--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Martin Williams"
<williams484@m...> wrote:
> ...
> Wallace's 3rd Division was transferred to the District of East
Arkansas, losing all identity as a division.  Wallace himself gave up
command of the division in June; Dyer does not give an exact date.
In September the state of Arkansas was transferred to the Department
of Missouri.

Wallace requested a leave of absence at the end of June.  His
division was transferred in July.


> ...
> My suspicious nature speculates that there was still some bad
feeling toward Wallace that July, that the 3rd Division was broken up
to give him nothing to command if and when he returned to duty, and
that if he insisted on going to Arkansas anyway he would still be
located in a comparative backwater.


I don't understand why the fate of his former division made a
difference, as commanders could be shuffled from division to division.
Also, the definition of East Arkansas as a backwater is relative: it
became part of the staging area for the Vicksburg Campaign and was
the scene of the battle of Helena.  Wallace almost returned in late
1862 and was slated to take command of Corinth.

Still, my sense is that Halleck definitely had bad feelings about
Wallace.  In ealry 1863, Wallace would write to Halleck with the
concern that a bad feeling existed in Halleck's office and that
Halleck himself entertained these feelings--this is what led to
statements about Shiloh from McPherson, Rowley and Rawlins.  Halleck
certainly expressed his negative feelings about Wallace later in the
war, generally as part of negative words about politically connected
generals.

~Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@m...> wrote:
>
> > Exactly.  I don't fault him for not knowing the roads intimately
>
> How was local topographic information disseminated?
>

A good question and I don't get the impression that it was; certainly
not with regard to the situation at Shiloh.  Though I don't get the
impression that this was unusual in that command early in the war.

FWIW the reference to which I alluded previously was "The campaign and
battle of Shiloh, April 1862.  Army War College Course in Military Art.
1909-1910.  A lecture by Maj. Eben Smith, General Staff, February 4,
1910."  The quote to which I referred was "The maps used by both sides
were so inaccurate that it is hard to understand how military movements
could have been based on them.  On the Federal side the commander of a
division six miles away was not able to reinforce the army because he
lost the road.  Likewise the road from Grant's HQ to the army was
unknown, which was the prinicpal reason why another division did not
reach the field till dark."  An interesting summary!  Smith also has
interesting things to say about most of the action during the day.

> IIRC, while campaigning, the AotP send out squads every day to glean
> local information and then the mapmakers worked all night compiling
> maps which were *photographed* in the morning for daily use.
>

Was that about the same time as Shiloh or later in the war?  Certainly
early on it did not seem to be a major consideration in the Western
theater, at least not in the AotT.  Of course Buell's AotO and the AotC
were much more sophisticated than Grant's boys!   8)>

>
> HankC

JB Jewell

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> ...
> Almost every full version of the battle of Shiloh notes that the
> front line--of camps before the battle as well as the front line at
> the start of the battle--ran from McDowell to Stuart.  This line
> trends generally East-West.  Even the map to which you referred me
> indicated this, as did Grant, Sherman and almost everybody else.

To a certain extent McDowell and Stuart began the battle as flank
units, positioned to protect the army at points where roads entered
on the flanks.   As the front line trended "generally East-West" it
was not entirely on and east-west orientation, in fact it angled
north-south as well (ie: Sherman was north of Prentiss).   Grant, in
his memoirs, said essentially the same thing as I am saying:
"The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek on
the left to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing
nearly south and possibly a little west. The water in all these
streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our
flanks."  I haven't taken the time to look up what Sherman said, by I
recall that he says much the same.


> The stretch of the Tennessee next to the army ran roughly north-
> south.  That made it the demarcation of the left of the army.

Simplistic compass directions do not determine the orientation of the
army.

The encampment was a beachhead on the east bank of the Tennessee that
was meant to serve as a staging ground for the overland advance to
Corinth.  The Pittsburg-Corinth Road represented the axis of advance
and therefore it defined the orientation of the army.   The advanced
forces that faced down the axis of advance were the front; forces to
either side that faced away from the axis of advance were on the
flanks; and those at the point of connection with the line of
communication/ line of supply were in the rear.  Conceptually, the
orientation of the army corresponded to a trapezoid.  The base was
the river; the short side was the left; the long side the right; with
the front sloping between the two sides.

Geographically, the flanks were defined by creeks that embraced the
route to Corinth as it moved away from the River.  A portion of Snake
Creek and then Owl Creek defined the right the right; a portion of
Lick Creek and then a tributary I have seen called both Spain Branch
and Locust Grove Creek defined the left. On the left, the flank was
pierced by a road at one point—the Hambug-Purdy Road—and Stuart was
assigned to guard that point.   On the right, the flank was pierced
by a road at two points—the Hamburg-Purdy Road and the River Road—
McDowell was assigned to guard one and portions of Smith/Wallace's
division guarded the other.


> If you were correct in stating that the Tennessee was to the army's
> rear, then Sherman would have been on the left and Stuart was to
the
> rear.  As they weren't, you are wrong.

Huh?  Once again I don't see the sense in what you are saying.

-Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Jfepperson@a... wrote:
>
> There's a story from the Forbidden Zone about Yankees
> capturing a map of Confederate positions from a Confederate
> officer and copying it by a "fast" photographic process:
> They simply laid the map over a photographic plate, out
> in the mid-day sun.  When the plate was developed, they
> had a negative of the map, and of course multiple copies
> could be made from the one exposed plate.
>
> JFE

Interesting nugget...kind of a Fred Flintstone xerox machine.

I spent a while looking for this source and it mentioned that the maps
were made in the morning 'once the sun rose' but did not explain why
the sun was needed. I assumed it was for a good exposure of a typical
photo.

This may move to the top of my list of 'damyankeeingenuity'...


HankC

Very interesting...

I can just imagine these topo engineers with the 'portable'
machines wig-wagging back to the main depot:

