--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "caztanzo" <cfsusg@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > But my next sentence started, "Unless you have some further
> evidence
> > or argument . . ." which shows that it is because Meigs offers
no
> > evidence for your stance that
>
> We disagree.  Repeated assertions of something that is not
> necessarily true does not add to the persuasiveness of the
assertion.

Proof of that is found in your repeatedly stating that
Meigs "reported" the statements which Grant made.

> Would you not agree that others interpret Meigs' testimony, taken
> together, than you do?

This sentence makes no sense.

> --unless there is further evidence or
> > argument--I wrote as I did.  You have yet to offer any other
> > evidence.
>
> Several people have offered other evidence that confirms what
Meigs
> put down in his journal.  I am sure you are aware of that
evidence.

Except for sycophantic--and easily impeached--reporting, I am not
aware of any substantive evidence that confirms what Grant claimed.

> My impression is that you simply accept without question that
> evidence which supports your preconceptions and try your darnest
to
> discredit that evidence that does not support your view.

If you want to attack the post, as you maintain below, do so.  This
is attacking the poster.  I'll try to write in a more restrained
manner, and I hope that you'll do the same.

> As I said, I believed this discussion had reached a
counterproductive
> moment.  My impression appears to have been correct.
>
> > Even with further evidence, I would be in the minority,
according
> to that illustrious poll.
>
> Yes, you would be.  Now, why do you term it "illustrious?"

The n is rather small and the responders are doubly self-selected.

> Are you
> disparaging other posters for disagreeing with you?
> not offer as full an account as he did later.

No, and your snippage is showing.

> > The report, as I stated, was republished (with corrections,
IIRC)
> > two months later.  That negates your assertion of some "rush of
the
> > moment."
>
> Where was it republished and by whom?

It appears to be by McGill & Witherow, Washington, D.C.

> > I told you before that Meigs didn't *report* it.  This was his
> > private journal.  Why would you intentionally state something
which
> > you should know is not true?
>
> Joseph, Meigs reported it in his journal.  I resent your personal
> slur.

Please excuse me.  The use of the word *report*, which was also used
in your book, is misleading as can be seen by the definitions below
in the postscript.

> My impression is that you are simply rehashing old arguments with
the
> same tactics you have employed before.  I find some of those
tactics
> distasteful.  Please reply to the post instead of insulting the
> poster.  Thank you.

Having been referred to as *disagreeable*, I will try to remember
your dictum.

You wrote that, "by not contesting Grant's claim but reporting it,
Meigs seems to have found it unobjectionable."  Not only did he
not "report" it in his journal entry, Meigs, when he did write his
dispatch  the very next day, *didn't* "report" what Grant claimed.
Therefore, according to your reasoning and mine, he seems to have
found it objectionable.  At no time did Meigs attest to the
truthfulness of Grant's claim; he merely noted what was told him.
Many readers of Grant's official report have done the same.

You also wrote that, I "cite accounts from two decades later,
whereas Shanks and Meigs wrote rather close to the event."  Dana
wrote positively that Grant did not intend the assault the day after
the battle!  Wood, Sheridan, and Granger wrote their official
*reports* on December 29, 1863, February 20, 1864, and February 11,
1864, respectively.   That is a far, far cry from 20 years!

So, au contraire, it is the sources upon which *you* build your case
which are beyond shaky; they are as nothing.

Joseph

P.S.  Dictionary.com defines the verb "report" as:

v. re·port·ed, re·port·ing, re·ports
v. tr.
To make or present an often official, formal, or regular account of.
To relate or tell about; present: report one's findings. See
Synonyms at describe.
To write or provide an account or summation of for publication or
broadcast: report the news.
To submit or relate the results of considerations concerning: The
committee reported the bill.
To carry back and repeat to another: reported the rumor of a strike.
To complain about or denounce: reported them to the principal.

v. intr.
To make a report.
To serve as a reporter for a publication, broadcasting company, or
other news media.
To present oneself: report for duty.
To be accountable: She reports directly to the board of directors.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> John Simon, Bruce Catton, and other Grant biographers use Meigs in
> an attempt to buttress their positions that Grant intended to have
> Thomas ascend Missionary Ridge after taking the pits at the base of
> the ridge.
>
> They utilize the passage, "General Grant said it was contrary to
his
> orders, it was not his plan--he meant to form the lines and prepare
> and launch columns of assault, but, as the men, carried away by
> their enthusiasm had gone so far, he would not order them back.
> Presently he gave the order for the whole line, now well formed to
> advance and storm the ridge."
>
> There are three major problems with this (I won't count, for now,
> the obvious stupidity of having the men form into columns--where
> they couldn't have even used the pits for protection and would have
> been perfectly concentrated targets for the muskets and cannon
> halfway up and on top of the ridge--while waiting for Grant to
> decide whether he was going to order them forward or not):
>
> First, Grant merely made this assertion to Meigs who, in his long
> dispatch the next day, promptly excluded mentioning what would have
> been one of the key points to the battle.  His writing there
implied
> that the ascent was unplanned (see the excerpt below).

Actually his post battle dispatch is consistent with the passage you
cited above.  In the passage quoted above he wrote "Presently he gave
the order for the whole line, now well formed to advance and storm
the ridge."  In his post battle dispatch he states "the advance was
supported, and the whole line ordered to storm the heights".   Meigs
dispatch does not show or imply what you claim it does.

-Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
<wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > John Simon, Bruce Catton, and other Grant biographers use Meigs
in
> > an attempt to buttress their positions that Grant intended to
have
> > Thomas ascend Missionary Ridge after taking the pits at the base
of
> > the ridge.
> >
> > They utilize the passage, "General Grant said it was contrary to
> his
> > orders, it was not his plan--he meant to form the lines and
prepare
> > and launch columns of assault, but, as the men, carried away by
> > their enthusiasm had gone so far, he would not order them back.
> > Presently he gave the order for the whole line, now well formed
to
> > advance and storm the ridge."
> >
> > There are three major problems with this (I won't count, for
now,
> > the obvious stupidity of having the men form into columns--where
> > they couldn't have even used the pits for protection and would
have
> > been perfectly concentrated targets for the muskets and cannon
> > halfway up and on top of the ridge--while waiting for Grant to
> > decide whether he was going to order them forward or not):
> >
> > First, Grant merely made this assertion to Meigs who, in his
long
> > dispatch the next day, promptly excluded mentioning what would
have
> > been one of the key points to the battle.  His writing there
> implied
> > that the ascent was unplanned (see the excerpt below).
>
> Actually his post battle dispatch is consistent with the passage
you
> cited above.  In the passage quoted above he wrote "Presently he
gave
> the order for the whole line, now well formed to advance and storm
> the ridge."  In his post battle dispatch he states "the advance
was
> supported, and the whole line ordered to storm the heights".
Meigs
> dispatch does not show or imply what you claim it does.
>
> -Will


Mr. Keene:

This would have to be after, by all accounts, the start of the
unordered storming of the ridge.

