--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@...> wrote:
>
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@>
> wrote:
> >
> > I haven't dropped by since the markers have been added, but I did
> > notice on this website that one of the stops is titled "A Soldier's
> > Battle," a description with which I very much disagree.
> >
>
> Why do you disagree?

This description is based on the Ed Bearss assertion that the battle
lines broke down into individual companies scrambling around in the
woods, and that each soldier's world collapsed into a 10 ft radius
circle of visibility, inside of which each soldier waged his own
battle.

There were some gaps in command and control during the battle, most
notably:

1) The Confederate left wing and right wing were out of supporting
distance of each other for two hours and consequently were each
defeated in detail.

2) Col. Manning Force of the 20th Ohio panicked, and ordered his men to
charge into the creek bed from which they could neither advance nor
retreat.  This left him exposed 100 yards in front of the Union battle
line, and required great sacrifice on the part of the 20th Ill. to
reconnect the battle line.

3) Gen. John Stevenson, commanding the reserve, over-pursued the
Confederate left wing with his two remaining regiments.  This exposed
the 7th MO to a route by the 10/30th TN as they attempted to reorganize
after emerging from the woods.

Interestingly enough, Bearss likes to use Raymond as a case study in
the dangers of a Corps commander being overly hesitant, when really all
of the serious gaffes in the battle resulted when regimental and
brigade commanders became overly aggressive.

I noticed in PUSG Volume 8 that Grant issues a pass to one WH Keene ...
any relation?

:)

I am the decendent of a William Henry Keene who was in the war.
However, IIRC, volume 8 of PUSG covers the Vicksburg campaign.  During
that time my ancestor was on the coast of North Carolina, so its
doubtful Grant issued a pass to him.   According to the National Park
Service database there were about a half dozen men named William H
Keene who served and over a dozen more listed as William Keene with no
middle initial identified.  Several of those listed were with units
present on the Vicksburg campaign.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@...>
wrote:
>
>
> I noticed in PUSG Volume 8 that Grant issues a pass to one WH
Keene ...
> any relation?
>
> :)

Charles P. Roland. Albert Sidney Johnston: Soldier of Three Republics.
Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky; Revised Edition
(February 2001). 384 pp., 16 maps, notes, index.. ISBN: 0-81319-000-2
$19.95 (Paperback).

The University Press of Kentucky reissued Charles P. Roland's
impressive biography of Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston in
2001, and readers will be glad they did.  It is telling, writes
historian Gary Gallagher in a new Foreword, that no new biography of
Johnston has come out in almost 40 years.  Roland's balanced,
entertaining, and informative work still stands as the standard
account of this martial man's life.   In telling Johnston's story,
Roland emphasizes his devotion to duty no matter how distasteful the
assignment.  Time and time again, whether in Texas, Utah, or
Tennessee, Johnston was faithful in discharging his duty despite any
personal misgivings with those in authority.  Many thought Johnston
would run for President of the eponymous three republics, Texas, the
United States, and the Confederate States.  In all cases, Johnston
declined, preferring military duty as the best way to help whatever
cause he was then involved with.  As of early 2007, Roland's study is
and will remain for the foreseeable future the standard work on Albert
Sidney Johnston's life.

Albert Sidney Johnston was born in Kentucky in 1803, the son of a
practicing doctor who originally hailed from New England.  Despite
these Yankee roots, Johnston would become a thoroughly southern man.
Johnston initially enrolled at Transylvania University in Lexington,
Kentucky, and he later attended West Point.  Johnston counted future
Confederate President Jefferson Davis as one of his close friends
while at the military academy.  Johnston was a good student and
finished eighth overall, requesting a commission in the infantry.
Johnston seemed to be attracted to the most active areas all his life,
first participating in the Black Hawk War in 1832, then moving on to
the newly created Republic of Texas in the 1830's.  Johnston became a
General an d commanded Texas' main army after she had won her
independence from Mexico.  While in Texas, Johnston eventually found
himself in a feud with prominent Texan Sam Houston, a situation which
would endure even after Texas joined the United States.  From Texas,
Johnston also participated in the 1846-48 War with Mexico, first as a
Colonel of volunteers and then as an honorary aide.  After the Mexican
War, Johnston became chief paymaster of the Department of Texas, and
also unsuccessfully ran a plantation in that state.  His job entailed
long, lonely journeys away from his family, a situation that finally
ended when Johnston was placed in command of the famed 2nd United
States Cavalry.  While in this position, Johnston commanded an
expedition to Utah to possibly fight a war with the Mormons in 1857.
Johnston's treatment of the Mormons was impeccable, though he
disagreed with their way of life.  Later, Johnston became commander of
the Department of California, and was at this post when the Civil War
broke out.  Johnston, who identified strongly with Texas, decided to
join the Confederacy as soon as the Lone Star state seceded.

