A LOGISTICAL waste land! I hope your post was made in jest, because
I can assure you I did not say nor mean to imply any of the
beautiful land is a waste.
Wakefield

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, hooperjwboro@c... wrote:
> Your remarks have merit, but we [all my compatriots] have never
thought of our beautiful land as a waste.
>
> --
> Respectfully,
> John Hooper [Boro to Horseshoe Bend]
>
> -------------- Original message --------------
> Very intresting stuff and I thank those who contributed
information.
> FWIW I have felt for a very long time that most people and
historians
> have never given adequate attention to just what a total
> logistical 'black hole' the area south of Murfreesboro to the
Coosa
> River was to 19th century armies. Even today driving down the
> interstates in this area I constantly marvel at how any large
group of
> soldiers where able to cross this mountainous waste land.
> Regards-Wakefield
>
>
>
>
>
> YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
>
>  Visit your group "civilwarwest" on the web.
>
>  To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
>  civilwarwest-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
>  Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service.

-------------- Original message --------------
A LOGISTICAL waste land! I hope your post was made in jest, because
I can assure you I did not say nor mean to imply any of the
beautiful land is a waste.
Wakefield

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, hooperjwboro@c... wrote:
> Your remarks have merit, but we [all my compatriots] have never
thought of our beautiful land as a waste.
>
> --
> Respectfully,
> John Hooper [Boro to Horseshoe Bend]
>
> -------------- Original message --------------
> Very intresting stuff and I thank those who contributed
information.
> FWIW I have felt for a very long time that most people and
historians
> have never given adequate attention to just what a total
> logistical 'black hole' the area south of Murfreesboro to the
Coosa
> River was to 19th century armies. Even today driving down the
> interstates in this area I constantly marvel at how any large
group of
> soldiers where able to cross this mountainous waste land.
> Regards-Wakefield
>
>
>
>
>
> YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
>
>  Visit your group "civilwarwest" on the web.
>  
>  To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
>  civilwarwest-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>  
>  Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service.

Just as an aside, I have a son, a medic in the Indiana Army National
Guard, who is mobilizing tomorrow morning and heading to Camp Shelby.

Cassandras arguing to prepare for the worse case are, by definition,
derided. Remember the chuckles when the "Y2K disaster" didn't occur - late
night TV jokes, forgetting that it didn't occur because the Cassandras were
listened to.

Knight Ridder Newsservice has a detailed analysis of the breakdowns at
"Federal government wasn't ready for Katrina, disaster experts say" by Seth
Borenstein. You can read it at
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12528233.htm

Along the same lines is "Intricate Flood Protection Long a Focus of Dispute
By Andrew C. Revkin and Christopher Drew at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/01/national/nationalspecial/01levee.html?adxn
nl=1&adxnnlx=1125593636-DbkYLzduAf8KYwZnMvHM3g

"A Sad Day, Too, for Architecture" by S. Frederick Starr at
http://travel2.nytimes.com//2005/09/01/garden/01fred.html details what he
presently knows about his personal part of the Big Easy and the historical
damage that has been done.
Floods are an old story in the Mississippi Valley and the Mark Twain site
has an excellent book review about the Great 1927 Flood along the lower
valley at http://www.yorku.ca/twainweb/reviews/barry-01.html

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  huddleston.r@...

"Le sens communn'est pas si commun."
"Common sense is not so common." Voltaire

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Harry Smeltzer" <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
You acknowledged the importance of the Snake
> Creek Gap movement.  It did not succeed to the degree that Sherman
had
> hoped.  Thus discussing counterfactuals is almost inescapable.

It's a fair observation.  I'm just questioning whether a good,
rigorous Snake Creek Gap counterfactual is possible--whether one can
say that if *this* one variable were changed, the disruption or
destructionof Johnston's army would have ensued.  (It's not really
enough to say that "better results" would have ensued.)

I'm not talking about any sort of "what-if" history.  Rather, I'm
trying to adhere to certain rules that have been proposed for using
counterfactual analysis in a way that meets the same tests as
conventional academic history.