Grant, himself, does not even claim that he ordered an advance.
Fullerton--after Granger did order the advance--noted that Grant
gave no orders.

Meigs, as well, appears to have changed his wording from "he gave
the order" (meaning Grant) to "the whole line ordered" (meaning
anyone could have done it).  Maybe Meigs also heard a Grant claim to
have ordered an advance on the 25th, but found out by the next day
that this, also, was untrue.

These changes in Meig's--it appears to have been *unofficial*--
dispatch strongly indicate that he put little or no trust in what
Grant told him.  Implications to the contrary seem unfounded.

Joseph

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> ...
> This would have to be after, by all accounts, the start of the
> unordered storming of the ridge.

Correct.


> Grant, himself, does not even claim that he ordered an advance.
> Fullerton--after Granger did order the advance--noted that Grant
> gave no orders.

Grant does claim that he issued orders authorizing the storming of
the ridge previously.


> Meigs, as well, appears to have changed his wording from "he gave
> the order" (meaning Grant) to "the whole line ordered" (meaning
> anyone could have done it).

Yes, but the overall context of the dispatch is that Grant was
directing the battle.


> ...Maybe Meigs also heard a Grant claim to
> have ordered an advance on the 25th, but found out by the next day
> that this, also, was untrue.

Seems doubtful to me.

> These changes in Meig's--it appears to have been *unofficial*--
> dispatch strongly indicate that he put little or no trust in what
> Grant told him.  Implications to the contrary seem unfounded.

Thats petty brash on your part.  On the contrary Meigs dispatch seems
to put a large degree of trust in Grant.  He calls the battle "well-
directed and "well ordered".  There is no indication in his dispatch
that anything occurred contrary to Grant's intent.

-Will

I do not post much.  It is wonderous to see members of this group
arguing over events that happened over 135+ years ago to justify the
member's opinion on Thomas, Sherman and Grant.

First, I am a Thomas supporter. I prefer his generalship to that of
Grant or Sherman.  Yet, an honest biography of him probably can not
be written.  He destroyed his private papers and everybody must use
to some extant Van Horne's biography which is extremely biased toward
Thomas which he comes out as a kind of perfect or marble man (like RE
Lee in the other theatre.)  That does not exist.  Van Horne's
biography was written during the same time frame as Grant's memoirs
and Sherman's memoirs; both which have errors in them that remain
uncorrected today.

Thomas's generalship comes from a school that to me states: I can not
afford to fail.  I will make sure everything I am assigned to do can
not fail.  If that involved taking more time than someone else
thought necessary to complete an objective; so be it.

Genesis,

Very astute obsevation. If I could take it one step further.

Grant's generalship comes from a school that to me states, "I refuse
to think of failure; I will put all of my energy on success. The
enemy is just as afraid of me as I am of him. I will keep the
intiative and wait for him to make a mistake that I can take
advantage of".

In other words, he was a risk taker. The more the risk, the greater
the potential benefits. Sounds like another general in that forbidden
theatre.

Which style is right? Depends upon the individual. One style was
right for Thomas; the other style was right for Grant. As far as my
preference, I'll take a little of both, thank you.

Jack Ehmer


--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "genesispg" <genesis@m...> wrote:
<snip
>
> Thomas's generalship comes from a school that to me states: I can
not
> afford to fail.  I will make sure everything I am assigned to do
can
> not fail.  If that involved taking more time than someone else
> thought necessary to complete an objective; so be it.<unsnip>

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
<wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > ...
> > This would have to be after, by all accounts, the start of the
> > unordered storming of the ridge.
>
> Correct.

So it shouldn't directly bear on Grant's allegation that he had
ordered the movement preparatory to an assault.

> > Grant, himself, does not even claim that he ordered an advance.
> > Fullerton--after Granger did order the advance--noted that Grant
> > gave no orders.
>
> Grant does claim that he issued orders authorizing the storming of
> the ridge previously.

Yes, but he *didn't* order the advance.  Meigs somehow came to that
conclusion when writing in his journal--after hearing Grant speak--
but then he wrote a dispatch which stripped off both Grant's intent
and Grant's ordering an advance.

> > Meigs, as well, appears to have changed his wording from "he
gave
> > the order" (meaning Grant) to "the whole line ordered" (meaning
> > anyone could have done it).
>
> Yes, but the overall context of the dispatch is that Grant was
> directing the battle.

True.  And even though the subordinate officers and men in Granger's
division started the assault, they went to the rifle-pits on Grant's
orders (oops, I'm wrong; it was on the orders of Wiley et al.).

> > ...Maybe Meigs also heard a Grant claim to
> > have ordered an advance on the 25th, but found out by the next
day
> > that this, also, was untrue.
>
> Seems doubtful to me.

You must admit that Meigs report differed substantially from his
journal.  The question is, "Why?"

> > These changes in Meig's--it appears to have been *unofficial*--
> > dispatch strongly indicate that he put little or no trust in
what
> > Grant told him.  Implications to the contrary seem unfounded.
>
> Thats petty brash on your part.  On the contrary Meigs dispatch
seems
> to put a large degree of trust in Grant.  He calls the
battle "well-
> directed and "well ordered".  There is no indication in his
dispatch
> that anything occurred contrary to Grant's intent.

Is there anything which Grant apparently told Meigs in the following
excerpt of the journal that was kept in Meigs' dispatch?  IIRC (not
having the whole of the dispatch here), No.

"General Grant said it was contrary to his orders"--unmentioned
"it was not his plan"--unmentioned
"he meant to form the lines"--unmentioned
"and prepare and launch columns of assault"--unmentioned
"but, as the men, carried away by their enthusiasm had gone so far,
he would not order them back"--unmentioned
"Presently he gave the order for the whole line"--unmentioned
"now well formed"--unmentioned
"to advance and storm the ridge."

As Meigs somehow felt it necessary to strip out everything which
Grant told him about the assault up the ridge, it seems obvious that
Meigs didn't believe Grant's story.

This is not a stretch when, if Meigs had talked to Dana, Smith,
Granger, Fullerton, and/or Wood after the assault, he would have
heard a story completely opposite to Grant's.

Joseph

> -Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
<wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > ...
> > He was about a mile short and, with the steep valley between the
> two
> > positions, I think that we can state with some assurance that
> > Sherman did not even advance "to about the railroad tunnel".
>
> Sherman's force certainly advanced to Tunnel Hill on the 24th--
> Cleburne describes Sherman's men clashing with his there,

I think that this was some of Sherman's skirmishers only.