Johnston was soon appointed as one of the five senior generals of the
Confederacy, and his experience was so extensive that his personal
friendship with Jefferson Davis never even factored into the equation.
  Davis considered Johnston to be the finest general he had available,
and assigned him to command the entire western theater from eastern
Kentucky to western Arkansas.  What Davis didn't give Johnston enough
of was men and materiel.  He was expected to cover this massive amount
of territory with less than 60,000 men initially, facing over twice
that number in Union troops.  Johnston's attempts to defend the easter
expanse of this department failed when one of his strong points at
Forts Henry and Donelson was taken.  Not only did Johnston fail to
hold the forts, but he also lost 15,000 badly needed men in the
process.  Roland rightly criticizes Johnston's actions during this
time frame.  To Johnston's credit, he managed to hold together his
army through a long and demoralizing retreat which saw the loss of all
of Kentucky and most of Tennessee including Nashville.  Johnston and
P. G. T. Beauregard now called in reinforcements from across the
Confederacy in an attempt to overwhelm Grant's Army of the Tennessee
at Pittsburg Landing.  At the height of the attack, Johnston was hit
and his boot heel torn partially from the boot.  Johnston seemed fine,
but in reality an artery had been nicked and the general bled to death
in a short while.  Johnston was never given the chance to achieve
greatness, argues Roland, so we cannot honestly say what might have
been regarding his development.  Men such as Grant learned from their
early mistakes; whether or not Johnston would have done the same is
open for speculation.

Johnston spent most of his adult life in and around the military in
one form or another, so this biography is naturally enough concerned
with a lot of military matters.  Roland moves equally well in military
and non-military discussions of Johnston's life.  His portrayal of
Johnston's family and the general's inability to house all of his
children in one home due to his financial situation was especially
touching.  That Roland's book still stands as the standard account of
Johnston's life testifies to his mastery of the subject.  From
Johnston's days as a cadet at West Point to the various campaigns for
different countries Johnston found himself in, Roland covers all
aspects of Johnston's life in a consistently fair manner, giving the
man's failures (mainly financial) and successes (mainly military)
equal attention.  Roland ultimately concludes that Johnston handled
his military commands with aplomb throughout the antebellum years, and
he was possibly on his way to this same success in the Civil War
before his life was cut short at Shiloh.

The maps in this book were standard for their time (1964), and I was
actually pleasantly surprised by most of them.  They serve their
intended role of familiarizing  the reader with the situation without
being too vague or too few in number to make a difference.  Roland
uses the footnote method at the bottom of each page, a process which
works better for me in terms of actually looking through the notes at
the pertinent point in the text rather than at the end of a chapter or
at the end of the book.  Roland's bibliography is extensive and uses
quite a few manuscript collections as the foundation of his research.
  Johnston's letters to and from family, friends, and acquaintances are
used to especially good effect.  The index is functional and serves
its intended purpose quite well.

Charles P. Roland's biography of Albert Sidney Johnston continues to
stand as the only modern work of the general.  The quality of the book
will insure that it stays this way for the foreseeable future.  Those
readers interested in biographical works on the Civil War's leaders
would do well to have a copy of Albert Sidney Johnston: Soldier of
Three Republics on their shelves.  No portion of Johnston's life, from
his military and personal affairs, his financial failures and military
successes, is left uncovered.  This biography of Johnston can also be
seen as a microcosm of the difficult choices facing men who had
previously or were then serving in the United States Army in 1860.
For many of these men, their state was more important to them than
their country.  This biography was also mentioned in several Civil War
periodicals as one of the 100 best books written on the Civil War, a
sentiment which is pretty close to the mark.  Albert Sidney Johnston:
Soldier of Three Republics will appeal to students of antebellum
America almost as much as students of the Civil war, for most of
Johnston's life was spent in those pre-war years.  Considering the
relatively low price and solid account of Johnston's life, this
biography belongs in every Civil War buff's collection.