The basic idea is that whenever historians interpret the past they
isolate certain factors as key.  When they do so, they are implicitly
arguing that if one of those factors were modified or removed, the
outcome would change.  To use an example from the western theater:
the Army of the Cumberland lost the battle of Chickamauga primarily
because a gap opened up when Wood's division shifted its position just
before Longstreet's attack.  The argument implicitly is that *if*
Wood's division had remained in place, the Union would have won.  In
this scenario, the "consequent" is a Union victory at Chickamauga.
What accounts for the outcome--leaving Wood in place--is the
"antecedent."

It occurs to me that maybe the easiest thing would be to paste in nine
rules for grounding counterfactuals.  They're not mine; the credit
goes to Prof. Ned Lebow, a political scientist who has worked
extensively with counterfactual theory.  The rules are excerpted from
an essay available online at
http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/gesint/lehre/2002_2003
/counterfact/lebow_ch2.pdf

1.  Realism:  Good counterfactuals must arise from the historical
context, and we must have compelling mechanisms to bring them into
being that themselves require only minimal rewrites of history.

2.  Clarity:  All causal arguments should define as unambiguously as
possible what is to be explained (the consequent in counterfactual
arguments), which accounts for this outcome (the antecedent) and the
principle(s) linking the two.  Good counterfactuals should also
specify the conditions that would have to be present for the
counterfactual to occur.

3.  Logical consistency or cotenability:  Every counterfactual is a
shorthand statement of a more complex argument that generally requires
a set of connecting conditions or principles.  The hypothetical
antecedent should not undercut any of the principles linking it to the
consequent.

4.  Enabling counterfactuals should not undercut the antecedent:  Some
counterfactual scenarios may require other counterfactuals to make
them possible.  Researchers need to specify all important enabling
counterfactuals and consider their implications for the consequent.

5.  Historical consistency:  While the "minimal rewrite" rule should
be followed as closely as possible, the nature of the changes is more
important than the number of changes.  A minimal rewrite that makes
only one alteration of reality may not qualify as a plausible world
counterfactual if the counterfactual is unrealistic.

6.  Theoretical consistency:  It is useful to reference any theories,
empirical findings, historical interpretations or assumptions on which
the causal principles or connecting arguments are based.  This will
provide readers with a more explicit perspective from which to
evaluate the counterfactual's plausibility.

7.  Avoid the conjunction fallacy:  The probability of any compound
counterfactual is exceedingly low.  Counterfactuals might have changed
the world, but in ways that become exponentially more difficult to
track over time because of the additional branching points that enter
the picture.  As the probabilities associated with these outcomes will
vary enormously, researchers accordingly need to specify if their
counterfactuals are intended to produce a specific world, a set of
worlds with a particular characteristic or any world (on a specific
dimension) other than the one that actually came to pass.

8.  Recognize the interconnectedness of causes and outcomes:  Changes
we make in the past may not only require other changes to make them
possible, they may also produce additional changes beyond those we
intend to lead to the consequent.

9.  Consider second order counterfactuals:  Even when there is good
reason to believe that the antecedent will produce the desired
consequent, the possibility remains that subsequent developments will
return history to the course from which it was initially diverted by
the antecedent.  Researchers should try to identify what in their view
is the most likely course of events that could unravel their
consequent or negate its value as an outcome.

Basically what I fear is that so many variables are in play at Snake
Creek Gap that too many of the above rules are violated or ignored.  I
may be able to explain this better when I write the next part of the
post, which looks at the Confederate side of the hill.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@y...>
wrote:
> Furthermore, there is the dramatic aspect of this topic [Snake Creek
Gap] for civil
> war 'buffs'.  To hear a common version of the tale, one can
envision a
> cast of players consisting of the hero (Thomas), the villain
(Sherman),
> the fool (JEJ) and the well-meaning but bumbling apprentice
> (McPherson).

I think that's very perceptive.

I think one of the appeals of Civil War military history is that it
lends itself to mythic archetypes.  I've discussed this a bit in a
multi-part post, still unfinished, called "Shadow Warriors."  You'll
find it here:
http://warhistorian.org/blog/index.php?entry=entry050501-205656

The theme is dealt with more succinctly in a post about McClellan
entitled "Little Mac Fauntleroy:
http://warhistorian.org/blog/index.php?entry=entry050522-004507

These examples mostly deal with eastern theater examples, but they
have their western theater counterparts.

Mark

Just a note...while the lead in to the below may have been snipped from a
post made by me or in response to a post I made, the comment was not mine.

