I thought List readers might find this interesting. In fairness see
the Ira Straus side in his JRL posting if you feel inclined to.

JRL 8365
Subject: Re: Ira Straus in JRL 8359/ September 10, 2004
From: Donald Jensen (JensenD@...)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004

I make a point of not engaging in intellectual tit-for-tat on the
JRL, since I believe that that kind of thing detracts from the
extremely valuable material otherwise posted on the site. But since
Ira Straus rants against RFE/RL's allegedly "anti-Russian" positions
in JRL 8359, I would like to take this opportunity to state our
editorial policy again:

RFE/RL's on-line publications seek to present a wide variety of
views on issues of criticial interest to our broadcast region. There
is no editorial line -- indeed, my colleagues and I frequently
disagree among ourseleves. We are neither pro- nor anti-Russia, nor
do we have an official position on any other issue. Moreover, we
actively seek and publish balanced, thoughtful analyses from outside
experts as well, regardless of the "line" they take, as long as they
are factually based and soundly reasoned. It is participation in
this debate about some of the critical issues of our time that makes
my job as publisher fun. It accounts, I also believe, for our high
readership and significant influence.

Regarding the language Mr Straus finds offensive in the RFE/RL
Political Weekly Vol. 4, No. 34, 2 September 2004 ("[1999] '13-15
August: Russian forces launch air and ground attacks in Daghestan
that some analysts believe led to second Chechen war'"), I would
note that the wording came directly from the website smi.ru, which
can be hardly be considered either Russia-phobic or given to KGB
conspiracy mongering, since it used to be tied to Gleb Pavlovskiy.

On the matter of the origins of the second Chechnya war and Mr.
Straus remarks, let me make a few points in my capacity as a Russia
analyst only.

First, Mr. Straus' appeal to logic is disingenuous unless you
believe, as he seems to, that in the wake of the Dagestan invasion,
Russia had to invade Chechnya and no choices were involved. Not so.
Without getting into the motivations of Basayev going in, without
getting into the evidence that a corridor was left for him to get
OUT of Dagestan, without getting into the suspicious set of
circumstances surrounding these events aired by individuals like
Aleksey Arbatov (hardly a paranoid Russophobe) etc., that invasion
was repulsed during August (www.russ.ru/politics/articles/99-09-21-
moskov.html). After this, Russia had options and the choice made was
not the only one. Others included attempting to seal the border
around Chechnya, invading up to the Terek, crossing the Terek etc.
However, the apartment bombings did take place in September, the
government did blame the Chechens and used this, not the invasion of
Dagestan, as the causus belli.

In short, Straus makes an appeal to chronology and then proceeds to
violate chronology because it doesn't suit his purposes. In
addition, despite what Mr Straus thinks, there's really no necessary
contradiction between "the FSB did it" and "Boris Berezovskiy" when
it comes to the apartment bombings. And it is entirely keeping with
Berezovskiy's audacity to blame an institution -- elements of which
may have been his accomplices -- as the sole perpetrator of the
acts. I will not discuss further the evidence concerning the
apartment bombings here, except to note that some colleagues are
working with the evidence as I speak in an effort to see where it
leads.

I will add a couple of additional points:

1) Anton Surikov, another inhabitant of the gray zone where Russian
authorities regularly intersect with criminal interests, did note
that the theory that the security services assisted Basayev in the
invasion of Daghestan had a "right to exist, but only in part." A
tad mysterious to be sure, but he knows Basayev and assisted him
during the time Basayev fought WITH the Russians in Abkhazia. Lebed
said the same.

2) Sergey Kovalev, hardly "anti-Russian," also raised about this in
his commission's investigation of the apartment bombing.

3) Polling among Russians indicates that more than a third believes
that the "authorities" may have had something to do with the
bombings.

The fact is, there's a seamy underside to politics in Russia that we
ignore at our peril. Note well what an active reserve officer said
this week in Moskovskie Novosti (Igor Korolkov, "Russia After
Beslan," MN #34, September 10, 2004): When they say that the Chechen
boyeviky are financed from abroad, that's only part of the truth.
Their main sources of income are from Russia, from Moscow. If any
FSB investigator uncovers the business dealings the Chechens are
involved in, he his quickly called off by customs, the procurator's
office, their fellow FSB officers, MVD officers. It's absurd: the
financing of the terrorists is aided by the very law enforcement
organs that are battling them. He says he knows of FSB officers who
help criminalized Chechen business types make money. Those same
officers then go off to fight the Chechens, who are armed with
weapons bought with that same money.

One of the interesting aspects of Western commentary on Beslan this
week has been the outpouring of sympathy for Putin. He is now said
to need help, just as 6 months ago he was acclaimed as being firmly
in charge. I, for one, believe that, despite the unfortunate
adulation of the west, Putin is in over his head, as will most
likely become even more apparent in the coming months.