Hi Steve, I suggest you go to www.civilwarhome.com and ask Shotgun for the info your looking for (He is the man) and he can also tell you about a great chatroom that can help. Bonnie

----------
From: Steve Charles <gunner@...>
To: civilwarwest@egroups.com
Subject: [civilwarwest] 5th Wisconsin Battery
Date: Saturday, October 02, 1999 9:08 PM

Hi, I'm a new member seeking any info available on the 5th Wisconsin Battery or any of it's members Thank you Steve Charles

I don't know much about the 5th Wisconsin Battery. However, I do know it was commanded by Capt. George Q. Gardner.  Hope this helps you some.

Larry (KyReb)

Steve Charles wrote:

 Hi,I'm a new member seeking any info available on the 5th Wisconsin Battery or any of it's membersThank youSteve Charles

---

Click Here! eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications

Steve Charles wrote:
>
> Hi,
> I'm a new member seeking any info available on the 5th Wisconsin
> Battery or any of it's members
> Thank you
> Steve Charles

Hi Steve,

I'm not sure whether you have Dyer's Compendium but there is a minnie
history in there of the 5th Wisconsin Battery that is short but has a
lot of info about their participation in the war. In the Official
Records, I found 40 references to them in the various reports.
Additionally, there are after battle reports for the 5th at the Battle
of Stones River (Murfreesborough), The Chickamauga Campaign, The Atlanta
Campaign, and The Campaign of the Carolinas. The 5th Wisconsin Battery
has a record in the war that is long and proud.

I can send any one of these or all of them to you. I am reluctant to
send anything without first checking to see if you already have the data
(Heck, I may have already sent it and just don't remember). If you need
any of this, just let me know. I ain't hard to find :-)

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Dick (a.k.a. Shotgun)
http://www.civilwarhome.com

Good day to all.  I have been a member for a month or so but haven't
been able to visit at all as the summer is my busiest time of the year.


I have been researching the history of the 23d Mississippi Infantry
Regiment.  It all started with a copy of a  letter my great-frandfather
wrote in which he breifly detailed the places he visited during the
war.  Not being from the south I thought is would be "fun" to look on a
map to se whre these places he visited were located.  That was six
years ago.  I couldn't find much on the map.  What I did find was more
questions which, of course, led to more and more questions which needed
answers.  It is a never ending quest.

As I have introduced myself I must pose a question relating to Fort
Donelson.  The question is, simply, does the following statement make
sense? If not, where have I missed sometning?  My premise is the
strategy devised by Genreal Grant and Commodore Foote was to trick
Johnston into believing an invasion of the Mississippi River was about
to begin.

On January 7, 1862, an elaborate series of deceptive troop movements
begins southward towards Columbus.

Commodore Foote makes a reconnaissance with 3 gunboats down the
Mississippi to within 2 miles of Columbus.
At the same time Grant sends General McClernand  with 5000 troops and
two batteries of light artillery on another reconnaissance in the
general direction of Columbus.  McClernand eventually takes a position
commanding the road between Paducah and Columbus.
At this point Grant (also with 5000 troops) joins McClernand and moves
the now 10,000 man force to a point 10 miles east of Columbus.  This
troop movement should have appeared to be an expedition to cut supply
lines between Columbus and its supply depot, Union City.
While this was going on, another 5000 troops under the command of
General Smith leaves Cairo in the general direction of Columbus.
Once Confederate scouts reported communication links had been
established between Grant, McClernand, and Smith, this charade should
have appeared to be the beginnings of a major campaign to gain control
of the Mississippi River.
Already prepared for exactly this kind of attack, Johnston should have
done nothing...and he did nothing.
As luck would have it, President Lincoln had ordered a general military
advance southward all along the front from the Atlantic seaboard to the
Mississippi River to take place around the first of February.
Movement was occurring everywhere.  All Confederate forces were on
alert  and commanders were hesitant to release their reserve troops to
support others weakened by Federal attacks.


Suddenly, on January 21, Grant returns his entire expedition to Cairo.
   When General Johnston hears about this sudden move a few days later,
he correctly concludes Forts Henry and Donelson were the targets all
along, but time is against him.   Reasonably certain the fall of Forts
Henry and Donelson was only a matter of time, and knowing he could not
hold Kentucky without the forts in Confederate possession, Johnston
abandons Bowling Green and moves his thirty thousand men to Nashville.
  Around the 1st of February troops including  D. W.  Wade were ordered
out of winter quarters and sent to Fort Donelson via Clarksville,
Kentucky.  This was movement of the troops towards Fort Donelson.  The
23rd Regiment arrived on  Feb 7.

Hello. I'm new to this list, but a "veteran" to the Civil War. I was
intorduced to this list in the AceWeb chatroom. those of you from there will
know me as TreeFrog. My main nitrest is the Berdan's Sharpshooters in the AoP
*That's not like a vulgar word in here is it?* But have began researching
Western Theater movements and battles, etc, for a reenactment unit. Hope to
find out alot here, unfortunetly I've neglected this part of the war in my
studies. And if any of you have info on the 26th Mo Inf (USA) please let me
kno. Thanks.

Robb Brown "TreeFrog"

I have forwarded this on in total because it is most definitely on
topic.
I can't answer the questions (especially about the Order of Battle)
because I am away from my library. However, if I remember correctly the
armies in that area of the war at the time were set up in wings and did
not have Corps as they would later have. For instance, a quick glance at
the ORs shows the Army of The Mississippi (yep, in this case "The" is
proper)at Perryville divided into two wings with the Righ Wing having
the First Division and the Left Wing having the Second and Third
Divisions. By looking at the Casualty Returns report I can break these
down to the Brigade and Regiment level.  However, since the data is said
to be incomplete I would be reluctant to post a further break down
unless requested to do so.

As far as a discussion on Fort Donelson goes, this is as good a place as
any to start one. I'm sure you will get a lot of responses in the this
area.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Dick (a.k.a. Shotgun)
http://www.civilwarhome.com

-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen D Wakefield <SDWAKEFIELD@...>
To: civilwarwest@egroups.com <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
Date: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 10:11 PM
Subject: [civilwarwest] Organization of Cs forces In Kentucky campaign

GENERAL ORDERS No. 116.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 2,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 15, 1862.

I. The commander of the forces resumes command of the Army of the Mississippi for the impending campaign.

II. Major-General Polk is assigned to the command of the right wing, composed of Cheatham's and Withers divisions as now organized, and Major-General Hardee will command the left wing, formed of the divisions of Jones and Wood.

By command of General Bragg:

THOMAS JORDAN,

Chief of Staf

GENERAL ORDERS No. 4.

 

HEADQUARTERS FORCES,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 17, 1862.

The following-named officers and troops will be left for the base of operations at and near Chattanooga, Tenn., Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones in command:

Brig. Gen S.B. Maxey: First Regiment Kentucky Cavalry; Howard's battalion <ar23_762> (nine companies) Georgia cavalry; Crawford's regiment (Third) Georgia cavalry; Forty-first Regiment Alabama Volunteers, Col. [H.] Talbird; Thirty-second Regiment Alabama Volunteers, Colonel McKinstry; Fourth Regiment Florida Volunteers, Col. [J.P.] Hunt; Twenty-fifth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers.

Three companies Forty-first Regiment Alabama Volunteers will remain at Hiwassee Bridge, Charleston, Tenn., under a field officer; the other companies to report to Maj. Gen. S. Jones at this point for assignment. The Twenty-seventh Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Col. Thomas M. Jones, is transferred to the left wing, and will report to Major-General Hardee. Two batteries of light artillery, one from each wing, to be designated by the commander, will report for duty to Maj. Gen. S. Jones.

By command of General Bragg:

THOMAS JORDAN,

Chief of Staff.

-----

Organization of the Right Wing, Army of the Mississippi, under Maj. Gen. L. Polk, August 18 and 20, 1862.

CHEATHAM'S DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. BENJAMIN F CHEATHAM.

First Brigade.

Brig Gen. D. S. DONELSON.

8th Tennessee, Col. W. L. Moore.

15th Tennessee, Col. R. C. Tyler.

16th Tennessee, Col. John H. Savage.

38th Tennessee, Col. John C. Carter.

51st Tennessee, Col. John Chester.

Carnes' battery, Capt. W. W. Carnes.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. A. P. STEWART.

4th Tennessee, Col. O. F. Strahl.

5th Tennessee, Col. C. D. Venable.

24th Tennessee, Lieut. Col. H. L. W. Bratton.

31st Tennessee, Col. E. E. Tansil.

33d Tennessee, Col. W. P Jones.

Stanford's battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE MANEY.

41st Georgia, Col. C. A. McDaniel.

1st Tennessee, Col. H. R. Feild.

6th Tennessee, Col. George C. Porter.

9th Tennessee, Col. C. S. Hurt.

27th Tennessee, Col. A. W. Caldwell.

M. Smith's battery, Lieut. W. B. Turner.

Fourth Brigade.

Brig. Gen. PRESTON SMITH.

12th Tennessee, Col. T. H. Bell.

13th Tennessee, Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.

47th Tennessee, Col. M. R. Hill.

154th Tennessee, Col. E. Fitzgerald.

9th Texas, Col. W. H. Young.

Sharpshooters, Capt. P. T. Allin.

S. P. Bankhead's battery, Lieut. W. L. Scott.

WITHERS' DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. J. M. WITHERS.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. FRANK GARDNER.

19th Alabama, Col. Joseph Wheeler.

22d Alabama, Col. Z. C. Deas.

25th Alabama, Col. J. Q. Loomis.

26th Alabama, Col. J. G. Coltart.

39th Alabama, Col. H. D. Clayton.

Sharpshooters, Capt. B.C. Yancey.

Robertson's baty., Capt. F. H. Robertson.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. R. CHALMERS.

5th Mississippi, Lieut. Col. W. L. Sykes.

7th Mississippi, Col. W. H. Bishop.

9th Mississippi, Capt. T. H. Lynam.

10th Mississippi, Lieut. Col. J. G. Bullard.

29th Mississippi, Col. E. C. Walthall.

