgent Albanian
terrorism.

If he doesn’t stop Zoran Djindjic from winning the Serbian presidency in
the December election, Kostunica will lose his job and his country after
Djindjic arranges for Montenegro’s secession. There are indications of a
pact between the two factions of the new government, which would protect
Kostunica’s position and keep Djindjic reined in. How likely is Djindjic
is to respect that pact once in power is another matter.

Then there are the increasingly loud and obnoxious demands for
independence made by Milo Djukanovic’s regime in Montenegro. This regime
has already created a de facto separate state, and now seeks to have it
recognized on the sole basis of that fait accompli. Their actions over
the past two months have made it abundantly clear that Milosevic never
had anything to do with Montenegro’s drive for independence.
Djukanovic’s recent moves also indicate he has the strong backing of
Washington to successfully implement his secession plans. The Clinton
administration may have publicly stated its opposition to Montenegro’s
secession. But allotting $89 million in "aid" to Montenegro while giving
Serbia – with 95% of the Yugoslav population – only $109 million
indicates this position is an outright lie. It wouldn’t be the first
time.

After a month of seclusion, Slobodan Milosevic is back in politics as
well. He is a shadow of his former self, with a large chunk of his party
gone and his political platform in tatters. His wife is still the most
hated persona in Serbia. Nonetheless, Milosevic is ruthlessly exploiting
Djindjic’s power drive to present the ruling coalition as paid Western
agents and his Socialists as the only independent force in Serbia. It is
ironic that he may be right on some counts – that Djindjic really would
sell Serbia for 30 pieces of silver and that the Albanian revolt, NATO
attacks and Djukanovic’s separatism really had nothing to do with him –
but because of his record as ruler of Serbia, few will be inclined to
listen on December 23.

THE PRESEVO INCIDENT

Just as Kostunica was dealing with Milo Djukanovic’s last act of open
treason (really, how many of these does each politician get before he is
arrested?), news came of a large-scale attack of Albanian militants in
the Presevo valley. Situated on the eastern administrative border of
Kosovo, this area has a large Albanian population and has been marked on
more detailed maps of Greater Albania as "Kosova Lindore" – eastern
"Kosova." Incidentally, a good part of this area lies in the
three-mile-wide demilitarized zone NATO imposed on the Yugoslav army in
the June 1999 Kumanovo treaty. Under the treaty, only lightly armed
Yugoslav police are allowed in the zone, while NATO is supposed to
control the border of occupied Kosovo and stop the incursion of any
militants or gunrunners. The fact that there are between 400 and 600
armed Albanians holding the DMZ area around the town of Konculj
[Kon’chull] testifies to NATO’s efficiency and dedication to duty. This
is no homegrown militia, either, but a militant formation known for
almost a year under the moniker UCPMB – Ushtria Clirimtare Presheve,
Medveja e Bujanovec ([Preshevo-Medvegya-Buyanovats] Liberation Army).
Its insignia, uniforms, procedures and tactics mirror those of the
"disbanded" KLA (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves). This "army" has been
controlling the village of Dobrosin [Dobroshin] for over a year, under
the watchful eye of American KFOR troops. To create an impression they
were doing something, these troops recently started arresting the UCPMB
militants crossing in and out of Kosovo. How effective that practice has
been is obvious.

METHOD IN THE MADNESS

Why did the Albanian militants attack now, when they could have done so
in 1999, with NATO backing them up? The logic behind the surprise
raid/invasion of this border strip is seemingly incomprehensible. But
there may be method in the madness after all.

With NATO feeling less hostile towards the Serbs, Milosevic out of power
and everyone seemingly so infatuated with Kostunica, the KLA leaders
must be feeling frustrated. Additionally, Rugova’s victory in the local
elections robbed them of their power base and reduced their political
influence. In the face of these setbacks, they decided to do what they
do best – fight. So this attack could just be a show of force aimed at
restoring the KLA's flagging support among the Albanians.

