--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose <josepharose@y...>"
<josepharose@y...> wrote:
> ...
> None of these battles exhibited the level of surprise at Shiloh.

These battles exhibited similar levels of suprise based on your
expressed criteria--"a solid front line, supported by sufficient
artillery and by nearby reserves, the whole led by its commander" as
well as the your comments about tents, etc.


> At Mills Springs, the Rebels' overnight march ran into the Federals
> vedettes which were stationed out far enough to prevent any
> significant surprise.  This was not at all similar to Shiloh.

Why not?  There was not a solid front line, the tents were still up
in the camp, the commanding general had to be fetched from the camp,
etc.


> At Stone's River, the extent of surprise probably came closest to
> Shiloh's, but the troops engaged were face-to-face with the enemy
> and knew that there would be fighting the next day.  The
> Confederates achieved a good deal of surprise by concentrating
units
> on their left and extending past the Federal flank early in the
> morning.

Yes, and thereby there was not a solid front line to meet that enemy
advance.  Thus by your criteria, there was significant tactical
suprise.


> At Chickamauga, there would be a certain amount of surprise any
time
> troops came charging out of the forest.  Again, however, the two
> armies were facing each other and knew that fighting was imminent.
> The big problem wasn't any surprise per se, but the positioning of
> troops along the line.

Isn't that your argument abotu Shiloh too?
When Thomas sent a detachment out on Sept 19 at Chicka maugua, he was
poorly informed as to the presence of the enemy.  When the enemy
attacked, it was not meet with a solid front line with reserves
nearby and artillery in place.

Your explanation for why you claimed Shiloh was such a tactical
suprise seems applicable to all these other battles.

Will

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
> In a message dated 2/28/2003 8:01:33 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> bjewell@i... writes:
>
> > As for Prentiss, maybe that says
> > something about Prentiss, whom you have repeatedly tried to
> > defend.
>
> IIRC, Grant had Prentiss hold at all costs at the Hornet's Nest
which in
> return would allow the rest of the army time and a chance to
regroup.  ISTM
> that Sword covered this thought in his "Shiloh."   If this be the
case,
> Prentiss did his duty as was expected of him.
>
> JEJ

Prentiss was involved in two major engagments.  He fought near his
camps at about 8-9am, and then at the Hornet's Nest from 10ish to
about 5:30pm.  There are valid, IMHO, criticisms of Prentiss'
performance at the 8-9am engagement.  He advanced his two brigades in
different directions, each fought independently and was flanked.
He advanced troops across Spain Field into the opposite woods,
minimizing their field of fire.  According to Andrew Hicklenlooper,
he ordered a change of face, underfire, that was ill-advised and
served only to create confusion in the ranks that had previously been
standing their ground.

I have no criticisms of Prentiss at the Hornet's nest.  Maybe he
should have been able to fall back with Hurlbut, maybe his holding
out longer aided the Union cause more than trying to hold out, maybe
he had no escape at all.  I don't have a definitive on this, at least
nothing I consider one.

Eric

I did some work on the breakup of the AOT commands last year and found something
very interesting in the annalysis, anyone else notice it:

Hardee's Corps
Cheatham's Divison
JK Jackson's Brigade(Pro Bragg)
Moore's Brigade(Pro Bragg)
Walthall's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Hindman's Divison
Anderson's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Manigault's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Dea's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Vaughn's Brigade (No Data)

Buckner's Divison
Johnson's Brigade (No Data)
Gracie's Brigade (Anti Bragg)
Reynold's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Walker's Divison
Maney's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Gist's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Wilson's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Breckinridge"s Corps
Cleburne's Divison
Left alone by breakup

Stewart's Divison
Adam's Brigade-Gibson(anti Bragg)
Strahl's Brigade (no data)
Clayton's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Stovall's Brigade (no data)

Bate's Divison
Lewis's Orphan Brigade (Anti Bragg)
Bate's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Finley's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Stevenson's Divison
Brown's Brigade (Anti Bragg)
Cumming's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Pettus's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Vaughn's Brigade (no data)

This data refers to the Brigadiers.  Also as to the Longstreet move, that had
more to do with Lee wanting Longstreet back than Bragg wanting him gone, also
the move of Longstreets was in a way a weak transfer.  Longstreet replaced
Carter Stevenson's Division in East Tennessee.  Also although Longstreet was
anti Bragg, a number of his subordinates were more sympathetic to Bragg notably
LaFayette McLaws and Hood's Brigadiers, plus Longstreet took Wheeler's Cav with
him, Wheeler was one of the biggest supporters of Bragg in the army.