Blythe's Mississippi regiment, Lieut. Col. James Moore.

Ketchum's baty., Capt. Wm. H. Ketchum.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. K. JACKSON.

24th Alabama, Col. W. A. Buck.

32d Alabama, Col. Alexander McKinstry.

5th Georgia, Col. W. T. Black.

8th Mississippi, Lieut. Col. A. McNeill.

27th Mississippi,(*) Col. T. M. Jones.

Burtwell's battery, Capt. J. R. B. Burtwell.

Fourth Brigade.

Col. A. M. MANIGAULT, 10th South Carolina Infantry.

28th Alabama, Lieut. Col. John C. Reid.

34th Alabama, Col. J. C.B. Mitchell.

1st Louisiana, Lieut. Col. F. H. Farrar, Jr.

10th South Carolina, Lieut. Col. James F. Pressley.

19th South Carolina, Col. A. J. Lythgoe.

Waters' battery, Capt. David D. Waters.

-----

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 157.

 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 2,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 19, 1862.

* * * * * * * * * *

IV. Maj. Gen. S. B. Buckner, Provisional Army, having reported at these headquarters, is assigned to duty with the left wing of the Army of the Mississippi, and will report to Major-General Hardee.

* * * * * * * * * *

By command of General Bragg:

[GEO. G. GARNER,]

Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 159.

 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 2,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 21, 1862.

* * * * * * * * * *

IV. Brig. Gen. J. K. Duncan, Provisional Army, will report to Major-General Polk for duty with Withers' division.

* * * * * * * * * *

By command of General Bragg:

[GEO. G. GARNER,

] Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 5.

 

HDQRS. RIGHT WING, ARMY OF THE MISS.,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 21, 1862.

* * * * * * * * * *

II. Brig. Gen. J. K. Duncan will report for duty to Brigadier-General Withers, commanding Withers' division, right wing, to be assigned to the command of the brigade now commanded by Colonel Manigault.

By command of Major-General Polk:

GEORGE WILLIAMSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

-----

[CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 2,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 25, 1862.

On the proposed advance movement of the army general headquarters will be accompanied by the following staff departments, with the number of officers and attachés and the means of transportation herein prescribed:

1. General Headquarters.--Personal staff, 4 aides; adjutant-general's department, 3; judge-advocate, 1; medical inspector, 1, with 2 wagons and 1 ambulance.

2. Medical Department.--Medical director, 1; medical inspector, 1, and 1 wagon and 2 ambulances.

3. Engineer Department.--Chief of engineers, 1; draughtsman, 1, with I wagon.

4. Quartermaster's Department.--Chief quartermaster, 1; assistants, 2; ordnance department, chief of ordnance, and 1 four-horse wagon.

5. Subsistence Department.--Chief of subsistence, 1; assistants, 1; clerks, 2, and 1 two-horse wagon.

6. Artillery.--Chief, 1; inspectors, 2, with 1 two-horse wagon.

7. The chief of staff, with clerks, will remain, with the records. &c., of the department, at Chattanooga and carry on the current business, forwarding only such papers as may be necessary.

8. The chief paymaster will remain with his department in Chattanooga, furnishing a small amount of funds to the quartermaster who moves forward for payment of officers.

9. Extra wagons and ambulances will be turned in to the chief quartermaster. Supernumerary officers will report to Major-General Jones.

By command of General Bragg:

JNO. M. OTEY,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

-----

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 164.

 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 2,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 26, 1862.

* * * * * * * * * *

VIII. The following assignment of cavalry is announced: Crawford's, Mead's, and Allen's regiments, commanded by Colonel Wheeler, <ar23_782> to left wing, Army of the Mississippi, and will report to Major-General Hardee.

* * * * * * * * * *

By command of General Bragg:

JNO. M. OTEY,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 7.

 

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Glasgow, Ky., September 14, 1862.

* * * * * * * * * *

V. The following cavalry force, to be commanded by Brig. Gen. N. B. Forrest, is assigned to the right wing, Army of the Mississippi, and will report to Major-General Polk forthwith: First Alabama, [W. W.] Allen; Second Georgia, [W. J.] Lawton; [Fourth] Tennessee, [J.P.] Murray; Forrest's regiment, [Third Tennessee Cavalry], four companies; [J. F.] Lay's [Confederate] regiment. The following cavalry force, to be commanded by Col. Joseph Wheeler, is assigned to the left wing, Army of the Mississippi, and will report forthwith to Major-General Hardee: Third Georgia, Crawford; First Kentucky, Maj. [J. W.] Caldwell; Texas Rangers, [Eighth Texas Cavalry]. Wharton; [J. D.] Bennett's battalion.

* * * * * * * * * *

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3.

 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 2,
Bardstown, Ky., September 25, 1862.
(Rec'd Hdqrs. Army of the West, Nov. 19, 1862.)

I. Brig. Gen. N. B. Forrest is relieved from duty with this army, and is charged with the military operations in Middle Tennessee. He is <ar23_877> authorized to raise six regiments of new troops, two of cavalry and four of infantry, and muster them into the Confederate States service. With these and such corps as he may find already organized he will operate against the enemy wherever found, but especially at Nashville, Clarksville, &c., cutting off' supplies, capturing trains, and harassing them in all ways practicable.

II. Requisitions will be made on Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones at Chattanooga for arms and ammunition.

III. The four companies of Forrest's cavalry will report to the general as his escort on this service and remain subject to his order.

By command of General Bragg:

JNO. M. OTEY,

 

CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Bardstown, Ky., September 27, I862.

The following disposition of cavalry will be immediately made:

Right Wing, Army of the Mississippi.--Colonel Wharton, with main force, will establish his headquarters at High Grove or Salt River, if enemy will permit, with strong pickets in front; one regiment at Taylorsville, strong pickets in front; one regiment at or near Shepherdsville, strong pickets in front.

Left Wing, Army of the Mississippi.--Colonel Wheeler, with main force, will establish his headquarters at Boston; one regiment at Lebanon Junction, pickets at or near Elizabethtown; one regiment at New Haven, and pickets well down on Glasgow road.

By command of General Bragg:

GEO. G. GARNER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

-----

GENERAL ORDERS No. 9.

 

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Bardstown, Ky., September 28, 1862.

The general commanding, temporarily absent, relinquishes the command of this army to Major-General Polk.

By command of General Bragg:

GEO. G. GARNER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

-----

GENERAL ORDERS No. 8.

 

HDQRS. RIGHT WING, ARMY OF THE MISS.,
In Camp near Bardstown, Ky., 2½ miles east,
on the Springfield Turnpike, Sept. 28, 1862.

I. The general commanding, having been temporarily placed in command of the Army of the Mississippi, hereby relinquishes the command of the right wing to Major-General Cheatham.

By command of Major-General Polk:

GEORGE WILLIAMSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Abstract from Daily Returns, right wing, Army of the Mississippi, Maj. (Gen. L. Polk commanding, for October 1, 1862, near Bardstown, Ky.

Command. Effective
total. Total
present. Total
present
and
absent.

 

FIRST (DONELSON'S) DIVISION

1st (Savage's) Brigade 1,553 1,720 2,554

2d (Stewart's) Brigade 1,741 1,823 2,812

3d (Maney's) Brigade 1,799 1,927 3,002

Total First Division 5,093 5,570 8,368

{Actual Total--Ed.} 5,470

RESERVE (WITHERS') DIVISION.

1st (Gardner's) Brigade 2,303 2,526 4,264

2d (Chalmers') Brigade 1,582 1,805 3,139

4th (Duncan's) Brigade 1,673 1,876 3,705

Total Reserve Division 5,558 6,207 11,108

Grand total 10,651 11,777 19,476

Reorganization of the troops under command of Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith.

[About October 31, 1862. ]

FIRST DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. C. L. STEVENSON.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. S. M. BARTON.

30th Alabama, Col. C. M. Shelley.

31st Alabama, Col. D. R. Hundley.

40th Georgia, Col. A. Johnson.

52d Georgia, Col. W. Boyd.

9th Georgia Battalion, Maj. Joseph T. Smith.

Anderson's battery, Capt. J. W. Anderson.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JAMES E. RAINS.

4th Tennessee, Col. J. A. McMurry.

11th Tennessee, Col. G. W. Gordon.

29th North Carolina, Col. R. B. Vance.

42d Georgia, Col. R. J. Henderson.

3d Georgia Battalion, Lieut. Col. M. A. Stovall.

Eufaula Artillery, Capt. W. A. McTyer.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. THOMAS H. TAYLOR.

36th Georgia, Col. J. A. Glenn.

39th Georgia. Col. J. T. McConnell.

54th [57th] Georgia, Col. William Barkuloo.

56th Georgia, Col. E. P. Watkins.

59th [34th] Georgia, Col. J. A. W. Johnson.

Cherokee Artillery, Capt. Max. Van Den Corput.

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. J. P. McCowN.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. E. D. TRACY.

20th Alabama, Col. I. W. Garrott.

23d Alabama, Col. F. K. Beck.

46th Alabama, Col. M. L. Woods.

43d Georgia, Col. Skidmore Harris.

Waddell's artillery, Capt. J. F. Waddell.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. M. D. ECTOR.

10th Texas Dismounted Cavalry, Col. C. R. Earp.

11th Texas Dismounted Cavalry, Col. J. C. Burks.

14th Texas Dismounted Cavalry, Col. A. Harris.

15th Texas Dismounted Cavalry, Col. J. A. Weaver.

Douglas' artillery, Capt. J.P. Douglas.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. E. McNAIR.

4th Arkansas, Col. H. O. Bunn.

30th Arkansas Col. C. J. Turnbull.

31st Arkansas, Col. T. H. McCray.

4th Arkansas Battalion, Major Ross.

1st Arkansas Dismounted Rifles, Col. R. W. Harper.

2d Arkansas Dismounted Rifles, Col. J. A. Williamson.

Humphreys' battery, Capt. J. T. Humphreys.

Fourth---Hilliard's Legion.

Col. A. H. BRADFORD.

1st Alabama Battalion, Lieut.. Col. J. Thorington.