[snip]

> Sherman's orders called for him to secure a portion of the ridge.
> Since the enemy was already on Tunnel Hill, he secured what he
> could.  This position put him somewhat less than a mile short of
the
> Tunnel -- I estimate it at 1/2 mile as measured on a map and as
> reported by some of the men involved.  So with some assurance this
> puts Sherman's force close to the railroad tunnel.

From Sherman's entrenched positions on the detached hill, there were
a valley and a hill intervening before the tunnel was reached.
Cozzens' maps indicates this is more than a half-mile.  More
importantly, the valley effectively separated Sherman's position by
more than mere distance from the tunnel.

> > He had only gone two-thirds of the way from his jumping off
point
> to
> > the objective.  That's not good.
>
> 2/3 sounds good to me, though in my opinion the fraction was
larger,
> say around 3/4 using the south bank as his jumping off point
(though
> the camp he departed from was some distance away on the north
bank)
> and the tunnel itself as the objective (though his orders only
stated
> that he was to secure the ridge to "about" the tunnel).

I think that he entrenched some 8000 men at the bridgehead, and then
he moved forward some 500 yards further from the shore, IIRC, and
entrenched again.  That was the jumping-off point.

> > Mr. Keene, I was talking about Grant ordering the carrying of
the
> > ridge and Sherman *not* carrying the ridge.  You, instead, state
> > that "Sherman did secure the end of the ridge."  That's was
pretty
> > meaningless.  Alerting the enemy to his presence was *about* all
> > Sherman accomplished.
>
> Actually Sherman accomplished the objective of securing important
> geographic features of the battlefield, which seems to me to have
> been Grant's intent.

No, sir.  Grant intended for the ridge to be carried in a flanking
movement.

> Cleburne said that the heights which Sherman
> secured "in a military point of view dominated over every point
> within cannon range".  Sounds like a good thing to me.

But, apparently, not good enough.

> > ... However, the movements that actually took place also fit
> > > Grant's original plan.
> >
> > You would only be correct if Grant was actually planning to
carry
> > the ridge on the south (where Hooker actually did so) or the
center
> > (where Granger actually did so).  Grant was not planning to do
> > either, so both you and Shanks are incorrect.
>
> I seems to me that Grant did plan to carry the ridge in the area
> where Thomas actually assualted the ridge as this was where
Bragg's
> position on the ridge was at the time the plan was first
developed.

Grant intended to carry the ridge by flanking from the north end
down.  Instead, the ridge was carried in the center by a frontal
assault (and in a flanking move on the southern end).  That's a huge
difference.

> > Look, when even a stalwart hero-worshipper asserts that Grant
was
> > being self-serving, then you can probably put some stock in it.
He
> > should just not be believed when he's engaged in hero-
worshipping.
>
> I disagree.  If you consider someone faulty in their research and
a
> bad historian (or some such thing as you have labelled Simpson in
the
> past) then it seems ridiculous to say that he is trustworthy on
some
> parts just becuase you find the conclusion pleasing.
>
>
> > Think of what Hooker did: one division on the crest and one on
each
> > side.  Granger would have stayed on the near side of the ridge.
>
> Since as events actually happened Sherman's forces occupied the
crest
> and each slope of the ridge AND he was originally suppossed to
have
> had one more division AND Granger was allegedly to bring along two
> extra large divisions, then the idea that there would be space for
> Granger to fit on the western slope of the ridge seems to me to be
> nonesense.

Granger not only had to carry the slope (with a partial line of
pits), but he had to sweep along the base with it's full line of
pits which were heavily manned.  That would have been a big job.

> > Sherman would have had five divisions and could have used them
on
> > the crest, along the back side, in reserve, to cross the creek
to
> > attack the supply line, and in pursuit.  Unfortunately, Sherman
> only
> > used about a third of the force of six divisions he was given--
and
> > that's not even counting Baird.
>
> He was only given four divisions with which to carry out the
actions
> of the 24th and started the 25th with still only four divisions.
> Even though Howard's force was designated as two divisions in, its
> actual size was comparable to a single division, in fact Howard's
> Corps was smaller than either Sheridan's or Wood's divisions
> individually.  Howard spent the first half of the day moving to
> Sherman and then was put into position on Sherman's left to fill a
> gap, a useful purpose.  When the opportunity presented itself,
> Sherman went on to make effective use of Howard, and of Davis who
had
> been protecting the brigdes and line of communication (something
> military commanders usually thing is a useful thing to do).  I
don't
> think there is anything unfortunate about his dispositions.  On
the
> contrary they seem to have been quite good.

But in the battle itself, Sherman only used a third of his force,
and his attack started very late and ended early.

> > I would agree with you that taking Orchard Knob should have been
> > done before moving Granger out, and that's why Thomas should
> receive
> > kudos for taking it on the 23rd.  I don't know why Grant's plans
> > didn't mention it; maybe he overlooked it or was too lazy to
spell
> > it out.
>
> Lazy? Ever heard of a concept called delegation.  I did not think
you
> had such a low opinion of Thomas that you feel Grant needed to
spell
> out to him in detail each move he should make.   Though
interesting
> that Thomas's first orders did not direct that the Knob be held,
it
> seemed to be an afterthought.  According to Howard's Report it was
> Grant who made the determination to hold Orchard Knob; Thomas's
> report doesn't say it whether it was or wasn't Grant idea.

Thomas was only supposed to determine if the enemy were still in his
front.  That he used a force sufficient to safely carry and occupy
Orchard Knob, the ridge to the south, and the Citico Creek line
indicates that he knew full well what he was doing.

Joseph

> -Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> > > This would have to be after, by all accounts, the start of the
> > > unordered storming of the ridge.
> >
> > Correct.
>
> So it shouldn't directly bear on Grant's allegation that he had
> ordered the movement preparatory to an assault.

Incorrect.  If Grant earlier ordered such a movement to occur, then
it would follow his intent for his subordinates to issue orders for
that movement.


> ...
> Yes, but he *didn't* order the advance.

But he gave the authority for these orders to be given and indicated
that it was his intent for such a move to happen.


> ...Meigs somehow came to that
> conclusion when writing in his journal--after hearing Grant speak--
> but then he wrote a dispatch which stripped off both Grant's intent
> and Grant's ordering an advance.

I don't see how you come up with the contention that the intent was
stripped away.  The dispatch gives high credit to Grant for managing
the battle.  In fact the dispatch gives more credit to Grant than
Meigs journal does.


> > > Meigs, as well, appears to have changed his wording from "he
> gave
> > > the order" (meaning Grant) to "the whole line ordered" (meaning
> > > anyone could have done it).
> >
> > Yes, but the overall context of the dispatch is that Grant was
> > directing the battle.
>
> True.

