After the dazzling heights of the previous sections on reaching the
divine, Aristotle returns to very practical matters, on how to educate
the young toward moral virtue, and people in general, by the means of laws.
This way of ending the book reminds me of the tale of the cave in the
Republic, after a time of contemplation, the philosopher must go back
down into the city and help the most blinded people to climb the ladder
of virtue and knowldege.
Well this ends my very slow reading of the NE (has taken 3 years;-).
Even if I've had few replies, it's been an excellent exercise to write
down my thoughts, which forces me to structure them.
My next slow reading project is Nietzsche's Zarathustra, this will be at
http://members3.boardhost.com/nietzsche/
Later I would like to return to Plato, the Phaedo, the Sophist or the
Theetetus.
Best wishes to all,
Thomas
------------------------------------------------------------------------

1179a34-1181b23;
If then we have sufficiently discussed in their outlines the subjects of
Happiness and of Virtue in its various forms, and also Friendship and
Pleasure, may we assume that the investigation we proposed is now
complete? Perhaps however, as we maintain, in the practical sciences the
end is not to attain a theoretic knowledge of the various subjects, but
rather to carry out our theories in action.
[2] If so, to know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavor to
possess and to practice it, or in some other manner actually ourselves
to become good.
[3]Â  Now if discourses on ethics were sufficient in themselves to make
men virtuous, â??large fees and manyâ?? ï¼?as Theognis saysï¼? â??would
they win,â?? quite rightly, and to provide such discourses would be all
that is wanted. But as it is, we see that although theories have power
to stimulate and encourage generous youths, and, given an inborn
nobility of character and a genuine love of what is noble, can make them
susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to
stimulate the mass of mankind to moral nobility.
[4] For it is the nature of the many to be amenable to fear but not to a
sense of honor, and to abstain from evil not because of its baseness but
because of the penalties it entails; since, living as they do by
passion, they pursue the pleasures akin to their nature, and the things
that will procure those pleasures, and avoid the opposite pains, but
have not even a notion of what is noble and truly pleasant, having never
tasted true pleasure.
[5] What theory then can reform the natures of men like these? To
dislodge by argument habits long firmly rooted in their characters is
difficult if not impossible. We may doubtless think ourselves fortunate
if we attain some measure of virtue when all the things believed to make
men virtuous are ours.
[6] Now some thinkers hold that virtue is a gift of nature; others think
we become good by habit, others that we can be taught to be good.
Natural endowment is obviously not under our control; it is bestowed on
those who are fortunate, in the true sense, by some divine dispensation.
Again, theory and teaching are not, I fear, equally efficacious in all
cases: the soil must have been previously tilled if it is to foster the
seed, the mind of the pupil must have been prepared by the cultivation
of habits, so as to like and dislike aright.
[7] For he that lives at the dictates of passion will not hear nor
understand the reasoning of one who tries to dissuade him; but if so,
how can you change his mind by argument? And, speaking generally,
passion seems not to be amenable to reason, but only to force.
[8] We must therefore by some means secure that the character shall have
at the outset a natural affinity for virtue, loving what is noble and
hating what is base. And it is difficult to obtain a right education in
virtue from youth up without being brought up under right laws; for to
live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most men, especially
when young; hence the nurture and exercises of the young should be
regulated by law, since temperance and hardiness will not be painful
when they have become habitual.
[9] But doubtless it is not enough for people to receive the right
nurture and discipline in youth; they must also practice the lessons
they have learnt, and confirm them by habit, when they are grown up.
Accordingly we shall need laws to regulate the discipline of adults as
well, and in fact the whole life of the people generally; for the many
are more amenable to compulsion and punishment than to reason and to
moral ideals.
[10] Hence some persons hold, that while it is proper for the lawgiver
to encourage and exhort men to virtue on moral grounds, in the
expectation that those who have had a virtuous moral upbringing will
respond, yet he is bound to impose chastisement and penalties on the
disobedient and ill-conditioned, and to banish the incorrigible out of
the state altogether. For ï¼?they argueï¼? although the virtuous man,
who guides his life by moral ideals, will be obedient to reason, the
base, whose desires are fixed on pleasure, must be chastised by pain,
like a beast of burden. This indeed is the ground for the view that the
pains and penalties for transgressors should be such as are most opposed
to their favorite pleasures.
[11] But to resume: if, as has been said, in order to be good a man must
have been properly educated and trained, and must subsequently continue
to follow virtuous habits of life, and to do nothing base whether
voluntarily or involuntarily, then this will be secured if men's lives
are regulated by a certain intelligence, and by a right system, invested
with adequate sanctions.
[12] Now paternal authority has not the power to compel obedience,nor
indeed, speaking generally, has the authority of any individual unless
he be a king or the like; but law on the other hand is a rule, emanating
from a certain wisdom and intelligence, that has compulsory force. Men
are hated when they thwart people's inclinations, even though they do so
rightly, whereas law can enjoin virtuous conduct without being invidious.
[13] But Sparta appears to be the only or almost the only state in which
the lawgiver has paid attention to the nurture and exercises of the
citizens; in most states such matters have been entirely neglected, and
every man lives as he likes, in Cyclops fashion â??laying down the law
For children and for spouse.â??
