In a message dated 4/30/01 7:00:24 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LWhite64@...
writes:

<<  On Wilder, he really doesnt do much after Chickamauga and ends up
  resigning and going home >>
Another classic example of higher-ups treatment of one that did a formidal
job as a brigade commander.

In a message dated 4/30/01 9:30:11 PM Eastern Daylight Time, basecat1@...
writes:

<< Bob....Good question....as I have yet to find anyone who is doing any
  research on Pap with the exception of Susannah Warner.  Am not complaining,
  but how many new bios. on Hiram Ulysses are we supposed to be subjected
  too???  Seems like one comes out hourly on General Grant.  Regards from the
  Garden State, Steve.
   >>
Steve,
The best book that I have found was one recommended to me by Ed Bearss and
Wiley Sword,  George Henry Thomas  -  The Dependable General by Frank A.
Palumbo.  It was published in 1983 by Morningside House, Inc.  ISBN No.
0-89029-311-2    This is one book that would be well worth being part of
one's George Thomas library.

Your obedient servant,

Wayne

I have read Palumbo's and enjoyed it very much.  My favourite though would be
Education in Violence by Frances F. McKinney.  Also enjoyed General George H.
Thomas, The Indomitable Warrior by Wilbur Thomas(no relation).

Is Susannah Warner doing research for a new book?  Wouldn't that be great!

I must say that I am enjoying Brooks' Grant.  Heck, I enjoy all books on the
Civil War.

Bob Taubman
----- Original Message -----
From: <FLYNSWEDE@...>
To: <civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2001 11:43 AM
Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] Brooks Simpson's Ulysses S. Grant: An opposing view
II


| In a message dated 4/30/01 9:30:11 PM Eastern Daylight Time, basecat1@...
| writes:
|
| << Bob....Good question....as I have yet to find anyone who is doing any
|  research on Pap with the exception of Susannah Warner.  Am not complaining,
|  but how many new bios. on Hiram Ulysses are we supposed to be subjected
|  too???  Seems like one comes out hourly on General Grant.  Regards from the
|  Garden State, Steve.
|   >>
| Steve,
| The best book that I have found was one recommended to me by Ed Bearss and
| Wiley Sword,  George Henry Thomas  -  The Dependable General by Frank A.
| Palumbo.  It was published in 1983 by Morningside House, Inc.  ISBN No.
| 0-89029-311-2    This is one book that would be well worth being part of
| one's George Thomas library.
|
| Your obedient servant,
|
| Wayne
|
|
|
|
| Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
|
|
|

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6276   Adco@...

 

In a message dated 5/1/2001 12:23:41 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
josepharose@... writes:

 SNIP I'll be honest....I find HUG
fascinating...but even I am tired of the lack of new scholarship on Thomas.  
It seems that everytime I walk into the bookstore....a new book appears on
Grant.   Is a big discussion in the us-civilwar chat room.....Many feel that
Rosy and GHT are ignored...and I agree.... SNIP 

Today's USAToday has an article by Stephen Ambrose on Vicksburg. You can
find it on-line, sans photos, at
http://www.usatoday.com/life/2001-05-01-vicksburg.htm

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6276   Adco@...

I can't hear the pros and cons of U. S. Grant without hearing in my
mind the scene from the movie THE MIRACLE WORKER (1962,) so I had to
go and rent the movie again and thought I would share a transcription:

Captain Keller, who is quite the unreconstructed Rebel, shall we say,
is having a dinner table conversation with his son James. Cap. Keller
is also pretty much the tyrannical head of household who brooks no
opposition:

[evidently James tried to say something favorable about Grant]...
JAMES KELLER: " No, but shouldn't we give the Devil his due, Father?
The fact is we lost the South two years earlier when he out-thought us
behind Vicksburg."

CAP. KELLER: " Out-thought is a peculiar word for a butcher."

JK: " Harness maker, wasn't he?"

CAP. K.: " I said butcher! His only strength as a soldier was in
numbers; led them to slaughter with no more regard than so many
sheep!"

JK: "But even if in that sense he was a butcher..."

CAP. K.:  [cuts him off] " And a drunk, half the war."

JK: " Agreed, Father, if his own people said he was, I can't argue..."

CAP. K.: [cuts him off] " So what is it you find to admire in such a
man, Jimmy? The drunkenness or the butchery?"

JK: " Neither, Father, only the fact that he beat us."

CAP. K.:  " HE didn't!"

JK: " Is it your contention we won the war, sir?"

CAP. K.: " He didn't beat us at Vicksburg, we lost Vicksburg by
stupidity verging on treason!"

JK: " Well, I would have said that we lost Vicksburg because Grant was
one thing no Yankee general was before..."

CAP. K.: [cuts him off, and is getting into his stride] : "Drunk!? I
doubt it!"

JK: " Obstinate."

CAP. K.: " Obstinate? Wouldn't even any of them compare even in that;
with old Stonewall? If he had a been there, we'd still have
Vicksburg!"

JK: " Well, the butcher simply wouldn't give up; He tried four ways to
getting around Vicksburg..."

CAP. K.: [ cuts him off and really becomes vociferous] "He wouldn't
have gotten around had a Southerner been in command instead of a
half-breed Yankee traitor like Pemberton! [at this point the young
Helen Keller and her new teacher cause a disruption] ...
(unfortunately! I would have loved it if they had gone on.)

The sub-theme of the scene is that Helen's new teacher is as obstinate
as Grant was, in fact is a "Yankee;"  James (alone) recognizes this
and encourages her at the end of the scene saying to go ahead and do
what it takes "... if it takes all summer!"

I am not sure why I like this scene so much... I guess it is partly
because I can picture some of my relatives having just such a
conversation during my childhood. Captain Keller is not supposed to be
a sympathetic character, but even though he is making an ass out of
himself, I also enjoy that he is getting his licks in!
Carl

(apologies if this double-posts) Re the below, I guess there is no
reason to expect a USA TODAY article to be in depth, but some
remarks:1) it was not just a matter of moving below Vicksburg, but the
Navy had to get transports down there to get those troops across... it
was a difficult task and a dramatic day when this occurred. 2) Grant
could not rely on these ships for proper supply, so he famously lived
off the land; however, once the siege was in progress, Vicksburg was
cut off from supplies, but Grant had re-established supply. The
article does  not say how Grant was in supply…I have read suggestions
that supply went up through the Yazoo river through the newly created
"Yazoo Pass." This would have been quite vulnerable to interruption.
Others imply that the supply line was north of Vicksburg through the
swamps to Millikens Bend. However, the history of attempts to cross
through there would seem to suggest they all failed. Perhaps the short
section of the Yazoo the Union controlled north of Vicksburg was
enough to establish contact with Grant. Does ANYONE know exactly how
Grant was in supply? 3) I share Captain Keller's incredulity that
Pemberton could fail to see that a)Vicksburg was a trap b) his big
chance was to keep Grant from re-establishing proper supply ( those
troops were not going to be finding ammo "off the land") c) failing
'b,' Vicksburg had to be abandoned, Johnston having told him as much,
I do believe. IMHO.
Carl


--- In civilwarwest@y..., "Bob Huddleston" <adco@f...> wrote:
> Today's USAToday has an article by Stephen Ambrose on Vicksburg. You
can
> find it on-line, sans photos, at
> http://www.usatoday.com/life/2001-05-01-vicksburg.htm..."