So know you are agreeing that Meigs indicated Grant's intent in his
dispatch.  Hmmm.


> ... And even though the subordinate officers and men in Granger's
> division started the assault, they went to the rifle-pits on
Grant's
> orders (oops, I'm wrong; it was on the orders of Wiley et al.).

Correct, you are wrong.


> You must admit that Meigs report differed substantially from his
> journal.  The question is, "Why?

Because they served different purposes.  The dispatch was a
generalized overview for the consumption of Stanton.  This was not
the place to relate the conversation with Grant.




> "General Grant said it was contrary to his orders"--unmentioned
> "it was not his plan"--unmentioned

The dispatch does imply a geater degree of control of the battle by
Grant than the journal does.  However, both indicate that Grant
intended to assualt the ridge, the jounral just indicates that what
happened was not precisely the manner he wanted.  So the difference
is really not significant to the purpose of the dispatch.


> "he meant to form the lines"--unmentioned
> "and prepare and launch columns of assault"--unmentioned

Neither are really significant to the dispatch.  The dispatch spoke
of what did occur so there was no need to relate these hicupps in
Grant's plan.  Why would it be neceesary to relay this to Stanton?


> "but, as the men, carried away by their enthusiasm had gone so far,

The dispatch does say "Some regiments pressed on and began to swarm
up the steep sides of the ridge."


> he would not order them back"--unmentioned

Not really significant for the purposes of the dispatch.


> "Presently he gave the order for the whole line"--unmentioned

This is mentioned, as we have already discussed.  The change from 'he
gave the order' to 'the whole line ordered' is not substantial.
Since Meigs indicates in his dispatch that Grant directed the battle,
which he describes as one of the most well-directed battles of the
war, then it is implied that the orders had there origin with Grant.


> "now well formed"--unmentioned

The dispatch does refer to "the line" and that the "advance was
supported".  Sounds pretty close, such that any difference is
inconsequential.


> "to advance and storm the ridge."

This is mentioned.  The dispatch states "ordered to storm the
heights".


> As Meigs somehow felt it necessary to strip out everything which
> Grant told him about the assault up the ridge, it seems obvious
that
> Meigs didn't believe Grant's story.

This is bogus reasoning.

-Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> ...
> > Sherman's force certainly advanced to Tunnel Hill on the 24th--
> > Cleburne describes Sherman's men clashing with his there,
>
> I think that this was some of Sherman's skirmishers only.

I think it was more than this, but regardless even if it was just
some skirmishers, so?  You are now agreeing with me that Sherman's
advance reached Tunnel Hill, contradicting your earlier assertions.


> From Sherman's entrenched positions on the detached hill, there
were
> a valley and a hill intervening before the tunnel was reached.
> Cozzens' maps indicates this is more than a half-mile.  More
> importantly, the valley effectively separated Sherman's position by
> more than mere distance from the tunnel.

Cozzens maps are not that great for measuring distance nor is he the
ulitmate authority on everything.  You also seems to give greater
importance to the 'valley' than seems warranted.


> I think that he entrenched some 8000 men at the bridgehead, and
then
> he moved forward some 500 yards further from the shore, IIRC, and
> entrenched again.  That was the jumping-off point.

You seem incredibly desparate to win your point.  Once again I would
point out that the day began much earlier, and much further back, for
Sherman's men.


> > > Mr. Keene, I was talking about Grant ordering the carrying of
> the
> > > ridge and Sherman *not* carrying the ridge.  You, instead,
state
> > > that "Sherman did secure the end of the ridge."  That's was
> pretty
> > > meaningless.  Alerting the enemy to his presence was *about*
all
> > > Sherman accomplished.
> >
> > Actually Sherman accomplished the objective of securing important
> > geographic features of the battlefield, which seems to me to have
> > been Grant's intent.
>
> No, sir.  Grant intended for the ridge to be carried in a flanking
> movement.

Please indicate where Grant stated this.  Certainly not in the
written orders of the 18th which indicate that Sherman is to secure a
portion of the ridge before the enemy can concentrate against him,
with further movements dependent on what the enemy did.  Sherman did
may not have secured as far down the ridge as Grant wished, but he
did secure an important part of the ridge.


> > Cleburne said that the heights which Sherman
> > secured "in a military point of view dominated over every point
> > within cannon range".  Sounds like a good thing to me.
>
> But, apparently, not good enough.

Good enough for who?  This is a cryptic statement.


> Grant intended to carry the ridge by flanking from the north end
> down.

I am unaware of Grant ever indicating this specifically.
Please show me where Grant states this.


> Granger not only had to carry the slope (with a partial line of
> pits), but he had to sweep along the base with it's full line of
> pits which were heavily manned.  That would have been a big job.

The big job would have been finding a place to squeeze in among
Sherman's men.


> But in the battle itself, Sherman only used a third of his force,
> and his attack started very late and ended early.

These are your anti-Sherman opinions which I do not share.


> Thomas was only supposed to determine if the enemy were still in
his
> front.  That he used a force sufficient to safely carry and occupy
> Orchard Knob, the ridge to the south, and the Citico Creek line
> indicates that he knew full well what he was doing.

Really?  Seems like pure speculation that he knew but Grant did not.
Thomas also had standing orders about the movements he was to make in
the forthcoming battle.  I would say that Grant knew full well what
he was doing too.

-Will

Lee, I accept your findings. However, even if there were more Bragg
supporters and less Bragg detractors, Davis should have removed Bragg.
Or insisted that the cabalists resign or be reassigned, as Dave Smith
suggests. The army should not have been allowed to continue in such a
dysfunctional condition. There WERE consequences. The defense of
Missionary Ridge was mismanaged, the Rebs set up on the topographical
crest of the ridge instead of the military crest [with the best fields
of fire; this is military tactics 101]. Can we really believe there
was no Reb officer who knew better than this? the privates probably
knew it had been done wrong! Convincing evidence to me of a
dysfunctional command: Bragg should have seen to it [distracted by
dissent?], the commanding officer on the ridge should have seen to it
[distracted by his dissent?] the lower ranks should have complained
till it was fixed [distracted by overbearing Bragg discipline?].
-On the basis of the below, Lincoln had no business replacing AotP
Commanders. I'm sure it was possible to find supporters in the army
for Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and certainly McClellan. But Lincoln
replaced these men before it got to the ridiculous condition of
virtual mutiny!
-Didn't Davis soon have to admit the dissenters were right? JEJ took
over in December 1863. I believe I have it right that the dissent
peaked between the times of the battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga
[nov '63]. Isn't this gross and obvious failure to act at the right
time just another example of Davis contributing to the defeat of the
Confederacy?
Carl


--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, LWhite64@a... wrote:
> Oh where to begin,  Bragg did have a good amount of supporters, as
many if not more that openly signed the infamous petition after
Chickamauga.  Also interestingly a fair amount of Longstreet's own
officers were against him at the time, and were sympathetic to
Bragg.[...]