I agree with your conclusion, Mark.  Most counterfactuals break down due to
codependency of variables.  Usually you can't just change one variable.  Too
often we only change the variables that we prefer to see change.

Harry

-----Original Message-----
From: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com [mailto:civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com] On
Behalf Of profgrimsley
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 4:16 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Counterfactuals and Contingency

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Harry Smeltzer" <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
You acknowledged the importance of the Snake
> Creek Gap movement.  It did not succeed to the degree that Sherman
had
> hoped.  Thus discussing counterfactuals is almost inescapable.

It's a fair observation.  I'm just questioning whether a good,
rigorous Snake Creek Gap counterfactual is possible--whether one can
say that if *this* one variable were changed, the disruption or
destructionof Johnston's army would have ensued.  (It's not really
enough to say that "better results" would have ensued.)

I'm not talking about any sort of "what-if" history.  Rather, I'm
trying to adhere to certain rules that have been proposed for using
counterfactual analysis in a way that meets the same tests as
conventional academic history.

The basic idea is that whenever historians interpret the past they
isolate certain factors as key.  When they do so, they are implicitly
arguing that if one of those factors were modified or removed, the
outcome would change.  To use an example from the western theater:
the Army of the Cumberland lost the battle of Chickamauga primarily
because a gap opened up when Wood's division shifted its position just
before Longstreet's attack.  The argument implicitly is that *if*
Wood's division had remained in place, the Union would have won.  In
this scenario, the "consequent" is a Union victory at Chickamauga.
What accounts for the outcome--leaving Wood in place--is the
"antecedent."

It occurs to me that maybe the easiest thing would be to paste in nine
rules for grounding counterfactuals.  They're not mine; the credit
goes to Prof. Ned Lebow, a political scientist who has worked
extensively with counterfactual theory.  The rules are excerpted from
an essay available online at
http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/gesint/lehre/2002_2003
/counterfact/lebow_ch2.pdf

1.  Realism:  Good counterfactuals must arise from the historical
context, and we must have compelling mechanisms to bring them into
being that themselves require only minimal rewrites of history.

2.  Clarity:  All causal arguments should define as unambiguously as
possible what is to be explained (the consequent in counterfactual
arguments), which accounts for this outcome (the antecedent) and the
principle(s) linking the two.  Good counterfactuals should also
specify the conditions that would have to be present for the
counterfactual to occur.

3.  Logical consistency or cotenability:  Every counterfactual is a
shorthand statement of a more complex argument that generally requires
a set of connecting conditions or principles.  The hypothetical
antecedent should not undercut any of the principles linking it to the
consequent.

4.  Enabling counterfactuals should not undercut the antecedent:  Some
counterfactual scenarios may require other counterfactuals to make
them possible.  Researchers need to specify all important enabling
counterfactuals and consider their implications for the consequent.

5.  Historical consistency:  While the "minimal rewrite" rule should
be followed as closely as possible, the nature of the changes is more
important than the number of changes.  A minimal rewrite that makes
only one alteration of reality may not qualify as a plausible world
counterfactual if the counterfactual is unrealistic.

6.  Theoretical consistency:  It is useful to reference any theories,
empirical findings, historical interpretations or assumptions on which
the causal principles or connecting arguments are based.  This will
provide readers with a more explicit perspective from which to
evaluate the counterfactual's plausibility.

7.  Avoid the conjunction fallacy:  The probability of any compound
counterfactual is exceedingly low.  Counterfactuals might have changed
the world, but in ways that become exponentially more difficult to
track over time because of the additional branching points that enter
the picture.  As the probabilities associated with these outcomes will
vary enormously, researchers accordingly need to specify if their
counterfactuals are intended to produce a specific world, a set of
worlds with a particular characteristic or any world (on a specific
dimension) other than the one that actually came to pass.

8.  Recognize the interconnectedness of causes and outcomes:  Changes
we make in the past may not only require other changes to make them
possible, they may also produce additional changes beyond those we
intend to lead to the consequent.

9.  Consider second order counterfactuals:  Even when there is good
reason to believe that the antecedent will produce the desired
consequent, the possibility remains that subsequent developments will
return history to the course from which it was initially diverted by
the antecedent.  Researchers should try to identify what in their view
is the most likely course of events that could unravel their
consequent or negate its value as an outcome.