Lee

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "theme_music <theme_music@y...>"
<theme_music@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
> > In a message dated 2/28/2003 8:01:33 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> > bjewell@i... writes:
> >
> > > As for Prentiss, maybe that says
> > > something about Prentiss, whom you have repeatedly tried to
> > > defend.
> >
> > IIRC, Grant had Prentiss hold at all costs at the Hornet's Nest
> which in
> > return would allow the rest of the army time and a chance to
> regroup.  ISTM
> > that Sword covered this thought in his "Shiloh."   If this be the
> case,
> > Prentiss did his duty as was expected of him.
> >
> > JEJ
>
> Prentiss was involved in two major engagments.  He fought near his
> camps at about 8-9am, and then at the Hornet's Nest from 10ish to
> about 5:30pm.  There are valid, IMHO, criticisms of Prentiss'
> performance at the 8-9am engagement.  He advanced his two brigades
in
> different directions, each fought independently and was flanked.
> He advanced troops across Spain Field into the opposite woods,
> minimizing their field of fire.  According to Andrew Hicklenlooper,
> he ordered a change of face, underfire, that was ill-advised and
> served only to create confusion in the ranks that had previously
been
> standing their ground.
>
> I have no criticisms of Prentiss at the Hornet's nest.  Maybe he
> should have been able to fall back with Hurlbut, maybe his holding
> out longer aided the Union cause more than trying to hold out,
> maybe he had no escape at all.  I don't have a definitive on this,
> at least nothing I consider one.

I think we can all agree that Prentiss attempted to shift to his left
when Hurlbut shifted left.  This left a thick stand of woods
separating Prentiss from the Union right flank.  At the same time, he
did not shift left far enough to maintain contact with Hurlbut.  This
left a thick stand of woods separating Prentiss from the left flank.
With roads to the rear on either side of these two stands of woods,
and Prentiss sitting in a salient position in the line, this
necessarily meant that Prentiss would risk encirclement the minute
either flank decided to withdraw.  Such was the nature of the
position.  I think that it's also an established fact that Prentiss
did, eventually, order a withdrawal.  It was this movement that
caught the eye of the Confederate left flank, and turned it upon the
Hornet's Nest position.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> Kent,
>
> Refer to a discussion on this forum from about a month ago...I
posed a
> similar question.
>
> That is why I have been watching the current
discussion...previously, the
> comparison was damned by some on the basis that Howard should have
prepared
> his lines better because he knew the enemy was near, while Sherman's
> dispositions were excused on the basis that the proximity of the
enemy was
> not known and the likelihood of attack was assumed to be remote.

Funny, I didn't realize that Hooker had gunboat support at C-Ville,
unfordable streams on either flank, and direct proximity to his
supply line.

Hooker expected to be attacked, he just didn't realize from which
direction.  Grant knew which direction the enemy lurked, he just
didn't expect to be attacked, for obvious reasons.

-----Original Message-----
From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@...> [mailto:slippymississippi@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:59 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> Kent,
>
> Refer to a discussion on this forum from about a month ago...I
posed a
> similar question.
>
> That is why I have been watching the current
discussion...previously, the
> comparison was damned by some on the basis that Howard should have
prepared
> his lines better because he knew the enemy was near, while Sherman's
> dispositions were excused on the basis that the proximity of the
enemy was
> not known and the likelihood of attack was assumed to be remote.

Funny, I didn't realize that Hooker had gunboat support at C-Ville,
unfordable streams on either flank, and direct proximity to his
supply line.

Hooker expected to be attacked, he just didn't realize from which
direction.  Grant knew which direction the enemy lurked, he just
didn't expect to be attacked, for obvious reasons.





Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> Slippy,
>
> Not to open that whole discussion up again, but the comparison was
Howard to
> Sherman.  Howard did not expect an attack to come when and from
where it
> did, because he had been assured that the enemy was retreating.
This
> assurance came from Hooker, by way of Sickles, and manifested
itself in the
> detachment of Howard's largest brigade and only reserve to assist
Sickles in
> his pursuit.
>
> But, that is Eastern Theatre, and therefore taboo.
>
> Harry


Ah, I see.  I still don't think it's really a valid comparison.
Howard remained "in the air," despite reports of movement.  The
federal positions at Shiloh were far from ever being "in the air."
The only way I see any analogy is if you erase Owl Creek from the map
and Sherman ignored reports of movement from that direction.