It seems odd to me that the NPS battle summaries at
http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/tvii.htm
list 3 battles of Chattanooga, none known by other names. Thus when
referring to the battle of Chattanooga, you need to say which one!

check it out



http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030801-093840-5645r.htm




repeating that:







http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030801-093840-5645r.htm

I dont dispute things about Bragg, he was no longer able to command the Army by
the mid late part of 1863, I think he was physically and mentally broken down by
the Fall.

Lee

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
<wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > ...
> > > Sherman's force certainly advanced to Tunnel Hill on the 24th--
> > > Cleburne describes Sherman's men clashing with his there,
> >
> > I think that this was some of Sherman's skirmishers only.
>
> I think it was more than this, but regardless even if it was just
> some skirmishers, so?  You are now agreeing with me that Sherman's
> advance reached Tunnel Hill, contradicting your earlier assertions.

I am not agreeing with you.  Sherman's force (skirmishing at the
foot of the hill and then departing quickly is not the same thing)
did not take or occupy Tunnel Hill.

> > From Sherman's entrenched positions on the detached hill, there
> were
> > a valley and a hill intervening before the tunnel was reached.
> > Cozzens' maps indicates this is more than a half-mile.  More
> > importantly, the valley effectively separated Sherman's position
by
> > more than mere distance from the tunnel.
>
> Cozzens maps are not that great for measuring distance nor is he
the
> ulitmate authority on everything.  You also seems to give greater
> importance to the 'valley' than seems warranted.

Many writers give great importance to the 'valley' also when they
use phrases to the effect that, "Cleburne's position was impregnable
from where Sherman was."

> > I think that he entrenched some 8000 men at the bridgehead, and
> then
> > he moved forward some 500 yards further from the shore, IIRC,
and
> > entrenched again.  That was the jumping-off point.
>
> You seem incredibly desparate to win your point.  Once again I
would
> point out that the day began much earlier, and much further back,
for
> Sherman's men.

Why don't you start back in Vicksburg, then?

> > > > Mr. Keene, I was talking about Grant ordering the carrying
of
> > the
> > > > ridge and Sherman *not* carrying the ridge.  You, instead,
> state
> > > > that "Sherman did secure the end of the ridge."  That's was
> > pretty
> > > > meaningless.  Alerting the enemy to his presence was *about*
> all
> > > > Sherman accomplished.
> > >
> > > Actually Sherman accomplished the objective of securing
important
> > > geographic features of the battlefield, which seems to me to
have
> > > been Grant's intent.
> >
> > No, sir.  Grant intended for the ridge to be carried in a
flanking
> > movement.
>
> Please indicate where Grant stated this.  Certainly not in the
> written orders of the 18th which indicate that Sherman is to
secure a
> portion of the ridge before the enemy can concentrate against him,
> with further movements dependent on what the enemy did.  Sherman
did
> may not have secured as far down the ridge as Grant wished, but he
> did secure an important part of the ridge.

Why do you keep omitting the fact that Sherman was to carry the
ridge?

Granger: "It was designed that after having effected a juncture with
these troops I should change the direction of my column, and move
along the northwestern side and base of Mission Ridge, taking the
enemy in front and flank."

Wood was to: "form a junction with the right flank of General
Sherman's force, swing to the right and sweep along the lower slope
and the base of Mission Ridge."

So, while Granger was sweeping the slope and base of the ridge,
Sherman was to be on his left (i.e., on the crest of the ridge).

What in mercy's sake do you think that Sherman was supposed to be
doing while Granger was doing this and when the Confederate guns and
positions were along the crest?

> > > Cleburne said that the heights which Sherman
> > > secured "in a military point of view dominated over every
point
> > > within cannon range".  Sounds like a good thing to me.
> >
> > But, apparently, not good enough.
>
> Good enough for who?  This is a cryptic statement.

*Not* good enough to take Tunnel Hill, much less carry the ridge.

> > Grant intended to carry the ridge by flanking from the north end
> > down.
>
> I am unaware of Grant ever indicating this specifically.
> Please show me where Grant states this.

If you don't think that this was so, please tell me what you think
Sherman's duties were and how he was to carry the ridge from Tunnel
Hill.

> > Granger not only had to carry the slope (with a partial line of
> > pits), but he had to sweep along the base with it's full line of
> > pits which were heavily manned.  That would have been a big job.
>
> The big job would have been finding a place to squeeze in among
> Sherman's men.

To confirm that you and Shanks are wrong about whether Granger
followed Grant's plan in his frontal attack of the 25th, please see
what Dana wrote: "At the same time that this wing [Sherman's]
advances, Granger, with about 18,000 men, will first move up on the
left of the Chattanooga lines, throwing two bridges across Citico
Creek, and engaging the rebel right with all possible vigor."

Crossing Citico leads toward Tunnel Hill.  Taking Orchard Knob was
not necessary to do this, although I would still maintain that this
was a positive accomplishment.

> > But in the battle itself, Sherman only used a third of his
force,
> > and his attack started very late and ended early.
>
> These are your anti-Sherman opinions which I do not share.

It is not an "opinion" that "in the battle itself, Sherman only used
a third of his force."  Please check the records.  I think casualty
figures by brigade tell an extraordinary picture which may be
covered up by the ORs of Sherman and his subordinates.

As to starting late, read Cleburne: "Up to 10.30 a.m. the enemy
contended himself with severe skirmishing . . ."  Grant wrote: "I
have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
the morning."  That's late; well, really, that's very late.  I guess
that Sherman was "slow."

As to ending early, reports indicate that Sherman was pulling back
around 2:30-3:30 PM, just as Thomas' atack was supposed to get
started.  Or do you think that it is wise to end an attack before
one for its relief is even started or--as you believe Grant's tale,
to end an attack in time to allow the enemy to reinforce his center
just as Thomas was about to attack.

> > Thomas was only supposed to determine if the enemy were still in
> his
> > front.  That he used a force sufficient to safely carry and
occupy
> > Orchard Knob, the ridge to the south, and the Citico Creek line
> > indicates that he knew full well what he was doing.
>
> Really?  Seems like pure speculation that he knew but Grant did
not.
> Thomas also had standing orders about the movements he was to make
in
> the forthcoming battle.  I would say that Grant knew full well
what
> he was doing too.

What is your evidence that Grant knew?  We only have his orders to
Thomas to ascertain the enemy's position.

