See especially two articles on Microsoft alternatives.
>_________________________________________________________________
>
> A N T I T R U S T L A W A N D P O L I C Y
> A B S T R A C T S
> Working Paper Series
> Vol. 1, No. 4: April 11, 2000
>_________________________________________________________________
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>T A B L E of C O N T E N T S
>_________________________________________________________________
>
>
>"Financial Intermediation and Entry Deterrence"
> NEELAM JAIN
> Rice University
> Jones Graduate School of Management
> THOMAS D. JEITSCHKO
> Texas A&M University
> Department of Economics
> LEONARD J. MIRMAN
> University of Virginia
> Department of Economics
>
>
>"Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities:
> Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach"
> RICHARD N. LANGLOIS
> University of Connecticut
> Department of Economics
>
>
>"Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: A
> Structural Remedy for Microsoft"
> THOMAS M. LENARD
> The Progress & Freedom Foundation
>
>
>"A Fool's Paradise: The Windows World After a Forced Breakup of
> Microsoft"
> STAN J. LIEBOWITZ
> University of Texas at Dallas
> School of Management
>
>
>"Globalisation and International Antitrust Co-operation"
> MASSIMILIANO MONTINI
> Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
>
>
>PROFESSIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT
>
>UNFAIRNESS AND THE INTERNET
> Wayne State University Law School
> April 13, 2000
>
>
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>
>W O R K I N G P A P E R A B S T R A C T S
>_________________________________________________________________
>
>"Financial Intermediation and Entry Deterrence"
>
> BY: NEELAM JAIN
> Rice University
> Jones Graduate School of Management
> THOMAS D. JEITSCHKO
> Texas A&M University
> Department of Economics
> LEONARD J. MIRMAN
> University of Virginia
> Department of Economics
>
>Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=199308
>
> Contact: NEELAM JAIN
> Email: Mailto:jain@...
> Postal: Rice University
> Jones Graduate School of Management
> MS#531
> P.O. Box 1892
> Houston, TX 77251-1892 USA
> Co-Auth: THOMAS D. JEITSCHKO
> Email: Mailto:thosd@...
> Postal: Texas A&M University
> Department of Economics
> College Station, TX 77843-4228 USA
> Co-Auth: LEONARD J. MIRMAN
> Email: Mailto:lm8h@...
> Postal: University of Virginia
> Department of Economics
> 114 Rouss Hall
> Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
>
>ABSTRACT:
> In this paper, we analyze the interaction between an incumbent
> firm's financial contract with a bank and its product market
> decisions in the face of the threat of entry, in a dynamic
> model. The main results of the paper are: there exists a
> separating equilibrium with no limit pricing; there are
> conditions under which the low-cost incumbent repays more to the
> bank, due to the threat of entry; and there are parameter values
> for which the bank makes more profits with the threat of entry
> than without.
>
>
>JEL Classification: D4, L1, G3
>______________________________
>
>"Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities:
> Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach"
>
> BY: RICHARD N. LANGLOIS
> University of Connecticut
> Department of Economics
>
>Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=204069
>
> Contact: RICHARD N. LANGLOIS
> Email: Mailto:Richard.Langlois@...
> Postal: University of Connecticut
> Department of Economics
> Monteith Building, Room 332
> 341 Mansfield Road
> Storrs, CT 06269 USA
> Phone: (860)486-3472
> Fax: (860)486-4463
>
>ABSTRACT:
> In this essay, I attempt to take seriously Schumpeter’s
> perspective on competition as fundamentally about innovation.
> Drawing on literatures that concern themselves centrally with
> the patterns and processes of technological change, I focus on a
> set of issues very much on the present-day agenda: antitrust
> policy toward network industries in which technological
> standards are important. As both scholars and legal cases have
> suggested, one might logically view a set of standards as an
> “essential facility” — a technological bottleneck — for those
> who wish to connect to the network.
>
> I attempt to define the limits of the standard price-theoretic
> account for understanding the problem of essential facilities
> and offer instead a perspective drawing on the theory property
> rights in a regime of innovation. Contrary to what is suggested
> by traditional economic analysis, I argue that, as a logical
> matter, refusals to deal by essential-facility monopolists are
> not always equivalent to the exercise of existing monopoly power
> through price, and there are good theoretical reasons for an
> essential facility doctrine to concern itself with refusals to
> deal even when it fails to touch other exercises of market power
> by a legally acquired monopoly. I introduce the concept of the
> scope of an essential facility, understood in analogy with a
> similar concept in the economics of patents, and suggest that
> the degree to which antitrust policy should concern itself with
> the ownership or control of a technical standard ought to be
> proportional to the scope of the standard.