Basically what I fear is that so many variables are in play at Snake
Creek Gap that too many of the above rules are violated or ignored.  I
may be able to explain this better when I write the next part of the
post, which looks at the Confederate side of the hill.







Yahoo! Groups Links

Professor, a very good post and as good a one as I have seen for a while.  I
might not agree with everything but it is certainly food for thought.
Welcome aboard my friend.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Dick (a.k.a. Shotgun)
http://www.civilwarhome.com

----- Original Message -----
From: "profgrimsley" <grimsley.1@...>
To: <civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 2:15 PM
Subject: [civilwarwest] Counterfactuals and Contingency


> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Harry Smeltzer" <hjs21@c...>
> wrote:
> You acknowledged the importance of the Snake
> > Creek Gap movement.  It did not succeed to the degree that Sherman
> had
> > hoped.  Thus discussing counterfactuals is almost inescapable.
>
> It's a fair observation.  I'm just questioning whether a good,
> rigorous Snake Creek Gap counterfactual is possible--whether one can
> say that if *this* one variable were changed, the disruption or
> destructionof Johnston's army would have ensued.  (It's not really
> enough to say that "better results" would have ensued.)
>
> I'm not talking about any sort of "what-if" history.  Rather, I'm
> trying to adhere to certain rules that have been proposed for using
> counterfactual analysis in a way that meets the same tests as
> conventional academic history.
>
> The basic idea is that whenever historians interpret the past they
> isolate certain factors as key.  When they do so, they are implicitly
> arguing that if one of those factors were modified or removed, the
> outcome would change.  To use an example from the western theater:
> the Army of the Cumberland lost the battle of Chickamauga primarily
> because a gap opened up when Wood's division shifted its position just
> before Longstreet's attack.  The argument implicitly is that *if*
> Wood's division had remained in place, the Union would have won.  In
> this scenario, the "consequent" is a Union victory at Chickamauga.
> What accounts for the outcome--leaving Wood in place--is the
> "antecedent."
>
> It occurs to me that maybe the easiest thing would be to paste in nine
> rules for grounding counterfactuals.  They're not mine; the credit
> goes to Prof. Ned Lebow, a political scientist who has worked
> extensively with counterfactual theory.  The rules are excerpted from
> an essay available online at
> http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/gesint/lehre/2002_2003
> /counterfact/lebow_ch2.pdf
>
> 1.  Realism:  Good counterfactuals must arise from the historical
> context, and we must have compelling mechanisms to bring them into
> being that themselves require only minimal rewrites of history.
>
> 2.  Clarity:  All causal arguments should define as unambiguously as
> possible what is to be explained (the consequent in counterfactual
> arguments), which accounts for this outcome (the antecedent) and the
> principle(s) linking the two.  Good counterfactuals should also
> specify the conditions that would have to be present for the
> counterfactual to occur.
>
> 3.  Logical consistency or cotenability:  Every counterfactual is a
> shorthand statement of a more complex argument that generally requires
> a set of connecting conditions or principles.  The hypothetical
> antecedent should not undercut any of the principles linking it to the
> consequent.
>
> 4.  Enabling counterfactuals should not undercut the antecedent:  Some
> counterfactual scenarios may require other counterfactuals to make
> them possible.  Researchers need to specify all important enabling
> counterfactuals and consider their implications for the consequent.
>
> 5.  Historical consistency:  While the "minimal rewrite" rule should
> be followed as closely as possible, the nature of the changes is more
> important than the number of changes.  A minimal rewrite that makes
> only one alteration of reality may not qualify as a plausible world
> counterfactual if the counterfactual is unrealistic.
>
> 6.  Theoretical consistency:  It is useful to reference any theories,
> empirical findings, historical interpretations or assumptions on which
> the causal principles or connecting arguments are based.  This will
> provide readers with a more explicit perspective from which to
> evaluate the counterfactual's plausibility.
>
> 7.  Avoid the conjunction fallacy:  The probability of any compound
> counterfactual is exceedingly low.  Counterfactuals might have changed
> the world, but in ways that become exponentially more difficult to
> track over time because of the additional branching points that enter
> the picture.  As the probabilities associated with these outcomes will
> vary enormously, researchers accordingly need to specify if their
> counterfactuals are intended to produce a specific world, a set of
> worlds with a particular characteristic or any world (on a specific
> dimension) other than the one that actually came to pass.
>
> 8.  Recognize the interconnectedness of causes and outcomes:  Changes
> we make in the past may not only require other changes to make them
> possible, they may also produce additional changes beyond those we
> intend to lead to the consequent.
>
> 9.  Consider second order counterfactuals:  Even when there is good
> reason to believe that the antecedent will produce the desired
> consequent, the possibility remains that subsequent developments will
> return history to the course from which it was initially diverted by
> the antecedent.  Researchers should try to identify what in their view
> is the most likely course of events that could unravel their
> consequent or negate its value as an outcome.
>
> Basically what I fear is that so many variables are in play at Snake
> Creek Gap that too many of the above rules are violated or ignored.  I
> may be able to explain this better when I write the next part of the
> post, which looks at the Confederate side of the hill.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>

