Glas Javnosti, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
November 24, 2000

"Glas" investigates

What is going on in Kosovo and southern Serbia

The war against tolerance

Even thought it would be extremely uncomfortable for him to do so,
perhaps Kostunica, despite his personal sentiment, could meet with
Madeleine Albright.

In Kosovo and in Serbia right next to it, it appears that nothing has
changed. The terrorist-guerrilla framework remains. KFOR is neither
capable of disarming the KLA nor does it desire to do so. The state is
forced to simultaneously resolve multiple strategic problems but
apparently the most important of these is the extremely contradictory
relationship with Europe and the world: the democratically elected
president of Yugoslavia can go wherever he lives. Even the greatest
consider him to be an equal. But in Serbia there are far too many
troubles for them to be cured only by the glitter of global
representative promotion.

Now we are left to seek the main causes for the rejuvenation of Shiptar
militarism. It was never dead to begin with. The platform of a great
state was based on it for decades. This variant of aggressive ethnic
behavior has its biological prerequisites in constant demographic
expansion.

The Albanian leaders based their concept on a mix of diplomatic and
financial pressure wherever the national lobby is present, and on
potential revolt. This was the work of several generations, the goal
which was never given up. In that effort, great amounts of money were
spent without limitation but also living human material. Finally, it is
believed that today's generation is very close to the goal.

The current Shiptar military and political philosophy was constructed on
Serb foundations. As far back as 1998, Demachi said: "We don't have to
work too much at it. Everything that Milosevic and Seselj are doing is
in our best interests."

No matter how uncomfortable we are with the inordinately aggressive
Demachi said, his cited observations are correct. Had Milosevic remained
in power only a few months longer, perhaps the dream of central Balkan
expansion by a Shiptar state would have been realized. However,
Milosevic fell and he no longer serves as anyone's excuse: either the
Albanians, who without him will be hard pressed to create their own
state, or the Serbs, who even without him hardly know what to do.

Obviously, a giant conceptual vacuum has been created for the great
powers. The Americans are unable to either forget the reasons why the
came her or to maintain their prejudices after the "democratic
revolution" in FRY. What they would like most of all is to withdraw
without political scratches but it is too late for such an operation.
The Albanian leaders no longer know who is allied with whom"" whether
the military and civil forces engaged to secure peace support Rugova
(the winner in the local elections), Thaci (the romantic hero of a
national rebellion) or Kostunica (the winner against Milosevic).

With so many winners in such a small area, it's rather difficult for
anyone to figure out what is going on. The greatest power in the world
is still resolving is presidential problems; the outcome will also
determine its position on Kosovo. It is precisely in this confusing gap
that a new Balkan trauma was announced.

In our opinion, the following reasons brought about a resurge in Shiptar
guerrilla aggressiveness: first, Thaci's attempt to marginalize Rugova's
victory, with the message: Nothing is finished, the real action is just
beginning.

Second, to demonstrate the strength of the militant branch in the
Albanian nationalist movement. They want to show that this is where all
the strength lies, that it is the only force which resolves matters.

Third, to overshadow the changes in Yugoslavia and Serbia, with the
message: nothing has changed, everything is still the same and much
worse.

Fourth, to use a terrorist and guerrilla spectacle to remind the U.S.,
first and foremost, that the Shiptar nationalist movement will never
accept either Serbia or Yugoslavia as its own state framework.

Fifth, to demonstrate the defensive vulnerability of the remainder of
the Serb state, and the assigned sterility in use of even defensive
units.

Sixth, to test in the most practical way the international forces in
Kosovo and institutions outside it. If there are no practical reactions
(an armed response by KFOR, for example), the action can be continued.

Seventh, in the event of any kind of intervention by the state, to
demonstrate its "Greater Serbian" essence.

Perhaps there are more but it is not easy to list them. In resolving the
listed and other reasons, the role of the Serbian state, which is
confronted with the dilemma of what it is allowed and what it can do, is
essential. The presidential statement of the Security Council apparently
is not enough, although it is far more specific than we have been
accustomed to past years. Nevertheless, there have been no concrete
steps by the international community except to somehow tolerate the
actions of the KLA, while a response by the Serbian state (in the
security zone of five kilometers) would probably be sanctioned.

Thus, the previous regime left Kostunica with the heavy burden of his
inheritance. At the beginning of his term in office, he is faced with a
complex, armed and political attack on the country of which he is
president. The Albanians have not given up on the "contested"
municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedje; consequently, in the
days which follow, we can expect very bad news.

The state, therefore, can do what it has done in the past: to try its
strength in the use of force. This may be unavoidable but, nevertheless,
it is very risky. Perhaps, finally, Dr. Kostunica might grant Mrs.
Madeleine Albright an audience and meet with her. She is on the way out
and it is not easy to extend one's hand to her but politics is something
far above personal distastes. The Albanians need a new war; we do not.
It would be good if they were stopped by those who came here to
allegedly protect them. In this way, they would show that they are aware
that something has changed in Serbia even though it is already very
difficult for the Serbs themselves to observe that it the case.

Ljubodrag Stojadinovic

Translated by S. Lazovic (Nov. 24, 2000)