P-A-P-E-R J-A-M  C-A-L-L S-E-R-V-I-C-E


HankC


--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Jfepperson@a... wrote:
> >
> > There's a story from the Forbidden Zone about Yankees
> > capturing a map of Confederate positions from a Confederate
> > officer and copying it by a "fast" photographic process:
> > They simply laid the map over a photographic plate, out
> > in the mid-day sun.  When the plate was developed, they
> > had a negative of the map, and of course multiple copies
> > could be made from the one exposed plate.
> >
> > JFE
>
> An interesting website which Mr. Keene recently referenced has much
> good information.  One relevant section, at
> http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/cwmhtml/cwmfm.html#GWTS, noted:
>
> "The Topographical Department of the Army of the Cumberland, under
> the direction of Col. William E. Merrill, was chiefly responsible
> for providing the maps necessary for the Atlanta Campaign. Thomas B.
> Van Horne in his History of the Army of the Cumberland (1875) notes
> that "The army was so far from Washington that it had to have a
> complete map establishment of its own. Accordingly, the office of
> the chief topographical engineer contained a printing press, two
> lithographic presses, one photographic establishment, arrangements
> for map-mounting, and a full corps of draughtsmen and assistants."2
>
> "The lithographic presses were invaluable for quickly providing
> multiple copies of a map. However, the weight of the presses and
> stones made transporting them difficult, necessitating that they
> remain in a central depot near the front lines. As Van Horne points
> out, the topographic engineers in the field had available to them a
> mobile "fac-simile [sic] photoprinting device invented by Captain
> Margedant, chief assistant. This consisted of a light box containing
> several india-rubber baths, fitting into one another, and the proper
> supply of chemicals. Printing was done by tracing the required map
> on thin paper and laying it over a sheet coated with nitrate of
> silver. The sun's rays passing through the tissue paper blackened
> the prepared paper except under the ink lines, thus making a white
> map on black ground. By this means copies from the drawing-paper map
> could be made as often as new information came in, and occasionally
> there would be several editions of a map during the same day. The
> process, however, was expensive, and did not permit the printing of
> a large number of copies; therefore these maps were only issued to
> the chief commanders."3 The map of the environs of Resaca, Georgia,
> is an example of a quickly made field map produced by the Margedant
> photoreproduction process. Printed on May 13, 1864, it shows the
> critical position of the Army of the Tennessee at Snake Creek Gap,
> Georgia (LC Civil War Maps no. S102).
>
> "In preparation for the coming campaign, the Topographical
> Department began the compilation of an accurate campaign map of
> northern Georgia. The best available map was enlarged to the scale
> of an inch to the mile.4 According to Van Horne, this was
> then "elaborated by cross-questioning refugees, spies, prisoners,
> peddlers, and any and all persons familiar with the country in front
> of us. It was remarkable how vastly our maps were improved by this
> process. The best illustration of the value of this method is the
> fact that Snake Creek Gap, through which our whole army turned the
> strong positions at Dalton and Buzzard Roost Gap, was not to be
> found on any printed map that we could get, and the knowledge of the
> existence of this gap was of immense importance to us."5
>
> "Two days before the Atlanta Campaign began, the Topographical
> Department was informed of the date of advance. As Van Horne notes,
> the single copy of the map of northern Georgia over which the
> Topographical Department had been laboring "was immediately cut up
> into sixteen sections and divided among the draughtsmen, who were
> ordered to work night and day until all the sections had been traced
> on thin paper in autographic ink. As soon as four adjacent sections
> were finished they were transferred to one large stone, and two
> hundred copies were printed. When all the map had thus been
> lithographed the map-mounters commenced their work. Being
> independent of sunlight the work was soon done--the map-mounting
> requiring the greatest time; but before the commanding generals left
> Chattanooga, each had received a bound copy of the map, and before
> we struck the enemy, every brigade, division, and corps commander in
> the three armies had a copy."6 Entitled "Map of Northern Georgia
> made under the direction of Capt. W. E. Merrill, Chief Topl. Engr.,"
> the finished map measures 94 by 88 cm. It is lightly hand colored
> and indicates below the title and scale that it was "Lith. and
> printed at Topl. Engr. Office, Dept. Cumbd., Chattanooga, Tenn. May
> 2d, 1864." For ease of carrying in the field, the map was cut into
> 24 sections and mounted on cloth to fold to 16 by 23 cm. Pasted to
> the cloth mounting were cardboard covers to protect the map when
> folded (LC Civil War Maps no. S29-S30).
>
> "In addition to the standard edition of the campaign map
> lithographed on paper, it was also printed directly on muslin and
> issued in three parts. Van Horne points out that this was mainly for
> the convenience of the calvary, "as such maps could be washed clean
> whenever soiled and could not be injured by hard service."7 Each
> section of the cloth map is entitled "Part of Northern Georgia" and
> was printed from one of the lithographic stones used for the
> standard campaign map. The superb work of the Topographic
> Department, Army of the Cumberland, led Van Horne to conclude "that
> the army that General Sherman led to Atlanta was the best supplied
> with maps of any that fought in the Civil War."8"
>
> Joseph

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "bjer50010" <bjewell@i...> wrote:
> > IIRC, while campaigning, the AotP send out squads every day to
glean
> > local information and then the mapmakers worked all night
compiling
> > maps which were *photographed* in the morning for daily use.
> >
>
> Was that about the same time as Shiloh or later in the war?

May 1864.

It seems to have been a standard practice in both major army groups by
then, though the data-gathering process was variable.


HankC

From: David Kowalski

Vicksburg remains the classic American siege.  It is interesting that denying
food to the city is mentioned as "cruel."

--------------------
The siege
--------------------

The tactic has a long and bloody history. Will Baghdad be the latest chapter?

By Christopher Reynolds
Times Staff Writer

April 4 2003

For weeks now, 21st century implements of war have been rolling, soaring and
sailing across the sand, sky and sea in and around Iraq. But as U.S. troops mass
around Baghdad, the conflict increasingly suggests something downright medieval:
a city under siege. And history is full of sieges with surprise endings.

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.calendarlive.com/cl-war-reynolds4apr04,0,814848.story

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > ...
> > Almost every full version of the battle of Shiloh notes that the
> > front line--of camps before the battle as well as the front line
at
> > the start of the battle--ran from McDowell to Stuart.  This line
> > trends generally East-West.  Even the map to which you referred
me
> > indicated this, as did Grant, Sherman and almost everybody else.
>
> To a certain extent McDowell and Stuart began the battle as flank
> units, positioned to protect the army at points where roads
entered
> on the flanks.   As the front line trended "generally East-West"
it
> was not entirely on and east-west orientation, in fact it angled
> north-south as well (ie: Sherman was north of Prentiss).   Grant,
in
> his memoirs, said essentially the same thing as I am saying:
> "The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek
on
> the left to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right,
facing
> nearly south and possibly a little west. The water in all these
> streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our
> flanks."  I haven't taken the time to look up what Sherman said,
by I
> recall that he says much the same.

Mr. Keene:

Your geography and what determines the orientation of the army are
both wrong.  My "east-west" line is the same as Grant's
line, "facing nearly south," and these are the same as almost every
other modern description.  Smith and the landing were both in the
rear--that part of the army which is furthest from the front in a
rearward direction.  Your previous quotation indicated that Smith
was on the "right."  To the left of Smith was the landing.
Therefore, the landing was in army's left rear.

> > The stretch of the Tennessee next to the army ran roughly north-
> > south.  That made it the demarcation of the left of the army.
>
> Simplistic compass directions do not determine the orientation of
the
> army.
>
> The encampment was a beachhead on the east bank of the Tennessee
that
> was meant to serve as a staging ground for the overland advance to
> Corinth.  The Pittsburg-Corinth Road represented the axis of
advance
> and therefore it defined the orientation of the army.

You are wrong, again.  It doesn't matter whether the army is going
to advance to the front, left, right, or rear.  The front line
defines the basic orientation of an army.  Grant's army faced
generally south.  That was the orientation.

> The advanced
> forces that faced down the axis of advance were the front; forces
to
> either side that faced away from the axis of advance were on the
> flanks; and those at the point of connection with the line of
> communication/ line of supply were in the rear.  Conceptually, the
> orientation of the army corresponded to a trapezoid.  The base was
> the river; the short side was the left; the long side the right;
with
> the front sloping between the two sides.