And Hooker's complicity came in the form of "assurances," second hand
from Sickles.  That's a soft and fuzzy term.  Halleck's complicity
came in the form of a direct preremptory order to avoid a general
engagement at all costs.  When the bullets started flying, it's quite
telling that Sherman's only verbally expressed concern was that
Halleck was going to have his ass in a sling over this.

-----Original Message-----
From: tmix [mailto:tmix@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 4:36 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

During a visit to Howard’s lines Hooker, Sickles and the chief engineer (the name escapes me) told and warned Howard to enhance and even establish a defensive line. He chose to ignore them and paid. Possible retreat or not he was expected to develop a defense. Sherman was aware of Confederate presence in his front but chose to not take it seriously. They both paid for their over-confidence. Tom Mix

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:22 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

 

Slippy,

 

Not to open that whole discussion up again, but the comparison was Howard to Sherman.  Howard did not expect an attack to come when and from where it did, because he had been assured that the enemy was retreating.  This assurance came from Hooker, by way of Sickles, and manifested itself in the detachment of Howard's largest brigade and only reserve to assist Sickles in his pursuit.

 

But, that is Eastern Theatre, and therefore taboo.

 

Harry

-----Original Message-----
From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@...> [mailto:slippymississippi@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:59 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> Kent,
>
> Refer to a discussion on this forum from about a month ago...I
posed a
> similar question.
>
> That is why I have been watching the current
discussion...previously, the
> comparison was damned by some on the basis that Howard should have
prepared
> his lines better because he knew the enemy was near, while Sherman's
> dispositions were excused on the basis that the proximity of the
enemy was
> not known and the likelihood of attack was assumed to be remote.

Funny, I didn't realize that Hooker had gunboat support at C-Ville,
unfordable streams on either flank, and direct proximity to his
supply line.

Hooker expected to be attacked, he just didn't realize from which
direction.  Grant knew which direction the enemy lurked, he just
didn't expect to be attacked, for obvious reasons.





Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

-----Original Message-----
From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@...> [mailto:slippymississippi@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 4:43 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

Ah, I see.  I still don't think it's really a valid comparison. 
Howard remained "in the air," despite reports of movement.  The
federal positions at Shiloh were far from ever being "in the air." 
The only way I see any analogy is if you erase Owl Creek from the map
and Sherman ignored reports of movement from that direction.

And Hooker's complicity came in the form of "assurances," second hand
from Sickles.  That's a soft and fuzzy term.  Halleck's complicity
came in the form of a direct preremptory order to avoid a general
engagement at all costs.  When the bullets started flying, it's quite
telling that Sherman's only verbally expressed concern was that
Halleck was going to have his ass in a sling over this.







Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> I think the detachement of Hooker's largest brigade and only reserve
> (Barlow) to go to Hooker to pursue the fleeing Jackson (a
> detachement initiated by Sickles apparently authorized by Hooker)
> amounts to something more than a second hand assurance.  Obviously
> it was expressed in such a manner that Howard felt the "place to
> be" was with Barlow, because he personally accompanied him on his
> trek.

I still don't feel your analogy holds any water.  Let's test this
with an exercise: hindsight being 20/20, it's easy to see how
Jackson's entire force showing up on Howard's exposed flank could
throw the entire federal force into disorganized panic.  I challenge
you, with hindsight being 20/20 and with full knowlege of the federal
dispositions, to devise a battle plan that would have created the
same panic in the federal forces at Shiloh.

-----Original Message-----
From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@...> [mailto:slippymississippi@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 5:03 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> I think the detachement of Hooker's largest brigade and only reserve
> (Barlow) to go to Hooker to pursue the fleeing Jackson (a
> detachement initiated by Sickles apparently authorized by Hooker)
> amounts to something more than a second hand assurance.  Obviously
> it was expressed in such a manner that Howard felt the "place to
> be" was with Barlow, because he personally accompanied him on his
> trek.

I still don't feel your analogy holds any water.  Let's test this
with an exercise: hindsight being 20/20, it's easy to see how
Jackson's entire force showing up on Howard's exposed flank could
throw the entire federal force into disorganized panic.  I challenge
you, with hindsight being 20/20 and with full knowlege of the federal
dispositions, to devise a battle plan that would have created the
same panic in the federal forces at Shiloh.





Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> The problem here is that Jackson's flank attack did not throw the
entire
> federal force into disorganized panic.

Yes it did.  It forced the entire federal disposition to withdraw 10
miles into a protective circle.

> It did send about half of the 11th Corps into disorganized panic.

Okay, where is the analogy at Shiloh?  The only federal force
outflanked at Shiloh was Prentiss' force of about 2,000 effectives.

Sherman *knew* that there was a large Confederate force nearby, and
*knew* their direction of approach.  His immediate concern was trying
to prevent a general engagement, which is why there was no concerted
effort to sweep the roads in support of reconaissance.  At no point
was a federal flank exposed in *any* direction.  I see less and less
similarities in the two situations.

A quick count shows 19 pro-Bragg officers and 9 anti on this list.  A bit of a surprise to me anyway.

 SDE80@... wrote:

In a message dated 2/28/2003 3:13:06 PM Eastern Standard Time, LWhite64@... writes:

Cheatham's Divison  Cheatham anti, but didn't sign the petition.
JK Jackson's Brigade(Pro Bragg)
Moore's Brigade(Pro Bragg)
Walthall's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Hindman's Divison (Hindman (anti) was out sick, Patton Anderson was pro)
Anderson's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Manigault's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Dea's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Vaughn's Brigade (No Data)

Buckner's Divison (shipped or being shipped to Knoxville)
Johnson's Brigade (No Data)  Bushrod signed the petition.
Gracie's Brigade (Anti Bragg) another petition signer
Reynold's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Walker's Divison Shot pouch was pro
Maney's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Gist's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Wilson's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Breckinridge"s Corps 
Cleburne's Divison
Left alone by breakup (was being shipped to Knoxville)

Stewart's Divison Stewart was pro. 
Adam's Brigade-Gibson(anti Bragg)
Strahl's Brigade (no data)
Clayton's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Stovall's Brigade (no data)  Stovall signed the petition, too.

Bate's Divison Bate was pro
Lewis's Orphan Brigade (Anti Bragg)
Bate's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Finley's Brigade (Pro Bragg)

Stevenson's Divison Stevenson was pro.
Brown's Brigade (Anti Bragg)
Cumming's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Pettus's Brigade (Pro Bragg)
Vaughn's Brigade (no data)

Notice, Lee, that the antis were either being shipped to Knoxville with Longstreet, such as Buckner and Cleburne, or they were surrounded by pros, who could watch them. 

Sam Elliott


Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

-----Original Message-----
From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@...> [mailto:slippymississippi@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 6:03 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
wrote:
> The problem here is that Jackson's flank attack did not throw the
entire
> federal force into disorganized panic.

Yes it did.  It forced the entire federal disposition to withdraw 10
miles into a protective circle.

> It did send about half of the 11th Corps into disorganized panic. 

Okay, where is the analogy at Shiloh?  The only federal force
outflanked at Shiloh was Prentiss' force of about 2,000 effectives.

Sherman *knew* that there was a large Confederate force nearby, and
*knew* their direction of approach.  His immediate concern was trying
to prevent a general engagement, which is why there was no concerted
effort to sweep the roads in support of reconaissance.  At no point
was a federal flank exposed in *any* direction.  I see less and less
similarities in the two situations.






Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, David Kowalski <kywddavid@y...>
wrote:
>
> A quick count shows 19 pro-Bragg officers and 9 anti on this
list.  A bit of a surprise to me anyway.

I don't think that includes Cleburne as an anti, add Forrest and the
two best commanders in the AOT were anti-Bragg.
The likes of JK Jackson, aka Mudwall Jackson, gives the level of the
pro-Bragg faction.

From what I've read it was worse with the rank & flie, they hated
him!

Hooker (1)figured out what Lee was up to and instructed Howard to
look to his flank, held by Devens' division, and (2)ordered Reynolds
to bring his corps over from the north bank of the Rappahannock and
fill the gap between Devens and the river.  Hooker may have also had
some mission in mind for Averell's cavalry division, which was
located well beyond the right flank, but I don't recall the details.

Howard did nothing, unless you count sending Barlow's brigade off to
help Sickles.  The orders to Reynolds were delayed in arriving and
he reached the south bank well after Howard had been overwhelmed.
Hooker indeed did not follow up on his instructions, apparently
never informed some of his staff officers of same, and also
apparently reversed his opinion later in the day.

