THE INDEPENDENT (London)

UK role in Kosovo 'disappointing'

MPs criticise limited participation

By Bob Roberts, Deputy Political Editor, PA News

24 October 2000

The British contribution to the Kosovo air campaign was both
limited and disappointing, according to a damning new report
published today.

The Commons Defence Select Committee issued a
catalogue of criticism of the way that Nato leaders both
approached and then ran the campaign.

But Britain's Armed Forces Minister John Spellar claimed the
committee had acknowledged that the 78-day campaign -
codenamed Operation Allied Force - had been a success.

The report said the UK air forces suffered from a lack of
precision-guided weapons and made up less than 5% of all
the Nato sorties flown.

It said the 2% of 1,000lb unguided bombs confirmed as hitting
their targets was "distressingly low".

The report also questioned the wide use of "cluster bombs"
which drop munitions over wide areas of ground and it
condemned as a "major shortcoming" the lack of secure
communications system.

"Overall, despite the heroic efforts of UK aircrew and support
staff, we must conclude that the UK's contribution to the air
campaign, in terms of actual firepower rather than support,
was somewhat disappointing," said the report.

It added: "UK aircraft were (even compared to other European
allies) relatively few in number, delivered few munitions
relative to even their small numbers and were not
well-equipped for the task they faced.

"The lack of all-weather capability to deliver precision-guided
weapons from the air severely compromised the RAF's and
the Royal Navy's effectiveness.

"Our major contribution to the bombing campaign was in the
form of unguided cluster bombs - a contribution of limited
military value and questionable legitimacy."

On the air campaign overall, the report was also critical about
its impact and effectiveness.

It said: "Despite some success in bottling-up Serbian forces,
the strikes against fielded forces in Kosovo failed in their
declared primary objective of averting a humanitarian disaster.

"The limitations of airpower in pursuit of such humanitarian
goals were clearly demonstrated and this lesson must be
learned."

It added that there had been a "poor kill rate" and that the
contribution of air strikes to the alliance's military objectives
was "at best marginal".

The report criticised the Nato leadership for failing to agree its
willingness to use military power, saying this "hobbled" early
attempts to deal with the Kosovo crisis.

The purpose of using the armed forces was "confused"
among Nato countries and that alliance planning was "too
reactive and cumbersome".

On the campaign itself it said the scale and brutality of the
expulsion of ethnic Albanians took Nato by surprise adding
that it "must be counted a failure of imagination in assessing
how effectively an adversary like (Yugoslav president
Slobodan) Milosevic was likely to identify the alliance's
Achilles heel".

And the report said the "confusion of purpose" about the
objectives of the military operation "dogged the campaign".

The report singled out the public pronouncements ruling out of
the use of ground troops early in the campaign as a "serious
error of judgment".

It said they "hamstrung" the alliance's diplomatic leverage and
gave comfort to Milosevic.

"They enabled Milosevic to shelter much of his military
equipment underground, rather than leaving it deployed to
meet the possibility of a ground attack. This severely
weakened the impact of air attacks against forces in the field."

It concluded: "Kosovo has, fortunately, dispelled the illusion
that Nato is an instrument that can readily be used in a
precise and discriminating way to support diplomacy.

"Military conflict, it reminded us, is messy, dangerous and not
wholly predictable. Politicians will, we hope, face up to some
of its less palatable lessons."

Mr Spellar said: "I welcome the report and the committee's
acknowledgement that Nato prevailed and that Operation
Allied Force can fairly be counted a success.

"The departure of Milosevic's troops from Kosovo, the return of
Kosovar Albanians and now the rejection of Milosevic's
dictatorship by the people of Serbia has shown that Nato's
approach was right.

"It is right that we should look at the lessons that can be learnt.
But we must not let this overshadow the fact that our
objectives were achieved."