Unfortunately, Mr. Keene, a trapezoid's base is parallel to it's
top.  The river, which you stated was the base, was not parallel
with the front line or top.  In fact, it was almost perpendicular to
it.  You couldn't be more wrong.

> Geographically, the flanks were defined by creeks that embraced
the
> route to Corinth as it moved away from the River.  A portion of
Snake
> Creek and then Owl Creek defined the right the right; a portion of
> Lick Creek and then a tributary I have seen called both Spain
Branch
> and Locust Grove Creek defined the left. On the left, the flank
was
> pierced by a road at one point—the Hambug-Purdy Road—and Stuart
was
> assigned to guard that point.   On the right, the flank was
pierced
> by a road at two points—the Hamburg-Purdy Road and the River Road—
> McDowell was assigned to guard one and portions of Smith/Wallace's
> division guarded the other.

Well, thank you.  If the Hamburg-Purdy Road pierced the right flank,
as you indicate here, than Wallace was heading toward the right in
moving toward that same point.  Eight of the nine people who
described Grant's verbal or Baxter's written order stated that it
was to move to the right.  only Grant seemed to have difficulty in
remembering that the order referred to the "right."

> > If you were correct in stating that the Tennessee was to the
army's
> > rear, then Sherman would have been on the left and Stuart was to
> the
> > rear.  As they weren't, you are wrong.
>
> Huh?  Once again I don't see the sense in what you are saying.

As soon as you stop seeing the army as a trapezoid with the river,
as the base and the front as the top, you will.  The base of the
army also ran east-west, roughly parallel with the front, from the
landing westward along the line of Smith's camps.  The landing was
to the army's left rear and in no way could be referred to as
the "right."  The landing was opposite to McDowell's position; if
the landing really was the right, what would you call the point
exactly opposite it . . . the other right?

Joseph

> -Will

On the other hand, 3rd Division could have been selected because it had not
been beaten up as badly at Shiloh as the other five divisions were, and
because there was no real replacement available for Wallace at that time.
In any case, I just checked my notes and out of the eleven regiments left to
the division, only six went to Arkansas, four to the District of Jackson
(but not to either of the two divisions assigned there) and the eleventh was
reassigned to the 1st Division.

I will heartily agree that Eastern Arkansas was much less of a backwater
than wherever Irvin McDowell ended up after 2nd Bull Run, and that was a
whole lot better than D. C. Buell's next assignment after being relieved
from command of the old Army of the Ohio in 1862, which was basically to go
home and wait for orders. Grant tried to arrange some command for him in
1864 but couldn't get approval from higher authority, and Buell resigned
from both the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army.

Early in 1864, Hallack wrote to Sherman (that's W. T., not T. W.) that "It
seems but little better than murder to give important commands to such men
as Banks, Butler, McClernand, Sigel and Lew Wallace."





>From: "Will" <wh_keene@...>
>Reply-To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
>To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
>Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Lew Wallace's Destination
>Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2003 02:37:41 -0000
>


_________________________________________________________________
The new MSN 8: smart spam protection and 2 months FREE*
http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> ...
> Your geography and what determines the orientation of the army are
> both wrong.  My "east-west" line is the same as Grant's
> line, "facing nearly south," and these are the same as almost every
> other modern description....

Except you have snipped the last part of what Grant said: "...and
possibly a little west."  This is not the same as what you are
arguing.


> ...Smith and the landing were both in the
> rear--that part of the army which is furthest from the front in a
> rearward direction.  Your previous quotation indicated that Smith
> was on the "right."  To the left of Smith was the landing.
> Therefore, the landing was in army's left rear.

Just because it is to the left of Smith, does not make on the left of
everything.


> You are wrong, again.  It doesn't matter whether the army is going
> to advance to the front, left, right, or rear.  The front line
> defines the basic orientation of an army.  Grant's army faced
> generally south.  That was the orientation.

No, it faced toward Corinth, or as Grant puts it "nearly south and
possibly a little west", which is not the same as just plain south.


> Unfortunately, Mr. Keene, a trapezoid's base is parallel to it's
> top.  The river, which you stated was the base, was not parallel
> with the front line or top.

A trapezoid is defined as a quadrilateral with one pair of parallel
sides.  It is not necessary that the base and the top be the parallel
sides.   But if you are still having a difficult time with this, we
can call it a rhombus.


> ...In fact, it was almost perpendicular to
> it.  You couldn't be more wrong.

You are the one who is wrong.  The angle was not even near
perpendicular.



> Well, thank you.  If the Hamburg-Purdy Road pierced the right
flank,
> as you indicate here, than Wallace was heading toward the right in
> moving toward that same point...

Neither I nor Grant, as far I am aware, have ever argued
differently.  This is a strawman or some confusion on your part.


> ...Eight of the nine people who
> described Grant's verbal or Baxter's written order stated that it
> was to move to the right.  only Grant seemed to have difficulty in
> remembering that the order referred to the "right."

You seem to have some confusion about what Grant said.  As he stated,
and I have repeated, Smith was also on the right.


> As soon as you stop seeing the army as a trapezoid with the river,
> as the base and the front as the top, you will.  The base of the
> army also ran east-west, roughly parallel with the front, from the
> landing westward along the line of Smith's camps.

This is nonesensical and suggests a lack of understanding of the
situation at Shiloh.  By this reasoning, McDowell was in the rear and
references by those in the battle that Owl Creek secured the flank
must be a sign of confusion since by your standard it was their rear.


> ...The landing was
> to the army's left rear and in no way could be referred to as
> the "right."  The landing was opposite to McDowell's position; if
> the landing really was the right, what would you call the point
> exactly opposite it . . . the other right?

One is the right front, the other the right rear.

-Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> ...
> A trapezoid is defined as a quadrilateral with one pair of parallel
> sides.  It is not necessary that the base and the top be the
parallel
> sides.   But if you are still having a difficult time with this, we
> can call it a rhombus.

Actually a rhombus wouldnot be right, since the sides were not of
equal length.

Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>

[snip]

> > ...The landing was
> > to the army's left rear and in no way could be referred to as
> > the "right."  The landing was opposite to McDowell's position;
if
> > the landing really was the right, what would you call the point
> > exactly opposite it . . . the other right?
>
> One is the right front, the other the right rear.
>
> -Will


Okay, Mr. Keene; have it your way.  Both McDowell's position and the
landing were the army's right (and don't forget Smith; he was on the
right, too).

But if you really want to distinguish the army's right from it's
left, merely draw a line from Stuart to McDowell and then bisect it
with a perpendicular line (or ray) heading generally north (but
slightly east).  Everything west of that line is, roughly, on the
army's right.  Everything to the East--and the landing is well
within this sector--is on the left.

The point is, however, that almost everybody but Grant stated that
the orders called for Wallace to go to the right (and even Grant
once implied that, also).  Wallace was attempting to go to a point
on the right;  It happened to be the point that was on the right of
the line, on McDowell's flank.  Maybe much of the fault with
Wallace's non-arrival lies with Grant's poor instructions.  It may
not have been where Grant intended Wallace to go, but it could have
come from a reading of the orders, if a route had not been
specifically named.