To all:

On the Grant Homepage Message Board, I have been in discussion with
Brooks Simpson, who stated that Smith "urged" Grant to make an all-out
attack on 11/7/63.  I asserted that Smith only proposed a
demonstration and that it was Grant's idea and impetus for the
full-scale assault.  He quoted Smith's autobiography as having him
state "I instigated it" in reference to the all-out attack.  I assumed
(always dangerous) that this may have referred only to the
demonstration.  Everything else I have seen on the subject (e.g.,
Cozzens) suggests that Smith, like Thomas, was surprised and probably
dismayed by Grant's order for an all-out attack.

Not having the autobiography at hand, can anyone provide quotes from
it or from other sources which would resolve this disagreement?

Thanks in advance,
Joseph

P.S. My last post to Professor Simpson (plenty of reading ahead) on
the affair stated:
You requested documentation for my assertion that, "Baldy Smith
did no such thing" in response to your book's statement, "Smith,
who had urged Grant to order the attack...." regarding Grant's
peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63.  As I stated before, "I don't have
his autobiography present to look it up first-hand."  My reading,
though, had given me adequate confirmation that "Baldy" Smith did
not share the feelings you ascribed to him.

As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
three reports, which are copied below.  They seem especially
acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
before and during the incident and not years after when other
events may have colored his perspective.  The change seen between
11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
ordered, is obvious.

Furthermore, I had quoted the following extract from Baldy Smith
before: "When it is remembered that eighteen days after this
Sherman with six perfectly appointed divisions failed to carry
this same point of Missionary Ridge, at a time when Thomas with
four divisions stood threatening Bragg's center, and Hooker with
nearly three divisions was driving in Bragg's left flank (Bragg
having no more strength than on the 7th), it will not be a matter
of surprise that the order staggered Thomas."  If Smith did urge
such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
carry it out.

I would agree with your book's statement that Thomas "paled at the
notion of a full-scale attack"--psychologically at least, if not
physiologically.  In reality, Grant's plan would have to be
carried out by a still-hungry Army of the Cumberland--without
cavalry or horses to draw artillery or a supply train, without
holding Lookout Mountain or Orchard Knob, with Chattanooga left
mainly undefended, with Hooker still in Lookout Valley, without
Sherman's troops, with Johnson's Confederate division still on the
field, with no advantage of surprise, and with only one day's
notice.  Once accomplished, the troops would take four days
rations in their haversacks and cut the rail lines some twenty
miles away.  Even if they got that far, Longstreet would have been
close enough to turn on them.  Grant, furthermore, didn't even
delineate how all of this was to be accomplished; he left that up
to Thomas.

Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
Ridge. This, taken in connection with our present demonstration
in Lookout Valley, will compel them to concentrate and come back
from Burnside to fight here.

Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
as proposed by Smith. Thomas, who rather preferred an attempt
on Lookout Mountain, desired to postpone the operation until Sher-
man should come up, but Grant has decided that for the sake of
Burnside the attack must be made at once; and I presume the
advance on Citico will take place to-morrow morning, and that on
Missionary Ridge immediately afterward. If successful, this
operation will divide Bragg's forces in Chattanooga Valley from
those in the Valley of the Chickamauga, and will compel him either
to retreat, leaving the railroad communications of Cheatham and
Longstreet exposed, or else to fight a battle with his diminished
forces.

Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith's plan of
attack impracticable. The creek and country are wrongly laid
down on our maps, and no operation for the seizure of Missionary
Ridge can be undertaken with the force which Thomas can now
command for the purpose. That force cannot by any efforts be
made to exceed 18,000 men. The deficiency of animals, forage, and
subsistence rendering any attacks by us on Bragg's line of
communications at Cleveland or Charleston out of the question, it
follows that no important effort for the relief of Burnside can be
made.

P.P.S. To ensure a fair discussion, herewith is Simpson's reply:
"You requested documentation for my assertion that, 'Baldy Smith
did no such thing' in response to your book's statement, 'Smith,
who had urged Grant to order the attack....' regarding Grant's
peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63.  As I stated before, 'I don't have
his autobiography present to look it up first-hand.'"

Joseph, have you ever seen the book in question?  Have you read
the part under discussion?  And how can you assert that I've
taken something out of context when you do not have the context
at hand?

"My reading, though, had given me adequate confirmation
that 'Baldy' Smith did not share the feelings you ascribed to
him."

Well, I think Smith knew better than you what his feelings were,
and he set them down in his autobiography.

"As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
three reports, which are copied below.  They seem especially
acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
before and during the incident and not years after when other
events may have colored his perspective."

Exactly.  Each dispatch credits Smith with the concept of the
operation.

"The change seen between
11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
ordered, is obvious."

Not to Dana; not to Smith.

"If Smith did urge
such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
carry it out."

That's what Smith said in his autobiography.

"Grant, furthermore, didn't even
delineate how all of this was to be accomplished; he left that up
to Thomas."

True.  I've already quoted Grant on this.  Don't you think it was
wise of him to allow Thomas to devise the best way to execute the
order?  And, when Thomas and Smith returned with news that
Smith's plan wouldn't work, didn't Grant heed Thomas's advice?

So what's the problem?

As for authorship of the plan, let's focus on the Dana dispatches:

Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
"Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
Ridge."

Note Dana says "plan proposed by W. F. Smith."

Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
"Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
as proposed by Smith."

Note Dana says "as proposed by Smith."

Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
"Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith?s plan of
attack impracticable."

Note Dana called it "Smith's plan."

Smith's autobiography and Dana's dispatches settle the matter: it
was Smith's plan.  Thanks for providing us with the additional
information.

P.P.P.S.  Professor Simpson wondered if I was as critical a reader
with other books or just his.  I noted that here on the CivilWarWest
e-group, someone mentioned errors in Cozzens' "Shipwreck..." and I
asked what they were.  The individual only mentioned a mistake in
an officer's rank and one other smallish problem.  I have yet to
finish the book, but I have found two more--what I feel
are--substantial issues.  On page 259, enumerating Thomas' assault
force, Cozzens writes: "On Granger's right, Palmer's Fourteenth
Corps was represented solely by Richard Johnson's division."  Yet,
in his appendix (no, not that appendix), it correctly states that
Palmer's third division is Baird's which was on the opposite end
of the line.  Worse, in my mind, the timing of Hooker's delay at
the bridge appear to be self-contradictory.  On page 244, it
notes, "It was 1:25 P.M. when the ... advance guard ... bumped  up
against the bank of the creek."  On the next page, "[Hooker]
scribbled a note apprising Thomas that his march had stalled ...."
On page 247, "[Thomas] had heard nothing from Hooker since 1:30
P.M., when Hooker had reported his delay at the creek ...."  Not
only would these times give Hooker only five minutes to determine
his situation, scribble a note, and send it over the creek three
miles to Orchard Knob, but the time of first encountering the
creek must have happened much sooner.