2d Alabama Batt'n. Lieut. Col. B. Hall, jr.

3d Alabama Battalion, Lieut. Col. J. W. A. Sanford.

4th Alabama Battalion, Lieut. Col. W. N. Reeves.

Kolb's artillery, Capt. R. F. Kolb.

<ar23_985>

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. HENRY HETH.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. W. G. M. Davis.

1st Florida Dismounted, Cavalry Col. G. T. Maxwell.

6th Florida, Col. J. J. Finley.

7th Florida, Col. M. S. Perry.

Marion Artillery, Capt. J. M. Martin.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. A. GRACIE, JR.

43d Alabama, Col. Y. M. Moody.

55th Georgia, Col. C. B. Harkie.

58th North Carolina, Col. J. B. Palmer.

62d North Carolina, Col. R. G. A. Love.

64th North Carolina, Col. L. M. Allen.

Newman Artillery, Capt. G. M. Hanvey.

Third--Smith's Legion.

Col. SUMNER J. SMITH.

Battalion Georgia Cavalry, Lieut. Col. J. R. Hart.

Battalion Georgia Volunteers, Col. John S. Fain.

Fourth Brigade.

Col. A. W. REYNOLDS.

3d Tennessee, Col. N.J. Lillard.

31st Tennessee, Col. W. M. Bradford.

[59th] Tennessee, Col. J. B. Cooke.

43d Tennessee, Col. J. W. Gillespie.

39th North Carolina, Col. D. Coleman.

3d Maryland Battery, Capt. H. B. Latrobe.

 

63d Tennessee, Col. R. G. Fain.

Regiment North Carolina Volunteers, Col. W. H. Thomas.

First Cavalry Brigade.

JOHN H. MORGAN.

2d Kentucky, Col. B. W. Duke.

7th Kentucky, Col. R. M. GaNo. 1st

8th Kentucky, Col. R. S. Cluke.

11th Kentucky, Col. D. W. Chenault.

9th Kentucky Battalion, Maj. W. C. P. Breckinridge.

Howitzer Battery, Captain Arnett.

Second Cavalry Brigade.

Brig. Gen. JOHN PEGRAM.

1st Tennessee, Col. H. M. Ashby.

3d Tennessee, Col. J. W. Starnes.

-- Tennessee, Col. J. E. Carter.

[3d Confederate] Col. James R. Howard.

Howitzer Battery, Capt. G. A. Huwald.

First section Kain's artillery, Lieut. Hugh White.

Third Cavalry Brigade.

Col. J. S. SCOTT.

1st Georgia, Col. J. J. Morrison.

1st Louisiana, Lieut. Col. J. O. Nixon.

12th Tennessee Battalion, Maj. T. W. Adrian.

Howitzer Battery,Captain Holmes

7th North Carolina Battalion, Lieut. Col. G. N. Folk.

[16th] Tennessee Battalion, Maj. E. W. Rucker.

2d [5th] Tennessee, Col. G. W. McKenzie.

16th Battalion Georgia Partisans, Lieut. Col. F. M. Nix.

[3d] Kentucky Cavalry, Col. J. R. Butler.

Horse Artillery, Capt. W. R. Marshall.

-----

These are excerpts from Hardee's Perryville report:

"The forces under my command were two divisions, constituting the left wing of the army, commanded respectively by Major-General Buckner and Brig. Gen. J. Patton Anderson. Each consisted of four brigades, with a battery attached to each brigade."

"Brigadier-General Anderson, with two brigades, under command of Brigadier-General Adams and Colonel Powell, covered the extreme left on the Springfield road to"

"The brigade of Brigadier-General Johnson gallantly led the advance, with Brigadier-General Cleburne's as a support, while the brigade of General St. John R. Liddell was held as a reserve. The brigades of [John C.] Brown and Jones, of Anderson's, and [S. A.M.] Wood, of Buckner's division, had been detached to occupy the interval between the right of Buckner and the left of Cheatham, and the two remaining brigades of Anderson's division, under command of General [D. W.] Adams and Col. [Sam.] Powell, [Twenty-ninth Tennessee], covered the extreme left of our line. "

 

 

---

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>     2)  Are there any sites, discussions, case studies etc., that
deal with the "What If" of the "Fort Donelson Fiasco".  "What If" the
Fort had held out longer, allowing an orderly retreat from Nashville,
or yet still held out altogether and saved Nashville for the time
being?  Where would the next battles have occurred?  Would Halleck have
allowed Grant to continue with his "expedition" if he would have been
beaten again the next day?  I fully realize I'm no General, soldier
either for that matter...., but I've been to Ft. Donelson, and can't
understand the reasons given for the "Surrender" of 16,000 effectives.
Although C.F. Smith may have taken SB Buckner's forward rifle pits, and
did control some of the "high ground" around Hickman Creek,  I can't
imagine that AS Johnston sent the re-inforcements to Donelson to be
surrendered.  As NB Forest said " I did not come out for the purpose of
surrendering my command.....".
>
> Thanks in advance for any help or advice you may provide or offer.
>
> My name is Don Myers, I'm from (live in) Michigan, although prior to
my mid-1950's birth, my family hailed from Tennessee, (Reelfoot Lake
Area, Obion Co.), and Kentucky, (Mayfield-Graves Co.).
>
> My e-mail is "forlife@...", (I have a teenaged son who is a
"Pro" wrestling fanatic and the address was picked without my input, as
at the time I was "computer illiterate".  Still just learning if you
can't tell.
>
> Thanks again, Don.


This is Waldemar Winkler responding (e-mail: pedinkler@...):

Please take the following comments in perspective, as I have yet to get
a firm grasp on what happened, let alone entertain "what if".
Nonetheless, Mr. Weeks, a.k.a. "shotgun" , excellent website provides
reports from generals Wallace, Buckner, Floyd, and Pillow regarding Ft.
Donelson which may shed some light on your "what if" scenario.  Reading
them all helped me gain some insight.

I am basing my following comments on what I think are four critical
situations.  First, this is early in the war.  Second, defection of
officers to the south in the US Army left some significant voids.
Third, even with a few years of thoughtful preparation from the
sidelines, the Confederate Military organization had to be built from
scratch, and quickly. Fourth, the logistics of successful military
organization in the Western theatre were nightmarish as best.

In my case, I discovered that Gen. Pillow mentions that Col. Davidson
(cmdr of the 23d Miss. Inf. Rgmt.)  did not bring his troops on line
according to the battle plan.  This was the attempt to make a line of
escape through the Federal line.
The problem was that Col. Davidson was ill (he later died of dysentery
in POW camp), and (I surmise) no one else on his staff was willing to
take the responsibility to move the regiment into position.  That was
about 960 personnel who did not get the opportunity to "make a
difference".

In reading the reports of Generals Wallace, Buckner, Floyd, and Pillow
I am forced to ask, Why did Gen. Johnston send Pillow and Floyd to Ft.
Donelson in the first place?   I don't ink he had a lot to choose from.
From what I've been able to tell, these officers were the worst.  Even
Grant is reputed to have said they were more valuable to him on active
duty in the CSA than as prisoners.

In my message (#117) I suggest General Johnston was subjected to (and
fell for) an elaborate deception prior to the Ft. Henry/Donelson
attack. Because the Confederate command expected the Federals to follow
their well known plan of securing control of the Mississippi River, and
Gen. Grant and Commodore Foote reinforced that idea in their movements
in Jan. of 1862, no one really expected any threat to the Tennessee and
Cumberland Rivers.  In consequence, I believe Forts Henry and Donelson
were give a low priority in regards to developing defenses.  I think
Johnston was caught in total surprise.  He threw a large number of
reinforcements into the area in hopes he could stall an unexpected
disaster.

Hindsignt being 20-20 vision, if I had been Johnston, I would have left
Buckner in command.

The following material is presented for your consideration and comment.
Was Pillow really such a jerk or was Buckner the first "spin doctor"?
Hopefully just some food for thought.
  Portions of General Floyd's  Ft. Donelson Report

<BR><font size=2>The enemy had been landing re-enforcements throughout
the day. His numbers had been augmented to eighty-three regiments. Our
troops were completely exhausted by four days and nights of continued
conflict. To renew it, with any hope of successful result was obviously
vain, and such I understand to be the unanimous opinion of all the
officers present at the council called to consider what was best to be
done. I thought, and so announced, that a desperate onset upon the
right of the enemy's forces, on the ground where we had attacked them
in the morning, might result in the extricating of a considerable
proportion of the command from the position we were in, and this
opinion I understood to be concurred in by all who were present; but it
was likewise agreed, with the same unanimity, that it would result in
the slaughter of nearly all who did not succeed in effecting their
escape. The question then a rose whether, in point of humanity and a
sound military policy, a course should be adopted from which the
probabilities were that the larger proportion of the command would be
cut to pieces in an unavailing fight against overwhelming numbers. I
understood the general sentiment to be averse to the proposition, I
felt that in this contingency, while it might be questioned whether I
should, as commander of the army, lead it to certain destruction in an
unavailing fight, I had a right individually to determine that I would
not survive a surrender there. To satisfy both propositions, I agreed
to hand over the command to Brigadier-General Buckner through
Brigadier-General Pillow, and to make an effort  for my own extrication
by any and every means that might present themselves to me. ....
The consultation which took place among the officers on the night of
the 15th was to ascertain whether a further struggle could be
maintained, and it was resolved in the negative unconditionally and
emphatically. General Buckner, whose immediate command was the largest
in the fort, was positive and unequivocal in his opinion that the fight
could not be renewed. I confess I was myself strongly influenced by
this opinion of General Buckner; for I have not yet seen an officer in
whose superior military ability, clear, discriminating judgment, in
whose calm, unflinching courage and unselfish patriotism I more fully
confide than in his. The loss to the Confederacy of so able, brave, and
accomplished a soldier is irreparable.</font size>


Portions of General Pillows Report and resulting correspondence:


<font size=2> <br>We had fought the battle to open the way for our army
and to relieve us from an investment which would necessarily reduce us
and the position we occupied by famine. We had accomplished our object,
but it occupied the whole day, and before we could prepare to leave,
after taking in the wounded and dead, the enemy had thrown around us
again in the night an immense force of fresh troop and reoccupied his
original position in the line of investment, thus again cutting off our
retreat. .... The command had been in the trenches night and day for
five days, exposed to the snow, sleet, mud, and ice-water, without
shelter and without adequate covering and without sleep. In this
condition the general officers held a consultation, to determine what
we should do. General Buckner gave it's his decided opinion that he
could not hold his position a half hour against an assault of the
enemy, and said he was satisfied the enemy would attack him at daylight
the next morning. The proposition was then made by the undersigned to
again fight our way through the enemy's line and cut our way out.
General Buckner said his command was so worn-out and cut to pieces and
demoralized that he could not make another fight; that it would cost
the command three-fourths its present numbers to cut its way out; that
it was wrong to sacrifice three-fourths of a command to save
one-fourth, and that no officer had a right to cause such a sacrifice.
General Floyd and Major Gilmer I understood to concur in this opinion.
I then expressed the opinion that we could hold out another day, and in
that time we could get steamboats and set the command over the river
and probably save a large portion of it. To this General Buckner
replied that the enemy would certainly attack him in the morning and
that he could not hold his position a half hour.
<br>.....The alternative of these propositions was a surrender of the
position  and command. General Floyd said he would not surrender the
command nor would he surrender himself a prisoner. I had taken the same
position. General Buckner said he was satisfied nothing else could be
done, and that therefore he would surrender the command, if placed in
command. General Floyd said he would turn over the command to him, if
he could be allowed to withdraw his command. To this General Buckner
consented. Thereupon the command was turned over to me, I passing it
instantly to General Buckner, saying I would neither surrender the
command nor myself. I directed Colonel Forrest to cut his way out.
<br>Under these circumstances General Buckner accepted the command and
sent a flag of truce to the enemy for an armistice of six hours, to
negotiate for terms of capitulation. Before this flag and communication
were delivered I retired from the garrison........
<br>With these facts all before Generals Floyd, Buckner, and myself
(the two former having remained at my quarters all the intervening
while), General Floyd said: "Well, gentlemen, what is best now to be
done?" Neither General Buckner nor myself having answered promptly,
General Floyd repeated his inquiry, addressing himself to me by name.
My reply was that it was difficult to determine what was best to be
done, but that I was in favor of cutting our way out. He then asked
General Buckner .... that the army had done all it was possible to do,
and that duty and honor required no more. General Floyd then remarked
that his opinion coincided with General Buckner's.............
Again, I believe we could have maintained our position another day, and
have saved the army by getting back our boats and setting the command
across the river; but, inasmuch as General Buckner was of opinion that
he could not hold his position half an hour and I could not possibly do
more than hold my own portion of the line, I had no alternative but to
submit to the decision of a majority of my brother general
officers.</font size>
........
Accompanying Pillows reports where the following reports:

<font size=2>Statement of Col. John C. Burch.
DECATUR, ALA., March 15, 1862.
On Saturday evening, February 15, .... After supper a council of
officers was held at Brigadier-General Pillow's headquarters. I was not
present at this council, but during its session, being in an adjoining
room, I learned from some officers that intelligence had been received
from scouts on the east side of the river that fourteen of the enemy's
transports were landing re-enforcements 1½ or 2 miles below us, at
their usual place of landing.
<BR>After I learned this, and during the session of the same council,
two couriers came to Brigadier-General Buckner, ...-one stating that a
large force was forming in front of our right (General Buckner's) wing,
the second stating that large bodies of the enemy were seen moving in
front of our right around towards our left.
<br>After the adjournment of this council, about 11 or 12 o'clock, I
learned that it had been determined to evacuate the post, cut our way
through the right wing of the enemy's investing force, ...
<br> in General Pillow's private room, where Generals Floyd, Pillow,
and Buckner all were, two scouts came in, stating that the enemy's
campfires could be seen at the same places in front of our left that
they had occupied Friday. ....
Major Rice, ... and interrogated as to the character of the road to
Charlotte. His account of it was decidedly unfavorable. In the course
of the conversation which then followed among the generals--<b>General
Pillow insisting upon carrying out the previous determination of the
council--to cut our way out </b>Brigadier-General Buckner said that
such was the exhausted condition of the men that if they should succeed
in cutting their way out it would be at a heavy sacrifice; and if
pursued by the large cavalry force of the enemy they would be almost
entirely cut to pieces. General Floyd concurred with General Buckner.
General Pillow said: "Then we can fight them another day in our
trenches, and by to-morrow night we can have boats enough here to
transport our troops across the river and let them make their escape to
Clarksville." General Buckner said that such was the position of the
enemy on his right, and the demoralization of his forces from exposure
and exhaustion that he could not hold his trenches half an hour....
General Floyd concurred with General Buckner in his opinion as to the
impossibility of holding the trenches longer, .... General Pillow said
that he never would surrender. General Floyd said that he would suffer
any fate before he would surrender or fall into the hands of the enemy
alive.....Colonel Forrest, of the cavalry, who was present, said he
would die before he would surrender; that such of his men as would
follow him he would take out. General Floyd said he would take his
chances with Forrest, and asked General Buckner if he would make the
surrender. General Buckner asked him if he (General Floyd) would pass
the command to him. General Floyd replied in the affirmative. I
understood General Pillow as doing the same. "Then," said General
Buckner, "I shall propose terms of capitulation ;" and asked for ink
and paper, and directed one of his staff to send for a bugler and
prepare white flags to plant at various points on our works....
. Thus ended the conference.
... JNO. C. BURCH,
  Aide to General Pillow.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of March, 1862.
  LEVI SUGARS,
   Intendant of the Town of Decatur, Ala.,
and ex-officio Justice of the Peace.</font size>
....................


<font size=2>Statement of Col. N. B. Forrest.<BR>
  <BR>MARCH 15, 1862.
<BR>Between 1 and 2 o'clock on Sunday morning, February 16, being sent
for, I arrived at General Pillow's headquarters, and found him, General
Floyd, and General Buckner in conversation. General Pillow told me that
they had received information that the enemy were again occupying the
same ground they had occupied the morning before. .... He instructed me
to go immediately and send two reliable men to ascertain the condition
of a road running near the river bank and between the enemy's right and
the river, and also to ascertain the position of the enemy. I obeyed
his instructions and awaited the return of the scouts. They stated that
they saw no enemy, but could see their fires in the same place where
they were Friday night; that from their examination and information
obtained from a citizen living on the river road the water was about to
the saddle skirts, and the mud about half-leg deep in the bottom where
it had been overflowed. The bottom was about a quarter of a mile wide
and the water then about 100 yards wide.
<BR>During the conversation that then ensued among the general officers
<B><font color=red>General Pillow was in favor of trying to cut our way
out.General Buckner said that he could not hold his position over half
an hour in the morning, and that if he attempted to take his force out
it would be seen by the enemy (who held part of his intrenchments), and
be followed and cut to pieces. I told him that I would take my cavalry
around there and he could draw out under cover of them. He said that an
attempt to cut our way out would involve the loss of three-fourths of
the men.</b> </font color>General Floyd said our force was so
demoralized as to cause him to agree with General Buckner as to our
probable loss in attempting to cut our way out. .... I went out of the
room, and when I returned General Floyd said he could not and would not
surrender himself. I then asked if they were going to surrender the
command. General Buckner remarked that they were. I then slated that I
had not come out for the purpose of surrendering my command, and would
not do it if they would follow me out; that I intended to go out if I
saved but one man; and then turning to General Pillow I asked him what
I should do. He replied, "Cut your way out." I immediately left the
house and sent for all the officers under my command, and stated to
them the facts that had occurred and stated my determination to leave,
and remarked that all who wanted to go could follow me,.... The weather
was intensely cold;  a great many of the men were already frost-bitten,
and it was the opinion of the generals that the infantry could not have
passed through the water and have survived it.
<BR> N. B. FORREST,
  Colonel, Commanding Forrest's Regiment of Cavalry.
<br>Sworn to and subscribed before me on the 15th day of March, 1862.
  LEVI SUGARS, </font size>
......................