Joseph

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> ...
> But if you really want to distinguish the army's right from it's
> left, merely draw a line from Stuart to McDowell and then bisect it
> with a perpendicular line (or ray) heading generally north (but
> slightly east).  Everything west of that line is, roughly, on the
> army's right.  Everything to the East--and the landing is well
> within this sector--is on the left.

A) Stuart occupied a flank position.  Once the battle began, the
situation changed and became more fluid, but a line indicating the
front facing of the Army of the Tennesee at dawn on April 6th, 1862
should only be drawn from the right of Sherman to the left of
Prentiss.

B) It is not very meaningful to draw ruler straight lines in a world
full of hills, valleys, curving roads and creeks.



> The point is, however, that almost everybody but Grant stated that
> the orders called for Wallace to go to the right (and even Grant
> once implied that, also)...

Most of them said much more than this.


> ...Wallace was attempting to go to a point
> on the right;  It happened to be the point that was on the right of
> the line, on McDowell's flank.  Maybe much of the fault with
> Wallace's non-arrival lies with Grant's poor instructions.  It may
> not have been where Grant intended Wallace to go, but it could have
> come from a reading of the orders, if a route had not been
> specifically named.

The above paragraph contains points I have agreed with several times
in the past and that have never been disputed by me.

~Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > ...
> > But if you really want to distinguish the army's right from it's
> > left, merely draw a line from Stuart to McDowell and then bisect it
> > with a perpendicular line (or ray) heading generally north (but
> > slightly east).  Everything west of that line is, roughly, on the
> > army's right.  Everything to the East--and the landing is well
> > within this sector--is on the left.
>

A quote from someone who is qualified to make such assessments, in fact
he published a map of the battlefield which was considered one of the
most accurate available.

"Twenty-three years ago the banks of the Tennessee witnessed a
remarkable occurrence.  There was a wage of battle.  Heavy blows were
given and received, and the challenger failed to make hs cause good.
But there were peculiar circumstances which distinguished the combat
from other trials of strength in the rebellion: An army comprising 70
regiments of infantry, 20 batteries of artillery, and a sufficiency of
cavalry, lay for two weeks and more in isolated camps, with A RIVER IN
ITS REAR (emphasis mine) and a hostile army claimed to be superior in
numbers 20 miles distant from it front, while the commander made his
headquarters and passed his nights 9 miles away on the opposite side of
the river.  IT HAD NO LINE OF OR ORDER OF BATTLE ..."

DC Buell, B&L.  He goes on to enumerate the lack of outposts, the lack
of a leader on the field, etc.  IOW, all of the points which Mr. Rose
has previously enumerated.  So it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Rose
concurs with Buell's opinions.  How then does he explain the statement,
"with a river in its rear?"  Note that he doesn't write, "with a river
forming its left flank".  In fact this is a criticism which has been
levelled at Grant, that he camped in enemy territory with an unfordable
river in his rear.

> A) Stuart occupied a flank position.  Once the battle began, the
> situation changed and became more fluid,

Including the fact that the right flank eventually became the Snake
Creek bridge, which Lew Wallace ended up marching over and which is
where Grant wanted him in the first place.  Which brings up my second
point.  If Mr. Rose wants to insist that the Tennessee River
represented the left of the army, then Owl Creek represented the right
of the army.  Since Owl Creek angled in towards Snake Creek, eventually
we arrive at the Snake Creek bridge, which from all maps and
descriptions I have seen was near the junction of Owl and Snake Creeks.
IOW, according to Mr. Rose's own logic, Snake Creek bridge (on the
River Rd.) can be said to represent the "right (REAR) of the army".

Since this point was,

1. guarded by WHL Wallace's troops in expectation of Lew Wallace's
arrival along the River Rd.

2. used by Rowley, Rawlins and McPherson when they went in search of
Lew Wallace in accordance with Grant's orders

3. the point to which Rowley had Lew Wallace's division countermarch
after Rowley caught up with him on the Shunpike,

I think it a fair assumption that these men considered Snake Creek
bridge on the River Rd. to represent the "right of the army" to which
Wallace had been ordered.

This assessment is also confirmed by the fact that Sherman's force
eventually fell back to a point at which Snake Creek bridge became the
de facto "right of the army" and was the point from which Wallace's
division was placed in the Union battle line.

> but a line indicating the
> front facing of the Army of the Tennesee at dawn on April 6th, 1862
> should only be drawn from the right of Sherman to the left of
> Prentiss.
>

This is a correct assessment, IMO.  The line which is drawn has to
account for the point at which the Confederate attack occurred.  It
does not include Stuart because he wasn't attacked until later, after
Prentiss's initial retreat, when Stuart's presence was detected as a
threat to the Confederate right flank.

Buell's statement above about "there was no line ... of battle" and his
subsequent descriptions of the battle, suggest that the defenders were
deployed piecemeal, hardly representative of the kind of structured
battle lines which Mr. Rose seems intent on portraying.

> B) It is not very meaningful to draw ruler straight lines in a world
> full of hills, valleys, curving roads and creeks.
>
>

Where have I heard this argument before?  ISTM that this is a point
which has been repeatedly ignored by Mr. Rose.  Other than on a map,
these straight lines are meaningless.

>
> > The point is, however, that almost everybody but Grant stated that
> > the orders called for Wallace to go to the right (and even Grant
> > once implied that, also)...
>
> Most of them said much more than this.
>

Exactly.  The consensus seems to have been Wallace was ordered to come
up and be positioned on the "right of the army", not "march to the
right of the army".

>
> > ...Wallace was attempting to go to a point
> > on the right;  It happened to be the point that was on the right of
> > the line, on McDowell's flank.  Maybe much of the fault with
> > Wallace's non-arrival lies with Grant's poor instructions.  It may
> > not have been where Grant intended Wallace to go, but it could have
> > come from a reading of the orders, if a route had not been
> > specifically named.
>
> The above paragraph contains points I have agreed with several times
> in the past and that have never been disputed by me.
>

We cannot know what orders Wallace received.  We know what Grant
intended, that is clear from his account, his subordinates accounts and
his subordinates actions in attempting to find Wallace and Rowley's
orders to Wallace to move to the River Rd.

As I have repeatedly attempted to argue, Wallace made his decision to
use the Shunpike PRIOR to the receipt of Grant's orders.  This is clear
from his actions.  To summarize for Mr. Rose, yet again,

1.  Wallace's first action after seeing Grant the morning of the 6th
was to order his 1st brigade from Crump's Ldg. to Stoney Lonesome.
Stoney Lonesome represented the start of the Shunpike was about 1 1/2
miles from the River Rd.  The obvious conclusion is that Wallace
intended to use the Shunpike.

2.  Wallace only knew about the Shunpike.  His men had cordouroyed part
of it, his troops at Adamsville (3rd brigade) were deployed to protect
the construction crews and his cavalry, in accordance with the letter
between Lew and WHL Wallace, had scouted it out as the route to take to
the battlefield.  (This is all in Sword and is consistent with previous
postings from Will).