(Note: Special thanks goes to Hap Houlihan at The University Press of
Kentucky.)

Compliments,
Shall I start in the 1840s even? Certainly in the 50`s. All I have to
mention is, Jennison, Sen. Lane, Bloody Bill Anderson, and a host of
others. The war in the border regions was a far cry from such
gentlemanly (SP) endevors in the east for sure and even anything east
of the Miss. What took place out there was not War it was Murder, to
quote a Gen. talking about Cold Harbor. Course he had never been in the
border area of Ks. and Mo.

Jessett

San Elliott writes:

Hardee, notwithstanding his stepping aside for Joe the previous
December.

Stewart just wasn't ready.  He was readier than Hood, but not ready
yet.  Remember, even if you count the period in early 1863 that he
commanded McCown's Division, he had only been in division command
for about 18 months at that point.  If, as Steve Woodworth suggests,
he was given a corps command in January or February, 1864, and had
commanded a corps during the first two months of the Atlanta
campaign, probably so.

Interestingly, Johnston thought the AOT's 7 divisions (before Polk
came) should be divided into 3 corps, one of 3 divisions and two of
two.   Stewart was given the defense of Mill Creek Gap with his
division and that of Bate--effectively commanding a corps during the
fighting in Feb. 1864 and in the first few days of the Atlanta
campaign.

Sam Elliott


Sam exaactly when did experience become a deciding factor in the
CW.  At Bull Run nobody had experience.  The U S army, just before
the war had approx. 25,000 men.  It has been pointed out that if
every regular Lt. and Capt. had been promoted to  Col. of a
Regiment, there would not be enough to command the regts. that N Y
by itself had mustered by the end of the war and this dosen't take
into account the ones that went South. ISTM that courage and
aptitude was shown to be more accurate indicators than experience.

Bill Bruner

P. S. I am coming to believe that Hood wasn't nearly as bad as many
believe.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, SDE80@... wrote:
>
> In a message dated 1/6/2007 4:43:13 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> banbruner@... writes:
>
> > Interestingly, Johnston thought the AOT's 7 divisions (before
Polk
> > came) should be divided into 3 corps, one of 3 divisions and two
of
> > two. Stewart was given the defense of Mill Creek Gap with his
> > division and that of Bate--effectively commanding a corps during
the
> > fighting in Feb. 1864 and in the first few days of the Atlanta
> > campaign.
> >
> > Sam Elliott
> >
> > Sam exaactly when did experience become a deciding factor in the
> > CW. At Bull Run nobody had experience. The U S army, just before
> > the war had approx. 25,000 men. It has been pointed out that if
> > every regular Lt. and Capt. had been promoted to Col. of a
> > Regiment, there would not be enough to command the regts. that N
Y
> > by itself had mustered by the end of the war and this dosen't
take
> > into account the ones that went South. ISTM that courage and
> > aptitude was shown to be more accurate indicators than
experience.
> >
>
> Bill, experience was always a deciding factor.  Its just no one
had it at the
> first of the war.
>
> Courage and aptitude are more times than not shown by experience.
>
> Sam Elliott
>

Of course you are right. Sam.  I'm not saying that promotions could
have or even should been handled differently.  I guess my thinking
is that by 64 good div. commanders had 100 rimes the experience
their Corps and Army commanders had in 61 and had enhanced and
improved their abilities.

I suppose the one glaring example that comes to my mind is the
promotion of D H Hill over the likes of Cheatham, Stewart, and
Cleburn. And the question that comes to my mind, is just how much
experience could these men be expected to get.  The list of possible
candidates had become far to short by Davis' methods.

If one was promoted by distinguished service, which the Union Army
did a little more of than the CSA, Cleburn and Stewart would have
been prime candidates.  Beauregard suffered the enmity of davis.
Hardee didn't seem excite anyones confidence or expectations. Who
was left?  Certainly not Theophiles Holmes, or Samuel Cooper (high
rank and long service).