In this case there were  'Cassandras'.  What was needed was leadership.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Bob Huddleston" <huddleston.r@c...> wrote:
> Cassandras arguing to prepare for the worse case are, by definition,
> derided. Remember the chuckles when the "Y2K disaster" didn't occur - late
> night TV jokes, forgetting that it didn't occur because the Cassandras were
> listened to.
>
> Knight Ridder Newsservice has a detailed analysis of the breakdowns at
> "Federal government wasn't ready for Katrina, disaster experts say" by Seth
> Borenstein. You can read it at
> http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12528233.htm
>
> Along the same lines is "Intricate Flood Protection Long a Focus of Dispute
> By Andrew C. Revkin and Christopher Drew at
> http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/01/national/nationalspecial/01levee.html?adxn
> nl=1&adxnnlx=1125593636-DbkYLzduAf8KYwZnMvHM3g
>
> "A Sad Day, Too, for Architecture" by S. Frederick Starr at
> http://travel2.nytimes.com//2005/09/01/garden/01fred.html details what he
> presently knows about his personal part of the Big Easy and the historical
> damage that has been done.
> Floods are an old story in the Mississippi Valley and the Mark Twain site
> has an excellent book review about the Great 1927 Flood along the lower
> valley at http://www.yorku.ca/twainweb/reviews/barry-01.html
>
> Take care,
>
> Bob
>
> Judy and Bob Huddleston
> 10643 Sperry Street
> Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
> 303.451.6376  huddleston.r@c...
>
> "Le sens communn'est pas si commun."
> "Common sense is not so common." Voltaire

I live up here in Meridian and we just got our power
back on at 3pm cst, it was pretty bad this way. but we
pray for those south of us. I dont really have many
words for it, just sick to my stomach. because of the
power outage i was not able to visually see biloxi
through New Orleans but just was able to and it hurts.
here we are out of gasoline, water, and in most places
electricity but things are getting better! some houses
were destroyed but not the majority thank God.

--- lilsteve68@... wrote:

>
> Beauvoir, the final home of Jefferson Davis that was
> on the beach in  Biloxi
> has been completely destroyed.
>
_http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050830/NEWS0110/508
> 30019_
>
(http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050830/NEWS0110/50830\
019)
>
>
> I can only imagine the devastation at  Confederate
> Memorial Hall in New
> Orleans. (And although it may not be CW, the  D-Day
> Museum as well. as all the
> other historical sites in the area  )
> Steven
>



   .....Eternally.....





__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail - Helps protect you from nasty viruses.
http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "profgrimsley" <grimsley.1@o...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@y...>
> wrote:
> > Furthermore, there is the dramatic aspect of this topic [Snake Creek
> Gap] for civil
> > war 'buffs'.  To hear a common version of the tale, one can
> envision a
> > cast of players consisting of the hero (Thomas), the villain
> (Sherman),
> > the fool (JEJ) and the well-meaning but bumbling apprentice
> > (McPherson).
>
> I think that's very perceptive.

Thank you.  And thank you for stating the term (archetype) I was seacrhing for,
unsuccessfully, to come up with.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Harry Smeltzer" <hjs21@c...> wrote:
> Just a note...while the lead in to the below may have been snipped
from a
> post made by me or in response to a post I made, the comment was not
mine.
>
> I agree with your conclusion, Mark.  Most counterfactuals break down
due to
> codependency of variables.  Usually you can't just change one
variable.  Too
> often we only change the variables that we prefer to see change.
>
> Harry

Yes, I realized after I sent the post that I'd gotten confused about
the person to whom I was responding.  Sorry!