3.  Wallace, when confronted by Rowley's arrival on the afternoon of
the 6th, indicated that he knew of no other road to Pittsburg Ldg.
This statement is consistent with point 2 above.  However, he later
amended his statement to indicate that he did not know about a cross
road to the River Rd.  This is consistent with his requiring a guide to
direct him after his countermarch was ordered.  In fact, he apparently
would have marched back to the Purdy Rd. and then an additional 1 1/2
miles to the River Rd. except for this guide.

But what is clear is that he ordered the concentration of his division
at Stoney Lonesome, PRIOR to receiving Grant's orders (in whatever form
those orders were written) suggesting that he intended to use the
Shunpike NOT the River Rd.  This is further confirmed by his statement
that had he not received orders by noon, that he intended on his own
initiative to march to the battlefield.  Since his division was already
concentrated to march on the Shunpike I would suggest that the logical
assumption to draw was that he intended to use the Shunpike, since it
was the road he KNEW BEST.

As I have stated previously, the debate over the inclusion or not of a
specific road in the orders from Baxter (note that Grant intended a
specific road to be used.  If the written orders did not contain that
specification the blame is Rawlins and Baxter's not Grant's, as he did
not write the orders), seems to me to represent an a posteriori
argument by Wallace and his men.  In fact, Daniel goes so far as to
question the accounts of both of Wallace's subordinates for suggesting
that Grant ordered Wallace to the Purdy Rd., on Sherman's right.

> ~Will

JB Jewell

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
> <josepharose@y...>
>
> [snip]
>
[snip of rather silly discussion of left and right]

> The point is, however, that almost everybody but Grant stated that
> the orders called for Wallace to go to the right (and even Grant
> once implied that, also).

This is incorrect.  All of Grant's subordinates indicated in their
accounts that Grant wanted Wallace to march to the Snake Creek bridge,
in the right rear of the army and to either move to the right of the
army or await orders to move to the right of the army.  Not a single
one of Grant's subordinates wrote that Grant wanted Wallace to "march
to the right of the army".

The fact that when ordered to find Wallace in the afternoon, all three
of Grant's subordinates moved out on the River Rd., over the Snake
Creek bridge indicates what their understanding of Wallace's
destination was, and by implication, what Grant's intention was in his
orders.  It of course says nothing about what orders Wallace actually
received.

> Wallace was attempting to go to a point
> on the right;

Wallace certainly was attempting to go to a point on the right.  But
Grant neither ordered him there nor wanted him there.  Wallace's
decision, as I have argued several times (all ignored by you), was to
use the Shunpike PRIOR to receiving orders from Grant.  It was the road
he knew best (see Will's and my previous posts on this matter), it was
the road his troops had rebuilt, it was the road his cavalry had
scouted per Lew Wallace assurances to WHL Wallace (in the form of the
letter between them) and it was the road that Lew Wallace mistakenly
believed would require only 5 miles of marching to reach the
battlefield.  In this latter belief, as I have argued numerous times
(using his own testimony as provided by the chief historian of Shiloh
NMP), he was incorrect.  It was actually closer to 8-9 miles, IOW it
was neither the shortest nor the most direct route to the battlefield.

> It happened to be the point that was on the right of
> the line, on McDowell's flank.

And the right of the line changed throughout the day.  This was a fact
that Lew Wallace never attempted to check and is the basis for Grant's
subsequent criticism about his misinterpretation of the sounds of
battle falling off to his left.  McDowell's flank, by the time Wallace
finally got moving, was nowhere near where Wallace was marching to.

> Maybe much of the fault with
> Wallace's non-arrival lies with Grant's poor instructions.

Since Wallace had decided to use the Shunpike PRIOR to receiving
Grant's orders your assertion is irrelevant.  Lew Wallace made several
mistakes, not all of which are related to the wrong chose of road.

1.  Despite his assertions that he was in readiness to march all
morning (from Stoney Lonesome, BTW, where he had ordered his division
to concentrate) once he received Grant's orders he had his division
have lunch.  I have asked you previously for an explanation of this
contradictory behaviour but you have never provided one.  Again, given
that his men were waiting all morning for orders, why did Lew Wallace
wait until he received those orders to have them eat lunch?

2.  Once Rowley caught up with Wallace at Clear Creek Wallace ordered
his division to countermarch, rather than simply reverse the order of
his brigades.  This cost over an hour while his 1st brigade
countermarched back to the cross road (a cross road that he did not
know anything about).  Had he simply reversed the order of his
brigades, the 2nd brigade could have started marching down the cross
road while the 1st was countermarching.  How much time would that have
saved?  And how is Grant responsible for Wallace's faulty thinking on
this point?

3.  On the march his infantry was slowed down constantly to allow them
to close up.  This lost time (from accounts by Grant's subordinates),
as did his decision to drop the artillery to the rear of the column
(only after McPherson pointed out to him how this would speed up the
march).  This lost another half hr. at least.  Strange behaviour for a
man moving to reinforce a hard-pressed army.  How is Grant responsible
for this?

While the content of his orders is perhaps arguable, the simple fact is
Grant did not intend Wallace to march to McDowell's right.  Wallace
made the decision to follow the Shunpike NOT Grant.  If there was any
misunderstanding at all Wallace should have checked with Grant.  He did
not.  In fact, despite the fact that Grant sent three officers to
Wallace, Wallace sent NONE to Grant during the entire day.

Wallace made enough mistakes on his own, without having to blame Grant.

> It may
> not have been where Grant intended Wallace to go, but it could have
> come from a reading of the orders, if a route had not been
> specifically named.
>

Wallace did not arrive at his decision based on a reading of Grant's
orders.  Wallace had already made his decision to use the Shunpike
because it was the road he knew best, it was the road his cavalry had
scouted to the battlefield, it was the road his construction crews had
rebuilt, it was the road which he mistakenly believed was the fastest
most direct route to the battlefield.  In this latter he was mistaken.
It was not only longer, it was less direct and would have gotten his
division destroyed had he continued on along the route he was moving.
Since you refuse to accept the fact that he was later convinced of this
mistake (which I have posted here numerous times as well as on other
groups) you continue in your mistaken belief that it was the shortest
route.  You, like Wallace, are wrong.

JB Jewell

> Joseph

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > ...
> > But if you really want to distinguish the army's right from it's
> > left, merely draw a line from Stuart to McDowell and then bisect
it
> > with a perpendicular line (or ray) heading generally north (but
> > slightly east).  Everything west of that line is, roughly, on
the
> > army's right.  Everything to the East--and the landing is well
> > within this sector--is on the left.
>
> A) Stuart occupied a flank position.  Once the battle began, the
> situation changed and became more fluid, but a line indicating the
> front facing of the Army of the Tennesee at dawn on April 6th,
1862
> should only be drawn from the right of Sherman to the left of
> Prentiss.

Grant contradicts you: "The position of our troops made a continuous
line from Lick Creek on the left to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake
Creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west
[although he lied about the line's being continuous]."  If Grant
considered Stuart to be part of his line, why shouldn't you?