Re the below, I guess there is no reason to expect a USA TODAY article
to be in depth, but some remarks: 1) it was not just a matter of
moving below Vicksburg, but the Navy had to get transports down there
to get those troops across... it was a difficult task and a dramatic
day when this occurred. 2) Grant could not rely on these ships for
proper supply, so he famously lived off the land; however, once the
siege was in progress, Vicksburg was cut off from supplies, but Grant
had re-established supply. The article does  not say how Grant was in
supply…I have read suggestions that supply went up through the Yazoo
river through the newly created "Yazoo Pass." This would have been
quite vulnerable to interruption.  Others imply that the supply line
was north of Vicksburg through the swamps to Millikens Bend. However,
the history of attempts to cross through there would seem to suggest
they all failed. Perhaps the short section of the Yazoo the Union
controlled north of Vicksburg was enough to establish contact with
Grant. Does ANYONE know exactly how Grant was in supply? 3) I share
Captain Keller's incredulity that Pemberton could fail to see that
a)Vicksburg was a trap b) his big chance was to keep Grant from
re-establishing proper supply ( those troops were not going to be
finding ammo "off the land") c) failing 'b,' Vicksburg had to be
abandoned, Johnston having told him as much, I do believe. IMHO.
Carl

--- In civilwarwest@y..., "Bob Huddleston" <adco@f...> wrote:" Today's
USAToday has an article by Stephen Ambrose on Vicksburg. You
can
> find it on-line, sans photos, at
> http://www.usatoday.com/life/2001-05-01-vicksburg.htm..."

To all:

In Simpson's book, he stated that "Baldy" Smith "urged" Grant to make
an all-out attack on the ridge at Chattanooga on 11/8/63 to be led by
Thomas.  The professor quoted Smith as saying he "instigated" the
all-out attack.  I said, according to all I had read (e.g., Cozzens
and a Smith quote), that he did not.  I suggested that any instigation
may have referred to the advance on Citico Creek and demonstration
toward the ridge which Smith did undoubtedly propose.

Not having Smith's autobiography at hand, can anyone provide me with
excerpts from it of from other sources which would enlighten us on
this matter?

Thanks in advance,
Joseph

P.S. If you want to read much more on the subject, my last post stated:
Professor,
You requested documentation for my assertion that, "Baldy Smith
did no such thing" in response to your book's statement, "Smith,
who had urged Grant to order the attack...." regarding Grant's
peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63.  As I stated before, "I don't have
his autobiography present to look it up first-hand."  My reading,
though, had given me adequate confirmation that "Baldy" Smith did
not share the feelings you ascribed to him.

As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
three reports, which are copied below.  They seem especially
acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
before and during the incident and not years after when other
events may have colored his perspective.  The change seen between
11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
ordered, is obvious.

Furthermore, I had quoted the following extract from Baldy Smith
before: "When it is remembered that eighteen days after this
Sherman with six perfectly appointed divisions failed to carry
this same point of Missionary Ridge, at a time when Thomas with
four divisions stood threatening Bragg's center, and Hooker with
nearly three divisions was driving in Bragg's left flank (Bragg
having no more strength than on the 7th), it will not be a matter
of surprise that the order staggered Thomas."  If Smith did urge
such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
carry it out.

I would agree with your book's statement that Thomas "paled at the
notion of a full-scale attack"--psychologically at least, if not
physiologically.  In reality, Grant's plan would have to be
carried out by a still-hungry Army of the Cumberland--without
cavalry or horses to draw artillery or a supply train, without
holding Lookout Mountain or Orchard Knob, with Chattanooga left
mainly undefended, with Hooker still in Lookout Valley, without
Sherman's troops, with Johnson's Confederate division still on the
field, with no advantage of surprise, and with only one day's
notice.  Once accomplished, the troops would take four days
rations in their haversacks and cut the rail lines some twenty
miles away.  Even if they got that far, Longstreet would have been
close enough to turn on them.  Grant, furthermore, didn't even
delineate how all of this was to be accomplished; he left that up
to Thomas.

Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
Ridge. This, taken in connection with our present demonstration
in Lookout Valley, will compel them to concentrate and come back
from Burnside to fight here.

Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
as proposed by Smith. Thomas, who rather preferred an attempt
on Lookout Mountain, desired to postpone the operation until Sher-
man should come up, but Grant has decided that for the sake of
Burnside the attack must be made at once; and I presume the
advance on Citico will take place to-morrow morning, and that on
Missionary Ridge immediately afterward. If successful, this
operation will divide Bragg's forces in Chattanooga Valley from
those in the Valley of the Chickamauga, and will compel him either
to retreat, leaving the railroad communications of Cheatham and
Longstreet exposed, or else to fight a battle with his diminished
forces.

Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith's plan of
attack impracticable. The creek and country are wrongly laid
down on our maps, and no operation for the seizure of Missionary
Ridge can be undertaken with the force which Thomas can now
command for the purpose. That force cannot by any efforts be
made to exceed 18,000 men. The deficiency of animals, forage, and
subsistence rendering any attacks by us on Bragg's line of
communications at Cleveland or Charleston out of the question, it
follows that no important effort for the relief of Burnside can be
made.

P.P.S.  To be fair, herewith is the professor's response, starting
with a quote from my post [so you won't be confused]:
"You requested documentation for my assertion that, 'Baldy Smith
did no such thing' in response to your book's statement, 'Smith,
who had urged Grant to order the attack....' regarding Grant's
peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63.  As I stated before, 'I don't have
his autobiography present to look it up first-hand.'"

Joseph, have you ever seen the book in question?  Have you read
the part under discussion?  And how can you assert that I've
taken something out of context when you do not have the context
at hand?

"My reading, though, had given me adequate confirmation
that 'Baldy' Smith did not share the feelings you ascribed to
him."

Well, I think Smith knew better than you what his feelings were,
and he set them down in his autobiography.

"As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
three reports, which are copied below.  They seem especially
acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
before and during the incident and not years after when other
events may have colored his perspective."

Exactly.  Each dispatch credits Smith with the concept of the
operation.

"The change seen between
11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
ordered, is obvious."

Not to Dana; not to Smith.

"If Smith did urge
such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
carry it out."

That's what Smith said in his autobiography.

"Grant, furthermore, didn't even delineate how all of this was to be
accomplished; he left that up to Thomas."