Hunter Nioholson's statement.
I was present at the council of war, held at Brigadier-General Pillow's
headquarters, in Dover, on Saturday night, February 15, 1862. I came
into the room about 2 o'clock. There were present Generals Floyd,
Pillow, and Buckner, Major Gilmer, Colonel Forrest, and several staff
officers, among whom I distinctly remember Major Henry and Colonel
Burch, of General Pillow's staff.
The generals were discussing the necessity and practicability of
marching the forces out of the intrenchments and evacuating the place.
...In a little while, or perhaps during the conversation of Major Rice,
the gentleman referred to was announced. He gave a description of the
roads which, from my ignorance of the locality, I am unable to repeat.
The substance was, however, that,<b> though exceedingly difficult, it
was possible to pass the roads with light baggage trains. </b>General
Pillow asked most of the questions propounded to this gentleman, as
also those to Major Rice.
<br>At this point I was called into an adjoining room, where I remained
but a few minutes. ....
About this time a scout was ushered in, who answered that the enemy had
reoccupied the lines from which they had been driven during the fight
on Saturday. General Pillow doubted if the scout was not mistaken; so
another was sent out. ....General Buckner remarked, "I am confident
that the enemy will attack my lines by light, and I cannot hold them
for half an hour." General Pillow replied quickly, "Why so; why so,
general?" General Buckner replied, "Because I can bring into action not
over 4,000 men, and they demoralized by long and uninterrupted exposure
and fighting, while they can bring  any number of fresh troops to the
attack." General Pillow replied, "I differ with you. I think you can
hold your lines; I think you can, sir." General Buckner replied, "I
know my position, and I know that the lines cannot be held with my
troops in the present condition." General Floyd, it was, I think, who
then remarked, "Then, gentlemen, a capitulation is all that is left
us." <b>To which General Pillow replied, "I do not think so; at any
rate, we can cut our way out."</B> General Buckner replied, "To cut our
way out would cost three-fourths of our men, and I do not think any
commander has a right to sacrifice three-fourths of his command to save
one-fourth." To which General Floyd replied, "Certainly not."
<br>About this time the second scout sent out returned, and reported
the enemy in force occupying the position from which they had been
driven. Thereupon two of Colonel Forrest's cavalry were sent to examine
the backwater and report if it could be crossed by the army. These
scouts returned in a short time and reported that cavalry could pass,
but infantry could not. General Buckner then asked, "Well, gentlemen,
what are we to do?" <b>General Pillow replied, "You understand me,
gentlemen; I am for holding out at least to-day, getting boats, and
crossing the command over the river. </B>As for myself, I will never
surrender the command or myself; I will die first." General Floyd
replied, "Nor will I; I cannot and will not surrender, but I must
confess personal reasons control me." General Buckner replied, "But
such considerations should not control a general's actions." General
Floyd replied, "Certainly not; nor would I permit it to cause me to
sacrifice the command." General Buckner replied, "Then I suppose the
duty of surrendering the command will devolve on me." ....A pause here
ensued. Then General Buckner asked, "Am I to consider the command as
turned over to me?" General Floyd replied, "Certainly, I turn over the
command." General Pillow replied quickly, "I pass it; I will not
surrender." General Buckner then called for pen, ink, and paper, and a
bugler. ...Colonel Forrest then asked, "Gentlemen, have I leave to cut
my way out with my command?" General Pillow replied, "Yes, sir; cut
your way out;" and, continuing, "Gentlemen, is there anything wrong in
my leaving?" General Floyd replied, "Every man must judge for himself
of that." General Pillow replied, "Then I shall leave this place." Here
General Pillow left the room, but returned in a short time, and, taking
a seat between Generals Floyd and Buckner, said, "Gentlemen, in order
that we may understand each other, let me state what is my position; I
differ with you as to the cost of cutting our way out, but if it were
ascertained that it would cost three-fourths of the command, I agree
that it would be wrong to sacrifice them for the remaining fourth."
Generals Floyd and Buckner replied, "We understand you, general, and
you understand us." After this I left the room, and soon after the
place.
<br> HUNTER NICHOLSON.
Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 18th day of March, 1862.
<br> LEVI SUGARS,
  Intendant of the Town of Decatur, Ala.,
and ex-officio Justice of the Peace.</font size>


Portions of General Buckner's Report


<font size=2>In a council of general and field officers, held after
night, it was unanimously resolved that if the enemy had not reoccupied
in strength the position in front of General Pillow the army should
effect its retreat, and orders to assemble the regiments for that
purpose were given by General Floyd; but as the enemy had late in the
afternoon appeared in considerable force on the battle-field of the
morning, a reconnaissance was ordered, I think by General Pillow, under
the instructions of General Floyd. The report of this reconnaissance,
made by Colonel Forrest, has been fully stated by Generals Floyd and
Pillow, and, from what I have been able to learn since, I am satisfied
the information reported was correct.
<BR>Among other incidents showing that the enemy had not only
reoccupied their former ground, but extended their lines still farther
to our left, is the fact that Overton's cavalry following after
Forrest's, was cut off from retreat by an infantry force of the enemy
at the point where Format had crossed the stream on the river road.
When the information of our reinvestment was reported, General Floyd,
General Pillow, and myself were the only members of the council
present. Both of these officers have stated the views of the council,
but my recollection of some of the incidents narrated differ so
materially from that of General Pillow,   that, without intending any
reflection upon either of those officers, I feel called upon to notice
some of the differences of opinion between us.
<BR>Both officers have correctly stated that I regarded the position of
the army as desperate, and that an attempt to extricate it by another
battle, in the suffering and exhausted condition of the troops, was
almost hopeless. The troops had been worn down with watching, with
labor, with fighting. Many of them were frosted by the intensity of the
cold; all of them were suffering and exhausted by their incessant
labors. There had been no regular issue of rations for a number of days
and scarcely any means of cooking. Their ammunition was nearly
expended. We were completely invested by a force fully four times the
strength of our own. In their exhausted condition they could not have
made a march. An attempt to make a sortie would have been resisted by a
superior force of fresh troops, and that attempt would have been the
signal for the fall of the water batteries and the presence of the
enemy's gunboats sweeping with the fire at close range the positions of
our troops, who would thus have been assailed on their front, rear, and
right flank at the same instant. The result would have been a virtual
massacre of the troops, more disheartening in its effects than a
surrender.
<br><b>In this opinion General Floyd coincided, and I am certain that
both he and I were convinced that General Pillow agreed with us in
opinion. </B>General Pillow then asked our opinion as to the
practicability of holding our position another day. I replied that my
right was already turned, a portion of my intrenchments in the enemy's
possession--they were in position successfully to assail my position
and the water batteries--and that, with my weakened and exhausted
force, I could not successfully resist the assault which would be made
at daylight by a vastly superior force. I further remarked that I
understood the principal object of the defense of Donelson to be to
cover the movement of General A. S. Johnston's army from Bowling Green
to Nashville, and that if that movement was not completed it was my
opinion that we should attempt a further defense, even at the risk of
the destruction of our entire force, as the delay even of a few hours
might gain the safety of General Johnston's force. General Floyd
remarked that General Johnston's army had already reached Nashville. I
then expressed the opinion that it would be wrong to subject the army
to a virtual massacre when no good could result from the sacrifice,...
General Floyd expressed himself in similar terms, and in his opinion
<b>I understood General Pillow to acquiesce. </B>For reasons which he
has stated General Floyd then announced his purpose to leave, with such
portions of his division as could be transported in two small steamers,
which were expected about daylight....  General Pillow, however,
announced his purpose to leave; when General Floyd directed me to
consider myself in command. I remarked that a capitulation would be as
bitter to me as it could be to any one, but I regarded it as a
necessity of our position, and I could not reconcile it with my sense
of duty to separate my fortune from those of my command..... </font
size>

Question to any and all out there.

  Did Lincoln really need Sherman's "gift" of the city of Atlanta in order
for him to be re-elected?I read and hear from others that the taking of
Atlanta assured Lincoln's re-election.The more I think about it the more
uncomfortable I am with it.What do you think..? Even if Atlanta did hold
out until after the election did Lincoln really have anything to worry
about?

          Stewart

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I really don't think that Lincoln needed Atlanta to win re-election. The
North was on a winning role and the war looked like it was going to be over
soon. By appointing Grant to lead the Army Lincoln had finally found someone
who knew how to defeat Lee. Although people were getting tired of the war I
think they knew that only Lincoln would be able to see them through to the
end. I also think that most people were thinking about what to do with the
South after the war and felt that Lincoln was a good leader to bring the
country back together.
Just my thoughts.
Karen Hall
On Wed, 13 Oct 1999 22:38:55 -0500, Stewart L Bennett wro
> Question to any and all out there.
>
>  Did Lincoln really need Sherman's "gift" of the city of Atlanta in order
> for him to be re-elected?I read and hear from others that the taking of
> Atlanta assured Lincoln's re-election.The more I think about it the more
> uncomfortable I am with it.What do you think..? Even if Atlanta did hold
> out until after the election did Lincoln really have anything to worry
> about?
>
>          Stewart
>
> ___________________________________________________________________
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> Free software, free e-mail, and free Internet access for a month!
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>
>
>





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Dear Karen, Stewart, and group,

One of the hardest things to do, at least for me, is to study the War or any
other historical event from the perspective of those who were there IN that
time, blocking out everything that we now know came after that.

I think that Lincoln THOUGHT that he needed Atlanta, or some other major
battlefield victory, and preferably a consistent string of them, very very
badly.  What we now think of as the "turning point" victories of Gettysburg and
Vicksburg were now a long time in the past. Chickamauga had been a dreadful
setback to what seemed at the time like an inexorable sweep by Rosecrans.  The
war in the east had settled into the siege around Petersburg that must have
seemed to the public to be going absolutely nowhere in terms of bringing the
war to a swift conclusion.

The example I will cite here as far as battlefield reality vs. political
reality is the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. The action was a near
total loss for the North Vietnamese. They lost huge amounts of materiel and
manpower, held none of the objectives that they tried to take.  From a military
perspective it was the last desperate gasp of a force on the verge of losing.

From a POLITICAL perspective though it was an unmitigated loss for Lyndon
Johnson, simply because the enemy was not supposed to be anywhere NEAR able to
attempt such a thing.  The shock that went through the American people (I was
about 17 at the time and remember it well) was palpable. Commentators like
Walter Cronkite and Paul Harvey, who had previously taken the attitude of "we
must stay the course",  started giving editorials to the effect of "We have
spent all this time, money and blood, and these people are just not giving up,
it's time to cut our losses and get out."

To return to the War that we are discussing here though, I can see a very
similar situation happening if Jefferson Davis had ordered that Atlanta be
defended to the last man, and then pumped in every man and boy capable of
firing a gun.  Heck, if he had had a 20-century attitude towards propaganda he
would have staged some photos of women drilling with rifles, followed by one of
armed slaves going to the defense of their country! Can you imagine THOSE
pictures running in Harper's Weekly, or the London Times? ;)

Could they have held out from Sept. 1 till Election Day? Who knows? But the
constant attitude of  Johnston, and then Hood, that "I must save my army to
fight another day" accomplished nothing but saving them to surrender at
Bentonville or Appomatox.