Sherman

> B) It is not very meaningful to draw ruler straight lines in a
world
> full of hills, valleys, curving roads and creeks.

Wallace had to determine what the word, "right," meant.  To do that
with an army--without any more explicit of a description--mandates
the use of such means.  The landing wasn't to the army's right.
Besides, it would have been awfully stupid to march Wallace to the
landing, where he would pass the roads to Sherman and to the front.

> > The point is, however, that almost everybody but Grant stated
that
> > the orders called for Wallace to go to the right (and even Grant
> > once implied that, also)...
>
> Most of them said much more than this.

I excerpted that part of their statements which referred to the
orders as seen or heard.  At that point in each, they referred to
the right.  Whether or not they later used the general
expression, "Pittsburg Landing," is hardly relevant.

If you need more proof, Sherman, who wasn't even directly involved
in this controversy, agreed with everyone except Grant and Rawlins;
he wrote in his memoirs: "He [Grant] also told me that on his way up
from Savannah that morning he had stopped at Crump's Landing, and
had ordered Lew Wallace's division to cross over Snake Creek, so as
to come up on my right, telling me to look out for him."

That's *very* clear!

> > ...Wallace was attempting to go to a point
> > on the right;  It happened to be the point that was on the right
of
> > the line, on McDowell's flank.  Maybe much of the fault with
> > Wallace's non-arrival lies with Grant's poor instructions.  It
may
> > not have been where Grant intended Wallace to go, but it could
have
> > come from a reading of the orders, if a route had not been
> > specifically named.
>
> The above paragraph contains points I have agreed with several
times
> in the past and that have never been disputed by me.

No one, excepting Grant and his ambiguous claims, stated that
Wallace was to go the landing itself.  No one, not even Baxter who
wrote out the orders, mentioned the rear of Smith's camps, as
Rawlins did.  Everyone else explicitly mentions a position on
Sherman's right flank or generally describes a location which does
not conflict with that position.

Joseph

> ~Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
> <josepharose@y...>
> > wrote:
> > > ...
> > > But if you really want to distinguish the army's right from it's
> > > left, merely draw a line from Stuart to McDowell and then bisect
> it
> > > with a perpendicular line (or ray) heading generally north (but
> > > slightly east).  Everything west of that line is, roughly, on
> the
> > > army's right.  Everything to the East--and the landing is well
> > > within this sector--is on the left.
> >
> > A) Stuart occupied a flank position.  Once the battle began, the
> > situation changed and became more fluid, but a line indicating the
> > front facing of the Army of the Tennesee at dawn on April 6th,
> 1862
> > should only be drawn from the right of Sherman to the left of
> > Prentiss.
>
> Grant contradicts you: "The position of our troops made a continuous
> line from Lick Creek on the left to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake
> Creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west
> [although he lied about the line's being continuous]."  If Grant
> considered Stuart to be part of his line, why shouldn't you?
>

Grant's memoir account contains several discrepancies of this kind.  It
doesn't make your assertions correct.

> Sherman
>
> > B) It is not very meaningful to draw ruler straight lines in a
> world
> > full of hills, valleys, curving roads and creeks.
>
> Wallace had to determine what the word, "right," meant.  To do that
> with an army--without any more explicit of a description--mandates
> the use of such means.  The landing wasn't to the army's right.
> Besides, it would have been awfully stupid to march Wallace to the
> landing, where he would pass the roads to Sherman and to the front.
>

Wallace, as I have argued repeatedly, had made the decision to use the
Shunpike before receiving orders from Grant.  It was the road he knew
best, it was the one scouted by his cavalry, it was the road his men
had repaired, it was the road he used to comply with his assurances to
scout the road to WHL Wallace's position, it was the road to which he
ordered his brigades to concentrate (before receiving orders from
Grant) and it was, in his view the shortest most direct road to the
battlefield, irrespective of right or left.  He believed it to be the
most direct road.

As for "pass(ing) the roads to Sherman and to the front", what roads
are you talking about?  The only road to the front, would have been the
Hamburg-Purdy Rd., which was already in Confederate hands by the time
Wallace even set off.  What would have been stupid is for him to have
marched to the Owl Creek bridge on that road and been met in a swamp,
without being able to deploy in line of battle, by two regiments of
infantry, artillery and cavalry.  Wallace himself found out that that
was awaiting him if he had gotten as far as the Owl Creek bridge on the
army's former right flank.

> > > The point is, however, that almost everybody but Grant stated
> that
> > > the orders called for Wallace to go to the right (and even Grant
> > > once implied that, also)...
> >
> > Most of them said much more than this.
>
> I excerpted that part of their statements which referred to the
> orders as seen or heard.  At that point in each, they referred to
> the right.  Whether or not they later used the general
> expression, "Pittsburg Landing," is hardly relevant.
>

But none of these accounts indicate that Wallace was to march directly
to Sherman's right.  The only ones which do are from Wallace's
subordinates, written 6 yrs. after the fact and which even Daniel, who
is generally pro-Wallace in this debate, has called into question.  No-
one ever mentioned marching directly to the right of the army.  That
was an a posteriori construction by Wallace and his subordinates.

> If you need more proof, Sherman, who wasn't even directly involved
> in this controversy, agreed with everyone except Grant and Rawlins;
> he wrote in his memoirs: "He [Grant] also told me that on his way up
> from Savannah that morning he had stopped at Crump's Landing, and
> had ordered Lew Wallace's division to cross over Snake Creek, so as
> to come up on my right, telling me to look out for him."
>

And this contradicts your assertions and proves what Grant and his
subordinates stated.  In order to cross over Snake Creek he should have
been on the River Rd., exactly as Baxter, Rawlins, Rowley and McPherson
wrote and consistent with Grant's writings.  The Shunpike crossed over
Snake Creek, Clear Creek and then intersected the Hamburg-Purdy Rd.
which crossed Owl Creek.  Had Grant intended Wallace to move to
Sherman's right directly he would have stated that he had ordered him
to cross over Owl Creek and to come up on Sherman's right.  Your
interpretation is incorrect.

> That's *very* clear!
>

Yes it is and you just proven the opposite of what you wanted to do.
Your interpretation is incorrect.

> > > ...Wallace was attempting to go to a point
> > > on the right;  It happened to be the point that was on the right
> of
> > > the line, on McDowell's flank.  Maybe much of the fault with
> > > Wallace's non-arrival lies with Grant's poor instructions.  It
> may
> > > not have been where Grant intended Wallace to go, but it could
> have
> > > come from a reading of the orders, if a route had not been
> > > specifically named.
> >
> > The above paragraph contains points I have agreed with several
> times
> > in the past and that have never been disputed by me.
>
> No one, excepting Grant and his ambiguous claims, stated that
> Wallace was to go the landing itself.

Why are you harping on going to the landing itself?  Grant intended
Wallace to cross Snake Creek on the River Rd. bridge and come up on the
battlefield from that direction.  His use of Pittsburg Ldg. is meant to
portray a general position, ie. as opposed to Crump's Ldg.

> No one, not even Baxter who
> wrote out the orders, mentioned the rear of Smith's camps, as
> Rawlins did.