Joseph

> -Will

As we all know, Sherman's force took Tunnel Hill; just read Ewing's
official report:

"On the 25th, Corse led his brigade down the gorge and up Tunnel
Hill, assaulting and carrying it with great gallantry. We drove the
enemy from his entire intrenchments, and reduced the larger part to
possession. For the extreme southern point, heavily massing behind
it, he contended until nightfall, when he abandoned the position."

Joseph

Mark,

  First let me say that I am thoroughly confused as to why you reacted
with so much animosity to my post.  As far I know, I have never said
anything to you (or anyone else for that matter) that should give an
impression that I don't respect your interests or what you have to
say.  I was merely trying to keep from going off on a tangent, and
was also trying to point out to you and to others who may be newer to
this group that there are many interesting topics and discussions
that make for interesting review.  Of course, we all are interested
in fresh perspectives.

But you were talking specifically about lack of trust and
communication from Bragg to Longstreet *AT* Chickamauga, and this
preceded the incidents concerning the conspiracy of officers that
involved Longstreet at Chattanooga.  I am pretty much in agreement
with all you said in your reply concering that conspiracy, but *MY*
point was that it had no bearing on Bragg's lack of support to
Longstreet at Chickamauga.  Yes, he had a lot of baggage with his
other generals, but Longstreet was new on the scene.  You are right
that Longstreet had a pretty good idea of what Bragg was like and the
problems that were going on in that command structure.  But Bragg had
NO previous relations with Longstreet to justify his attitudes.
That's all I meant to say.

Joe

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Mark Peters"
<col_freemantle@y...> wrote:
>
> I appreciate the response and your analysis of the situation.  You
> might be very well correct with your assumptions.  However, I am
> disappointed that you intimate that this needn't be dicussed any
> further as longer serving members have previously discussed it
> ie. "thoroughly hashed over" the subject.  This leaves me in a
> quandary as to whether I should continue posting if they're so
> obviously 'old hat'.  I would like to think that a new perspective
> would be of at least some interest!
>
> The point I was making illustrated the fact that there was no trust
> between Bragg and his Officers at Chickamauga.  The point I raised
> was about a lack of communication between Bragg and Longstreet, and
> that there was the possibility that fault shouldn't necessarily be
> laid at the door of one person alone.  However, much Bragg is used
> as a 'whipping boy' by some.  This reminds me of previous
> correspondence with regards to Grant or Forrest, where some find it
> difficult to see any qualities of leadership/skills in some and
> flaws/mistakes in others.  A bit like Shakespeare plays, where all
> the goodies are virtuous and heroic paragons of virtue, and all the
> baddies are hunched-backed scheming monsters.  Life tells us that
> truth is usually somewhere in between.
>
> The fact that Longstreet was new to Bragg's Army does not preclude
> the possibility that Bragg was suspicious of all his officers.  A
> suggestion that Longstreet was unaware of the difficulties in the
> Army of the Tennessee, at the time of his transfer, would seem
highly
> improbable.  I provide three examples to substantiate this
> assumption.  James Fremantle, the British observer, who met many of
> the south's generals, described Bragg in late spring 1863 as
the "...
> least prepossesing of them".  Fremantle had met Longstreet prior to
> the transfer to the Army of Tennessee.  Secondly, a confederate
joke
> displayed the lack of public confidence in Bragg saying that "he
> would never get to heaven because the moment he was invited he
would
> fall back."  Thirdly, Jerry Korn states in 'The Fight for
> Chattanooga' that things prior to the battle of Chickamauga were so
> bad between Bragg and his subordinates that "... Bragg had no
> illusions about how he stood with his corps and division
commanders:
> They had told him, almost to a man, that they had no confidence in
> him and that he ought to be replaced."
>
> Finally, Longstreet would have been well aware of Polk's friendship
> with Davis, and probably aware that Davis had almost replaced Bragg
> after Perryville and Stones River after the first revolt by Bragg's
> command.  His later actions very much reflects his attitude to
> Bragg, and displayed gross insubordination and refusal to follow
> orders.  I can provide examples of such, if I must.  Right or
> wrong, Bragg was C-in-C, and made Longstreet's behaviour out of
> order!
>
> Mark Peters

> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hartshje" <Hartshje@a...>
wrote:
> > The long simmering resentment of some of the major generals under
> > Bragg found a spokesperson in Longstreet, thinking his fame,
> > prestige and contribution to victories would be enough to finally
> > persuade Davis to remove Bragg.  This topic has been thoroughly
> > hashed over, and you can search the group messages if you would
> > like to read those discussions.
> > However, that was all AFTER Chickamauga.  Up until the time of
> > the battle, I don't believe Bragg had any reason to treat
> > Longstreet like an unloved step-child.  When Longstreet got off
> > the train, Bragg didn't even have the decency to send an aide to
> > greet and guide him to the battlefield or his HQs.  In fact,
> > Longstreet was nearly captured by enemy pickets.  Much time was
> > wasted, and Longstreet ended up assuming command of the left wing
> > in the middle of the night.  Perhaps Bragg was jealous, or
> > fearful that Longstreet was being considered as his replacement.
>

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:

First, I'd like to thank those posters who have advised me as to the
Hornet's Nest (pun intended) inherent is some discussions.

::::::::::::

> Proof of that is found in your repeatedly stating that
> Meigs "reported" the statements which Grant made.

Is this not an attempt to score a cheap point?  Meigs' private
journal contains this statement.  You are desperately trying to
explain it away.  Let's keep to the merits of the evidence and not
try to slide in personal slams,, for as I understand that's not's
part of what this newsgroup's about.

> > Would you not agree that others interpret Meigs' testimony, taken
> > together, than you do?
>
> This sentence makes no sense.

To clarify:

Would you not agree that others interpret the entire body of evidence
provided by Meigs, both in his report and in his private journal,
differently than do you?

> > My impression is that you simply accept without question that
> > evidence which supports your preconceptions and try your darnest
> to
> > discredit that evidence that does not support your view.
>
> If you want to attack the post, as you maintain below, do so.  This
> is attacking the poster.

It is responding to you as you have responded to me.

:::::::

> > > Even with further evidence, I would be in the minority,
> according
> > to that illustrious poll.
> >
> > Yes, you would be.  Now, why do you term it "illustrious?"
>
> The n is rather small and the responders are doubly self-selected.

This makes no sense.  Are you saying that posters here are
uninformed?  I'm impressed by their reading and their knowledge.
What's the harm in acknowledging that people disagree and the
evidence is not conclusive?

> > > The report, as I stated, was republished (with corrections,
> IIRC)
> > > two months later.  That negates your assertion of some "rush of
> the
> > > moment."
> >
> > Where was it republished and by whom?
>
> It appears to be by McGill & Witherow, Washington, D.C.