Laurie Chambliss
Civil War Interactive
www.almshouse.com

Karen Hall wrote:

> I really don't think that Lincoln needed Atlanta to win re-election. The
> North was on a winning role and the war looked like it was going to be over
> soon. By appointing Grant to lead the Army Lincoln had finally found someone
> who knew how to defeat Lee. Although people were getting tired of the war I
> think they knew that only Lincoln would be able to see them through to the
> end. I also think that most people were thinking about what to do with the
> South after the war and felt that Lincoln was a good leader to bring the
> country back together.
> Just my thoughts.
> Karen Hall
> On Wed, 13 Oct 1999 22:38:55 -0500, Stewart L Bennett wro
> > Question to any and all out there.
> >
> >  Did Lincoln really need Sherman's "gift" of the city of Atlanta in order
> > for him to be re-elected?I read and hear from others that the taking of
> > Atlanta assured Lincoln's re-election.The more I think about it the more
> > uncomfortable I am with it.What do you think..? Even if Atlanta did hold
> > out until after the election did Lincoln really have anything to worry
> > about?
> >
> >          Stewart
> >
> > ___________________________________________________________________
> > Get the Internet just the way you want it.
> > Free software, free e-mail, and free Internet access for a month!
> > Try Juno Web: http://dl.www.juno.com/dynoget/tagj.
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
> > http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
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Here's my two cents worth.  A major victory in the summer of '64 was,
indeed, critical to Lincoln's reelection hopes, I believe.  It certainly
wasn't coming in the east, even though Grant's steady and effective "move by
the left flank" strategy slowly pushed Lee's embattled army to the gates of
Richmond.  Grant's campaign came at a horrendous cost of lives with no
foreseeable hope for ultimate victory.  Sherman was bogged down in No.
Georgia and faced the prospect of doing battle with Rebel commanders,
Longstreet, Hood, and Johnston, who (although not perfect by a long shot)
were vastly superior soldiers compared to Bragg.  Jubal Early was in the
Valley threatening Washington, and Lincoln had Copperhead and "peace"
Democrats nipping at his heels - - so much so that a November victory by his
old nemesis Geo. McClellan could have certainly led to a settled truce with
the Confederacy and the continuation of slavery (it was actually in Little
Mac's political platform!!).
The average soldier in the field was overwhelmingly for "Father Abraham",
but for the common voters up north it was another question altogether.
Regards to all,    John

-----Original Message-----
From: L.A. Chambliss <xanthipp@...>
To: civilwarwest@egroups.com <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
Date: Thursday, October 14, 1999 9:18 AM
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Did Lincoln really need Atlanta?


>Dear Karen, Stewart, and group,
>
>One of the hardest things to do, at least for me, is to study the War or
any
>other historical event from the perspective of those who were there IN that
>time, blocking out everything that we now know came after that.
>
>I think that Lincoln THOUGHT that he needed Atlanta, or some other major
>battlefield victory, and preferably a consistent string of them, very very
>badly.  What we now think of as the "turning point" victories of Gettysburg
and
>Vicksburg were now a long time in the past. Chickamauga had been a dreadful
>setback to what seemed at the time like an inexorable sweep by Rosecrans.
The
>war in the east had settled into the siege around Petersburg that must have
>seemed to the public to be going absolutely nowhere in terms of bringing
the
>war to a swift conclusion.
>
>The example I will cite here as far as battlefield reality vs. political
>reality is the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. The action was a near
>total loss for the North Vietnamese. They lost huge amounts of materiel and
>manpower, held none of the objectives that they tried to take.  From a
military
>perspective it was the last desperate gasp of a force on the verge of
losing.
>
>From a POLITICAL perspective though it was an unmitigated loss for Lyndon
>Johnson, simply because the enemy was not supposed to be anywhere NEAR able
to
>attempt such a thing.  The shock that went through the American people (I
was
>about 17 at the time and remember it well) was palpable. Commentators like
>Walter Cronkite and Paul Harvey, who had previously taken the attitude of
"we
>must stay the course",  started giving editorials to the effect of "We have
>spent all this time, money and blood, and these people are just not giving
up,
>it's time to cut our losses and get out."
>
>To return to the War that we are discussing here though, I can see a very
>similar situation happening if Jefferson Davis had ordered that Atlanta be
>defended to the last man, and then pumped in every man and boy capable of
>firing a gun.  Heck, if he had had a 20-century attitude towards propaganda
he
>would have staged some photos of women drilling with rifles, followed by
one of
>armed slaves going to the defense of their country! Can you imagine THOSE
>pictures running in Harper's Weekly, or the London Times? ;)
>
>Could they have held out from Sept. 1 till Election Day? Who knows? But the
>constant attitude of  Johnston, and then Hood, that "I must save my army to
>fight another day" accomplished nothing but saving them to surrender at
>Bentonville or Appomatox.
>
>Laurie Chambliss
>Civil War Interactive
>www.almshouse.com
>
>Karen Hall wrote:
>
>> I really don't think that Lincoln needed Atlanta to win re-election. The
>> North was on a winning role and the war looked like it was going to be
over
>> soon. By appointing Grant to lead the Army Lincoln had finally found
someone
>> who knew how to defeat Lee. Although people were getting tired of the war
I
>> think they knew that only Lincoln would be able to see them through to
the
>> end. I also think that most people were thinking about what to do with
the
>> South after the war and felt that Lincoln was a good leader to bring the
>> country back together.
>> Just my thoughts.
>> Karen Hall
>> On Wed, 13 Oct 1999 22:38:55 -0500, Stewart L Bennett wro
>> > Question to any and all out there.
>> >
>> >  Did Lincoln really need Sherman's "gift" of the city of Atlanta in
order
>> > for him to be re-elected?I read and hear from others that the taking of
>> > Atlanta assured Lincoln's re-election.The more I think about it the
more
>> > uncomfortable I am with it.What do you think..? Even if Atlanta did
hold
>> > out until after the election did Lincoln really have anything to worry
>> > about?
>> >
>> >          Stewart
>> >
>> > ___________________________________________________________________
>> > Get the Internet just the way you want it.
>> > Free software, free e-mail, and free Internet access for a month!
>> > Try Juno Web: http://dl.www.juno.com/dynoget/tagj.
>> >
>>
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>> > http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>
>> ________________________________________________________________
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>> Talk online at http://voicechat.excite.com
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>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
>http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>
>
>
>

Another opinion to add to the pile:

I believe that Sherman's "gift" of Atlanta was a huge boost to the Lincoln
campaign - as others have stated, the war was not progressing in Virginia as
rapidly as many wished - casualty lists were long the summer of '64, and
even at that time late in the War, the Copperhead movement was alive and
well.  Even though Grant had moved East, many were of the consensus that the
War would be won in the West, and then more troops sent East to aid the
Potomac Army.  Lincoln was not a popular president with the people at home.
BUT, he was popular with the men in uniform.  The sentiment of the men in
uniform was that they were in it for the long haul - they were not leaving
the service until the rebellion was put down.  I am of the opinion that
giving the soldiers the right to vote from the field was far more
influential to the reelection of Lincoln than the fall of Atlanta.  Lincoln
himself thought so - evidence his "the pen is mightier than the sword"
quote.

I submit in support of my opinion the following letter from Private Marcus
Pratt Wheeler, Co. G, 29th Wisc. Vols dated November 8, 1864.  The sentiment
expressed is the one commonly found among the men of the regiment, but Pvt.
Wheeler's letter is probably the most eloquently written of those that I've
come across:

"November 8, 1864
Mouth of White River

Dear Mother:  Election 1864 & c.

I will write today just to keep you posted if I do remain in ignorance of
your welfare.  Besides, I expect to move at once, when the thing does break
loose and letter comes at all.  Nothing startling has transpired since my
last.  Yesterday we had an election, and Abe got a large majority, McClellan
getting 88, Abe 280.  Total number votes cast, 360!  In the 21st Iowa, in
our Brigade, the vote stood, Lincoln 410, McClellan 24!  The other regiments
are from Ill. and Ind. and do not vote.  The 120th Ohio had less than 130
votes, and stands very equal.

Co. "G" went 25 union, 14 copperhead.  The latter votes were
German from Cross Plains.  All the Westport men voted for Abe!  Enclosed I
send the identical ticket which I voted.  I want you to preserve it, as they
do the copies of the Emancipation Proclimation as I consider it a valuable
relic.  I also send a "secesh" ticket voted at the same time.  Please keep
both, as I may want to refer McClellan men to the "men they voted for" in
future time.  I shall frame them and keep them for my grandchildren to look
upon with pride!  Tell Cramer that I recalled his prophecy made four years
since - that "men who voted for Lincoln in 1860 would be damned shamed of it
before his term of office expired" and "Lincoln would kill the Republican
Party"!  I was a Lincoln man then, and I voted for him yesterday!  I am
proud to say it, and am ready to avow it "from the housetops"!  But the
"Little Mackrels" were so ashamed of their position that they were shy and
foxy, as old Damp, and have no reason to give for voting as they did except
"Dey had fought long enough and want to have Peace and go home"!!!

We are "Union" men all the time!  Consequently, we are Lincoln men!  We are
"Peace men" too, but not anxious to give the South independence or to abate
one "just a little" of our first claims until we are decidedly and
unequivocally whipped!  We don't see that this war had "failed", even so far
- it is gradually restoring the Union!

And I go in for calling out all the men at home and keeping all now in the
field until the rebs are whipped or we are!  If it is not considered
necessary to have all out, then let those at home take a turn at serving the
country, which feeds and protects them!  One word more to Cramer - he
prophecied that in case of war between the states, foreign powers would step
in and we would lose our liberty and the right to vote "in less than six
months".  Please tell him I voted, after four years of war!

Ed has been on fatigue duty at the commissary and is getting is supper.
Sends love and regard to which add mine.