IIRC Rawlins wrote out the orders for Baxter, according to his report,
so he may know more about what was written than you do.

> Everyone else explicitly mentions a position on
> Sherman's right flank or generally describes a location which does
> not conflict with that position.
>

Everyone mentioned that Wallace was expected on the River Rd. from
whence he would be directed to Sherman's right, that's not the same
thing as ordering him directly to Sherman's right.  Their accounts all
indicate that, Sherman's account which you give above indicates that,
Grant's account indicates that, the actions of Grant's subordinates
when looking for Wallace's column is consistent with this
interpretation.  The only thing inconsistent with it is Wallace's
choice of the wrong road.  As I have argued previously he intended to
use the Shunpike and made that decision PRIOR to receiving orders from
Grant.

JB Jewell

> Joseph
>
> > ~Will

http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030405-91250893.htm

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
> <josepharose@y...>
> > wrote:
> > > ...
> > > But if you really want to distinguish the army's right from it's
> > > left, merely draw a line from Stuart to McDowell and then bisect
> it
> > > with a perpendicular line (or ray) heading generally north (but
> > > slightly east).  Everything west of that line is, roughly, on
> the
> > > army's right.  Everything to the East--and the landing is well
> > > within this sector--is on the left.
> >

Actually if you will read Sword (pp. 41-42 in the revised edition) you
will realize that Wallace himself considered Sherman's position the
front of the Union position; but apparently doesn't mention right or
left.  Sword's citation is Wallace's 1905 autobiography.
Interestingly, in view of the supposed importance of the definition of
the term "right of the army" which is being insisted upon, Wallace does
not seem to make an argument based on that point.  From Sword, Wallace
wrote the following "It seemed logical that the going or the coming
would be to or from  the front [Sherman's camps] rather than the base"
of the Union position.

Essentially I think that Wallace's own description belies the idea that
Wallace was misled by Grant's "ambiguous order".  The account in Sword,
based entirely on Wallace's autobiography, indicates that while Wallace
knew about the River Rd. he considered it longer and less direct than
the Shunpike (actually to be accurate he thought the Shunpike shorter
and more direct; don't want to leave any semantic holes), though he
apparently indicated that both were in "deplorable" condition.

Wallace's quote above indicates his thinking on the issue, ie. he
considered the Shunpike the better route to Grant's position.  Acting
accordingly he directed his construction crews to repair the Shunpike.
This work was completed by the last week in March.  He then rode the
entire route (or so he states) with his chief of cavalry Maj. Hayes.

I think this might be an error on his part and the source of subsequent
misunderstandings with regards to distances.  The account of his
revisit to the battlefield in 1901 indicates that he may only have
ridden as far as Clear Creek and assumed that he had arrived at Owl
Creek.  This was certainly what he thought in 1901, when the chief
historian of the NMP dissuaded him of this view (as I have repeatedly
argued).

In sum, Wallace had already by late March decided on the Shunpike as
the best route between Pittsburg Ldg. and Crump's Ldg. (by this I mean
of course, the camps at those sites, not the actual landings).  He
believed it was more direct and shorter, since his thinking was that
all movements would be to or from the front (Sherman's position).  This
may explain his aides insistence on mentioning Sherman in their post-
war accounts, IMHO.

FWIW, I believe Grant intended Wallace to come by the River Rd., as
indicated by all of his aides, his own account, Sherman's account, the
actions of his aides in their attempts to find Wallace in the
afternoon, etc.  I also think that the orders to Wallace did not
mention a specific road; and Rawlins, who wrote out the order may have
remembered Grant's intentions (clear from the accounts cited above,
including Sherman's) but may have misremembered the actual wording.  Of
course we don't know since the only copy was lost by one of Wallace's
aides.  Grant assumed River Rd., Wallace assumed Shunpike, for reasons
which are indicated above.  The result, a horrible misunderstanding
which resulted in Wallace missing the entire day's fighting.

But neither man can be blamed; unless one wants to incessantly nitpick.
They each acted in accordance with what they thought was the best
course of action.  But Wallace made the decision to use the Shunpike
long before receiving Grant's orders, possibly as long as week or two
before, when he concentrated on repairing that route.  His own writings
suggest as much.  Again, why didn't he argue the case more strongly
(for the ambiguity in the orders resulting in his decision) in his
autobiography instead of providing an argument for why he preferred the
Shunpike?

On the morning of the 6th he ordered his division to concentrate at
Stoney Lonesome because he intended to use the Shunpike, irrespective
of orders from Grant.

JB Jewell

[snips]

In a message dated 4/4/2003 7:45:44 PM Eastern Standard Time, wh_keene@...
writes:

> One is the right front, the other the right rear.
>
> -Will

McDowell's First Brigade was at the right front and never right rear.  Perhaps,
one has the Shiloh McDowell mixed up with his brother in VA.  <G>  At around
five in the evening of the first day however, portions of this brigade where
place on the defensive perimeter along with the seige cannon at the  Landing
itself.  If memory serves me correct, about fifty yards slightly to the right of
where today's Park Hq is located.

JEJ

Carl, neat article .. I also liked the story of Sherman's delight at a report of a boat full of reporters sinking in the Mississippi .. can you imagine Sherman dealing with CNN? ...tom gilbert

 Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:

http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030405-91250893.htm


Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "bjer50010" <bjewell@i...>
wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
<josepharose@y...>
> wrote:
> > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...>
wrote:
> > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
> > <josepharose@y...>
> > > wrote:
> > > > ...
> > > > But if you really want to distinguish the army's right from
it's
> > > > left, merely draw a line from Stuart to McDowell and then
bisect
> > it
> > > > with a perpendicular line (or ray) heading generally north
(but
> > > > slightly east).  Everything west of that line is, roughly,
on
> > the
> > > > army's right.  Everything to the East--and the landing is
well
> > > > within this sector--is on the left.

Mr. Jewell:

In reply to your last, considered reply:

> Actually if you will read Sword (pp. 41-42 in the revised edition)
you
> will realize that Wallace himself considered Sherman's position
the
> front of the Union position; but apparently doesn't mention right
or
> left.

That Wallace thought Sherman was in front certainly seems plausible,
but it could have hardly been anything other than right.

> Sword's citation is Wallace's 1905 autobiography.
> Interestingly, in view of the supposed importance of the
definition of
> the term "right of the army" which is being insisted upon, Wallace
does
> not seem to make an argument based on that point.  From Sword,
Wallace
> wrote the following "It seemed logical that the going or the
coming
> would be to or from  the front [Sherman's camps] rather than the
base"
> of the Union position.

That's also seems plausible.

> Essentially I think that Wallace's own description belies the idea
that
> Wallace was misled by Grant's "ambiguous order".  The account in
Sword,
> based entirely on Wallace's autobiography, indicates that while
Wallace
> knew about the River Rd. he considered it longer and less direct
than
> the Shunpike (actually to be accurate he thought the Shunpike
shorter
> and more direct; don't want to leave any semantic holes), though
he
> apparently indicated that both were in "deplorable" condition.