>
> At the same time, however, a Schumpeterian perspective reminds
> us that, in a world of dynamic technological competition, even
> possession of a standard with wide scope may afford only
> temporary protection, and the winds of Schumpeterian creative
> destruction may be a better antidote to monopoly than the
> cumbersome and interest-laden processes of antitrust law and
> policy. Nonetheless, the notion of the scope of a standard may
> prove useful in many cases, including those involving regulated
> (or formerly regulated) industries or involving tradeoffs in
> intellectual property rights.
>
>
>JEL Classification: L1, L4, L5
>______________________________
>
>"Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: A
> Structural Remedy for Microsoft"
>
> BY: THOMAS M. LENARD
> The Progress & Freedom Foundation
>
>Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=220288
>
>Paper ID: The Progress & Freedom Foundation Working Paper
> Date: January 2000
>
> Contact: THOMAS M. LENARD
> Email: Mailto:tlenard@...
> Postal: The Progress & Freedom Foundation
> 1301 K Street NW, Suite 550 East
> Washington, DC 20005 USA
> Phone: (202)289-8928
> Fax: (202)289-6079
>
>ABSTRACT:
> The case against Microsoft raises fundamental questions about
> the role of antitrust in the digital economy. The government has
> presented testimony showing that Microsoft is guilty of serious
> antitrust violations. The district court has now issued
> comprehensive Findings of Fact that leave little doubt that the
> government has proved its case. The evidence convincingly
> establishes that Microsoft possesses monopoly power in the
> market for Personal Computer (PC) operating systems and that it
> has engaged in a broad campaign to protect and extend this
> monopoly through anticompetitive acts in violation of Section 2
> of the Sherman Act.
>
> Microsoft's behavior is not just a case of a business practice
> or two that strays over the line. The district court found that
> Microsoft engaged in a wide-ranging effort to protect its
> operating system monopoly, utilizing a full array of
> exclusionary practices, including exclusive contracts, tying,
> market-division proposals, and other forms of predatory conduct.
> Microsoft aimed its artillery at any product or firm that
> presented even a remote threat to its monopoly power.
>
> Given the court's Findings, it is a virtual certainty that
> Microsoft will be subject to remedial action of some form. The
> range of anticompetitive behavior documented by the court, the
> importance of Microsoft to the computer industry, and the
> importance of the computer industry to the economy all argue for
> a serious remedy that will be effective in promoting
> competition. The remedy should not only address the illegitimate
> practices Microsoft employed to maintain its operating system
> monopoly. It should also try to create conditions where
> Microsoft is not able to leverage its monopoly beyond the
> desktop into new phases of computing. Whether the chosen remedy
> is effective in promoting competition in the software industry
> will have much to say about whether antitrust is viewed as
> having a constructive role to play in the digital economy.
>
> The parties and the court have an extensive array of potential
> remedial options at their disposal. These options can be grouped
> into two general categories - conduct remedies and structural
> remedies, with intellectual property remedies straddling both
> these categories.
>
> Conduct remedies would leave Microsoft intact and attempt to
> constrain its anticompetitive behavior by imposing what would
> likely be a very detailed set of behavioral requirements -
> essentially, a regulatory regime tailor-made for one firm.
> Microsoft's structure - and, importantly, its incentives - would
> remain the same. Given those incentives, the challenge for the
> decree court would be to develop rules that deter Microsoft's
> anticompetitive behavior and, at the same time, permit Microsoft
> to be an innovative, aggressive, value-creating competitor in
> the software industry.
>
> Structural relief takes a different approach, and there are
> several different ways this could be done in the Microsoft case.
> In contrast to behavioral rules, a structural solution can
> change the incentive structure facing the firm, and thereby be
> much more effective in promoting competition, which, as Richard
> Posner as written, "is the proper purpose of the antitrust
> laws."