Yours affectionatly,

M.P. Wheeler"

______________________________________________________

John,
You wrote (partial)
>Grant's campaign came at a horrendous
>cost of lives with no
>foreseeable hope for ultimate victory.  Sherman was
>bogged down in No.
>Georgia and faced the prospect of doing battle with
>Rebel commanders,
>Longstreet, Hood, and Johnston, who (although not
>perfect by a long shot)
>were vastly superior soldiers compared to Bragg.
>Jubal Early was in the
>Valley threatening Washington, and Lincoln had
>Copperhead and "peace"
>Democrats nipping at his heels - - so much so that
>a November victory by his
>old nemesis Geo. McClellan could have certainly led
>to a settled truce with
>the Confederacy and the continuation of slavery (it
>was actually in Little
>Mac's political platform!!).
>The average soldier in the field was overwhelmingly
>for "Father Abraham",
>but for the common voters up north it was another
>question altogether.
I agree with you on the importance of a union victory with regards to Lincoln's
re-election.  Atlanta was of vast political importance to not only Lincoln's
re-election but on the southern mind and Lincoln's political enemies.  This was
one of the most important rail and supply hubs in the south that the confederacy
lost. This combined with Sheridan's defeat of Early in the Valley prior to the
elections was of vast political importance to Lincoln.  Not to get into the
eastern theater but what Grant was doing outside of Petersburg was of such
importance to the western campaign, by depriving Johnston then Hood of
reinforcements from Lee, such as what happened at Chicamauga was decisive to the
western campaign.  I agree with you partially on the superiority of Longstreet,
Hood & Johnston over Bragg.  But at this time in the war Longstreet was still
recovering from his wounds received in the Battle of the Wilderness so he was
unavailable.  Hood was one of the best division commanders on either side.  He
didn't have a chance to prove if he was a good corps commander because he wasn't
one for long.  As an Army commander he wasn't ready for that position, not
enough experiance.(just my opinion)  That leaves Joe Johnston.  He was probably
Sherman's best opponent.  However,  I believe Johnston was only good at one
thing, Retreating.  He may have held out for a while at Atlanta, but probably it
wouldn't have mattered. Even Lil' Mac' was backing off his party's platform of a
negotiated peace with the south, prior to the elections.  In no small part by
the fall of Atlanta and the other union victories.

With respect
Mark Wiggin

Hey Terry, GREAT post there! Along with Steve Wakefield's compilations from the
Official Records and the like, this letter is a prime example of what we need
on this list.

And I love the writer's outlook on his "relics", if more soldiers had taken
this attitude we would be better informed today.  The popular phrase in
collecting is "If these men had realized that their guns, uniforms, buttons,
and letters and such  were incredibly expensive antiques, they would have taken
better care of them. " ;)

Laurie

Terry Arliskas wrote:

> Another opinion to add to the pile:
>
> I believe that Sherman's "gift" of Atlanta was a huge boost to the Lincoln
> campaign - as others have stated, the war was not progressing in Virginia as
> rapidly as many wished - casualty lists were long the summer of '64, and
> even at that time late in the War, the Copperhead movement was alive and
> well.  Even though Grant had moved East, many were of the consensus that the
> War would be won in the West, and then more troops sent East to aid the
> Potomac Army.  Lincoln was not a popular president with the people at home.
> BUT, he was popular with the men in uniform.  The sentiment of the men in
> uniform was that they were in it for the long haul - they were not leaving
> the service until the rebellion was put down.  I am of the opinion that
> giving the soldiers the right to vote from the field was far more
> influential to the reelection of Lincoln than the fall of Atlanta.  Lincoln
> himself thought so - evidence his "the pen is mightier than the sword"
> quote.
>
> I submit in support of my opinion the following letter from Private Marcus
> Pratt Wheeler, Co. G, 29th Wisc. Vols dated November 8, 1864.  The sentiment
> expressed is the one commonly found among the men of the regiment, but Pvt.
> Wheeler's letter is probably the most eloquently written of those that I've
> come across:
>
> "November 8, 1864
> Mouth of White River
>
> Dear Mother:  Election 1864 & c.
>
> I will write today just to keep you posted if I do remain in ignorance of
> your welfare.  Besides, I expect to move at once, when the thing does break
> loose and letter comes at all.  Nothing startling has transpired since my
> last.  Yesterday we had an election, and Abe got a large majority, McClellan
> getting 88, Abe 280.  Total number votes cast, 360!  In the 21st Iowa, in
> our Brigade, the vote stood, Lincoln 410, McClellan 24!  The other regiments
> are from Ill. and Ind. and do not vote.  The 120th Ohio had less than 130
> votes, and stands very equal.
>
> Co. "G" went 25 union, 14 copperhead.  The latter votes were
> German from Cross Plains.  All the Westport men voted for Abe!  Enclosed I
> send the identical ticket which I voted.  I want you to preserve it, as they
> do the copies of the Emancipation Proclimation as I consider it a valuable
> relic.  I also send a "secesh" ticket voted at the same time.  Please keep
> both, as I may want to refer McClellan men to the "men they voted for" in
> future time.  I shall frame them and keep them for my grandchildren to look
> upon with pride!  Tell Cramer that I recalled his prophecy made four years
> since - that "men who voted for Lincoln in 1860 would be damned shamed of it
> before his term of office expired" and "Lincoln would kill the Republican
> Party"!  I was a Lincoln man then, and I voted for him yesterday!  I am
> proud to say it, and am ready to avow it "from the housetops"!  But the
> "Little Mackrels" were so ashamed of their position that they were shy and
> foxy, as old Damp, and have no reason to give for voting as they did except
> "Dey had fought long enough and want to have Peace and go home"!!!
>
> We are "Union" men all the time!  Consequently, we are Lincoln men!  We are
> "Peace men" too, but not anxious to give the South independence or to abate
> one "just a little" of our first claims until we are decidedly and
> unequivocally whipped!  We don't see that this war had "failed", even so far
> - it is gradually restoring the Union!
>
> And I go in for calling out all the men at home and keeping all now in the
> field until the rebs are whipped or we are!  If it is not considered
> necessary to have all out, then let those at home take a turn at serving the
> country, which feeds and protects them!  One word more to Cramer - he
> prophecied that in case of war between the states, foreign powers would step
> in and we would lose our liberty and the right to vote "in less than six
> months".  Please tell him I voted, after four years of war!
>
> Ed has been on fatigue duty at the commissary and is getting is supper.
> Sends love and regard to which add mine.
>
> Yours affectionatly,
>
> M.P. Wheeler"
>
> ______________________________________________________
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> In the market for computer hardware or software? Compare prices on
> more that 100,000 products at CNET.com. Get all the latest news,
> reviews and prices! http://clickhere.egroups.com/click/1159
>
> eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
> http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications

Terry:
     A wonderful letter from Private Wheeler, Co G, 29th Wisc. I would like to
hear more about and from the lad. :)

About the gift of Atlanta being a boost for Lincoln's reelection,  it sure
didn't hurt. :) One thing that amazes me about the election and reelection of
Presidents in the mid-19th century is that the President did not campaign (if
only that could happen now).  Lincoln spent his time, as he should, running the
country and his many minions then campaigned for him.  I mention this only to
point out that MAYBE Lincoln never realized what good stead he was in.  We know
that Lincoln claimed he didn't think he would win, remember this is from a man
who suffered from melancholy/depression at times, but have there ever been many
numbers, polls, whatever to substantiate it.

     I have also found intersting, and now I am going to have to dig for
references, is that McClellans (ol' Abe's opponent in 1864) popularity was not
what it once was.  First of all, in the early part of the war politics was still
a major factor and northern/union Democrats were still a strong political group.
Lincoln did much to appease them.  McClellan was a Union Democrat and many of
tha armies were largely populated by democrats fighting for the Union. Thus,
McClellan was not only the General-in-chief but also was seen as within the same
political party and beliefs, he became very popular, as we all know, to his
soldiers.


     As the war progressed and emancipation became a major factor in addition to
union, Lincoln's popularity was constantly on the rise and McClellan's
declining.  The soldier saw real victories in the east (possesion of fields),
Lee was bottled up in Petersburg by Grant.  Grant of course new a little
something about seige warfare. Sherman riding on the coatails of the almighty
Army of the Cumberland :) was taking the war to those that seceded.  They, the
Federals, could feel and see that the war was going much in there favor.  IMHO,
Lincoln would still have one the election even without Atlanta's fortuitous
occupation. The Union was on the move and the people would know that it would be
taken eventually.

IMHO,
Your obedient servant

Kevin S. Coy
**I used 'Grant'  properly**

> -------------------------------------------------------
> In the market for computer hardware or software? Compare prices on
> more that 100,000 products at CNET.com. Get all the latest news,
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> http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications

It is my belief the Confederate armies in the west, most particulary the
Army of Tennesse never stood a chance against the Union forces. Any
opportunity they had was put to an end after the cease of the invasion of
the north at Shiloh, and the death of Albert Sidney Johnston. After that
defeat it was only a matter of time before the entire west fell. This is
mainly due to the fact that all the Confederacy's more prominent generals
were given commands in the east. (Lee, Jackson, Longsteet, Stuart etc.)The
better generals in the west such as Nathan Bedford Forrest were never given
adequete numbers to take on the armies of the Cumberland, Tennesse, and of
course, the great army Sherman marched across Georgia. The one main factor
as always however in the defeat of the CSA in the west, was the terrible
lack of men and supplies.

______________________________________________________

I question whether the Western Army could have prevailed in the long run.
However there were some missed opportunities early on, as in Ft. Donalson
(sp?), or later at Vicksburg and Nashville when the Federals were a bit slow
to initially move.  I think Forrest did rather well with his recruiting
forays and the capture of supplies.  Had Forrest or even Cleburne been given
a greater opportunity to conduct offensive action(s) things might have been
different.  What would have happened if Bragg had been relieved and a more
able Confederate commander been in place?  Would the Federal's have had to
commit more forces to the West.  What then, the effect on the Army of the
Potomac?

This may not be the correct forum for this question, but I will bet that
there are several out there who can answer a question for me: Who were the
officers present in the room at the McLean House for the signing of the
surrender? In particular, I am referring to the painting, "Surrender at
Appomattox", by Tom Lovell. The Union officer at the far right has been
identified to me as either Custer or Chamberlain. In fact, this picture may
or may not be historically accurate. From Chamberlain's, "Passing of the
Armies", it does not appear that he was in the room. Thanks for your help.


Jack Ehmer

Jack,
              The painting to which you reffer is historically accurate. The
gentleman in gray standing beside Lee is his secretary Lt. Col. Charles
Marshall. Standing around Gen. Grant, from left to right are; Gen. Phil
Sheridan, Col. Orville E. Babcock, Lt.Col. Horace Porter,  Maj. Gen. Edward
O.C. Ord, Maj. Gen. Seth Williams, Col. Theodore S. Bowers,  Col. Ely S.
Parker, and Maj. Gen. George A. Custer.