And so you have no evidence that Meigs submitted a report for the
second time, but that the publishers may simply have reprinted the
original report.  That would weaken you case about corrections
considerably.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
<wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:

> > As Meigs somehow felt it necessary to strip out everything which
> > Grant told him about the assault up the ridge, it seems obvious
> that
> > Meigs didn't believe Grant's story.
>
> This is bogus reasoning.

Sounds like it's time for another poll.

Enter your vote today!  A new poll has been created for the
civilwarwest group:

In light of the discussion about
Montgomery Meigs' dispatch to Edwin M.
Stanton about Chattanooga *and* his
journal entry, which included Grant's
statement of his intent to order an
assault against the ridge, do you
conclude:

   o Meigs' report and journal, taken together, suggest that Grant intended to
assault the crest, but had not yet issued specific orders; he did not question
the veracity of Grant's explanation
   o Meigs may have confided to his journal Grant's explanation, but he clearly
thought Grant a liar or dissembler, and thus did not include that conversation
in his report
   o Miegs is simply unreliable, perhaps even a liar


To vote, please visit the following web page:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/civilwarwest/surveys?id=1123646

Note: Please do not reply to this message. Poll votes are
not collected via email. To vote, you must go to the Yahoo! Groups
web site listed above.

Thanks!

articles on civil war cavalry and one on Pleasonton in particular.
http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030724-113412-5522r.htm
http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030704-090212-9660r.htm









repeating








http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030724-113412-5522r.htm
http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030704-090212-9660r.htm

Along with the overwhelming evidence from Dana and the generals on
Orchard Knob that Grant only intended to take the rifle-pits, there
is a large amount of circumstantial evidence that confirms this.

One strong piece is Grant's absence from on top of Orchard Knob
after he first ordered/suggested the advance.  Grant's memoirs and
Catton's biography both have Grant ordering the assault and then
waiting an hour before anything happened. Catton mentioned that
Grant was having lunch (described by W. W. Smith) during this time.
This would also make sense, because if Grant had been on the Knob
the whole time, he would have noticed well before an hour was up
that nothing was happening with the officers on the Knob and with
the men on the plain below.

The point is, if Grant really had been intending to have the troops
halt in the pits--and in a very untenable position, I might add--
before he gave them orders to ascend the ridge, he wouldn't be off
having lunch.

In reality, the initial movement was off in about ten minutes.  The
distance to the pits ranged from about 1/2 to 1 mile covered at the
quick- and double-quick-step.  The pits were gained in about a half
an hour or less.  Estimates have the ridge, itself, being carried in
one hour after the start.

So, why would Grant, whose presence was needed in order to gauge the
resistance at the pits and order, when ready, the dangerous assault
up the ridge, be having lunch elsewhere at this very time?

The obvious answer is that Grant ordered only a demonstration for
Sherman's relief.

Joseph

P.S. Grant's memoirs:
"Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from
early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now
directed Thomas to order the charge at once. I watched eagerly to
see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no
indication of any charge being made.  The centre of the line which
was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but
concealed from view by an intervening forest.  Turning to Thomas to
inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J.
Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge,
standing talking to him.  I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he
did not charge as ordered an hour before.  He replied very promptly
that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been
ready all day to move at a moment's notice.  I told him to make the
charge at once.  He was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short
time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the
enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge."

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
>
> You have our positions reversed: *you* are trying to make a silk
> purse (a military genius) out of a sow's ear (Grant).  I am just
> attempting to show Grant for what he was.  At Chattanooga, he was a
> very lucky, militarily unreasonable, non-truth-telling general.
>

That's about the funniest thing I've ever read on the internet.

BTW, Moe, was he "lucky" are was he "undeniably serendipitous?"

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "caztanzo" <cfsusg@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:

[snip]

> > > Would you not agree that others interpret Meigs' testimony,
taken
> > > together, than you do?
> >
> > This sentence makes no sense.
>
> To clarify:
>
> Would you not agree that others interpret the entire body of
evidence
> provided by Meigs, both in his report and in his private journal,
> differently than do you?

I don't remember where a comparison between the private journal and
the dispatch has been made before this.

> > > My impression is that you simply accept without question that
> > > evidence which supports your preconceptions and try your
darnest
> > to
> > > discredit that evidence that does not support your view.
> >
> > If you want to attack the post, as you maintain below, do so.
This
> > is attacking the poster.
>
> It is responding to you as you have responded to me.

And I excused myself.

> > > > Even with further evidence, I would be in the minority,
> > according
> > > to that illustrious poll.
> > >
> > > Yes, you would be.  Now, why do you term it "illustrious?"
> >
> > The n is rather small and the responders are doubly self-
selected.
>
> This makes no sense.  Are you saying that posters here are
> uninformed?

I implied, much less stated, nothing at all about the knowledge of
the posters.

>I'm impressed by their reading and their knowledge.

I am, also.

> What's the harm in acknowledging that people disagree and the
> evidence is not conclusive?

That has nothing to do with my statement.  I criticize the use of
the poll as a meaningful survey.  The number of respondents is much
too small to make any conclusions from the poll.  The respondents
were limited to those who chose to be members of this website and,
further, to those who responded to this particular poll; this was
not a random sample.  Lastly, Perret's name was misspelled.

> > > > The report, as I stated, was republished (with corrections,
> > IIRC)
> > > > two months later.  That negates your assertion of some "rush
of
> > the
> > > > moment."
> > >
> > > Where was it republished and by whom?
> >
> > It appears to be by McGill & Witherow, Washington, D.C.
>
> And so you have no evidence that Meigs submitted a report for the
> second time, but that the publishers may simply have reprinted the
> original report.  That would weaken you case about corrections
> considerably.

The "case about corrections" you talk of was "(with corrections,
IIRC)."  That's not a "case" and it shouldn't be called one.  I
haven't made any representations about what any corrections were or
what meaning they might have had.  This argument is a red herring.

To summarize, Meigs wrote down what Grant told him in a private
journal.  He didn't include Grant's claims in his dispatch.  Meigs
never stated as fact what Grant claimed.  Copying someone's comments
is not the same as agreeing or believing them.

Joseph

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "caztanzo" <cfsusg@y...>
wrote:

[snip]

> > > It appears to be by McGill & Witherow, Washington, D.C.
> >
> > And so you have no evidence that Meigs submitted a report for
the
> > second time, but that the publishers may simply have reprinted
the
> > original report.  That would weaken you case about corrections
> > considerably.


It seems that I was correctly remembering, after all, about the
corrections to Meigs' dispatch.  The Library of Congress catalog
lists:

"Three days' battle of Chattanooga, 23d, 24th, 25th November, 1864
[!] An unofficial dispatch from General Meigs to the Hon. E.M.
Stanton, secretary of war. Now first correctly printed," dated 1864.