It's always important to know whether an author is measuring
distance from Crump's Landing, itself, or from Stoney Lonesome (what
a name!) and whether it's to Pittsburg Landing along the river,
Sherman's right, or some other point.  According to the map
referenced by Mr. Keene, the distance from Stoney Lonesome to the
bridge on Sherman's flank is roughly the same--and that map shows
the Shunpike route to be more circuitous than most other maps I've
seen.

> Wallace's quote above indicates his thinking on the issue, ie. he
> considered the Shunpike the better route to Grant's position.
Acting
> accordingly he directed his construction crews to repair the
Shunpike.
>
> This work was completed by the last week in March.  He then rode
the
> entire route (or so he states) with his chief of cavalry Maj.
Hayes.
>
> I think this might be an error on his part and the source of
subsequent
> misunderstandings with regards to distances.  The account of his
> revisit to the battlefield in 1901 indicates that he may only have
> ridden as far as Clear Creek and assumed that he had arrived at
Owl
> Creek.  This was certainly what he thought in 1901, when the chief
> historian of the NMP dissuaded him of this view (as I have
repeatedly
> argued).
>
> In sum, Wallace had already by late March decided on the Shunpike
as
> the best route between Pittsburg Ldg. and Crump's Ldg. (by this I
mean
> of course, the camps at those sites, not the actual landings).  He
> believed it was more direct and shorter, since his thinking was
that
> all movements would be to or from the front (Sherman's position).
This
> may explain his aides insistence on mentioning Sherman in their
post-
> war accounts, IMHO.

This last paragraph sounds plausible, but if Wallace had been
ordered to Pittsburg Landing, instead, I doubt that he would have
taken this route.  That he didn't do so suggests that he actually
was ordered to Sherman's right without a mention of any particular
route.  Otherwise, he was grossly insubordinate and his aides
covered up the fact.

> FWIW, I believe Grant intended Wallace to come by the River Rd.,
as
> indicated by all of his aides, his own account, Sherman's account,
the
> actions of his aides in their attempts to find Wallace in the
> afternoon, etc.

Grant may well have "intended Wallace to come by the River Rd."  I
just don't think that any such intention made it into the written
orders.  I wouldn't put any weight to the route which Grant's aides
took in looking for him because, at that time, Sherman had lost
control over the bridge which had been on his right flank.  They had
to take the River Road.

> I also think that the orders to Wallace did not
> mention a specific road; and Rawlins, who wrote out the order may
have
> remembered Grant's intentions (clear from the accounts cited
above,
> including Sherman's) but may have misremembered the actual wording.

We, surprisingly, are in almost complete agreement.

Some people don't approve of my sometimes determining that a certain
person lied at a certain time; here, in the same way, you have
determined that Rawlins merely "misremembered."

> Of
> course we don't know since the only copy was lost by one of
Wallace's
> aides.  Grant assumed River Rd., Wallace assumed Shunpike, for
reasons
> which are indicated above.  The result, a horrible
misunderstanding
> which resulted in Wallace missing the entire day's fighting.

I think that you are correct.

> But neither man can be blamed; unless one wants to incessantly
nitpick.

There's always room for nitpicking.

> They each acted in accordance with what they thought was the best
> course of action.  But Wallace made the decision to use the
Shunpike
> long before receiving Grant's orders, possibly as long as week or
two
> before, when he concentrated on repairing that route.  His own
writings
> suggest as much.  Again, why didn't he argue the case more
strongly
> (for the ambiguity in the orders resulting in his decision) in his
> autobiography instead of providing an argument for why he
preferred the
> Shunpike?

I'm not sure that he decided on that route to the exclusion of the
River Road, without more clearcut evidence.  It's likely that
Wallace favored that route for various reasons and certainly thought
of it as an option.  I don't think we know whether Grant knew
anything about that route, and that might explain why a specific
route may not have been mentioned.

> On the morning of the 6th he ordered his division to concentrate
at
> Stoney Lonesome because he intended to use the Shunpike,
irrespective
> of orders from Grant.

If you look at the map Mr. Keene referenced, you will note that
there is a route from Stoney Lonesome into the River Road.  At least
one author, IIRC, suggested that Wallace chose that starting point
as it would give him an option of the route depending upon the order
received.

Respectfully,
Joseph

> JB Jewell
>
> [snips]

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
> In a message dated 4/4/2003 7:45:44 PM Eastern Standard Time,
wh_keene@y... writes:
>
> > One is the right front, the other the right rear.
> >
> > -Will
>
> McDowell's First Brigade was at the right front and never right
rear.  Perhaps, one has the Shiloh McDowell mixed up with his brother
in VA.  <G>  At around five in the evening of the first day however,
portions of this brigade where place on the defensive perimeter along
with the seige cannon at the  Landing itself.  If memory serves me
correct, about fifty yards slightly to the right of where today's
Park Hq is located.
>
> JEJ

The sentance you quoted above was in response to a question regarding
the relative positions of McDowell and the Landing.  My meaning was
that McDowell was the right front.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Carl Williams <carlw4514@y...>
wrote:
>
>
>
> http://www.washtimes.com/civilwar/20030405-91250893.htm

Good story, but he left out my favorite part!!  Knox, eventually, and
very contritely asked Sherman for permission to return.  Sherman's
reponse (Sherman's Civil War page 440):

"Come with a sword or musket in your hand, prepared to share with us
our fate, in sunshine and storm, in prosperity and adversity, in
plenty and scarcity, and I will welcome you as a brother and
associate.  But come as you now do, expecting me to ally the honor
and reputation of my country and fellow soldiers with you as the
representative of the press, which you yourself say, makes so slight
a difference between truth and falsehood, and my answer is never."

Eric

-----Original Message-----
From: GnrlJEJohnston@... [mailto:GnrlJEJohnston@...]
Sent: Monday, April 07, 2003 11:10 AM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] sherman and the reporter

In a message dated 4/6/2003 7:37:33 PM Eastern Standard Time, tomgil47@... writes:

Carl, neat article

I agree whole heartily.  Sherman's hatred or distrust of reporters goes back before the war when he was involved in banking in San Francisco.  In letters to his wife, Ellen, he stated many times that the much of the bank failure was as a result of articles written by reporters for the San Francisco Globe.  The straw that broke the camel's back however was in 1861 when taking a side remark from an official in the War Department, they took it as gospel and printed that Sherman was crazy.  It is like saying Shotgun is crazy for putting up with us, and then having all the newspapers and magazines write articles about Crazy Shotgun.  <LOL>.  After that incident previously posted, If memory serves me correct, Sherman allowed only one reporter to be in his camp, and that reporter happened to be a personal friend of McPherson's.  Other reporters received most of their information from Dana and what he wanted them to know.

JEJ

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
> ...
> Totally accurate.  BTW, it was McDowell's Brigade that Sherman
lauded and
> applauded for facing the enemy with nothing but their bayonets
after they ran
> out of ammunition.  The regiments of that Brigade stayed together
all the way
> to the National Review in Washington.  6th Iowa, 40th Illinois, and
the 46th
> Ohio.  Their last commander was Walcutt.
>
> JEJ

Was this the same brigade commanded by Corse at Chattanooga?

~Will