Hope this helps,

Dameron
----- Original Message -----
From: <JackEhmer123@...>
To: <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 4:34 PM
Subject: [civilwarwest] Surrender at Appomattox


> This may not be the correct forum for this question, but I will bet that
> there are several out there who can answer a question for me: Who were the
> officers present in the room at the McLean House for the signing of the
> surrender? In particular, I am referring to the painting, "Surrender at
> Appomattox", by Tom Lovell. The Union officer at the far right has been
> identified to me as either Custer or Chamberlain. In fact, this picture
may
> or may not be historically accurate. From Chamberlain's, "Passing of the
> Armies", it does not appear that he was in the room. Thanks for your help.
>
>
> Jack Ehmer
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
> http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>
>
>
>
>

Mike and Group;

     We all will have our own opinions on this of course..........however,
this comes to the heart of a "what if project" I am researching right now.
As with most things in life, history rests on a few turns of fate.  I have
to strongly disagree with your position on the CSA forces in the Western
theatre.

     The "lack of men and materiels" was a fact that was present at certain
times in the great conflict of late.  However, history also shows that at
times there was an abundance of men, or an abundance of materiel.

Case in point, prior to going into winter quarters 1961-1962, AS Johnston
had several "thousand" men that had been organized into regiments in camp
disbanded because of a lack of proper firearms to arm them with.  (I am
looking for the source where I read this at now).

Case in point number two, during his Kentucky campaign of Summer-Fall of
1962, Bragg writes in several communications that he has weapons to arm
20,000 recruits that he had hoped to find in Kentucky.  Instead, if I
remember correctly he wasn't even able to get enough recruits to re-fill his
loses in the campaign.  The men of Kentucky, no matter where their loyalties
lay, were not willing to risk what they had "to throw off the yoke of their
oppressors".  Braggs words not mine.

IMHO, had Ft. Donelson held out, and Nashville been perserved, the outcome
of the war in the west could of been much, much, different.  Nashville,
besides being the capitol of Tennessee was also a major industrial site for
the confederacy, including at least one iron works comparable to the Tredgar
works in Richmond.  Nashville was also one of the major supply depots for
the Army of Central Kentucky, etc.  Although, through the valiant efforts of
Officers such as NB Forest, some of the supplies were saved, the vast
majority was destroyed or captured.
The loss also caused a tactical retreat from Bowling Green, Ky., all the way
to the Northern Alabama border, thus losing Middle and Western Tennessee's
food stuffs, manufactured products, and recruits.  This had to be a
devastating blow to the southern cause.  It very well could of been playing
on the minds of potential recruits in Braggs Kentucky campaign, knowing that
their State had been abandoned to Union occupation once already.

Not to mention the fact that it caused the flanking of the entire Northern
Mississippi line of forts, including the "Gibralter of the West" at
Columbus, Ky. to be abandoned without a fight.  Also, estimates of between
10,000 to 18,000, (depending on what source you are reading) men were
surrendered at Donelson.  I realize that there arguements both ways on
whether or not a surrender should of occurred, however, in researching the
CSA Order of Battle for Ft. Donelson (correct spelling, for some reason
Grant always misspelled it) I was very surprised at the VERY LARGE numbers
of soldiers that were  surrendered at Ft. Donelson, who ended up dieing in
the Northern prison camps before they could be exchanged.  I am only
guessing that these men would of much rather died with their comrades on the
field of battle, than behind bars and fences at such places as Camp Douglas
and the like.

Sorry for the rambling.
I remain your humble servant;
Don Myers.
-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Meno <neho69@...>
To: civilwarwest@egroups.com <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
Date: Sunday, October 17, 1999 2:11 PM
Subject: [civilwarwest] Was it possible for the Confederacy to avoid losing
the west?


>It is my belief the Confederate armies in the west, most particulary the
>Army of Tennesse never stood a chance against the Union forces. Any
>opportunity they had was put to an end after the cease of the invasion of
>the north at Shiloh, and the death of Albert Sidney Johnston. After that
>defeat it was only a matter of time before the entire west fell. This is
>mainly due to the fact that all the Confederacy's more prominent generals
>were given commands in the east. (Lee, Jackson, Longsteet, Stuart etc.)The
>better generals in the west such as Nathan Bedford Forrest were never given
>adequete numbers to take on the armies of the Cumberland, Tennesse, and of
>course, the great army Sherman marched across Georgia. The one main factor
>as always however in the defeat of the CSA in the west, was the terrible
>lack of men and supplies.
>
>______________________________________________________
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
>http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>
>
>
>
>

Bryan,

I wouldn't swear to this, I thought that I had read somewhere that Custer
was not actually in the same room for the surrender because it was too
crowded.  That he had to witness it from another room or hallway or
something.  Further, that Phil Sheridan felt bad that Custer couldn't be in
there, so he purchased the table the surrender signing took place on from
Mr. MacClean, and presented it to Custer as a present.

Like I said, I "heard" or read this somewhere, whether it has any factual
basis to it or not I could not vouch for.
Your Obedient Servant;
-----Original Message-----
From: Bryan D. McRaven <dameron@...>
To: civilwarwest@egroups.com <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
Date: Monday, October 18, 1999 9:03 PM
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Surrender at Appomattox


>Jack,
>             The painting to which you reffer is historically accurate. The
>gentleman in gray standing beside Lee is his secretary Lt. Col. Charles
>Marshall. Standing around Gen. Grant, from left to right are; Gen. Phil
>Sheridan, Col. Orville E. Babcock, Lt.Col. Horace Porter,  Maj. Gen. Edward
>O.C. Ord, Maj. Gen. Seth Williams, Col. Theodore S. Bowers,  Col. Ely S.
>Parker, and Maj. Gen. George A. Custer.
>
>Hope this helps,
>
>Dameron
>----- Original Message -----
>From: <JackEhmer123@...>
>To: <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
>Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 4:34 PM
>Subject: [civilwarwest] Surrender at Appomattox
>
>
>> This may not be the correct forum for this question, but I will bet that
>> there are several out there who can answer a question for me: Who were
the
>> officers present in the room at the McLean House for the signing of the
>> surrender? In particular, I am referring to the painting, "Surrender at
>> Appomattox", by Tom Lovell. The Union officer at the far right has been
>> identified to me as either Custer or Chamberlain. In fact, this picture
>may
>> or may not be historically accurate. From Chamberlain's, "Passing of the
>> Armies", it does not appear that he was in the room. Thanks for your
help.
>>
>>
>> Jack Ehmer
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
>> http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
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>eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
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>
>
>
>
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----- Original Message -----

From: Don Myers

To: civilwarwest@egroups.com

Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 8:09 PM

Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Surrender at Appomattox

Bryan,

I wouldn't swear to this, I thought that I had read somewhere that Custer
was not actually in the same room for the surrender because it was too
crowded.  That he had to witness it from another room or hallway or
something.  Further, that Phil Sheridan felt bad that Custer couldn't be in
there, so he purchased the table the surrender signing took place on from
Mr. MacClean, and presented it to Custer as a present.

Like I said, I "heard" or read this somewhere, whether it has any factual
basis to it or not I could not vouch for.
Your Obedient Servant;
-----Original Message-----
From: Bryan D. McRaven <dameron@...>
To: civilwarwest@egroups.com <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
Date: Monday, October 18, 1999 9:03 PM
Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Surrender at Appomattox


>Jack,
>             The painting to which you reffer is historically accurate. The
>gentleman in gray standing beside Lee is his secretary Lt. Col. Charles
>Marshall. Standing around Gen. Grant, from left to right are; Gen. Phil
>Sheridan, Col. Orville E. Babcock, Lt.Col. Horace Porter,  Maj. Gen. Edward
>O.C. Ord, Maj. Gen. Seth Williams, Col. Theodore S. Bowers,  Col. Ely S.
>Parker, and Maj. Gen. George A. Custer.
>
>Hope this helps,
>
>Dameron
>----- Original Message -----
>From: <JackEhmer123@...>
>To: <civilwarwest@egroups.com>
>Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 4:34 PM
>Subject: [civilwarwest] Surrender at Appomattox
>
>
>> This may not be the correct forum for this question, but I will bet that
>> there are several out there who can answer a question for me: Who were
the
>> officers present in the room at the McLean House for the signing of the
>> surrender? In particular, I am referring to the painting, "Surrender at
>> Appomattox", by Tom Lovell. The Union officer at the far right has been
>> identified to me as either Custer or Chamberlain. In fact, this picture
>may
>> or may not be historically accurate. From Chamberlain's, "Passing of the
>> Armies", it does not appear that he was in the room. Thanks for your
help.
>>
>>
>> Jack Ehmer
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
>> http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
>http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>
>
>
>
>


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eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications

Well said!

M. Discher

Even though I am aware this group is more for discussion than for
research,and deals w/ matters of the western theatre, I am trying to
find a certain document and I felt, who better to ask than a group of
Civil War buffs? Anyway, I'm trying to find the autobiography of
colonel Eppa Hunton of the 8th Virginia, for research purposes. Eppa
Hunton was in numerous battles including Pickett's Charge (3rd day at
Gettysburg), he eventually became a brigadier general and served in
Congress. Because he is an unknown figure of the war, it is extremely
hard to find this book. If anyone knows where I would or might find it
I would be very thankful.

The best info I can give you is to e-mail shotgun@... If he can't help you just give up and what I really am saying is he's your man!!!! Good Luck, Bonnie

----------
> From: neho69@...
> To: civilwarwest@eGroups.com
> Subject: [civilwarwest] Autobiography of a Confederate Colonel
> Date: Wednesday, October 20, 1999 5:25 PM
>
> Even though I am aware this group is more for discussion than for
> research,and deals w/ matters of the western theatre, I am trying to
> find a certain document and I felt, who better to ask than a group of
> Civil War buffs? Anyway, I'm trying to find the autobiography of
> colonel Eppa Hunton of the 8th Virginia, for research purposes. Eppa
> Hunton was in numerous battles including Pickett's Charge (3rd day at
> Gettysburg), he eventually became a brigadier general and served in
> Congress. Because he is an unknown figure of the war, it is extremely
> hard to find this book. If anyone knows where I would or might find it
> I would be very thankful.  
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/civilwarwest
> http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>
>
>
>