Meanwhile, out on the right flank, both of Devens' brigade
commanders were receiving reports of suspicious activity but were
unable to convince Devens.

And then there was Cedar Creek...

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
> To me the biggest failure was Hooker's failure to follow up on
seeing if
> Howard had improved his defense or not. Either personally or via
staff
> he should have checked. Tom Mix
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@c...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:47 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
Shiloh
>
>
>
> Tom,
>
>
>
> Not to belabor this eastern stuff, but your synopsis ignores
> developments after Hooker's visit.  I do not think the assertions
of
> retreat (given, in fact, by Hooker and Sickles), excuse Howard's
failure
> to defend against an attack from the west (he did adequately
prepare for
> an asault from the south), but they go a long way in explaining it.
>
>
>
> I do agree with your assessment that both Howard and Sherman paid
for
> their overconfidence.
>
>
>
> Harry
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: tmix [mailto:tmix@i...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 4:36 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
Shiloh
>
> During a visit to Howard's lines Hooker, Sickles and the chief
engineer
> (the name escapes me) told and warned Howard to enhance and even
> establish a defensive line. He chose to ignore them and paid.
Possible
> retreat or not he was expected to develop a defense. Sherman was
aware
> of Confederate presence in his front but chose to not take it
seriously.
> They both paid for their over-confidence. Tom Mix
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@c...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:22 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
Shiloh
>
>
>
> Slippy,
>
>
>
> Not to open that whole discussion up again, but the comparison was
> Howard to Sherman.  Howard did not expect an attack to come when
and
> from where it did, because he had been assured that the enemy was
> retreating.  This assurance came from Hooker, by way of Sickles,
and
> manifested itself in the detachment of Howard's largest brigade
and only
> reserve to assist Sickles in his pursuit.
>
>
>
> But, that is Eastern Theatre, and therefore taboo.
>
>
>
> Harry
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@y...>
> [mailto:slippymississippi@y...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:59 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh
>
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
> wrote:
> > Kent,
> >
> > Refer to a discussion on this forum from about a month ago...I
> posed a
> > similar question.
> >
> > That is why I have been watching the current
> discussion...previously, the
> > comparison was damned by some on the basis that Howard should
have
> prepared
> > his lines better because he knew the enemy was near, while
Sherman's
> > dispositions were excused on the basis that the proximity of the
> enemy was
> > not known and the likelihood of attack was assumed to be remote.
>
> Funny, I didn't realize that Hooker had gunboat support at C-
Ville,
> unfordable streams on either flank, and direct proximity to his
> supply line.
>
> Hooker expected to be attacked, he just didn't realize from which
> direction.  Grant knew which direction the enemy lurked, he just
> didn't expect to be attacked, for obvious reasons.
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>  Terms of Service.
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/> .
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
>
>
> ADVERTISEMENT
>
>
<http://rd.yahoo.com/M=246920.2960106.4328965.2848452/D=egroupweb/S=1
705
>
126278:HM/A=1464858/R=0/*http:/www.gotomypc.com/u/tr/yh/cpm/grp/300_C
quo
> _1/g22lp?Target=mm/g22lp.tmpl>
>
>
>
> <http://us.adserver.yahoo.com/l?
M=246920.2960106.4328965.2848452/D=egrou
> pmail/S=:HM/A=1464858/rand=156350295>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>  Service.

Excellent post. Absolutely excellent. Thanks Tom,

-----Original Message-----
From: mfitz4002000 <williams484@...> [mailto:williams484@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 7:50 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

Hooker (1)figured out what Lee was up to and instructed Howard to
look to his flank, held by Devens' division, and (2)ordered Reynolds
to bring his corps over from the north bank of the Rappahannock and
fill the gap between Devens and the river.  Hooker may have also had
some mission in mind for Averell's cavalry division, which was
located well beyond the right flank, but I don't recall the details.

Howard did nothing, unless you count sending Barlow's brigade off to
help Sickles.  The orders to Reynolds were delayed in arriving and
he reached the south bank well after Howard had been overwhelmed.
Hooker indeed did not follow up on his instructions, apparently
never informed some of his staff officers of same, and also
apparently reversed his opinion later in the day.

Meanwhile, out on the right flank, both of Devens' brigade
commanders were receiving reports of suspicious activity but were
unable to convince Devens.

And then there was Cedar Creek...