Mark

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  huddleston.r@...

“Le sens communn’est pas si commun.”
“Common sense is not so common.” Voltaire

Is this my computer or is in the transmission
Stan

--- Bob Huddleston <huddleston.r@...> wrote:

> Your first starting place should be the appendix to
> the Luvaas, Army War College Guide to the Battle of
> Antietam. Charles R. Shrader, “Field Logistics in
> the Civil War.”
>
>
>
> “Army Logistician,” the professional journal of
> US Army logistics
> <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/Back.html > has a
> number of articles on Civil War logistics, although
> most are quite short and simplistic. One good one is
> David Sabine, “The Role of Logistics in
> Confederate Defeat” (Jan-Feb 1982, pp. 12-16).
> Another is William Kyle, “The logistics of the
> Battle of Chickamauga,” (Sep-Oct 1986, pp. 26-30)
>
>
>
> Journal of Military History (and its various name
> changes) is available on line is you have access to
> JSTAR, but that usually means a good university
> library. Lots and lots of stuff in there!
>
>
>
> Henry Halleck devoted Chapter IV of his Military Art
> and Strategy to logistics. See
>
http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?sid=3bc84072168b07d7
>
<http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?sid=3bc84072168b07d7&c=moa&idno=AG\
N0334.0001.001&view=toc>
> &c=moa&idno=AGN0334.0001.001&view=toc  for the text.
>
>
>
> Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics,
> 1775‑1953. is published by the Army as one of its
> historical volumes. Not on line, but worth digging
> out.
>
>
>
> USAMHIs reference bibliographies have excellent
> lists on practically any topic you want. The only
> limit is that the lists are of their holdings. Check
> http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usamhi/finding_aids.htm
>
>
>
>
> Take care,
>
> Bob
>
> Judy and Bob Huddleston
> 10643 Sperry Street
> Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
> 303.451.6376  huddleston.r@...
>
> “Le sens communn’est pas si commun.”
> “Common sense is not so common.” Voltaire
>
>
>
>
>
>




____________________________________________________
Start your day with Yahoo! - make it your home page
http://www.yahoo.com/r/hs

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  huddleston.r@...

“Le sens communn’est pas si commun.”
“Common sense is not so common.” Voltaire

Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  huddleston.r@...

“Le sens communn’est pas si commun.”
“Common sense is not so common.” Voltaire

Just as an aside, I have a son, a medic in the Indiana Army National
Guard, who is mobilizing tomorrow morning and heading to Camp Shelby.

I saw a leader on TV tonight. Some visitors from, I think, England were
totally lost. There were 5-6 of them feeling they were about to die.
Desolate, deserted, vandals around, water and destruction all around.
Totally adrift in a foreign country amass in catastrophe, convinced they
were about to die, and no one would even know of their deaths. I can't
think of being in a much worse situation.
Then an angel appeared. This one was a young African American wearing a
camouflage t-shirt and hat. He, along with his wife, went over and took
all of them to safety.  The tourist recanted the story to a TV reporter
and broke down in tears. The tourist said he didn't even know the man's
name but he saved their lives. He reached over and grabbed him and
hugged him. The young man said his first name and smiled.
He then said that he has seen plenty of trucks and stuff around but they
won't come. And then he said, "If I can walk around any where they (the
rescuers) sure can." It wasn't bravado. Just a fact.
That is leadership. He saw a situation and did something about it. He
didn't convene a meeting, make a speech, thank a senator, or complain.
He simply saw people in need and helped them.
So simple. So right. So rare.
That is leadership.

Two hours before the above story above aired, the FEMA Director said he
just became aware that people were even at the Convention Center in New
Orleans. CNN has known it for a day or two at least. That means I knew
too and I'm in Indiana.  That is not leadership. I hope he is familiar
with Monster.com.