>
> There is no perfect solution, and choosing among the available
> alternatives requires a careful weighing of their benefits and
> costs. Structural remedies will generally be more disruptive and
> impose greater initial costs than behavioral relief. However,
> the ongoing costs of regulatory oversight associated with
> detailed behavioral relief can be very large. Subjecting
> Microsoft's business, and even its technical decisions, to
> ongoing regulatory scrutiny by the court and the Department of
> Justice would be harmful for Microsoft and for consumers as
> well.
>
>
> Other papers related to the Microsoft Case:
>
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=204874
> The Flawed Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the
> Microsoft Case
> by Robert J. Levinson, R. Craig Romaine, and Steven C. Salop
>
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=218178
> A Fool's Paradise: The Windows World After a Forced Breakup of
> Microsoft
> by Stan J. Liebowitz
>
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=214312
> Breaking Windows: Estimating Some Costs of Breaking up Microsoft
> Windows
> by Stan J. Liebowitz
>
> Our database includes more than 20 other papers about the
> Microsoft case. To find them, please use an "abstract body"
> search,. and enter "Microsoft" as the search term.
>
>
>JEL Classification: K21, L4
>______________________________
>
>"A Fool's Paradise: The Windows World After a Forced Breakup of
> Microsoft"
>
> BY: STAN J. LIEBOWITZ
> University of Texas at Dallas
> School of Management
>
>Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=218178
>
> Date: February 25, 2000
>
> Contact: STAN J. LIEBOWITZ
> Email: Mailto:liebowit@...
> Postal: University of Texas at Dallas
> School of Management
> Mail Station JO51
> Dallas, TX 75025 USA
> Phone: 972-883-2807
> Fax: 972-883-2818
>
>ABSTRACT:
> This is a followup paper to an earlier paper of mine estimating
> the costs to developers of a Microsoft breakup. It responds to
> papers by Levinson, Romaine, and Salop (lrs.pdf) and Lenard
> (lenard.doc) available at
> http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/mic/
> Among other things, this paper examines the changes in the
> windows operating system and explains why, if broken into three
> competing versions, they must lose complete compatibility,
> imposing additional costs on developers. It also explains why
> these extra development costs are deadweight losses.
>
>
> Other papers related to the Microsoft Case:
>
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=220288
> Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: A
> Structural Remedy for Microsoft
> by Thomas M. Lenard
>
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=204874
> The Flawed Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the
> Microsoft Case
> by Robert J. Levinson, R. Craig Romaine, and Steven C. Salop
>
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=214312
> Breaking Windows: Estimating Some Costs of Breaking up Microsoft
> Windows
> by Stan J. Liebowitz
>
> Our database includes more than 20 other papers about the
> Microsoft case. To find them, please use an "abstract body"
> search,. and enter "Microsoft" as the search term.
>
>
>JEL Classification: L4, L5, K21, O3
>______________________________
>
>"Globalisation and International Antitrust Co-operation"
>
> BY: MASSIMILIANO MONTINI
> Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
>
>Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=200611
>
> Other Electronic Document Delivery:
> http://www.feem.it/web/activ/wp/abs99/69-99.pdf
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> them into your browser eliminating all spaces.
>
>Paper ID: FEEM Working Paper No. 69-99
> Date: September 1999
>
> Contact: MASSIMILIANO MONTINI
> Email: Mailto:montini@...
> Postal: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
> Milano, ITALY
> Phone: +39 02 52036938
> Fax: +39 02 52036946
>
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> Contact Publications Office, Mailto:ranzini@... or
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> 52036938. Fax:(02) 52036946 AB.
>
>ABSTRACT:
> The globalisation of the world economy on the one side and the
> expansion of national systems of competition antitrust law on
> the other side over the last few years have raised to the top of
> the international agenda the trade and competition issue. While
> trade barriers are decreasing and business internationalises,
> cross-border anticompetitive practices increase. Such practices,
> which may reduce effective competition and undermine the
> benefits of globalisation, dramatically reveal the limits of an
> asinchronised international antitrust regime. From one point of
> view, it is generally very difficult for the panoply of national
> antitrust systems to tackle domestically cross-border
> anticompetitive practices, which by their very nature are
> planned and implemented by several actors under several
> jurisdictions and have negative effects in many countries. From
> another point of view, it is generally inefficient for companies
> operating at the international level to be subject to different
> national competition rules, due to the lack of common rules at
> the international level. Up to now, various attempts to
> synchronise competition principles with a new globalised trading
> system by establishing a harmonised international competition
> regime have dramatically failed. Meanwhile, several countries
> have concentrated their efforts on the development of bilateral
> co-operation agreements, by their nature more limited in scope.
