http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.com/2008/05/sabah-and-sarawak-defining-and.html
Sabah And Sarawak; Defining And Redefining
Posted by Malik Imtiaz Sarwar at 10:41 AM Sat, May 17, 2008
I chanced upon a brief history of the entry of Sabah and Sarawak into
Malaysia, Zainon Ahmad for The Sun (24.07.2007) reproduced here. It points
to the uneasiness in and around the entry of Sabah and Sarawak into Malaysia
and points to root concerns that have prevailed ever since.
http://31august1957.blogspot.com/2007/07/winning-over-sabah-and-sarawak.html
Read with a more recent analysis of Sabah and Sarawak post GE2008 written by
Anthea Mulakala for the Asia Foundation (see here), the two articles set out
an interesting perspective to the discontent that that now threatens to
redefine federal government.
http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2008/03/26/the-kingmakers-sabah-sarawak
-and-the-12th-malaysia-general-elections/
MIS
____
http://31august1957.blogspot.com/2007/07/winning-over-sabah-and-sarawak.html
Winning over Sabah and Sarawak
Posted by mansid at 6:46 PM Mon, 30 July 2007
Winning over Sabah and Sarawak
INITIALLY the leaders of Sabah (then British North Borneo) and Sarawak were
opposed to Malaysia or at best gave it a lukewarm welcome after it was
proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman on May 27, 1961 at the Foreign Correspondents
Association in Singapore.
"Let us become independent first and then we will decide whether to join
Malaysia or not," said Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, the Kuching mayor and leader of
the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), formed in 1959.
Other prominent Sarawak leaders like Datu Abang Haji Openg - later the first
local governor - and Abang Mustapha Abang Haji Abdul Gapor who are also
members of the Council Negeri, considered the oldest legislature in the
country, were unanimous in their opposition to the Tunku's plan.
In Sabah, Tun Fuad Stephens (then Donald Stephens), a newspaper publisher, a
member of the State Council and Huguan Siou (paramount leader) of the
Kadazan/Dusun people, shared the same view as Ong. "We must not be seen as
changing colonial masters," was the response of the United National Kadazan
Organisation (Unko), a party Fuad formed with Keningau
community leader GS Sundang. They contacted leaders from the other
territories to see whether they should revive the idea of a federation of
Borneo states of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei instead.
Many of the leaders believed that Malaysia's formation was not really meant
to benefit the people of the two territories but more to provide a solution
to solve the problems of Britain, Malaya and Singapore.
Britain needed to withdraw from the East but it could not just up and go
without ensuring its former colonies' survival. Malaya wanted to increase
the number of bumiputras to ensure that their numbers were bigger than the
others. Singapore, threatened by communists, wanted security.
The leaders opposed the plan because they feared their people would be at
the mercy of the commercially superior Chinese whose numbers would increase
with Malaysia, and they also feared that they would eventually be sidelined
by the more politically sophisticated Malays.
They also worried that their culture and polity would be gradually eroded.
Thus, discussions were held on such issues as religion, education and
finance where early assurances on these matters were made. Most of the
discussions centred on the Sabah All-party 20-point memorandum and the
Sarawak 18-point memorandum containing matters the two territories wanted to
safeguard. But mostly the focus was on religion, constitutional safeguards,
immigration, special position of the indigenous people, language, education
and fiscal arrangements.
But even while discussions were still at the early stages, more and more
leaders and their people gradually began to voice support for the plan.
The Malays were easily persuaded by Malayan Foreign Ministry permanent
secretary Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie - the driving force behind the plan. And
the resolve of those Malays who still resisted the plan finally caved in
shortly before the Cobbold Commission arrived in the two territories to
determine the peoples' response to Tunku's proposal.
Tun Mustapha Datu Harun, a Sabah State Council member and considered a
leader of Sabah Malays, agreed wholeheartedly. Someone even described him as
being the most "gung-ho" about Malaysia. A few months after the
announcement, he formed Usno (United Sabah National Organisation).
In Sarawak, two lawyers, Tun Abdul Rahman Yakub and his nephew Tan Sri Abdul
Taib Mahmud, not only favoured the idea but also promoted it. They quickly
formed a party called Barjasa (Barisan Anak Jati Sarawak) which later merged
with Panas (Parti Negara Sarawak) to form Parti Bumiputra.
Many Dayaks, led by their paramount chief, Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng,
also came out in support of the idea. The chief was among the founders of
Pesaka (Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak) which later merged with Parti Bumiputra
to form Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu or PBB, the current dominant party of
the Sarawak Barisan Nasional.