I'm afraid that if I was in Davis' shoes and had eliminated
Beauregard and not having the advantage of hindsight, I may very
well have come to the same decision.  The situation was desparate
and called for desperate measures. Or I may have decided it would be
to my benefit, politically, to draw matters out as long as possible
or into the coming elections in the North and see what Johnston
could in the end game.

Bill Bruner

Compliments,
Shall I start in the 1840s even? Certainly in the 50`s. All I have to
mention is, Jennison, Sen. Lane, Bloody Bill Anderson, and a host of
others. The war in the border regions was a far cry from such
gentlemanly (SP) endevors in the east for sure and even anything east
of the Miss. What took place out there was not War it was Murder, to
quote a Gen. talking about Cold Harbor. Course he had never been in the
border area of Ks. and Mo.

Jessett

>In a message dated 1/6/2007 10:36:12 AM Central Standard Time,
>hjs21@... writes:
>
>Actually the antebellum army prior to AL's first increase was just
>under 20,000.
>
>Does anyone have the real number? I've read as few as 13,000,
>15,000, and as much as 17,000. This is the first time I've seen it
>pegged at 20,000 or just under 20,000.

    16,367 men total, officers and enlisted. Spread among 4 artillery
regiments, 5 mounted
regiments, and 10 regiments of infantry.  Of those, as of January 1,
1861, 14,663 were
listed as present for duty, with 1704 listed as absent.

Regards,  Dave

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  Huddleston.r@...

I am A thousand times meaner A hundred times Harder and A damed sight wors Looking than I Ever was so you can form some sort of an idea what sort of A Looking man you have now for A Husband if this kind of Buisness wont make men hard I should like to know what will it is Everyone for himself and dam the one that pulls the hind tit

Henry Clemons of Company K, 23rd Wisconsin Infantry Regiment, to his wife Anna in Sauk City, Wis, January 15, 1863

Sorry about the 25,000 figure, wrong number for the wrong time.  I
think that Sherman stated in his memoirs that at no time during the
war did the regulars exceed 25,000.
Gorski's figures I think are right on.  Jacob Cox cites that at the
beginning of the war there 20 regiments, of which only 12 saw action.
Bill Bruner


--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Dave Gorski <amhistoryguy@...>
wrote:
>
> >In a message dated 1/6/2007 10:36:12 AM Central Standard Time,
> >hjs21@... writes:
> >
> >Actually the antebellum army prior to AL's first increase was
just
> >under 20,000.
> >
> >Does anyone have the real number? I've read as few as 13,000,
> >15,000, and as much as 17,000. This is the first time I've seen
it
> >pegged at 20,000 or just under 20,000.
>
>    16,367 men total, officers and enlisted. Spread among 4
artillery
> regiments, 5 mounted
> regiments, and 10 regiments of infantry.  Of those, as of January
1,
> 1861, 14,663 were
> listed as present for duty, with 1704 listed as absent.
>
> Regards,  Dave
>

Afternoon Captain,Sir, Compliments,

I guess my point is the savagery (SP) of the war in that area. These
people could of taught Sherman a few things of total war. It was
destruction and murder just for its own sake, quite often for no
paticular reason. Just commenting on the spectrum of the war I guess,
on one end you have Marse Robert telling his troops, upon entering
Maryland and Penn. not to harm or molest civilians VS Jennison
telling his gang of thugs exactly the oppisite (Sp again) when
entering MO. War is not a pretty thing in any sense but it must be
waged for a goal of some sort other than the sole purpose of
destruction which seems to be the way it was handled in that arena.
Just wondering why such a juxtapoisition in methods I guess.

