Book Review for Balkan Academic News, June 1999

Daniele Conversi, German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia
Donald W. Treadgold Paper 16, 1998. 81 pp. 6.45$

by Florian Bieber (fbieber@...)

Daniele Conversi, professor at Nationalism Studies (Central European
University, Budapest), has written a brief monograph on one of the most
contentious issues in the international response to the breakup of
Yugoslavia: The German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December
1991. In his analysis he essentially seeks to answer two questions: Why did
Germany recognize the two republics and why was the international reaction,
especially in Britain and France, so negative to this German initiative and
ended in a political climate Conversi describes as "German-Bashing"? After
his cursory glance at the Western refusal to recognize Slovenia and
Croatia, Conversi identifies the first EC negotiator for Yugoslavia, Lord
Carrington as a driving force in the "anti-recognition front." Conversi
subsequently seeks to point out that Lord Carringtons supposedly
even-handed approach amount to implicit support to the Serbian side. This
pro-Serbian line is, according to Conversi, rooted in deep anti-German
feelings among the British elite, as well as in Lord Carrington's own
personal and financial connections with Serbia.
In addressing the reasons for the German quest for the recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia, Conversi identifies the absence of any "imperial"
policy in regards to the recognition of the two republics. He also notes
that the media outcry and the public dismay over the war and especially the
brutality of the Yugoslav People's Army was no stronger in Germany than in
numerous other European countries (i.e. Scandinavia, Italy, Spain). The
author concludes that the political elite of Germany, especially minister
of foreign affairs Hans Dietrich Genscher, were driven by the lessons of
German history to avoid appeasement with dictators. The fact that it was
unconceivable in 1991 to send German troops to Yugoslavia, unlike today,
made recognition the only tool available for German foreign policy and
intervention in the conflict, unlike in Britain or France, were other
options were available.
The author then refutes other supposed reasons for German recognition, such
as the "Vatican" connection or the revival of the "Fourth Reich." In this
context Conversi convincingly outlines the British fear of German
domination and its instrumentalization for anti-European policies of the UK.
The absence of "Western knowledge on Yugoslavia," as Conversi calls it, is
misleading, as there was considerable expertise on Yugoslavia in the West.
In many ways, it was more thoroughly studied than most other Central and
East European countries with the exception of the Soviet Union. However,
many studying the country followed the conception of the ruling party all
too blindly that the national question has effectively been "solved" in
Yugoslavia. In addition, the global relevance of Yugoslavia lay not in its
approach to the national question, but rather in its different path to
Communism. This "lens" blurred the perception of many Western observers.
There were, however, a good number of Western academics, as there were
numerous Yugoslav intellectuals and scholars who had been teaching in the
West and who could offer a more differentiated picture of the country. The
problem of Western policy making (and media reporting) has been rather the
unwillingness of consulting the existing experts, rather than their absence
altogether. Here Conversi claims the pro-Serbian lobbies yielded
disproportional influence on the British public opinion and politics, while
dismissing any significant influence of the Croatian lobby in Germany.
While the role of lobbies has to be approached with great care, as they
lend themselves to the construction of conspiracy theories, there has been
undeniably a strong Croatian lobby in Germany. This is already visible by
the large number of Croatian Diaspora publication in Germany. Also often
forgotten is the heavy terrorist activity of Croatian Diaspora groups in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Conversi also fails to discuss the opinions
voiced in conservative German and Austrian circles which were strongly
anti-Yugoslav (not the Yugoslavia of 1991, but Yugoslavia as an
"artificially constructed state") and conceived the Serbs as essentially
Byzantine and culturally alien, while the Croats were described as cultural
kins of Germans. Even the journalist Viktor Meier, writing for the
conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, had to concede that this
influential paper published such commentaries (mostly by Johann Georg
Reißmüller) from which he distances himself. Meier furthermore acknowledges
that this perception might have played a role in the Austrian support for
Croatian and Slovene independence, especially in the person of the minister
of foreign affairs, Alois Mock.1
Conversi rightfully points out that the German recognition in December 1991
did not fuel the war in Croatia-Vukovar fell in November 1991. He
convincingly deconstructs the myth of Germany acting as a "traditional
ally" of Croatia. It would have been interesting to see this perception
further analyzed in the case of the supposed Franco- and Russia-Serbian
connection. The Serbian political scientist Viskovic has claimed that
France has actually behaved the most "anti-Serbian" of all Western
countries. Although this claim might be hard to substantiate, there is
ample evidence that neither Russia, nor France behaved as can often be
heard, as "traditional allies." In the case of Russia, the case for a
historical alliance is even hard to substantiate.
As a professor primarily concerned with the study of nationalism, Daniele
Conversi pays only little attention to legal aspects and the influence of
international relations on the German recognition of the Slovenia and
Croatia.2 The role of the Badinter commission which was established by the
European Community to assess the "recognizability" of all the Yugoslav
republics, is only mentioned in passing. However, by recognizing Croatia
prior to the Badinter commission report which concluded that recognition
would have to be subject to more favorable minority rights regulations of
Croatia, Germany signaled the irrelevance of adequate minority protection
in Croatia. Although significant pressure was exerted later on Croatia to
alter the constitution an grant the Serbian population full rights, the
mixed signals of late 1991 demonstrated to Croatia that the treatment of
its Serbian minority was not of prime importance for its relations with the
West.
As the European Community had already agreed to recognize Slovenia and
Croatia effective on Jan. 15 1992, it would have been interesting to
investigate the reason for German recognition three weeks earlier. The
explanation that it was a "Christmas present" on the December 23 cannot
suffice. Even the German foreign ministry official Michael Libal, writing
on German recognition had to conclude: "Many critics...feel that the way in
which German policy was conducted was wrong for reasons of Westpolitik,
because it put an unnecessary strain on relations with allied and partners,
and thus at a time when Europe still had to "digest" the reunification of
Germany. Such a view is of course perfectly legitimate and... irrefutable
on logical and empirical grounds."3
The monograph of Daniele Conversi is an insightful and interesting
contribution to enhance our understanding of the German recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia and the hostile reaction of Britain in particular.
Conversi, however, tends to adopt a similar sinister interpretation for the
British opposition to the recognition, as that side adopted towards
Germany. The British position would also have to be seen in the light of
the predominant approach to international relations at the time and the
realistic fear of setting the precedent of a violent break-up of the Soviet
Union. The benefit of hindsight and the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the successful independence of Slovenia (still problematic in
Croatia) do not render these fears irrelevant or anachronistic.
"German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia" is an important contribution
to enhance our understanding of the blunders of the international community
surrounding the dissolution of Yugoslavia and at the same time points to
the need to further scholarship on this matter.


1 Viktor Meier, "Die Frage der Anerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens," in
Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Internationale Politik 1996 (Vienna: Böhlau,
1995), 170.
2 Viktor Meier follows a same line of argument as Conversi, he however
approaches the question from the perspective of international relations and
as a journalist/observer of the dissolution. Viktor Meier, "Die Frage der
Anerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens, in Österreichisches Jahrbuch für
Internationale Politik 1996 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995),163-177.
3 Michal Libal, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis,
1991-92 (Westport & London: Praeger, 1997), 159.

© Balkan Academic News 1999
This Review may be freely distributed, if credit is given to the reviewer.
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______________________
Florian Bieber
Alsoerdosor utca 3
H-1076 Budapest
Hungary

fbieber@...
http://www.all.at/fbieber

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