Datuk James Wong Kim Ming, who later led the Dayak-based Sarawak National
Party (SNAP) and was deputy chief minister several times, agreed "subject to
favourable terms for Sabah and Sarawak." In his book The Price of Loyalty,
he said he had been told of the proposed federation in 1960 by British
officials while he was in London.
Indeed, most leaders of the Borneo territories had heard of similar
proposals for an association of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei
being bandied about by officials in Britain and in Asia long before the
Tunku's announcement.
But Fuad Stephens and members of his delegation abandoned the idea of a
federation of Borneo territories after meeting Tunku in Kuala Lumpur where
they were royally entertained. Fuad Stephens was also talked out of it by
Ghazali and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, a strong campaigner for Malaysia.
A member of Fuad's delegation, Datuk Seri Ghani Gilong, told reporters on
arrival at the airport in Kota Kinabalu (then Jesselton) ". bisuk pun boleh
masuk Malaysia" ("... we can join Malaysia as early as tomorrow").
Fuad Stephens, who with his friends had tried to popularise the term Kadazan
in the 1950s to refer to his people who were "unglamorously" known as Dusun,
now threw himself into campaigning for Malaysia.
He hoped the founding day of the new federation would fall on Sept 14, 1963,
his 43rd birthday. It was not to be. It fell instead on the 40th birthday of
Lee Kuan Yew, the man who convinced the Unko leader of the benefits of
joining Malaysia.
Sundang, who was against Malaysia and who was also not enamoured by the term
Kadazan, left Unko and formed United National Pasok Momogun Party or Pasok
Momogun for short.
But all these parties later came together as the Sabah Alliance led by
Mustapha and Fuad. On Merdeka Day, Mustapha took office as governor and Fuad
as chief minister. And, as Fuad wanted, it was an independent Sabah that
officially became part of Malaysia on Sept 16, 1963.
In Sarawak, SNAP, led by Tan Sri Stephen Kalong Ningkan, finally agreed to
join Malaysia but SUPP refused to be persuaded till the end. Said Ong: "We
felt that any decision on North Borneo and Sarawak becoming part of a larger
confederation should not be made until both these states were independent
and directly responsible for their own destiny."
The party held demonstrations when the Cobbold Commission arrived in Sarawak
and told the commission why Sarawak should not be part of Malaysia. It said
the same thing to the United Nations team that was sent to verify the
peoples' response to the new federation.
Such was its opposition to Malaysia that it even voted against the bill when
the Sarawak Alliance government, led by SNAP's Ningkan as chief minister,
presented it in the inaugural meeting of the newly elected Council Negeri.
The vote was 31 ayes to five SUPP nays.
Having succeeded in forming Malaysia, Tunku, now prime minister of a larger
federation was magnanimous to SUPP. Since then, the Chinese-based party with
Dayak and Malay members has played an important role in the country as well
as the state.
It is interesting to note that as Malaysia celebrates 50 years of
nationhood, fewer and fewer people seem to be asking about the safeguards
that were put in place and whether they are still in place. Like in any
strong federation, the tendency is for them to gradually fade away.
In Sabah's case, it was successive state governments themselves that
whittled away some of the safeguards, arguably, for better state and federal
relations and stronger national unity.
Under Mustapha, for instance, the Sabah constitution was amended to make
Islam the state religion. But he refused to sign over Sabah's petroleum
rights to the federal government and Petronas. Fuad, when he became chief
minister as the head of the Berjaya government, however, did it just before
he was killed in a plane crash.
Under Mustapha, the state government also changed the provisions for
education and language through the extension of the Federal Education Act
1961 to the state, hence making the education department and its director
directly responsible to the education ministry.
After Datuk Harris Salleh succeeded Fuad as Berjaya chief minister, he made
Labuan a federal territory, and in the process, made it easy for other
Malaysians to enter Sabah.
There is little to distinguish Sabah from the peninsula states now that Umno
is leading the state Barisan Nasional.
Sarawak, on the other hand, seems to be fiercely autonomous even though it
has given up some safeguards in the interest of unity and uniformity. But it
is still the only state without a state religion.
Unlike Sabah, it was an independent state from 1842 and was recognised so by
the US and Britain. It had its own flag and national anthem long before it
became a British colony in 1946. The same flag was unfurled and the same
anthem sung when the state became independent again.
That perhaps explains why the proud state - the only one still without the
benefit of Umno's guidance - is trying very hard to remain autonomous.