Pvt Jessett

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Steve Saultz <tristan4th@...>
wrote:
>
>        Greetings PvtJessett....Howdy All...
>               Yes... Bloody Kansas... But I don't think I missed a
post lately??? What is your point sir?
>          All Respects,
>        Capt. McCracken.......
>
> pvtjessett <pw541301@...> wrote:
>           Compliments,
> Shall I start in the 1840s even? Certainly in the 50`s. All I have
to
> mention is, Jennison, Sen. Lane, Bloody Bill Anderson, and a host
of
> others. The war in the border regions was a far cry from such
> gentlemanly (SP) endevors in the east for sure and even anything
east
> of the Miss. What took place out there was not War it was Murder,
to
> quote a Gen. talking about Cold Harbor. Course he had never been in
the
> border area of Ks. and Mo.
>
> Jessett
>

In January of 1861, the standing army of the United States
consisted of 727 officers and 13,930 enlisted men, present
for duty.  The army had seen 313 of its officers resign or
desert in order to serve in Confederate units.  The army of
United States regulars was spread out across the country,
many of them serving in the West and in Indian Territory.

     In the 1861 Corp. of cadets, 278 men, there were 86 from
Southern states. Of those 86, there were 65 cadets who
resigned to go to their states.
    In the regular army in 1861, there were 1,080 officers.
Of these, there were 821 West Point graduates.  There
were 491 Northern born and 330 Southern born.  Of the
330 Southern born in the regular army in 1861, 168 resigned
to join the Confederacy.  There were 162 who remained in
the U. S. service, slightly under half.

   A total of 16 out of 491 officers born in or appointed from
Northern states. serving in 1861, made the choice to resign and
serve the Confederacy.  The families that they had married into
played a large part in their decisions.

     There were 296 graduates from the Military Academy at
West Point who served the Confederacy.  Of those, 151
became general officers.  Five academy drop outs also made
general.  That makes 36.7 % of the Confederate generals
associated with West Point.  In the Union Army, 39.1 % of
the generals had West Point experience.

    On April 12, 1861, Fort Sumter, was fired upon.  Three
days later, President Abraham Lincoln issued the following
proclamation.
---
"President's Proclamation

Washington, D. C. April 15, 1861

Whereas, The laws of the United States have been and are
opposed in several States by combination too powerful to be
suppressed in the ordinary way, I therefore call for the militia
of the several states of the Union, to the aggregate number of
75,000, to suppress said combination and execute the laws.
   I appeal to all loyal citizens to facilitate and aid this effort,
and maintain the laws and integrity of the National Union and
the perpetuity of popular government, and redress wrongs long
endured.  The first service assigned will probably be to repossess
the forts, places and property which have been seized from the
Union.  The utmost care will be taken, consistent with the object,
   to avoid devastation, destruction or interference of peaceful
citizens in any part of the country; and I hereby command the
persons composing the aforesaid combinations to disperse within
twenty days from this date.  I hereby convene both Houses of
Congress for the 4th of July next, to determine upon such
measures as the public safety and interest may demand.

(signed) Abraham Lincoln, President of United States

By W. H. Seward, Secretary of State."
----
     The loyal states were each given a quota of men to provide.
Maine's quota was 780 men - Maine provided 771 men in this call.
New Hampshire's quota was 780 men - New Hampshire provided
779 men.
Vermont's quota was 780 men - Vermont provided 782 men.
Massachusetts's quota was 1,560 men - Massachusetts provided
3,736 men.
Rhode Island's quota was 780 men - Rhode Island provided
3,147 men.
Connecticut's quota was 780 men - Connecticut provided
2,402 men.
New York's quota was 13,280 men - New York provided
13,906 men.
New Jersey's quota was 3,123 men - New Jersey provided
3,123 men.
Pennsylvania's quota was 12,500 men - Pennsylvania provided
20,175 men.
Delaware's quota was 780 men - Delaware provided 775 men.
Maryland's quota was 3,123 men - Maryland refused Lincoln's
call for troops.
Indiana's quota was 4,683 men - Indiana provided 4,686 men.
Illinois' quota was 4,683 men - Illinois provided 4,820 men.
Michigan's quota was 780 men - Michigan provided 781 men.
Wisconsin's quota was 780 men - Wisconsin provided 817 men.
Minnesota's quota was 780 men - Minnesota provided 930 men.
Iowa's quota was 780 men - Iowa provided 968 men.
Missouri's quota was 3,123 men - Missouri provided 10,591 men.
Kentucky's quota was 3,123 men - Kentucky also refused to comply.
Kansas did not have a quota - Kansas sent 650 men.
Tennessee's quota was 1,560 men - Tennessee refused to comply.
Arkansas' quota was 780 men - Arkansas refused to comply.
North Carolina's quota was 1,560 men - North Carolina refused.
The District of Columbia had no quota - D. C. sent 4,720 men.
In addition, 900 men from the area that would become
West Virginia, answered Lincoln's first call for troops.