>
> The first part of this paper will be devoted to analyse the
> main features of the EC-US bilateral co-operation agreements in
> the field of competition law. On the basis of this analysis, I
> will argue that although bilateral co-operation must be
> recognised as an important achievement in the present
> preliminary stage of the globalisation of the world economy, it
> should be gradually supplemented, and eventually replaced, by
> some forms of multilateral antitrust co-operation, possibly
> within the framework of the WTO. In the second part of this
> work, I will present some concrete options for the development
> of multilateral antitrust co-operation in this sense.
>
>
>P R O F E S S I O N A L Announcement
>_________________________________________________________________
>
>UNFAIRNESS AND THE INTERNET
> Wayne State University Law School
> Detroit, Michigan
>
> April 13, 2000
>
> SUMMARY:
>
> Twenty years ago, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), under
> attack as too aggressive in its application of the FTC Act's
> prohibition of "unfair . . . acts and practices," issued a policy
> statement on unfairness that was designed in part to reassure
> critics. Congress subsequently codified this definition of
> "unfairness" in an amendment to the FTC Act. Thereafter, the
> Commission showed reluctance to exercise its authority to prohibit
> acts as "unfair."
>
> In this 20th-anniversary year of the Unfairness Statement, things
> are changing. The Commission has started to invoke this authority
> more frequently. At the same time, the internet is causing a
> fundamental rethinking of the role of consumer protection in
> general, and of the FTC and its unfairness authority in particular.
> Privacy issues have taken center stage nationally and at the state
> level. Enforcers are debating how to protect important consumer
> interests without unduly chilling innovation; companies are trying
> to comply with evolving legal standards at the same time that their
> business plans are quickly changing; scholars are working to help
> bring understanding and insight to a whole series of important
> questions concerning licensing, copyright, privacy, and the proper
> role of the courts, federal agencies, and the states.
>
> At this critical time, the Wayne Law Review brings together central
> figures in this important debate. Leading experts from government,
> business, and academia will review the special questions raised by
> the internet and explore a series of difficult questions related to
> our theme, "unfairness and the internet." This one-day program should
> be every bit as timely and provocative as the internet itself.
>
> SPEAKERS:
>
> Luncheon Address: FTC Commissioner Thomas Leary.
>
> Presentations by:
>
> Lee Peeler: Associate Director of the Bureau of Consumer
> Protection in charge of Advertising Practices, Federal Trade
> Commission
>
> Professor Jean Braucher, University of Arizona, James E.
> Rogers College of Law
>
> Professor Stephen Calkins, Wayne State University Law
> School; Former General Counsel, FTC
>
> David Evans, Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, Washington,
> D.C.
>
> Professional Michael Greenfield, Washington University in
> St. Louis School of Law
>
> William MacLeod, Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, Washington
> D.C.; Former Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection,
> FTC
>
> Professor Roger Schechter, George Washington University
> School of Law
>
>
> COMMENTATORS INCLUDE:
>
> Martin J. Adelman, Professor of Law and Director of the
> Intellectual Property Law Program The George Washington
> University Law School Professor Emeritus, Wayne State
> University Law School
>
> Vincent A. Wellman, Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State
> University Law School
>
> Jill Phillips, Ford Motor Company Senior Attorney and Legal
> Counsel for e-business, including e-commerce and other
> related initiatives.
>
> Stuart Pruss, Michigan Assistant Attorney General in charge
> of consumer protection
>
> Robert Rothman, Counsel, e-GM
>
>
> FURTHER INFORMATION:
>
> For further information, visit:
>
> http://www.law.wayne.edu/lawrev/symposia.htm
>
>
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>ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY
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> Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School
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> University
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> Professor of Law, New York University Law School
>
>HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP
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> College of Law
>
>LOUIS KAPLOW
> Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
>
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> Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law, School of Law, and
> Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of
> California, Berkeley; Co-Editor, International Review of Law
> and Economics
>
>CARL SHAPIRO
> Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy, Haas School of
> Business, University of California at Berkeley
>
>LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN
> Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of Law, Southwestern University
> School of Law
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