True.  I've already quoted Grant on this.  Don't you think it was
wise of him to allow Thomas to devise the best way to execute the
order?  And, when Thomas and Smith returned with news that
Smith's plan wouldn't work, didn't Grant heed Thomas's advice?

So what's the problem?

As for authorship of the plan, let's focus on the Dana dispatches:

Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
"Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
Ridge."

Note Dana says "plan proposed by W. F. Smith."

Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
"Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
as proposed by Smith."

Note Dana says "as proposed by Smith."

Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
"Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith?s plan of
attack impracticable."

Note Dana called it "Smith's plan."

Smith's autobiography and Dana's dispatches settle the matter: it
was Smith's plan.  Thanks for providing us with the additional
information.

P.P.P.S.  Simpson also had asked whether I was as critical of other
authors; I replied:
As a very critical reader, I find problems with most
articles and books that cross my path.  On the CivilWarWest
e-group, someone mentioned errors in Cozzens' "Shipwreck..." and I
asked what they were.  The individual only mentioned a mistake in
an officer's rank and one other smallish problem.  I have yet to
finish the book, but I have found two more--what I feel
are--substantial issues.  On page 259, enumerating Thomas' assault
force, Cozzens writes: "On Granger's right, Palmer's Fourteenth
Corps was represented solely by Richard Johnson's division."  Yet,
in his appendix (no, not that appendix), it correctly states that
Palmer's third division is Baird's which was on the opposite end
of the line.  Worse, in my mind, the timing of Hooker's delay at
the bridge appear to be self-contradictory.  On page 244, it
notes, "It was 1:25 P.M. when the ... advance guard ... bumped  up
against the bank of the creek."  On the next page, "[Hooker]
scribbled a note apprising Thomas that his march had stalled ...."
On page 247, "[Thomas] had heard nothing from Hooker since 1:30
P.M., when Hooker had reported his delay at the creek ...."  Not
only would these times give Hooker only five minutes to determine
his situation, scribble a note, and send it over the creek three
miles to Orchard Knob, but the time of first encountering the
creek must have happened much sooner.

To all (sorry if this is a triple post; it hasn't shown up):

In Simpson's book, he stated that "Baldy" Smith "urged" Grant to make
an all-out attack on the ridge at Chattanooga on 11/8/63 to be led by
Thomas.  The professor quoted Smith as saying he "instigated" the all-
out attack.  I said, according to all I had read (e.g., Cozzens and a
Smith quote), that he did not.  I suggested that any instigation may
have referred to the advance on Citico Creek and demonstration toward
the ridge which Smith did undoubtedly propose.

Not having Smith's autobiography at hand, can anyone provide me with
excerpts from it of from other sources which would enlighten us on
this matter?

Thanks in advance,
Joseph

P.S. If you want to read much more on the subject, my last post
stated:
Professor,
You requested documentation for my assertion that, "Baldy Smith
did no such thing" in response to your book's statement, "Smith,
who had urged Grant to order the attack...." regarding Grant's
peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63.  As I stated before, "I don't have
his autobiography present to look it up first-hand."  My reading,
though, had given me adequate confirmation that "Baldy" Smith did
not share the feelings you ascribed to him.

As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
three reports, which are copied below.  They seem especially
acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
before and during the incident and not years after when other
events may have colored his perspective.  The change seen between
11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
ordered, is obvious.

Furthermore, I had quoted the following extract from Baldy Smith
before: "When it is remembered that eighteen days after this
Sherman with six perfectly appointed divisions failed to carry
this same point of Missionary Ridge, at a time when Thomas with
four divisions stood threatening Bragg's center, and Hooker with
nearly three divisions was driving in Bragg's left flank (Bragg
having no more strength than on the 7th), it will not be a matter
of surprise that the order staggered Thomas."  If Smith did urge
such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
carry it out.

I would agree with your book's statement that Thomas "paled at the
notion of a full-scale attack"--psychologically at least, if not
physiologically.  In reality, Grant's plan would have to be
carried out by a still-hungry Army of the Cumberland--without
cavalry or horses to draw artillery or a supply train, without
holding Lookout Mountain or Orchard Knob, with Chattanooga left
mainly undefended, with Hooker still in Lookout Valley, without
Sherman's troops, with Johnson's Confederate division still on the
field, with no advantage of surprise, and with only one day's
notice.  Once accomplished, the troops would take four days
rations in their haversacks and cut the rail lines some twenty
miles away.  Even if they got that far, Longstreet would have been
close enough to turn on them.  Grant, furthermore, didn't even
delineate how all of this was to be accomplished; he left that up
to Thomas.

Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
Ridge. This, taken in connection with our present demonstration
in Lookout Valley, will compel them to concentrate and come back
from Burnside to fight here.

Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
as proposed by Smith. Thomas, who rather preferred an attempt
on Lookout Mountain, desired to postpone the operation until Sher-
man should come up, but Grant has decided that for the sake of
Burnside the attack must be made at once; and I presume the
advance on Citico will take place to-morrow morning, and that on
Missionary Ridge immediately afterward. If successful, this
operation will divide Bragg's forces in Chattanooga Valley from
those in the Valley of the Chickamauga, and will compel him either
to retreat, leaving the railroad communications of Cheatham and
Longstreet exposed, or else to fight a battle with his diminished
forces.

Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith's plan of
attack impracticable. The creek and country are wrongly laid
down on our maps, and no operation for the seizure of Missionary
Ridge can be undertaken with the force which Thomas can now
command for the purpose. That force cannot by any efforts be
made to exceed 18,000 men. The deficiency of animals, forage, and
subsistence rendering any attacks by us on Bragg's line of
communications at Cleveland or Charleston out of the question, it
follows that no important effort for the relief of Burnside can be
made.

P.P.S.  To be fair, herewith is the professor's response, starting
with a quote from my post [so you won't be confused]:
"You requested documentation for my assertion that, 'Baldy Smith
did no such thing' in response to your book's statement, 'Smith,
who had urged Grant to order the attack....' regarding Grant's
peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63.  As I stated before, 'I don't have
his autobiography present to look it up first-hand.'"

Joseph, have you ever seen the book in question?  Have you read
the part under discussion?  And how can you assert that I've
taken something out of context when you do not have the context
at hand?

"My reading, though, had given me adequate confirmation
that 'Baldy' Smith did not share the feelings you ascribed to
him."

Well, I think Smith knew better than you what his feelings were,
and he set them down in his autobiography.

"As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
three reports, which are copied below.  They seem especially
acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
before and during the incident and not years after when other
events may have colored his perspective."

Exactly.  Each dispatch credits Smith with the concept of the
operation.

"The change seen between
11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
ordered, is obvious."

Not to Dana; not to Smith.

"If Smith did urge
such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
carry it out."

That's what Smith said in his autobiography.

"Grant, furthermore, didn't even delineate how all of this was to be
accomplished; he left that up to Thomas."