--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
> To me the biggest failure was Hooker's failure to follow up on
seeing if
> Howard had improved his defense or not. Either personally or via
staff
> he should have checked. Tom Mix
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@c...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:47 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
Shiloh
>
>
>
> Tom,
>
>
>
> Not to belabor this eastern stuff, but your synopsis ignores
> developments after Hooker's visit.  I do not think the assertions
of
> retreat (given, in fact, by Hooker and Sickles), excuse Howard's
failure
> to defend against an attack from the west (he did adequately
prepare for
> an asault from the south), but they go a long way in explaining it.
>
>
>
> I do agree with your assessment that both Howard and Sherman paid
for
> their overconfidence.
>
>
>
> Harry
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: tmix [mailto:tmix@i...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 4:36 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
Shiloh
>
> During a visit to Howard's lines Hooker, Sickles and the chief
engineer
> (the name escapes me) told and warned Howard to enhance and even
> establish a defensive line. He chose to ignore them and paid.
Possible
> retreat or not he was expected to develop a defense. Sherman was
aware
> of Confederate presence in his front but chose to not take it
seriously.
> They both paid for their over-confidence. Tom Mix
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@c...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:22 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
Shiloh
>
>
>
> Slippy,
>
>
>
> Not to open that whole discussion up again, but the comparison was
> Howard to Sherman.  Howard did not expect an attack to come when
and
> from where it did, because he had been assured that the enemy was
> retreating.  This assurance came from Hooker, by way of Sickles,
and
> manifested itself in the detachment of Howard's largest brigade
and only
> reserve to assist Sickles in his pursuit.
>
>
>
> But, that is Eastern Theatre, and therefore taboo.
>
>
>
> Harry
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@y...>
> [mailto:slippymississippi@y...]
> Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:59 PM
> To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh
>
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
> wrote:
> > Kent,
> >
> > Refer to a discussion on this forum from about a month ago...I
> posed a
> > similar question.
> >
> > That is why I have been watching the current
> discussion...previously, the
> > comparison was damned by some on the basis that Howard should
have
> prepared
> > his lines better because he knew the enemy was near, while
Sherman's
> > dispositions were excused on the basis that the proximity of the
> enemy was
> > not known and the likelihood of attack was assumed to be remote.
>
> Funny, I didn't realize that Hooker had gunboat support at C-
Ville,
> unfordable streams on either flank, and direct proximity to his
> supply line.
>
> Hooker expected to be attacked, he just didn't realize from which
> direction.  Grant knew which direction the enemy lurked, he just
> didn't expect to be attacked, for obvious reasons.
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>  Terms of Service.
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/> .
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
>
>
> ADVERTISEMENT
>
>
<http://rd.yahoo.com/M=246920.2960106.4328965.2848452/D=egroupweb/S=1
705
>
126278:HM/A=1464858/R=0/*http:/www.gotomypc.com/u/tr/yh/cpm/grp/300_C
quo
> _1/g22lp?Target=mm/g22lp.tmpl>
>
>
>
> <http://us.adserver.yahoo.com/l?
M=246920.2960106.4328965.2848452/D=egrou
> pmail/S=:HM/A=1464858/rand=156350295>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
> <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>  Service.





Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Is it possible for a mere member to 'hook' a thread as off-theater?

Just wondering, of course...