Source: Zainon Ahmad, The Sun, Tuesday, July 24, 2007
____
http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2008/03/26/the-kingmakers-sabah-sarawak
-and-the-12th-malaysia-general-elections/
The Kingmakers: Sabah, Sarawak and the 12th Malaysia General Elections
Malaysia
By Anthea Mulakala posted on Wednesday, March 26th, 2008 at 4:37 pm
The Economist last week featured a telling pie chart on Malaysia's 12th
general election results. It revealed, without analysis, that Malaysia's
Barisan National (BN) coalition has the electorate in Sabah and Sarawak to
thank for saving its narrow majority in parliament. While the BN was toppled
in key states like Penang and Selangor, there was barely a ripple in voter
trends in Malaysia's eastern most states. Almost all BN candidates in both
states won with a solid majority. The BN has been the ruling coalition in
Malaysia since 1974, though its dominant party the United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) has been in the governing seat since independence in
1957.
These often ignored states are now enjoying the limelight as kingmakers for
the BN and are well placed to cash in on the attention.
Geographically separated from Kuala Lumpur by the South China Sea, Sabah and
Sarawak comprise 5.4 million people or 20% of Malaysia's population of 27
million. Together the states gave the BN 54 seats out of 140 in the
Malaysian parliament. 41 of these seats are held by local Sabah and Sarawak
parties that have joined the BN coalition.
However, the BN's success in Eastern Malaysia should not lead observers to
believe that Sabahans and Sarawakians are satisfied with the BN's
governance, accountability and service delivery in their states.
Despite their wealth in natural resources, Sabah and Sarawak are amongst
Malaysia's poorest states. In Sabah, 24% of households live below the
national poverty line and child poverty rates are 42%. More than one fifth
of the population aged six and over has never been to school. Malaysia
enjoys the unflattering distinction of having the highest Gini coefficient
in Southeast Asia attributable to the high incidence of poverty in Eastern
Malaysia. Sabah's GDP per capita is less than 50% of the national average.
Furthermore, most of Sabah and Sarawak's poor come from the non-Malay
Bumiputra population (61% of Sabah and more than 50% of Sarawak). Clearly,
the affirmative action New Economic Policies of UMNO and the BN have not
been successful in alleviating these indigenous people from poverty.
Why then, when their development has lagged under decades of BN and UMNO
rule, did the local parties, give the BN so many seats in parliament? First
the local parties in Sabah and Sarawak are homegrown; the opposition parties
are not and are seen to represent the interests of peninsular Malaysians.
Until the opposition parties establish roots in Eastern Malaysia they will
continue to have limited traction amongst the electorate. Second, everyday
Sabahans and Sarawakians worry that voting for the opposition may result in
the loss of vital development grants and projects for their states.
Certainly BN politicians have dangled the fruit of these grants temptingly
during the campaign. Sabahans also feel that constituencies which fell to
the opposition parties in the 2006 state elections were subsequently denied
federal development grants. Voter education workshops with citizens in
Eastern Malaysia reveal that they feel their needs are more likely to be
addressed as part of the governing coalition than the opposition.
Furthermore, though peninsular Malaysians very rarely refer to Sabah and
Sarawak in their political debates, national politicians are acutely aware
of the importance of the Eastern votes and have rewarded their vote bank by
building highways and airports. However if Sabah and Sarawak are to emerge
from the development doldrums and their voters kept "on side" the BN must
reward the backbone of its support with more than tarred roads. In the
future, they may demand more power at the centre and more meaningful
growth-led development.
Sabah's shifting demographics add a further layer of complexity to this
analysis. 25% of Sabah's population is comprised of non-Malaysian citizens,
mostly Muslim Indonesians and Filipinos, many who entered Malaysia illegally
through the state's porous borders, many seeking jobs and a better life.
Many have become "regularized" by the federal government and thereby earn
the right to vote. While the means through which these citizens have
acquired their papers may be dubious, they form a significant power base for
the Muslim dominated UNMO. Critics cry fowl and claim this is an attempt to
buy votes in exchange for citizenship. The issue is one of increasing social
tension in Sabah and Sarawak which UNMO will need to adroitly navigate.
There was much more to Malaysia's 12th General Elections than meets the eye.
Not least, it provides a pivotal opportunity for the citizens of Sabah and
Sarawak to exercise more influence over national policy and get a better
deal for themselves. Recognition of their role as 'kingmakers' has already
sparked grumbling within Sabah and Sarawak that they only received 5
ministerial seats out of 27 in the new cabinet. With 54 seats in parliament,
the time is ripe for Eastern Malaysians to put their key issues - like land
rights, illegal immigration, persistent poverty, and sub-par economic
growth - on the table. If the BN does not pay attention the outcome of the
13th General Election is likely to be quite different than the 12th.
-----------------------------------------------------
Anthea Mulakala is The Asia Foundation's Country Representative in Malaysia.
She can be reached at amulakala@....
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