Sorry,
Tom

-----Original Message-----
From: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com [mailto:civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com]
On Behalf Of William H Keene
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 4:51 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Cassandras were needed

In this case there were  'Cassandras'.  What was needed was leadership.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Bob Huddleston"
<huddleston.r@c...> wrote:
> Cassandras arguing to prepare for the worse case are, by definition,
> derided. Remember the chuckles when the "Y2K disaster" didn't occur -
late
> night TV jokes, forgetting that it didn't occur because the Cassandras
were
> listened to.
>
> Knight Ridder Newsservice has a detailed analysis of the breakdowns at
> "Federal government wasn't ready for Katrina, disaster experts say" by
Seth
> Borenstein. You can read it at
> http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12528233.htm
>
> Along the same lines is "Intricate Flood Protection Long a Focus of
Dispute
> By Andrew C. Revkin and Christopher Drew at
>
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/01/national/nationalspecial/01levee.html?
adxn
> nl=1&adxnnlx=1125593636-DbkYLzduAf8KYwZnMvHM3g
>
> "A Sad Day, Too, for Architecture" by S. Frederick Starr at
> http://travel2.nytimes.com//2005/09/01/garden/01fred.html details what
he
> presently knows about his personal part of the Big Easy and the
historical
> damage that has been done.
> Floods are an old story in the Mississippi Valley and the Mark Twain
site
> has an excellent book review about the Great 1927 Flood along the
lower
> valley at http://www.yorku.ca/twainweb/reviews/barry-01.html
>
> Take care,
>
> Bob
>
> Judy and Bob Huddleston
> 10643 Sperry Street
> Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
> 303.451.6376  huddleston.r@c...
>
> "Le sens communn'est pas si commun."
> "Common sense is not so common." Voltaire






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Take care,

Bob

Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
303.451.6376  huddleston.r@...

“Le sens communn’est pas si commun.”
“Common sense is not so common.” Voltaire

One of the best introductions to the subject I have seen is an article
that is now almost half a century old:

     John G. Moore, "Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War" Military
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, Civil War Issue. (Summer, 1960), pp. 68-77.

         Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931%2819602
2%2924%3A2%3C68%3AMASITC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

Its documentation is deceptively simple, but it has some pretty shrewd
calculations about the extent to which Civil War armies of a given
size could forage within a given area and, particularly, the demands
of supplying an army at increasing distances from a railhead.

The issue is available online (thus the Stable URL).  But--so far as I
know-- it can only be accessed through
J-STOR (short for Journal Storage), and you'll need permission to
do so.  However, many college libraries and even some secondary
schools  subscribe to it, and you can get to it via their on-site
computers.  You can find a list participating institutions here:

http://www.jstor.org/about/participants_na.html

It's not so much that this single article is worth the trouble of
gaining access to J-STOR, but there's such an abundance of scholarship
available once you do get access that it's worth looking into.

As an alternative, the Moore article is reprinted in _Military
Analysis of the Civil War_ (KTO Press, 1977).

Mark

The old saying goes "Amateurs study tactics - professionals study
logistics."  I think this is mostly because tactics lends itself more easily
to sweeping, romantic generalizations in relative vacuums.  Logistics is
complicated and mind numbingly dull - most amateurs see it more often than
not as an "excuse" for the failure of tactics.

Harry

-----Original Message-----
From: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com [mailto:civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com] On
Behalf Of profgrimsley
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 11:47 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Logistics

One of the best introductions to the subject I have seen is an article
that is now almost half a century old:

     John G. Moore, "Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War" Military
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, Civil War Issue. (Summer, 1960), pp. 68-77.

         Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931%2819602
2%2924%3A2%3C68%3AMASITC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

Its documentation is deceptively simple, but it has some pretty shrewd
calculations about the extent to which Civil War armies of a given
size could forage within a given area and, particularly, the demands
of supplying an army at increasing distances from a railhead.

The issue is available online (thus the Stable URL).  But--so far as I
know-- it can only be accessed through
J-STOR (short for Journal Storage), and you'll need permission to
do so.  However, many college libraries and even some secondary
schools  subscribe to it, and you can get to it via their on-site
computers.  You can find a list participating institutions here:

http://www.jstor.org/about/participants_na.html

It's not so much that this single article is worth the trouble of
gaining access to J-STOR, but there's such an abundance of scholarship
available once you do get access that it's worth looking into.

As an alternative, the Moore article is reprinted in _Military
Analysis of the Civil War_ (KTO Press, 1977).

Mark






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