HankC

>
> Hooker (1)figured out what Lee was up to and instructed Howard to
> look to his flank, held by Devens' division, and (2)ordered
Reynolds
> to bring his corps over from the north bank of the Rappahannock and
> fill the gap between Devens and the river.  Hooker may have also
had
> some mission in mind for Averell's cavalry division, which was
> located well beyond the right flank, but I don't recall the details.
>
> Howard did nothing, unless you count sending Barlow's brigade off
to
> help Sickles.  The orders to Reynolds were delayed in arriving and
> he reached the south bank well after Howard had been overwhelmed.
> Hooker indeed did not follow up on his instructions, apparently
> never informed some of his staff officers of same, and also
> apparently reversed his opinion later in the day.
>
> Meanwhile, out on the right flank, both of Devens' brigade
> commanders were receiving reports of suspicious activity but were
> unable to convince Devens.
>
> And then there was Cedar Creek...
>
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
> > To me the biggest failure was Hooker's failure to follow up on
> seeing if
> > Howard had improved his defense or not. Either personally or via
> staff
> > he should have checked. Tom Mix
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@c...]
> > Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:47 PM
> > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
> Shiloh
> >
> >
> >
> > Tom,
> >
> >
> >
> > Not to belabor this eastern stuff, but your synopsis ignores
> > developments after Hooker's visit.  I do not think the assertions
> of
> > retreat (given, in fact, by Hooker and Sickles), excuse Howard's
> failure
> > to defend against an attack from the west (he did adequately
> prepare for
> > an asault from the south), but they go a long way in explaining
it.
> >
> >
> >
> > I do agree with your assessment that both Howard and Sherman paid
> for
> > their overconfidence.
> >
> >
> >
> > Harry
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: tmix [mailto:tmix@i...]
> > Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 4:36 PM
> > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
> Shiloh
> >
> > During a visit to Howard's lines Hooker, Sickles and the chief
> engineer
> > (the name escapes me) told and warned Howard to enhance and even
> > establish a defensive line. He chose to ignore them and paid.
> Possible
> > retreat or not he was expected to develop a defense. Sherman was
> aware
> > of Confederate presence in his front but chose to not take it
> seriously.
> > They both paid for their over-confidence. Tom Mix
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@c...]
> > Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:22 PM
> > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at
> Shiloh
> >
> >
> >
> > Slippy,
> >
> >
> >
> > Not to open that whole discussion up again, but the comparison was
> > Howard to Sherman.  Howard did not expect an attack to come when
> and
> > from where it did, because he had been assured that the enemy was
> > retreating.  This assurance came from Hooker, by way of Sickles,
> and
> > manifested itself in the detachment of Howard's largest brigade
> and only
> > reserve to assist Sickles in his pursuit.
> >
> >
> >
> > But, that is Eastern Theatre, and therefore taboo.
> >
> >
> >
> > Harry
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: slippymississippi <slippymississippi@y...>
> > [mailto:slippymississippi@y...]
> > Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:59 PM
> > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh
> >
> > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Harry Smeltzer <hjs21@c...>
> > wrote:
> > > Kent,
> > >
> > > Refer to a discussion on this forum from about a month ago...I
> > posed a
> > > similar question.
> > >
> > > That is why I have been watching the current
> > discussion...previously, the
> > > comparison was damned by some on the basis that Howard should
> have
> > prepared
> > > his lines better because he knew the enemy was near, while
> Sherman's
> > > dispositions were excused on the basis that the proximity of
the
> > enemy was
> > > not known and the likelihood of attack was assumed to be remote.
> >
> > Funny, I didn't realize that Hooker had gunboat support at C-
> Ville,
> > unfordable streams on either flank, and direct proximity to his
> > supply line.
> >
> > Hooker expected to be attacked, he just didn't realize from which
> > direction.  Grant knew which direction the enemy lurked, he just
> > didn't expect to be attacked, for obvious reasons.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo!
> > <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>  Terms of Service.
> >
> >
> >
> > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service
> > <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/> .
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service
> > <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/> .
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
> >
> >
> >
> > ADVERTISEMENT
> >
> >
>
<http://rd.yahoo.com/M=246920.2960106.4328965.2848452/D=egroupweb/S=1
> 705
> >
>
126278:HM/A=1464858/R=0/*http:/www.gotomypc.com/u/tr/yh/cpm/grp/300_C
> quo
> > _1/g22lp?Target=mm/g22lp.tmpl>
> >
> >
> >
> > <http://us.adserver.yahoo.com/l?
> M=246920.2960106.4328965.2848452/D=egrou
> > pmail/S=:HM/A=1464858/rand=156350295>
> >
> >
> > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
> > <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>  Service.
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
> http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

-----Original Message-----
From: tmix [mailto:tmix@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 7:47 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

To me the biggest failure was Hooker’s failure to follow up on seeing if Howard had improved his defense or not. Either personally or via staff he should have checked. Tom Mix

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 3:47 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

 

Tom,

 

Not to belabor this eastern stuff, but your synopsis ignores developments after Hooker's visit.  I do not think the assertions of retreat (given, in fact, by Hooker and Sickles), excuse Howard's failure to defend against an attack from the west (he did adequately prepare for an asault from the south), but they go a long way in explaining it.

 

I do agree with your assessment that both Howard and Sherman paid for their overconfidence.