True.  I've already quoted Grant on this.  Don't you think it was
wise of him to allow Thomas to devise the best way to execute the
order?  And, when Thomas and Smith returned with news that
Smith's plan wouldn't work, didn't Grant heed Thomas's advice?

So what's the problem?

As for authorship of the plan, let's focus on the Dana dispatches:

Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
"Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
Ridge."

Note Dana says "plan proposed by W. F. Smith."

Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
"Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
as proposed by Smith."

Note Dana says "as proposed by Smith."

Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
"Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith?s plan of
attack impracticable."

Note Dana called it "Smith's plan."

Smith's autobiography and Dana's dispatches settle the matter: it
was Smith's plan.  Thanks for providing us with the additional
information.

P.P.P.S.  Simpson also had asked whether I was as critical of other
authors; I replied:
As a very critical reader, I find problems with most
articles and books that cross my path.  On the CivilWarWest
e-group, someone mentioned errors in Cozzens' "Shipwreck..." and I
asked what they were.  The individual only mentioned a mistake in
an officer's rank and one other smallish problem.  I have yet to
finish the book, but I have found two more--what I feel
are--substantial issues.  On page 259, enumerating Thomas' assault
force, Cozzens writes: "On Granger's right, Palmer's Fourteenth
Corps was represented solely by Richard Johnson's division."  Yet,
in his appendix (no, not that appendix), it correctly states that
Palmer's third division is Baird's which was on the opposite end
of the line.  Worse, in my mind, the timing of Hooker's delay at
the bridge appear to be self-contradictory.  On page 244, it
notes, "It was 1:25 P.M. when the ... advance guard ... bumped  up
against the bank of the creek."  On the next page, "[Hooker]
scribbled a note apprising Thomas that his march had stalled ...."
On page 247, "[Thomas] had heard nothing from Hooker since 1:30
P.M., when Hooker had reported his delay at the creek ...."  Not
only would these times give Hooker only five minutes to determine
his situation, scribble a note, and send it over the creek three
miles to Orchard Knob, but the time of first encountering the
creek must have happened much sooner.

Carl,

Good questions.  I don't have the answer.

I think that Grant stated at the time of Rosecrans' pursuit after
Corinth that he didn't know an army could off the land there.  At some
point, he realized you could.  If so, why could he not have moved
south from Holly Springs living off the land and dispensing with the
entire naval effort?  If there was access to the river around
Chickasaw Bluffs just above the siege lines, it might have been
possible to get supplies off boats there.

Just a thought, as someone once said,
Joseph

It is for certain that neither Curtis, Grant, or Sherman believed you
could live off the land INDEFINITELY. For a limited period of time,
food and forage, and not ammunition, could be found by raiding the
farms and plantations.
--- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
> Carl,
>
> Good questions.  I don't have the answer.
>
> I think that Grant stated at the time of Rosecrans' pursuit after
> Corinth that he didn't know an army could off the land there.  At
some
> point, he realized you could.  If so, why could he not have moved
> south from Holly Springs living off the land and dispensing with the
> entire naval effort?  If there was access to the river around
> Chickasaw Bluffs just above the siege lines, it might have been
> possible to get supplies off boats there.
>
> Just a thought, as someone once said,
> Joseph

--- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
> Re the below, I guess there is no reason to expect a USA TODAY
article
> to be in depth, but some remarks: Does ANYONE know exactly how
Grant was in supply? 3) I share
> Captain Keller's incredulity that Pemberton could fail to see that
> a)Vicksburg was a trap b) his big chance was to keep Grant from
> re-establishing proper supply ( those troops were not going to be
> finding ammo "off the land") c) failing 'b,' Vicksburg had to be
> abandoned, Johnston having told him as much, I do believe. IMHO.
> Carl

Hi Carl

I've been lurking here for months but this is my first post.  here
goes:

  Following Grant's crossing of the Big Black River, the confederates
abandoned their fortifications along the lower Yazoo River (Haines
Bluff, Snyder's Bluff and Dromgould's Bluff.)  The Union forces then
moved supplies up the Yazoo from the Mississippi, landing at Snyder's
Bluff about 10 miles north of Vicksburg.

One should note that both the Yazoo and the Mississippi rivers no
longer follow the paths they did in 1863.   The Mississippi cut
through the neck of DeSoto Bend in the 1870s.  Vicksburg residents,
not willing to be left high and dry, diverted the Yazoo so that it
flows into the Mississippi just below the city, instead of ten miles
upriver as it did in 1863.   A circa 1863 map is inside the rear
cover of Shlby Foote's Volume II.

This turning of the rebel batteries along the lower Yazoo was the
objective of both the Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou expeditions.
Each of these attempts was thwarted by a combination of  natural
obstacles, mistakes by Union commanders and Pemberton's forces sent
to oppose the Union efforts.

Whether or not Pemberton saw Vicksburg as a trap, Jefferson Davis had
ordered him to hold the city.  (The Confederates dis-functional chain
of command served the Union well.)    Pemberton was acting on orders
from Johnston when he left Vicksburg and moved eastward with his
army.   The CS defeat at Champions Hill, and subsequent rout at Big
Black River Bridge, were the actions that sealed the fate of the army
at Vicksburg.


I trust any errors I've made will not go uncorrected!


Eric Calistri

--- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
> Carl,
>
> Good questions.  I don't have the answer.
>
> I think that Grant stated at the time of Rosecrans' pursuit after
> Corinth that he didn't know an army could off the land there.  At
some
> point, he realized you could.  If so, why could he not have moved
> south from Holly Springs living off the land and dispensing with the
> entire naval effort?  If there was access to the river around
> Chickasaw Bluffs just above the siege lines, it might have been
> possible to get supplies off boats there.
>
> Just a thought, as someone once said,
> Joseph

Hi Joseph.

I've enjoyed your "offensive into enemy territory" over at the US
Grant Message board.

It was during Grant's retreat to Memphis after the Holly Springs
fiasco that he claims to have learned of his armies ability to live
off the land.  After "foraging liberally" in a northward march across
Mississippi, during December and January, it would have been unwise
to expect a successful southward march over the same ground don't you
think?   He was, however,  to put this knowledge to use six months
later during the Vicksburg campaign, over Sherman's vehement
objections.

The Union had no access to the Yazoo River above the siege lines
until after the crossing of the Big Black River on May 17.  Several
efforts to turn the batteries on the lower Yazoo had failed prior to
the Union embarking on their ultimately successful campaign.