Or, as some analysts have pointed out, this could be an attempt to
involve NATO in another war against Serbia. This scheme is incredibly
harebrained, since NATO doesn’t have enough will or weapons for such an
adventure right now and the PR situation is not favorable at all. More
likely, the KLA is trying to show NATO that it is serious about wanting
independence for Kosovo, and would not hesitate to embarrass or even
openly oppose the Alliance in order to achieve that goal.

For conspiracy theorists, this is obviously a part of a greater American
plot to separate Kosovo from Serbia by showing that the Albanians refuse
to be pacified.

Either way, there are hundreds of bandits on the border of free Serbia
and occupied Kosovo, and they don’t seem willing to leave unless someone
makes them. For the time being, Kostunica is successfully restraining
his troops and putting an egg on NATO’s face for allowing this situation
to happen in the first place. NATO’s critics can now rightfully say what
they’ve been saying all along: that the Alliance never had any
intentions of honoring its agreements, opposing the Albanians in any
way, or protecting Serbia’s sovereignty. After all, they did just fight
a very dirty and brutal war against the Serbs only a year and some
months ago.

BUT A FEW CHOICES

There isn’t much any of the actors involved can do right now. NATO will
have to do something in order to at least repair its image. It is
unlikely that the occupation garrison in Kosovo will actually disarm or
in any way confront the UCPMB militants. Instead of doing so – as the
Kumanovo treaty dictates it should – KFOR has instead "brokered a
cease-fire" and threatened to move into the DMZ. This way, all KFOR has
to do is arrange a cease-fire every time the militants take another
town, and soon enough "Kosova Lindore" will join the rest of Kosovo
under NATO occupation.

Of course, Yugoslav troops could take action and wipe out the UCPBM off
the face of the earth. They would have every right to do so, since they
cannot be held to the letter of the Kumanovo treaty if NATO has failed
to honor its end of the bargain. Using force would be bad from a PR
standpoint, though, and Kostunica will probably give every other
solution a try before actually ordering in the tanks.

EPIPHANY

Regardless of how this situation is ultimately resolved, the most
profound effect of the Albanian bandits’ incursion could be a better
understanding of last year’s war over Kosovo. Several reports have
mentioned the similarity between this weekend’s attack on Serbian police
and the 1998’s assault by the KLA on Serbian police and military
personnel in Kosovo. Of course, those reports continue to say that
Yugoslav response to these attacks was the "ethnic cleansing" that
ensued. But what caused the attacks?

What do the first major offensive by the KLA and the first major attack
by the PMBLA have in common? Slobodan Milosevic and his "oppression" of
Albanians can no longer be invoked as an excuse. Neither can violations
of human rights by the new government, which has released many former
KLA members and has appointed numerous human rights activists to
powerful positions. Nothing else seems plausible.

Well, not quite. As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes used to
say, once you eliminate the impossible, anything else – however
improbable – must be the truth. It could be that the solution has been
staring everyone in the face all along, but that everyone has been too
busy accusing the Serbs of racism, fascism, genocide and dictatorship to
see it.

Could the causes behind Presevo Albanians’ and Kosovo Albanians’ attacks
on Serbia be one and the same: hatred of Serbs and the desire to have a
separate, ethnically cleansed statelet in the Balkans? Is this desire
for independence not what their leaders have reiterated over the past
year and a half? Have not the Kosovo Albanians expelled just about every
other ethnicity from the territories in Kosovo they control? Have they
not repeatedly killed and assaulted non-Albanians over the past year and
a half?

Could it be that there really is a plan to create a Greater Albania,
which had nothing to do with Slobodan Milosevic or the human rights
policy of Belgrade, and everything to do with the hatred and racism of
those militant Albanians unwilling to live together with anyone else?

Because when you eliminate the impossible, that is what remains.

1) Note to Balkan Express readers: Though in last week’s installment I
objected to the butchering of Serbian and other Balkans names through
improper spelling, in order to avoid confusion I have decided to retain
the old forms for the time being.