     In all, under this first call for troops, 91,816 men were enlisted for
three months.  By the time these troops were equipped and trained,
their three month terms of service began to expire.  Large numbers
of these men re-enlisted immediately.  The OR, Series III, Vol. 5, page
606, makes mention that, "Their only active experience was in the brief
campaign terminating in the first battle of Bull Run.  It went to
demonstrate most strikingly the inefficiency of militia called into
service for short periods."

    The building of the army is an interesting subject, IMO.  Especially
when you keep in mind that the army was not just the enlistment of
men, but clothing them, equipping them, feeding them, and transporting
them.  IMO, a subject that could stand a bit of modern study.

Regards,  Dave Gorski

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  Huddleston.r@...

I am A thousand times meaner A hundred times Harder and A damed sight wors Looking than I Ever was so you can form some sort of an idea what sort of A Looking man you have now for A Husband if this kind of Buisness wont make men hard I should like to know what will it is Everyone for himself and dam the one that pulls the hind tit

Henry Clemons of Company K, 23rd Wisconsin Infantry Regiment, to his wife Anna in Sauk City, Wis, January 15, 1863

During the "advance" on Corinth, Grant was Halleck's second in
command.  At one point he was ready to resign and Shreman talked him
out of it.  Do we have a date for this?

James

>During the "advance" on Corinth, Grant was Halleck's second in
>command. At one point he was ready to resign and Sherman talked him
>out of it. Do we have a date for this?

    It would seem to have been sometime just prior to June 6, 1862.
On June 6, while in "Camp at Chewalla," Sherman wrote to Grant,
"I have just received your note and am rejoiced at your
conclusion to remain."

Regards,  Dave Gorski

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  Huddleston.r@...

I am A thousand times meaner A hundred times Harder and A damed sight wors Looking than I Ever was so you can form some sort of an idea what sort of A Looking man you have now for A Husband if this kind of Buisness wont make men hard I should like to know what will it is Everyone for himself and dam the one that pulls the hind tit

Henry Clemons of Company K, 23rd Wisconsin Infantry Regiment, to his wife Anna in Sauk City, Wis, January 15, 1863

Mr. Keeno2 Compliments Sir,

First off I certainly hope the "Pvt. Jennison" salutation is a
mistake, being from parents that were born and raised in Missouri it
would be a slap in the face to be addressed as such, I will assume
that it is a mistake.
The sleeping giant nor any other force controlled warfare/slaughter
in the far western theatre. "Sherman tearing up Georgia and South
Carolina was later" has no bearing. This anarchy in KS. & MO. had
been going on for some years before Gen. Sherman even thought about
making GA. Howl and SC. Shriek(posible SP)and long after. All I was
saying was that the difference between the style of warfare, for what
ever reason between the two areas is striking. The difference being
the trading of coffee and tobbacco amongst eastern soldiers on picket
duty and the scalps of soldiers on picket duty being tacked on a
fence with a sign that says "This is the way we do buisness", is
shall I say, at variance with each other.

Pvt Jessett


--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, keeno2@... wrote:
>
> In a message dated 1/6/2007 2:25:39 PM Central Standard Time,
> pw541301@... writes:
> These people could of taught Sherman a few things of total war.
> Pvt Jennison:
> You seem to be taking a misunderstood piece of the war and applying
it to the
> entire affair. When Lee issued his "be gentlemen" order, he was
very much
> aware that the recently awakened sleeping giant didn't need much
additional
> prodding to set it into a towering rage. And the Yankee commanders
were of the same
> mind. Sherman tearing up Georgia and South Carolina was later --
when
> patience was worn to a nub and stronger measures were called for to
end the madness.
> Sherman didn't enjoy the destruction he carried; he viewed it as
necessary to
> bring the war to an end.
> Ken
>

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DORR64OVI@... wrote:
> ...
> In actuality Thomas had asked Halleck ...

Allegedly, since there is no evidence supporting this claim.