Joseph

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> As we all know, Sherman's force took Tunnel Hill; just read Ewing's
> official report:
>
> "On the 25th, Corse led his brigade down the gorge and up Tunnel
> Hill, assaulting and carrying it with great gallantry. We drove the
> enemy from his entire intrenchments, and reduced the larger part to
> possession. For the extreme southern point, heavily massing behind
> it, he contended until nightfall, when he abandoned the position."
>
> Joseph

Read various other of the reports too.  Cleburne says much the same
thing.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> ...
> One strong piece is Grant's absence from on top of Orchard Knob
> after he first ordered/suggested the advance.  Grant's memoirs and
> Catton's biography both have Grant ordering the assault and then
> waiting an hour before anything happened. Catton mentioned that
> Grant was having lunch (described by W. W. Smith) during this
time.
> This would also make sense, because if Grant had been on the Knob
> the whole time, he would have noticed well before an hour was up
> that nothing was happening with the officers on the Knob and with
> the men on the plain below.

Dana supports this ocnetion that there wasa deklay caused by Granger
not tending to his duties.


> The point is, if Grant really had been intending to have the troops
> halt in the pits--and in a very untenable position, I might add--
> before he gave them orders to ascend the ridge, he wouldn't be off
> having lunch.

Why?  I don;t see the reasoning here.


> In reality, the initial movement was off in about ten minutes.  The
> distance to the pits ranged from about 1/2 to 1 mile covered at the
> quick- and double-quick-step.  The pits were gained in about a half
> an hour or less.  Estimates have the ridge, itself, being carried
in
> one hour after the start.

So you think Dana is bad evidence yete you think him overwhelming in
other respects.


> So, why would Grant, whose presence was needed in order to gauge
the
> resistance at the pits and order, when ready, the dangerous assault
> up the ridge, be having lunch elsewhere at this very time?

Why was his presence needed? Wasn't Thomas commpetent enough?

-Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> ...
> > I think it was more than this, but regardless even if it was just
> > some skirmishers, so?  You are now agreeing with me that
Sherman's
> > advance reached Tunnel Hill, contradicting your earlier
assertions.
>
> I am not agreeing with you.  Sherman's force (skirmishing at the
> foot of the hill and then departing quickly is not the same thing)
> did not take or occupy Tunnel Hill.

Your earlier remakrs were that Sherman's advance "was about a mile
short and, with the steep valley between the two positions, I think
that we can state with some assurance that Sherman did not even
advance "to about the railroad tunnel"."  So when you acknowledge
that Sherman did advance to Tunnel Hill, this seemd to me like a
change of tune.




> Many writers give great importance to the 'valley' also when they
> use phrases to the effect that, "Cleburne's position was
impregnable
> from where Sherman was."

Good for them.


> > > I think that he entrenched some 8000 men at the bridgehead, and
> > then
> > > he moved forward some 500 yards further from the shore, IIRC,
> and
> > > entrenched again.  That was the jumping-off point.
> >
> > You seem incredibly desparate to win your point.  Once again I
> would
> > point out that the day began much earlier, and much further back,
> for
> > Sherman's men.
>
> Why don't you start back in Vicksburg, then?

Since we are discussing the plan for the battle of Chattanooga and
Sherman's actions with regard to the orders he was given for the
battle, I think it is appropriate to start where those orders start,
which is the crossing of the Tennessee.


> ...
> Why do you keep omitting the fact that Sherman was to carry the
> ridge?

I thought it was understood from the preceding paragraphs. Ont he
24th, Sherman carried the end of the ridge and secured it.


> ...
> What in mercy's sake do you think that Sherman was supposed to be
> doing while Granger was doing this and when the Confederate guns
and
> positions were along the crest?

Sherman was suppossed to do what he did -- attack southwards from the
position he secured.  What I don't get was how Granger was suppossed
to do what you and he claim.



> > I am unaware of Grant ever indicating this specifically.
> > Please show me where Grant states this.
>
> If you don't think that this was so, please tell me what you think
> Sherman's duties were and how he was to carry the ridge from Tunnel
> Hill.

Though, further movements depended on what the enemy did, Sherman
would likely be expected to attack southward as was done.  Thomas
could then attack eastward taking the ridge in two directions.


> To confirm that you and Shanks are wrong about whether Granger
> followed Grant's plan in his frontal attack of the 25th, please see
> what Dana wrote: "At the same time that this wing [Sherman's]
> advances, Granger, with about 18,000 men, will first move up on the
> left of the Chattanooga lines, throwing two bridges across Citico
> Creek, and engaging the rebel right with all possible vigor."
>
> Crossing Citico leads toward Tunnel Hill.  Taking Orchard Knob was
> not necessary to do this, although I would still maintain that this
> was a positive accomplishment.

This does not prove either of us wrong.  Citico has two branches --
one curves around between Orchard Knob and the ridge.   If Granger
was suppossed to move so as to engage "the rebel right" than the plan
would not direct him to Tunnel Hill, since at the time Dana wrote
this the rebel right was further down the ridge.



> It is not an "opinion" that "in the battle itself, Sherman only
used
> a third of his force."  Please check the records.  I think casualty
> figures by brigade tell an extraordinary picture which may be
> covered up by the ORs of Sherman and his subordinates.

Check the records yourself.  Sherman used more than a third of his
force in the attack.  Since, if we count Howard's force too, Sherman
had 16 brigades, for it to be a third less than 6 would have to be
used.  Yet the records show more than 6 brigades used [G Smith,
Corse, Loomis, Bushbeck, Mathies, Raum, + part of Lightburn and IIRC
part of Alexander]


> As to starting late, read Cleburne: "Up to 10.30 a.m. the enemy
> contended himself with severe skirmishing . . ."  Grant wrote: "I
> have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light
in
> the morning."  That's late; well, really, that's very late.  I
guess
> that Sherman was "slow."

Yes, read Cleburne: "Up to 10.30 a.m. the enemy  contended himself
with severe skirmishing"  Thus Cleburne has indicated that prior to
10:30 Sherman has advanced.


> As to ending early, reports indicate that Sherman was pulling back
> around 2:30-3:30 PM, just as Thomas' atack was supposed to get
> started.  Or do you think that it is wise to end an attack before
> one for its relief is even started or--as you believe Grant's tale,
> to end an attack in time to allow the enemy to reinforce his center
> just as Thomas was about to attack.

I recall reports indicating otherwise, but will have to get back to
you on that.


> What is your evidence that Grant knew?  We only have his orders to
> Thomas to ascertain the enemy's position.

I have pointed out that Howard reported it was Grant who directed
that the Knob be held.

-Will