[14] The best thing is then that there should be a proper system of
public regulation; but when the matter is neglected by the community, it
would seem to be the duty of the individual to assist his own children
and friends to attain virtue, or even if not able to do so successfully,
at all events to make this his aim. But it would seem to follow from
what has been said before, that he will be more likely to be successful
in this if he has acquired the science of legislation. Public
regulations in any case must clearly be established by law, and only
good laws will produce good regulations; but it would not seem to make
any difference whether these laws are written or unwritten, or whether
they are to regulate the education of a single person or of a number of
people, any more than in the case of music or athletics or any other
form of training. Paternal exhortations and family habits have authority
in the household, just as legal enactments and national customs have
authority in the state, and the more so on account of the ties of
relationship and of benefits conferred that unite the head of the
household to its other members: he can count on their natural affection
and obedience at the outset. [15] Moreover individual treatment is
better than a common system, in education as in medicine. As a general
rule rest and fasting are good for a fever, but they may not be best for
a particular case; and presumably a professor of boxing does not impose
the same style of fighting on all his pupils. It would appear then that
private attention gives more accurate results in particular cases, for
the particular subject is more likely to get the treatment that suits
him. But a physician or trainer or any other director can best treat a
particular person if he has a general knowledge of what is good for
everybody, or for other people of the same kind: for the sciences deal
with what is universal, as their names imply.
[16] Not but what it is possible no doubt for a particular individual to
be successfully treated by someone who is not a scientific expert, but
has an empirical knowledge based on careful observation of the effects
of various forms of treatment upon the person in question; just as some
people appear to be their own best doctors, though they could not do any
good to someone else. But nevertheless it would doubtless be agreed that
anyone who wishes to make himself a professional and a man of science
must advance to general principles, and acquaint himself with these by
the proper method: for science, as we said, deals with the universal.
[17] So presumably a man who wishes to make other people better
ï¼?whether few or many? by discipline, must endeavor to acquire the
science of legislationâ??assuming that it is possible to make us good by
laws. For to mold aright the character of any and every person that
presents himself is not a task that can be done by anybody, but only
ï¼?if at allï¼? by the man with scientific knowledge, just as is the
case in medicine and the other professions involving a system of
treatment and the exercise of prudence. [18]
Is not then the next question to consider from whom or how the science
of legislation can be learnt? Perhaps, like other subjects, from the
experts, namely the politicians; for we saw that legislation who is a
branch of political science. But possibly it may seem that political
science is unlike the other sciences and faculties. In these the persons
who impart a knowledge of the faculty are the same as those who practice
it, for instance physicians and painters; but in politics the sophists,
who profess to teach the science, never practice it. It is practiced by
the politicians, who would appear to rely more upon a sort of empirical
skill than on the exercise of abstract intelligence; for we do not see
them writing or lecturing about political principles ï¼?though this
might be a more honorable employment than composing forensic and
parliamentary speeches?, nor yet do we notice that they have made their
own sons or any others of their friends into statesmen.
[19] Yet we should expect them to have done so had they been able, for
they could have bequeathed no more valuable legacy to their countries,
nor is there any quality they would choose for themselves, and therefore
for those nearest to them, to possess, in preference to political
capacity. Not that experience does not seem to contribute considerably
to political success; otherwise men would never have become statesmen
merely through practical association with politics; so it would appear
that those who aspire to a scientific knowledge of politics require
practical experience as well as study.
[20] On the other hand those sophists who profess to teach politics are
found to be very far from doing so successfully. In fact they are
absolutely ignorant of the very nature of the science and of the
subjects with which it deals; otherwise they would not class it as
identical with, or even inferior to, the art of rhetoric. Nor would they
imagine that it is easy to frame a constitution by making a collection
of such existing laws as are reputed to be good ones, on the assumption
that one can then select the best among them; as if even this selection
did not call for understanding, and as if to judge correctly were not a
very difficult task, just as much as it is for instance in music. It is
only the experts in an art who can judge correctly the productions of
that art, and who understand the means and the method by which
perfection is attained, and know which elements harmonize with which;
amateurs may be content if they can discern whether the general result
produced is good or bad, for example in the art of painting. Laws are
the product, so to speak, of the art of politics; how then can a mere
collection of laws teach a man the science of legislation, or make him
able to judge which of them are the best?
[21] We do not see men becoming expert physicians from a study of
medical handbooks. Yet medical writers attempt to describe not only
general courses of treatment, but also methods of cure and modes of
treatment for particular sorts of patients, classified according to
their various habits of body; and their treatises appear to be of value
for men who have had practical experience, though they are useless for
the novice. Very possibly therefore collections of laws and
constitutions may be serviceable to students capable of studying them
critically, and judging what measures are valuable or the reverse, and
what kind of institutions are suited to what national characteristics.
But those who peruse such compilations without possessing a trained
faculty cannot be capable of judging them correctly, unless they do so
by instinct, though they may very likely sharpen their political
intelligence.
[22] As then the question of legislation has been left uninvestigated by
previous thinkers, it will perhaps be well if we consider it for
ourselves, together with the whole question of the constitution of the
State, in order to complete as far as possible our philosophy of human
affairs.
[23] We will begin then by attempting a review of any pronouncements of
value contributed by our predecessors in this or that branch of the
subject; and then on the basis of our collection of constitutions we
will consider what institutions are preservative and what destructive of
states in general, and of the different forms of constitution in
particular, and what are the reasons which cause some states to be well
governed and others the contrary. For after studying these questions we
shall perhaps be in a better position to discern what is the best
constitution absolutely, and what are the best regulations, laws, and
customs for any given form of constitution. Let us then begin our
discussion.


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