 

Harry

 

-----Original Message-----
From: mfitz4002000 <williams484@...> [mailto:williams484@...]
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2003 8:50 PM
To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh

Hooker (1)figured out what Lee was up to and instructed Howard to
look to his flank, held by Devens' division, and (2)ordered Reynolds
to bring his corps over from the north bank of the Rappahannock and
fill the gap between Devens and the river.  Hooker may have also had
some mission in mind for Averell's cavalry division, which was
located well beyond the right flank, but I don't recall the details.

Howard did nothing, unless you count sending Barlow's brigade off to
help Sickles.  The orders to Reynolds were delayed in arriving and
he reached the south bank well after Howard had been overwhelmed. 
Hooker indeed did not follow up on his instructions, apparently
never informed some of his staff officers of same, and also
apparently reversed his opinion later in the day.

Meanwhile, out on the right flank, both of Devens' brigade
commanders were receiving reports of suspicious activity but were
unable to convince Devens.

And then there was Cedar Creek...

Mr. Keene:

You have it backwards.  My original post had six paragraphs about
the nature of the Confederate surprise and ended with one free-
standing sentence: "If the Union army had not been tactically
surprised, there would have been a solid front line, supported by
sufficient artillery and by nearby reserves, the whole led by its
commander."  These are *not* my criteria of a surprise; these are
what Grant should have had prepared if he had *not* been surprised.

The common criteria of a surprise, just quickly, would be that the
size, makeup, location, movement, and/or intentions of the enemy are
not known with a corresponding lack of preparation to adequately
receive any potential attack.

At Shiloh, Grant did not know the enemy's size, movement, and
location and he totally misread their intentions; he was,
consequently, almost completely unprepared for the ensuing attack.

At Mill Springs, on the other hand, Thomas knew the enemy's location
the day before, and in preparation for a surprise attack, IIRC, had
vedettes a long ways out, backed by pickets, which in turn were
backed by an advance regiment.  This gave his force sufficient
notice of the enemy's advance.  Federal troops came forward, IIRC,
just as the advance regiment was about to withdraw in the face of
three enemy regiments.  With his main body of troops up from their
camps he stopped and then broke the enemy line and then he pursued
and scattered their entire force and captured almost all of their
artillery, camp equipage, and animals.

That's how Grant should have done it, but Grant was surprised and
unprepared and his army paid for it with their lives.  If he had
been prepared to receive an attack in a very defensible, unflankable
position by an enemy who only outnumbered his by some 20%, the
Rebels should have been beaten off easily after suffering heavy
losses, and the imminent presence of Buell's army and Wallace's
division should have allowed an overwhelming pursuit.

Joseph


--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Will <wh_keene@y...>"
<wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose
<josepharose@y...>"
> <josepharose@y...> wrote:
> > ...
> > None of these battles exhibited the level of surprise at Shiloh.
>
> These battles exhibited similar levels of suprise based on your
> expressed criteria--"a solid front line, supported by sufficient
> artillery and by nearby reserves, the whole led by its commander"
as
> well as the your comments about tents, etc.
>
>
> > At Mills Springs, the Rebels' overnight march ran into the
Federals
> > vedettes which were stationed out far enough to prevent any
> > significant surprise.  This was not at all similar to Shiloh.
>
> Why not?  There was not a solid front line, the tents were still
up
> in the camp, the commanding general had to be fetched from the
camp,
> etc.
>
>
> > At Stone's River, the extent of surprise probably came closest
to
> > Shiloh's, but the troops engaged were face-to-face with the
enemy
> > and knew that there would be fighting the next day.  The
> > Confederates achieved a good deal of surprise by concentrating
> units
> > on their left and extending past the Federal flank early in the
> > morning.
>
> Yes, and thereby there was not a solid front line to meet that
enemy
> advance.  Thus by your criteria, there was significant tactical
> suprise.
>
>
> > At Chickamauga, there would be a certain amount of surprise any
> time
> > troops came charging out of the forest.  Again, however, the two
> > armies were facing each other and knew that fighting was
imminent.
> > The big problem wasn't any surprise per se, but the positioning
of
> > troops along the line.
>
> Isn't that your argument abotu Shiloh too?
> When Thomas sent a detachment out on Sept 19 at Chicka maugua, he
was
> poorly informed as to the presence of the enemy.  When the enemy
> attacked, it was not meet with a solid front line with reserves
> nearby and artillery in place.
>
> Your explanation for why you claimed Shiloh was such a tactical
> suprise seems applicable to all these other battles.
>
> Will