Eric Calistri

eric, I'm glad we stumbled across your area of expertise! Those early
expeditions across Steele Bayou, etc., are quite interesting, I'll try
to do a post on them sometime, maybe as 4th of July approaches!
If I understand you correctly, Grant essentially outflanked the
ability of the Rebs to stand astride his supply lines, once he crossed
the Big Black?
Carl

--- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
> > Carl,
> >
> > Good questions.  I don't have the answer.
> >
> > I think that Grant stated at the time of Rosecrans' pursuit after
> > Corinth that he didn't know an army could off the land there.  At
> some
> > point, he realized you could.  If so, why could he not have moved
> > south from Holly Springs living off the land and dispensing with
the
> > entire naval effort?  If there was access to the river around
> > Chickasaw Bluffs just above the siege lines, it might have been
> > possible to get supplies off boats there.
> >
> > Just a thought, as someone once said,
> > Joseph
>
> Hi Joseph.
>
> I've enjoyed your "offensive into enemy territory" over at the US
> Grant Message board.
>
> It was during Grant's retreat to Memphis after the Holly Springs
> fiasco that he claims to have learned of his armies ability to live
> off the land.  After "foraging liberally" in a northward march
across
> Mississippi, during December and January, it would have been unwise
> to expect a successful southward march over the same ground don't
you
> think?   He was, however,  to put this knowledge to use six months
> later during the Vicksburg campaign, over Sherman's vehement
> objections.
>
> The Union had no access to the Yazoo River above the siege lines
> until after the crossing of the Big Black River on May 17.  Several
> efforts to turn the batteries on the lower Yazoo had failed prior to
> the Union embarking on their ultimately successful campaign.
>
>
> Eric Calistri

--- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
> eric, I'm glad we stumbled across your area of expertise! Those
early
> expeditions across Steele Bayou, etc., are quite interesting, I'll
try
> to do a post on them sometime, maybe as 4th of July approaches!
> If I understand you correctly, Grant essentially outflanked the
> ability of the Rebs to stand astride his supply lines, once he
crossed
> the Big Black?
> Carl

Right, when Sherman moved onto the top of the Yazoo bluffs he had
made a full circle of about 100 miles to reach the top of the bluffs
assaulted 6 months before.  That's some serious flanking!!

Love to hear about Steele's Bayou.

Eric

thanks for the tip about the map at the end of vol II Shelby Foote ...
this actually shows where Sherman's 1862 assault was, while also
showing Grant's / Pemberton's movements/battles in 1863. I think you
are right, it was just one big flanking movement to get to where they
were trying to go in 1862!
Ok, I'll try to do a post, it'll be on Steele Bayou and the opening
of the Yazoo pass, connected events...
carl
> Right, when Sherman moved onto the top of the Yazoo bluffs he had
> made a full circle of about 100 miles to reach the top of the bluffs
> assaulted 6 months before.  That's some serious flanking!!
>
> Love to hear about Steele's Bayou.
>
> Eric

Well its been awhile since I have had a chance to peek in,  having to
make a living certainly does reduce one's civil war time! Anyway it
is a lazy Spring Sunday morning in West Tennessee and I thought I
might continue my rambling about battlefield leadership at
Chickamauga. I hope you do not mind, (actually I am trying to figure
out what the heck I am going to say at the muster- YIKES only about a
month away).
At any rate having cited some folks for what I thought was some
outstanding tactical leadership at the battle I throught I might
continue.
Perhaps the most `unsung' Union commander was Robt. Minty. Much like
John Buford at Gettysburg it may take a movie for people to begin to
generally appreciate just how critical Minty's delaying actions east
of Chickamauga Creek on September 18th were to the avoidance of total
Union  disaster. Without the near day long delay of Johnson in
crossing the creek the Battle would have started in earnest on the
afternoon of September 18th with the Union left anchored at the Lee
and Gordon Mill. Although this would have left Granger's folks in the
Rossville area ( threatening the rear of the Confederate forces whose
orientation would have been facing south probably directly across the
Lafayette Road) it would have also meant that the rest of the Army of
the Cumberland was flanked and very close to being totally cut off
from Chattanooga. For those who have studied Buford's defense or
delay in depth tactics against Heth's Division you will truly
appreciate what Minty did on September 18th against Bushrod Johnson's
division of infantry. Although Wilder's folks get lots of attention
for their September 18th defense of the Alexander Road Bridge ( and
they justily deserve much tribute)it was actually Minty's delay at
the Reed Bridge that mattered most in my humble opinion. Once the
Reed Bridge was captured Wilder's defense at the Alexander Bridge
further to the south was flanked and had to be given up. If the Reed
Bridge crossing had fallen at say 11 am instead of 3 pm the
consequences could have been significant.
Another Union officer that I think probably deserves a little more
good press than he gets is Tom Crittenden.  It was he who provided
some on the ground over-all leadership and moral support to the heavy
fighting in the Viniard Farm sector on September 19. In view of the
highly fluid command situation on that part of the field I think he
merits at least some favorable mention. Although continued Union
possession of the LaFayette Road itself was not critical to the Union
army (the further to the east Dry Valley Road provided a rougher but
adequate North-South means of communication) Crittenden's leadership
in this sector was personal and meaningful to the stalling of the
eastern drive of the confederate forces in the Vinard Farm- Widow
Glenn  sector. In addition it is unclear to me at this time what if
any role Crittenden may have had in coordinating Wilder's
various `spoiling' counter-attacks which were launched in this area
that were critical to maintaining the Union defense in the Vinard
Farm area.
As an aside it is just my opinion but of those Union officers who got
the ax after the Battle, Crittenden probably was the one most
wronged. Mc Cook appears to pretty well have lived up  to his
description by Union Brigadier General Sam Beatty as a `chucklehead',
throughout the campaign.  Clearly Wood's infamous `gap' had McCook's
finger prints all over it. In addition McCook's eventual `sacking'
was probably long over due for no other reasons than his less than
stellar performances at both Perryville and Murfreesboro. Negley's
early  unannounced abandonment of the Horseshoe Ridge position, at
least in my mind was an act which merited severe punishment. While
Negley's prior service would have been  a strong mitigating factor in
imposing punishment, his action on September 20th certainly justified
dismissal — at least in my mind.  But for the life of me I really can
not see exactly what more Tom Crittenden could have reasonably been
called upon to do.While it is true that he might have accompanied
Davis and Sheridan on their face saving attmpt to return to Thomas
via Rossville I really fail to see how such an action would have any
meaningful impact on the campaign. Of course all three of these
officers were `cleared' at their Courts of Inquiry but the practical
reality was that they were dumped from future command and as I say in
Tom Crittenden's case I persoanlly feel this was an injustice. In
view of their future performances, with the exception of Joe Hooker,
I do not think that subsequent Corps commanders of the Army of the
Cumberland were substantial improvements over Crittenden.
On an additional  purely personal note I think it is awful easy to
admire the battlefield performances of both US brigadiers Hans Heg
and William H. Lytle. This admiration for me comes not so much from
anything particularly outstanding in their tactics or command
decisions but rather because they are such appealing personalities,
one a Norweigen former 49er who wrote beautiful letters to his wife
and the other a pre-war poet. Both gave their lives in very heroic
fashion and continue to stand today as  shining examples of the
American tradition of citizen-soldiers.
On the other side of the Lafayette Road I also find some darn
admirable characters. Lucius Polk for lots of reasons remains a
personal favoite of mine. At Chickamuaga he was given a nearly
impossible task and quietly and persistently went about trying to
achieve his objective. His troops' willingness to follow him and to
attempt what they were told to try had ramifications far beyond what
they could see. In addition Lucius appears to have been an
aristocratic officer who did not seem to display many of the personal
negatives that were often displayed by such an officer.
Alexander P. Stewart fought his division very ably and without much
direction or help from his higher ups. The whole `gang' of Tennessee
lawyers turned Brigadier Generals (Maney, Strahl, Preston Smith,
later Vaughn, and even Marcus Wright) in Cheatham's largely Tennessee
Division performed well in my opinion. I can not tell you how often I
have seen Preston Smith's coat on display at the Memphis Pink Palace
Museum. It is a beautifully made coat of very expensive cloth with a
gaping hole right over the heart. I often pass by the still thriving
St. Peter's Catholic Orphanage which in pre-war days, Smith had
championed among the Protestant elite of Memphis as a noble cause
worthy of their finacicial support- even if it was then run by and
primarily for the benefit of Irish and German Catholics of the city.
(Forrest was the person who donated the land upon which the present
facility stands.) As in the case of Heg and Lytle, Smith remains for
me a shining example of the American tradition of citizen soldiers
that have always responded when their country have called even the
financially successful who had more than ample opportunities to
honorably avoid the danger. Preston Smith is just one of the people I
often think of when I hear `some' people refer to lawyers as pimps
and shysters. A final lesser leader who I can not think of without
smiling is the ubiquitious Colonel William C. Oats of the 15th
Alabama. Infantry. Yes the same man and troops who did battle with
the now lionized Chamberlain and 20th Maine on the slopes of Little
Round Top seemed to be everywhere at Chickamauga (Brock Field,
LaFayette Road, Dyer Field and Horseshoe Ridge). At least in my book
any man who led repeated charges against both Little Round Top, and
Horseshoe Ridge had a lot of `true grit'.
My personal list Chickamauga favorites could go on but I know I am
boring the heck out of everyone but I must list one last person. This
person is the character that first got me hooked on the American
Civil War some 40 years ago. The person who actually won the battle
and deserved the thanks of the nation- Johnny Lincoln Clem - at least
that is the way I remember the Walt Disney tv version of the late 50s
or early 1960s! Yes Johnny Clem known as both  the Drummer Boy of
Chickamauga and of Shiloh. Clem served as the drummer boy/mascot of
the 22nd Michigan at both the battles of Shiloh and Chickamauga. I
just know I am the only person alive that remembers these two Sunday
Evening episodes of Walt Disney's great program. Many remember the
Swamp Fox, Johnny Tremain, and of course the Davy Crockett episodes (
how many remember how many of those there were?) But I just know I am
the only person still living that remembers those two episodes with
Johnny Cochran (?) playing Clem and Brain Keith ( all susequent roles
where down hill) playing his buddy the sergeant. I still rmember
General Thomas' frightful reaction when Johnny explained that he had
discovered that General Longstreet with his whole Cavalry Corps from
Virginia where now on the field! (VBG) While my older brothers had
their coon skin caps a few years later I had my `Johnny Shiloh' kepi
and musket and to this day those two Christmas presents remain my
most memorable chilhood possessions. I can not fully explain how
crushed I was when my Uncle Norvel explained to me that Johnny had
fought for the wrong side! But I do digress, John Clem and the 22nd
Michigan stood tall on Horseshoe Ridge on Setember 20th. For those
who attend the muster I promise we will find the 22nd Michigan
monument and we will make an appropriate homage! The homage will  not
only be to Clem but to all the soldiers that participated in this
monumental "Soldiers' FIGHT"!
Sorry to have bored you with these ramblings but it is a lazy Sunday
morning!

Before everyone corrects me! LOL The young actor was of course --
Kevin Corcoran and not Johnny!

--- In civilwarwest@y..., sdwakefield@p... wrote:
> Well its been awhile since I have had a chance to peek in,  having
to
> make a living certainly does reduce one's civil war time! Anyway it
> is a lazy Spring Sunday morning in West Tennessee and I thought I
> might continue my rambling about battlefield leadership at
> Chickamauga. I hope you do not mind, (actually I am trying to
figure
> out what the heck I am going to say at the muster- YIKES only about
a
> month away).
> At any rate having cited some folks for what I thought was some
> outstanding tactical leadership at the battle I throught I might
> continue.
> Perhaps the most `unsung' Union commander was Robt. Minty. Much
like
> John Buford at Gettysburg it may take a movie for people to begin
to
> generally appreciate just how critical Minty's delaying actions
east
> of Chickamauga Creek on September 18th were to the avoidance of
total
> Union  disaster. Without the near day long delay of Johnson in
> crossing the creek the Battle would have started in earnest on the
> afternoon of September 18th with the Union left anchored at the Lee
> and Gordon Mill. Although this would have left Granger's folks in
the
> Rossville area ( threatening the rear of the Confederate forces
whose
> orientation would have been facing south probably directly across
the
> Lafayette Road) it would have also meant that the rest of the Army
of
> the Cumberland was flanked and very close to being totally cut off
> from Chattanooga. For those who have studied Buford's defense or
> delay in depth tactics against Heth's Division you will truly
> appreciate what Minty did on September 18th against Bushrod
Johnson's
> division of infantry. Although Wilder's folks get lots of attention
> for their September 18th defense of the Alexander Road Bridge ( and
> they justily deserve much tribute)it was actually Minty's delay at
> the Reed Bridge that mattered most in my humble opinion. Once the
> Reed Bridge was captured Wilder's defense at the Alexander Bridge
> further to the south was flanked and had to be given up. If the
Reed
> Bridge crossing had fallen at say 11 am instead of 3 pm the
> consequences could have been significant.
> Another Union officer that I think probably deserves a little more
> good press than he gets is Tom Crittenden.  It was he who provided
> some on the ground over-all leadership and moral support to the
heavy
> fighting in the Viniard Farm sector on September 19. In view of the
> highly fluid command situation on that part of the field I think he
> merits at least some favorable mention. Although continued Union
> possession of the LaFayette Road itself was not critical to the
Union
> army (the further to the east Dry Valley Road provided a rougher
but
> adequate North-South means of communication) Crittenden's
leadership
> in this sector was personal and meaningful to the stalling of the
> eastern drive of the confederate forces in the Vinard Farm- Widow
> Glenn  sector. In addition it is unclear to me at this time what if
> any role Crittenden may have had in coordinating Wilder's
> various `spoiling' counter-attacks which were launched in this area
> that were critical to maintaining the Union defense in the Vinard
> Farm area.
> As an aside it is just my opinion but of those Union officers who
got
> the ax after the Battle, Crittenden probably was the one most
> wronged. Mc Cook appears to pretty well have lived up  to his
> description by Union Brigadier General Sam Beatty as a
`chucklehead',
> throughout the campaign.  Clearly Wood's infamous `gap' had
McCook's
> finger prints all over it. In addition McCook's eventual `sacking'
> was probably long over due for no other reasons than his less than
> stellar performances at both Perryville and Murfreesboro. Negley's
> early  unannounced abandonment of the Horseshoe Ridge position, at
> least in my mind was an act which merited severe punishment. While
> Negley's prior service would have been  a strong mitigating factor
in
> imposing punishment, his action on September 20th certainly
justified
> dismissal — at least in my mind.  But for the life of me I really
can
> not see exactly what more Tom Crittenden could have reasonably been
> called upon to do.While it is true that he might have accompanied
> Davis and Sheridan on their face saving attmpt to return to Thomas
> via Rossville I really fail to see how such an action would have
any
> meaningful impact on the campaign. Of course all three of these
> officers were `cleared' at their Courts of Inquiry but the
practical
> reality was that they were dumped from future command and as I say
in
> Tom Crittenden's case I persoanlly feel this was an injustice. In
> view of their future performances, with the exception of Joe
Hooker,
> I do not think that subsequent Corps commanders of the Army of the
> Cumberland were substantial improvements over Crittenden.
> On an additional  purely personal note I think it is awful easy to
> admire the battlefield performances of both US brigadiers Hans Heg
> and William H. Lytle. This admiration for me comes not so much from
> anything particularly outstanding in their tactics or command
> decisions but rather because they are such appealing personalities,
> one a Norweigen former 49er who wrote beautiful letters to his wife
> and the other a pre-war poet. Both gave their lives in very heroic
> fashion and continue to stand today as  shining examples of the
> American tradition of citizen-soldiers.
> On the other side of the Lafayette Road I also find some darn
> admirable characters. Lucius Polk for lots of reasons remains a
> personal favoite of mine. At Chickamuaga he was given a nearly
> impossible task and quietly and persistently went about trying to
> achieve his objective. His troops' willingness to follow him and to
> attempt what they were told to try had ramifications far beyond
what
> they could see. In addition Lucius appears to have been an
> aristocratic officer who did not seem to display many of the
personal
> negatives that were often displayed by such an officer.
> Alexander P. Stewart fought his division very ably and without much
> direction or help from his higher ups. The whole `gang' of
Tennessee
> lawyers turned Brigadier Generals (Maney, Strahl, Preston Smith,
> later Vaughn, and even Marcus Wright) in Cheatham's largely
Tennessee
> Division performed well in my opinion. I can not tell you how often
I
> have seen Preston Smith's coat on display at the Memphis Pink
Palace
> Museum. It is a beautifully made coat of very expensive cloth with
a
> gaping hole right over the heart. I often pass by the still
thriving
> St. Peter's Catholic Orphanage which in pre-war days, Smith had
> championed among the Protestant elite of Memphis as a noble cause
> worthy of their finacicial support- even if it was then run by and
> primarily for the benefit of Irish and German Catholics of the
city.
> (Forrest was the person who donated the land upon which the present
> facility stands.) As in the case of Heg and Lytle, Smith remains
for
> me a shining example of the American tradition of citizen soldiers
> that have always responded when their country have called even the
> financially successful who had more than ample opportunities to
> honorably avoid the danger. Preston Smith is just one of the people
I
> often think of when I hear `some' people refer to lawyers as pimps
> and shysters. A final lesser leader who I can not think of without
> smiling is the ubiquitious Colonel William C. Oats of the 15th
> Alabama. Infantry. Yes the same man and troops who did battle with
> the now lionized Chamberlain and 20th Maine on the slopes of Little
> Round Top seemed to be everywhere at Chickamauga (Brock Field,
> LaFayette Road, Dyer Field and Horseshoe Ridge). At least in my
book
> any man who led repeated charges against both Little Round Top, and
> Horseshoe Ridge had a lot of `true grit'.
> My personal list Chickamauga favorites could go on but I know I am
> boring the heck out of everyone but I must list one last person.
This
> person is the character that first got me hooked on the American
> Civil War some 40 years ago. The person who actually won the battle
> and deserved the thanks of the nation- Johnny Lincoln Clem - at
least
> that is the way I remember the Walt Disney tv version of the late
50s
> or early 1960s! Yes Johnny Clem known as both  the Drummer Boy of
> Chickamauga and of Shiloh. Clem served as the drummer boy/mascot of
> the 22nd Michigan at both the battles of Shiloh and Chickamauga. I
> just know I am the only person alive that remembers these two
Sunday
> Evening episodes of Walt Disney's great program. Many remember the
> Swamp Fox, Johnny Tremain, and of course the Davy Crockett episodes
(
> how many remember how many of those there were?) But I just know I
am
> the only person still living that remembers those two episodes with
> Johnny Cochran (?) playing Clem and Brain Keith ( all susequent
roles
> where down hill) playing his buddy the sergeant. I still rmember
> General Thomas' frightful reaction when Johnny explained that he
had
> discovered that General Longstreet with his whole Cavalry Corps
from
> Virginia where now on the field! (VBG) While my older brothers had
> their coon skin caps a few years later I had my `Johnny Shiloh'
kepi
> and musket and to this day those two Christmas presents remain my
> most memorable chilhood possessions. I can not fully explain how
> crushed I was when my Uncle Norvel explained to me that Johnny had
> fought for the wrong side! But I do digress, John Clem and the 22nd
> Michigan stood tall on Horseshoe Ridge on Setember 20th. For those
> who attend the muster I promise we will find the 22nd Michigan
> monument and we will make an appropriate homage! The homage will
not
> only be to Clem but to all the soldiers that participated in this
> monumental "Soldiers' FIGHT"!
> Sorry to have bored you with these ramblings but it is a lazy
Sunday
> morning!

To all:

Bob Redman just e-mailed me; at least, I am pretty sure it was him--
nowadays, it seems you can't always trust the names you see on posts
and e-mails, unlike the good old days of the mid-nineties.

He just asked me to tell you all that the review written in his name
of Brooks Simpson's book on Amazon.com was a complete hoax.  He also
stated that he didn't care for the book, which shouldn't come as much
of a surprise; Simpson seems to dislike the same people (e.g.,
Rosecrans and Thomas) that Grant did.

I would like to know how Bob Taubman, among any others who have read
or are reading it, is finding the book.  I have gone through large
portions and am very dissatisfied with the professor's writing.  As a
case in point, he attempts to refute statements by Generals Banks and
Franklin concerning Grant's inebriation and injury at New Orleans by
asking irrelevant questions about why these men allowed Grant to do
what he did.  The author also seems to take stands and then "proves"
them through the absence of evidence (e.g., If this person is
correct, than why doesn't anybody else say so?).

Regarding Chattanooga, Simpson seems to want Grant to look good no
matter what the cost to the historical record.  In an exchange of
posts with him, he made several unreasonable assertions to me.

On a lighter note, I envy everyone who goes to the muster.

Joseph